Master of Arts in European Culture

Palacky University

University of Deusto

Master Thesis “Harmful Traditional Practices in Europe: Honor Killings among Immigrant Communities”

Student: Iuliia Rushchenko

Thesis supervisors:

Dr. Lubor Kysucan

Prof. Aitor Ibarrola

Bilbao - 2012

1 Contents

1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………... 5

1.1. Research problem ………………………………………………………………. 6 1.2. Aim and object of the study ……………………………………………………. 8 1.3. Methodology …………………………………………………………………… 9 1.4. Structure ………………………………………………………………………. 10

2. Human rights dimension of harmful traditional practices and honor-based crime ……………………………………………………………………………………… 12

2.1.International and European policies of gender-based violence ………………... 12 2.2.Honor-based crime: dilemma between cultural relativism and human rights’ universalism ……………………………………………………………………. 16

3. Analysis of honor killings as a socio-cultural phenomenon …………………… 24

3.1. Honor killings and honor-based crime: the rationale (s) behind the practice and the explanations 3.1.2. Sociology ………………………………………………………………. 24 3.1.3. Cultural anthropology …………………………………………………. 27 3.1.3.1. Notions of “honor,” tribalism and customary law in Bedouin community: anthropological, sociological and psychological insights ………. 31 3.1.4. Criminology ……………………………………………………………. 39 3.2. “Geography” of honor killings worldwide ……………………………………... 44 3.2.1. Pakistan …………………………………………………………………. 44 3.2.2. Jordan …………………………………………………………………… 47 3.2.3. Palestine/Israel ………………………………………………………….. 49

4. Tackling the problem of honor-related crime in Europe ……………………… 56

4.1. An overview of honor killing cases in Europe ……………………………….. 56 4.1.1. United Kingdom ………………………………………………………… 56 4.1.2. Sweden ………………………………………………………………….. 61 4.1.3. The Netherlands ………………………………………………………… 63 4.2. Qualitative research “Attitudes and values of immigrants in Europe towards honor-based violence” …………………………………………………………. 65

5. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………… 71

6. Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………. 73

2

Abbreviations and terms

UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CRC – Committee on the Rights of the Child HTP – Harmful traditional practices HBV – Honor-based violence FGM – Female genital mutilation ECHR – European Court of Human Rights VAW – Violence against women DEVAW – Declaration on Violence against Women

3 Abstract of MA thesis

The present study deals with the problem of honor killings in the framework of a broader term of gender-based violence and harmful traditional practices. The author analyzes the "roots" of honor killings and the value of "honor" embedded in the cultural settings, social expectations and established gender roles of the Eastern societies; likewise, she explains the phenomenon through the prism of theoretical constructions from different disciplines: sociology, anthropology, psychology, and criminology. The study focuses on the cases of honor killings in the countries with the highest incidence of honor-based violence in the world (Palestine, Pakistan and Jordan) and discusses the problem of honor murders among immigrant communities in Europe taking the examples of the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands. A "pilot research", set forth at the end of the study, suggests that there are certain trends about attitudes and values of immigrants in Europe towards honor-based violence.

4

1. Introduction

Having undergone a significant transformation from the continent of emigration to the destination of immigration, Europe has long been a place where people from diverse cultures settle and interact, bringing their own languages, traditions, customs and beliefs. Over the last decades, the concept of multiculturalism has been encouraged by certain European governments and the respect “for each and every culture” has been promoted. However, some of the cultural peculiarities brought to Europe by the immigrants, which are allowed by the community’s opinion and customary law in their countries of origin, constitute a violation of some of the main principles enshrined in the international and European human rights legal instruments, and, therefore, become a crime in Europe. Some cultural practices are targeted at women and children who are subjected to them involuntarily – such practices have been named “harmful traditional practices.” What are these harmful traditional practices? There is no clear and comprehensive definition of harmful traditional practices recognized by all international agencies and institutions, but both UN Committees of CEDAW (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women) and CRC (Committee on the Rights of the Child) agree that these are the practices prejudicial to the health, physical or psychological integrity of women and children rooted in cultural traditions and beliefs. 1 The fact that these practices stem from the traditional beliefs of the community makes the topic particularly interesting for the fields of sociology, anthropology and cultural studies. As put forth in the UN Fact Sheet No: 23,2 the harmful traditional practices include honor killings, female genital mutilation, forced feeding of women, early marriage, the various taboos or practices which prevent women from controlling their own fertility, nutritional taboos and traditional birth practices, son preference and its implications for the status of the girl child female infanticide, early pregnancy and dowry price. Every year millions of girls worldwide, mostly in Middle Eastern, Asian and African countries, are victims of HTP that have different consequences in the fields of health, education, survival and development, which are often traumatic, and which may cause grave injuries, and sometimes death.3 For instance, The United Nations Population Fund estimates that approximately 5,000 women and girls are killed every year by members of their own families

1 United Nations Fact Sheet No.: 23, Harmful traditional practices affecting the health of women and children . Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009. 2 Ibid. 3 M. Temmerman, E. Leye, “Issue in the European Health Care for Victims of FGM.” Gender-based violence in Europe . Brussels: IPPF European Network, 2009. 5 worldwide. However, many women groups in the Middle East and Southwest Asia suspect that the number of victims is at least four times more.4 A briefing paper prepared for the European Parliament in 2007 contains the following definition of the honor killing: “Honor killing is a practice whereby male members kill a female relative who is perceived as having damaged family honor […] In such a case, her death restores the honor of the family.”5 As put forth by Sylvia Maier, an honor murder constitutes “a physical extermination of young girls and women for allegedly transgressing gender roles and values in a particular society.”6 Honor killings are one of the most prejudicial and dangerous kinds of harmful traditional practices frequently defended or disregarded by police officials and public administration on the basis of “cultural accommodation” claims. The problem of honor killings and related to it gender-based violence has been tackled before by various international human rights organizations, such as the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, various NGOs, and the recommendations to stop their spread had been already embodied in different human rights reports, decrees, resolutions and fact sheets. This issue has also been analyzed by scholars, individual human rights activists and journalists, such as S. Maier, S. Ruggi, R. Fisk, P. Chesler, N. Afzal, and R. Husseini. The problem of honor killings has been likewise theorized through a feminist and women’s rights perspective (A. Sev’er and G. Yurdakul, A. Gill, L. Pervizat,), in the light of socio-cultural context (N. Youssef, F. Faqir, L. Barsted) and in connection with the existing legislation in the Muslim countries, Islamic principles and Shari’a law provisions (L. Abu-Odeh, A. Quraishi, N. Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. Coulson, L. Welchman).

1.1. Research problem

Women’s rights organizations argue that in the last decade, honor-related violence has been more clearly present in Europe. The rise of HRV in north-western European countries is generally related to the immigration of workers, in the 1960s and 1970s, from the

4 Robert Fisk. “The Crimewave that Shames the World,” The Independent , 2010 [online] Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/the-crimewave-that-shames-the-world-2072201.html (Accessed 10 April 2011) 5 “Honour Killing: Its Causes & Consequences: Suggested Strategies for the European Parliament,” 2007 [online] Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/expert/eStudies.do?languageEN (Accessed 10 March 2011). 6 Jennifer Dunham, “Honor Killings in Europe: An Interview With Scholar and Activist Dr. Sylvia Maier,” Perspectives on global issues Journal, 2008 [online] Available at: http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0302/SilviaMaier.htm (Accessed 15 April 2011)

6 Mediterranean, especially from rural areas of Turkey and Morocco and from the Middle East. In the 1980s, the immigrant workers brought their families over to Europe. From this period, the police were confronted with the first instances of honor-based violence, even though this term did not exist yet at that time.7 As stated by the vice-President of the European Commission Franco Frattini,8 the European Parliament has given a very clear official opinion on the issue of harmful traditional practices, emphasizing that anything that violates the rights of girls and women will not be tolerated by the people of Europe, and it is calling on Member States to embody this principle in national laws and policies. The question of honor killings is less discussed in comparison with the other kinds of harmful traditional practices (such as FGM, where numerous studies and surveys exist), partly as a result of the lack of valid data, low level of awareness and unwillingness of victims and witnesses to report the cases to the police in Europe. According to the official data, reported by the UK Metropolitan Police, as of December 2009, there had been a huge rise in recorded incidents motivated by "honor”: 211 honor-based incidents had been reported in London – 129 of which were criminal offences – between April and October. It is estimated that every year in the United Kingdom at least a dozen women are victims of honor killings, almost exclusively within Asian and Middle Eastern origin.9 A newly collected and reported data about HBV in the UK portrays a more alarming picture. UK police recorded at least 2,823 so-called honor attacks in 2010.10 The information by the Iranian and Kurdish Women's Rights Organization (IKWRO) revealed that nearly 500 of these were in London 11 . In comparison to the figures from 2009, there was an overall 47% rise in such incidents. It is stated that honor attacks are punishments on people, usually women, for acts deemed to have brought shame on their family. Such attacks can include acid attacks, abduction, mutilations, beatings and in some cases, murder. IKWRO said its research, carried out between July and November, is the best national estimate so far of the extent of honor violence in Britain, although the charity says the figures do not give the full

7 Lidia Luyckfaasseel. “Honour-related violence: on the rise in Europe,” Gender-based violence in Europe , Brussels: IPPF European Network, 2009. 8 Honour killing: its causes & consequences: suggested strategies for the European Parliament, 2007 [online] Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/expert/eStudies.do?languageEN [Accessed 10 March 2011] 9 “UK police start “honour” crime plane,” Aljazeera, 22 October 2008 [online] Available at: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2008/10/2008102292619942890.html [Accessed 15 April 2011] 10 Violence Is Not Our Culture. “UK: “Honor” Attack Numbers Revealed by Police Forces.” December 3, 2011. http://www.violenceisnotourculture.org/News-and-Views/uk-honour-attack-numbers-revealed-police-forces 11 Ibid. 7 picture. As underlined by the director of IKWRO, families often try to deny the existence of honor attacks and those who carry them out are “very much respected.” 12 Since the issue of honor-related violence is characterized by a latent nature, it is possible to assume that the incidence of honor-related crimes and honor killings in particular should be much higher than the official data claimed by the police officials. An increasing flow of immigrants and refugees that arrive to Europe from the countries where honor killings are practiced and are not strictly prosecuted by the legislation together with the latent character of this kind of crime in Europe (due to the factors mentioned above) makes the problem of honor killings among immigrants particularly suitable for the qualitative research, which has been chosen as an empirical base for the present master thesis.

1.2. Aim and object of the study

Since the problem of harmful traditional practices and honor killings has been mostly investigated before in the framework of international law, the aim of the present work is to contribute to the academic debates analyzing the phenomenon through the prism of sociology, cultural anthropology and criminology theories targeting and questioning inner motives and rationales of the perpetrators/accomplices related to this crime. The main object s of the study are: 1) The honor killing as a complex sociocultural phenomenon and values that comprise its core/determine the actions of the perpetrators (the theoretical part of the thesis deals with this issue); 2) The attitudes of immigrants towards honor-related crimes (the empirical part of the thesis deals with this issue). Therefore, the research questions of the present study revolve around the following debates: 1) Which socio-cultural values prompt the families/individuals to commit honor killings worldwide and in Europe? 2) What are the attitudes of the immigrants who settle in Europe, but come originally from the Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, towards honor-related violence? Although the study mostly focuses on a sociocultural dimension of honor killings and intends to shed light on the moral/social rationales behind the acts of honor-related crimes, a legalistic perspective is also important for understanding how laws can shape the behavior of the population (e.g., “zina laws” in Pakistan described in the section 3.2.1), and how social

12 Ibid. 8 norms might influence adoption or rejection of certain draft laws (e.g., a recent debate on the outlawing honor killings in Jordan). In addition, the questions of honor killings and gender- based violence, selected as the main focus in the present study, have to do with the human rights abuses; and it is not useful to discuss human rights violations without referring to international law and international or regional human rights instruments. From a personal perspective, I have spent 4 months working for the Human Rights Treaties Division at the UN OHCHR in the framework of the master’s program, and during my internship I have dedicated a great deal of time to the analysis of human rights gaps in the area of women and children, and likewise worked with the international human rights conventions (CRC, CEDAW and CMW). This experience has prompted me to research more about international law and policies, and that is why the present thesis combines both sociocultural and legalistic aspects. Returning to the main object of study, why is there a need to investigate values and attitudes of the newcomers to Europe? As a premise I take an idea that in sociology attitudes are never a final object of inquiry, but always form a part of studying of social conduct. As put forth by P.S. Cohen, an inquiry into attitudes is justified by the assumption that attitudes are predictive of social conduct.13 In his opinion, study of attitudes enables us to predict the behavior or explain actions of individuals, as both are shaped by the core values and attitudes.14 As suggested by R. Benedict in her well-known work “ Patterns of Culture ”: “If we are interested in cultural processes, the only way in which we can know the significance of the selected detail of behavior is against the background of the motives and emotions and 15 values that are institutionalized in that culture. ” Since I do not dispose of a reliable data on honor killings, it is indispensable to consider the attitudes and values of the immigrants, as they might give us some more information on this phenomenon. I believe that through studying the prevalent attitudes towards honor-based crime and rationales behind them, I would be able to construct adequate conclusions and propose some recommendations in order to modify the attitudes and opinions, promoting awareness about women’s rights and contributing to eradication of gender-based violence.

13 Persy S. Cohen. “Social Attitudes and Sociological Enquiry.” British Journal of Sociology . Vol.17, No.4, Dec.1996. http://www.jstor.org/pss/589181 (Accessed 20 December 2011) 14 Ibid. 15 Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934, p. 49. 9 1.3. Methodology

Although my research questions refer not only to honor killings, but to honor-related crime and violence in general, and in that sense might seem rather broad and vague, I strongly believe that honor killings should be always investigated in a close relation to the wide range of gender-based violence, as usually an honor killing is preceded by the repeated threats, psychological or physical abuse of women by the family members, such as humiliating, beating, “grounding,” or rape. Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, analyzing honor killings in Palestine, argues that “femicide” indicates a range of acts and situations including not only the physical killing of women, but also threats and other components of the “arduous process leading up to the actual death 16 . Therefore, an honor killing becomes the last step in the continuous chain of honor- related violence, but it can be prevented if the violence is reported and revealed on time. That is why in the interviews I include questions on the general attitudes of informants towards honor-based violence and crimes, and only then I proceed to the questions on the honor killings as such. Taking into consideration the “sensitivity” of the researched question, I have selected semi-structured in-depth interviews with male immigrants from the Middle Eastern and South Asian countries (this is the region where the notions of “honor” as an Eastern concept have been originated) as an empirical method of the research. The discussion included questions on the perception of the notions of “honor,” “reputation,” the role of women and “women’s chastity” in the society, gender roles in the family, the attitude towards communal responsibility and community-pressure, etc. All the notions usually linked to the explanation and rationales of honor-based killings (a more detailed description of the questions raised is provided in the last chapter) were targeted during the interviews aiming at spotting the main attitudes, values and potential reactions to the perceived “misbehavior” of women. Since most of the perpetrators of honor killings are male, the present research is thought to give us an insight into their psychological and social attitudes towards questions that revolve around honor. Although it could also be very informative to find out about women’s opinions on the matter, I deemed conversations with men would be more fruitful for the research, as normally the victim of an honor killing is a woman, and the man is the one (often using his male relatives, wives or sisters as accomplices) who commits a crime. There are, without any

16 Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, “Re-examining Femicide: Breaking the Silence, Crossing “Scientific” Borders,” SIGNS: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28:2, 581-608. 10 doubt, some exceptions when men are assassinated on behalf of their families or disowned by their relatives, but traditionally the guilt for all the wrongdoings in the Eastern society lies on a female, even if both man and woman are involved in a hypothetical “illicit” relationship. Since in the present research I tackle solely the Eastern interpretations of “honor” and refer to the Eastern tradition of gender roles, man is not only the one responsible for “decision- making” in the families of the Middle East and South Asia, but also the one who tightly controls women. Normally in the Eastern society an unmarried girl is controlled by her father, uncle or brother. A married woman is supposed to obey to her husband, and a divorced lady or a widow is expected to obey the authority of her older son or husband’s brother (this social mechanism is discussed in detail in the section 3.1.3.1). Hence, if there is any necessity for violence, it would initially emanate from a man (or a group of men; as men are the ones who control and decide the fate of females), but not from a woman. That is why men, originally coming from the “target region” (Middle East and South Asia) and currently residing in Europe, have been chosen for the research. The reason for choosing in-depth interviews over the other qualitative methods of research (e.g., focus groups) consist in the assumption that, in my opinion, most of the informants would not be eager to talk about violence, share intimate details about their childhood, family relations and social expectations from a future/actual life partner in front of the group of people.

1.4. Structure

The present study has an “umbrella-like” structure, which starts by viewing honor killings in a broader context, and ends with a micro-level independent research on attitudes to honor killings among immigrants in Europe. After an introductory part, the study moves on to the second chapter devoted to the international and European policies on gender-based violence, and further section on human rights discourse of honor killings and honor-based crime focusing on the dilemma between cultural peculiarities/cultural differences as grounds for the honor-based violence vs. human rights-based approach. The third chapter provides an analysis of honor killing as a socio-cultural phenomenon in the light of sociological, criminological and anthropological theories, while the fourth chapter discusses the problem of honor killings in Europe among immigrant communities summing up with the research findings and conclusions.

11 2. Human rights dimension of harmful traditional practices and honor-based crime

2.1. International and European policies of gender-based violence

As underlined by the CEDAW Committee members,17 one of the main achievements of women’s rights activists worldwide during the last two decades consists in the bringing gender-based violence out of the private realm into the public arena of international human rights where it engages State responsibility and obliges State parties to prevent violence against women, to investigate acts of such violence, prosecute and punish perpetrators and ensure access to remedies, as well as provide support and services to victims. Although there are several international resolutions calling to stop honor killings, honor-based crime is usually tackled under the international framework of VAW, or violence against women. During the 1980’s, the Unites Nations Member States began to address VAW and to appreciate the multiple manifestations of this violence and the settings in which it occurred. In 1993, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Violence against Women (DEVAW) which became the first UN instrument to define violence against women, and to indicate that it includes traditional practices harmful to women. The adoption of this Declaration had been encouraged by the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights which took place in 1993. The following year, the Cairo Program of Action adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development urged Governments to prohibit FGM, encourage women’s empowerment and eradication of gender-based violence. In 1995, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Actions, the outcome of the Fourth World Conference on Women also called on Governments to enact and enforce legislation against the perpetrators of practices and acts of violence against women.18 The five-year review of the implementation of the Beijing Declaration in 2000 by twenty-third session of the General Assembly added honor crimes to the list of harmful customary or traditional practices, describing these as violations of the human rights of women and girls and obstacles to the full enjoyment by women of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. In March 2000, also the Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 2000/31 on extrajudicial summary or arbitrary executions noted the large number of cases reported by the Special Rapporteur on the issue of killings committed in the name of passion or in the name of honor, and called on Governments to investigate such killings

17 Violeta Neubauer. “CEDAW Convention.” Pratique préjudiciables et droits humains. Institut International Des Droits De L’Enfant: 2011, p.25. 18 Jane Connors. “Evolution and definition of the concept of harmful traditional practices.” Pratique préjudiciables et droits humains. Institut International Des Droits De L’Enfant: 2011, p.31-39 12 promptly and thoroughly, bring those responsible to justice and ensure that those killings were neither condoned nor sanctioned. Following suit, but not without initial difficulty, from 2000 to 2004 the General Assembly adopted resolutions on “so-called honor crimes.”19 Special procedures mandate holders of the UN Human Rights Council have also dealt with this issue. The mandate’s report on “Cultural practices in the family that are violent towards women” documents a number of culturally derived forms of violence against women, such as honor killings, early marriages, FGM, witch hunting etc. The mandate’s report on “Intersections between culture and violence against women” addresses cultural discourses from the standpoint of inequalities and subjectivities within culture and cultural groups. It acknowledges biases and shortcomings of the “traditional cultural practices,” approach in terms of “othering” Southern cultures, essentializing them as being harmful to women, and projecting women from traditional cultures as being uniformly victimized, while treating violence in non-Southern cultures as individualizes aberrations.20 United Nations has published several expert papers on harmful traditional practices (including honor killings), which underlined that some practices cannot continue in Europe for reason of the strong communal links attached to their execution; these links are for the most part absent in the European context. Yet some practices defy convention and thrive in Europe even where they are actually undertaken outside Europe.21 In 2003 Resolution 57/179 “Working towards the elimination of crimes against women committed in the name of honor” was adopted by the General Assembly.22 As noted by Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, honor crimes are exacerbated in a number of countries by domestic legal systems, including by discriminatory laws, that still fully or partially exempt individuals of honor killings from punishment, and by state institutions that that fail the victims and perpetuate a culture of impunity for the perpetrators.23

19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Carole Ageng’o. Expert paper EGM/GPLHP/2009/EP.12. Harmful traditional practices in Europe: judicial interventions. 21 May 2009. Available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw_legislation_2009/Expert%20Paper%20EGMGPLHP%20_Carole %20Ageng%27o%20revised_.pdf (accessed 15 September 2011) Aisha Gill. Expert paper EGM/GPLHP/2009/EP.03. Honor killings and the quest for justice in black and minority communities in the UK. 12 June 2009. Available at: Available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw_legislation_2009/Expert%20Paper%20EGMGPLHP%20_Aisha %20Gill%20revised_.pdf (accessed 15 September 2011) Fatma Khafagy. Honor killing in Egypt. The Association of Legal Aid for Women. Cairo, 2005. 22 UN Resolution 57/179 “Working towards the elimination of crimes against women committed in the name of honor.” Available at: http://www.stopvaw.org/drafting_laws_3.html (accessed 20 December 2011) 23 Navi Pillay. “Domestic violence and killing in the name of “honor,” 8 March 2011, Available at : http://wwwupdate.un.org/en/events/women/iwd/2010/documents/HCHR_womenday_2010_statement.pdf 13 With respect to women’s rights and protection from gender-based violence, the key instrument is the Convention of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979. The CEDAW Committee has issued several recommendations summoned to tackle the harmful traditional practices. The most famous of them is considered to be General Recommendation No.19 issued in 1992 which defines the term “discrimination.” As stated in the CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19:24

The Convention in Article 1 defines discrimination against women. The definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence that is violence directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and/or deprivation of liberty. Gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention violence.

Speaking about European policies of gender-based violence, several important mechanisms can be named. The first is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that entered into force in 1953. The Convention established European Court of Human Rights, under which a notorious case of Opuz vs. Turkey was prosecuted. The case was brought by Nahide Opuz who with her mother suffered years of brutal domestic violence at the hands of her husband. On 9 June 2009 the European Court of Human Rights has found Turkey in violation of its obligations to protect women from domestic violence, and for the first time has held that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination under the European Convention. For the first time the Court has elaborated the nature of State obligations with respect to violence in the family – recognizing the gravity of domestic violence in Europe, acknowledging the problems created by the “invisibility” of the crime, and highlighting the seriousness with which States must respond. In a judgment relying heavily on international and comparative law, the Court emphasized that domestic violence is not a private or family matter, but is an issue of public interest which demands effective State action.25 Besides ECHR and activities of European Court of Human Rights, there have been various decisions and recommendations of Council of Europe. Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, opened for signature on May 11 in 2011 in Istanbul, Turkey, is now a recognized legal instrument against gender-based violence.26 This Convention is the first legally binding instrument in the world

24 CEDAW General Recom. 19, A/47/38, 1992, Available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/300395546e0dec52c12563ee0063dc9d?Opendocument 25 INTERIGHTS. Opuz vs. Turkey. Available at: http://www.interights.org/opuz/index.html 26 Council of Europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/HTML/DomesticViolence.htm (accessed 12 December 2011) 14 creating a comprehensive legal framework to prevent violence, to protect victims and to end with the impunity of perpetrators. It defines and criminalizes various forms of violence against women (including forced marriage, female genital mutilation, stalking, physical and psychological violence and sexual violence).27 The Convention stresses that violence against women is a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination. It contains an all- encompassing definition of violence against women that includes all acts based on gender if they result or are likely to result in sexual, physical, psychological, or economic harm or suffering to women. The term gender-based violence, which is used throughout the Convention, refers to violence that targets women because of the mere fact that they are women.28 Likewise European Parliament has issued a resolution of 5 April 2011 on priorities and outline of a new EU policy framework to fight VAW. The abovementioned resolution has highlighted, among others, the following points: 1) although there is no internationally recognized definition of the term “violence against women,” it is defined by the United Nations as any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life; 2) the comparable data on different types of violence against women in the European Union are not collected on a regular basis, which makes it difficult to ascertain the real extent of the problem and to find appropriate solutions; whereas it is very difficult to collect reliable data as women and men are reluctant, due to fear or shame, to report their experiences to the relevant stakeholders. It has been underlined that according to the existing studies concerning Council of Europe Member States, the annual cost of violence against women is estimated to be in the region of EUR 33 billion, and women in the European Union are not equally protected against male violence, due to differing policies and legislation across Member States. The document also takes note of the fact that whereas economic stress often leads to more frequent, more violent and more dangerous abuse; studies have shown that violence against women intensifies when men experience displacement and dispossession as a result of the economic crisis. Likewise it takes a note that traditional harmful practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM) and so-called “honor killings” are highly contextualized forms of violence

27 Women Against Violence Europe. Ad Hoc Committee on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic violence. http://www.wave-network.org/start.asp?ID=23079 (accessed 12 December 2011) 28 T. Papademetriou. Council of Europe: Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence. Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402695_text (Accessed 10 December 2011) 15 against women and therefore urges the Commission to give specific attention to traditional harmful practices in its strategy to combat violence against women.29

2.2.Honor-based crime: dilemma between cultural relativism and human rights’ universalism

The present section is inspired by my experience at the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights as an intern during the time period August – December 2011. Serving the Sessions of Human Rights Treaty Bodies, particularly assisting at the 50 th Session of CEDAW that took place during October 3-October 21 2011, I came across the fact that frequently government representatives of non-western countries claimed to justify certain women’s rights violations in their respective countries and deny reasonable objections and recommendations of the CEDAW Committee experts using the term “culture,” and, therefore, providing logical explanations on the grounds of one’s culture. For instance, such alleged women’s rights violations as the necessity of a girl to have a “wally” (a legal guardian that would sign all documents on her behalf); the inability of a woman to pass her nationality on to children born out of a marriage with a foreigner or to divorce; the practice of polygamy; or the practice of an unequal share of inheritance between male and female members of the family – all these actions would be defended and justified by the certain governments’ delegations as a vital part of their culture that they have a full right to exercise. From the United Nations’ point of view it is clear that all the abovementioned facts belong to a broad range of discrimination against women, which sometimes might have honor-based implications, and should be a subject of a continuous eradication. However, the subsequent remarks of the Committee members about these violations and an urgent need to tackle them would be perceived by the delegation members as bias, as well as an offensive attempt to undermine one’s culture. Honor-based crime is a kind of criminal offence that has often been defended in the name of “culture.” The Asian, African and Middle Eastern individuals tend to blame Westerners for presenting a one-sided, ethnocentric picture in dealing with cases of honor- based violence, posing their own Western culture as a standard for others’ behavior and decision-making. For instance, the practice of FGM that is now opposed and criminalized by a number of European countries, is believed to be a “cultural choice” by certain African

29 European Parliament Website. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2011-0127 (Accessed 1 March 2012) 16 immigrant communities and activists explained by many socio-cultural reasons, such as rites of initiation in the process of socialization, fidelity of women, social solidarity and aesthetic reasons.30 Hence, in the official settings of the United Nations during the public review of State parties’ reports, the governments' representatives use the term “culture” as grounds for justification of human rights gaps. This section will attempt to look at the definition and nature of human rights, and briefly discuss the concepts of universalism and relativism in order to emphasize to what extent the notion of cultural relativism and excessive tolerance to different cultures might be dangerous regarding honor-based violence. Given numerous definitions of the term “culture,” before engaging into discussion about culture and human rights, I would like to indicate that a working definition of “culture” in the present study is the one formulated by Bates and Plog which identifies culture in a sociological way as “a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that the members of a society use to cope with their world and with one another, and that are transmitted from generation to generation through learning.”31 As stated by the United Nations Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other status.32 We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. Universal human rights are often expressed and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties, customary international law, general principles and other sources of international law. International human rights law lays down obligations of Governments to act in certain ways or to refrain from certain acts, in order to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals or groups.33 The principle of universality of human rights is the cornerstone of international human rights law. This principle, as first emphasized in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948, has been reiterated in numerous international human rights conventions, declarations, and resolutions. The 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, for example, noted that it was the duty of States to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems.34

30 John Tierney. “A New Debate on Female Circumcision.” The New York Times : November 30, 2007. http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/30/a-new-debate-on-female-circumcision/ (Accessed 20 October 2011) 31 D. Bates and F. Plog., Cultural Anthropology , 3rd Ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 6, 1976. 32 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “What are human rights?” http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (accessed 10 November 2011) 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 17 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines human rights as “international norms that help protect people everywhere from severe political, legal and social abuses.”35 According to Cranston, “A human right by a definition is a universal moral right, something which all men, everywhere, at all times ought to have, something of which no one may be deprived without a grave affront justice, something which is owing to very human being simply because he is a human.”36 Both definitions in their heart contain the norm of universality. As we can conclude based on the paragraphs above, all the human rights instruments, starting from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 in the aftermath of the World War II, and other international law documents in the post-United Nations era, are based on the assumption of the universality of human rights as well. However, not all the countries agree on the idea that human rights per se have a universal character, and, consequently, that international human rights law can be universal. Shaheen Sardar Ali mentions an example that the CEDAW Convention, although believed to defend universal rights of women, has evoked strong objections from many Islamic countries on the basis that some of its substantive provisions contain values and pronouncements contrary to the Shari’a law on the status of women 37 . A number of Muslim State parties to the Convention have entered far reaching reservations on the same grounds of discrepancy with Shari’a.38 What are the main interpretations of origin of human rights? Scholars tend to debate whether the concept of human rights is of a value pertinent to all cultures in the world or a merely Western invention. While certain authors maintain that “all societies crossculturally and historically manifest conceptions of human rights,”39 the others argue that, although all cultures do have a notion of human dignity and limited governance, the latter cannot be a synonym of human rights, being a more narrow term.40 According to Jack Donnelly’s opinion, “most non-Western cultural and political traditions lack not only the practice of human rights, buy the very concept.”41 He strongly believes that the concern for human dignity is central to non-Western cultural traditions, whereas human rights, in the sense in

35 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philisophy. “Human rights.” February 7, 2003. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/ (accessed 1 November 2011) 36 Maurice Cranston. What are human rights ? 1973, 2 nd edn., London: Bodley Head at p.36. 37 Shaheen Sardar Ali. Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law. Equal Before Allh, Unequal Before Man? The Hague/London/Boston: 2008. 38 Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservations Relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women CEDAW/SP/2006/2. New York, 2006. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/309/97/PDF/N0630997.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 12 October 2011) 39 P.Schwab and A.Pollis. Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives. Praeger: New York, 1980. 40 Jack Donnelly. Human rights and human dignity: an analytic critique of non-Western conceptions of human rights. The American Political Science Review . Vol.76, No.2, 1982. http://www.jstor.org/pss/1961111 (accessed 1 November 2011) 41 Ibid. 18 which Westerners understand that term – namely, rights (entitlements) held simply by virtue of being a human being – are quite foreign to, for example, Islamic, African, Chinese, and Indian approaches to human dignity. 42 Without any doubt, the concept of human rights grew from the Western philosophical and legal thoughts of writers, such as Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau, Mill, Montesquieu, Kant and Jefferson. Their ideas were based on the values of individualism and secularism of Enlightenment developed and promoted in France, England and the United States between 17 th and the 20 th centuries. Nevertheless, the concept of human rights has been transformed in a certain way since its emergence. Being theorized in the writings of John Locke as very abstract and broad concepts (a right to life, liberty and property), “human rights” understanding nowadays has shifted from a philosophical vague set of notions to the concrete principles defended by lawyers (a right to education, guarantee of a fair trial, a right to housing etc).43 Returning to honor-related crime, it violates such fundamental human rights, enshrined in the international human rights instruments, as a right to life, liberty and security; a freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; a freedom from discrimination in different spheres of life – for example, in marriage and family relations.44 Although these rights are believed to be universal and inalienable without any justified reason by the creators of international conventions and treaties, the incidence of honor-based crime and its rise nowadays in Europe, the USA and Canada proves that the point of view on this might differ among different communities. In most of the cases of honor killings the perpetrator or a group of perpetrators sincerely believe they have a right to do so; since a victim has allegedly breached some essential rule and/or moral code of community and therefore a sanction is to be imposed – aimed at restoring of family honor and reputation, social control and solidarity, controlling the sexual behavior of women etc. Moreover, an excessively tolerant and permissive attitude towards this kind of crime in their “countries of origin” encompasses also legislative differences: the perpetrators in countries, such as Jordan or Egypt are more likely to receive a lenient sentence as they acted according to noble values of “honor defense.”45

42 Ibid. 43 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philisophy. “Human Rights.” February 7, 2003. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/ (accessed 1 November 2011) 44 A right of freedom from discrimination in marriage and family relations is upheld in the Article 16 of CEDAW Convention. 45 The Penal Codes of certain countries are lenient to honor-based killings. The murder, if proven to be committed in the name of honor, gives a perpetrator a chance to receive a reduced sentence in such countries, as Egypt or Pakistan etc. 19 Samuel Hantington in his highly controversial article “The Clash of Civilizations” 46 named eight civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African concluding that the future conflicts will be taking place not because of ideological or economic differences, but rather due to cultural reasons along the cultural fault line separating civilizations. In his opinion, “differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues.”47 Herein we can add: and also differences in legislations and human rights implementation. Although the abovementioned Hantington’s work has been widely criticized for a wrong geopolitical forecast about the future division of powers in the world, in the present research I do believe that his ideas about cultural differences can be used in analyzing and explaining the phenomenon of honor killings. The events of Arab Spring over the course of 2011, such as people’s rebellion against corrupted governors in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and a move towards democratization in the Middle East prove that both Western and Eastern civilizations share the same political and civil values of freedom and human dignity, and yet core differences on the grass-roots micro-level (e.g., on the level of family life) exist. If by certain groups the sole concept of honor killing is strictly condemned (and the condemnation is embodied in the respective legislation criminalizing the practice and establishing strict penalties for the offenders), and among certain groups it receives if not encouragement, but lenient sentences and silent support endorsed by the community opinion, the explanation of “why it happens” lies rather in cultural differences of civilization, than in economics or politics. Does the practice of honor-based crime mean a blind denial of the human rights of women or just another logically structured and justified vision of the world based on different moral principles? 48 Some researchers, trying to comprehend the complex “East-West” relationships, propose the dichotomy of rights-based and duty-based human rights.49 If Western concept of human rights is the one based on rights per se, as individual entitlements granted to every human, the Eastern concept of human rights is based on duties. Bassam Tibi, a Muslim scholar born in Syria and having taught most of his life in Germany, states that Islam is a distinct cultural system in which the collective body, not the individual, lies at the

46 Samuel Hatington. “The Clash of Civilizations.” 1993. Foreign Affairs , 72 (3), pp. 22-49. http://www.polsci.wvu.edu/faculty/hauser/PS103/Readings/HuntingtonClashOfCivilizationsForAffSummer93.p df (accessed 3 November 2011) 47 Ibid., at p. 29. 48 Although the victims of honor killings can be men as well, especially if believed to have engaged into an extramarital affair, but in most of the cases victims are women. 49 The division of “rights-based” and “duty-based” human rights is discussed in the previously mentioned work of Shaheen Sardar Ali. Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law. Equal Before Allh, Unequal Before Man? The Hague/London/Boston: 2008. 20 center of the respective world view. Muslims as believers have duties vis-à-vis the community, but no individual entitlements. Tibi maintains that in order to establish human rights in Islam as individual rights it is necessary to introduce the concept of rights and to shift away from the concept of duties.50 Agreeing with Tibi on this point, one can likewise add that all traditional societies, and not only Islamic ones, are based on the duties. Therefore, practicing honor-based crime, the individuals justify their actions by the necessity of exercising their duties in front of the community. The community-pressure and the importance of community opinion for traditional societies’ members will be discussed in the next chapter of the work. As already indicated above, those individuals that defend harmful traditional practices and honor-based crimes frequently articulate their claims in favor of cultural relativism. Being very progressive and innovative in the time of its emergence, cultural relativism became an opposition to the ethnocentrism as a leading principle and a dominant anthropological methodology developed in the first decades of 20 th century and usually associated with the name of Franz Boas 51 and his students (such as Alfred Kroeber, Robert Lowie, Melville Herskovits, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and many others). Cultural relativism, which became a very important methodological tool in anthropology in the first half of 20 th century, rejects value judgments on cultures, suggesting that beliefs, aesthetics, moral and other cultural items can only be judged through their relevance to a given culture. There is no good and bad: every culture indicates its own ethical judgments to regulate the proper behavior of its members. It is worth recalling that a serious anthropological debate on the implementation of cultural relativism in human rights broke out during the preparation of the UDHR. Melville Herskovits, a former Boas’ student, drafted "Statement on Human Rights" 52 which was further submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, and then published. The main request in the document referred to the necessity of “taking into full account an individual as a member of the social group of which he is part, whose sanctioned modes of life shape his behavior, and with whose fate his own is inextricably bound,”53 and one of the main

50 Bassam Tibi, “Islamic Sharia, Human Rights and International Relations,” in Islamic Law Reform and Human Rights: Challenges and Rejoinders , ed. T. Lundholm and K. Vogt. Copenhagen: Nordic Human Rights Publications, 1993. 51 See one of the main works of Franz Boas: Franz Boas. The Mind of Primitive Man New York: Collier Books. 1963 [1911] 52 Executive Board, American Anthropological Association 1947 "Statement on Human Rights" in American Anthropologist 49(4) 539-543. http://direitosehumanos.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/satement-45.pdf (accessed 4 November 2011) 53 Ibid., n.p. 21 objections of the statement consisted in the fact that since the Declaration had been drafted by Westerners, the values included in it, were also Western: Today the problem is complicated by the fact that the Declaration must be of world-wide applicability. It must embrace and recognize the validity of many different ways of life. It will not be convincing to the Indonesian, the African, the Chinese, if it lies on the same plane as like documents of an earlier period. The rights of Man in the Twentieth Century cannot be circumscribed by the standards of any single culture, or be dictated by the aspirations of any single people. Such a document will lead to frustration, not realization of the personalities of vast numbers of human beings. 54

“Statement on Human Rights” published in 1947, has triggered a number of debates on the nature of cultural relativism. For instance, Julian Steward, a representative of cultural ecology, questioned whether the principle of tolerance and respect for every individual in his social environment means that anthropologists approve the social caste system of India, the racial caste system of the United States, or many other varieties of social discrimination in the world. 55 Other researchers go even further, questioning if ideologies, such as Nazism or Fascism can be also justified on the grounds of cultural (which leads to a moral) relativism.56 It is pertinent to underline that cultural relativism, although being a remarkable achievement for social sciences’ methodology in terms of denying ethnocentrism and viewing the previously labeled as “uncivilized” customs and beliefs of aboriginal people in a new light, can become an extremely dangerous claim whilst dealing with the cases of harmful traditional practices nowadays. On the one hand, honor-related violence is justified by the respective norms and values of a community and therefore should be respected and tolerated; on the other hand, it obviously constitutes discrimination against women and children. Such detrimental practices, as forced or early marriages, female infanticide, nutritional taboos and traditional birth practices, and even domestic violence can be encouraged and asked to be “tolerated” on the grounds of cultural relativism. In our opinion, this might have serious negative consequences in terms of further human rights’ violations, especially when it comes to the most vulnerable and sometimes less legally protected strata of society, such as children or women. Concluding this section, I would like to reiterate that human rights, embodied in all international law instruments and promoted internationally, are not objective concepts, but are rather culturally defined and culturally shaped by the values dominant in a certain community.

54 Ibid., n.p. 55 Julian Steward. "Comments on the Statement of Human Rights" in American Anthropologist 50(2) 351-352, 1948. 56 Renato Ortiz. “Sobre o Relativismo Cultural.” Alambre. Comunicación, Información, cultura . No.2, 2009. http://www.revistaalambre.com/Articulos/ArticuloMuestra.asp?Id=33 (accessed 4 November 2011) 22 Notwithstanding, when it comes to such serious violations of human dignity, as deprivation of life, liberty, security, subjecting to torture or any other kind of maltreatment such as rape or moral humiliation, the notion of cultural relativism should be disregarded. However, even honor-related crime has its different categories. Honor killings, for instance, cannot be placed on the same footing as FGM or early marriages, sincerely supported by some women. Unlike such cultural practices, as FGM 57 (when women, despite a cruel character of the surgery, especially its “infibulation” variant, and a potential risk for their lives, often show consent and approbation of the practice due to social and cultural norms), in case of honor killings and honor-related violence there is a very important factor: absence of consent of the second party. Thus, there should be no excuse and no justification for this kind of criminal offense. One can debate whether FGM should be medicalized or criminalized, but one cannot deny that honor killings should not be justified by cultural relativism, tolerance and cultural differences: it is a practice that should be strictly forbidden and condemned both on the moral and legal levels of each and every society, regardless its religious, economic or political background.

57 The WHO defines FGM as follows: “Female genital mutilation constitutes all procedures which involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs whether for cultural or any other non-therapeutic reasons.” FGM is classified into four types according to the WHO classification:

Type I: Also known as clitoridectomy, this type consists of partial or total removal of the clitoris and/or its prepuce.

Type II: Also known as excision, the clitoris and labia minora are partially or totally removed, with or without excision of the labia majora.

Type III: The most severe form, it is also known as infibulation or pharaonic type. The procedure consists in narrowing the vaginal orifice with creation of a covering seal by cutting and appositioning the labia minora and/or labia majora, with or without removal of the clitoris. The appositioning of the wound edges consists of stitching or holding the cut areas together for a certain period of time (for example, girls’ legs are bound together), to create the covering seal. A small opening is left for urine and menstrual blood to escape. An infibulation must be opened either through penetrative sexual intercourse or surgery.

Type IV: This type consists of all other procedures to the genitalia of women for non-medical purposes, such as pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterization.

WHO estimates that between 100 million and 140 million women and girls worldwide have been subjected to FGM. Three million girls and women a year are at risk of mutilation - approximately 8000 girls per day. It has been documented mainly in Africa (in 28 countries), and in a few countries in the Middle East (e.g. Yemen, Kurdish communities, Saudi Arabia), Asia and among certain ethnic groups in Central and South America. Anecdotal evidence and case studies show that FGM is now being encountered in various European countries as well. More information on the practice can be found on the website of “End FGM Campaign” http://www.endfgm.eu/en/about-us/vision-mission-and-guiding-principles/ 23

3. Analysis of honor killings as a socio-cultural phenomenon

3.1. Honor killings and honor-based crime: the rationale (s) behind the practice and the explanations

3.1.1. Sociology

Honor-based crime and honor killings in particular are quite complex interdisciplinary phenomena which require a thorough theorizing from sociological, anthropological, criminological, and law discourses. The present section represents an attempt of developing a theoretical framework of honor killings’ explanation in sociology, anthropology and criminology. The following part of study will discuss the main sociological notions of honor killings, such as “traditional society,” “reputation,” “patriarchal system,” “honor,” and “community.” In our opinion, honor-based violence is usually an attribute of a traditional society where a community’s opinion prevails over an individual choice. Let’s see how the traditional society differs from a modern one. French sociologist Emile Durkheim, being especially concerned with the issues of social order, dedicated a significant part of his research trying to understand what ties individual to the society and what makes person either conform to the existing norms or rebel against them.58 He coined the term “ solidarity ,” which can be defined as a main force that maintains social integrity and coherence. Traditional and modern societies differ by the type of solidarity that constitutes a core of their being, and therefore what is a norm in the traditional society (e.g., gender-based violence) may be considered a deviance in the modern one. Traditional societies, Durkheim argued, are held together by mechanical solidarity, a form of social cohesion that is based on the following features: similarity between the members; considering family as the basic social, economic and political unit; and thus thinking in terms of membership or loyalty to a group. Modern societies, on the other hand, are characterized by organic solidarity, a form of social based on the differences between their members. Similar ideas have been expressed by another sociologist of a German origin Ferdinand Tönnies 59 who distinguished between two types of social groups: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft . If the first one is translated as “community” and is viewed as a group based on the feelings of mutual bonds and belonging to a certain kinship, the second one is usually

58 Emile Durkheim. The Division of Labor in Society . New York: Free Press, 1984. 59 Ferdinand Tönnies. Community and Society . East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957. 24 translated as “society” and refers to the group where instrumental goals and acquired statuses are prevailing. Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are also interpreted as alternative terms for traditional and modern society. Max Weber in his work “ Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology ” theorized about social order by defining types of power and legitimacy.60 According Weber, there are three kinds of authorities: traditional, charismatic and legal (or rational) authority. Traditional type of authority is the one where the traditional rights of a powerful and dominant individual or group are accepted, or at least not challenged, by subordinate individuals. These could be (i) religious, sacred, or spiritual forms, (ii) well established and slowly changing culture, or (iii) tribal, family, or clan type structures. 61 Traditional authority might be represented by gerontocracy, or rule by elders, and patriarchalism where positions are inherited. Patriarchalism is frequently identified as one of the reasons of gender-based crime and control of women by men. As put forth by Gerth and Mills, “patriarchalism means the authority of the father, the husband, the senior of the house, the sib elder over the members of the household and sib; the rule of the master and patron over bondsmen, serfs, freed men; of the lord over the domestic servants and household officials' of the prince over house- and court-officials, nobles of office, clients, vassals; of the patrimonial lord and sovereign prince over the “subjects.”62 The explanation of the main mechanisms binding individuals together in a traditional society along with Durkheim’s idea of mechanical solidarity and Weber’s idea of traditional authority are indispensable in understanding the phenomenon of honor killings. Since honor killings represent “an act of vengeance, usually death, committed by male family members against female family members, who are held to have brought dishonor upon the family,”63 the community opinion is a vital factor that pressures the potential perpetrators to commit the crime, as the death is believed to restore the good name of the family and constitutes, therefore, an obligation to “clear the shame” in front of the community. Taking into consideration the importance of community opinion and communal responsibility over the individual freedom in the traditional society, a “good name” becomes more important than an individual life, which can be sacrificed in the name of a reputation.

60 Max Weber. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology , New York: Bedminster Press, 1968. 61 Ibid. 62 Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology , New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. 63 Human Rights Watch, “Honoring the killers,” 19 April 2004. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/04/19/honoringkillers- 0 (Accessed 20 January 2011). 25 The terms “reputation,” “face,” and “prestige” are key terms in sociology, as they partially determine the individual’s status in the society. Reputation is believed to be one of the criteria defining the social class by some researchers,64 and in certain social groups that do not possess any other socio-cultural or economic capital (e.g., immigrants in a new society) this factor might be even more powerful. According to A. Sev’er,65 the poor are even more possessive about their honor, as they have little else in these rigidly stratified societies that they form part of. Erving Goffman, a representative of micro-sociology and an author of “dramaturgical perspective,” considered “face” as a mask that is to be applied during a social interaction via various politeness strategies aimed at maintaining each others’ faces. His main ideas about face-to-face interaction were discussed in his book “ Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to- Face Behavior ” (1967). Face may be translated as a “social esteem” or “prestige” and can be regarded as an attribute as well as the unstable result of social interaction and judgment. As D. Yau-Fai Ho writes: The point is that face is distinctively human. Anyone who does not wish to declare his social bankruptcy must show a regard for face: he must claim for himself, and must extend to others, some degree of compliance, respect, and deference in order to maintain a minimum level of effective social functioning. While it is true that the conceptualization of what constitutes face and the rules governing face behavior vary considerably across cultures, the concern for face is invariant. Defined at a high level of generality, the concept of face is a universal.66

The idea of “maintaining face,” although more developed in the framework of Asian tradition, is a fundamental concept in all social sciences, including psychology, psychoanalysis, communication theory and political science. In case of honor-related killings, the murder is also targeted at “restoring the face” by eliminating a source of “dishonor.” Honor is another essential term on the way of sociological analysis of honor killings. Honor is an abstract concept entailing a perceived quality of worthiness and respectability that affects both the social standing and the self-evaluation of an individual or corporate body such as a family, school, regiment or nation. ”in Arabic language, known as “sharam” in South Asia, “izzat ( ف) ”Called “sharaf in Hindi and Urdu, “sheref,” “onur,” or “namus” in Turkish, or simply ( ت इज़त or)

“pride” among immigrants in the English-speaking countries, honor becomes an extremely important social pattern of a traditional Eastern society. As put forth by the Turkish Canadian

64 Theory of William Lloyd Warner set forth in his work “Social Class in America” (1949). 65 A.Sev’er. “Culture of Honor, Culture of Change: A Feminist Analysis of Honor Killings in Rural Turkey.” Violence Against Women: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal , 1999, 7 (9). 66 David Yau-Fai Ho, "On the Concept of Face," American Journal of Sociology , 81 (4), 867–84, 1976. 26 sociologist A. Sev’er, eastern and western definitions of honor differ greatly: if in the West honor is associated with morality and the esteem accorded to virtue or talent, in the East, besides constituting a valued possession, this quality might have a two-folded interpretation. In its positive manifestation, honor is non-tangible path for social status which can equate a poor man or woman with a rich one, at least on one culturally esteemed dimension.67 The negative side of this Eastern tradition consists in the fact that when honor becomes an obsession, it can lead to a biased interpretation of individual’s action and to an honor-related crime.68 Although acknowledging a tremendous impact of honor in the Eastern tradition, A. Sev’er in her feminist analysis of honor killings in Turkey comes to a conclusion that the problem of honor killings is, first of all, a problem of domination and hatred of women who are viewed as servants of their family, both physically and symbolically.69 What can be an example of “dishonoring behavior”? Dishonor encompasses personal acts of a woman that come in conflict with the opinions and ideas about gender roles already established on the societal level. The examples of “misbehavior” that might bring a shame and honor to the community vary greatly: dressing in an inappropriate way for the family; rejecting an arranged marriage or choosing a spouse without one’s relatives’ permission; chatting with male friends; engaging in the extramarital affairs; and a very broad vague accusation of “acting too western” and “forgetting his/her own culture.” The latter is a very typical feature among the children of immigrants. While their parents are still loyal to the traditions and demands of the society of origin, the children appear to be trapped between the conservative obligations of family and the Western norms/values of their peers. Honor crimes punish women who have taken on their own decisions in a “Western” style when they are supposed to obey their family elders and the male generation.

3.1.2. Cultural anthropology

Various anthropologists have contrasted cultures of honor with cultures of law. In a culture of law there is a body of laws which must be obeyed by all, with punishments for transgressors. Nisbett Cohen, conducting investigations among Southern men of the United States, have come to a conclusion that a Southern part of the U.S. has a very rich tradition of honor. The explanation of this phenomenon they linked to a herding culture (that used to exist in the

67 A.Sev’er. “Culture of Honor, Culture of Change: A Feminist Analysis of Honor Killings in Rural Turkey.” Violence Against Women: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal , 1999, 7 (9). 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 27 South) operating outside a formal government. Cultures of honor, therefore, appear among the Bedouin, and the Scottish and English herdsmen of the Border country, and many similar peoples, who have little allegiance to a national government; among cowboys, frontiersmen, and ranchers of the American West, where official law-enforcement often remained out of reach, as is famously depicted and celebrated in Westerns; among the plantation culture of the American South, and among aristocrats, who enjoy hereditary privileges that put them beyond the reach of codes of law. Cultures of honor also flourish in criminal underworlds and gangs, whose members carry large amounts of cash and contraband and cannot seek legal redress if it is stolen.70 According to Nisbett,71 cultures of honor will often arise when three conditions exist: 1) a lack of resources; 2) where the benefit of theft and crime outweighs the risks; and 3) a lack of sufficient law enforcement (such as in geographically remote regions). Historically, cultures of honor exist in places where the economy is dominated by herding animals. In this situation the geography is usually remote since the soil can not support extensive sustained farming and thus large populations; the benefit of stealing animals from other herds is high since it is main form of wealth; and there is no central law enforcement or rule of law. However cultures of honor can also appear in places like modern inner city slums. The three conditions exist here as well: lack of resources (poverty); crime and theft have a high rewards compared to the alternatives (few); and law enforcement is generally lax or corrupt. Men from the “cultures of honor” have different patterns of behavior in terms of violence than men from the “cultures of law.” In a culture of honor, when someone allows himself to be insulted or disrespected, he gives the impression that he lacks the strength to protect what is his. With little or no formal government presence to punish selfish behavior— including massive theft of property that could destroy a herdsman economically—the individual must respond with violence or the threat of violence to any affront.72 The homicide rate is significantly higher for white male southerners than for white male northerners, but only for argument-related homicides (e.g., trivial altercations). These homicides follow insults that center on reputation, strength, toughness, and honor. An increased concern with maintaining or repairing a reputation for strength, toughness, and honor following insult accounts for the higher rate of homicide among southern white men relative to northern white

70 Todd K. Shackelford. 2005. “An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective on Cultures of Honor,” Evolutionary Psychology, No. 3 http://www.epjournal.net/filestore/ep03381391.pdf (accessed 23 December 2011) 71 Richard Nisbett. Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South . Westview Press, 1996. 72 Ibid. 28 men, over and above North-South differences in temperature, poverty, and the historical practice of slavery.73 Cohen and other scholars who conducted jointly an ethnographic research 74 documented that insulted white southern men, relative to non-insulted white southern men and insulted and non-insulted white northern men (1) more strongly believed that the insult damaged their appearance of strength and toughness in the eyes of an observer; (2) were made more upset by the insult, as indicated by their rise in cortisol levels and the pattern of emotional responses they displayed as rated by observers; (3) became more cognitively primed for future aggression in insult situations, as indicated by their violent completions of a vignette in which they were asked to indicate how one man should respond when another man is attempting to kiss his long-term partner at a crowded party; (4) showed physiological preparedness for dominant and aggressive behaviors, as indicated by a rise in testosterone levels; (5) behaved in more domineering ways (e.g., gave a firmer handshake) during interpersonal encounters with male observers of the insult; and (6) behaved in physically aggressive ways in subsequent challenge situations, as indicated by a greater willingness to stay put in a narrow hallway as a 6 foot, 3 inch, 250 lb. confederate barreled toward them on a certain collision course.75 Why does the notion of a “culture of honor” still persist in the South of the United States, although there is no longer herding community, and the governance is strong? Nisbett and Cohen argue that the culture of honor has achieved a degree of “functional autonomy,” “acquired a life of its own,” and no longer needs herding economy or the absence of government for its persistence. T. Shackelford argues that such a conclusion requires a further explanation, which he develops on the basis the evolutionary psychology evidence.76 Evolutionary psychology theory maintains that much of human behavior (e.g., religion) is a result of psychological adaptations that that evolved to solve recurrent problems in human ancestral environments. One of the representatives of evolutionary psychology Richard Dawkins in his work “The Selfish Gene ” (1976) develops a construct called “meme” that he identifies as an idea, belief, and pattern of behavior which is “hosted” by one or more individual minds, and which

73 Ibid. 74 Dov Cohen, Brian F. Bowdle, R. Nisbett, N. Schwarz, “Insult, Agression and the Southern Culture of Honor: An “Experimental Ethnography,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 1996, Vol. 70, No. 5, 945-960. http://internal.psychology.illinois.edu/~bwrobrts/Cohen%20et%20al.,%201996.pdf (Accessed 14 December 2011) 75 Ibid. 76 Todd K. Shackelford. 2005. “An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective on Cultures of Honor,” Evolutionary Psychology, No. 3 http://www.epjournal.net/filestore/ep03381391.pdf (accessed 23 December 2011) 29 can reproduce itself from mind to mind.77 According to Dawkins, it could be an idea, a fashion, a melody, or the technology of building arches. Memes by the adherents of meme theory are viewed as cultural analogues of genes in that they self-replicate, mutate and respond to selective pressures. Memes generally replicate through exposure to humans, who have evolved as efficient copiers of information and behavior. Because humans do not always copy memes perfectly, and because they may refine, combine or otherwise modify them with other memes to create new memes, they can change over time. Dawkins likened the process by which memes survive and change through the evolution of culture to the natural selection of genes in biological evolution. Meme theory has been seriously criticized for a lack of empirical validity and ignoring of established advances in other fields of social sciences; moreover, some researchers 78 point out at the lack of the “code script” (analogous to DNA) which would make the evolutionary process chaotic. Notwithstanding, since in the present research I view honor killings as a cultural and tribal phenomenon and “honor’ as a culturally transmitted concept, the explanations of evolutionary psychology of how cultural features evolve over time and get transmitted to other individuals might be interesting in analyzing honor-related violence. As we can see from the abovementioned scientific findings of Cohen and Nisbett, “cultures of honor” exist in a broader historical and geographical environment, and are not necessarily only bound to Eastern tradition. Nadia Youssef points out that in Latin America family honor, or male honor is symbolized in the idea of two-sex linked characteristics that distinguish the ideal character of man and woman: the manliness of the man (“machismo”) and the sexual purity of the woman (“verguenza”).79 Both express a solid corpus of values which control behavior and act as effective checks on social relationships. Although acknowledging a powerful presence of “honor” in cultures of Latin America and Middle East, N. Youssef underlines that, unlike Latin America, where feminine behavior diverges from the cultural norms because the machinery of control over women is not institutionally strong, in the Middle East the correspondence of asserted ideals of female chastity and actual feminine behavior has become possible due to the practice of parentally arranged nuptiality and male/female segregation in educational, labor or recreational settings.80

77 Richard Dawkins. The Selfish Gene . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976. 78 Luis Benitez Bribiesca, “Memetics: A Dangerous Idea,” Interciencia: Revista de Ciencia y Technologia de América (Venezuela: Asociación Interciencia), 26 (1), January 2001, pp. 29-31. 79 Nadia Youssef, “Cultural Ideals, Feminine Behavior and Family Control,” Comparative Studies in Society and History , Vol. 15, No. 3, June 1973. Pp. 326-47.

80 Ibid. 30 In order to describe how “honor” functions in a particular community and what social functions it exercises, in the next paragraphs I will focus on the culture of Bedouins which can be found in the Middle East, Gulf region and some parts of Africa and which has incorporated a “code of honor” as a means of strict social order and social hierarchy. The anthropological analysis of the social system of a Bedouin society is extremely important for the present study, as it gives us an idea where tribalism and customary law of the Middle Eastern societies find their roots.

3.1.2.1. Notions of “honor,” tribalism and customary law in Bedouin community: Anthropological, sociological and psychological insights

Bedouins are a predominantly desert-dwelling Arab ethnic groups traditionally divided into tribes or clans. The latter division of clans, according to Durkheim,81 would be the main indicator of a traditional society bound by mechanic solidarity. Bedouin’s code of honor is a central focus to their society which dictates all law and customs within the tribes. The Bedouin code of honor is determined, first of all, by climate conditions of the region where the Bedouins dwelled. Due to the harshness of the desert, good grazing and watering grounds were strictly protected by those who were able to maintain their hold on the land. This usually meant that different tribes were raided because of the need for resources. The Bedouin strict code of honor made him bound to protect the women and children, and ensure that they had enough food and resources to survive. It is said that the Western World’s ideals of chivalry and honor were brought back from the knights of the Crusades, who admired the Bedouin honor codes.82 The Bedouins’ “honor code” contains the terms “ird” and “sharaf” that reflect their values of honor: “Ird differs from sharaf in that sharaf can be acquired and augmented through a right behavior and great achievements, whereas ird can only be lost by the misconduct of the woman. And once lost, it cannot be regained.”83 Since “ird” appears to be the main cultural mechanism that mandates honor killings, some researchers 84 assume that in order to eradicate honor killings among Bedouins, it is necessary to eliminate or neutralize “ird.” Y. Plesner suggests two broad policy goals aimed at

81 Emile Durkheim. The Division of Labor in Society . New York: Free Press, 1984 . 82 Bedouin Adventures. Our Bedouin Tribe: Culture and Traditions. http://www.bedouinadventures.com/about- us-1/our-bedouin-tribe (Accessed 22 December 2011) 83 Peter C. Dodd, “Family Honor and the Forces of Change in Arab Society,” International Journal of Middle East Studies , Vol. 4, No. 1. January, 1973, p. 41. 84 Yohanan Plesner, “Subverting the Ird Code: A Framework for Examining the Efficacy of Religious, Legal and Social Policies to Tackle “Honor Killings” in Southern Israel’s Bedouin Society.” Boston: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2003. http://www.plesner.co.il/pdf/12/10.pdf (Accessed 20 December 2011) 31 neutralizing the concept of “ird” among Bedouins: 1) to ensure that Bedouins’ honor would no longer depend on a woman’s sexual behavior alone through promoting other ways or other means of “honor,” 2) to ensure that there would be a smaller correlation between the ird norm and the actual adherence to it. Going back to the first suggestion, Y. Plesner takes an example of a Qatari society, where most of the citizens are of a Bedouin origin. Qatar, being a highly industrialized developed country with a broad range of educational facilities, also has a tradition of “honor” but killings on the basis of honor are a very rare phenomenon there, as Qatar offers more versatile ways to secure “honor”: one can achieve an honorable status by accumulating wealth or by obtaining a prestigious profession.85 In our opinion, this is a very important observation about existence of diverse ways of constructing honor for men, and it likewise corresponds to the conclusions of other scholars, such as A. Sev’er who points out that “the poor are even more possessive about their honor, since they have little else in the rigidly stratified societies they are part of.”86 Duran Bell in his research dedicated to patrilineal marriages among the first cousins practiced by the nomadic groups 87 underlines that in the Bedouin group there is a cultural attribute intrinsic to cultures of violence which can explain prevalence of such marriages. He maintains that their code of honor is a fundamental and essential element in the system of social reproduction : “ Honor joins with the fertility of women and the milk of camels as an essential input to the production of the Bedouin warrior.” 88 Although taking a note that from a Marxian perspective, honor may appear to be an ideological construct, functioning at the level of a “superstructure,” Bell presents it as an aspect of the “infrastructure;” a “mental” factor that interpenetrates the “material” in the structuring of Bedouin institutions. He further suggests that a code of honor intervenes as a mentally derived infrastructural element of a social process that requires the agnatic group to provide rights in women to the benefit of young warriors.89 In his theoretical constructions Bell makes a reference to the ideas of Ladislav Holy who also recognizes honor to be a foundational factor in the Bedouin social organization.90 Holy points out that the deportment of women after marriage remains the responsibility of her family of origin, including the responsibility to pay bloodwealth in the event that she commits

85 Ibid. 86 A. Sev’er. “Culture of Honor, Culture of Change: A Feminist Analysis of Honor Killings in Rural Turkey.” Violence Against Women: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal , 1999, 7 (9). 87 Duran Bell, “Evolution of Middle Eastern Social Structures: A New Model,” Social Evolution and History , Vol. 3, No. 2, 2004. http://www.economics.uci.edu/~dbell/nomadicevolution.pdf (Accessed 21 December 2011) 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Ladislav Holy. Kinship, honour, and solidarity: cousin marriage in the Middle East , Manchester, New York : Manchester University Press, 1989. 32 murder. Morally improper acts on her part are a source of shame for her father and brothers. It is they who are likely to kill her in the event that she commits adultery. L. Holy argues that: The strongest responsibility for a woman’s chastity befalls her father and brother, followed by the father’s brother, the father’s brother’s son, mother’s brother, mother’s brother’s son, etc. They exercise this responsibility by seeing to it that she gets married or by actually marrying her. What amounts, under certain circumstances, to an obligation to marry a kinswoman is thus directly related to the responsibility for her chastity.

Thus, the right to marry the “father’s brother’s daughter” among the Bedouins has the function of protecting her from irresponsible conduct that would stain the honor of her father and his agnates and controlling women’s chastity. And by achieving this protection of virtue and by being more easily negotiated and arranged, this form of marriage contributes greatly to strength of an agnatic group, its integrity, and emerges as an expression of agnatic solidarity. Lila Abu-Lughod, an American anthropologist of a Palestinian descent, having lived two years in the community of Bedouins in Egypt, also describes patrilateral parallel-cousin marriages among Bedouins of the Western Desert as a mechanism to control women’s sexuality, as in such a case a bride remains in her own camp where she was born and brought up; such marriages built on the prior bonds of paternal kinship are known for closeness, trust and extreme loyalty that impedes “misbehavior.” 91 She summarizes that women’s sexuality is viewed by the members of this community as a threat to their organized framework of social relations; therefore the modesty code is the strategy for protecting “ird” while undermining the sexuality and mitigating the threat. Bell suggests that a major difficulty in understanding honor nowadays by western scholars is the attempt of the bourgeois classes to appropriate for themselves a term that belonged appropriately only to a section of the European aristocracy.92 He claims that the duel was not simply a quaint custom that suffered the absence of law forbidding insult. Indeed, a law against insult is a fatal assault on the code of honor and to a large extent this was its purpose. A man of honor can greet insult only by reacting in a culturally approved, but always violent manner. While honor resides in social recognition, its defense is necessarily reserved for the honored individuals. It is only the “honor” of the bourgeoisie that law can protect. In this case, however, honor is transmogrified into “honorable.” Lila Abu-Lughod’s work “Veiled sentiments – honor and poetry in the Bedouin society ” represents a detailed profound anthropological study of the social interactions and

91 Lila Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments – Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, p. 56-59. 92 Duran Bell, “Evolution of Middle Eastern Social Structures: A New Model,” Social Evolution and History , Vol. 3, No. 2, 2004. http://www.economics.uci.edu/~dbell/nomadicevolution.pdf (Accessed 21 December 2011) 33 social structure (including questions of social stratifications, social hierarchy, gender roles exercised by both men and women) in the Bedouin society. In order to understand why strict sanctions, such as honor killings, might be imposed particularly on women, it is necessary to discuss the following two ideas about Bedouins put forth by the author. First, Abu-Lughod underlines the importance of kinship and belonging to the paternal kin among the Bedouins and a collective responsibility stemming out from this social structure – a condition when one member of the kin is responsible for the reputation of the whole clan. For instance, if a member of one clan pays a visit to the other clan, the way a newly arrived guest is treated is perceived as esteem of the whole his clan. If a woman commits adultery or a man behaves improperly (e.g., acting as a coward or a fearful person), their individual actions automatically lower the status of the whole clan to which they belong. These ideas corroborate Kennett’s description of tribal order of the Bedouins. What is important for the present study is his observation that at the back of all Bedouin Law and Custom lies the root idea, which is the maintenance of the fighting strength of the tribe . Therefore, all the individual actions of the person (e.g., domicile, births, marriages, and deaths) are of supreme importance to the tribe as the whole, in so far as they affect the actual or potential fighting strength.93 Unlike Western ideology of free choice and liberal values, the idea of tribalism involves looking at life entirely from the tribal standpoint, where each individual is merely a link in the tribal chain. According to Kennett, tribalism and collective idea become a backbone for the Penal Law among Bedouins. What main features characterize their Penal Law? Kennett maintains that Penal Law in “civilized” countries, in which the individual is the unit, consists in inflicting punishments on guilty individuals in order that the others may be warned and discouraged from similar misdeeds, and that the community as a whole may be saved from similar crimes against the safety, honor and welfare of the collective community. Bedouin Law, on the other hand, consists simply in retribution and restitution . It knows no punishments qua punishments, but rather solely concerned with the retribution and restitution “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.”94 The principle of restitution is very important as it gives as an insight from where the ideas of honor punishments originate, and which place they take in the tribal organization. Going back to the study of Abu-Lughod, apart from the ideas of patrilineal kinship based on the blood of agnates, she recalls certain ideas about women’s behavior. Because of their sexuality and menstruation women are considered less assertive, less strong, dominated, never pure, and more prone to temptations and to “improper behavior.” Bedouin women

93 Austin Kennett. Bedouin justice. Laws and customs among the Egyptian Bedouins . London: Franc Cass & Co Ltd., 1968, p. 27 94 Ibid., p. 30. 34 never wear white clothes that symbolize purity (unlike men), their traditional attires are of black and red colors even during the pilgrimage to Makkah. Since women normally lack purity and honor (in terms of being dependants ruled by men most of their lives and not being that strong and autonomous), one of the ways they can achieve an honorable status in the community is by being modest. This quality is highly valued and appreciated among Bedouin women. Here Abu-Lughod tracks an important distinction between voluntary and forced deference. Although those individuals who are coerced into obeying are scorned among the Bedouins (e.g. a woman who obeys her husband because she has no choice, either because of coming originally from a poor family or because she has no male kin who would stand up for her), those who voluntarily defer are honorable.95 The ideal woman for a Bedouin society is the one that “tahashshams” – a verb derived from the root “hashama” which means modesty, shame, and shyness. Hasham is a word closely linked to the Bedouin “code of honor” and to the concept of modesty, and involves both feeling of shame in the company of the more powerful and the acts of deference that arise out of these feelings. In the first instance, hasham is conceptualized as an involuntary experience (compared to an emotion); in the other instance, as a voluntary set of behaviors conforming to the “code of honor.” The cultural repertoire of such behaviors includes the most extreme and visible acts of veiling and dressing properly (covering hair, arms, legs and the outlines of the body) as well as more personal gestures, such as downcast eyes, humble but formal posture, and restraint in eating, talking, smoking, laughing and joking.96 To know when to “tahashsham” is a primarily goal of socialization in the Bedouin society, and the women who do not comply to the concepts of “hashama” are called as willful (gawya) or slutty (qhaba).97 To sum up, “hasham” becomes an “honor of the weak,” using the phrase of Abu-Lughod, in the Bedouin society. What about the “honor of the strong,” i.e., honor of the men? How is it defined? The author purports that the notion of honor is linked to autonomy: the ideal person among Bedouins is a “real man,” the apogee of control who manifests his independence in his freedom from control by others and his strength or potency in his unwillingness to submit to others. He commands respect because of his high degree of physical and emotional self- control. Because weakness is an anathema, individuals strive to assert their independence and strength through resistance to coercion or through aggressive responses to loss. The prime sentiment of resistance is anger, which is focused into the blame of others. An alternate

95 Lila Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments – Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society, Berkeley: University of University of California Press, 1999, p. 105 96 Ibid., p. 108. 97 Ibid., p. 109 35 strategy for asserting honor is defensive denial of concern. To admit that one is wounded or deeply affected by a certain loss is to admit a lack of autonomy and self-control, a dependency through vulnerability.98 Therefore, the notion of honor is shaped by a certain behavior which encompasses the following qualities: autonomy, self-control (including a rule of not succumbing to emotions in front of other people), strength, assertiveness, and stoicism (both emotional and physical). According to the Arab customary law, the individual who violates the “code of honor” is supposed to pay a high price, either by death or by granting a bloodmoney. Austin Kennet, analyzing the customary laws in Bedouin society regarding females, states that in Arab law there is no “age of consent,” a girl’s virtue and honor being solely assets belonging to her father or husband, she herself not being entitled to consent to anything.99 He further writes about strictness of punishment in case of adultery: When married woman, whose husband is still alive, is found by her husband in flagrante delito with a lover, the outraged husband is perfectly justified, according to Arab law, in killing them both out of hand. […] If the lover persuades the woman to elope, the crime is considered the worst insult possible, entailing the severest penalties. If the husband returns home, and finds his wife fled with the adulterer, and if, on giving chase, he can catch them up and kill them both, the position is as before. But if they escape entirely, the most extraordinary procedure obtains. The husband’s family are perfectly justified, according to the provisions of their own code, in catching as many as four men from the abductor’s family and killing them out of hand. They are also entitled to round up and confiscate every single camel in the possession of the other family.

However, Arab customary law is not the only set of principles in the Middle East or Asia that stem out from the notion of “honor.” The biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan – Pashtuns – is famous for strictly following its own practice of Pashtun custom, known as Pashtunwali, which includes the maintenance of female seclusion (purdah). It is further marked by value orientation, which places emphasis on male autonomy, equality, self- expression and aggressiveness – summarized under the concept of honor (“izzat”).100 Similar notions of honor, according to Horowitz and Schwarz,101 can be found in other cultures located geographically far from the Bedouins and Pashtuns: Samurai culture of traditional Japan, the Sarakatsani shepherd culture of Greece, the knightly culture of medieval Europe and even Chicano street gangs in Chicago. What makes difference between these

98 Ibid., p. 205. 99 Austin Kennett. Bedouin justice. Laws and customs among the Egyptian Bedouins . London: Franc Cass & Co Ltd., 1968. 100 Nassim Jawad. “Afghanistan: a nation of minorities.” Minority Rights Group International Report, 1992/2. p. 25. 101 Ruth Horowitz and Gary Schwartz, “Honor, normative ambiguity and gang violence” in American Sociological Review 39 (2): 238-51, 1974. 36 communities is that honor killings and honor-related violence justified on the grounds of punishment for the “stain on the reputation” are more prevalent crimes (and, moreover, supported both morally and in terms of legislation) in the Eastern countries, perhaps due to the concept of tribalism and a strong position of the customary law that becomes grounds for such anti-human rights actions, as honor violence, bloodmoney or trial by ordeal. Speaking about customary law of Bedouins and the way it is reflected nowadays in the Middle Eastern societies with regards to honor-based violence, what are the main sources of the customary law in general? Customary law as a social phenomenon that emanates directly from social customs, mores and traditions deserves a special place in analyzing the honor crime cases. Whilst common law in most countries of the world (even though sometimes being lenient to it) prohibits any kind of killings, customary law of Africa or the Middle East may as well allow them. In this case, as put forth by some researchers, it is not just the state or the individual may be in conflict with each other, but the group and the individual, or group and state, or most pertinently, even the tripartite combination of state, group and individual.102 Leon Sheleff in his work “ The future of tradition: Customary law, common law and legal pluralism ” (1999) examines the nature of the customary law and the manner in which the traditional beliefs and practice of tribal groupings may be recognized by state authorities. He proposes to move beyond the old anthropological and political categories of colonialism, and to see the “tribe” in sociological terms, as embodiment of a Gemeinschaft , as representing those qualities which Tönnies 103 tried to describe as the alternative to a Gesselschaft society, with the latter most noted in the western world. Although Sheleff maintains via referencing other scholars that tribal affiliations can be of a positive social impact (due to the feeling of “inherent generosity of within a tribe or a clan,” or a quality of “knowing certain responsibilities, duties, and main sanctions against those who do not fulfill expectations” 104 ), he nevertheless admits the fact of a possibility of clash of tribal rites and personal rights. He does recognize that part of the problem lies in the fact that some customs are incompatible with some of the basic rights enshrined in constitutions or elaborated in theorizing about the rule of law and human rights in general (these ideas are attune to the ones of the author of the present study expressed in the first section). He further compares two visions on the tribalism expressed by the African scholars Tom Mboya, who distinguishes between “positive” and “negative” tribalism, and Ali Mazrui,

102 Leon Sheleff. The Future of Tradition: Customary Law, Common Law and Legal Pluralism . London: Franc Cass, 1999. 103 Ferdinand Tönnies. Community and Society . East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957. 104 Leon Sheleff. The Future of Tradition: Customary Law, Common Law and Legal Pluralism. London: Franc Cass, 1999., p. 20 37 who argues for the coming demise of the tribal system. Tom Mboya, a Kenyan politician, laments that: People have done their worst in outlawing tribalism, and never differentiating what was positive and worth preserving. Missionaries taught Africans to despise their tribal culture, telling them it was in conflict with the modern world. No effort was made to trace what was good, or to point out to the potential leaders of a community how some customs could be modified to suit the changes in the world. People were simply taught European social behavior without any reference to African custom…105

From this approach we can see that Mboya actively advocates for a preservation of African idiosyncrasy, even if it takes forms of the tribalism. On the contrary, Mazrui believes that tribalism represent a biological human connection (mechanical solidarity, according to Durkheim) and will disappear soon; relationships based on economics will replace them, even though here the future is of constant class struggle. For Mazrui “the ultimate destination for humankind is not a classless society, but a detribalized society, at least in the sense of the final elimination of all forms of political and economic allegiances on the solidarity of kith and kin.”106 Mboya’s ideas are attune to the point of view of another critique of tribalism “Tribesmen ,” a book of Marshall Sahlins where he states: “In its broadest term the contrast between tribe and civilization is between War and Peace. A civilization is a society specially constituted to maintain “law and order”; the social complexity and cultural richness of civilizations depend on institutional guarantees of Peace. Lacking these institutional means and guarantees, tribesmen live in conditions of War, and War limits the scale, complexity and all- round richness of their culture, and accounts for some of their more “curious” customs.”107

He further adds that “in tribal societies control of force is not withheld from the people, they are in that condition Hobbes called Warre, which is a fatal condition if not checked.” Sheleff, although viewing the tribe as an undoubtedly problematic concept (such as class or caste), whose validity has been challenged, argues that customary law should be recognized as a “living law” of a community as a part of a pluralistic society, and as a part of a “legal pluralism.” But is this idea prevalent among all the representatives of scientific community? In both sociology and law there is nowadays an increasing search for the essence of community (in sociology) and communitarianism (in law). Therefore, there are two main attitudes to tribalism as a social and legal phenomenon supported by the academia: the one

105 Ibid., p. 20 106 Ibid., p. 24 107 Marshall Sahlins. Tribesmen. Foundations of Modern Anthropology Series: Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1968 at p. 42. 38 that claims the tribe is a biological way of organization prevalent among primitive peoples, and eventually has to vanish; and the other that proposes to focus rather on positive aspects of the tribe, such as a cultural idiosyncrasy and interpersonal relations between members of the tribe including certain duties and obligations.108 The tradition of honor killings contains at its heart the elements of tribalism and customary law of different countries. Hence, in the present study customary law is rather viewed as a negative phenomenon. While taking a note of its enormous social impact and recognizing the importance of its analysis, I am concerned with the possible harmful effects that customary tribal law in its pure form might produce for the women and children. Both can be targeted as subjects of harmful traditional practices. However, regarding immigrants from Eastern countries in Europe and North America, some researchers point out that tribal identity “often becomes of a greater importance in the urban areas, as migrants seek help.”109 Sometimes it can be legitimate and positive, when given within the framework of social welfare considerations, but often it is negative, when exploited for the purpose of gaining favored treatment or as a ploy for political power, continuously argues Sheleff. Resorting to tribal traditions (e.g., using kinship contacts) becomes an option for those migrants seeking help and experiencing hardships abroad. Moreover, some researchers claim that resorting to tribal traditions help immigrants coping with the alienation of the Western world. In the next chapter I will discuss how honor-related crimes can be interpreted in the light of the feminism and gender studies, and in the light of criminological theory of social control which is based mostly on sociological interpretation of social reality.

3.1.3. Criminology

For the explanations of honor killings from a criminological point of view, I will refer to the following theories: 1) feminist theory of criminology which states that crime is shaped by patriarchal systems and different gender roles men and women exercise in the society; 2) social control theory (Travis Hirschi) which suggests that people’s moral codes, such as norms, values and relationships prevent them from breaking the law. Travis Hirschi, constructing his theory of delinquency, goes back to the tradition of Durkheim and Hobbes stating that delinquent acts will take place when the connection to society, or social bonds, are broken. This is more sociological theory, as Hirschi disassociates

108 Leon Sheleff, p. 22 109 Ibid., p. 21 39 from the psychological reasons of crime (prevalent at that time in the American criminology) stemming from the individual mind, and explains the emergence of crime through the deterioration of social connections, the same way Durkheim did it in his work “Suicide” arguing that the higher level of suicides were more prevalent in the societies with a lower level of trust and social bonds. Therefore, the lack of societal control is purported to be the root of criminality. The explanation provided by Hirschi as to why individuals conform to or deviate from social norms entails four variables that were subjects of analysis in his work “Causes of delinquency”: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief.110 By attachment, Hirschi refers to the extent to which a person is attached to others. As the individual becomes more attached to others, he is far less likely to become delinquent. The primary attachments and interactions are with the parents, closely followed by the attachments to peers, teachers, religious leaders, and other members of a community. He claims that the essence of internalization of norms, conscience or superego thus lies in the attachment of the individuals to others. Therefore, a person with strong bonds of attachment better internalizes society’s norms and becomes a “moral animal.” Since to violate a norm is to act contrary to the wishes and expectations of other people, an individual is free to deviate only if he does not care about the wishes and expectations of other people – that is, if he is insensitive to the opinion of others. Commitment is “the rational component in conformity.” 111 , according to Hirschi. In general, it refers to the fear of law-breaking behavior. When one considers committing deviant or criminal behavior, he must consider the risks of losing the investment he has made in previous conventional behavior. Moreover, it can be generally assumed that the decision to commit a criminal act may well be rationally determined. The actor’s decision is not irrational given the risks and costs he faces. In terms of honor-related violence, the risks and costs of the perpetrator are certainly higher in the foreign Western countries, but can it be considered as a factor mitigating the incidence of honor crime abroad? Engrossment in conventional activities comprises the component of involvement. “Many persons undoubtedly owe a life of virtue to a lack of opportunity to do otherwise” – states Hirschi. 112 He believes that involvement in conventional activities would keep someone's time too occupied to allow him the indulgence of deviant behavior. The assumption is that persons might be too busy performing their routine activities to find time to

110 Travis Hirschi. Causes of Delinquency . New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2002. 111 Ibid., p. 16 112 Ibid., p. 21 40 engage in deviant behavior. The person involved in such activities is tied to appointment, deadlines, working hours, plans so the opportunity to commit deviant act rarely arises. Finally, belief refers to the existence of a common value system within the society whose norms are being violated. If the deviant is committed to a value system different from that of conventional society, there is, within the context of the theory, nothing to explain (the case of immigrant communities in the European or North American countries). However, one of the approaches argues that an individual can at once violate the rule and maintain his belief in it. The outcome reminds a Freud’s defense mechanism of “rationalization,” which involves making excuses to defend the behavior that is known to be wrong. Although honor killings are forbidden by Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Christianity or any other religious system; the religious rationale is sometimes used to defend them. In the present study I maintain that the idea of social control of Hirschi can be used explaining the phenomenon of honor-based violence. However, since honor-based crimes belong to a very particular kind of delinquency (caused by different reasons than those rooted in white-collar crime, organized crime etc.) the theory itself should be interpreted in a reverse way. If, according to Hirschi, normally crime is caused by social disorganization, honor-based crime is caused, on the contrary, by the high level of social organization, social bonds and existence of all four Hirschi’s variables: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. Surprisingly, honor-based crime becomes an exception in a logical chain of crime classification and therefore clearly stands out in comparison to other kinds of crime. The analysis of honor-related crime becomes even more intriguing and multi-faceted together with the analysis of public opinion towards this phenomenon (social aspect), customary and common laws (legal aspect) of a certain country. Whereas very often in the Middle Eastern or South Asian countries the common law clearly prohibits honor killings, this crime is silently approbated on the community level or on the level of customary law. While in the Western countries honor killings constitute both deviant behavior and crime, in the Middle East, South Asia or North Africa honor killings might be a crime, but not necessarily a deviant behavior since it meets with an approbation of other individuals. In this relation the definition of delinquency by Hirschi as “acts, the detection of which is thought to result in punishment of the person committing them by the agents of the larger society” 113 can also be contested. Radical feminist criminologists understand violence against women not as a pathological, but rather as an intentional behavior chosen by men as a part to construct their

113 Ibid., p. 62 41 masculinity as dominant and powerful.114 While Hirschi was looking for an answer of why people conform, rather than deviate from norms, it has been already asserted by the radical feminists that violence against women is a foundation of patriarchy. The only way to eradicate the inequality and masculine dominance is by minimizing and eventually eliminating differences between genders, and achieving the state of androgyny. Violence against women (including honor-related violence), according to radical feminist criminologists, stems out of the nature of heterosexual relations, where women are victims and men are rapists. VAW is explained by the personal aggressiveness and ruthlessness of the man. Hence for Caputi, the sex in sex murder is a political sex, and what is unique about the modern age is that it is the “age of sex crime,” or a new mode of heterosexual expression – the lust murder, the mutilation killing.115 The fusion of violence and heterosexuality is discussed in the works of MacKinnon, when she argues that sexuality is a natural attribute and the primary sphere of masculine power, encompassing the expropriation of women’s sexuality by men. It is the exploitative nature of heterosexuality that structures men and women as social beings in society. MacKinnon maintains that the universal system of patriarchy is maintained through heterosexuality and sexual violence – rape, wife beating, wife rape, incestuous assault, and sexual harassment. For MacKinnon, sexuality is crucial to women’s subordination, and she theorizes it as the dynamic of inequality: gender derives from sexual dominance, not vise versa.116 Although Abu-Lughod and other scholars who analyzed the structure of Bedouin’s society did not adopt a radical position regarding this issue, Abu-Lughod did underline that the sexuality of women makes them subjects of a strict code of modesty which does not allow many actions Bedouin men perform. One of the main representatives of feminist theory of criminology James Messerschmitdt in his work “ Masculinities and crime ” (1993) was trying to construct a sociology of masculinity in order to explain the questions of delinquency and to determine why most of the violent crimes are performed by male offenders. In search for this answer, Messerschmidt coined the term of “hegemonic masculinity.” Messerschmidt defined

114 Eamonn Carrabine, Maggy Lee, Pam Cox, Ken Plummer and Nigel South. Criminology: A Sociological Introduction. New York: Routledge, 2009. http://books.google.co.in/books?id=_qsfAZXV98sC&pg=PA200&lpg=PA200&dq=messerschmidt+criminology +feminist&source=bl&ots=cb1f_KKswI&sig=8GURRIWBSuzKpZCRRKrG_jkdQuU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=A3D9 TqfpN8zNrQf2v9zkDw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=messerschmidt%20criminology%20feminist&f=false (Accessed 15 December 2011) 115 James Messerschmidt . Masculinities and crime: Critique and reconceptualization of theory . Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC: Lanham, 1993. http://books.google.es/books?id=xo0gTQg5oi8C&pg=PA119&hl=es&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q &f=false (accessed 20 December 2011) 116 Ibid. 42 hegemonic masculinity as “emphasizing… authority, control, competitive individualism, independence, aggressiveness, and the capacity for violence.117 ” Hegemonic masculinity, a theory informed by a radical feminism, asserts that people will act in ways that reinforce main privilege by supporting conformity to an idealized version of masculinity, even if it may not be in their best interest, to maintain the system of patriarchy. Hegemony, as originally discussed by a political theorist Antonio Gramsci, works by coaxing, rather than forcing people to abide by social norms (which implies the assumption of power within a society without the use of force).118 Hegemonic masculinity suggests that men comply with social norms of masculinity by subordinating women (external hegemony) and marginalizing men (internal hegemony). Masculinity as a way of behavior is also a means of maintaining prestige and reputation in every society: men are supposed to be tough, strong, dominant, aggressive, while women are expected to be subordinate, flexible, fragile, inert and passive. Not every culture has the same understanding of what “being a real man” implies; such notions are culturally relative. Views on masculinity and gender roles, imposed by a cultural environment, also play an important role in the interpretation of the honor killings. Some scholars (such as Messerschmidt, Bowker, Kimmel and Messner) have been already carried out researches about masculinity as a significant construct in understanding crime and violence. Honor-related violence can be viewed as a part of “constructing gender,” an idea put forth by West and Zimmerman in 1987.119 Gender is not a stable entity but a routine process that is created and maintained throughout every day interaction. Consequently, men use the resources available to them to assert their gender – to show they are “manly.” As suggested by Messerschmidt, there are traditional (socially approved) and alternative (violent) outlets that can be used to attain the same goal in “constructing gender.” For instance, getting promoted at work, earning a decent salary, doing sports are socially approved activities to gain masculine traits and prestige, while violence is an alternative outlet which may be utilized when other ways are unattainable. In the situation with honor killings, the outlets have a relative character as in some societies murdering a person for the sake of “restoring family honor” is socially approved (at least by certain groups) and might be viewed as a tool of

117 James Messerschmidt . Masculinities and crime: Critique and reconceptualization of theory . Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC: Lanham, 1993. http://books.google.es/books?id=xo0gTQg5oi8C&pg=PA119&hl=es&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q &f=false (Accessed 20 December 2011) 118 Ibid. 119 Jessy Krienert. Masculinity and Crime: A Quantitative Exploration of Messerschmidt’s Hypothesis.” Electronic Journal of Sociology, 2003. http://www.sociology.org/content/vol7.2/01_krienert.html (Accessed 15 January 2012). 43 maintaining masculine dignity, while in the Western countries such a way of constructing masculinity is absolutely unacceptable from both social and legal standpoints. Messerschmidt suggests that criminal behavior can be used as a resource to accomplish masculinity when other resources are not available. The latter idea corresponds to what Sev’er and Plesner maintain about the honor crimes as more frequently occurring among people with low economic and socio-cultural status.120

3.3.“Geography” of honor killings worldwide

Although, as it has been already mentioned in the introduction part, the honor killings and honor-related violence of Eastern origin had permeated into European realities some decades ago, these incidents are certainly more prevalent in the number of Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. In the forthcoming sections I will discuss the “geography” of honor killings worldwide briefly discussing the countries with the highest incidence of honor-related crime worldwide (Pakistan, Palestine and Jordan).

3.3.1 Pakistan

Although the exact numbers are unknown, Pakistan is probably the country where such atrocities are most pervasive and are called “karo-kari.” Estimating the scale of the phenomenon there, as elsewhere, is made more difficult not only by the problems of data collection in predominantly rural countries, but by the extent to which community members and political authorities collaborate in covering up the atrocities. According to Yasmeen Hassan, author of “ The Haven Becomes Hell: A Study of Domestic Violence in Pakistan ”: “The concepts of women as property and honor are so deeply entrenched in the social, political and economic fabric of Pakistan that the government, for the most part, ignores the daily occurrences of women being killed and maimed by their families.”121 The main peculiarity of women’s rights gaps in Pakistan consists in the fact that honor violence almost always goes unpunished. There is a certain attitude in the society which is being cultivated by political leaders and juridical systems. As S. Goldenberg’s article reveals: “Activists argue the government has given tacit encouragement to such crimes by seeking to make Islamic practice the supreme law in the country, making it politically impossible to take

120 Ideas of A. Sev’er and Y. Plesner have been mentioned in the previous section. 121 Adam Jones. “Case Study: Honor Killings and Blood Feuds.” http://www.gendercide.org/case_honour.html Gendercide Watch (Accessed 2 February 2012) 44 a hard line against those who kill in the name of religion.122 ” Hana Jilani, a Pakistani lawyer and a women’s rights activist, has collected 150 case studies as of 1999, and in only eight did the judges reject the argument that the women were killed for honor. All the others were let off, or given reduced sentences How islamization of the country influences the enactment of some laws targeted at women’s safety and dignity, is discussed in the work of Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Vanja Hamzic “Control and Sexuality: The Revival of Zina Laws in Muslim Contexts ” (2010),123 where the authors depict the reintroduction of the so-called zina laws (laws that criminalize an actual or perceived women’s adultery and any kind of sexual intercourse of women outside of marriage) along with the imposition of a certain dress code in the framework of “purdah” as based on both patriarchal demands and political ambitions to gain or hold political influence and power. The authors mention honor murders together with rape, psychological and physical torture, domestic violence, and impunity for perpetrators of such atrocities, as some of the widespread consequences of the revival of zina laws in Muslim countries. Mir-Hosseini and Hamzic claim that those particularly affected are poor women and girls from rural areas with limited access to education; female migrant workers; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersex and queer (LGBTQ) individuals. In her opinion, there are two tremendously important aspects of the revival of zina laws: misconception of religious justice and the misconception of gender justice. Honor murders, especially in Pakistan, are frequently interpreted as actions in line with the Qur’anic principles. The resurgence of Islam in the 20 th century in certain countries and Islamic fundamentalism leads not only to developing of a relevant legal framework where women are subjects to humiliating treatment, but also gives a rise to a culture of male impunity if it comes to defending their “honor.” Tapping into popular demands for social justice, the Islamist rallying cry of “return to Shari’a” led to regressive gender policies, with devastating consequences for women: compulsory dress codes, gender segregation, and the revival of outdated patriarchal and tribal attitudes of social relations. At the same time, the Islamists criminalized – and thus politicized – areas of sexual and moral behavior, that had previously not been the concern of the state, and thus facilitated enforcement of their authoritarian and patriarchal interpretations of the law. The second half of the 20 th century has been marked by the revival of fiqh-based 124 penal laws codified in Pakistan in 1979 (Enforcement of Hudood Ordinances).125

122 Suzanne Goldenberg. “A Question of Honor.” The Guardian (UK), May 27, 1999. http://www.gendercide.org/case_honour.html (Accessed 2 February 2012). 123 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Vanja Hamzic. Control and Sexuality: The Revival of Zina Laws in Muslim Contexts. London: Women Living Under Muslim Laws, 2010. 124 Fiqh (“deep understanding” in Arabic) is Islamic jurisprudence. It deals with the observance of rituals, morals and social legislation in Islam. Technically it refers to the body of Islamic law extracted from detailed Islamic 45 The revival of zina laws that criminalize consensual sexual activity of women, as put forth by Mir-Hosseini, authorize VAW. Although admitting that zina laws are a part of Islamic legal tradition, the author rejects such statements as “Islam says…” or “Islam allows” arguing that Islam does not speak, rather it is people who claim to speak in the name (with authority) of Islam, selecting sacred texts out of context that appear to justify certain claims. There is a similar situation in regard to honor violence: neither is it allowed nor approved by Qur’an, but Pakistani political leaders claim such punishments of women to be in line with the principles of Islam. When religious reasons do not work, then cultural reasons or references to tribal traditions might be utilized. “The Guardian” reports from an honor killing case, that in May 2008 three teenage girls have been buried alive by their tribe in a remote part of Pakistan to punish them for attempting to choose their own husbands. The girls, thought to have been aged between 16 and 18, were kidnapped by a group of men from their Umrani tribe. After news of the deaths emerged, male politicians from their province, Baluchistan, defended the killings in parliament, claiming the practice was part of “our tribal custom.” In Pakistan's national parliament, an MP from Baluchistan, Israrullah Zehri, said on Friday that “this action was carried out according to tribal traditions,” a view backed up by some other male lawmakers, who attacked a woman senator who had raised the case. “These are centuries-old traditions and I will continue to defend them,” 126 Zehri added over the weekend. The killings happened in the Naseerabad district of Baluchistan. Although so-called honor killings are not unusual, burying the victims alive seems to have been brutal even by tribal standards.127 “It is very common for women in these cases to be deprived of an honorable burial. This is to make sure others learn the lesson,” said Samar Minallah, a human rights activist based in Islamabad.128 Killing is not the only way of protecting the honor and reputation of a male. Besides killings and psychological threats, Pakistan is known for the widespread cases of acid attacks which leave women’s faces and bodies disfigured for life. Burning and cutting are other weapons used by men who commit such crimes. Lawyer and women's activist Nahida Mahbooba Elahi states: “We deal with these cases every day, but I have seen very few convictions. The men say the wife didn't obey their orders, or was having relations with

sources and the process of gaining knowledge of Islam through jurisprudence. There are four prominent schools (madh’hab) of fiqh within Sunni practice and two within Shi’a practice. 125 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Vanja Hamzic. Control and Sexuality: The Revival of Zina Laws in Muslim Contexts, p. 26 126 Saeed Shah. “Three Teenage Girls Buried Alive in Tribal “Honour” Killing.” The Guardian (UK), 1 September 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/01/pakistan (accessed 4 February 2012) 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 46 someone else. The police often say it is a domestic matter and refuse to pursue the case. Some judges even justify it and do not consider it murder.”129 Therefore, apart from patriarchal attitudes, two factors influence the high incidence of honor murders and honor violence in Pakistan: the revival of Islamist laws that criminalize any instances of women’s sexuality and their legal embodiment in the juridical system of the country; and the reluctance of police or politicians to review the cases of honor violence and treat them as a serious crime. While the victims of Pakistani “honor” killings are overwhelmingly female, tradition dictates that males involved in the crimes should face death as well. But the accused women are standardly killed first, giving men a chance to flee retribution. Moreover, targeted men can escape death by paying compensation to the family of the female victim, leading to an “honor killing industry involving tribesmen, police and tribal mediators,” which “provides many opportunities to make money, [or] obtain a woman in compensation,” according to Amnesty International.130

3.3.2. Jordan

Jordan presents an interesting case in terms of investigation into cases of honor violence. Being notoriously lenient on honor killings based on Articles 340 and 98 of the Penal Code, the country is now in the process of changing its view on processing honor killings’ cases due to a strong international pressure and further measures taken by Kind Abdullah II and Queen Rania in 2009. In Jordan, honor killings have long been sanctioned by law. According to Article 340 of the criminal code: “A husband or a close blood relative who kills a woman caught in a situation highly suspicious of adultery will be totally exempt from sentence.” 131 Article 98 of the Penal Code, meanwhile, guaranteed a lighter sentence for male killers of female relatives who have committed an “act which is illicit in the eyes of the perpetrator.”132 Article 98 used to be often cited alongside Article 340 in cases of honor killings; it stipulated that a reduced sentence is applied to a person who kills another person in a “fit of fury’.” It has been noted

129 Suzanne Goldenberg. “A Question of Honour.” The Guardian (UK), May 27, 1999. http://www.gendercide.org/case_honour.html (accessed 2 February 2012). 130 Adam Jones. “Case Study: Honor Killings and Blood Feuds.” http://www.gendercide.org/case_honour.html Gendercide Watch (Accessed 2 February 2012) 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid. 47 that “in practice, once a murder has been judged an honor killing, the usual sentence is from three months to one year.”133 These provisions of the Penal Code of Jordan that directly violated international human rights regulations had been condemned by international human rights organizations that have numerously appealed to King Abdullah II to put an end to the practice. The historical and structural origins of the article 340 come from three separate countries that made an impact on the early modernization of Jordan. The article itself is a combination of the French Penal Code of 1980 and the Ottoman Penal Code of 1858. Although there have twice been efforts to change the legislation and amend the articles 340 and 98, in 2003 the Parliament of Jordan has overwhelmingly rejected a proposed law imposing harsher punishments for men who kill female relatives in honor killings. It was the second time that the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, quashed the bill on such killings, which are mostly carried out by brothers and fathers against women who have had sex outside of marriage. Jordanian MPs argued that more lenient punishments will violate religious traditions and damage the fabric of Jordan's conservative society, where men have the final say.134 Attempts to introduce harsher sentences have been blocked in Jordan's parliament, where the predominantly conservative Bedouin lawmakers allegedly argued that tougher penalties would lead to adultery. Some members of government have also urged judges to consider honor killings equal to other homicides and punishable by up to 15 years in prison. But many in the judiciary kept handing down lenient punishments of half of that or less.135 It is estimated that around two dozen women are killed each year in these conservative areas of Jordan by male relatives who typically accuse them of besmirching the family honor through adultery or having sex outside of marriage. Most incidents take place in the conservative Bedouin heartland of southern Jordan.136 However, the death toll may even run into the hundreds, with hundreds more women in perpetual hiding, fearful for their lives. Finally, in July 2009 the government started restructuring the legal system to deal with honor crimes as normal criminal cases, and Jordan has seen at least 10 cases result in prison sentences of seven to 15 years. After pressure from activist groups and even Jordan’s King Abdullah II and Queen Rania, the courts created a special judicial committee to handle honor crimes. It also began working with non-government organizations to educate legal officials

133 Julian Borger. "In Cold Blood," Manchester Guardian Weekly , November 16, 1997. 134 BBC News. “Honor Killings Law Blocked.” 8 September, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3088828.stm (accessed 3 February 2012) 135 Dale Gavlak. “Jordan Honor Killing: Man Confesses to Brutally Stabbing To Death Pregnant Sister.” Huffington Post, 12 April 2009. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/12/jordan-honor-killing-man- _n_185977.html (Accessed 3 February 2012) 136 Ibid. 48 about how to deal with the honor killings. When these efforts began in 2009, Rana Husseini 137 and many other activists doubted they would bring about much change. Since then, however, the court has yet to hand out one of the nominal prison sentences that used to be standard. Still, in almost all honor crime cases, families drop charges so the accused receives only half of the assigned prison sentence.138 Though the overall number of honor crimes has not dropped, Enaam Asha, a member of the board directors at the Sisterhood is Global Institute in Jordan, said that her organization had begun to see a slight cultural shift in how people handled incidents that could have previously resulted in honor crimes. Now, when a young woman has relations with a man before marriage, rather than escalating to violence, Asha said some families are willing to resolve the situation through non-violent methods, such as marrying the couple. Additionally, she noted that the local media had begun reporting on honor crimes in such a way that was empathetic toward the victim. In the past, many news reports would condemn the murdered woman. The longer prison sentences “reflect the change in the mentality of the judges in handling these kinds of cases and more importantly the change in the social perspective,” Asha said. “Maybe the number of honor crimes is not decreasing ... but through our daily interaction with people working on this issue, we were able to spot that there is a difference in how people handle such issues. People are becoming more understanding to such cases, both on the perpetrator’s part and the victim’s part, and also the society and the families around them.” 139 Thus even though Article 340 of the Jordan Penal Code has been repealed, the experts, however, claim that perpetrators of honor crimes still benefit inappropriately from the provisions in Articles 97 and 98, which allow for a reduction in sentence if a man is "provoked" into killing.140 Moreover, it is pointed out that despite the urgent need for national women's shelters where women may find refuge and support, the government of Jordan still has not followed up on its pledge that women in Jordan would soon have access to such facilities. It is still critical therefore to press for penal reform and the urgent provision of shelters in Jordan.

137 Rana Husseini is a famous Jordanian human rights activist researching the topic of honor killings and thus considered to be one of the experts in this area worldwide. She is an author of the book “Murder in The Name of Honor” (2010). Based in Jordan, she is a senior reporter at The Jordan Times and an advisor to the U.S. government funded human rights organization Freedom House . 138 Tom A. Peter. “Jordan Honor Killings Draw Tough Response.” Global Post, April 7 2010 http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/jordan/100323/honor-killings-jordan (Accessed 4 February 2012) 139 Ibid. 140 Feminist.com. “Spotlight on: Honor Killings.” No Date Available. http://www.feminist.com/violence/spot/honor.html (Accessed 5 February 2012) 49 3.3.3. Palestine/Israel

Honor killings are also regularly reported on the Occupied Palestinian Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Both Jordan and Palestine are located on the territories with the strong Bedouin traditions of customary law and tribalism previously discussed in this study. If honor murders in the Bedouin camps are not surprising due to their strict “code of honor,” what about urbanized areas? How do the people perceive the actions of others? In fact, the situation of Bedouin honor and demands for female behavior is reflected in the modern Palestinian society. Palestinian communities are typically insular, as noted by the experts.141 Family members often remain in the same village or neighborhood for their entire lives. Wealthy or poor, the reputation and honor of a family are its most important attributes. The family is considered the central unit in economic, social, and religious spheres of life; it also constitutes a source of support, unity, and cohesion that can sustain the individual socially, economically, and politically. The family plays a crucial role in providing assistance and services that in the modern state are expected from formal social services, for instance, mutual support in protection, financial support, employment, child rearing, etc. Family members are expected to be totally committed to the values of family protection, unity and reputation, which may require putting aside their own personal, needs, aspirations, and desires in favor of the group. The collectivist orientation stresses self-sacrifice of individual members for the “common good,” and lays out expectations to put the community's welfare and interests beyond one's personal happiness.142 Once a Palestinian student in Ukraine while interviewed about “what happens if he gets abused by the police or other authorities back home” he surprisingly exclaimed: “Back there we have a strong family that won’t let it happen. See that guy in the university cafeteria, Hussain? I have never met him before coming to Ukraine, but he has my last name, and hence belongs to my family. If he gets in trouble, I will be the one to protect him or revenge, and he will do the same for me.”143 That’s how a brother who killed his sister for “honor” in 1995 in Palestine explained his inner motives and the rationales: “She is my sister – my flesh and blood – I am a human being. I didn't want to kill her. I didn't want to be in this situation. They [community members] push[ed] me to make this decision. I know what they expect from me. If I do this,

141 James Emery. “Reputation is Everything: Honor Killing Among the Palestinians.” WorldAndi, No Date Available http://www.worldandi.com/newhome/public/2003/may/clpub.asp (Accessed 5 February 2012) 142 Anat Berko, Edna Erez. “Gender, Palestinian Women and Terrorism: Women’s Liberation or Oppresion?.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 30, 6 June 2007, pages 493-519. 143 From the interviews with foreign long-term students carried out in Ukraine, Kharkov in the framework of my previous MA thesis “Peculiarities of adaptation of foreigners to different socio-cultural conditions.” 50 they look at me like a hero, a clean guy, a real man. If I don't kill my sister, the people would look at me like I am a small person.”144 It should be noted that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are governed by the Palestinian Authority under a combination of Jordanian, Egyptian, and tribal laws. Israel has no jurisdiction in these territories. Leniency for honor killings dates back to a 1960 Jordanian legal codex, parts of which are still in effect in the West Bank; the area was under Jordanian rule until it was captured by Israel in 1967. Hundreds of women have died from strange and unusual accidents or questionable suicides. Many more are buried in the desert, unreported and unaccounted for. The secret of their fate is entombed with them in the sand. The lack of reliable statistics has hindered women's groups and human rights organizations in their campaign to eliminate honor killings. 145 Among Palestinians, all sexual encounters, including rape and incest, are blamed on the woman. Men are presumed innocent; the woman must have tempted him into raping her or enticed him into having an affair. A woman is expected to protect her honor, even at the cost of her own life. If she survives a violent rape, she is condemned for her “mistake” and may be killed by her family. Men are considered to be so free in the Middle Eastern society, that a wife has no moral right to ask her husband a simple question “where are you?” as this question might be considered to be offensive by the man who assumes a total liberty from the youth. At this point it is pertinent to recall the observations of Abu-Lughod about differences in the upbringing of girls and boys in the Bedouin community of Awlad Ali.146 Her research reports that mothers believe it is important to indulge boys in their youth, for it contributes to the boys’ fearlessness and a spirit of liberty (as anyway men will be free in their society), while girls should be treated with more strictness and less indulgence, for they will be always dependent on some male member of their family and therefore would need to be fearful and submissive. It is known that for Palestinian women accused of sexual infidelity or disobeying their family, there is little recourse. Few are given the opportunity to refute the charges or prove their innocence. It is difficult for women to flee the situation because of the following reasons. First, there are socio-economic reasons. Arab societies are close-knit, and most of women lack the resources to live alone. Palestinian newspapers include advertisements placed by families who are looking for female relatives accused of immoral behavior. The

144 Suzanne Zima, "When Brothers Kill Sisters," The Gazette [Montreal], April 17, 1999. 145 Ibid. 146 Lila Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments – Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 51 community is warned not to interfere, not to hide the woman.147 That is why even if a woman decides to run away, she is likely to be found and killed. If she does manage to escape and decides to live on her own in a new place, she probably won’t be able to for financial reasons. The second reason is the lack of social centers and available social workers for the victims of gender-based violence. The Palestinian community has limited resources and shelters for the victims of VAW, which is why women accused of inappropriate behavior are frequently jailed to protect them from their families. At least fifty women a year are imprisoned in Jordan on honor-related cases. The number held in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is unknown. It is reported that the length of detention ranges from a few months to several years. Some of the female detainees expressed concern that they would never be able to leave jail because their families would kill them. Once imprisoned, women can be released only to a male relative, who must first agree not to execute them. Regardless of assurances, women are often murdered within hours of their discharge. Fayez Mohammed secured the release of his seventeen-year-old daughter, Lamis, from a Jordanian detention center where she was staying for her protection. He guaranteed her safety and then slit her throat. Fayez was sentenced to nine months in prison for the crime.148 In Palestinian communities, a woman's purity reflects directly on a family's reputation. If a woman is raped, missing, or even rumored to have engaged in premarital sexual relations, she is taken to a medical clinic for a hymen exam. In fact, forced virginity tests of women are considered to belong to the category of harmful traditional practices by the experts of the UN CEDAW. The process of hymen exams, as claimed by an anthropologist and journalist James Emery, can have fatal consequences. Over 75 percent of the Palestinian women in Jordan subjected to hymen exams were subsequently killed by family members, even when tests proved they were still virgins. Some women, including virgins, have operations to reattach their hymen prior to marriage, in part, to ensure that they bleed on their wedding night. This procedure, illegal in most Arab countries, can save a woman's honor, and perhaps her life. Among Arabs, it is essential that the new bride be a virgin. If the bride's hymen is not intact, or if she fails to bleed during initial penetration, the husband can declare the marriage void and return her to her family. Viewing her as damaged goods, her family may feel they have no alternative but to kill her, even if they believe she is innocent of any wrongdoing.149 The third reason of why it is so difficult and almost impossible for Palestinian women to flee the situation of “honor punishment” consists in a psychological reason deeply

147 James Emery. “Reputation is Everything: Honor Killing Among the Palestinians.” WorldAndi, No Date Available http://www.worldandi.com/newhome/public/2003/may/clpub.asp (Accessed 5 February 2012) 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid. 52 entrenched in their minds due to the cultural settings, certain socialization patterns and upbringing. Palestinian women are characterized by the feeling of fatalism, perhaps originally rooted in the ideas of jihad and extremist beliefs promoted by the radical Palestinian political groups. James Emery mentions that in such cases women, instead of looking for the ways of saving their life, often accept their fate and expect to be executed. He maintains that girls, feeling they are ruined by scandal, go submissively to the slaughter. They feel it is a law of their society which they have to respect. Such is the power of culture that has conditioned both victim and killer to accept their roles. Moreover, even if they have a possibility to escape and move to Jordan starting a new life there, they fear such an action would bring even bigger shame to their family, which is why girls opt for death. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW): “Palestinian women and girls who report abuse to the authorities find themselves confronting a system that prioritizes the reputations of their families in the community over their own well-being and lives.” 150 Sometimes honor crime takes a shape of a “suicide for honor” – girls are given the chance to “remove the stain on the family’s reputation” by killing themselves. Indeed, this situation may take place in every Middle Eastern or South Asian country. What is so special about it on the Occupied Palestinian Territories? Given Palestinian-Israeli conflict, some Palestinian women, facing a loss of honor, are directly or indirectly offered a chance to “die with dignity” becoming a terrorist-shaheeda a female for “martyr” first used in the public speech by a –  ة from the Arabic word) Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat). Self-sacrificing for killing Israeli civilians in a bomb blast becomes a way out for some Palestinian girls. Female suicide bombing is widely believed to be a tool increasingly used by radical extremist leaders of Palestine and other Islamic countries or groups. For instance, in Russia in the context of Chechen terrorist acts there are certain names for this kind of woman (“Black widows,” “The brides of Allah,” “shahidki”).151 Some sources claim that a disturbing amount of Palestinian women captured and interrogated by Israel recount stories of feeling compelled to carry out an attack to restore their family's honor. In one notorious case, Wafa Samir al-Biss, a 22-year-old burn victim from Gaza, went routinely to an Israeli hospital where she received free medical treatment as a humanitarian gesture. Militants convinced her and her family that since she was disfigured she would never get married and that she was better off becoming a martyr. A surveillance

150 Ramzi Choura. “Killing for Honor: A Deadly Part of a Larger Trend,” Palestine Monitor, date unknown http://www.scribd.com/doc/77285480/Palestine-Monitor-Killing-for-Honor-A-Deadly (Accessed 15 February 2011) 151 Dmitriy Volchok. “Author of The Book “The Brides of Allah” Speaks About Terrorism in Russia.” Svoboda News , 4 April 2010 (originally in Russian) http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/2002048.html (Accessed 6 February 2012) 53 camera at Erez checkpoint captured al-Biss's anguish and desperation when her suicide belt failed to go off. Later, crying, she told journalists, “Maybe I have been used” by the recruiters. Al-Biss intended to blow up the very doctors and nurses who had been treating her burns.152 A famous shaheeda Wafa Idris who blew up 2 persons and injured dozens of other victims in an Israeli supermarket, had been divorced by her husband for not being able to conceive a child and therefore doomed to face the neighbors’ mocking and societies’ ostracism, decided to become a suicide bomber to reinstate her own and her family’s honor. Barbara Victor in her work “ Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers ” reviews the personal stories of Palestinian suicide bombers uncovering relevant sociological structures that determine such actions. She proves that Wafa Idris’ case, being the first instance of female martyrdom in Palestine, has inspired other women with “no future.” The stories of the subsequent shaheedas are similar in the respect that they all shared an inability to control their own lives. For reasons of respectability, honor and societal pressure, they all undertook the attacks in hope of acquiring honor for their families. Most of the researchers and journalists who have been carrying out interviews regarding female suicide bombers in the Middle East, claim that such women are being manipulated by men (as only men recruit women in the Arab countries) promising them paradise, glory and escape from a reality riddled with personal problems in exchange for wearing an explosive belt.153 According to Jihad Watch, the motivation for a female jihad-martyrdom bomber is murkier than for a male one. The libidinous aspect is not there, but instead some of these female bombers are women who have come to be considered as having sullied the family's purity, and as such, their surest path to Paradise is to take hold of Allah's guarantee of it to those who "kill and are killed" for him (Qur'an 9:111). And that promise, of course, may also be attractive to those who do not otherwise face immediate death.154 It is highlighted by experts that “Muslim women are both highly visible members of one of the most marginalised groups in Western society and the most vulnerable to vilification and media stereotyping, suffering the ‘triple-whammy’ effect of sexism, racism and religious

152 Tim McGirk, “Palestinian Moms Becoming Martyrs,” Time Magazine , 3 May 2007. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1617542-2,00.html (Accessed 5 February 2012) 153 The topic of women-shaheeda is discussed in the series of TV documentary programs created by Russian journalist Leonid Mlechnik “Women who have become puppets in the men’s hands.” 154 Jihad Watch. “Two Female Jihad-Martyrdom Martyrs Bombers Kill at Least 64 in Baghdad,” Jihad Watch , 1 February 2008 http://www.jihadwatch.org/2008/02/two-female-jihad-martyrdom-bombers-kill-at-least-64-in- baghdad.html (Accessed 5 February 2012) 54 bigotry.”155 The question remains open. What happens if some victims of honor violence in Europe decide to take the path of religious martyrdom to prove their innocence or to get rid of a shame on their family name? To what extent can the “dishonored” female Muslim immigrants in Europe become tools of radical extremist groups fighting for jihad? While acknowledging a high volume of honor violence in Palestine, I also take note of the recent changes in Palestinian legislation prompted by a notorious honor killing of Aya Baradiya which took place in 2011 in the village Surif of the West Bank. The girl was dumped into a well by her uncle and two accomplices who didn’t like a potential suitor. This story, disclosed 13 months after the incident, as the police found the remains of her body, has provoked media coverage and rallies of students of Hebron University who called Aya Baradiya a “martyr” and appealed for stricter sentences for the perpetrators. As a consequence of social pressure and media efforts, Mahmoud Abbas signed a decree that scraped provisions making killing for family honor a mitigating circumstance.156 Although we see a general negative tendency in terms of violence directed against females in the Middle East, there has also been certain improvement in the past few years, as the laws are being amended and modified both in Jordan and in Palestine. The recent changes and a move towards women’s rights recognition in the Arab world can be attributed to the international pressure of human rights activists and to the civil society’s actions within the countries (e.g., student rallies and demonstrations that took place in Hebron in 2011).

155 Julie Posetti. “Jihad Sheilas or Media Martyrs? The Scavenger, No Date Available http://www.thescavenger.net/feminism-a-pop-culture/jihad-sheilas-or-media-martyrs-93456-210.html (Accessed 5 February 2012) 156 Nasser Shiyoukhi, Karin Laub. “Palestinian Woman Aya Baradiya’s Honor Killing Sparks Tougher West Bank Laws.” Huffington Post , 19 May 2011 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/19/palestinian-woman- aya-bar_n_864430.html (Accessed 15 February 2012) 55 4. Tackling the problem of honor-related crime in Europe

4.1. An overview of honor killing cases in Europe

4.1.1. United Kingdom

Taking a note that in the European Union zone the biggest volume of honor killings is noticed in the northern countries, I will further concentrate on the situation of honor violence in the following countries: the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The reasons I chose these three countries as a case study for the present research consist in the fact that most of the cases of honor killings in Europe have taken place particularly in the northern countries (however, apart from the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands, there have also been some notorious cases of honor killings in Denmark and Germany, but we decided to limit our research to only three case studies). In addition, academic and public debates are quite intense in the abovementioned countries. In the UK it has to do with the existence of “segregated ghettoes” where people of the Middle Eastern and South Asian descent (particularly migrants of Indian and Pakistani origins) have settled for many decades due to the colonial past; in the Netherlands and Germany the debates are mostly linked to the North African and Turkish guest workers who came to Europe in the 1970s and started bringing their family members not letting them integrate; and in Sweden, a country that boasts a high level of integration of youngsters, the debates around honor killings address a cross-generational gap between different generations of immigrants. Being a country with a strong tradition of multiculturalism, the United Kingdom is a place where different communities settle in the so-called “ghettos.” Most of the honor killings known to have occurred in the UK appear to have been carried out by people of the South Asian origin.157 As pointed out by the research conducted in London, most of these murders are carried out by Muslims from Pakistan and Bangladesh which can be considered an interesting peculiarity of the HBV in the United Kingdom. Hindus and Sikhs also carry out honor killings but seemingly at a proportionally lower rate.158 Although many – and perhaps most – honor-related murders are carried out by first-generation immigrants to the UK, an increasing number also involve people born and raised in Britain. Honor killings by South Asians occur nationwide.159 Although there have been several such killings in towns in the Midlands and the North, there is little evidence to suggest that such crimes are much more

157 According to in-house analysis of honor killings reported in the UK media between 1990 and 2007 conducted by Center of Social Cohesion in London. 158 Centre for Social Cohesion. Crimes of the Community. Honor-Based Violence in the UK. The Centre for Social Cohesion: London, 2010. 159 Ibid. 56 prevalent there than in London and the South East. Several of the murders have been carried out by relatively well-off immigrants who would usually be regarded as “well-integrated.” This suggests that lack of education or socio-economic deprivations do not, in themselves, cause honor killings. Such killings are instead often more indicative of the extent to which a family will go to defend its own traditions against ideas of female independence and freedom of thought and action which they regard as ‘western’ and therefore as morally and ethically inferior to their own South Asian value system. A woman’s own willingness to break traditional cultural, social and religious taboos is also an important factor. If women’s actions are tightly controlled and their behavior remains within traditional norms, violence is unnecessary; families only kill when they fear that a woman freeing herself from traditional controls will damage their standing in their community.160 Nazir Afzal, the Crown Prosecution Service’s lead on honor-based violence, says: A factor that links integration and honor-crimes is that obviously women are more likely to be exposed to foreign ideas than they would be in South Asia. This leads to tensions within the community and within the family that leads to honor-based violence. The women who are trying to integrate are more likely to become victims of honor-based violence. 161

A notorious case of Banaz Mahmod, a Kurdish Iraqi 20-year-old girl that was strangled by Kurdish assassins on the order of her father and uncle (both were later jailed for life), has become widely known due to massive media coverage in the UK and abroad.162 Banaz Mahmod’s story became known thanks to the frankness of her sister who ran away fearing repercussions from the community and shared details with the journalists. The Mahmods emmigrated to the UK as asylum seekers fleeing Saddam Hussain’s war. Despite being relatively well-off back in Iraq, the father of Banaz has never worked in the UK, and therefore his status in the community and the respect of Iraqi Kurds were all that mattered to him. The victim of the murder, Banaz, had agreed to an arranged marriage at the age of 17, but soon ran away due to mistreatment by her husband and started a relationship with a Kurdish man, who was not approved by her family. She was continuously threatened by her male family members and eventually assassinated. After the murder took place, the mother and two other sisters of Banaz refrained from giving any testimonies in court as being afraid to act “against the community rules.” Bekhal,

160 Centre for Social Cohesion. Crimes of the Community. Honor-Based Violence in the UK. The Centre for Social Cohesion: London, 2010. 161 Ibid., p. 39. 162 Helen Weathers, “Honor killing” sister breaks her silence,” Mail Online , 17 June 2007 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-462342/Honour-killing-sister-breaks-silence.html (accessed 2 April 2011). 57 Banaz’s sister, does not specify whether the mother and other female members of the family knew about the upcoming murder, but more likely they knew and have never protested. To sum up, the case of Banaz Mahmod represents all main features of a typical honor killing: “immoral behavior” of the daughter, which leads to the “stain” on the reputation of the whole family; perceiving of daughters’ chastity as a commodity; physical abuse of the girl before the murder, numerous threats from the family members; reluctance of the victim to seek support outside and contact social services, believing that “things will go back to normal”; indifferent role of the mother and other female relatives because of the fear; violent character of killing; general approval of the murder by the patriarchal community. Therefore, the honor killings, “transferred” to the European soil, do not change their main features but remain the same as if they would have happened in the country where immigrants came from. Besides Banaz Mahmod’s case, there have been similar cases of Rukhsana Naz, Samaira Nazir and Amrit Singh Ubhi. In 1999 Rukhsana Naz, a 19-year old woman of Pakistani origin living in Derby, was murdered by her mother. She was killed when, three years after she had been forced to marry an older man, she became pregnant after having an affair with a young man she had known since childhood. When she refused to have an abortion, her mother told her that she was “an insult to [her] husband.” 163 Samaira Nazir, 25-year-old girl of Pakistani origin was summoned to the family home in April 2005 after rejecting husbands proposed by her family and having a relationship with an Afghan asylum seeker. When she refused to stop dating him, her brother (Azhar Nazir, a 30 year-old businessman), her father and her 17-year old cousin, stabbed her 17 times and slashed her throat. 164 Amrit Singh Ubhi, 24-year-old girl of an Indian descent, was killed in the family home by her Sikh father for living a “western lifestyle.” The latter was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2010 and when in police custody, he did not show any signs of remorse.165 NGOs and police officials maintain that the number of women and girls in the UK suffering violence and intimidation at the hands of their families or communities is increasing rapidly, according to figures revealing the nationwide scale of honor abuse for the first time in 2011. Statistics obtained under the Freedom of Information Act about such violence – which can include threats, abduction, acid attacks, beatings, forced marriage, mutilation and murder

163 Jason Burke. “Love, Honor and Obey – or Die,” The Guardian , 8 October 2000. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/oct/08/jasonburke.theobserver (Accessed 10 February 2012) 164 Riazat Butt. “You're Not My Mother Any More,” The Guardian , http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/jul/15/ukcrime.mainsection (Accessed 10 February 2012) 165 No Author. “Telford Man Guilty of Daughter’s Murder,” BBC, 11 February 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-shropshire-12431942 (Accessed 17 February 2012) 58 – show that in the 12 police force areas for which comparable data was available, reports went up by 47% in just a year.166 The 39 police forces that gave figures to IKWRO (Iranian and Kurdish Women’s Rights Organizaion) recorded 2,823 incidents in 2010. IKWRO estimates that another 500 crimes in which police were involved were committed in the 13 force areas that did not provide data. This is the first time UK figures have been collated for so-called honour-based violence, defined as crimes planned and carried out by a family or community in order to defend their perceived honor. IKWRO's campaigns officer, Fionnuala Ni Mhurchu, said the increase was probably due partly to better police awareness and to more victims coming forward after coverage of high-profile prosecutions, but that violence itself was also increasing as young people increasingly refused to bow to their families' demands.167 Organizations that deal with honor-based violence also help forced marriage victims, as some of those killed in the name of honor were trying to escape coercion into matrimony. Laws to prevent forced marriages and provide a way out for those already in unconsented unions were introduced in England, Wales and Northern Ireland in November 2008. Anybody convicted of trying to force someone into a marriage could be jailed for up to two years. Within the first year, 86 Forced Marriage Protection Orders were implemented. But as one worker who specialises in the issue said: “The sticking point is that potential victims do not want orders served on their parents – or whoever is responsible – they just want a way out of the situation.”168 It is observed that the idea of honor as found among Middle Eastern and Asian immigrants in the UK is often distinctive (in comparison to Caribbean or Latin American communities) because it is openly expressed, and because it has arguably become the basis for organizing such communities as well as playing an important part of many people’s cultural and religious identities. Just as any honor-based society has always granted social and material advantages to those who conform, so is the case in such communities in the UK today.169 The following question might be posed: do honor killings happen exclusively within the Middle Eastern or Asian immigrant groups in Europe, or do they take place among autochthonous local population of Europe (white Anglo-Saxons if we take the case of the UK)

166 Rachel Williams, “Honour Crimes Against Women in UK Rising Rapidly, Figures Show,” The Guardian , 3 December 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/dec/03/honour-crimes-uk-rising (Accessed 15 February 2012) 167 Ibid. 168 “Ethics guide. Honor crime,” BBC , No Date Available http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/honourcrimes/crimesofhonour_1.shtml (Accessed 1 March 2012) 169 Centre for Social Cohesion. Crimes of the Community. Honor-Based Violence in the UK. The Centre for Social Cohesion: London, 2010, p. 59 as well? Workers of women’s groups underline that many murders carried out by white Britons of partners and family members are also based on ideas of honor. Humera Khan, the co-founder of An-Nisa Society, a women’s advocacy group in Wembley in London, says: Just because honor issues are not associated with white people does not mean that it does not happen. It happens, but not in the way that people talk about it when it happens in a Muslims or Asian context. What fuels honor in Asian and Middle Eastern culture and created its framework lies within feudalism, tribalism and patriarchal ways of living. Those things do not exist within white secular families . If an honor killing in these communities occurs it is usually referred to as a “crime of passion.” But underneath this, the basic drivers such as pride and honor are still the same even if the motives are different. 170

Honor killings of the targeted victims-immigrants also take place in the countries outside of the European Union. There have also been several cases where South Asian and Kurdish women currently residing in the UK have been taken abroad, “back home,” and may have been killed. Olivia Madden, client co-ordinator for Panah, a refugee in Newcastle, says: “We have worked with women who were taken abroad and just disappeared.”171 Fareena Alam, a journalist of a Bangladeshi origin in the UK, writes that honor killings which arise in Western cultures such as Britain are a tactic for immigration families to cope with the alienating consequences of urbanization.172 Alam argues that immigrants remain close to the home culture and their relatives because it provides a safety net: “In villages back home,” a man's sphere of control was broader, with a large support system. In our cities full of strangers, there is virtually no control over who one's family members sit, talk or work with” 173 . Hence, F. Alam suggests that “honor killing is neither simply a gender issue nor an individual aberration,” it is thus the attempt to regain control and the feelings of alienation that ultimately leads to an honor killing. Alam recalls the statistical data of Teenage Pregnancy Unit Report from the Health Department of the UK, which states that teenage pregnancy is significantly higher among Bangladeshis than whites. And yet, she notes, pregnancy out of wedlock is perhaps the most mortifying thing that can happen to a traditional family, and often provokes what sociologist Akbar Ahmed termed as "hyper- honour" – a fanatical sense tribalism. Regardless of class, people hold on to traditional practices more fiercely when they feel threatened or confronted. Fareena Alam presents an interesting point of view, claiming honor killings and feelings of “hyper-tribalism” among immigrants in the UK are provoked by the urbanism of the foreign land and a consequent feeling of alienation. Analyzing honor violence in the

170 Ibid., p. 38. 171 Ibid., p. 18. 172 Fareena Alam. “Take The Honour Out Of Killing.” The Guardian , 6 July 2004 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jul/06/religion.prisonsandprobation (Accessed 10 January 2012) 173 Ibid. 60 context of alienation would mean to follow a Marxist definition of the word, meaning transformation of people’s own labor into a power which rules them as if by a kind of natural or supra-human law. Abstracting from an economic sense of the term, we take alienation rather in psychological sense as a feeling stemming out “geographical and social dislocation of diaspora and their cultural and emotional displacement.”174 It is natural to presume that a peasant originally coming from a rural area of Iraq or India, would feel overwhelmed by the urbanism of London or any other dynamic urban center of Europe and would psychologically strive for regaining his/her own “private space” full of tribal traditions and kinship values that he has left in the country of origin upon immigration. However, I should take a note of a wide range of women’s rights organizations that work nowadays in the direction of eradication of honor-based violence or in the area of rendering psychological and social support to the women-victims of honor violence in the UK. To name just few of them: “Iranian and Kurdish Women’s Rights Organization” (a charity organization founded by the refugee women from Iran and Iraq which mission is to preserve rights and equality of the Middle Eastern women); “Karma Nirvana” (a charity center that supports victims and survivors of forced marriage and honor-based abuse); “Sharan” (a project which seeks to provide support, advice and create a forum for vulnerable women, particularly of South Asian origin, who have left home forcefully or voluntarily), etc.

4.1.2. Sweden

On the contrary to the recently adopted approach of the UK and some substantial research carried out during the last years by both NGOs and police about HBV in the country, the sources of Sweden claim that no comprehensive statistics exist to show the extent of such honor killings here and elsewhere in Scandinavia, where whole communities of Kurds and other Muslim groups have found refuge.175 Immigrants have been coming to Sweden in increasing numbers in the past decade to fill a persistent labor shortage. But institutional flaws (such as the two years on average it takes to get a decision on asylum requests) encourage those waiting for permanent refuge to band together in bleak housing projects in what amounts to self-imposed segregation. At least 15 percent of Sweden's 9 million residents are non-Nordic and heavily concentrated in volatile ghettos of Somalis, Kurds, Bosnians and dozens of other groups. “There are places

174 Amit Shankar Saha. “The Psychological Sense of Exile and Alienation.” Boloji.com , 3 May 2009 http://www.boloji.com/index.cfm?md=Content&sd=Articles&ArticleID=2448 (Accessed 15 January 2012) 175 Carol J. Williams. “Honor Killing Shakes Up Sweden After Man Slays Daughter Who Wouldn’t Wed,” Seattle Times , March 8 2002 http://jeffweintraub.blogspot.de/2007/01/fadime-sahindal-honor-killing- culture.html (Accessed 1 March 2012) 61 just outside of Stockholm where the entire population is foreign. These people aren't living in Sweden at all,” said Keya Izol, head of the Federation of Kurdish Associations in Sweden, referring to towns and suburbs such as Botkyrka, a 30-minute drive from Stockholm. A 1995 reform of laws on refugees and immigration has worsened the situation, Izol said, by focusing training and jobs on the younger generation, causing strains within families as well as between immigrants and Swedes.176 The case of Fadime Sahindal, a Kurdish Swedish girl originally from Turkey, shot dead by her Kurdish father in the city of Uppsala in 2002 for refusing an arranged marriage and hence defying the patriarchal values of her culture 177 , stirred deep emotions in the Swedish society and urged the government to promise $170,000 to help girls in the same position. The legal age of marriage for foreigners was also raised from 15 to 18, on par with the age for Swedes. Some years before the case of Fadime took place, another well integrated Kurdish Iraqi girl, Pela Atroshi, was assassinated by her clan on the grounds of the same motives. Following these honor killings, the organization “Never forget Pela and Fadime” 178 has been created in order to urge the society to take responsibility for HBV. However, there is also the opinion that both cases caused such strong revulsion just because Sweden has done much more in the area of immigrants’ integration than other European countries, and that is why the cases of Fadime and Pela might be considered in a way extraordinary.179 Notwithstanding, there have been some other honor killings’ cases in Sweden that prove an alarming tendency of HBV spread: Abbas Rezai’s case (Afghan girl, beaten with a baseball bat and an iron rod, scaled with a hot oil and stabbed to death in 2005); Subhi Othman’s case (who stabbed his step-daughter to death in 2010 and was sentenced to 18 years in prison); and various cases of beating, public humiliation and threatening of teenagers or young women who do not comply with the “cultural norms” of the male-dominated communities in Sweden. 180

176 Ibid. 177 Johanne Hildebrandt. “Honor Killing in Sweden Silences Courageous Voice on Ethnic Integration,” The Guardian , January 31 2002 http://jeffweintraub.blogspot.de/2007/01/fadime-sahindal-honor-killing-culture.html (Accessed 1 March 2012) 178 Website of Organization “Never Forget Pela and Fadime” http://www.pelafadime.se/english/ 179 These words belong to Mr. Nalin Pekgul, a Social Democratic legislator of Kurdish origin in Sweden, who expressed caution against interpreting an act of criminal extremism of Fadime’s father as typical of fundamentalist immigrants. Carol J. Williams. “Honor Killing Shakes Up Sweden After Man Slays Daughter Who Wouldn’t Wed,” Seattle Times , March 8 2002 http://jeffweintraub.blogspot.de/2007/01/fadime-sahindal-honor-killing-culture.html (Accessed 1 March 2012) 180 No Author. “Hogsby Retrial Brings “Honour” Killings Back Into Focus,” The Local , 17 June 2011 http://www.thelocal.se/34496/20110617/ (Accessed 2 March 2012) 62 4.1.3. The Netherlands

It is noted that in the Netherlands alone, the official number of honor killings per year stands at 13, or more than one every month — and that does not include the growing trend of ‘honor suicides’ — girls and even boys who take their own lives knowing that if they do not do it, others will, that they have been marked for death.181 As stated by the experts, many of the victims of HBV in the Netherlands (and in European countries in general, as I could also assume) are “import brides,” brought from Turkey or Morocco and unprepared for life in Western Europe. Others are Dutch-born wives of import grooms their families - most of whom came here as guest workers in the 1970s – force them to marry.182 Radical Islam, according to Dutch Secret Service reports, is also growing among Dutch Muslim youth (especially second-generation men) inciting clashes between them and increasingly Westernized Dutch Muslim girls and young women. Psychiatrist Carla Rus, who counsels Muslim and non-Muslim domestic violence victims, says that these girls stand “with one leg in Dutch society and the other in their traditional Muslim culture. Often, they find themselves forced to choose between the two worlds.183 One of the most profound works dedicated to the problem of honor killings among immigrants in Europe can be considered a research by the Dutch cultural anthropologist Clementine Van Eck “Purified by Blood: Honor Killings amongst Turks in the Netherlands ”184 where she has successfully examined a possible link to the situation in which Turkish immigrants find themselves. Clementine Van Eck analyzes the way Turkish terms for “honor” are positioned on the societal level by drawing the difference between “ namus ” (a feeling related to the purity of a woman that a man is responsible for) and “ şeref ” (social standing, prestige and social reputation; a broader term than “namus”). Likewise she provides us with a valuable insight into Turkish linguistical differences between passive and active loss of namus . A woman who is the unwilling victim of namus loss is “defiled or tarnished” ( namusu kirlenmi ş), whereas a woman who has contributed to the loss of her namus is not only defiled but also “dishonorable” ( namussuz ). The latter term is worse as the woman is perceived as bad. In

181 Alana Goodman. “Why is the Media Silent about Honor Killings?,” Commentary , October 2 2011 http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/02/10/why-is-the-media-silent-on-honor-killings/ (Accessed 1 March 2012) 182 Ibid. 183 Abigail Esman. “Hirshi Ali Leaves Hiding to Spotlight Honor Killings,” Feminist.com , January 25 2005 http://www.feminist.com/news/vaw26.html (Accessed 2 March 2012) 184 Clementine Van Eck. Purified by Blood: Honor Killings amongst Turks in the Netherlands . Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam, 2003. 63 principle, only the woman labeled namussuz is killed, not the woman who is namusu kirlenmi ş. In the latter case, the man is killed, as the “honor violator” (irz dü şmani).185 Although acknowledging that some peaceful resolutions of an “honor conflict” do take place regularly in Turkish communities (e.g. a couple who is found to have a premarital relationship can get married), the author takes a note that, due to certain reasons, if the question of honor arises abroad, it makes escalation to an honor killing more likely. Because the Turkish migrants who came to the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s have had to rely so heavily on one another, the Turkish community abroad has acquired a heightened significance. Social control is such that loss of namus leads to social isolation. For men who derive their status from namus alone, the loss of namus is even more dramatic. These are the men who eventually – often in the 1980s – lost their jobs, became ill or were declared unfit for employment after long years of hard work.

185 Ibid., p. 43 64 4.2. Qualitative research: “Attitudes and values of immigrants in Europe towards honor-based violence”

The reasons for a chosen methodology of qualitative research and the inquiry into values and attitudes undertaken for the present study are previously described in the introduction. The in-depth interviews were selected as a main method of data collection. The interviews were conducted among the Middle Eastern and South Asian immigrants 186 currently residing in the European countries. All the informants were male, ranging from 22 to 35 years old. In total 9 informants have been interviewed. The interviews were taken in English and Spanish languages and shortly afterwards were transcribed and analyzed. Below a table with the informants’ basic data is given:187

Name Country of Country of Age Occupation origin residence 1. Mohammad Jordan Ukraine 23 Student of medicine 2. Bassem Tunisia Switzerland 35 Employee at the railway station 3. Rashid Morocco Spain 29 Employee at a store 4. Komal India Italy 35 Businessman

5. Mahmod Palestine Ukraine 24 Student of medicine 6. Ali Pakistan United Kingdom 23 Student of economics 7. Gopal India Italy 29 Engineer

8. Imat Jordan Ukraine 34 Businessman

9. Atul India Germany 31 Employee at an international company

Before summarizing all of the research findings, it is pertinent to underline that due to the low number of the individuals interviewed it is not possible to extrapolate the findings of the research, make generalized statements or refute/confirm certain hypotheses. Due to technical problems it was not feasible to limit the research to just one European country or to pick a certain diaspora (e.g. Pakistani or Jordanian) in order to focus solely on it. That’s one of the reasons why this research does not pretend to be universally representative. However,

186 According to the UN definition, immigrant is an individual that has been residing outside the country of citizenship for more than 1 year 187 Upon request of the informants some of the names have been changed 65 this research conducted in the framework of the MA thesis can be well considered as a “pilot research” which served some important methodological purposes and allowed us to spot some interesting tendencies ideal for further research. The interviews had a semi-structured nature and every conversation was divided into 5 thematic blocks: 1) Background of the informant . This section included information on the family and social position of an individual, his previous/current education, his job or current occupation, city of origin and religious affiliation; 2) Exposure to HBV. This section encompassed the questions on the general awareness of the individual about the HBV: to what extent is he aware of the problem? Has he ever heard/witnessed any episodes of HBV? 3) Key terms of HBV. The main goal of this section was to find out how the informant perceives such social categories, as “shame,” “honor,” “reputation,” “misbehavior” and which meaning he attributes to each of them. What kind of actions might be considered “shameful” for both men and women? How can “honor” be achieved? What should happen if one commits a “shameful” act? 4) Family roles and HBV. This section was targeted at understanding how gender roles were distributed and perceived in the informant’s family and how he actually views the “ideal” organization of gender roles. 5) Attitudes to HBV. The present section included situational questions and hypothetical situations (e.g. “What would your reaction be if your sister runs away with a man or conceives out of wedlock?”) which were aimed at spotting values and attitudes of an informant that might have been omitted during the previous sections. This section helped us to track how honest the informant was during the first “theoretical” questions.

However, the “pilot research” helped us to find out certain limitations and obstacles of the research: • Accessing target audience . Given the “sensitivity” of the questions discussed, initially planned method of “snowball sampling” for searching of informants appeared to be impossible. After some unsuccessful tries of establishing interpersonal contacts with the unknown informants it became clear that the in-depth interviews focused on HBV could only be conducted on the grounds of a high confidence and trust. Therefore, the interviews

66 were carried out among “friends of friends”; which meant there was already a certain rapport between interviewer and interviewee. • Main categories utilized during the interviews . It became soon evident that the abovementioned 5 blocks scheme was quite problematic in practice. The biggest problems arose with the section No. 2. Trying to figure out how aware informants were about the HBV problem, I came to realize about our methodological mistake while compiling questions and utilizing certain terms: most of the informants were not familiar with the term “honor-based violence” at all (e.g., some believed HBV meant only honor killings; the others thought HBV encompassed husband’s revenge for the adultery; on overall, all the informants were confused about the term). In the end, it was decided to leave the term to the academic debates and use different words for the informants in order not to confuse them. Speaking about the main findings of the research, the following tendencies were spotted: 1) No informant linked honor killings and honor-based violence to religion, rather explaining the phenomenon by the conservatism and patriarchal values of the society. This is how an informant from India puts it: “Honor killings rather happen in small villages of India, especially in the north. There girls are not allowed to go out at night, and every single thing done by them is counted as a matter of male prestige. The boys have much more freedom in their actions. For instance, if the guy drinks or smokes, it is fine. But if the girl drinks it turns out to be a disaster. Yes, sadly men and women do not get an equal treatment in India. Also parents tend to mishandle a girl-child, and invest more in their sons.” An informant from Jordan maintains a similar idea: “It is all about conservative attitudes. Some people mistakenly think honor killings are allowed by Qur’an, but it is not true. Women are treated very well in Islam. But one should not confuse Islam as a religious doctrine that grants a lot of rights to women, and Muslims as humans that might not act in accordance with these principles.” 2) Although most of the informants condone the practice of honor violence in Europe or in Western countries in general and do not report any cases of violence in their families during their childhood, not necessarily they think it should be forbidden in their countries/communities of origin. An informant from Tunisia confesses: “Of course I would like my wife to be a virgin. If the woman is not a virgin in our society, it’s a sin. Why? In Europe everyone behaves in a liberal way, it is normal to have sexual relations before marriage, and it is fine for me too. For

67 example, my Swiss wife was married before I met her. I would not say anything to a French or Swiss girl if she is not a virgin. But there, in my village in Djerba, the rules about virginity and marriage are different. Most of the girls follow them. Now, the question is, if almost all the girls comprehend and manage following these rules and just one or two disobey, are they good or bad? It means they are bad, and I would not tolerate it.” Following such testimony, a curious observation emerges: punishment for “honor” cases is normally carried out against individuals who are expected to understand Eastern social, cultural and religious standards. It would unlikely be directed against a white European person that “is not supposed” to know the cultural settings. This observation corroborates with the conclusion of the research conducted by London experts 188 which purports that there are few, if any, cases of honor killings of white men or women by South Asian, Arabic or Kurdish families. As about legal embodiment of honor killings’ prohibition, the Jordanian informants 189 agree that “it is a big achievement, as before women were often maltreated with no response, especially in rural areas,” but at the same time when it comes to the hypothetical situation about their family’s “honor,” they are unanimous in the desire to revenge if someone “puts a stain” on their sister’s honor: “When my sister’s husband first came to ask for her hand, we conducted a serious investigation of his previous whereabouts… We had to know for sure if he was a right person with no stains on his reputation. He was studying abroad before, and one of the family members went there to inquire his friends and former classmates about him… In the end, we were satisfied. He is a right man…” Although condoning honor-based violence in general, when it comes to their personal stories and family members, informants do not seem to be so human rights-oriented: “Would I be able to kill if someone hurts my sister? Well, now I’m telling you that I would not, but everything depends on the situation. If someone maltreats my sister, I will beat him up, yes. I might even kill him too, who knows.” However, the abovementioned situation would rather correspond to the definition of “crime of passion” than of “honor crime,” as it is deprived of a strategic planning and would rather take place triggered by a feeling of affect. 3) When facing with the questions about their definition of “honor,” most of the informants defined it as “pride,” “being a reputed person,” “respected by others.” As one of the informants put it: “Honor is comprised of two things: power and popularity. Speaking about power, there is a social aspect: good job, family, nice image in front of others. As about popularity, connections and networking achievements matter. Now,

188 Centre for Social Cohesion. Crimes of the Community. Honor-Based Violence in the UK. The Centre for Social Cohesion: London, 2010 at p. 64. 189 The law has been recently promulgated in Jordan outlawing honor killings. 68 “dishonored” means that someone is humiliated or insulted.” Another informant concurs with these words, stating the difference between “honor” and “reputation”: “Honor means, first of all, respect of society. It can be gained by giving respect to others, and consequently taking respect. Reputation is an acknowledgment by the people. An individual might have reputation and not have honor.” An informant from Jordan comments that “reputation is very important in social life… While doing business one needs reputation that he is a powerful man and is able to make things happen the way he wants.” However, there have been differences in defining “dishonored man” and “dishonored woman.” Dishonored man, according to some informants, would be the one who is unable to make others obey and force his ideas on anyone (“Dishonored man is the one who fails his opinion to be heard”). Dishonored woman, on the contrary, would be the one “doing unethical things.” Answering the question about whether a girl subjected to rape would be considered “dishonored woman,” all but one agreed that her “honor” in this case would remain intact, as she was coerced into a sexual intercourse and therefore would remain “pure” and “innocent.” However, out of 7 informants that initially agreed on this position, only 3 confirmed that they would consequently marry such a girl. The other 4 informants were unclear and seemed to be reluctant to further explain their unwillingness to marry such a woman, even though her honor “would remain intact,” according to their previous words. Although informants seem to acknowledge the difference between namusu kirlenmi ş and namussuz , in the end they tend to blame the woman even if she was a subject of rape. 8 out of 9 informants didn't have any information on the honor killings' cases in Europe believing that honor-based violence only takes place in their countries of origin. Only one informant from India pointed out the case of honor killing of an Afghan girl that has recently happened in Germany (the country where he has been working for some time) describing in details the information regarding her murder he heard from the mass-media. All the other informants were quite surprised to find out that honor killings also happen in the European countries. As reported during the interviews, no informant would discuss honor-based violence matter in the conversations with his friends or relatives. First, it has to do with a certain feeling of shame about these cases as a powerful indicator of vices and limitations of a traditional society and women's inferior status therein. All the informants of the present empirical research consider themselves to be quite modern (and, in fact, they are modern individuals living in European countries, working for European companies and pursuing or having pursued higher education) and hence do not like discussing "traditional society"

69 matters. Although the problem of honor killings is not a taboo, it does bring some "shameful" reminiscences and is preferred to be avoided, particularly in the male discourse. "Why would be discuss the problem of honor violence with my friends? We have enough topics to talk about, such as jobs, careers and politics, which are the questions much more relevant to our lives."

70 5. Conclusion

In the present study I have viewed honor killings as “the ultimate step” of a long series of honor-related, gender-based violence committed mainly against women who have allegedly transgressed gender roles and, hence, are perceived as a threat to the family’s social standing in the eyes of the community. Although acknowledging that the notion of “honor” or “pride” is historically present across many continents and religions (including medieval Europe, Mediterranean region and Latin America), I underline that the highest incidence of honor killings takes place in the Middle East and South Asia. While the crimes committed on the grounds of a feeling of “honor” are widespread among white Europeans as well (e.g., murder of a wife in case of adultery committed in the state of emotional affect), a traditional honor killing which is the subject of the present study is rather an Eastern phenomenon as: 1) it is a planned act committed by multiple perpetrators; 2) it revolves around values of tribalism/kinship which do not exist in secular modern European societies. In Europe nowadays the question of honor killings is mostly discussed on the academic and public level in the connection to the Middle Eastern and South Asian immigrants’ socio-cultural integration into Western societies. A series of honor killings during the last decade in such countries, as the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and the UK characterized by brutal and sometimes ritual actions of the family members involved, has triggered numerous public debates on the essence of multiculturalism and its failures; strategies of successful integration and a full membership of immigrants in Europe. Although even well-integrated individuals might practice honor-based violence, it is noted that honor killings are more likely to happen in the marginalized/segregated communities, where symbolic status and reputation are the only capital a male immigrant possesses. Accordingly, it is crucial to approach the question of honor killings from the angle of integration of newcomers to Europe, and likewise from the cross-generational conflicts that might arise in the process of integration. Whereas it is believed by some researchers that open public debates about honor killings undermine integration of immigrants due to the construction of “Us” vs. “Them” scheme and a consequent prejudiced portrayal of immigrants (particularly the ones of Muslim religious affiliation) who are bound to suffer from biases and stereotypes, I agree with the words of the UK Minister Mike O’Brien that “Multicultural sensitivity is no excuse for moral blindness.” I consider public debates on the matter of honor killings and research among

71 diaspora communities in Europe as essential steps on the way to combating honor-based violence. Who will benefit from the research? First of all, members of the diaspora communities will benefit from it, especially those “vulnerable” women who are strictly controlled and constantly threatened by their male relatives: 1) child brides and victims of forced marriages, married off in the countries of their origin and brought to Europe against their will without any knowledge of the language and, hence, any ability to contact the police officials; 2) women who voluntarily marry compatriots from the diaspora, move to the country of their husband’s residence and further suffer from a physical or psychological maltreatment; young girls of the second generation of immigrants brought up by the conservative families and threatened by the male members of the family for a perceived “disobedience” (i.e., such as Banaz Mahmod and her sisters). The latter category of women, even though they are fluent in the language, attend high school, university or even work in Europe, are often afraid of speaking up and bringing up the family’s problems on public. The research on the issues of honor-based violence, raising awareness about this matter and suggesting solutions for the female representatives of diaspora, might encourage women to share their problems and might help them to get out of the situation of domestic mistreatment. At the same time, men as potential offenders need to be aware of the possible retaliation should they happen to be involved in an honor-based crime. In my opinion, an excessively tolerant, all permissive position is not a right approach when it comes to violation of human dignity and individual freedoms – fundamental values that European civilization is based on. Meanwhile, such actions as academic research, human rights campaigns, public dialogue and a powerful network of social services for “women at risk” might be able to improve the situation. Hence, I hope that the present research will somehow contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon of honor killings, and the “pilot research” described above will someday transform into a starting point of a more substantial immersion into the insights of honor violence on the European scale.

72 Bibliography:

Abu-Lughod, Lila. Veiled Sentiments – Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

Alam, Fareena. “Take The Honour Out Of Killing.” The Guardian , 6 July 2004 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jul/06/religion.prisonsandprobation (Accessed 10 January 2012).

Ali, Shaheen Sardar. Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law. Equal Before Allh, Unequal Before Man? The Hague/London/Boston: 2008.

Bedouin Adventures. Our Bedouin Tribe: Culture and Traditions. http://www.bedouinadventures.com/about-us-1/our-bedouin-tribe (Accessed 22 December 2011).

Bell, Duran. “Evolution of Middle Eastern Social Structures: A New Model,” Social Evolution and History , Vol. 3, No. 2, 2004. http://www.economics.uci.edu/~dbell/nomadicevolution.pdf (Accessed 21 December 2011).

Benedict, Ruth. Patterns of Culture. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934.

Benitez Bribiesca, Luis. “Memetics: A Dangerous Idea,” Interciencia: Revista de Ciencia y Technologia de América (Venezuela: Asociación Interciencia), 26 (1), January 2001, pp. 29- 31.

Berko, A., Erez E. “Gender, Palestinian Women and Terrorism: Women’s Liberation or Oppresion?.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 30, 6 June 2007.

Carole Ageng’o. Expert paper EGM/GPLHP/2009/EP.12. Harmful traditional practices in Europe: judicial interventions. 21 May 2009. Available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw_legislation_2009/Expert%20Paper%20EGM GPLHP%20_Carole%20Ageng%27o%20revised_.pdf (accessed 15 September 2011).

Carrabine E., Lee M., Cox, P., Plummer K. and South, N. Criminology: A Sociological Introduction. New York: Routledge, 2009.

CEDAW General Recom. 19, A/47/38, 1992, Available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/300395546e0dec52c12563ee0063dc9d?O pendocument (Accessed 15 November 2011)

Centre for Social Cohesion. Crimes of the Community. Honor-Based Violence in the UK. The Centre for Social Cohesion: London, 2010.

Cohen, Persy S. “Social Attitudes and Sociological Enquiry.” British Journal of Sociology . Vol.17, No.4, Dec.1996. http://www.jstor.org/pss/589181 (Accessed 20 December 2011).

Connors, Jane. “Evolution and definition of the concept of harmful traditional practices.” Pratique préjudiciables et droits humains. Institut International Des Droits De L’Enfant: 2011.

73 Council of Europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/HTML/DomesticViolence.htm (accessed 12 December 2011).

Cranston, Maurice. What are human rights ? 1973, 2 nd edn., London: Bodley Head.

Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservations Relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women CEDAW/SP/2006/2. New York, 2006. http://daccess-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/309/97/PDF/N0630997.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed 12 October 2011).

Dodd, Peter. “Family Honor and the Forces of Change in Arab Society,” International Journal of Middle East Studies , Vol. 4, No. 1. January, 1973, p. 41.

Donnelly, Jack. Human rights and human dignity: an analytic critique of non-Western conceptions of human rights. The American Political Science Review . Vol.76, No.2, 1982. http://www.jstor.org/pss/1961111 (accessed 1 November 2011).

Dunham, Jennifer “Honor Killings in Europe: An Interview With Scholar and Activist Dr. Sylvia Maier,” Perspectives on global issues Journal, 2008 [online] Available at: http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0302/SilviaMaier.htm (Accessed 15 April 2011).

Durkheim, Emile. The Division of Labor in Society . New York: Free Press, 1984.

Durkheim, Emile. The Division of Labor in Society . New York: Free Press, 1984.

Emery, James. “Reputation is Everything: Honor Killing Among the Palestinians.” WorldAndi, No Date Available http://www.worldandi.com/newhome/public/2003/may/clpub.asp (Accessed 5 February 2012).

Esman, Abigail. “Hirshi Ali Leaves Hiding to Spotlight Honor Killings,” Feminist.com , January 25 2005 http://www.feminist.com/news/vaw26.html (Accessed 2 March 2012)

European Parliament Website. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA- 2011-0127 (Accessed 1 March 2012).

Executive Board, American Anthropological Association 1947 "Statement on Human Rights" in American Anthropologist 49(4) 539-543. http://direitosehumanos.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/satement-45.pdf (accessed 4 November 2011).

Feminist.com. “Spotlight on: Honor Killings.” No Date Available. http://www.feminist.com/violence/spot/honor.html (Accessed 5 February 2012).

Ferdinand Tönnies. Community and Society . East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957.

74

Fisk, Robert. “The Crimewave that Shames the World,” The Independent , 2010 [online] Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/the-crimewave-that- shames-the-world-2072201.html (Accessed 10 April 2011).

Gavlak, Dale. “Jordan Honor Killing: Man Confesses to Brutally Stabbing To Death Pregnant Sister.” Huffington Post, 12 April 2009. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/12/jordan- honor-killing-man-_n_185977.html (Accessed 3 February 2012).

Gill, Aisha. Expert paper EGM/GPLHP/2009/EP.03. Honor killings and the quest for justice in black and minority communities in the UK. 12 June 2009. Available at: Available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw_legislation_2009/Expert%20Paper%20EGM GPLHP%20_Aisha%20Gill%20revised_.pdf (accessed 15 September 2011).

Goldenberg, Suzanne. “A Question of Honor.” The Guardian (UK), May 27, 1999. http://www.gendercide.org/case_honour.html (Accessed 2 February 2012).

Goodman, Alana. “Why is the Media Silent about Honor Killings?,” Commentary , October 2 2011 http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/02/10/why-is-the-media-silent-on-honor- killings/ (Accessed 1 March 2012).

Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology , New York: Oxford University Press, 1958.

Hantington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations.” 1993. Foreign Affairs , 72 (3) http://www.polsci.wvu.edu/faculty/hauser/PS103/Readings/HuntingtonClashOfCivilizationsF orAffSummer93.pdf (accessed 3 November 2011).

Hildebrandt, Johanne. “Honor Killing in Sweden Silences Courageous Voice on Ethnic Integration,” The Guardian , January 31 2002 http://jeffweintraub.blogspot.de/2007/01/fadime-sahindal-honor-killing-culture.html (Accessed 1 March 2012).

Hirschi, Travis. Causes of Delinquency . New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2002.

Holy, Ladislav. Kinship, honour, and solidarity: cousin marriage in the Middle East , Manchester, New York : Manchester University Press, 1989.

Honour killing: its causes & consequences: suggested strategies for the European Parliament, 2007 [online] Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/expert/eStudies.do?languageEN (Accessed 10 March 2011).

Horowitz, Ruth and Schwartz Garry, “Honor, normative ambiguity and gang violence” in American Sociological Review 39 (2): 238-51, 1974. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-462342/Honour-killing-sister-breaks-silence.html (accessed 2 April 2011).

Human Rights Watch, “Honoring the killers,” 19 April 2004. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/04/19/honoringkillers0 (Accessed 20 January 2011).

75 INTERIGHTS. Opuz vs. Turkey. Available at: http://www.interights.org/opuz/index.html (Accessed 15 November 2011).

Jawad, Nassim. “Afghanistan: a nation of minorities.” Minority Rights Group International Report, 1992/2. p. 25.

Jihad Watch. “Two Female Jihad-Martyrdom Martyrs Bombers Kill at Least 64 in Baghdad,” Jihad Watch , 1 February 2008 http://www.jihadwatch.org/2008/02/two-female-jihad- martyrdom-bombers-kill-at-least-64-in-baghdad.html (Accessed 5 February 2012)

Jones, A. “Case Study: Honor Killings and Blood Feuds.” http://www.gendercide.org/case_honour.html Gendercide Watch (Accessed 2 February 2012).

Jones, Adam. “Case Study: Honor Killings and Blood Feuds.” http://www.gendercide.org/case_honour.html Gendercide Watch (Accessed 2 February 2012)

Julian Borger. "In Cold Blood," Manchester Guardian Weekly , November 16, 1997.

Kennett, Austin. Bedouin justice. Laws and customs among the Egyptian Bedouins . London: Franc Cass & Co Ltd., 1968.

Khafagy, Fatma. Honor killing in Egypt. The Association of Legal Aid for Women. Cairo, 2005.

Krienert, Jessy. Masculinity and Crime: A Quantitative Exploration of Messerschmidt’s Hypothesis.” Electronic Journal of Sociology, 2003. http://www.sociology.org/content/vol7.2/01_krienert.html (Accessed 15 January 2012).

Luyckfaasseel, Lidia. “Honour-related violence: on the rise in Europe,” Gender-based violence in Europe , Brussels: IPPF European Network, 2009.

McGirk, Tim. “Palestinian Moms Becoming Martyrs,” Time Magazine , 3 May 2007. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1617542-2,00.html (Accessed 5 February 2012).

Messerschmidt, James . Masculinities and crime: Critique and reconceptualization of theory . Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC: Lanham, 1993.

Mir-Hosseini, Z., Hamzic V. Control and Sexuality: The Revival of Zina Laws in Muslim Contexts. London: Women Living Under Muslim Laws, 2010.

Neubauer, Violeta. “CEDAW Convention.” Pratique préjudiciables et droits humains. Institut International Des Droits De L’Enfant: 2011.

Nisbett, Richard. Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South . Westview Press, 1996.

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “What are human rights?” http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (accessed 10 November 2011).

76 Ortiz, Renato. “Sobre o Relativismo Cultural.” Alambre. Comunicación, Información, cultura . No.2, 2009. http://www.revistaalambre.com/Articulos/ArticuloMuestra.asp?Id=33 (accessed 4 November 2011).

Papademetriou. T. Council of Europe: Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence. Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402695_text (Accessed 10 December 2011).

Peter, Tom. “Jordan Honor Killings Draw Tough Response.” Global Post, April 7 2010 http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/jordan/100323/honor-killings-jordan (Accessed 4 February 2012).

Pillay, Navi. “Domestic violence and killing in the name of “honor,” 8 March 2011, Available at http://wwwupdate.un.org/en/events/women/iwd/2010/documents/HCHR_womenday_2010_st atement.pdf . (Accessed 10 November 2011)

Plesner, Yohannan. “Subverting the Ird Code: A Framework for Examining the Efficacy of Religious, Legal and Social Policies to Tackle “Honor Killings” in Southern Israel’s Bedouin Society.” Boston: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2003. http://www.plesner.co.il/pdf/12/10.pdf (Accessed 20 December 2011).

Posetti, Julie. “Jihad Sheilas or Media Martyrs? The Scavenger, No Date Available http://www.thescavenger.net/feminism-a-pop-culture/jihad-sheilas-or-media-martyrs-93456- 210.html (Accessed 5 February 2012).

Saha, Amit Shankar. “The Psychological Sense of Exile and Alienation.” Boloji.com , 3 May 2009 http://www.boloji.com/index.cfm?md=Content&sd=Articles&ArticleID=2448 (Accessed 15 January 2012).

Schwab P., Pollis A. Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives. Praeger: New York, 1980.

Sev’er, A. “Culture of Honor, Culture of Change: A Feminist Analysis of Honor Killings in Rural Turkey.” Violence Against Women: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal , 1999, 7 (9).

Shackelford, Todd. 2005. “An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective on Cultures of Honor,” Evolutionary Psychology, No. 3 http://www.epjournal.net/filestore/ep03381391.pdf (accessed 23 December 2011).

Shah, Saeed. “Three Teenage Girls Buried Alive in Tribal “Honour” Killing.” The Guardian (UK), 1 September 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/01/pakistan (accessed 4 February 2012).

Sheleff, Leon. The Future of Tradition: Customary Law, Common Law and Legal Pluralism . London: Franc Cass, 1999.

Shiyoukhi N., Laub K. “Palestinian Woman Aya Baradiya’s Honor Killing Sparks Tougher West Bank Laws.” Huffington Post , 19 May 2011

77 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/19/palestinian-woman-aya-bar_n_864430.html (Accessed 15 February 2012).

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philisophy. “Human rights.” February 7, 2003. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/ (accessed 1 November 2011).

Steward, Julian. "Comments on the Statement of Human Rights" in American Anthropologist 50(2) 351-352, 1948.

Temmerman M., Leye E., “Issue in the European Health Care for Victims of FGM.” Gender- based violence in Europe . Brussels: IPPF European Network, 2009.

Tibi, Bassam. “Islamic Sharia, Human Rights and International Relations,” in Islamic Law Reform and Human Rights: Challenges and Rejoinders , ed. T. Lundholm and K. Vogt. Copenhagen: Nordic Human Rights Publications, 1993.

Tierney, John. “A New Debate on Female Circumcision.” The New York Times : November 30, 2007. http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/30/a-new-debate-on-female- circumcision/ (Accessed 20 October 2011).

Tönnies, Ferdinand. Community and Society . East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957.

UK police start “honour” crime plane,” Aljazeera, 22 October 2008 [online] Available at: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2008/10/2008102292619942890.html (Accessed 15 April 2011).

UN Resolution 57/179 “Working towards the elimination of crimes against women committed in the name of honor.” Available at: http://www.stopvaw.org/drafting_laws_3.html (accessed 20 December 2011).

United Nations Fact Sheet No.: 23, Harmful traditional practices affecting the health of women and children . Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009.

Van Eck, Clementine. Purified by Blood: Honor Killings amongst Turks in the Netherlands . Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam, 2003.

Violence Is Not Our Culture. “UK: “Honor” Attack Numbers Revealed by Police Forces.” December 3, 2011. http://www.violenceisnotourculture.org/News-and-Views/uk-honour- attack-numbers-revealed-police-forces .

Volchok, Dmitriy. “Author of The Book “The Brides of Allah” Speaks About Terrorism in Russia.” Svoboda News , 4 April 2010 (originally in Russian) http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/2002048.html (Accessed 6 February 2012).

Weathers, Helen.“Honor killing” sister breaks her silence,” Mail Online , 17 June 2007

Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology , New York: Bedminster Press, 1968.

Williams, Carol. “Honor Killing Shakes Up Sweden After Man Slays Daughter Who Wouldn’t Wed,” Seattle Times , March 8 2002

78 http://jeffweintraub.blogspot.de/2007/01/fadime-sahindal-honor-killing-culture.html (Accessed 1 March 2012).

Williams, Rachel. “Honour Crimes Against Women in UK Rising Rapidly, Figures Show,” The Guardian , 3 December 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/dec/03/honour-crimes- uk-rising (Accessed 15 February 2012).

Women Against Violence Europe. Ad Hoc Committee on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic violence. http://www.wave- network.org/start.asp?ID=23079 (accessed 12 December 2011).

Yau-Fai Ho, David. "On the Concept of Face," American Journal of Sociology , 81 (4), 867– 84, 1976.

Youssef, Nadia. “Cultural Ideals, Feminine Behavior and Family Control,” Comparative Studies in Society and History , Vol. 15, No. 3, June 1973.

Zima, Suzanne. "When Brothers Kill Sisters," The Gazette [Montreal], April 17, 1999.

79