One Country, Two Cultures: the Invisible Boundary

Home , Below the Lion Rock, Cha chaan teng, History of Hong Kong, Kong Qingdong, When Heaven Burns

ONE COUNTRY, TWO CULTURES:

THE INVISIBLE BOUNDARY BETWEEN HONG KONG AND MAINLAND CHINA

Ho Ling Pricilla Cheung Summer, 2013

An Undergraduate Honors Thesis Presented to

the Department of International Studies

______

Xiaobo Su Honors Thesis Advisor

All requirements for graduation with Honors in the

Department of International Studies have been completed.

______

Kathie Carpenter ISP Director of Undergraduate Studies Table of Contents Acknowledgement ...... 1

List of Abbreviations ...... 2

Abstract ...... 3

Chapter 1: Introduction and Problem Statement ...... 4 I. Introduction ...... 4

_.II. Research Problem Statement ...... 5

III. The Politics of Identity ...... 6

Chapter 2: Background History and the “HKID” ...... 13 I. Context/ Background ...... 13 i. Colonial History of Hong Kong ...... 13 ii. “One Country, Two System” ...... 15 iii. “Biliterate and Trilingual” Policy ...... 17

II. The Hong Kong Identity (HKID) ...... 19 i. Definition and Essential Components of the HKID ...... 19 ii. Secondary Data and Statistics ...... 27

Chapter 3: Recent Language Trend and Implication ...... 32 I. The New “Using Putonghua to Teach Chinese Language Subject” Measure ...... 32 i. Implication and Impact on the “HKID” ...... 34 ii. Contribution to the China-Hong Kong Tension ...... 37

Chapter 4: Case Studies and Analysis ...... 40 I. Linguistic and Sociocultural Tension ...... 40

i. Case Study 1: The Subway Disputes and Aftermath ...... 40

ii. Case Study 2: Mainland Professor Kong’s Criticism ...... 46

II. Symbolization of Language Preference ...... 50

III. Personal Observation and Experience ...... 51

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 54 I. Conclusions ...... 54

i. Restate Problem Statement ...... 56

ii. Restate Major Findings ...... 56

II. Recommendations and Forward Looking ...... 58

i. Personal Thoughts and Recommendations ...... 58

ii. Forward Looking Statement ...... 60

Works Cited

Appendices APPENDIX A: Categorical Ethnic Identity Poll Chart and Table (1997-2013)

APPENDIX B: Public Statement by Ken Wai

APPENDIX C: The “Locust Song” Lyrics

Acknowledgement

First and foremost, I praise and thank God, the Almighty, for his abundant blessings and love throughout my life. I am extremely grateful for His infinite and unconditional support from beginning to end of the thesis. Without the strength, wisdom, and dedication He has granted me, I would not be able to proceed with the thesis successfully.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor Xiaobo Su, for his continuous support of my research and writing. I am thankful for his time, patience, guidance, and encouragement. It is my pleasure to have an advisor who is so knowledgeable and available to help.

Beside my thesis advisor, I would also like to thank my academic advisor, Dr. Anita Weiss, for enlightening me to start this research in the first place. She has also connected me with

Professor Su so that I have an opportunity to work with a professional in this field of study.

Last but not least, my deepest gratitude goes to my family and friends. Their love and caring motivated me to persevere during times that I was stressed and lost. I can never ask for better family and friends, and I am forever grateful to have them in my life.

1 List of Abbreviations

CSLI Center for the Study of Language and Information

EVCHK The Encyclopedia of Virtual Communities in Hong Kong

HKEB Hong Kong Education Bureau

HKCU Hong Kong Chinese University

HKID Hong Kong Identity

HKLII Hong Kong Legal Information Institute

HKSAR Hong Kong Special Administration Region

HKU University of Hong Kong

MOI Medium of Instruction

MTR Mass Transit Railway

OCTS One Country; Two Systems

POP Public Opinion Program

PRC People’s Republic of China

PTH Putonghua

SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

SCOLAR Standing Committee on Language Education and Research

2 Abstract

July 1, 1997 marked the historical handover of Hong Kong from Britain to the People’s

Republic of China. While being part of China, Hong Kong operates as a special region with independent sets of systems under the “One Country, Two Systems” policy. This policy allows

Hong Kong to maintain the pre-colonial ways of life with a high degree of autonomy for fifty years. However, the feasibility and interpretations of this innovative policy have always been controversial.

Throughout the colonial era, Hong Kongers have developed a distinctive “Hong Kong identity” that should be recognized apart from the national identity. This thesis will identify the essential components of the local culture from the legal, historical, linguistic, and sociocultural perspectives. By examining the new “Using Putonghua to Teach Chinese Language Subject” measure in Hong Kong, it will investigate its potential manipulation of the language preference of Hong Kongers, demolition of the core values of the “Hong Kong identity,” and impacts on

China-Hong Kong relations.

A series of clashes between Hong Kongers and Mainland Chinese happened in early

2012. The two case studies will continue to demonstrate how language, an esteemed symbol of culture, and sociocultural discrepancies are underlying sources of these disputes. Surrounding these tensions, the local media attracts the attention of national and international audiences that further intensify the situation. This thesis will conclude with my personal observations, recommendations to smoothen the postcolonial reunification. It hopes to raise awareness of the unique “Hong Kong identity” and to point out the invisible boundary between Hong Kong and Mainland China despite the reunification in 1997.

3 Chapter 1: Introduction and Problem Statement

I. Introduction

Sixteen years ago in 1997, Britain returned the sovereignty of Hong Kong back to the

People’s Republic of China (PRC). Britain, the “foster mother” of Hong Kong, is a capitalist country with a distinct culture, socioeconomic system, and language that were widely introduced in Hong Kong during the colonial period. Mainland China, the “biological mother,” on the other hand, is a hybrid socialist and capitalist country with a rich history and traditional beliefs that are deeply rooted in the Hong Kong society. Even before 1997, different people have expressed concerns about the feasibility of an innovative policy, “One Country, Two

Systems,”1 adopted during the decolonization period. Their anxiety is reasonable because Hong

Kongers have been struggling to fit into their “biological” family. Running almost as an autonomous system within Mainland China, Hong Kong is also closely related to Mainland

China at the same time.

There is a substantial amount of visitors flow to and from both sides due to geographic proximity. With the rising average income level in Mainland China and a simplified visa procedure, more and more civilians would visit, invest in, or even attempt to migrate to Hong

Kong. This phenomenon has not felt like a threat to many Hong Kongers until recently.

Language and sociocultural differences have led to some significant clashes that happened around the beginning of 2012. Along with the longstanding stereotypes of the Mainlanders among the Hong Kong public, the tension between local Hong Kongers and Mainland Chinese

1 “One Country, Two Systems” is a promise from Mainland China granting Hong Kong the freedom to practice capitalism and a high degree of autonomy for at least 50 years. See chapter 2, I, Section ii for full explanation of the policy.

4 seems to have escalated to a new highest level. These ongoing conflicts indicate that problems in China-Hong Kong relations, on an everyday level, are becoming more visible and too dangerous to be ignored. Therefore, this thesis will address the roots of the problems and raise awareness of the “Hong Kong Identity” (HKID).

II. Research Problem Statement

This thesis has two purposes. The first is to investigate the formations and implications of the HKID at different levels under the “One Country, Two Systems” (OCTS) policy. Under the

British influence, I contend that Hong Kongers have their own distinctive cultural legacy despite having the same ethnic origin as the Mainland Chinese. The local Hong Kong identity (HKID) is different from the national Chinese identity; therefore, it should be recognized separately. The second is to identify the leading causes of the invisible boundary between Hong Kong and

Mainland China. I argue that the inconsideration of the distinctive HKID and the language2 and sociocultural differences between two places, developed during the colonial era, contribute to the formation of this invisible boundary. The reunification in 1997 might have seemingly united

Hong Kong and Mainland China on the surface, but it failed to incorporate the two distinct cultures harmoniously.

2 While the status of Cantonese has been a debate among different linguists and scholars, there still isn’t a consensus on whether it should be considered a “language” or “dialect.” The goal of this thesis is to explore the Hong Kong identity and the China-Hong Kong relations. Given the difficulties in interpretation, I will refer Cantonese as a language in order to facilitate my analysis. Readers can refer to Julie M. Groves’s “Language or Dialect—or Topolect?” on Sino-Platonic Papers for more information regarding the discussion on Cantonese.

5 III. The Politics of Identity

This section summarizes and evaluates key findings by scholars in the field of

International Relations and intercultural communication. It also conceptualizes the politics of identity between Mainland China and Hong Kong. Many firsthand and secondhand resources regarding the roles of language and culture in the HKID construction and the China-Hong Kong tensions have been published. There are also theories about identity construction and cross- cultural communication that relate to my research about the Hong Kong identity. Many existing studies center on the postcolonial tensions in Hong Kong caused by economic and political changes and the feasibility of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy. However, the tensions contributed by disparities in the language preferences and cultures among the two are relatively less explored. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the cultural identity of Hong

Kongers and formation of the boundary specifically with a language and cultural discourse. As part of the requirements, this thesis will refer to literature in other foreign languages.

The description of the term “identity politics” by the Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy provides an effective framework for this thesis. The definition is as follows:

The laden phrase “identity politics” has come to signify a wide

range of political activity and theorizing founded in the shared

experiences of injustice of members of certain social

groups…Identity political formations typically aim to secure the

political freedom of a specific constituency marginalized within its

larger context. Members of that constituency assert or reclaim

ways of understanding their distinctiveness that challenge

6 dominant oppressive characterizations, with the goal of greater

self-determination (Heyes).

In the case of Hong Kong and China, Hong Kongers are a marginalized social group within the greater Chinese society. They should be able to express their cultural characteristics that may be different from the mainstream Chinese national identity without hindrance. In Self, Identity, and Social Movements, Stryker et al. analyze social or political movements via exploring the role of self-identity. They claim that individuals should identify themselves based on race, ethnicity, culture, religion, and/or other commonalities liberally. People with common characteristics often gather as a group with a communal identity determined upon consensus (Stryker et al.

30). Their study reiterates the fundamental concept of cultural identity formation. In the context of this thesis, the cultural identity of Hong Kongers is a preference and should be independent of other identities they hold. Even within Hong Kong, people from different generations may have experienced different colonial encounters and developed different perspectives of their self-identities.

In his article on South China Morning Post, Lau also looks at the China-Hong Kong tensions with the lens of identity politics. He notices that some Hong Kongers choose to inflate their unique cultural traits, and “gradually a strand of indigenous culture has evolved that wants to exclude Hong Kong from China.” Others choose to emphasize their Chinese or British roots. Self-identity is a matter of choice regardless of the passports3 people hold (Lau 2012).

Thanks to its geographical identity as a special region in China, Hong Kongers should have the

3 Before the reunification, citizens of Hong Kong were granted the British National (Overseas) passports since 1987, which they were regarded as British citizens in legal terms (UK Border Agency). The HKSAR passports were issued instead since July 1, 1997.

7 right to maintain their local culture and a separate cultural identity than the Mainland Chinese, regardless of the political situation. After an exhaustive research, Fredrik Barth proposes, in

Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference, that “identity boundaries” are defined when people with different cultural identities interact. “Not only do ecologic variation mark and exaggerate differences; some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences…*some+ radical differences are played down and denied” (14). He also argues that cultural commonality unite a group of people and “boundary defines the group” in contrast (15). Barth’s hypothesis elucidates the creation of the boundary between Hong Kong and Mainland China. It is now clear that Hong Kongers are committed to maintain an identity boundary because it unites them as a group.

Ever since the transfer of sovereignty, the role of language in cultural integration has been a heated debate. The legal status and importance of Cantonese, English, and PTH are slowly changing at a different pace within the Hong Kong society. Previous research has proven language to be the carrier of social identity (Giles, Taylor, and Bourhis 1977). Lee and Leung’s study affirms the importance of Cantonese in Hong Kong by addressing its role in culture- building and social fabric, given its universality in Hong Kong (1). Their study lays a conceptual foundation for my analysis of "Using Putonghua to teach Chinese Language subject” in Chapter

3. They cite that neglecting Cantonese in the school curriculum will undermine the freedom of

Hong Kongers to retain their established system promised by OCTS.

While exploring the relationship between language and social identity in Hong Kong,

Yuk-yue Tong and fellow researchers found an in-group expectation among people who identify themselves as Hong Kongers to communicate in Cantonese (the in-group language) even with a

8 Mainland Chinese (Tong et al. 285). Their findings help to explain the conceivable cause of the subway conflict in my first case study (see Chapter 4). Language gap contributes to many on- going conflicts between Hong Kongers and Mainlanders. It is a significant factor that intensifies their invisible boundary. The legitimacy of Hong Kongers claiming a distinctive identity is especially reflective of the language differences. With an increasing inflow of mainland visitors nowadays,4 Tong et al. also notice that more salespersons in Hong Kong have switched to greet customers with PTH first, instead of Cantonese, in order to accommodate the Mainland visitors

(285). Some local civilians find it offensive and ironic to be greeted with a different language in their home city. Although the Communication Accommodation Theory5 developed by Howard

Giles explains this phenomenon, some are undoubtedly concerned that PTH may soon submerge Cantonese and spoil the local Hong Kong culture (Coupland 62). Safeguarding

Cantonese and traditional Chinese characters become a daily battle for the Hong Kong public.

Their fear generates detestation towards Mainland people, which intensify social division.

With relatively limited academic resources about discursive tensions with a focus on language difference, I will rely more on current newspaper articles and political commentaries while examining my two cases. Li Yu-Ming, the Vice president of the Chinese National Language

Committee, analyzes the evolution of both Cantonese and PTH and their positions in the international arena in his article. Following his argument “all languages are equal in theory, but some are stronger (more useful) than the other in reality” (Li), he elaborates how a country’s economic well-being determines the importance or usefulness of its national language. Despite

4 In 2012, Mainland Chinese visitors account for 34.9 million (71.8%) of the total arrivals in Hong Kong. It shows an increase of 24.2% from 2011 (Hong Kong Tourism Commission 2013). 5 Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT) states that “when people interact they adjust their speech, their vocal patterns and their gestures, to accommodate to others” (Giles 1973).

9 his logical contention, I argue that Cantonese should not be evaluated solely based on its economic value. Its cultural value should not be diminished by any economic or political position. Writing about the Hong Kong style of blending Cantonese, Mandarin, and English into a conversation, Vinton Poon defends the role of Cantonese and acknowledges “English [as] a habitus…has become part and parcel of the Hong Kong identity” (37). His argument furthers an understanding of the communication approach of the Hong Kongers that could attribute to cross-cultural miscommunication. It also recognizes this unique communication style as the

“cultural capital” of HKID (34).

Different scholars have conducted in-depth studies about the relationship between language and culture; all agreed that the two are inseparable (e.g. Poon 36). Geert Hofstede, a renowned cross-cultural researcher, suggests each culture can be represented by a set of symbols that defines its core values, collective experiences, and expected behaviors. He repeatedly highlights that language is a significant symbol that draws the boundary between cultures (423). Put into the context of Hong Kong, I, therefore, firmly believe that Cantonese is a pivotal symbolic representation of Hong Kong. It differentiates the local HKID from the generic

Chinese identity. Kanu also presents a similar perspective while discussing different cultural communication principles and issues. He suggests that “*language+ serves as a gatekeeper in naming and selecting what is news or real in a social context and supports our cultural worldviews” (42). The role of language in maintaining one’s cultural identity is not to be unnoticed. Documented in International Journal of the Sociology of Language, Giles and

Johnson notice people who endeavor to preserve their cultural identity tend to “insist using their ethnic language in social interaction to symbolically distinguish themselves from others”

10 (69). Deducing from their observation, adapting to another language could mean compromising one’s cultural distinctiveness. Protecting the language of an in-group is necessary in protecting the cultural identity of that group. It helps to explain the antagonistic feelings of some Hong

Kongers towards PTH or Mainland Chinese that PTH represents.

Lastly, many sociologists and researchers are devoted to study the subject of the HKID.

Most literatures, available in both English and Chinese, focus on the formation, significance, development, and differentiation of the HKID. They provide a comprehensive background of the identity complexity6 in Hong Kong for my own research. A book written by Gordon

Mathews and other scholars examines how Hong Kong “learns to belong to a nation” through education and mass media. Their book is noteworthy because it places the intricate interpretation and development of the HKID on the global scale. In Social Cognition, Hong and

Chiu have written an article about the cultural identity of Hong Kongers.7 Their distinctive observations support the difference between Hong Kong Chinese and Mainland Chinese through participants’ view of Individualism. Besides different views of individualism, I contend that we should recognize the differences in social norms and ways of life, which will be demonstrated in the case studies in Chapter 4. Margaret Ng, member of the Hong Kong

Legislative Council, once publically stated, “We are Chinese without being only Chinese. We can

6 “Social Identity Complexity” refers to the subjective representation of the interrelationships among different group identities a person owns. It reflects the perceived overlap between multiple groups that a person is simultaneously a member (Roccas and Brewer 88). 7 Ying-yi Hong et al., Social Cognition Vol. 19, No. 3 Toward a Paradigm Shift: From Cross-Cultural Differences in Social Cognition to Social-Cognitive Mediation of Cultural Differences

11 accept western civilization without identifying with the west. We observe universal values without losing our own cultural identity” (England).8 Her statement shows the plight of the HKID.

In summation, previous studies about the identity politics in Hong Kong are helpful for the understanding of political, cultural, and social context of this complex issue. I have come to realize that the debate on the purposes of the teaching language reform, the effort to preserve the HKID and safeguarding Cantonese, and the tensions between the peoples are all identity politics after all. Some of their theories support my insistences, including 1) the distinctiveness of the HKID; 2) the necessity to differentiate it from the national Chinese identity; 3) the importance of Cantonese within the HKID; and 4) the language disparity as a leading cause to the invisible boundary between the two. I hope to contribute to the international studies field by further discovering possible interpretations of the HKID and the root causes of the invisible boundary through my case studies.

8 England, Vaudine. "Hong Kong Suffers Identity Crisis as China's Influence Grows." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 23 Mar. 2012. Web. 05 July 2013.

12 Chapter 2: Background History and the “HKID”

I. Context/ Background

In order to learn about the relationship of Hong Kong and Mainland China, Part I of this chapter will first introduce the modern history of Hong Kong and the “One Country, Two

Systems” policy adopted after 1997. Knowing the historical context and values of Hong Kongers is helpful in understanding the HKID and the roots of many on-going feuds between Hong Kong and Mainland China. i. Colonial History of Hong Kong

Figure 1: The Hong Kong flag during the British colonial era Figure 2: The British National (Overseas) Passports of Hong Kong

Because of the defeat of China in the First and Second Opium War, Hong Kong had been a colony of the United Kingdom for more than 150 years, precisely, from January 1841 to June

1997. At first, Britain only treated Hong Kong as a free port to promote Sino-British trade when she signed the Treaty of Nanjing. China, on the other hand, did not see the value of getting the sovereignty of tiny Hong Kong back either (Tsang 69). During the 1950-60s, Hong Kong began to

13 industrialize from a small entrepot and gradually improved living standards. While Hong Kong was developing steadily under the British control, the political situation of the rest of China was chaotic; this caused thousands of mainland refugees to stream into Hong Kong (Rioni 155-156).

These immigrants worked hard with the locals; hence they were included as part of the Hong

Kong family which they could enjoy the economic prosperity together. During the 1960s, the liberal and efficient new legal, economic, and educational systems, inspired by the British ones, began to fall into place.

The 1980-90’s was the second stage of the economic take-off. Hong Kong transformed from an industrialized city to an international financial center. Many foreign companies saw

Hong Kong as the door to do businesses in Mainland China. Henry Tang, the Chief Secretary for

Administration, indicates that in a global conference9 “Hong Kong had been playing a special role in bringing foreign investment into the Mainland in the past 30 years of China’s reform”

(The Central Policy Unit of the Government of the HKSAR). Entitled as one of the four Asian

Tigers10, the prosperity we see in Hong Kong today was not established until five decades ago.

Since the miraculous transformation happened during its British colonial era, the British government is usually credited for the effective administration and policies. The Economic

History Association has the following remarks regarding their effort:

The *British+ government’s programs of public housing, land

reclamation, and infrastructure investment were ambitious. New

industrial towns were built to house immigrants, provide

9 In 2009, a conference was held in Hong Kong on the “Global and China’s Economy and Hong Kong’s Future Development.” 10 “Four Asian Tigers” refers to Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea with their significant economic development between the 1960s and 1990s.

14 employment and aid industry. The government subsidized

industry indirectly through this public housing, which restrained

rises in the cost of living that would have threatened Hong Kong’s

labor-cost advantage in manufacturing. The government also

pursued an ambitious public education program, creating over

300,000 new primary school places between 1954 and 1961

(“Economic History of Hong Kong”).

Hong Kongers are immensely proud of the fruit of their collective hard labor as well.

Throughout the whole process of continual transformation, the new “HKID” was formed and sharpened, which I will examine in the second part of this chapter.

ii.” One Country, Two Systems”

Figure 3: The Basic Law Figure 4: Sino-British Joint Declaration

15 “One Country, Two Systems” (OCTS) is central to understanding the China-Hong Kong relations and the identity politics in Hong Kong. It is a policy proposed by Deng Xiaoping, the

Paramount leader of the PRC in the 1980s. It was originally a proposal for handling the relationship between China and Taiwan, but was adopted in Hong Kong and Macau instead.

This policy essentially means that Hong Kong, being part of the PRC, can maintain its own capitalist economy while the main body of the country runs a socialist system (“China through a

Lens”). It is a promise from Mainland China granting Hong Kong the freedom to practice capitalism and a high degree of autonomy for at least 50 years, or until 2047. The social, education, and political systems, along with the existing foreign trade policies would remain unchanged. Hong Kongers would still enjoy the freedom of speech, assembly, and religion

(Carroll 181). OCTS allows peaceful coexistence of two systems and aims to achieve peaceful reunification of the motherland. The principle of this policy is to “maintain and preserve Hong

Kong’s economic prosperity and social stability” in order to smooth out the transitional process

(Tsang 107).

Under OCTS, Hong Kong operates as an independent system than the rest of China.

Hong Kong has a separate set of legal system, education system, economic policies; including currency and agreements with foreign nations, and social culture that are distinctly different from the ones in Mainland China. Therefore, one should not assume that there are no differences between Hong Kong and any other mainland cities. OCTS provides valuable context to the existing disconnectedness between the two cultures. With the focus on “One Country,” the PRC government is keen on stimulating the bilateral integration through various policies. In terms of education, there are policies that foster national education and raise the PTH

16 proficiency and prevalence in Hong Kong. Simplifying the visa application in Hong Kong and introducing bilateral economic agreements are other policies that encourage more contact between two places. However, many Hong Kongers interpret these policies as forms of cultural assimilation and respond antagonistically. They often legitimize the maintenance of a distinctive cultural identity using the “One Country, Two Systems” principle. They emphasize on

Cantonese and traditional characters preservation and advocate the rights to nominate and vote for their own Chief Executive. Paradoxically, the OCTS policy becomes a boundary between mainland China and Hong Kong despite its original intention for national integration (Lim). The discordant emphases on the policy create tensions that amplify the invisible boundary at the same time.

iii. “Biliterate and Trilingual” Policy

Hong Kong has a unique linguistic background. The “Biliterate and Trilingual” policy helps to make sense of the symbolization of Cantonese and PTH in Hong Kong and language preferences of Hong Kongers. Before 1974, English was the sole official medium of communication. However, the government began to recognize Chinese as another official language in Hong Kong. In the 1980s, the Chinese language became more significant after the

Joint Declaration signed by the Chinese and British government (Leung 167).

After the handover in 1997, the HKSAR government promoted the “Biliterate and

Trilingual” policy (“兩文三語政策”). The Official Language Ordinance specifies the status of

Chinese and English as the official languages of Hong Kong. According to Chapter 5, these two languages serve “the purposes of communication between the government or any public

17 official and members of the public and for court proceedings” (HKSAR Bilingual Laws Advisory

Committee). Cantonese and traditional characters are the de facto spoken language and writing standard respectively. In addition, English and PTH as two other widely accepted spoken languages. Approximately 90% of the Hong Kong population speak Cantonese and use traditional Chinese characters on the daily basis (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department

2011). Both Chinese and English are required subjects in school from kindergarten to secondary school. PTH became an official subject, in some cases required, after 1997. Since Hong Kong is a highly cosmopolitan city, the government wants its people to take advantage of the linguistic heritage and excel in their linguistic abilities. The Hong Kong Education Bureau (HKEB) emphasizes heavily language education and allocates a lot of money and resources into the

Chinese, English, and PTH education. Chapter 3 will discuss the details about the new “Using

Putonghua to Teach Chinese Language Subject” measure.

For those non-Chinese speakers, I will clarify the differences between Cantonese and

Putonghua Chinese. According to Yinbing Leung, Cantonese and PTH have similar lexical items and syntactic structure but very different phonologic system (169). A person who speaks only

PTH could not understand Cantonese, and vice versa. The Cantonese spoken in Hong Kong has its own style slightly different than the one in Guangdong. Because of the universality of English in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers blend in a lot of English words and phrases into their daily

Cantonese conversations (Poon 48). For instance, the English word “check,” “book,” “lunch,” and “good” often directly replace their corresponding Chinese words. The unique communication style in Hong Kong helps to define the HKID. They become one of the criteria

18 used to tell Hong Kongers apart from non-Hong Kongers.

II. The Hong Kong Identity (HKID) i. Definition and Essential Components of the HKID

What does it mean to be a Hong Konger? Who is and who is not? Many Hong Kongers have a long history of identity crisis11 even before 1997. The Hong Kong identity (HKID) is constantly adjusting over time; thus there is not one clear definition. Because of the colonial past, Hong Kongers are always on the fence when it comes to their cognitive and emotional identification. While illustrating the identity complexity, April Zhang12 points out that Hong

Kong is neither a sovereign city-state nor a colony. People may not adjust their self-identities immediately, even after returning to the motherland (A. Zhang). They tend to address themselves as different things in different situations (Browne 39). For examples, Hong Kongers are more willing to embrace the national Chinese identity during events like the 2008 Beijing

Olympics. However, many feel offended when foreigners think they are “from China” and are likely to clarify the differences. Their inconsistence shows the desire to “regard Hong Kong as an entity, sufficiently well known to grant them a unique identity” and keep themselves apart from their mainland counterpart (A. Zhang).

To gain insights into the building blocks of the HKID, I will look into the legal qualifications of a permanent resident by the HKSAR government. According to the Hong Kong

11 Psychologist Erik Erikson coins the term “identity crisis” as the failure to achieve ego identity during adolescence (Erikson). It could also refer to changing patterns of reterritorializations, and personal or national identity reassignment in a postcolonial context (Ladele 70). 12 April Zhang is an entrepreneur and a teacher of Putonghua as a second language. Her article published on South China Morning Post looks at the struggles amid fears of a mainland 'invasion.'

19 Immigration Ordinance, the basic qualifications to enjoy the right of abode and permanent residence are as follows (HKSAR Immigration Services):

 For Chinese citizens:

o Born in Hong Kong

o Resided in Hong Kong for at least seven continuous years

o Has a parent who is a Chinese citizen (if born outside of Hong Kong)

 For non-Chinese citizens:

o Entered Hong Kong with a valid travel document

o Resided in Hong Kong for at least seven continuous years

o Born in Hong Kong to a parent who is a permanent resident (if under 21)

o Had the right of abode in Hong Kong only before 1997

Figure 5: The Front and Back of the Hong Kong Permanent Identity Card (Source: HKSAR Immigration Office)

In this section, I will analyze the essential components of the HKID from different perspectives in the hope of unveiling this obscure matter. Besides the above requirements, the cultural symbolization and implications attached to this “HKID” can be further divided into different layers.

20 I will first explain the formation of HKID with the chronological perspective. During the

1950s, many Mainland refugees fled to Hong Kong due to the political instability in Mainland

China. With a passer-by mentality, many of them never planned to settle down in Hong Kong, even though they eventually stayed and became permanent citizens (Zheng and Wong, “The

Self-Identification”).13 Following the economic takeoff after the 70-80s, the local HKID was inadvertently formed. According to a survey conducted by HKCU about the attributes of the

“Hong Kong spirit,” proactivity, perseverance, and resilience were some core values endorsed by the Hong Kong public (Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies).14 At that time, everyone worked hard to build a brighter future for themselves and the whole society with a belief in these values. A sense of belonging and community obligation were dedicated during the 1980s.

The differences between immigrants and locals were present but not conspicuous; the general society was hospitable.

Figure 6: A Logo with symbolization of the Lion Rock (Source: Hong Kong Spirit Ambassadors)

13 Dr. Zheng H.T. and Wong Siu-Lun SBS, BBS, JP are writers, socialists, assistant professors and founders of the Social Sciences Research Centre of the University of Hong Kong. They have done many researches and written books about the Chinese society and culture. 14 Visit the URL for a full survey report: http://www.hkspirit.org/pdf/survey.pdf

Figure 7: “Hong Kong Spirit - A Person's Collective Memories”

Most scholars agree that a widespread Cantonese song, “Below the Lion Rock” (“獅子山

下”), 15 is a magnum opus that truly reflects the HKID in the 1970s. This song is an unofficial representative of the Hong Kong Spirit, with the lyrics quoted in many occasions16 even until today. The following is the original chorus with English translation:

放開彼此心中矛盾理想一起去追

同舟人誓相隨無畏更無懼

同處海角天邊攜手踏平崎嶇

我地大家用艱辛努力寫下那不朽香江名句

“Set aside any discrepancy in our minds,

of one mind in pursuit of our dream;

We are all on the same boat with no fears;

15 “Below the Lion Rock” (“獅子山下”) was used as the theme song of a Hong Kong TV drama with the same name aired in 1979. 16 For example, Wikimania 2013 in Hong Kong, an international conference for users of the wiki projects, has chosen part of the chorus as its yearly slogan.

22 We overcome all challenges hand in hand wherever we go.

Together as a whole, we work hard to build the lasting reputation

of Hong Kong” (Tam 1979).

This song reflects the joint desire to maintain harmony regardless of people’s backgrounds. The solidarity of different communities in Hong Kong was slowly building at that time.

Roughly around the 1970s-90s, the Hong Kong economy continued to develop rapidly.

The average GDP increase of 8% remains one of the most remarkable throughout history. The

British government established the infrastructures and systems of the city that are still running in present days. With a series of planning schemes,17 the social development in the 1980s was as impressive as the economic performance. In her research on Hong Kong historical social development, Eliza Lee points out that civil liberties established in the 1980s remain effective at the present time (2). A post-80s activist also describes the Hong Kong culture to have “a respect for the rule of law…social contract and consensus in everyday life” (qtd. in England). Different evidence has shown the establishment of a strong sense of local identity and ways of thinking over the colonial period (Tsui and Tollefson 121; Hong and Chiu 181-196). Hong Kongers became proud of this identity and enjoyed the reputation. Being the richest group of people in

China, many Hong Kongers felt superior to the relatively poor Mainlanders (Ku 352). The immigrants and their offspring from the 50s began to identify themselves as “Hong Kongers” as opposed to “Mainland Chinese”. The HKID in the historical sense included everyone who dedicated to the economic prosperity and excluded others who did not.

17 The British government undertook different plans, such as the Sub-Region Planning, Rural Planning, Metroplan and Port, and Airport Development Plan, to establish the infrastructure in Hong Kong (R. Wong 2).

23 In the sociocultural perspective, cuisine, language, popular music, television18 and film produced in Hong Kong are also vital elements of the HKID and sense of belonging. They are all developed in different paths than in Mainland China. Hong Kong is indeed a culturally diversified society where the “East meets West” (Dinnie 158). It encompasses both the traditional Chinese and Western culture. Fusion cuisine and Hong Kong English19 (“港式英語”) are both unique and prevalent in Hong Kong (Setter, Wong and Chan). Cantonese popular music rose in the 50s, began widely accepted in the 60s, and entered its golden age in the 80s.

They are collective memories of Hong Kong that reflect people's livelihood, create social resonance, and solidify the HKID (Chun, Rossiter, and Shoesmith 146).

Even small pieces of the daily lives compose the sense of localness. They include the collective values, attitudes, feelings, and worldview of the Hong Kongers. This sense of localness is reinforced when people in the same society experience the historical events together, such as different economic the financial crisis in 1997, Tiananmen Square protest in

1989, and SARS in 2003. Eating at a tea restaurant (cha chaan teng; “茶餐廳”) 20 speaking

“Chinglish,” watching local television dramas, and knowing HK-pop music and singers could be some criterion of a “true” Hong Konger. People’s cultural identification distinguishes “self” and

“otherness.” It involves how people make sense of their membership within a particular social group (Yim 26).

18 “The Good, The Bad and the Ugly” (“網中人”) is one of the representative television dramas in Hong Kong premiered in 1979. The main character “Ah Chank” (“阿燦”) becomes a negative stereotypical term that labels Mainland immigrants in Hong Kong as lazy, laidback, and backward (Ma 2003). 19 Because of the former British colonial background, English in Hong Kong is integrated into the everyday life in various ways. Hong Kong English a linguistic phenomenon from the point of view of language structure, but also takes into account historical, socio-cultural and socio-political developments (Poon 44). 20 “Cha chaan teng” became popular among local civilians in the 1950s. They are known for serving affordable dishes including the local and Hong Kong-style Western cuisine. They symbolize the “East Meets Western” element of the local Hong Kong culture.

24 According to Bourdieu‘s theory, the linguistic capital is a crucial cultural symbolization of the HKID as well (qtd. in Poon 34). The accent, usage of slang, common vocabulary, and the borrowing of English all characterize a typical Hong Konger. A person’s Cantonese accent and communication style are obvious indicators of his or her “localness.” The Cantonese in Hong

Kong and Guangzhou are slightly different but mutually understandable21 (Pimsleur 4), which is similar to the situation of American and British English. They also tend to create new terms—in

Cantonese, English, or a combination of both— that reflects the current social events. These new terms become part of the low culture22 that prevalent especially among young people.

Language is a delicate, yet significant, element that makes up a social identity. As a result, there is not a precise definition of the Hong Kong style Cantonese.

Yvonne Leung suggests in her thesis, “who are considered to be the ‘local’, are not defined by the place of birth, but by the experience of a particular historical moment and its effect” (8). The HKID is not simply the matter of ethnicity or birth place. It could be identified based on the dominant lifestyle and values. It has an intuitive definition depending on one’s perspective. An insightful article in Zhongnanhai argues that the difference in priorities reflect the differing value structures and socialization emerging from the historical development of these two regions (“What It Means to Be ‘Chinese’ in Hong Kong"). Flexibility and efficiency are two typical characteristics of most Hong Kongers. With a busy lifestyle and workplace culture, being flexible in order to manage simultaneous things efficiently is extremely important (“Hong

21 Guangzhou Cantonese is more affected by and similar to the Mandarin, the official language in Mainland China. However, Hong Kong Cantonese tends to borrow words from other languages, primarily from English given its British colonial heritage (Pimsleur 5). 22 Low culture is made up of different aspects of the “ordinary” lives, including reality television, magazines, popular music, and sport games. They usually correspond to the socio-economic and educational classes (Nuijs 7; Gans 95).

25 Kong: Culture”). “Time is money” is the motto of many Hong Kongers. They are reluctant to waste any second of their lives, which gives them a stereotype of being impatient.

Unlike some people in other colonies, many Hong Kongers are proud of their colonial history instead of finding it shameful. There is a sense of superiority that put them in a higher position than the Mainland Chinese because Hong Kong was “remodeled” by the British government to become an outstanding city in China. They are used to viewing themselves as modern and other Mainland immigrants as people who “lack civility” (Leung 13). However, this sense of superiority is challenged by the recent rising Mainland Chinese economy and looming domination in Hong Kong’s politics (Yim 49). The PRC government even attempts to elevate the patriotic sentiment of Hong Kongers by introducing different kinds of national education23.

Many Hong Kongers began to feel insecure with their HKID, and they consequently differentiate themselves even more (Flowerdew 1555). Some criticize Hong Kongers as xenophilic and unpatriotic when they stress on their local identity or differences from Mainland China.

However, some anthropologists and professors disprove that criticism to be a slander of Hong

Kongers. They claim that patriotism should not simply be an emotional feeling or a fetish of certain political power. Instead, the Hong Kong Style patriotism is rather “practical and flexible”

(Ma and Matthews).

In many cases, the invisible boundary between Mainland Chinese and Hong Kongers originated from the disputes over the HKID. Although Hong Kongers suffer from identity crisis, a distinct HKID certainly exists. One’s patriotic spirit should not be forced because it will become

23 Three objectives of National Education in Hong Kong includes "deepening students’ understanding of the history and culture of the motherland", "enhancing their interest in and concern for the development of our motherland", and "demonstrating their commitments to the motherland" (“National Education” 2012).

26 meaningless if it is not genuine. Educating the public about the nation is appropriate, but not with the intention to eradicate the unique culture and identity of Hong Kong. It is undeniable that Hong Kong has its own culture different than the greater Chinese culture. Neither of them is better or worse than the other; hence, they both deserve respect and protection. Being respectful and receptive to people from all cultures are some universal expectations.

ii. Secondary Data and Statistics

The Public Opinion Program (POP) is one of the most reliable and cited sources among the media and academic fields in Hong Kong. The University of Hong Kong (HKU) established the POP in 1991; it is now under the Journalism and Media Studies Centre in HKU. It aims to

“collect and study public opinion on topics which could be of interest to academics, journalists, policy-makers, and the general public” (HKUPOP). All research findings are available to the public. This section will examine a POP survey conducted that gathers public opinion on ethnic identity 2-5 times every year since 1997.

This survey studies how people in Hong Kong identify themselves with different ethnic identity categories, in both specific and broader sense. The question asks “how would you identify yourself as a ‘Hong Kong citizen,’ ‘Chinese citizen,’ ‘Hong Kong Chinese citizen,’ or

‘Chinese Hong Kong citizen’?” Since HKU has conducted this poll regularly since 1997, the self- identification trends of Hong Kongers can shed lights on the changes after the reunification. The chart below summarizes the survey results from 1997 to 2013 (see APPENDIX A for the full chart).

27 Table 1

Hong Kong Citizen

Chinese Citizen

Table 1: HKU POP Categorical Ethnic Identity Poll (1997-2013)

This survey indicates the HKID in relation to the Chinese identity. The chart shows what labels respondents identify themselves with and how their preferences have changed over times. To simplify, I will focus on the “Hong Kong Citizen” (in green) and “Chinese citizen” (in blue) labels. According to the chart, the trends of both lines are almost symmetrical, indicating their opposing positions. In August 1997, one month after the handover from the British rule,

34.9% of the respondents preferred the “Hong Kong citizen” label while 18.6% preferred

“Chinese citizen.” After the one-year mark, the reunification was going to a positive direction in terms of people’s willingness to embrace their new identity as citizens of China. With a 23% increase from the last year, 31.6% of the respondents called themselves a Chinese citizen. This

28 marked the highest point of the trend within the first five years. People who associated themselves as Hong Kong citizens dropped from 34.9% to 30.2%.

In 1999, there was a massive decline of the Chinese citizen label. It went from one of the highest points to 13.8%, the lowest point of all times. During that period of time, Hong Kong and many other Asian countries were severely affected by the Asian Financial Crisis (Asian

Development Bank 1999). Hong Kong went through one of the worst recessions in its history.

This is a potential reason that explains the loss of confidence of the PRC government. The self- identification of Hong Kongers reflects how people perceive their relationship with Mainland

China. During the economic downturn, many felt vulnerable and insecure about their future under the guidance of their new parent, Mainland China.

Between 1999 and 2008, the “Chinese citizen” identity showed an overall increasing trend with some fluctuations. It reached the pinnacle of 38.6% in 2008, especially two months before the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games opening. It was the first time in history that China won the hosting position for the Olympics. Hong Kong also had the opportunity to take charge of the equestrian events. Every Chinese was proud of the country’s historical breakthrough, which fostered the willingness of Hong Kongers to call themselves a Chinese citizen. As a result, the

“Hong Kong citizen” label in 2008 reached 18.1%, the lowest of all time. This significant contrast reflected people’s tendency to emphasize less the distinctiveness of the HKID and instead emphasize the common ground with the rest of the country. Both Hong Kong and Mainland

China had a common goal of establishing an international prestige through co-hosting the

Olympic Games. Hong Kongers are inclined to affirm their Chinese identity during other

Olympic Games. This may due to the active participation of Mainland China in the Olympics.

29 With relatively limited resources, Hong Kong does not have many professional teams, like China, that can join various events. When the China and Hong Kong team are not competitors in the same events, Hong Kongers would cheer for Mainland China wholeheartedly.

However, since the self-identification of Hong Kongers has been fluctuating, their patriotic feelings during the Olympic heat seem to be temporary. Within a year after the 2008

Beijing Olympics, the “Chinese citizen” label had a continuous decline of 14.4%. In contrast, the

“Hong Kong citizen” label doubled from 18.1% to 37.6%. Overall, Hong Kongers took about 10 years to uphold their national identity and lower their HKID slowly. However, it only took 3 years to abolish the previous national-building effort. The HKID bounced back rapidly after a low point in 2008 to a new high of 45.6%, and the increasing trend does not seem to be stopping. Given a series of controversies in 2012, the “Chinese identity” label keeps on decreasing to almost the bottommost point. These conflicts accumulate anger towards the PRC government and Mainland Chinese that is, once again, reflected on people’s self-identifications.

With a reliable survey method and sample size, the respondents’ opinion about their ethnic identity should represent the Hong Kong general public. The comparative analysis of the survey result contributes to my understanding of the self-identification of Hong Kongers in three ways. Firstly, even after 15 years of reunification, Hong Kongers still appear to be quite conscious of their ethnic identity as “Hong Kong citizen” as opposed to the “Chinese citizen” label. The total number of respondents who considered themselves a “Chinese citizen” never surpassed one-third of the total. Their sense of regional pride and belonging seem to remain strong. Their preferred identity as “Hong Kong citizen” is one factor that maintains—if not deepens—the invisible boundary between Hong Kong and Mainland China. Secondly, the ethnic

30 labels are highly responsive to the social, economic, and political affairs regarding the China-

Hong Kong interactions. For instance, when a quarrel erupts between Hong Kongers and

Mainland Chinese, Hong Kongers tend to deny their “Chinese citizen” identity and refuse to be part of the Chinese family. In “Constructing Social Identity,” Rebecca Curtis also supports that cultural stereotypes and direct experience with people in a particular category influence the selection of an identity and give meaning to it (90). Hong Kongers selectively embrace their

Chinese citizenship when this label makes them proud. The multifaceted nature of the colonial history and political situations can explain their unstable self-identification. Lastly, because

Hong Kong had been a British colony for most of its contemporary existence, people still struggle to grasp the true meaning of being a Chinese or Hong Kong citizen. They often vacillate among different possible identities; some even respond “undecided” in the poll. The identity crisis had always been present in Hong Kong even when it was under the British rule. Despite their struggles to fit into two distinct cultures (Chinese and British), Hong Kongers have slowly been adapting to a new local HKID. With the growing sociocultural and language tensions, it seems difficult to remove the invisible boundary between Hong Kong and Mainland China any time soon.

31 Chapter 3: Recent Language Trend and Implication

I. The New “Using Putonghua to Teach Chinese Language Subject” Measure

Throughout the colonial history, Cantonese has been a dominant language of communication in Hong Kong. Unlike many colonies where people are forced to speak the language of the colonizers as Filipinos had to speak Spanish,24 Hong Kong was able to preserve its own language while adopting English at the same time. Cantonese has been the medium of instruction (MOI) in schools in most classes except English class. However, after 1997 and because of the rising Chinese economy, more people have realized the importance of PTH. It became an independent, mandatory subject offered in most kindergartens and grade schools since 1998.

The Standing Committee on Language Education and Research (SCOLAR; “語文教育及

研究常務委員會”) is a governmental consultant for the HKEB on language education issues, including the MOI and standards and targets of language education (SCOLAR). In October 2007, the SCOLAR announced a $2 billion (Hong Kong dollars) budget for the new “Using Putonghua to Teach Chinese Language Subject” measure (“以普通話教授中國語文科”) that would start in the 2008/09 academic year. It is a four-year scheme that subsidizes a total of 40 primary and secondary schools to implement this measure. As the name implies, this measure aims to facilitate the long-term goal of switching the MOI of Chinese classes to PTH in all primary and

24 Spanish remained the official language in the Philippines throughout its colonial period until 1973 (Enriquez and Marcelino).

32 secondary schools by 2018. Before it became effective, there were eight schools25 that volunteered to teach Chinese class in PTH (SCOLAR).

The SCOLAR and other organizations26 proposed four main objectives of this “Using

Putonghua” measure. First of all, Hong Kongers are part of the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu;

“中華民族”) no matter how they identify themselves. It is a matter of course for every Chinese to know PTH, the common language in Mainland China. Hong Kong is unusual by not following the norm of teach Chinese class in PTH like most Chinese populations worldwide (SCOLAR).

Secondly, since PTH corresponds to the standard written Chinese while Cantonese does not, many Chinese linguists and Literature scholars have attested to its ability to reduce barriers of linguistic proficiency experienced by many Hong Kong students. As a result, the SCOLAR is confident “Using Putonghua” can achieve the ultimate goal of strengthening students’ Chinese writing and reading skills through attaining language and literature integration (“言文合一”) and thinking and writing synchronization (“我手寫我心”) (W. Wong). Thirdly, along the same lines, “Using Putonghua” will foster a desirable environment which provides students with additional PTH speaking and listening opportunities. This teaching language reform will enhance the biliterate and trilingual competency of the younger generation. Therefore with one-fifth of the world’s population speaking in PTH, it will increase the overall competitiveness of Hong Kong as an international financial center (SCOLAR).

25 Examples of schools that volunteered to teach Chinese class in PTH include Sun Fong Chung Primary School, Kiangsu-Chekiang College, and King Ling College. 26 Other proposers includes the Hong Kong Association for the Promotion of Quality Education (PYQE), Sun Fong Chung Primary School, King Ling College, Xianggang Putonghua Yanxishe, Hong Kong Putonghua Professionals Association, and Chinese Language Society of Hong Kong

33 Last but not least, the SCOLAR proposes that PTH proficiency is an essential instrument to promote national consciousness (“國民意識”) of the young generations as part of national education. Since PTH is the common spoken language that unifies the Chinese ethnic groups, it is vital to the Chinese cultural identity (SCOLAR). As supporting policies, the SCOLAR also proposes that Putonghua should replace Cantonese as the official language. The HKSAR government officers should “give more public speeches in Putonghua and enforce the public media (including television and radio stations) to have certain hours of Putonghua programs” in order to make Hong Kong a better Putonghua-speaking environment (SCOLAR). This proposal legitimizes the HKEB to replace Cantonese with PTH as the MOI of Chinese class. SCOLAR closes the proposal by reiterating its alignment with Article 10 of the Law of the PRC on the Standard

Spoken and Written Chinese Language.27 The next section will investigate how the new “Using

Putonghua” policy would affect the HKID.

i. Implication and Impact on the “HKID”

As discussed in previous sections, Cantonese has been the medium of communication among the vast majority of Hong Kongers, even during the British colonial era. Therefore, it is an essential part of the HKID (Lee and Leung 1; Giles, Taylor, and Bourhis 1977). Since language is the basic element of communication and education is critical to social development, the new

“Using Putonghua to Teach Chinese Language Subject” measure will have a notable impact on the entire social structure of Hong Kong and its cultural identity.

27 Article 10 states that Putonghua and the standardized Chinese characters shall be used as the basic language in education and teaching in schools and other institutions of education, except where otherwise provided for in laws (People's Republic of China 2001).

34 Although learning Chinese in PTH does not necessarily mean that students will switch to speaking in PTH outside the classroom, this teaching reform takes away their opportunity to communicate in Cantonese, a cultural capital28 of the Hong Kong culture (Poon 34). After launching this measure in all schools, in 2018, students will no longer have a formal, regulated environment to learn proper Cantonese pronunciation of the Chinese characters. Moreover, since students will receive part of their education in PTH for as long as twelve years, they may gradually change their language preference to PTH instead of their mother tongue. Chau-ping also has similar expectations about the potential social changes. In her article, she explains these changes with the butterfly effect29 that divides them into seven stages30 (1). This new measure does not merely affect the language preference, which also symbolizes their cultural identity, of the young generation, but also their social circles because of the close interactions with the students.

Dissenters of the “Using Putonghua” policy emphasize two main arguments. One is the impact, or even damage, to the local Hong Kong culture and identity. Language and culture are intertwined with one another. According to Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, humans conceptualize their worldviews through the languages they speak (Gammack, Hobbs, and Pigott 84). A language includes the historical context and values of a culture; therefore, learning Chinese in

PTH will changes Hong Kong students’ cognition of social identity and Chinese culture (Tong et al. 281). Geert Hofstede also remarks that “having to express oneself in another language

28 Cultural capital is “knowledge, skills and other cultural acquisitions, as exemplified by educational or technical qualifications” (Bourdieu). 29 The butterfly effect, invented by Edward Lorenz, asserts that a small change at the initial conditions can result in large differences in a later state. 30See the seven stages of her butterfly effect analysis in the original article “香港全面推行普通話教授中文後，方言(粵語)的去從” (Chan 2).

35 means having to adopt someone else’s frame of reference…Language is the vehicle of our thoughts…the major cause of cultural clashes” (425). A vital characteristic that tells Hong

Kongers apart from Mainland Chinese is their medium of communication—Cantonese—that is not spoken in other places in the world outside the Guangdong province. Cantonese has always been a celebrated cultural capital of the HKID (Poon 34). Some people worry replacing

Cantonese in school will severely diminish their unique identity and culture among all Chinese citizens in the long run. These people dread that it would redefine the core values of HKID and eliminate the well-respected colonial legacy.

By reducing the linguistic barriers between Hong Kongers and Mainland Chinese, the

SCOLAR alleges that “Using Putonghua” will stimulate China-Hong Kong integration (SCOLAR).

Even with this possible result, a lot of cultural experts, linguistic conservationists, and of course parents are cynical about the underlying political agenda. The use of a particular language as

MOI implies ideological imposition that perpetuates the social structure of a dominant cultural group to its advantage (Boyle and Gupta, qtd. in Gao, Leung, and Trent). According to an article in the Journal of Basic Education, a language can easily be used as a tool of political propaganda

(Tang 7). It is impossible to speak in PTH without naturally delivering its implicit political and cultural ideology. Therefore, the perceived threat to the de facto status of Cantonese is logical because more and more Hong Kongers will speak in PTH and adapt the attached ideology after familiarizing with the language. In due course, the “Using Putonghua” measure is a cultural assimilation attempt compromising the OCTS principle of maintaining the pre-colonial systems and Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy with the least interference.

36 In terms of the benefits to the children, most parents agree the increased proficiency in

PTH will raise the international competitiveness of their children. They believe trilingualism is especially valuable with the rising Chinese economy. As a worthwhile investment for their kids, many parents are even sending kids to some after-school PTH class. Nevertheless, recognizing the usefulness of PTH may not necessarily be equivalent to favoring postcolonial integration. In fact, many parents are hesitant about the applicability and value of “Using Putonghua” measure because this is the first ambivalent language revolution happening in the history of Hong Kong

(Tang 6).

The issues on the HKID have always been a sensitive topic. Hong Kongers tend to become defensive when they perceive a potential threat to their identity. However, it is necessary to understand the underlying cause of their insecurity. Hong Kongers have been struggling to establish, define, and maintain the Hong Kong identity. “Using Putonghua” does not simply change the language that students use in a classroom; it is only the first step to promote PTH that may gradually replace Cantonese. Therefore, it is realistic to infer the potential changes this policy brings to the cultural, linguistic, and social structure of Hong Kong.

It may or may not successfully reduce the invisible gap, but the long-term impacts on the original HKID are yet to be seen.

ii. Contribution to the China-Hong Kong Tension

Although “Using Putonghua” does not bring immediate conflicts, it progressively instigates antagonism towards Mainland China instead of achieving the intention of breaking the invisible boundary. Some organizations in Hong Kong have initiated demonstrations to

37 protect the status of Cantonese through Facebook31 and other social media. This phenomenon corroborates Ronald Wardhaugh’s theory that a feeling of solidarity “can lead people to preserve a local dialect or an endangered language to resist power, or to insist on independence” (28). More people are voicing out their divergence to the HKSAR government, who is eventually “Beijing-backed” (Bradsher). These collective reactions tend to be reflected on people’s self-identity as discussed in Chapter 2.

Along with the current national education debates, they see these educational policies with “significant bias and unreasonable patriotic sentiments” as a “communist regime” as a violation of the OCTS promise (Yim 50). The “Using Putonghua” policy has unexpectedly intensified the China-Hong Kong relations in different ways. Through this suspected linguistic and identity assimilation, the government has demonstrated “‘symbolic violence’ by demolishing the status of Cantonese” (Fung et al.). Questioning the integrity of OCTS, more

Hong Kongers are consequently unwilling to accept their “communal identity” in the greater

Chinese family (Flowerdew 1555). When the government is trying to cultivate patriotism and cultural values, time and willingness are crucial to prevent backfire and unnecessary tension.

Major reformations like this “Using Putonghua” measure require careful consideration of the public opinion and other political, social, and educational factors (Tang 2).

The counter arguments regarding the “Using Putonghua” policy never neglect the importance of PTH itself. When the PTH program first became an independent school subject,

31 There are different Facebook groups that aim to promote, preserve, or defend Cantonese and traditional Chinese characters. Some groups include: 保留粵語廣東話 (“Preserve Cantonese”), 港人港語 (“Hong Kong People; Hong Kong Language”), 香港只有正體字，我不要純簡體字的告示或字牌 (“Hong Kong Only Has Traditional Characters. I don’t Want Simplified Notices or Signs.”), and 港人齊來抵制共匪語 (“Hong Konger Let’s Boycott the Language of the Communist Bandits Together”).

38 there was never protesting against it because substituting Cantonese with PTH was not the intention. However, people find it intolerable when PTH is further propagated at the expense of the native language representing the Hong Kong culture. The resistive behaviors of Hong

Kongers will deepen the bilateral boundary once a sense of fear and distrust is developed

("Hong Kong's Identity Crisis: Feeling Special"). It will dampen their willingness to embrace their

Chinese nationality, which, ironically, was the fundamental intention of the “Using Putonghua to Teach Chinese Language Class” measure.

39 Chapter 4: Case Studies and Analysis

I. Linguistic and Sociocultural Tension

In this chapter, I will examine two remarkable feuds, in 2012, to illustrate the friction between Hong Kong and Mainland China. Both cases resonated within the Hong Kong society and even developed into public outrage, especially after the controversy in the second case study. Rome was not built in a day, just as the China-Hong Kong tensions are not a sudden occurrence. The two case studies in this chapter will demonstrate the linguistic and sociocultural tensions between the Mainland visitors and local people in Hong Kong.

i. Case Study 1: The Subway Dispute and Aftermath

Figure 8: The Subway Dispute in 2012 (Source: Apple Daily)

40 In mid-January 2012, a video titled Disputes on the Subway: Hong Kongers Versus

Mainlanders was posted on YouTube (Sambb214).32 It recorded some serious disputes between

Hong Kong and Mainland passengers that broke out on a subway in Hong Kong (captured in

Figure 8). The verbal feud began with only two passengers. A local passenger, Ken Wai, saw a

Mainland child making a mess while eating dried noodles in her seat, so he attempted to use his not-so-fluent PTH to remind her mother the eating prohibition on subway.33

At some point of the dispute, the Mainland mom yelled “this was such a trivial matter; you just have to tell us.” She claimed that the rule should excuse young children like her daughter. Besides, since the same rule may not apply to the subways back home, she probably did not understand why Wai had to make a fuss over this behavior. Meanwhile, her daughter even admitted, “I think mom was wrong,” but another Mainland passenger told her to remain quiet. As the quarrel continued, more and more passengers got involved defending their own side, including both Hong Kongers and Mainlanders. Some Mainland passengers nearby mocked the poor PTH proficiency of Wai (Magistad). An irritated local passenger pressed the emergency contact button to allow a staff member handle the situation. Within a short time, a staff came in and invited them to handle this off the subway. Meanwhile, people were still yelling to each other in the background. A Mainlander saying, “I do not understand the [dialect] you are speaking.” Another Hong Konger replied “You are in Hong Kong, so we are speaking Cantonese in this place.” Wai then told that person “don’t bother! All Mainlanders are like this.” The video ended there.

32 The following link contains the full video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E7oU-QFGU8Q 33 MTR Rule #11 states, “It is prohibited to smoke, eat, drink, litter or spit in any part of Light Rail premises, buses or trains” ("Important Notice for All Passengers").

41 Besides the Agnès B cafe menu34 and Dolce & Gabbana photo-ban disturbance,35 this subway incident was yet another prominent one happened in 2012. This video went viral within the next couple days it was uploaded. Different newspapers, such as GCP News and Epochtimes, were striving to report the incident with haunted titles like “A Bag of Dried Noodles These Days

Can Cause a Huge Verbal Fight between Hong Kong and Mainland China” and “The

Temperature (tension) Has Risen” (Lee and Wan). This video instantly became the hottest discussion on different social media sites such as Facebook, Weibo, and RenRen. According to an article, “Growing Rift between Hong Kong and Mainland china,” many Hong Kongers called

Ken Wai a hero, praising his effort in correcting the improper manners of the Mainland visitors

(Magistad). Thanks to the media, the subway controversy has attracted attention beyond the local level. It also appeared in different foreign news like BBC and WGBH, concerning the China-

Hong Kong relations and the future of Hong Kong.

The incident unexpectedly turned into such a momentous issue. Two days after the video was uploaded, Ken Wai published an article to explain the whole story as well as his own reflections on the incident (see APPENDIX B). He particularly apologized for his unthoughtful comment, “All Mainlanders are like this,” in such a chaotic situation. He understood that particular comment had unintentionally deepened the negative impression as rule-breakers on the Mainland visitors. Nonetheless, he thought he did what he needed to do at the moment (to

34Agnès b café, a new high-end French café opened in Hong Kong in early 2012, was found to have its menus only in English and simplified Chinese. It was satirized as a “brand of shame” for not doing adequate market research and furtively “Mainlandizing” Hong Kong. The café changed the menu to traditional Chinese and Cantonese usage after three days (Chen). 35This Italian flagship store was accused to be discriminatory against Hong Kong citizens because they were banned from taking pictures of window displays while some mainland tourists were granted the exception. This incident has caused mass protest that may deepen local people’s frustrations towards Mainland visitors. D&G later issued a press release to apologize for its unintended offense to the Hong Kong public (Chow, Dolce & Gabbana).

42 remind the Mainland mom of the subway rules and did not expect it to be videotaped. The mass media in Hong Kong are oftentimes responsible for escalating the displeasure of Hong

Kongers towards the Mainland tourists. They represent the social reality, transmit identities and attitudes to the audience, and shape the outcome of these social changes (A. Zhang 2). The goal of the media seems to have shifted from reporting the events to fighting for the public’s attention (Paterson and Sreberny 54). The media always publicize these incidents with appealing, sensational headlines that stir up the public wrath. Therefore, reader should be prudent while evaluating the accuracy and objectivity of the information. This subway controversy may not become significant enough to “concern” the foreign audience without the local media.

Furthermore, I contend that this incident is more than a trifling dispute between a Hong

Kong and a Mainland passenger; it is a reflection of the sociocultural and linguistic tensions between two cultures and other social problems caused by the Mainland visitors. First of all, the two different perspectives on eating in a subway show a gap in the social norms. The MTR in Hong Kong has clear regulations on eating and drinking in the paid area of stations or trains.36

Being unaware of the different sociocultural norms between Hong Kong and back home, the

Mainland woman certainly did not think she deserved such public humiliation. Being publically corrected about an acceptable manner, according to her cultural standards, was unexpected and embarrassing. As a result, she perhaps overreacted to protect her “face” (“面子”), which is a Chinese concept that is similar to “personal reputation” in English. On the contrary, Ken Wai,

36 Besides the written “Important Notice for All Passengers,” there are also frequent announcement and conspicuous car cards inside the trains to remind passengers of the eating and drinking prohibition and punishment.

43 the Hong Kong passenger, had the upper hand in this controversy. From his viewpoint, he was righteous in pointing out the uncouth behavior of the Mainland passenger in order to maintain the social order. The following quote from “Mainland chip on Hong Kong's shoulder” on Asian

Times comments on the subway incident:

Relations between Hong Kong and the mainland have always been

fraught with stereotypes and negative energy… seen as

uneducated bumpkins who could not cope with the urbanity and

sophistication of their Hong Kong cousins. Seen in this light, the

YouTube video represents something of a throwback in which

local MTR passengers rise up in haughty indignation to berate

mainlanders for their low-class, ill-mannered ways (Ewing).

Mainland visitors often have a reputation of disrespecting local laws and orders when they travel. Their rule-breaking behaviors irritate a lot of local Hong Kongers, probably including Wai.

Consequently, when Wai witnessed the misbehavior of that daughter and mother, he felt responsible to remind them of the rules. Before it escalated into a verbal fight, he claimed that his demeanor was friendly. When he first approached the mother, he even used his limited PTH trying to minimize linguistic miscommunication.

All in all, the subway controversy probably would not be magnified into an “everyone’s matter” without previously established rifts. With the escalating resentment toward the

Mainlanders, the mindless mistake of this Mainland child just became a timely outlet of the irritation among Hong Kongers. In addition to the language and sociocultural disparities, ethnocentrism is another source of disharmony in this controversy. Ethnocentrism, a concept

44 presented by William Graham Sumner, describes “the tendency to view one’s group as centrally important and superior to other groups— creates intergroup bias that fuels prejudice, xenophobia, and intergroup violence” (De Dreu et al. 1). In this incident, the involved local passengers expected Cantonese to be the medium of communication (Tong et al. 285). They believe that Cantonese is superior to PTH; consequently, their ethnocentric prejudice against the Mainland out-group, represented by PTH, fuels their anger. The Mainland passengers, who defended the misconduct of an in-group member, indicated in-group favoritism. The ethnocentric mindsets of both sides triggered off this intergroup discord. When both sides are unwilling to accept differences, if not celebrating diversity, an invisible boundary is built.

45 ii. Case Study 2: Mainland Professor Kong’s Criticism

Figure 9: Professor Kong Qingdong in His Interview (Source: V1.cn)

Figure 10: One of the Headlines Regarding Professor Kong's Criticism (Source: Oriental Daily)

This incident about Professor Kong is the reverberation of the prior one. A Chinese professor from Peking University, also a direct descendant of Confucius, Kong Qingdong, criticized the subway incident on a national television talk show.37 He also addressed different

37 The talk show Kong Has Something to Say (“孔和尚有話說”) is produced by VODone.

46 problems of Hong Kongers based on that incident. He made the following remarks: “All ethnic

Chinese are responsible to speak in Putonghua, the standard language. When two people have different dialect preferences, PTH should be used. Whoever refuses to speak in Putonghua is a bastard (“王八蛋”)” (Kong). He blamed the double standard upheld by the Hong Kongers for causing the subway argument. He believed if the woman and daughter were Japanese,

American, or Hong Konger, but not Mainland Chinese, Wai would probably have handled the situation differently. He denounced the problem of discrimination against Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong.

Besides making accusations based on the subway incident itself, he had also made harsh comments on Hong Kongers regarding different matters. He first attacked their “Hong Kong pride” because he saw all ethnic Chinese as one united body. He problematizes the very terms

“Hong Konger” and “Mainlander” because he saw no distinctions between the two. His most cited criticism of Hong Kongers was “Those people are used to being the dogs38 of British

Imperialists. You guys are still dogs, not humans”39 (Kong). He accentuated the term “dogs” five times during the talk show. His offensive and biased speech upset many Hong Kongers, causing a series of defensive actions. A newspaper article on The Guardian reported a demonstration in front of the Mainland China Liaison Office after a few days. Hundreds of demonstrators brought their dogs along to express their irritation (Watts). A video40 of that talk show episode quickly spread all over the Internet and caught even more national and international attention. Both

Hong Kongers and Professor Kong had different supporters worldwide. There were different

38 “Dogs” in Professor Kong’s context is similar to “lackeys,” which means “a servile follower.” 39 The original quote in Chinese was “這種人給人家英國殖民者當走狗當慣了，到現在都是狗，你們不是人” 40 See the talk show video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ko5MSXZjmBE

47 opinions regarding Kong’s remarks and attitude, language preferences, and Mainland China-

Hong Kong relations. Some people thought his controversial and vulgar comments did not conform to his title as a professor and descendant of Confucius. A Nanyang University alumnus held him accountable for “provoking political disputes” between Hong Kong and China instead of “diluting them” (Ye). Many supporters of Professor Kong found his argument factual, but disgraceful.

Professor Kong’s speech marked the breaking point of the postcolonial challenges facing

Mainland China and Hong Kong. The linguistic and sociocultural disparities have become too serious to ignore. This incident is significant because the controversies are no long kept at a civic level. Even academic scholars, such as Professor Kong, sociologists, and celebrities are now attentive to the China-Hong Kong issues. For instance, an episode on a Chinese talk show, Tiger

Talk (“一虎一席談”) produced by Phoenix Television held a debate on Professor Kong’s commentary (Hu). It invited social experts and authoritative people who know the China-Hong

Kong matters well to express their viewpoints. It was a relatively intellectual debate that addresses the China-Hong Kong tensions with a wider range of audiences based on the speech of Professor Kong.

In terms of the content of his speech, Professor Kong’s perspective about regional communities and dialects seemed contradicting. On one hand, he upheld the communal

Chinese identity with no regional division, claiming the equality among every Chinese descent regardless of their home regions. Therefore, he condemned the Hong Kongers who are ethnocentric. He thought Hong Kongers are conceited by preferring Cantonese and identifying them as a separate cultural group (Kong). His argument clearly acknowledged the linguistic

48 component to a cultural identity. On the other hand, while proclaiming no differentiation, he degraded Cantonese, Shanghainese, and all other regional dialects (“方言”) spoken by different

Chinese people. Despite the arguable status of Cantonese, the tone of his comment seemed to have degraded the de facto status of Cantonese in Hong Kong and its importance to the Hong

Kong culture.

On the political level, Professor Kong’s critique disregarded the fundamental concept of

“One Country, Two Systems” proposed by Deng Xiaoping. If Hong Kong was meant to function as a special administrative region under this policy, there must have been some legitimate differences between the two places. Hong Kong has inherited both British and Chinese legacies after undergoing a 150-year colonial era. Owing to the different historical influences, a distinctive Hong Kong identity was formed, similar to the Macanese identity with the

Portuguese legacy. Professor Kong seemed to provoke the OCTS ideal by imputing Hong

Kongers to their language preference and cultural identity. Like Demin Ye pointed out earlier, his speech has fueled the bilateral conflicts while outwardly stressing on cultural integration

(Ye). Professor Kong’s assertions were reminiscent of the “Using Putonghua” objectives regarding their emphasis on the importance of knowing PTH and promoting national cohesion as an ethnic Chinese.

49 II. Symbolization of Language Preference

The circumstances and social expectations strongly influence the language preference of the communicators (Tong et al. 284). “Language preference” is a common theme in the confrontations examined in both case studies. Language plays a significant role in cultural solidarity. It is even a criterion to the entry of an ethnic group. Tong states, “To maintain the positive distinctiveness…those with a strong Hong Konger identification would…favor separation from Chinese Mainlanders” (283). Language preference reflects how strong a person associates with his or her cultural identity.

In the first case study, the argument between the Hong Kong and Mainland passengers intensified when different expectations on the medium of communication occurred. The language they spoke, in this case, represented their cultural identities. The Mainland visitors mocked the imperfect PTH of Wai while the Hong Konger insisted speaking in Cantonese because they were “in Hong Kong.” Wai’s PTH ability did not qualify him to enter the in-group of the Mainland Chinese visitors. The woman who did not speak Cantonese was also excluded from Wai’s in-group. Despite their same ethnicity, they associated themselves with two distinct cultural groups with a different language preference. Wai’s effort to adapt to the Mainland woman’s preference did not make him an in-group member. Language is a strong cultural symbol and it marks the borders for an in-group (Hofstede 423). Once people have developed the “insider-outsider” mentality, their attitudes and behaviors towards the outsiders change accordingly.

In the following case study, Professor Kong severely criticized the language preference of Hong Kongers. He strongly believes that every ethnic Chinese is responsible to communicate

50 with each other in Putonghua, the standard Chinese language. When two Chinese people with different dialectic preferences come together, Putonghua should always be the mutual language of communication. He referred to whoever does not follow this “standard” as dogs and bastards. In his speech, he denied the de facto status of Cantonese in Hong Kong, which further denied the distinctive Hong Kong culture. To him, having a language preference other than PTH was a conspiracy to undermine the national solidarity. He did not acknowledge the sociocultural and linguistic distinction between Hong Kong and the rest of China. His rationale essentially placed PTH on top of the linguistic hierarchy as if all other Chinese dialects were inferior to PTH and did not deserve recognition.

III. Personal Observation and Experience

In this section, I would like to share some personal observations and thoughts regarding the thesis topic. Majoring in International Studies with an interest in cross-cultural communication, I have developed strong awareness of cultural differences. I like observing cross-cultural interactions and applying my knowledge to the real world. I have had numerous interactions with Mainlanders in different occasions. Some were hostile; others were not. I belive that the old saying, “When in Rome, do as the Romans,” is still relevant. Respecting local norms is a universal manner when traveling to a foreign place. In spite of the misbehaviors of some Mainland visitors, it is unfair to generalize all Mainlanders with certain stereotypes because there is variation within the same cultural group. After all, our beliefs, values, and behaviors are influenced by many different factors. China is the fastest growing economy in the last decade, with an incredible transformation in different aspects of the society. The whole

51 country is more urbanized and globalized than ever; therefore, it takes time for the people to adapt to the new ways of living. Civic education is essential because it facilitates the public to understand the rights and obligations as global citizens. It is irrational to base our judgments of each individual entirely on stereotypes or past experiences.

After observing the daily interactions between Hong Kongers and Mainland Chinese, I concluded three leading causes for their quarrels. First is the discrepancy between people’s expectations on public behaviors. Hong Kong and Mainland China implement different sets of laws to regulate the behaviors of civilians. A socially acceptable manner in Mainland China may not be the case in Hong Kong. Controversies often occur with a lack of cultural understanding and tolerance when people are not aware of the differences. A sense of superiority is another common cause. In the case of Hong Kong and Mainland China, it is not uncommon to see people looking down on each other. For example, by calling Hong Kongers “the dogs of British imperialist,” Professor Kong has placed them on the bottom of the hierarchy. This sense of superiority does not only go in one-direction. Some Hong Kongers generalize Mainland people as “locusts” (“蝗蟲”)41 who “exploit and take advantage of a city yet refuse to contribute”

(“Locust”). Neither side is willing to recognize, respect, or adapt to another culture. These dehumanizing and insolent languages are infectious illusions, too. Although they are often irrational and biased, they nonetheless still influence people’s perceptions towards one another.

My third observation about the causes is the concept of Face. Since China (including Hong Kong)

41 See Figure 11 for the definitions of this term. Also see Appendix C for the “Locust Song” produced by ChinglishVlogs of the Hong Kong Golden Forum.

52 is a high-context culture,42 people are extremely sensitive of the face of themselves and their represented groups. “Losing face is a terrible suffering in Asian cultures. Potential loss of face includes public humiliation, behaviors that discount one’s ability, and rejection” (Varner and

Beamer 158). Oftentimes, people insist upon their positions only to protect their faces, even after realizing they might be wrong. Conflicts start easily when someone does not admit wrongdoings that violated the rules or norms.

Figure 11: The Definition of "Locust” (Source: EVCHK)

42 High-context cultures emphasize interpersonal relationships. Words are not so important as context, which include the speaker’s tone of voice, facial expression, gestures, posture—and even the person’s family history and status ("Chapter 1 Lecture: High-Context & Low-Context Culture Styles").

53 Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

I. Conclusions

It has been sixteen years since Hong Kong reunited with Mainland China, the motherland. The transition from being a British colony to a Chinese special administrative region has been a rough journey. In spite of the combined effort of the PRC and HKSAR government to eliminate the invisible boundary, the current problems still need a great deal of improvement. Contrastingly, the governments are accountable for the growing rift between peoples. Since Hong Kong has developed in its own ways under the British rule for more than a century, its society and culture are constructed differently than the ones in Mainland China (W.

Wong 8). The government’s intention to facilitate the reunification process with an assimilation approach has already infringed the promise of OCTS. Because running a capitalist system within a communist country was an innovative idea, the attainability and potential problems of OCST are almost unpredictable. To date, after sixteen years of reunification, misunderstanding and dissatisfaction never cease to build up mainly due to the linguistic and sociocultural disparities.

The “invisible” boundary seems to become more “visible” after a series of conflicts in 2012.

The Hong Kong identity has multiple layers of meanings. There are certain requirements for someone to become a legal Hong Kong citizen. However, being a “true” Hong Konger requires a lot more than simply owning a Hong Kong identity card (Zheng and Wong, “Identity”).

Language is the building block of each ethnic identity. Cantonese is the primary language Hong

Kongers communicate with on a daily basis. Not only does it represent the HKID, it is part of the

HKID. Language conveys cultural implication, social expectation, and political ideology. It also influences our attitudes and communication approach during our intragroup interaction (Tong

54 et al. 285). The Hong Kong culture was constructed throughout the colonial history and is being defined and redefined continually. Under the British guidance, Hong Kong experienced an astonishing economic transformation between the 60s and 90s. Local people and Mainland immigrants back then, who created this prosperity together, have developed the core values of the society and a strong sense of belonging. The colonial era became a foundation of the distinctive and irreplaceable Hong Kong identity. It is misleading and inconsiderate to assume no distinction between Hong Kong and Mainland China after the reunification in 1997.

The language and sociocultural difference between Hong Kong and Mainland China are often the sources of the tensions. A lack of understanding and low tolerance of such disparities have caused a series of disputes happened especially at the beginning of 2012. The two case studies are the epitome of the daily struggles during this postcolonial transition. With an ethnocentric mentality, people based their evaluation of one another’s language preferences, social norms, and cultural values on their own standards. The cases I investigated delineate the invisible boundary between Hong Kongers and Mainland Chinese. Despite the government’s ideal of harmony, many people express a low degree of willingness to work on the postcolonial integration.

Like the subway incident and Professor Kong’s criticism, more disputes are now recorded and shared on the Internet. The social and mass media in Hong Kong certainly partake in deepening the postcolonial tensions. Under the freedom of press, the HKSAR government should minimize interference over the censorship of news. Since the media that shapes the

Hong Kong culture is also highly commercialized, they have to fight for readers’ attention by magnifying these disputes (M. Zhang 85). They often portray a negative image of Mainland

55 China, which affects people’s perceptions and attitudes toward Mainland Chinese. Some Hong

Kongers react strongly by organizing demonstrations and petitions, leaving irresponsible comments on the Internet, and writing songs or literature pieces to strike back. With the free epidemic of information under globalization, individuals worldwide have easy access to the local news in Hong Kong. More people are hopefully aware of the political and sociocultural state of affairs of Hong Kong since some foreign media also follow the local Hong Kong news.

i. Restate Problem Statement

This thesis asserted that there is an invisible boundary between Hong Kong and

Mainland China in terms of the language and sociocultural aspects. Under the British influence,

I contend that Hong Kongers have developed a distinctive cultural identity despite having the same ethnic origin as the Mainland Chinese; therefore, it should be recognized separately.

Through exploring the historical and economic development of Hong Kong, this thesis revealed the cultural implication of the “Hong Kong Identity.” The controversies between Hong Kongers and Mainland Chinese, demonstrated through two case studies, also showed that the “One

Country, Two Systems” policy seems to have failed to facilitate the postcolonial reunification.

ii. Restate Major Findings

Throughout my research process of this thesis, I have learned a lot about the China-Hong

Kong relation and the cultural implication of the HKID. The following are my major findings:

56  The “One Country, Two Systems” policy granted Hong Kong the right to maintain its

existing legal, economic, education, and social system for at least 50 years after to the

handover in 1997.

 The Mainland immigrants from the 1950s made up a large part of the current Hong

Kong population. They contributed to the economic development and shaped the core

values and local identity of Hong Kong during the last few decades.

 With a unique colonial background, Hong Kongers have been struggling to define their

cultural identity. Therefore, their inconsistent self-identifications are inclined to

respond to current social events, such as the Beijing Olympics and SARS.

 The formation and development of the HKID has been a long, on-going process. The

colonial history, collective memories, popular culture, communication style, and

language preference of Hong Kongers are all building blocks of the HKID.

 It takes a long time for Hong Kongers to uphold their national identity but only a short

time to abolish the previous national-building effort. This phenomenon is shown in the

ethnic identity poll analysis.

 Language is a carrier of political ideologies and cultural implications. It determines if a

person qualifies to be a member of a certain ethnic group. Cantonese the foundation of

the HKID; therefore Hong Kongers put a lot of effort to protect the status of Cantonese.

 Hong Kongers are eager to distinguish their unique cultural identity. Many of them are

reluctant to integrate with Mainland China even after sixteen years of reunification.

57  Besides improving students’ PTH competency, the “Using Putonghua to Teach Chinese

Language Subject” measure seems to have the underlying purposes of fostering

nationalism and linguistic and cultural assimilation.

 The power of the mass media is not to be underestimated. They are responsible for

projecting a negative image on the Mainland Chinese in the Hong Kong society, which

intensifies the tensions. They also play a crucial role in transmitting the local news to

the global audience.

 The language and sociocultural disparities between Hong Kong and Mainland China are

often the sources of the bilateral tensions. Ethnocentrism and low tolerance of such

disparities have caused a series of disputes happened in early 2012.

 The politics of identity in Hong Kong is an intricate issue. They include: the debate on

the purposes of the teaching language reform, the effort to preserve the HKID and

safeguarding Cantonese, and the tensions between people from the two places.

II. Recommendations and Forward Looking i. Personal Thoughts and Recommendations

Even after immigrating to the United States, I am especially aware of the cultural issues of my hometown, Hong Kong. Especially from the beginning of 2012, I have been seeing more headlines reporting the rough interaction between Hong Kongers and Mainland visitors in Hong

Kong. It is distressing to see the social harmony at risk. As Hong Kong citizen, I felt the need to learn more about my own cultural identity and heritage, so I decided to write a research paper

58 on this particular topic. I think all cultures are precious and unique because each contributes to diversify the global community. There isn’t one culture that is better or worse than others, although our sense of belonging may persuade us otherwise. I have a deep emotional connection with my birth place and I am always proud of my Hong Kong identity. I can still relate to the collective memories because I am part of them. Therefore, the confrontation between Hong Kongers and Mainlanders always gives me mixed feelings. Especially with the media hype nowadays, it is easy to bestow in the “us against them” attitude which influences our critical and logical thinking. On top of the actual disparities, I think people who blindly defend their in-groups also deepen the boundary between both sides. Although my interactions with Mainland Chinese are not always positive, my International Studies education has taught me to go beyond the stereotypes and my usual discourse in order to truly understand the sources of a problem.

Before I close this section, I would Iike to suggest solutions to improve the current

China-Hong Kong relations and the reunification process. First of all, I agree the necessity of postcolonial integration between Hong Kong and Mainland China. It is unrealistic to expect everything in Hong Kong to remain the same after the change of sovereignty. However, the process of integration needs to consider the preservation of the uniqueness Hong Kong culture.

Raising people’s national awareness and PTH ability is beneficial to Hong Kongers and to the relationship between two cultures, but imposing the national identity with the purpose of substituting the local identity is a whole different story. While promoting cultural integration, the government should avoid going too far in the direction of cultural assimilation.

59 Secondly, the core values of the HKID are essential to the successful economic transformation in the past few decades; they consolidate the Hong Kong society and create a sense of belonging. Understanding the sensitivity of Hong Kongers regarding their colonial past and cultural identity, the government should spend more time educating the public about the importance of integration. Listening to their concerns before implementing policies that would have immense potential impact to the society is also helpful to avoid unnecessary dissatisfaction. Lastly for the Hong Kongers, they should learn to embrace their new identity. A strained relationship with Mainland China is not beneficial to either side; it will only inflict damage on the social harmony and international reputation of Hong Kong. It is possible to preserve the local identity reasonably while adapting to the national identity at the same time.

Ethnocentrism is dangerous when we interact with people from different cultural backgrounds.

Although the mass media in Hong Kong may have presented certain ethnocentric ideologies and stereotypes towards the Mainland Chinese, people should be a more critical and rational audience. They should avoid relying on assumption and generalization. A smoother reunification process requires effort and understanding from both sides, and it will strengthen the economic growth and social development in a long-run.

ii. Forward Looking Statement

Despite the invisible boundary between Hong Kong and Mainland China, there is hope that the tensions can be relieved. Sixteen years of reunification is quite short compared to the preceding 150 years of the British colonial era. Hong Kong is still in the transition of readjusting to its new political status and relationship with Mainland China. Some conflicts and

60 misunderstanding at the beginning of any historical changes are inevitable. With the rising national awareness and increasing cross-border interaction, the public, especially the younger generation, are learning more about the biological mother—Mainland China. Hong Kongers will hopefully realize that insisting upon hostility towards Mainland Chinese would only lead to a no-win situation. The best way to achieve the OCTS ideals is when both sides can put the effort to break the invisible boundary and respect one another at all time. Lastly, I would like to close my thesis with a meaningful quote with English translation. It is cited from a television drama,

“When Heaven Burns,” that claims to reflect the current social phenomenon of Hong Kong:

每一個人都代表著一種獨立和自主的做人方法,

這些並不是不和諧的表現。

和諧不是一百個人說同一番話,

和諧是一百個人有一百句不同的一番話之餘,

而又互相尊重。

Everyone represents an independent and autonomic way of live;

These are not equivalent to a discordant representation.

Harmony is not having a hundred individuals are saying the same

things. Harmony is when a hundred individuals have a hundred

different beliefs and are still willing to maintain mutual respect

(Chow).

I hope that the tensions are only temporary, and people from both Hong Kong and Mainland

China can set any disagreements aside and work together towards a better relationship with each other.

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Twenty-First Century 31 Oct. 2002: n. pag. Web. 4 July 2012. APPENDIX A: Categorical Ethnic Identity Poll Chart and Table (1997-2013)

(Source: Public Opinion Program by The University of Hong Kong) APPENDIX A: Categorical Ethnic Identity Poll Chart and Table (1997-2013)

身份類別認同

你會稱自己為香港人/中國人/香港的中國人/中國的香港人 : (按次計算) You would identify yourself as a Hong Kong Citizen/Chinese Citizen/Hong Kong Chinese Citizen/Chinese Hong Kong Citizen : (per poll)

調查日期樣本人數次樣本人香港人中國的香港人香港的中國人中國人 Date of survey Total 數 HK Chinese HK HK Chinese Chinese Sample Sub- Citizen Citizen Citizen Citizen sample

10-13/6/2013 1055 677 38.2% 24.3% 12.0% 23.0% 14-17/12/2012 1019 687 27.2% 33.1% 16.1% 21.3% 13-20/6/2012 1001 560 45.6% 22.8% 11.5% 18.3% 12-20/12/2011 1016 541 37.7% 25.3% 17.8% 16.6% 21-22/6/2011 520 520 43.8% 21.3% 10.3% 23.5% 13-16/12/2010 1013 1013 35.5% 27.6% 13.8% 21.1% 9-13/6/2010 1004 1004 25.3% 31.3% 14.8% 27.8% 8-11/12/2009 1007 1007 37.6% 23.9% 13.1% 24.2% 8-13/6/2009 1002 1002 24.7% 32.0% 13.3% 29.3% 9-12/12/2008 1016 1016 21.8% 29.6% 13.0% 34.4% 11-13/6/2008 1012 1012 18.1% 29.2% 13.3% 38.6% 11-14/12/2007 1011 1011 23.5% 31.5% 16.0% 27.2% 8-12/6/2007 1016 1016 23.4% 31.8% 16.7% 26.4% 6-12/12/2006* 1011 1011 22.4% 24.3% 20.1% 31.8% 13-15/6/2006* 1018 1018 24.8% 25.1% 14.9% 34.6% 9-14/12/2005 1017 1017 24.8% 26.5% 16.9% 30.7% 6-8/6/2005 1029 1029 24.0% 21.2% 14.7% 36.4% 6-9/12/2004 1007 1007 25.9% 23.1% 16.2% 31.6% 7-11/6/2004 1027 1027 28.0% 21.2% 14.3% 33.0% 10-14/12/2003 1059 1059 24.9% 23.4% 15.6% 32.5% 13-18/6/2003 1043 1043 36.7% 19.2% 11.9% 29.0% 1-4/3/2003 1035 1035 28.5% 22.3% 15.0% 32.3% 13-18/12/2002 1026 1026 31.1% 21.3% 14.3% 29.7% 2-5/9/2002 1017 1017 28.9% 22.0% 15.0% 32.5% 4-5/6/2002 1067 1067 32.2% 18.1% 13.0% 32.5% 12-13/3/2002 1024 1024 27.5% 23.3% 17.9% 28.3% 7-9/12/2001 1052 1052 31.9% 20.5% 10.4% 31.5%

(Source: Public Opinion Program by The University of Hong Kong) APPENDIX A: Categorical Ethnic Identity Poll Chart and Table (1997-2013)

13-21/9/2001 1025 1025 26.1% 27.9% 17.6% 25.8% 1-5/6/2001 1053 1053 36.1% 18.3% 13.3% 28.4% 22/3-2/4/2001 1014 1014 31.4% 21.7% 16.0% 28.2% 4-12/12/2000 1040 1040 35.6% 19.1% 13.8% 25.2% 21-25/9/2000 1087 1087 37.0% 26.8% 14.5% 17.4% 7-8/6/2000 1074 1074 35.5% 22.9% 14.0% 22.8% 6-7/4/2000 570 570 38.7% 21.4% 14.2% 20.4% 1-2/2/2000 566 566 38.3% 23.2% 19.5% 13.8% 13-15/12/1999 529 529 39.0% 20.9% 17.2% 19.9% 26-27/10/1999 535 535 31.2% 23.7% 16.2% 25.5% 6/8/1999 596 596 30.3% 23.3% 17.5% 25.3% 8/6/1999 538 538 39.9% 25.0% 11.2% 17.0% 15/4/1999 527 527 43.4% 20.0% 13.1% 18.0% 8-9/2/1999 513 513 41.0% 20.9% 15.3% 17.6% 21/12/1998 544 544 40.7% 22.3% 15.1% 17.2% 29/9/1998 517 517 39.4% 22.9% 15.5% 20.6% 14/8/1998 526 526 29.7% 25.2% 19.6% 22.0% 22-24/6/1998 1042 1042 30.2% 18.0% 16.1% 31.6% 3-4/6/1998 544 544 34.2% 18.6% 18.7% 24.8% 8-9/12/1997 500 500 35.8% 22.9% 18.9% 18.2% 28-29/10/1997 536 536 36.6% 22.6% 20.1% 17.5% 23-24/9/1997 512 512 36.2% 24.2% 20.3% 17.5% 26-27/8/1997 532 532 34.9% 24.8% 20.1% 18.6%

(Source: Public Opinion Program by The University of Hong Kong) APPENDIX A: Categorical Ethnic Identity Poll Chart and Table (1997-2013)

認同「中國人」身份的程度

請你用 0-10 分表示你對中國人身份既認同感。10 分代表絕對認同，0 分代表絕不認同，5 分代表一半半。你俾幾多分自己？ (按次計算) Please use a scale of 0-10 to rate your strength of identity as a Chinese citizen, with 10 indicating extremely strong, 0 indicating extremely weak, and 5 indicating half-half. How would you rate yourself? (per poll)

調查日期樣本人數認同感標準誤差認知率 Date of survey Total Sample Strength Rating Standard Error Recognition Rate 13-20/6/2012 1001 6.99 0.11 98.5% 12-20/12/2011 1016 7.01 0.11 98.8% 17-22/6/2011 1028 7.24 0.10 98.2% 13-16/12/2010 1013 7.10 0.10 96.6% 9-13/6/2010 1004 7.63 0.10 98.2% 8-11/12/2009 1007 7.79 0.10 99.0% 8-13/6/2009 1002 7.72 0.10 99.4% 9-12/12/2008 1016 7.79 0.10 97.3% 11-13/6/2008 1012 8.02 0.07 97.7% 11-14/12/2007 1011 7.87 0.07 98.3% 8-12/6/2007 1016 7.66 0.08 96.2% 6-12/12/2006 1011 7.82 0.08 98.1% 13-15/6/2006 1018 7.68 0.07 97.7% 9-14/12/2005 1017 7.73 0.07 96.9% 6-8/6/2005 1029 7.56 0.07 96.1% 6-9/12/2004 1007 7.47 0.08 93.6% 7-11/6/2004 1027 7.48 0.08 90.9% 10-14/12/2003 1059 7.52 0.07 92.5% 13-18/6/2003 1043 7.32 0.07 95.3% 1-4/3/2003 1035 7.76 0.08 93.9% 13-18/12/2002 1026 7.44 0.08 91.5% 2-5/9/2002 1017 7.82 0.07 93.0% 4-5/6/2002 1067 7.44 0.07 89.2% 12-13/3/2002 1024 8.08 0.07 87.0% 7-9/12/2001 1052 7.57 0.08 84.9% 13-21/9/2001 1025 8.13 0.07 89.8% 1-5/6/2001 1053 7.43 0.08 89.6% 22/3-2/4/2001 1014 8.12 0.07 94.0%

(Source: Public Opinion Program by The University of Hong Kong) APPENDIX A: Categorical Ethnic Identity Poll Chart and Table (1997-2013)

4-12/12/2000 1040 7.47 0.08 89.6% 21-25/9/2000 1087 7.77 0.07 89.6% 7-8/6/2000 1074 7.38 0.08 89.3% 6-7/4/2000 570 7.45 0.11 91.9% 1-2/2/2000 566 7.68 0.10 89.6% 13-15/12/1999 529 6.99 0.11 88.1% 26-27/10/1999 535 7.37 0.13 95.1% 6/8/1999 596 7.46 0.11 91.3% 8/6/1999 538 6.79 0.11 89.2% 15/4/1999 527 7.17 0.11 92.8% 8-9/2/1999 513 7.10 0.12 90.1% 21/12/1998 544 7.18 0.10 91.2% 3-4/6/1998 544 7.10 0.10 92.6% 8-9/12/1997 500 6.98 0.12 91.2% 28-29/10/1997 536 7.33 0.11 94.8% 23-24/9/1997 512 7.37 0.11 95.1% 26-27/8/1997 532 7.46 0.10 94.7%

(Source: Public Opinion Program by The University of Hong Kong) APPENDIX B: Public Statement by Ken Wai

對於《香港人大戰內地人》 (In English, “Referring to ‘Hong Kongers versus Mainlanders’”) by Ken Wai on Monday, January 16, 2012 at 9:27pm ·

事件發生在前天(15/1/2012)，昨天已經開始收到不同好友的詢問，到今天在頭版上看到自己的樣子。哈，想不到會這樣。我只可以向各位講，我只是做一些當時我想做，以及應該做的事情，只是想不到給人拍了下來，然後引起各界的關注。

好多好友問我事件經過，或者讓我在這裡交代一下吧！

事緣當天與女友在紅磡站上車，上車後近我的兩排位都坐滿人，一邊一個大人三個小孩，一邊即是三個大人以及他們的行李。當時都不以為然；後來看到那個媽咪張一包童星點心麵倒進她旁的小孩手中，而另外兩個女孩則有一個拿著糖包。及後雙手捧著一堆點心麵的小孩不小心將一些灑到身上及地上。看到這個程況，我便以我有限的普通話，指著不准飲食的牌向他們說：不好意思，這裡不能吃東西。之後…..換來一輪啾呼叫。那媽咪說只是小孩子吃，以及正在收起，問我為何要多事…..我向他說剛才我都有見你放進自己口中，你也有吃…..其實講左幾句我都知冇結果，誰知這時他們對面的友伴邊笑邊出聲：佢地說得真是很差！我很火用廣東話同佢地講：我係講得差！呢度係香港人的地方，你同我講返廣東話。這時他們有一句沒一句繼續講，這時有位見義勇為的男仕出聲：收聲啦！好嘈呀！繼續食呀好唔好？自己做錯野仲嘈，要唔要叫職員呀？當那班人還在嘈時，男仕在旺角東站按著車門，等職員過來。而我亦第一時間下車向職員揮手叫他們過來。之後你地都響 YOUTUBE 度見到晒。

九龍塘站職員請我們全部落車，之後分開我地兩班人。了解事件後職員請我們走先，說會向他們發出警告。事件就係咁啦！我上左第二班車仲見到佢地係俾職員圍住。

好好彩有呢位見義勇為的先生。我呢兩日見到 D 好友不停咁講話我英雄、偶像，我只係講我做返自己應該做的事。及我無意冒犯內地人仕，至於我果句：大陸人係咁，如果對各位做成不便我在此致歉。呢次係個別事件，我唔想引起甚麼反甚麼的情緒，謝謝！

又好好彩，我冇爆粗，如果唔係成件事唔同晒。

請各位廣泛轉載！

Ken Wai

17/1/2012

(Source: Facebook)

APPENDIX B: Public Statement by Ken Wai

(Source: Facebook)

APPENDIX C: The “Locust Song” Lyrics

<<蝗蟲天下>> 唱: 花生湯丸詞: 高登眾巴打原曲: 富士山下

蝗蟲你的確欠打巴士港鐵小巴餐廳酒店商舖內亂叫喧嘩難道你不覺醜嗎街邊點煙踎下跟手比個蘇蝦將金滿地灑

其實見這個國家偷呃拐騙到家高呼一句中國人誰人亦怕蟲國化名叫支那一早醜遍東亞一天一句普通話將我同化

來香港闖我邊境愛侵占地盤是你本性寄生到身份終可以得確認蝗蟲大肚像異型懷孕入境卻未停無人能阻止它搶獲身份證

蟲卵在醫院蜉化侵占病床後再走數你可會悲哀中感到很憤怒其實下兩代前途全部被侵蝕未嫌早設下這圈套每天講中國多好對著我洗腦

誰在我境裡放聲不懂分吋叫囂不可一世口氣大話語輕挑 "如沒有中國關照香港已經死了" 香港都算真多得中國唔少蟲沒有所謂最醜根本只有更醜

(Source: ChinglishVlogs (YouTube); Hong Kong Golden Forum) APPENDIX C: The “Locust Song” Lyrics

週街剝褲解決後仍然未夠無論打尖放飛劍都不感到丟臉天天譴責得多都感到煩厭

如今的這個香港已給那害蟲逐吋收購嘆息這當天光輝已經過後平民汗血尚在流蝗蟲就搶盡食油誰能憑戰意將獅子山拯救難保有天把假貨中國運來讓你選購把假貨於香港黑店中發售無視你拼命跪求蝗蟲亂港亦未停手假麵包假奶假雞蛋假醋假酒你能說都有

誰都驚恐有天災對匪國暴民又要捐送這可算香港給中國的作用財物盡獻奉害蟲平民愈捐就愈窮誰人能教教我怎樣不悲痛何解在香港的我超過十年被你呃透假中有假香港怎會可接受窮人在閉目淚流蝗蟲就趕極亦唔走炒地都不夠炒車炒水貨炒樓佔盡我所有

往日靠打拼港英的繁華光景再沒有保證

(Source: ChinglishVlogs (YouTube); Hong Kong Golden Forum)