DOCSLIB.ORG

Panjwayi Alamo the Defence of Strongpoint Mushan

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Panjwayi Alamo the Defence of Strongpoint Mushan Canadian Military History Volume 18 Issue 3 Article 7 2009 Panjwayi Alamo The Defence of Strongpoint Mushan Sean M. Maloney Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Sean M. Maloney "Panjwayi Alamo The Defence of Strongpoint Mushan." Canadian Military History 18, 3 (2009) This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : Panjwayi Alamo The Defence of Strongpoint Mushan Panjwayi Alamo The Defence of Strongpoint Mushan Sean M. Maloney hroughout 2008, a small band of The enemy needed to facilitate Canadians living and working Abstract: The future of Afghanistan the movement of enemy personnel, T rests in the country’s ability to field alongside soldiers of the Afghan supplies and weapons from Baram effective national security forces. National Army (ANA) occupied an Canada has played a significant role in Cha–Helmand Valley–Maywand into isolated outpost in Panjwayi district mentoring the Afghan National Army Panjwayi. Once in Panjwayi, there are designated Strongpoint Mushan. (ANA) since 2003. By 2008, the ANA other routes that lead into both the Once the pivotal leg of an ambitious was operating in battalion strength southwest suburbs of Kandahar City in Kandahar province. Strongpoint security and development plan, and to the “rocket box” northwest of Mushan was a vital position that Strongpoint Mushan quickly became interfered with enemy activity in Kandahar Air Field where 107 mm an orphan as priorities changed, the region and the men from the rockets are fired at this vital ISAF the plan shifted, and the weight of Operational Mentoring and Liaison logistics and support facility. This available friendly forces moved to Team and their Afghan counterparts route is also one of several used by held that ground in the face of vast the eastern part of the district. At the amounts of firepower directed at their those engaged in the transport of same time, abandoning Strongpoint positions. narcotics to Pakistan. A strongpoint Mushan after such a lengthy at Mushan is extremely inconvenient occupation would not only result in for the Taliban, the Hezb-e-Islami a Taliban propaganda victory, but at a map, the embattled triangular Gulbuddin (HiG) and other anti- would also remove the only coalition Zharey district lies south of Ring government and criminal elements. presence in that part of Panjwayi, a Road South (Highway 1), the main In 2006, Mushan was quiet as the presence that was aggravating the International Security Assistance Operation Medusa battles raged in Taliban leadership in its attempts to Force (ISAF) service route to the Pashmul and Sperwan Ghar. It was challenge Canada and Afghanistan forces fighting in Helmand province widely believed that the “police” for control of the vital districts and the primary commerce artery in presence in Mushan at that time was west of Kandahar City. There was and through Afghanistan. Panjwayi really a militia belonging to elements no good solution to this dilemma, district, also triangular in shape, lies in the provincial power structure that so the position was kept manned to the south of Zharey district, with had some relationship to the narcotics and resupplied in an increasingly the Arghandab River separating the trade. Mushan was important to them dangerous environment, even when two. The forbidding Registan Desert as product could not move along it was cut off on the ground. This is is directly south of Panjwayi district, Ring Road South or through Zharey the story of the Canadian soldiers of with the Dowry River separating district because of the fighting that the Operational Mentor and Liaison the two. The tapered western point raged there throughout the year. Teams (OMLT) and the Afghan of Panjwayi district marks the In mid-2007, Task Force Kandahar soldiers they worked with in the confluence of the Arghandab and (TFK) formulated a plan to construct a defence of Strongpoint Mushan.1 Dowry rivers – it is also the meeting road from Panjwayi town to Mushan, place of Zharey, Panjwayi, and the and then another from Mushan to Band-e Timor communities from Ring Road South. In general the Why Mushan? Maywand district. Maywand leads to idea was to facilitate commerce and the Helmand river valley, and routes security in this extremely fertile ushan is geographically from that region branch to Baram Cha district. Mushan was the pivot for this Mimportant to coalition efforts in Pakistan (see map on next page). project and its enhanced stature in west of Kandahar City. Looking the plan resulted in the construction Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2009 18, Number 3, Summer 2009, pp.47-63. 47 1 Maloney - Panjwayi Alamo.indd 47 10/6/2009 1:19:04 PM Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 7 Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2009 Mike by Map drawn of better defensive facilities there. to mount costly ground resupply collided in the fight over Mushan, In time, Afghan National Police operations. There were no fewer with the Canadian soldiers from the replaced the local “police,” the than 14 IED attacks directed against OMLT and the Afghan soldiers from defensive works were designated a Canadian vehicles during this period. the Kandaks caught in the middle. “police sub-station” and a National Eventually, the decision was made to Mushan had to hold. Directorate of Security detachment cease ground resupply and a variety moved in. This in turn increased of aerial solutions were explored, enemy interest in Mushan which was including the use of contracted The OMLT and the Kandaks demonstrated by a significant rise in civilian Mi-8 helicopters. insurgent violence in the western part The situation also resulted in oalition soldiers have been used of Panjwayi district. Subsequently the the redeployment of forces away Cto train the emergent Afghan decision was made to designate the from some of the police sub-stations National Army since 2002. When police sub-station as a strongpoint along the Mushan-Panjwayi road Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and then deploy Afghan National which added to the physical was the main coalition effort in Army troops to Mushan. and psychological isolation of Afghanistan, Embedded Training In early 2008, Strongpoint Strongpoint Mushan. There were Teams (ETTs) were the primary Mushan was one of a line of police higher level considerations. The connection point between the ANA sub-stations and strongpoints Canadian government was a minority and the coalition forces at the tactical along the Panjwayi-Mushan road. government anticipating an election level. As NATO ISAF gradually Enemy forces mounted a campaign campaign some time in 2008 in which supplanted OEF and more non-North against this chain of facilities, which the costly commitment to Afghanistan American countries joined the effort, escalated throughout the spring would undoubtedly be an issue. Any new terminology emerged – the of 2008. Mechanized forces had to enemy analysis of Canadian media Operational Mentor and Liaison be used to resupply and replace would have concluded that casualties Team or OMLT. personnel along this chain which inflicted against Canadian forces The ETTs were similar to Vietnam- in turn attracted enemy Improvised would have a strategic effect on era Special Forces A-Teams working Explosives Device (IED) cells. The Canada’s commitment to a combat with non-professional indigenous battle along the Panjwayi-Mushan role. At the same time, Canadian forces. Indeed, the burden of ETT road nearly became a sub-campaign and Afghan forces could not retreat work initially fell on the 19th and 20th unto itself partly because the absence from Mushan for operational and Special Forces Groups in the early of Canadian helicopters forced TFK psychological reasons. These factors days of the war. As the ANA emerged https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss3/748 2 Maloney - Panjwayi Alamo.indd 48 10/6/2009 1:19:04 PM : Panjwayi Alamo The Defence of Strongpoint Mushan as an institution, the ETTs shifted to 2007 to handle ANA operations in were three infantry kandaks 1/1, 1/2 a more conventional posture as the the province. 1/205 Brigade’s kandaks and 1/3, a combat support kandak intent was to create a professional varied in number, however, and it (4/1) and a combat service support army to replace the Special Forces- would be a mistake to assume that kandak (5/1). For transport, each backed militias. A US National Guard 1/205 Brigade had the same level kandak had a varying number of Ford brigade took over this mission from of stability that a Canadian brigade Ranger pickup trucks, Hummers the special forces by 2004. The NATO- has. In 2006, it wavered between armed with 12.7 mm machine guns, led OMLTs were originally supposed one and three kandaks. At that time and International 7-ton trucks. Paper to supplement the OEF ETTs and the Canadian OMLT was capable of organizational charts are, however, provide mentoring at brigade and mentoring a single kandak. deceiving when dealing with Afghan Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2009 Mike by Map drawn higher levels, but as NATO took T h e O M LT r e q u i r e m e n t s units. In general, not all three infantry greater control of the coalition effort, increased dramatically in 2007, to kandaks were deployed at once. the NATO OMLTs increasingly the point where nearly an entire Some were undergoing refit, others handled tasks previously done by Canadian infantry battalion was had personnel on leave. There were the ETTs.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Progress in Afghanistan Bucharest Summit2-4 April 2008 Progress in Afghanistan
    © MOD NL © MOD Canada © MOD Canada Progress in Afghanistan Progress in Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008 Bucharest Summit2-4 Progress in Afghanistan Contents page 1. Foreword by Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, ..........................1 Jean-François Bureau, and NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai 2. Executive summary .........................................................................................................................................2 3. Security ..................................................................................................................................................................... 4 • IED attacks and Counter-IED efforts 4 • Musa Qala 5 • Operations Medusa successes - Highlights Panjwayi and Zhari 6 • Afghan National Army 8 • Afghan National Police 10 • ISAF growth 10 4. Reconstruction and Development ............................................................................................... 12 • Snapshots of PRT activities 14 • Afghanistan’s aviation sector: taking off 16 • NATO-Japan Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects 17 • ISAF Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund 18 • Humanitarian Assistance - Winterisation 18 5. Governance ....................................................................................................................................................... 19 • Counter-Narcotics 20 © MOD Canada Foreword The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission is approaching five years of operations in Afghanistan. This report is a
    [Show full text]
  • Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody One Year On” and Changing the Determined Deadline for Presentation of the Response on the Said Report
    Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody One Year On United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights January 2013 Kabul, Afghanistan Contents Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................... i UNAMA’s Mandate ......................................................................................................................................ii Access and Methodology ..........................................................................................................................ii Executive Summary.................................................................................................................................... 1 Map 1: Detention Facilities Visited by UNAMA.............................................................................. 26 Map 2: Detention Facilities where Incidents Occurred .............................................................. 27 Map 3: Detainee Accounts of Treatment in ALP, ANA, ANP and NDS Locations ................ 28 Treatment of Detainees by the National Directorate of Security ........................................... 29 Map 4: Multiple Incidents in NDS Custody in Ten Provinces ................................................... 42 Map 5: Systematic and Sufficiently Credible and Reliable Incidents in NDS Custody ..... 45 Treatment of Detainees by the Afghan National Police and Afghan
    [Show full text]
  • From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective
    University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository University of Calgary Press University of Calgary Press Open Access Books 2016-05 From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective Carroll, Michael K; Donaghy, Greg University of Calgary Press Carroll, M.K. & Donaghy, G. (2016). "From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective." Beyond Boundaries: Canadian Defence and Strategic Studies Series; no. 6. University of Calgary Press, Calgary, Alberta. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/51199 book http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives 4.0 International Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca FROM KINSHASA TO KANDAHAR: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective Edited by Michael K. Carroll and Greg Donaghy ISBN 978-1-55238-845-7 THIS BOOK IS AN OPEN ACCESS E-BOOK. It is an electronic version of a book that can be purchased in physical form through any bookseller or on-line retailer, or from our distributors. Please support this open access publication by requesting that your university purchase a print copy of this book, or by purchasing a copy yourself. If you have any questions, please contact us at [email protected] Cover Art: The artwork on the cover of this book is not open access and falls under traditional copyright provisions; it cannot be reproduced in any way without written permission of the artists and their agents. The cover can be displayed as a complete cover image for the purposes of publicizing this work, but the artwork cannot be extracted from the context of the cover of this specific work without breaching the artist’s copyright.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of Explosive Weapons on Education: a Case Study of Afghanistan
    The Impact of Explosive Weapons on Education: A Case Study of Afghanistan Students in their classroom in Zhari district, Khandahar province, Afghanistan. Many of the school’s September 2021 buildings were destroyed in airstrikes, leaving classrooms exposed. © 2019 Stefanie Glinski The Impact of Explosive Weapons on Education: A Case Study of Afghanistan Summary Between January 2018 and June 2021, the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) identified over 200 reported attacks on schools, school students and personnel, and higher education in Afghanistan that involved explosive weapons. These attacks injured or killed hundreds of students and educators and damaged or destroyed dozens of schools and universities. In the first six months of 2021, more attacks on schools using explosive weapons were reported than in the first half of any of the previous three years. Explosive weapons were used in an increasing proportion of all attacks on education since 2018, with improvised explo- sive devices most prevalent among these attacks. Attacks with explosive weapons also caused school closures, including when non-state armed groups used explosive weapons to target girls’ education. Recommendations • Access to education should be a priority in Afghanistan, and schools and universities, as well as their students and educators, should be protected from attack. • State armed forces and non-state armed groups should avoid using explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas, including near schools or universities, and along routes to or from them. • When possible, concerned parties should make every effort to collect and share disaggregat- ed data on attacks on education involving explosive weapons, so that the impact of these attacks can be better understood, and prevention and response measures can be devel- oped.
    [Show full text]
  • Listening to Women and Girls Displaced to Urban Afghanistan
    LISTENING TO WOMEN AND GIRLS DISPLACED TO URBAN AFGHANISTAN 1 2 8 Executive summary TABLE OF 10 Introduction 10 Methodology 10 Urbanisation and the growth of informal settlements CONTENTS 11 Young not listened to 13 Vulnerabilities of urban female IDPs 13 Entrenched gender inequality 13 Early marriage and child mothers 14 Widows and female-headed households 15 Widespread domestic violence 16 Limited mobility 17 Fear of reprisals for male behaviour 17 Poverty 18 Drugs 19 Food insecurity 20 Shelter: overcrowding and Tenure insecurity 21 Poor access to water, sanitation And electricity 21 Ill-health and unaffordable health care 22 Lack of access to education 23 Psychosocial problems 26 Conclusion 29 Bibliography 33 Appendix i: methodology 36 Endnotes 3 4 THE NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL (NRC) is an independent, humanitarian, non-profit, non- governmental organisation, established in 1946. NRC works to protect the rights of displaced and vulnerable persons during crisis. Through our programmes we provide assistance to meet immediate humanitarian needs, prevent further displacement and contribute to durable solutions. Through our advocacy we strive for rights to be upheld and for lasting solutions to be achieved. Through our stand-by rosters we provide expertise as a strategic partner to the UN, as well as to national and international actors. In Afghanistan, NRC has been assisting displacement-affected populations since 2002 with humanitarian programmes in education, shelter, legal assistance and emergency response. www.nrc.no THE LIAISON OFFICE (TLO) is an Afghan non-governmental organization that was established in 2003 at the request of south-eastern tribal elders wishing to be better integrated in the post-2001 peace and statebuilding process.
    [Show full text]
  • Military) (MSM)
    MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL (Military) (MSM) CITATIONS 2008 UPDATED: 18 June 2019 PAGES: 48 CORRECT TO: 26 January 2008 (CG) 01 March 2008 (CG) 19 April 2008 (CG) 19 July 2008 (CG) 29 November 2008 (CG) Prepared by John Blatherwick, CM, CStJ, OBC, CD, MD, FRCP(C), LLD(Hon) Brigadier-General Shane Anthony Brennan, MSC*, CD Colonel Pierre Huet, MSM*, CD 1 MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL (Military Division) (MSM) To CANADIAN FORCES MILITARY MEMBERS Canada Gazette 2008 CANADA GAZETTE NAME RANK UNIT DECORATIONS 20 ABBOTT, Peter Gerald Colonel Cdr Task Force El Gorah Sinai OMM MSM CD 34 ALAIN, Julie Marie Micheline Corporal CFHS Afghanistan MSM 34 ARCAND, Gilles CWO RSM JTF Afghanistan MMM MSM CD 04 BARNES, John Gerard MWO ‘C’ Coy 1 RCR Afghanistan MMM MSM CD 06 BARTLETT, Stephen Stanley CWO RSM Task Force Afghanistan MSM CD 20 BELL, Steven Albert Commander First OIC Maritime Amphibious Unit MSM CD 38 BERGERON, Joseph Jean-Pierre LCol Israel-Hezbollah conflict in 2006 MSM CD 38 BERREA, Patrick James Corporal Mass Distribution Cdn Medals MSM 25 BERRY, David Brian LCol Advisor Afghan Minister Rehab MSM CD 24 BÉRUBÉ, Jules Joseph Jean WO 2nd RCR JTF Afghanistan MSM CD 05 BISAILLON, Joseph Martin François Major DCO Mentor Team Afghanistan MSM CD 35 BOURQUE, Dennie Captain FOO F22eR Afghanistan MSM 21 BOWES, Stephen Joseph Colonel DCO Contingency Task Force MSC MSM CD 24 BRADLEY, Thomas Major Chief Ops JTF Afghanistan HQ MSM CD 38 BRENNAN, James Captain Strategic Airfield Planner 2007 MSM CD 35 BRÛLE, Pierre Jr. Corporal 53 rd Engineer Sqd Afghanistan MSM
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Dragon STRIKE! What Is...Howz-E-Madad? 2-BSTB's Combat Engineers
    Operation Dragon STRIKE! STRIKE Attacks Taliban with offensive page7 What is...Howz-E-Madad? STRIKE Force in the Zharay District page 9 2-BSTB’s Combat Engineers Company A, BSTB Teach Explosives page 5 Table of Contents... 2 COLUMNS 2 Words From the Top A message to the reader from STRIKE’s Leaders, 5 Col. Arthur Kandarian and Sgt. Maj. John White. 3 The Brigade’s Surgeon & Chaplain Direction provided by the Lt. Col. Michael Wirt and Maj. David Beavers. 4 Combat Stress, The Mayor & Safety 6 Guidance, direction and standards. FEATURES 5 Engineers, Infantry & Demolition 7 2-BSTB’s Alpha Company teaches the line units explosives 6 ANA gets behind the wheel Soldiers send the ANA through driver’s training Coverpage!! 7 Operation Dragon STRIKE Combined Task Force STRIKE attacksTaliban. 9 9 What is… Howz-E-Madad? A look at STRIKE Force and its Foward Operating Base. Staff Sgt. James Leach, a platoon 11 Company D, 2nd Five-Oh-Deuce sergeant with 1/75’s HHT, points Dog Company stays together during deploying. at enemy positions while in a fire fight during an objective for Opera- STRIKE SPECIALS tion Dragon STRIKE 13 Faces of STRIKE Snap-shots of today’s STRIKE Soldiers 11 14 We Will Never Forget STRIKE honors its fallen. 13 CONTRIBUTORS OIC Maj. Larry Porter Senior Editor Sfc. William Patterson Editor Spc. Joe Padula 14 Staff Spc. Mike Monroe Staff Pfc. Shawn Denham The Heartbeat is published monthly by the STRIKE BCT Public Affairs Office, FOB Wilson, Afghanistan, APO AE 09370. In accordance with DoD Instruction 5120.4 the HB is an authorized publication of the Department of Defense.
    [Show full text]
  • For an Extra $130 Bucks…
    For an Extra $130 Bucks…. Update On Canada’s Military Financial Crisis A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM UP Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence Committee Members Sen. Colin Kenny – Chair Sen. J. Michael Forrestall – Deputy Chair Sen. Norman K. Atkins Sen. Tommy Banks Sen. Jane Cordy Sen. Joseph A. Day Sen. Michael A. Meighen Sen. David P. Smith Sen. John (Jack) Wiebe Second Session Thirty-Seventh Parliament November 2002 (Ce rapport est disponible en français) Information regarding the committee can be obtained through its web site: http://sen-sec.ca Questions can be directed to: Toll free: 1-800-267-7362 Or via e-mail: The Committee Clerk: [email protected] The Committee Chair: [email protected] Media inquiries can be directed to: [email protected] For an Extra 130 Bucks . Update On Canada’s Military Financial Crisis A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM UP • Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence November, 2002 MEMBERSHIP 37th Parliament – 2nd Session STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE The Honourable Colin Kenny, Chair The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall, Deputy Chair And The Honourable Senators: Atkins Banks Cordy Day Meighen Smith* (Not a member of the Committee during the period that the evidence was gathered) Wiebe *Carstairs, P.C. (or Robichaud, P.C.) *Lynch-Staunton (or Kinsella) *Ex Officio Members FOR AN EXTRA $130 BUCKS: UPDATE ON CANADA’S MILITARY FINANCIAL CRISIS A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM UP TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 7 MONEY ISN’T EVERYTHING, BUT . ............................................ 9 WHEN FRUGAL ISN’T SMART ....................................................
    [Show full text]
  • What Is the Reserve Force? the Reserve Force Is a Large Branch of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)
    2 Joining the Reserves What is the Reserve Force? The Reserve Force is a large branch of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). It is made up of people from the community who work in the CAF part time or full time. Members of the Reserve Force are called Reservists. Most Reservists also have other jobs. Alternatively, the Regular Force consists of members that work full time. These Did you know? members are also available at a moment’s notice to respond to any natural disasters or The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) was threat to national security. previously referred to as the Canadian Forces (CF). The name was changed in 2013 to give a truer sense of the purpose of our troops. Who joins the Reserve Force? People join the Reserves for many different reasons. Some want adventure, a chance to serve others, a challenge, or a second income. However, something all Reservists have in common is a wish to serve their country. A career in the Canadian Armed Forces is a call to duty. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, and airwomen who answer this call want to help others, and they are determined to defend and protect what they believe in. Military families “Strength Behind the Uniform.” 3 About this handbook Why do we have an Orientation Handbook? The Reserve Force is a large branch of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). In the Canadian Armed Forces, we say that military families are the Strength Behind the Uniform. Families support Reservists during relatively small commitments like weekend training and summer courses. Families also support Reservists during major events, for example, when the Reservists are sent to other parts of Canada or the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghan Opiate Trade 2009.Indb
    ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME Vienna ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium Copyright © United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), October 2009 Acknowledgements This report was prepared by the UNODC Studies and Threat Analysis Section (STAS), in the framework of the UNODC Trends Monitoring and Analysis Programme/Afghan Opiate Trade sub-Programme, and with the collaboration of the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan and the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia. UNODC field offices for East Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Southern Africa, South Asia and South Eastern Europe also provided feedback and support. A number of UNODC colleagues gave valuable inputs and comments, including, in particular, Thomas Pietschmann (Statistics and Surveys Section) who reviewed all the opiate statistics and flow estimates presented in this report. UNODC is grateful to the national and international institutions which shared their knowledge and data with the report team, including, in particular, the Anti Narcotics Force of Pakistan, the Afghan Border Police, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and the World Customs Organization. Thanks also go to the staff of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, Afghanistan. Report Team Research and report preparation: Hakan Demirbüken (Lead researcher, Afghan
    [Show full text]
  • Operational Requirements for Soldier-Robot Teaming
    CAN UNCLASSIFIED Operational Requirements for Soldier-Robot Teaming Simon Banbury Kevin Heffner Hugh Liu Serge Pelletier Calian Ltd. Prepared by: Calian Ltd. 770 Palladium Drive Ottawa, Canada K2V 1C8 Contractor Document Number: DND-1144.1.1-01 PSPC Contract Number: W7719-185397/001/TOR Technical Authority: Ming Hou, DRDC – Toronto Research Centre Contractor's date of publication: August 2020 The body of this CAN UNCLASSIFIED document does not contain the required security banners according to DND security standards. However, it must be treated as CAN UNCLASSIFIED and protected appropriately based on the terms and conditions specified on the covering page. Defence Research and Development Canada Contract Report DRDC-RDDC-2020-C172 November 2020 CAN UNCLASSIFIED CAN UNCLASSIFIED IMPORTANT INFORMATIVE STATEMENTS This document was reviewed for Controlled Goods by Defence Research and Development Canada using the Schedule to the Defence Production Act. Disclaimer: This document is not published by the Editorial Office of Defence Research and Development Canada, an agency of the Department of National Defence of Canada but is to be catalogued in the Canadian Defence Information System (CANDIS), the national repository for Defence S&T documents. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (Department of National Defence) makes no representations or warranties, expressed or implied, of any kind whatsoever, and assumes no liability for the accuracy, reliability, completeness, currency or usefulness of any information, product, process or material included in this document. Nothing in this document should be interpreted as an endorsement for the specific use of any tool, technique or process examined in it. Any reliance on, or use of, any information, product, process or material included in this document is at the sole risk of the person so using it or relying on it.
    [Show full text]
  • National Defence and the Canadian Forces
    Skip to content | Skip to institutional links National Defence and the Canadian Forces www.forces.gc.ca Français Home Contact Us Help Search canada.gc.ca CEFCOM Home > Current Operations > Fact Sheets > Joint Task Force Afghanistan Operations Joint Task Force Afghanistan: Current Operations Current Operations Composition during Rotation 7 of Operation ATHENA Map Fact Sheets Joint Task Force Afghanistan comprises all Canadian Forces assets deployed in southwest Past Operations Asia on Operation ACCIUS , Operation ARCHER and Operation ATHENA . Its established CEFCOM strength is 2,830 personnel, of whom all but about 15 are deployed on Operation ATHENA. About Us Joint Task Force Afghanistan is made up of the following units: Newsroom Operations l At Kandahar Airfield: Media Embedding ¡ Joint Task Force Afghanistan Headquarters, which is also the headquarters of Program Task Force Kandahar ¡ the Canadian contingent at COMKAF (Commander, Kandahar Airfield) Feature Story ¡ the Canadian contingent at ISAF Regional Command (South) Headquarters Archive ¡ Task Force Kandahar, part of ISAF RC(South) Tell Us Your Stories ¡ the Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing ¡ the National Support Element (NSE) l In Kabul: ¡ the Canadian contingent at ISAF Headquarters ¡ the Canadian members of the Military Advisory Unit of the United Nations Advisory Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA, see Operation ACCIUS ) ¡ the Canadian contingent of Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC­A, see Operation ARCHER) ¡ the military liaison staff at the Canadian Embassy
    [Show full text]