Architect of the Capitol

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ricardo A. Herrera is a historian on the Staff Ride Team at the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from the University of California, Los Angeles, and a doctorate in history from Marquette University. Before joining CSI, he was director of honors at Mount Union College in Ohio and chair of the Department of History and Geography at Texas Lutheran University. He has published several articles and chapters in military history. Commissioned in 1983, he served as an Armor officer on active duty, in the Army Reserve, and with the California National Guard.

George Washington, by Charles Willson Peale, 1779 February–March 1778

BY RICARDO A. HERRERA

enerale be destroyed, giving Direction, to the SIZE MATTERS: CAMPAIGNS, BATTLES, G wwas understandably con- Officer or Officers to whom this Duty AND MYTHS ccerned about the continued is assign’d, to take an account of the prprovisioningovisioni of his army at Valley Quantity together with the Owners Compared to the campaigns and Forge, , in the middle of Names.”1 battles that bookended it, the Grand the winter of 1778. Writing to Maj. In issuing these orders, Washington Forage was small indeed. In terms of Gen. Nathanael Greene on 12 Febru- set in motion one of the Continental raw numbers, the four thousand or ary 1778, the American commander Army’s largest, riskiest, and most so Continentals, Britons, Pennsylva- observed that “whereas by recent in- complex operations executed while nians, Delawareans, and New Jersey telligence I have reason to expect that at , the Grand Forage of men who took part quite simply paled they [“the Enemy”] intend making an- 1778. The expedition involved some in comparison to the larger number of other grand Forage into this Country, fifteen hundred to two thousand sol- soldiers who fought at Brandywine, it is of the utmost Consequence that diers of the and Germantown, or Monmouth. Yet, the Horses Cattle Sheep and Proven- thus constituted a substantial portion while the forage was not equal in scale der within Fifteen or Twenty miles of the roughly sixty-five hundred to the campaign or the west of the River Delaware between able-bodied, armed, and uniformed , a closer study of the Schuylkil and the Brandywine be Continental Army troops at Valley that effort reveals in fine detail some immediately removed, to prevent the Forge. It also included elements of of the operational, logistical, and civil- Enemy from receiving any benefit the Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New military complexities, constraints, and therefrom, as well as to supply the Jersey and contingents of the opportunities faced by commanders in present Emergencies of the American Continental and Pennsylvania Navies. the War of Independence. Moreover, Army.” Washington did “therefore The forage spanned southeastern it demonstrates the growing tactical Authorise impower & Command . . . Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey, and operational maturity of the Con- [Greene] forthwith to take Carry off & northern Delaware, and northeastern tinental Army. Washington’s forces secure all such Horses as are suitable Maryland. It lasted nearly six weeks executed actions that today might be for Cavalry or for Draft and all Cattle and engaged an estimated twenty- deemed joint (involving companion & Sheep fit for Slaughter together three hundred British soldiers (about services like the Army and Navy), with every kind of Forage that may be one-sixth of the able-bodied British compound (involving missions under- found in possession of any of the In- force in Philadelphia), as well as sev- taken in conjunction by regular and habitants within the Aforesaid Limits.” eral vessels and crews of the Royal irregular forces), and full-spectrum That which could not be carried off, Navy. Yet, the Grand Forage remains operations (combining “offensive, Greene was to “immediately Cause to largely unexamined and unknown.2 defensive, and stability or civil support

7 Trenton Y S Mount Holly Mount T K Bristol N C Dunk’s Ferry Dunk’s U U O Approximately 10 Miles 10 Approximately Haddonfield Evesham Meeting House Creek Cooper’s Cooper’s Ferry Cooper’s Gloucester Germantown ERSEY Creek Mantua J Whitemarsh HILADELPHIA River P EW Schuylkill N Upper Bridge Darby Billingsport Swedesboro

Blessington

R

E

V

I

R

E

R

A

W

A L

Salem

ORGE E D F Springfield Meeting House ALLEY V Paoli Wilmington New Castle Port Penn ENNSYLVANIA ELAWA RE P D N 8 Army History Spring 2011 operations simultaneously as part of they reduce the Continental Army plies could be had, but a host of factors an interdependent joint force”). Those to passive witness and caricature, like the declining purchasing power actions stand in a startling contrast rather than viewing it as a field army of Continental currency, the disorga- to the image of the encampment that engaged in active operations. These nization and lack of firm leadership most Americans hold.3 views ignore the Continentals’ nearly in the Commissary and Quartermas- Herein lies the second reason for constant combat and reconnaissance ter’s Departments, and, of course, the the Grand Forage’s obscurity: the patrols and the foraging the Army British Army militated against the power of myth as popular history. For undertook to supply itself and to deny Continentals. The “situation of the most Americans, including military those supplies to the British. In the Camp is such that in all human prob- officers, the Valley Forge canton- scope, planning, and execution of the ability the Army must soon dissolve,” ment is little more than a national Grand Forage, Washington revealed wrote Brig. Gen. James Varnum of morality play highlighting the virtu- his burgeoning acumen as a planner Rhode Island on 12 February. Valley ous self-sacrifice and patriotism of and commander and his continued Forge historian Wayne Bodle agrees George Washington and his ragged willingness to accept risk. Equally that the army was fast approaching band of Continentals. Sketched in important, the Grand Forage revealed collapse and probably could not have broad outlines, they marched along the maturity of Washington’s staff and lasted through March 1778 without frozen, snow-choked roads, leav- the Army’s leadership. The operation obtaining additional sources of food ing their bloody footprints to mark was too distant and too dispersed for and fuel.5

their route in the cruel Pennsylvania Washington to exercise direct control; The problem was not that Pennsyl- winter. While these patriots, ignored thus he relied on the experience and vania was barren; it was not. There by Congress, their parent states, and judgment of his generals, dozens of were supplies to be had to the west and local farmers, starved and froze, they field- and company-grade officers, and south of Valley Forge, but transport- endured in the service of the “glori- the Army’s logistical staff. Washington ing them to the army was difficult. ous cause”—independence. By way of exercised centralized command but The roads were poor and even under contrast, General Sir William Howe placed his confidence in decentralized clement conditions the journey was and the British Army enjoyed the execution. Meanwhile, his opponent, difficult for heavily laden wagons. Col. winter and the pleasures of Loyalist General Howe, demonstrated a sin- Ephraim Blaine, deputy commissary society, snug and warm in occupied gular lack of interest in the largest general of purchases for the Middle Philadelphia, the erstwhile American and riskiest operation undertaken by Department, noted the “neglect in capital. American officers’ knowledge the Continental Army in the winter the Quarter Master Department [for] typically goes beyond this. They note of 1778.4 not keeping up a continual supply of the appearance of Friedrich Wilhelm Waggons from the Magazines with von Steuben, formerly a Prussian FEEDING THE CONTINENTALS provisions.” Increased military traffic, officer, who would, with vulgar to the extent this was possible, merely charm, lead the effort to transform By February 1778, the Army’s Com- churned the roadbeds, which in the the Continental Army from a group missary and Quartermaster’s Depart- freeze, thaw, and rain cycle made of individualistic and undisciplined ments had collapsed. The month’s an arduous journey hellish. Further- republican-warriors into citizen-sol- bad weather and the atrocious road more, wagoners often siphoned off diers, part of a well-drilled machine network compounded the dismal brine from barrels of pickled fish or able to stand up to British bayonets. logistical picture. On 5 February, the meat in order to lighten their loads, In each of these cases, the Continen- Schuylkill River, which divided the thus spoiling the food. Many simply tal Army emerges as a static force, a principal encampment of Washing- jettisoned barrels along the roadside. “Greek chorus” trumpeting stoic mar- ton’s Main Army on the right bank The frequent snow, rain, and cold tial values and patriotism. While there from its local magazine on the left, was weather made foraging for food very are kernels of truth to these images, impassable because of flooding. Sup- difficult. The proposition that hunting

9 January 1778, Howe’s Hessian aide de camp, Capt. Friedrich von Muench- hausen, matter-of-factly recorded the dispatch of “three regiments . . . this morning to cover our foragers and wagons, all of which returned unmolested.” They “brought almost 200 tons of hay” into Philadelphia. Often enough, however, lone farmers and millers brought their goods to the British.7 Howe’s foragers favored the lands east of the Schuylkill, where Loyalism was more pronounced, the enemy’s presence was lightest, and the risk of being caught on the wrong side of a rising river was obviated. Col. Walter could supply the army while maintain- ment a difficult proposition. Com- Stewart, whose 13th Pennsylvania ing its position is, at best, ludicrous. pounding the Continentals’ difficulty Regiment of the Continental Army Complicating supply problems for the were the British Army’s competing foraged through northeast Phila- Continental Army, farmers were re- need for food and forage and the raids delphia County and Bucks County, luctant to sell their goods to purchas- and patrols it executed to supply itself. estimated that enough flour and other ing agents, speculating that prices for To the southeast of Valley Forge, the provisions to feed from eight thousand agricultural products would continue British Army wintered in Philadelphia. to ten thousand men “goes daily to to rise. They avoided the public market If considerably more comfortable than Philadelphia, Carried in by Single established by Washington, and, upon were the Continentals in their huts at Persons, Waggons, Horses &ca.” the approach of foragers or purchasing Valley Forge, the British found that But while a large quantity of Bucks agents, husbandmen hid their horses provisioning Philadelphia was no County’s bounty entered British lines, and wagons.6 easy task. As Redcoats patrolled the something that astounded Washing- Dreadful roads to the west, inclem- countryside around the city, commis- ton, British agents discovered that ent weather, inadequate transport, sary agents under the escort of large providing for their army and navy was near-worthless currency, and reluctant detachments did their best to supply no easy task. Payment in specie and farmers made maintaining the canton- the army from local farms; thus on 26 escorts to city markets might encour-

A mid-nineteenth-century artist’s depiction of General Washington and his associates visiting suffering Continental Army troops at Valley Forge

Library of Congress

10 Army History Spring 2011 age many farmers, but fresh provisions to undertake a large foraging ex- dred men stated in the order Colonel were still difficult to obtain. Farmers’ pedition of its own, comparable to Angell recorded provides a likely total subsistence needs and political loyal- one the British were reported to be of the number that marched out of ties were as varied as their numbers. planning for sometime in mid- to Valley Forge. Washington instructed Moreover, the region was anything late February, at a location unknown Greene to give farmers certificates in but pacified.8 to Washington. Brig. Gen. Anthony lieu of cash. In addition to foraging, British foragers had swept through Wayne, a native of Chester County, in the detachment was to destroy “all Valley Forge and the surrounding area which Valley Forge was situated, and the provender on the Islands between before the Continentals occupied it in a former elected official from the area, Philadelphia and Chester which may December 1777. Following the armies’ took an active role in planning the be difficult of Access or too hazardous settling into winter quarters, life be- Continental Army mission, and he to attempt carrying off.” The expedi- tween the lines became increasingly was prepared to lead it. But on 12 Feb- tion effectively collapsed the army’s dangerous for soldiers and civilians ruary, Washington selected the more eastern screen and uncovered those alike as the two forces competed for senior General Greene to command approaches to Valley Forge because it popular affections, political power, the Continental Army’s forage. That dispatched so much of Washington’s and subsistence in a region that easily evening, as the diary of Col. Israel combat power to gather food and contained a hundred thousand civil- Angell records, orders went out “for a supplies. Already overstretched by its ians, who also needed to eat. Maraud- detachment from the army to parade mission and low effective strength, ing bands of furloughed Continentals, by ten OClock in the morning to Con- the army was unable to support the deserters from the armies, bandits, and sist of one Major General [Greene], or mount sizable patrols east Continental and British patrols looked one Brigadier Genl. [Wayne,] three of the Schuylkill while the Grand for easy pickings of all sorts. Some- Colo.lo. four Lt. Cols. four Majors 16 Forage took place. Washington’sWashington s only times Continental pickets summarily Capts.pts. 32 Subls 32 SerjtsSerjts 32 Corporals forwardforward securitsecurityy was furnished bbyy the executed farmers bringing produce 56 DrumsDrums and fifs and 1200 pprivats,rivats, understrengthunderstrength PennsylvaniaPennsylvania militia, and livestock to Philadelphia. Maj. to bebe furnishedfurnished withwith hardhard BreadBread forfor which, despitedespite active service in the John Graves Simcoe, commanding the Six days,days, but where theythey are a goinggoing Loyalist Queen’s Rangers, wrote that is notnot yetyet known.”known.”11 to “prevent this intercourse [with the British Army], the enemy added, to the THE GRANDRAND FORAGEORAGE severe exertions of their civil powers, COMMENCESMMENCES their militia” to enforce the will of the Continental Congress, although its WhileWhile contemporarcontemporaryy eses-- strength was by “no means sufficient timatesmates ofof thethe sizesize ofof thethe for . . . stoping the Intercourse between forcece thatthat WashingtonWashington the Country and City.”9 placedced under Greene’s The inability of Howe’s agents to commandmmand range from subsist the army locally forced British twelveelve hundredhundred to two commissaries to ship large quanti- thousandusand soldiers,soldiers, thethe ties of food from New Jersey and roughlyghly fourteen huhun-n- Delaware, but the “greatest reliance, especially for livestock, was placed on large detachments of soldiers who roamed both sides of the Delaware.” Fuel could be had in the local area, but forage for horses and cattle had Nathanael Greene, by to be “supplemented by hay ship- Charles Willson Peale, ments from other areas, particularly c. 1783 Rhode Island.” As for the Continental Army, its situation was so desperate that Washington ordered magazines that were to supply the army for the upcoming spring campaign emptied and brought to Valley Forge. The gar- risons protecting the magazines were forced to fend for themselves.10 The army’s dire straits did not translate into inaction or lethargy.

Instead the Continentals prepared Independence National Historical Park

1111 preceding year, was better suited for finding enough wagons and teams to foraging parties. Greene urged Biddle home defense than as a proper adjunct haul away whatever they might glean to “exert yourself in collecting for- to the army. Washington pleaded with from the region’s farms. Thus, one of age otherwise the business will go on the president of Pennsylvania, Thomas Greene’s first actions was to dispatch slow.” Underscoring his seriousness, Wharton Jr., to call out and strengthen Biddle and a group of soldiers to Lan- he enjoined Biddle to supervise the the militia in order to secure the coun- caster, some forty-five miles west of officers and men closely and promised tryside north and east of the Schuylkill. Valley Forge, with instructions to im- he would “punish the least neglect with Wharton and the county lieutenants press and bring forward wagons and the greatest severity.” Greene con- faced the insurmountable task of mus- teams. In the meantime, Greene led his cluded, “You must forage the country tering enough militiamen to do their division to Springfield Meeting House, naked, and,” he added with a touch duty. More often than not, however, about twelve miles southward, which of sardonic humor, “to prevent their Pennsylvania’s forces were “reduced coincided well with an earlier recom- complaints of the want of Forage we to Almost a Cypher.”12 mendation from Wayne to station a must take all their Cattle, Sheep and The morning of 13 February was thousand to twelve hundred soldiers Horses fit for the use of the Army.”15 “pleasant but Soon Clowded up and as an advanced post at Darby.14 If Greene had hoped to maintain grew raw cold and unpleasent.” At After establishing his headquarters, some degree of operational security, 1000, in obedience to Washington’s Greene set his men to collecting all the he would be disappointed, although orders, officers, soldiers, and musi- cattle, horses, wagons, and other nec- he was initially unaware of the prob- cians formed up into their ad hoc di- essary items in the area. He intended to lem. Von Muenchhausen recorded vision. Not long after, a “Detachment fall back six miles on 15 February “to with remarkable precision on 12 of fifteen hundred Men & four Field take post at one Edwards,” which was February that Washington “today Pieces . . . marched towards Darby: to serve as a collection point for the detached General Wayne with 1,500 what their destination is we know not.” In not atypical Continental fashion, the foraging column represented a mix of the army. Unit integrity, prized by modern armies, was cast aside out Anthony Wayne, by of necessity and in accordance with James Sharples Sr., 1796 the Continental practice of forming improvised units. General officers from Rhode Island and Pennsylvania commanded field- and company- grade officers and enlisted men from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Con- necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and regiments.13 Greene recognized the army’s dif- ficult situation but was doubtful about the forage’s ability to accomplish much. Doubt notwithstanding, the Rhode Islander concluded that “His Excellency thinks we had better make the experiment nevertheless.” Greene then ordered Wayne to “consult and fix upon the plan for execution” with Col. Clement Biddle, commissary general of forages, who was to oversee the expedition’s issue of warrants to farmers and others for their seized or destroyed property as well as direct

the subordinate commissaries and Independence National Historical Park quartermasters accompanying the forage. Greene dived into the task with his customary drive and energy. Because of the proximity of the target area to Valley Forge and the resultant wariness of its farmers, the Conti- nental soldiers had little chance of

12 Army History Spring 2011 General Wayne’s home near Paoli, Pennsylvania, as it

Library of Congress appeared c. 1900

men and four cannon down the river off to raise the alarm. Ballard “push’d setback notwithstanding, the forage about three miles beyond Darby to on as hard as possible” but discovered continued.18 gather available cattle, provisions, the garrison secure in a stone house. Greene maintained a steady cor- etc.” American progress was assisted A party of Ansbachers from the regi- respondence with Washington, con- by a “sudden heavy rain” on 11 Feb- ments von Eyb and von Voit held it. stantly updating him with the prog- ruary, which forced the British to Before Ballard’s attack got to within ress of his division, sometimes twice “dismantle the upper bridge across the one hundred yards, the Ansbachers daily. Scarcity and Pennsylvanians’ Schuylkill.” This was a pontoon bridge opened “a very heavy fire . . . which skill at hiding their goods prompted located directly west of the center of was very warmly returnd on our part Greene to request from Washington Philadelphia that linked “a redoubt till we got within 50 yds.”17 assistance from an additional deputy on the other side” with the garrison Unable to close with the enemy, Bal- quartermaster general “to conduct holding the city. Without the bridge, lard ordered his men to fall back. Dur- the business of that department.” The the British were unable to dispute the ing the course of the fight, Maj. Samuel foraging parties were not meeting with American forage. Under the circum- Cabell of the 14th Virginia Regiment much success; Greene noted that their stances, the redoubt was a temptation led a group toward the river and “fell in “collection was inconsiderable, [as] the that could not be resisted.16 with a small party” of the enemy. Ca- Country is very much draind.” None- The redoubt’s isolation prompted Lt. bell believed “he killd Several of them,” theless, they managed to find some Col. Robert Ballard of the 1st Virginia but in the darkness of the morning it cattle, sheep, and horses, all of which Regiment to propose an attack against was difficult to tell. The fight for the were sent to the encampment. Biddle it. Ballard and his command were “out redoubt lasted about thirty minutes. reported to Greene much the same on the foraging business yesterday [14 Capt. Johann Ewald, a Hessian jäger, state of affairs in Lancaster. He “com- February] down about Darby” when reported that Ballard lost ten killed plains bitterly of the disaffection of the he learned of the bridge’s removal. and left behind seven wounded, in- people,” wrote Greene to Washington. Sensing an opportunity to temporar- cluding a French officer. Ballard, how- There was “but a poor prospect of get- ily smash a British toehold across the ever, notified Greene that “there was ing Waggons.” Nonetheless, Greene Schuylkill, he selected about two hun- not a man of his men kild, [although] was not dissuaded. He steeled himself dred men “to attempt the Guard, [and] five were slightly wounded.” He also against the people’s distress: “The In- upon his earnest entreaty” Greene added that his men “kild one Hessian habitants cry out and beset me from all acceded. As Ballard’s party advanced and mortally wounded another; two quarters, but like Pharoh I harden my upon the redoubt around 0300, a of his men on their march deserted.” heart.” In pharaohnic fashion, when “Light horseman” spied it about five The Ansbachers reported suffering one Greene’s Continentals seized two men hundred yards distant and galloped killed and three wounded. Ballard’s transporting provisions to the Brit-

13 ish, he ordered “an hundred [lashes] of the best Hay Towns between Camp Greene ordered that no receipts be each by way of Example.” Greene was and Lancaster,” deposit the hay at the given to those whose concealed stock “determine[d] to forage the Country encampment, and proceed to Bucks was discovered. Naturally, the owners very bare. Nothing shall be left unat- County “with so much secrecy and were to be notified of the uncompen- tempted.”19 dispatch, that it will be difficult for the sated seizures; it was only right that Chester County’s farmers’ skill at Enemy to defeat it.”21 they should know of their support of hiding cattle aside, the chief problem Two other considerations may the Army. 23 was the paucity of wagons and teams. also have informed Greene’s logic. Any hope that the local “Whigs” Livestock could be driven forward, but First, he believed the farmers around would give information “respecting hay, flour, grain, and goods required Lancaster were more skillful at hid- the Tories” and their cached goods transportation. Temptingly, what the ing their wagons than Colonel Biddle was lost “for fear when we are gone land did have in abundance was “Hay was at discovering them. Thus, who they will be carried prisoners in Phila- . . . , the plentifulest article that there better at ferreting out wagons than delphia.” Still, detachments fanned is in the Country.” Greene estimated local officials? The second may have out in an ever-widening circuit. Lt. that “sixty or seventy tons may be been Greene’s sensitivity to state and Col. Josiah Harmar of the 6th Penn- had in this neighbourhood,” which Continental authority and the Army’s sylvania Regiment followed through would go far toward feeding the few role in supporting them. Part of the on Greene’s plan to forage west of the winter-thin cattle, sheep, and horses Army’s mission was buttressing the Brandywine’s forks “a little above the seized for the army. Greene proposed shaky authority of the state govern- rout of the enemy,” while Col. Oliver expanding the geographic scope of ment to help keep it in the war. By ap- Spencer, a New Jersey officer who the forage to include the back side of pealing to Pennsylvania’s government commanded Spencer’s Additional Brandywine Creek to the west, Read- to provide the wagons, the Continental Continental Regiment, made a large ing to his northwest, and, “as soon as Army publicly deferred to civil power, circuit north and west toward Gos- the Bridge [over the Schuylkill] is pass- which reinforced the state’s authority hen Meeting House, about ten miles able,” Bucks County to the northeast. while it demonstrated to the people southwest of Valley Forge.24 Determined to deny the British the of southern Pennsylvania the state’s Even with a much smaller force, hay his own foragers could not collect, power and its ability to persevere. Greene was determined to continue Greene expanded upon Washington’s Whatever the reasoning, however, foraging until all of the wagons were instructions to destroy provinder on Washington agreed with Greene’s loaded with hay. As for “Grain there the islands in the lower Delaware plans as “our present wants will justifie is but little to be got.” Elements of River and instead followed Wayne’s any measures you can take.”22 his force had already burned a “very advice to “destroy all the forage upon considerable” quantity of forage on the Jersey shore.” Greene selected Col. GREENE’S RETURN TO VALLEY FORGE the Delaware River islands and “We Richard Butler of the 9th Pennsylvania got a number of very good Horses Regiment to command the detach- Much as Greene had expected, the from off” them in the bargain. Greene ment. He was to “cross the River from pickings had been slim. About 17 also learned that the British were Chester.” Washington concurred.20 February, he forwarded “near fifty readying for a “grand forage some The following day, Greene altered Head of Cattle” to camp, and it was where.” His sources believed that it his proposal for the Bucks County not too soon. Over the past several would take place “on this side [of the incursion. Mindful of his force’s se- days the army had not had “Above Schuylkill], but I immagin they will curity, he believed that an attempt to half allowance” of its meat ration and alter their plan now if they designd seize wagons in Bucks County would the “soldiers are scarcely restrained it before” Continental foragers had “explain our intentions too early from mutiny by the eloquence and scoured Chester County. Greene had for the safety of the party.” Thus, he management of our officers.” Camp “no doubt of Bucks County being proposed issuing a press warrant to was littered with the carcasses of their object.” Throughout the forage, Johnston Smith, a purchasing agent horses, while those still alive exhibited the dearth of transportation had in the Quartermaster’s Department. a “deplorable leanness [for] . . . want of dogged Continental efforts, and now Greene wanted Smith to hold his forage.” Greene wished that he could Greene was ready to return to camp. warrant in abeyance, and instead first have sent more, but the “Inhabitants “The time for which I came out expires “apply to the Executive Council for have taken the alarm and conceal their tonight,” he wrote on 18 February, an hundred Waggons to be got ready stock in such a manner that it is very “but as the forageing business has in three Days.” Should the state gov- difficult finding any.” They had done as been greatly obstructed for want ernment in Lancaster prove unable much with their horses and harnesses, of Waggons it will be necessary or unwilling to exert itself, only then thus “Our poor fellows are obligd to for me to continue a few days was Smith to “collect the Waggons search all the woods and swamps af- longer.” Before acting, Greene first with his press Warrant.” The escorts ter them and often without success.” wished “to know your Excellencies for the newly acquired wagons were However, to provide a disincentive for pleasure respecting the matter.” to load them with forage from “some their efforts to hide animals and goods, Coincidentally, the unintended delay

14 Army History Spring 2011 General Washington’s Library of Congress headquarters at Valley Forge

notwithstanding, Greene believed troop units in Philadelphia, and fol- met with Washington’s desire that that the “little collections” made by lowing Greene’s departure from Valley Greene continue the forage “if you his command and “some others” Forge in February 1778 they led their have any prospect of making it worth had “prevented the Army from dis- companies into the counties north of the while.”25 banding.” Despite the few supplies Philadelphia and east of the Schuylkill By the evening of 19 February, collected, Greene had been fortunate. to attack Continental supply lines, Greene was prepared to present to Except for increased raiding, forages, often under or supported by regulars. Washington forty loaded wagons, and daily patrols, the British Army Their attacks grew in scope once the but nothing more. It was not that the had not stirred. Washington’s forag- foraging division divided, and its parts countryside was devoid of hay, rather ers had had unchallenged access to went their separate ways. One of their that the army did not have the num- southeastern Pennsylvania. This state most notable attacks took place in late ber of wagons and teams it needed to of affairs changed, however, once An- February, when Hovenden and his support its operations. With more of thony Wayne’s detachment entered troop of Philadelphia Light Dragoons them, Greene believed that he would New Jersey.26 captured a drove of one hundred and have made an even greater impact, thirty New England cattle, which had 27 but instead his efforts “rendered us A PROVINCIAL OFFENSIVE? been under light escort. but little assistance from the lines.” Wayne Bodle contends that Hov- As for cattle, that was another mat- Much as nature abhors a vacuum, enden’s “possession of the oxen was ter. Colonel Spencer reported from so too did would-be provincials. Re- an ominous sign of the scope of the Goshen that “there was but few Cattle sponding to the opportunity presented provincial offensive.” Furthermore, he to be got there.” Harmar, operating by the collapse of the Continentals’ argues that successes like this, coupled around the forks of the Brandywine, eastern screen line and the departure with the lack of resistance, embold- had not yet reported, but Greene, of Greene and Wayne from Chester ened the Loyalists, who expanded having “heard of Cattle going to camp County, some Pennsylvanians loyal their scope of operations into more from that quarter,” attributed them to the British government and “a great daring raids against the local Whig to Harmar. Greene’s foragers had many deserters” entered British lines, leadership and other sources of sup- “pretty well gleaned” Chester County. and many of them would join or form ply. Increased raiding, however much He then ordered his troops, save a Loyalist corps. Always a careful ob- consternation or fear that it raised, did two-company rearguard, to return server, Capt. Johann Ewald noted that not constitute an offensive. Indeed, to camp. Greene followed around “These people receive no pay, ride their as the ever-observant Ewald noted, 21 February, no doubt frustrated own horses, and live from pillage.” “we jägers felt like we were dead and by the army’s lack of transportation Loyalists like Capts. Richard Hoven- forgotten.” These Hessian regulars, and the unwillingness of so many den, Evan Thomas, Jacob James, and who, with their British counterparts to aid so few. His disappointment Thomas Sandford had formed Loyalist were the backbone of the army and of

15