Report Select Committee of the House of Keys

Home , Catalan Courts, Edgar Mann, Edgar Quine, Geoff Cannell, Hazel Hannan, House of Keys

REPORT

SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF KEYS ON THE CONSTITUTION (LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL) BILL

At the sitting of the House of Keys on 1st April 2003 it was resolved that a committee of five members be established to -

"examine and consider the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill To take evidence thereon in public and report to the House before the Clauses Stage no later than April 2004

Hon S C Rodan MHK (Garff) Chairman

The Hon J A Brown SHK (Castletown)

Mrs B J Cannell MHK (Douglas East)

Mrs H Hannan MHK (Peel)

Hon J Rimington MHK (Rushen)

The powers, privileges and immunities relating to the work of a committee of the House of Keys are those conferred by sections 3 and 4 of the Tynwald Proceedings Act 1876, sections 1 to 4 of the Privileges of Tynwald (Publications) Act 1973 and sections 2 to 4 of the Tynwald Proceedings Act 1984.

Copies of this Report may be obtained from the Tynwald Library, Legislative Buildings, Bucks Road, Douglas IM1 3PW (Tel 01624 685516, Fax 01624 685522) or may be consulted at www. tynwald.org. im

All correspondence with regard to this Report should be addressed to the Secretary of the House of Keys, Legislative Buildings, Bucks Road, Douglas IM1 3PW.

To: The Hon James Anthony Brown SHK, Speaker of the House, and the Hon Members of the House of Keys

REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION i (LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL) BILL

PART 1

INTRODUCTION & HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REFORM

1.1 At the sitting of the House of Keys on Tuesday 1st April 2003 it was resolved that

a Select Committee of five members should be established to:

"Examine and consider the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill, to take evidence

thereon in public and to report to the House before the Clauses Stage no later than

April 2004”

1.2 At the same sitting of the House the Long Title of the Constitution (Legislative

Council) Bill was amended to enable the Bill to: I

"make new provisions for the constitution of the House of Keys and the Legislative

Council. " ,

2 1.3 After a ballot Mrs Cannell, Mrs Hannan, Mr Rimington, Mr Rodan and

Mr Speaker were elected, and at the first meting Mr Rodan was elected as

Chairman.

1.4 In total your Committee has held fifteen meetings.

1.5 Your Committee decided that it would undertake its task in the following

manner:

(a) write to all Members of Tynwald inviting Members to submit, in writing,

any views they may have on the Bill; together with any amendments they

may wish to proposed. A deadline of 30th June 2003 was set for receipt of

Members evidence;

(b) invite members of the public to submit written evidence concerning the

proposed Bill. A deadline of 30th June 2003 was set for receipts from the

public;

the public to amplify on their written evidence; and

(d) to evaluate the proposals contained in the Bill in the light of evidence

received and the Committee's own opinions and recommend to the House

of Keys a way forward.

3 1.6 Legislative Council reform is of course not a new issue. Reform of the Council

has been taking place over many years. In the last 50 years the following reforms

have occurred:

1961: Isle of Man Constitution Act, which reduced the power of the Council over i legislation and subject to certain conditions allowed for a Bill to be passed by the

Keys without the Council's approval;

1969: Isle of Man Constitution Act, which increased the number of members of

the Council elected by the Keys from five to seven;

1971: Isle of Man Constitution Act, which removed the Attorney General's vote

in the Council;

1975: Isle of Man Constitution (Amendment) Act, which removed the

First Deemster from membership of the Council and introduced one more

elected Member;

1980: Constitution (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Act, which removed the

Lieutenant Governor from presiding over the Council;

1981: Constitution (Amendment) Act, which formally established the Office of

President of the Council; and

4 1990: Constitution Act, which established the Office of President of Tynwald

(elected by Members of Tynwald Court) who would also act as ex officio

President of the Council.

These reforms clearly demonstrate the evolving nature of the composition and

role of the Legislative Council.

1.7 Your Committee presented an Interim Report to the House of Keys on Tuesday

27th January 2004, recommending that leave be given for the Chairman to

introduce a Private Member's Bill to provide that any Bill passed by the House

and sent up to the Council shall, if not approved by the Council within three

months, with or without amendment, return to the House; and that the House

shall, on a motion made, again consider the Bill as it was passed by the House at

its third reading and shall either approve or reject the Bill. Such a Bill shall

require sixteen votes of the Members present and voting to be approved by the

House.

Your Committee's rationale for introducing this Private Member's Bill is to

ensure that the Council, which is not directly elected, ought not to have the

power to unnecessarily delay the will of the popularly elected Chamber,

5 PART 2

EVIDENCE RECEIVED

2.1 Evidence from Members

2.1.1 Written evidence was received from Mr J D Q Cannan MHK,

Mr A J Earnshaw MHK and the Hon S C Rodan MHK. In addition

Mr R E Quine MHK wrote to your Committee to inform them that he did not

intend to make a further written response since the Committee already had a

copy of his address to the Keys, made when he introduced the Bill.

2.1.2 Mr Cannan's written submission suggested the abolition of the Legislative i Council primarily on the grounds that it is not popularly elected and therefore

had no public mandate or accountability. He envisaged a Tynwald of 32 or

possibly 24 popularly elected members.

2.1.3 Mr Earnshaw indicated that, in his view, the present system was robust and had

stood the test of time.

i 2.1.4 The Hon S C Rodan argued for a directly elected Tynwald which could then be

subdivided into Keys and Council for the purposes of considering legislation.

2.1.5 A copy of the letter requesting written evidence from Members together with the

replies received as attached to the Report as Appendix 1.

6 2.2 Evidence from members of the Public

2.2.1 Evidence was received from Mr J C Cain, Mr R H Costain, Professor D Kermode

of Liverpool John Moores University and Mr G V H Kneale CBE.

2.2.2 Mr Cain proposed a directly elected Council. Mr Costain suggested a directly

elected Council chosen by the people from a panel of candidates approved by the

House of Keys. Professor Kermode produced a detailed letter concerning the

Legislative Council, attempts to reform it in the past and issues of relevance in

further reform. Mr Kneale suggested, that in essence, there should be a directly

elected Tynwald which would then be divided into two legislative committees.

2.2.3 A copy of the advertisement inviting public submissions and copies of the

submissions received are included in the Report as Appendix 2.

2.3 Oral Evidence

2.3.1 Your Committee determined to take oral evidence from Professor Kermode,

Mr Kneale and Mr Cain which took place on 5th September 2003. Your

Committee then invited Mr R E Quine MHK, as the proposer of the Bill, to give

oral evidence, which he did on 26th November 2003. In addition

Mr J D Q Cannan MHK and Mr A J Earnshaw MHK were also given the

opportunity to give oral evidence. Mr Cannan accepted the invitation and gave

evidence on 26th November 2003. Mr Earnshaw was content with his written

submission.

7 2.3.2 Hansard transcripts of the oral evidence taken from Professor Kermode,

Mr Kneale, Mr Cain, Mr Quine MHK and Mr Cannan MHK are attached to the i Report as Appendix 3.

PART 3

CONSTITUTION (LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL) BILL

3.1 Since the reason for establishing the Committee was to consider Mr Quine's

Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill, your Committee believes that it is correct i to begin with a full assessment of this Bill.

3.2 Mr Quine has attempted to introduce reform to the Legislative Council in the

past, and he indicated to your Committee, when giving oral evidence, that this

Bill is an attempt to achieve a pragmatic solution that would command support

in the House of Keys. The Bill, in essence, requires a popularly elected

Legislative Council. The Legislative Council should consist of the President of

Tynwald, the Attorney General (who would be non-voting as at present) and the

Lord Bishop (who would become non-voting) all of whom sit by virtue of their

Offices. In addition there would be eight popularly elected members. The eight

would be elected by postal ballot for a five year term, with elections taking place

in the year before a Keys General Election. Council elections would be

conducted using the same electoral system and franchise qualifications that

apply to Keys elections. However, the eight would be chosen by voters in five

electoral areas largely determined by the spread of population around the Island.

The Electoral areas proposed would be the North (one member), the South (two

members), the West (one member), the East (two members) and Douglas (two

members).

8 3.3 The Bill also proposes that the Legislative Council should have statutory

functions, which would be the revision of legislation (both primary and

secondary) and the consideration of any public document, which is laid or is to

be laid before Tynwald. Having considered such documents the Council would

then report back to Tynwald. Furthermore the Bill proposes that the Council of

Ministers could refer to the Legislative Council any European Union Instrument

which it believes will have an effect on the Isle of Man under the terms of the

European Communities (Isle of Man) Act of 1973. The Council could then

consider such Instruments and report to Tynwald.

3.4 Finally the Bill excludes a member of the Council from being elected as

Chief Minister, although it does not prevent a member of the Council from being

appointed as a Minister, Member of a Department or Chair of a Statutory Board,

3.5 A copy of the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill, together with the

amendment made to the long title of the Bill are attached to this Report as

Appendix 4.

3.6 Advantages of the Bill

(text in bold type indicates your Committee's analysis of the claimed advantages)

The advantages claimed for the Bill in evidence submitted include:

(a) The model proposed by this Bill would retain the historic tri-cameral

structure of the Manx parliamentary system.

9 Your Committee understands that this is regarded as an important

advantage by many and it is certainly not opposed to maintaining the

basic historic structure of the Manx parliamentary system.

(b) The Legislative Council would be able to claim popular legitimacy

because eight of its members are popularly elected and the Bishop and

Attorney General, whilst being members, would not have voting rights.

Because the members of the Council would be largely popularly elected

under the proposals of this Bill, there could be no objection to the Council

exercising a decision making role in the scrutiny of any public documents, i including legislation and EU Instruments.

Your Committee agrees that this is an important advantage and

considers that in the modern world it is essential for any legislative

body to be both representative of and responsible to the electorate.

can be argued that there should be little objection to elected members

being appointed as Ministers, Members of Departments or Chairs of

Statutory Boards. Where there are only a relatively small number of

politicians and many Government posts to be filled, it is obviously

important that the Chief Minister has as many members as possible to

choose from when appointing a Government.

Your Committee accepts the importance of the Chief Minister having a

wide choice in selecting the members of his government. This is

particularly important when the total number of members of Tynwald

is only relatively small to begin with. However we do discuss this issue

further in paragraph 3.7(g) below.

10 (d) Defining the powers of the Council by statute would have the clear

advantage of making it plain what the role of the Council is and this might

therefore encourage candidates to stand for election because they would

know exactly what their power and role would be. It has been argued

that it might even encourage a different type of candidate to stand for

Council election, such as someone with considerable experience in the

world of business and commerce or with specific knowledge of and

interest in the legislative process or in some other area of society, who

would not wish to be involved in the more robust political atmosphere of

the House of Keys. Such a person might bring helpful experience to the

making and scrutinising of legislation.

Your Committee accepts that there may be some truth in this view, but

is far from persuaded that in reality there would be many people of the

type described above who might want to stand for Council election.

Furthermore the fact that Council members would also be members of

Tynwald Court would mean they would be involved in a more robust

political atmosphere within Tynwald and that may deter some from

standing.

(e) Because Council members responsibilities would be defined by statute, it

was put to us that some individuals may be willing to stand for election to

the Council in the belief that they would not have direct responsibilities

for the wide ranging constituency issues that members of the Keys have,

as they would be unable to be involved in issues such as housing,

education etc except in so far as these issues may be raised in Tynwald or

be the subject of legislation. Just as at present, members of the Legislative

11 Council would act as 'conduits' to MHKs concerning such constituency

matters. It was further suggested that there might be those who would

not be,comfortable doing such work, who may nonetheless make a useful

contribution to the government and legislative process.

Your Committee is not persuaded by this argument, since members of

the Council would also be members of Tynwald Court where they

would have involvement in a wide range of issues. Whatever their

defined powers within the Council, Legislative Council members could

not isolate themselves from these wider issues in Tynwald. Furthermore

given that they are popularly elected, there would be an expectation

from the voters in their electoral areas that they would be involved in

these issues.

(f) The scrutiny of secondary legislation and EU Instruments is an important

parliamentary task. This Bill would give opportunity to the Legislative

Council1 to consider in depth these matters. Given the volume and often

complexity of secondary legislation and EU Instruments, such scrutiny

may help enhance good government, i Your Committee accepts that it is important that secondary legislation

and EU Instruments receive parliamentary scrutiny and therefore it

would endorse such a role for the Legislative Council as proposed in

Clause 6 of the Bill, although it is appreciated that this role could be

undertaken in other ways, for example by committees of Tynwald.

Although we believe that a case can be made for further and more

systematic parliamentary scrutiny we have not been presented with any

evidence that the present system is ineffective, and that change is

warranted.

12 With respect to the precise wording of Clause 6 (1) of the Bill which defines the power of the Council to scrutinise secondary legislation, your Committee has identified the following difficulties -

(i) Firstly, Clause 6 (1)

states that -

"The Council may consider any public document which is laid or

to be laid before Tynwald and report thereon to Tynwald."

It is the phrase "any public document" that is of concern to your

Committee. According to the Interpretation Act 1976 "public

document" is defined as:

"any order, proclamation, warrant, scheme, rule, regulation,

bye-law, resolution, notice or other instrument made under an

enactment"

This definition would enable the Council to examine a much

wider range of documents than simple secondary legislation. In

fact it would provide the Council with the power to scrutinise

many policy documents produced by the Government. Thus

where there is a statutory power or duty for a policy document to

be laid before Tynwald, for example the Annual Budget, this

Clause would apply; but if there is not a statutory requirement

for the policy document to be laid it would not be within the

scope of Clause 6.

13 Examination of Clause 6 suggests that the wording "any public

document" in Clause 6 (1) is much wider than the side heading

i for that Clause which is entitled "Scrutiny of subordinate

legislation". We believe that the side heading carries the correct

¡emphasis and therefore the term y/anv public document" needs to

be defined in a more precise way to reflect the role of the Council

to scrutinise subordinate legislation but not "any public

document". An appropriate amendment to Clause 6 to achieve

this objective can be found in Appendix 10 of this Report

(ii) Secondly, your Committee was also concerned to note that the

Bill provides no actual requirement for the Council to scrutinise

subordinate legislation. Clause 6 (1) states that the Council "may"

consider any public document, but that means it may choose not

to do so and could, in the extreme, never do so. An appropriate

amendment would ensure such scrutiny takes place and such an

amendment may be found in Appendix 10 of this Report.

(iii) Finally, Clause 6 does not provide a procedure for the actual

scrutiny of secondary legislation by the Council. Such a

procedure is essential to ensure that scrutiny takes place and an

appropriate Schedule to the Bill would achieve this. Such an

appropriate Schedule will be found in Appendix 10 of this

i Report.

14 3.7 Disadvantages of the Bill

(text in bold type indicates your Committee's analysis of the claimed difficulties)

The proposed Bill is seen to create some new difficulties. The difficulties

identified include -

(a) The Bill establishes a separately elected Legislative Council and gives the

Council a statutory role. However it fails to consider the role of the

Council members within Tynwald Court.

The fundamental issue relates to the role of the elected Council members

within Tynwald Court. The Bill does not explicitly state whether

popularly elected Council members are members of Tynwald Court.

Clause 1(2) of the Bill deals with the role of the Bishop and Attorney

General within both the Council and Tynwald Court but does not refer to

the elected members of the Council and Clauses 6 (1) and 7 (1) refer to the

role of the Council in considering any public document and

EU Instrument and reporting to Tynwald. It may well be the intention of

the Bill that Council members should be full members of Tynwald Court

but nowhere is that explicitly stated.

Your Committee feels that the failure of the Bill to explicitly state what

role Council members would have in Tynwald Court raises a number of

concerns, for example:

(i) Should Council members have the right to vote and speak?

(ii) Should Council members have the right to ask Questions?

15 (iii) , Should Council members have the right to move motions and

table amendments?

If the Bill intends that elected Council members have a full role as

members of Tynwald, then inevitably these members will become

involved in constituency issues and the more robust aspects of politics.

Furthermore if members of the Council were to have full membership

of Tynwald Court then they would be able to be involved in policy

making and financial decision making, which are roles that the Bill

excludes them from exercising within the Council. Whilst their role in

the Council may be intended to be limited by statute, they would

continue their present role as members of Tynwald Court. That role, at

present, gives Legislative Council members, as a body voting in

Tynwald, the ability to potentially thwart the will of the larger elected

House (the Keys). It is possible that the Council might use this power

more frequently if the Bill were made law, because as they would be

popularly elected they might feel less inhibited in voting against the

Keys. These issues warrant further consideration.

(b) If powers of the Council were less than those of the Keys then there might

be a reluctance to stand for popular election to the Council.

Your Committee has considered this point but feels that if members of

the Council were also popularly elected members of Tynwald, they

would have opportunities to play a full part in Tynwald proceedings

and decision making and that opportunity may compensate for the

prescribed role of the Council.

16 (c) It is often suggested that a popularly elected Council might come into

conflict with the Keys, since the members of both chambers would be able

to claim legitimacy. Indeed it may be argued that with a larger electoral

base, the Council members might claim greater legitimacy than members

in the Keys.

However, your Committee feels that the issue of inter-chamber conflict

is not such a problem as some suggest. Under the terms of this Bill the

powers of the Council would be clearly defined. If there was a conflict

with the Keys over a piece of legislation, then it could be resolved

relatively easily by the use of a joint Conference (as at present) and as a

last resort holding a joint vote on the matter in Tynwald Court. To

resolve conflict over legislation by using a joint vote would require

repeal of Section 10 of the Constitution Act 1961, which permits a Bill to

become law following rejection by the Council providing it is passed

again through all its stages in the Keys. Such a procedure was designed

to ensure the supremacy of the popularly elected chamber, but if this

Bill were to become law there could be less justification for such action

since both chambers would be the product of popular election.

(d) A further problem relating to this Bill concerns the electoral areas from

which members of the Council would be chosen. In the Bill there are five

electoral areas (North, South, West, East and Douglas) with some of these

returning two members and some one. This would create an imbalance in

voting as it means some voters would have two votes and others only one.

17 I Your Committee has concluded that each elector should have the same

voting powers. Therefore we believe that the Bill could be amended to

replace the five electoral areas with eight single member electoral areas.

These should be determined by a proposed Boundary Commission, but

might be for example: North, South (excluding Port Erin and

Port St Mary), East, West, Douglas East, Douglas West, Onchan and

Port Erin/Port St Mary. Alternatively there could be one whole Island

electoral area electing eight members to the Council. If either of the

above models were adopted, elections could be held using the Single

Transferable Vote electoral system. Appropriate amendments to

provide for eight single member electoral areas or one all Island

electoral area will be found in Appendix 10 of this Report.

(e) The five electoral areas are quite large which may make traditional

campaigning by the candidates both difficult and expensive.

Your Committee agrees that traditional methods of campaigning, such

as door-to-door canvassing of households, by a candidate would be

difficult. However the electoral areas, be there eight, five or even one,

would still allow campaigning through candidates issuing election

manifestos to voters by post, which set out their qualities and

experience. In addition public meetings in the electoral areas could still

be organised to enable voters to meet and question candidates.

Exclusively postal voting would remove any requirement for polling

stations.

18 (f) According to the Bill a directly elected Council would require a separate

election, and create a chamber with different powers to those of the Keys.

These issues may put off some voters and lead to a low turnout.

Your Committee does not believe that this is a major problem. The Bill

proposes a postal ballot and therefore voters will not be required to

physically turnout to vote. Furthermore a sustained education

campaign could be launched prior to each election to the Council to

inform and remind voters exactly what the role of Council members is.

(g) The role of scrutiny of Government could be compromised by the fact that

while the Bill does not permit the Chief Minister to be a member of the

Council, it does not prevent other members of the Council serving in

executive Government as ministers. These members would therefore both

play a role in the formation of policy and the scrutiny of that policy.

Your Committee does see this as being a disadvantage of the Bill. This

could be resolved by amending the Bill so that no minister could be

chosen from the Council. Members of the Council could still act as

Members of Departments and chair Statutory Boards. However, we

realise that this will reduce the number of members available to the

Chief Minister when appointing ministers. More importantly, if

members of the Council are the product of popular election and also full

members of Tynwald Court, then it can be argued that they have the

same right as members of the Keys to serve in government as ministers.

A possible solution may be to limit the number of ministers that can be

chosen from the Legislative Council, but the ideal number is debatable.

19 This deficiency in the Bill lends itself to suitable amendment, and an

appropriate amendment may be found in Appendix 10 of this Report.

However, if the term "public document" is to be redefined (see

paragraph 3.6 (f) above) to exclude matters of policy, then this ceases to

be a problem since Council members who may also be ministers would

not be scrutinising public policy which they had been involved in

making as a minister.

I (h) In practice it would be difficult to restrict campaign issues in Council

elections to the matters of a candidates competence and experience. It is

possible that candidates for the Council would campaign on major issues

such as health, education, housing etc.

Your Committee does not consider that this is a valid argument if

Council members are also to be full members of Tynwald. As such their

role in Tynwald would mean that they had the opportunity to be i involved in these issues and there could be no objection, therefore, to

these main stream political issues being raised during campaigns.

Indeed we believe that it would be almost inevitable that such issues

would be raised.

(i) Because Council members would not have an overt constituency role or a

political role in the way that MHKs do, it may prove difficult for the i voters to decide whether a Council member should be re-elected or not.

Evaluation of a member's performance could be difficult.

i Your Committee believes that there is some validity in this argument,

only in the event that members of the Council did not also serve in

Tynwald Court. But because the Bill does not exclude them from being

members of Tynwald Court and given that they are the subjects of

popular election in the electoral areas, they would ipso facto be

accountable to the public (albeit in larger electoral areas) for policy

decisions derived from their role in Tynwald.

(j) Under the proposals of this Bill, there is no explicit power for a member of

the Council to introduce a Private Members Bill. It is understood that this

was a conscious decision by the mover of the Bill following consultation,

in order to cast members of the Council into a distinctive and separate

role.

Your Committee believes that as elected public representatives, and full

members of Tynwald, it can be argued that this power should be

afforded to Council members and the Bill could logically be amended to

reflect this. An appropriate amendment will be found in Appendix 10

of this Report.

3.8 Other Issues Identified by Your Committee concerning the Bill:

3.8.1 Having examined the Bill in detail and considered the claimed advantages and

disadvantages of it, your Committee has also identified one further issue

concerning Clauses 6 and 7(1) which, we believe, requires amendment.

21 3.8.2 Your Committee notes that the Explanatory Memorandum relating to Clauses 6

and 7 of the Bill "require" the Council to scrutinise subordinate and European

Legislation, whereas in the both Clauses 6 (1) and 7 (1) the term "may" is used to

refer to the Council scrutiny of these matters. There is plainly an inconsistency

between the Explanatory Memorandum and the Clauses of the Bill.

3.8.3 With respect to Clause 6, this issue has already been considered, see paragraph

3.6(f) above.

3.8.4 In the case of Clause 7 (1), it is the function of the Council of Ministers to decide

whether a European Union Instrument should be referred to the Council. The

criteria for referral is whether that Instrument has or will have effect in the Island I by virtue of Section 2 of the European Communities Act 1973. If the Council of

Ministers believe this to be the case, the Bill requires that they should refer that

Instrument to the Legislative Council who "may" consider it. Given that there

are only a limited range of issues that will affect the Isle of Man (eg agriculture

and manufacturing), and bearing in mind that the Council have a discretion

under our proposed revision of Clause 6 to consider any EU Instrument, the

number of Instruments to be referred to the Council is not likely to be excessive.

Therefore we believe that the Council should consider all such Instruments. To

achieve this Clause 7(1) of the Bill could be amended. An appropriate

amendment may be found in Appendix 10 of this Report.

22 PART 4

OTHER ALTERNATIVES

4.1 Your Committee has also evaluated a number of other alternatives regarding the

future of the Legislative Council. Some of these alternatives are less radical than

the Bill proposed by Mr Quine while some are more radical. The main options

which your Committee has examined are:

4.2. Retain the Legislative Council in its existing composition and

powers

This option is essentially the one suggested by Mr A J Earnshaw MHK in his

submission to the Committee.

4.2.1 To follow this option would mean taking no action whatsoever. The Council

would continue to have eight Members elected by the Keys, together with the

Bishop (who would retain voting rights), the Attorney General sitting ex officio

and the President of Tynwald acting as presiding officer. Its functions would

remain as at present, although the composition, power and functions of the

Council may further evolve over time as it has in the past.

4.2.2 Advantages

A number of advantages are claimed for retaining, in effect, the status quo.

These include -

(a) Recent history. The Legislative Council may be considered to have

worked well in its existing format and with its present functions for many

years. Furthermore, taking no action would not make any change to the

historic structure of the Manx parliamentary system;

23 (b) The Chief Minister would continue to be able to use the Council as an

additional source of recruitment for Government Ministers, Members of

Departments and chairs of Statutory Boards. This may be considered to

be useful given such a small number of Tynwald Members to form a

Government from.

4.2.3 Disadvantages'

The disadvantages identified in retaining the status quo include -

(a) A major disadvantage is that the lack of popular democratic legitimacy

would remain, with the Council exercising legislative functions and yet

not being directly answerable to the public for its actions. It would remain

neither representative of nor responsible to the electorate. It is recognised

that election of eight members of the Council by the House of Keys does

provide the Council with a degree of legitimacy but this is not of course

total legitimacy since the Council is not popularly elected.

(b) In their oral evidence both Professor Kermode and Mr Kneale suggested

that the delaying power of the Council could be used (and has been in the i past) to block the wishes of the elected Keys, (see Hansard transcript of

oral evidence 5th September 2003 which is attached as Appendix 3 of this

i Report). Although such blocking may be relatively rare, it could occur,

meaning that the will of the popularly elected House is at least delayed by

the will of the Council, which of course is not popularly elected.

24 (c) In addition the problems created by the Keys trying to fill Council

vacancies under the present voting system might continue. This problem

was highlighted in 2003 when it took the Keys six sittings to fill the

Council vacancies (4th March, 18th March, 1st April, 15th April, 6th May and

20th May 2003). Such a situation may well produce a negative image of the

Manx political system and is certainly something that your Committee

would wish to avoid being repeated in the future.

4.2.4 Your Committee rejects this option. It believes that it is time for reform to be

made to both the composition and functions of the Legislative Council.

4.3 Retain the Legislative Council with its existing composition but

alter its functions

4.3.1 This option would mean the Council continued to be elected by the Keys but that

its functions could be modified thereby reducing its power. The Keys' Select

Committee Report of 1999 identified four possible modifications to the Council

functions:

(i) Limiting its function to revising primary legislation only, with the Keys

having the final say over any amendments proposed by the Council.

Under this option the Council Members may not even need to sit in

Tynwald. Council Members would not be eligible for appointment to any

office in Government;

25 (ii) Limiting the function of the Council to revising primary legislation and

scrutinising secondary legislation. Scrutiny of secondary legislation could

be undertaken by the Council sitting entirely separately, or within

Tynwald Court. Council Members would not be eligible for appointment

to any office in Government;

(iii) Limiting the function of the Council to revising primary legislation,

scrutiny of delegated legislation and scrutiny of government policy and

administration. Council Members would not be eligible for appointment

to any office in Government; and

(iv) Limiting the function of the Council to revising primary legislation,

scrutiny of delegated legislation, scrutiny of government policy and

administration and maintaining the capacity of its Members to be

appointed to posts in Government other than at ministerial level. This is

virtually the present situation with the exception that Council Members

currently may be appointed as Ministers.

4.3*2 Advantages

A number of advantages are claimed for this model. These include -

(a) The historical composition of the Council remains unaltered; and

(b) The powers of the Council could be reduced, to a greater or lesser degree

(depending on which of the four options was adopted), which may be

appropriate given the Council's lack of popular legitimacy.

26 4.3.3 Disadvantages

The drawbacks claimed for this model include -

(a) The composition of the Council, which ever of the four options was

chosen, remains unaltered. Therefore the problem of democratic

legitimacy is not resolved;

(b) The potential difficulties in filling Council vacancies may still occur. In his

oral evidence Professor Kermode pointed out that this may be an even

greater problem if the powers of the Council were further curtailed since

even fewer persons may be willing to put their names forward for

selection by the Keys. (See Hansard transcript of oral evidence

5th September 2003 El pl4 which is attached as Appendix 3 of this Report);

and

(which were fully discussed in the Select Committee Report of 1999) and

consequently these options were rejected by the House of Keys in 1999.

Your Committee has not heard any evidence that would cause it to change

the decision of the Keys in 1999.

4.3.4 Full details and some of the advantages and disadvantages of each of the four

reform options are covered in detail in the Keys' Select Committee Report 1999,

(see sections 5.2 to 5.5). This document is attached to this Report as Appendix 5.

27 4.3.5 Once again your Committee rejects this option. It is plain that it fails to make

any progress towards the démocratisation of the composition of the Council,

for which your Committee has already outlined its unanimous support. In

addition it does nothing to prevent the problem of filling vacant seats in the

Council, which the Keys has experienced in the past.

i 4.4 A directly elected Tynwald which is then divided into Keys and

Council 1

4.4.1 The concept of directly electing Tynwald Court and then dividing it into two

bodies for legislative purposes/ the Keys and Council, is one that a number of

people submitting evidence to your Committee argued for, including

Hon S C Rodan MHK and Mr G V H Kneale. i

4.4.2 A similar system is used in Norway and a summary of the Norwegian system

may be found as Appendix 6 of this Report.

i 4.4.3 Under this option one general election would take place for 32 or 33 members,

perhaps in single seat constituencies or perhaps in a mixture of single and

multi-member constituencies with some multi-member seats having an

additional member. It would be from those constituencies with the additional i seat that the Council would be chosen. Following the election (and the election

by Tynwald of a President and a Chief Minister), some Members would then be

selected to serve as the Legislative Council. The number selected may be eight,

which would produce a Council of eleven assuming that the Attorney General,

Bishop and President of Tynwald continue to sit in the Council and maintain

i 28 parity with the existing size of the Council. This number would permit the more

informal consideration of legislation to continue as it does under the present

structure. Alternatively, the membership of Tynwald Court could be divided

into two equal halves to form the Keys and Council.

4.4.4 Under this model the role of the Keys and Council would change quite

considerably. Tynwald Court would exclusively deal with all issues except

legislation. Policy, finance, the scrutiny of government, Question Time, the

tabling of motions etc. would all be the sole prerogative of Tynwald Court. The

Keys and Council would deal solely with legislative matters. In performing this

legislative role, the Keys and Council could be regarded as 'Legislative

Committees' of Tynwald, or retain their own status as distinct branches but with

their powers limited exclusively to a legislative role.

4.4.5 There are a number of alternative possibilities regarding the actual legislative

powers of the Council under such a system. It may be that its powers would be

limited to the revision of primary legislation and scrutiny of secondary and

EU Instruments. But since all its members are popularly elected to Tynwald

Court, it could legitimately be given equal powers to those of the Keys in matters

of legislation. If so, Bills could be introduced in the Council before the Keys. In

such circumstances the Keys would then act as the revising chamber, but if the

Council membership was only eight, the twenty-four members of the Keys might

then fundamentally seek to alter the Bill. This would support the proposition

that Tynwald would be better divided into two equal parts. Any inter-chamber

conflict resulting from this equality in legislative power could be resolved by the

use of a Conference or a joint vote in Tynwald. Whichever model was adopted,

29 presumably there could be no objection against Council Members being eligible

for inclusion in Executive Government given that they would be elected to

Tynwald by the people.

4.4.6 Advantages

(text in bold type indicates your Committee's analysis of the claimed advantages)

The advantages claimed for this model include -

(a) It would allow retention of Tri-cameral structure in the sense that the Keys

and Council would be the equivalent to the existing legislative branches of

Tynwald, thereby keeping the link to the historic parliamentary structure

of the Isle of Man. The Hon S C Rodan MHK emphasised this point in his

written submission to your Committee (see page 5 of his letter) The

dividing of Tynwald into an eight member Council and a twenty-four

member Keys for legislation would re-enforce this link.

As already noted in paragraph 3.6 (a) your Committee understand the

importance of maintaining a link with the historic structure of the Manx i parliamentary system.

(b) The work of Tynwald would now be performed entirely by a popularly

elected, democratic, body. Members of the Council would be directly

elected, through Tynwald elections, and therefore able to claim complete

legitimacy in the exercise of their functions.

As already noted in paragraph 3.6 (b), your Committee fully endorses

the principle that a parliament should be democratically elected.

Indeed this principle underpins our whole approach to Legislative

Council reform.

30 (c) This model would enable Tynwald to focus its attentions on scrutiny of

government while the Keys and Council would focus on legislation. It

would avoid the duplication that now occurs with all three branches being

involved to some degree in scrutiny.

Your Committee considers that this may be an advantage in that it

avoids the duplication that now exists with all three branches being

involved to some extent in scrutiny and it enables the Keys and Council

to focus entirely on the vital work of dealing with legislation.

(d) There could be little objection to Council Members being appointed as

Ministers or Members in Government. Mr Kneale highlighted this factor

when presenting his evidence to your Committee (see Hansard transcript

5th September 2003 which is attached as Appendix 3 of this Report).

As already noted in paragraph 3.6 (c) your Committee accepts the logic

of this argument within the Manx parliamentary context.

(e) If both Chambers had equal powers, Bills could be introduced in either

chamber first. This would assist in spreading the work-load of dealing

with legislation between the two Chambers.

Your Committee accepts the logic of this argument.

(f) Unlike the structure proposed by the Bill, this model would only require a

single election, which might avoid the problems of voter confusion

concerning what exactly they were being asked to vote for.

31 Your Committee is not fully persuaded that holding separate elections

for the Council and Keys as proposed in the Bill would cause undue

problems with voters as discussed in paragraph 3.7 (f) above.

(g) Finally, moving to a 32 or 33 member directly elected Tynwald with the

fifteen existing constituencies, albeit with some boundary changes, would

give an opportunity to address the present disparity in electoral

representation by providing broad equality of numbers of voters for each

elected member, (see written evidence from Hon S C Rodan MHK

particularly pages 2 to 4 and from Mr G V H Kneale particularly section 2.

This evidence will be found in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 of this Report

respectively.)

Although your Committee understands that this is not the prime

purpose behind this model, it would nevertheless be a most desirable

consequence.

4.4.7 Disadvantages

(text in bold type indicates your Committee's analysis of the claimed disadvantages)

A number of difficulties have been identified with this model. These include -

(a) The electorate would not know, when they cast their votes, whether the

candidates they were voting for would end up as Members of the Keys or

Council and neither would the candidates themselves. Furthermore, if the

Council's powers were less than those of the Keys this may well actually

discourage members from wanting to go to the Council. While giving oral

evidence Mr Kneale explored these questions and suggested that they are

not really an issue since ultimately Tynwald Court is sovereign and both

Keys and Council members are full members of Tynwald Court.

32 The opinion of Mr Kneale is not one that your Committee fully endorses.

With regard to the fact that at election time neither voters nor candidates

would know who would end up as members of the Council, your

Committee agrees that this is not a significant issue, provided that

Tynwald Court in which all members (whether members of the Keys or

the Council) also sit, is intended to have sole parliamentary jurisdiction

over all matters except legislation.

However, members would certainly be reluctant to join the Council if its

powers were, or were thought to be, inferior to those of the Keys in

matters of legislation. Moreover, if the chambers were of unequal size,

then a joint vote of Tynwald Court to resolve a disputed issue might

merely serve to emphasis the limits to a smaller Council's collective will,

and add to the reluctance of members to join it.

(For the views of Mr Kneale see the Hansard transcript of oral evidence for

5th September 2003 which is attached as Appendix 3 of this Report);

(b) The electorate would not actually choose Council members, that

responsibility resting elsewhere.

However, in the Committee's view, this is not a significant problem

since the electorate itself has chosen all members of Tynwald, from

whom the Council are then chosen.

the Keys and Council since both would claim equal democratic legitimacy

and equal power - the danger of conflict depending on the size of the

Council in relation to the Keys.

33 Your Committee agrees that tension between the chambers might be

seen as a contentious matter, but given the restriction of the power of

the Council (and indeed the Keys) to that of a legislative committee, and

the tri-cameral structure providing for a joint vote of Tynwald Court to

resolve disputes, then the opportunity for inter-chamber conflict is

likely to be less apparent in practice. As already indicated (paragraph

3.7 (c) above), clearly prescribing the powers of the Council in statute is i likely to weaken the argument about inter-chamber conflict that is often

suggested.

(d) A major issue that would have to be dealt with is the most appropriate

mechanism for selecting those members of Tynwald to go to the Council

(whether that be eight as at present or sixteen ie 50% of the elected

membership). There are various options that could be adopted -

(i) If there were 32 or 33 single seat constituencies, Tynwald Court

could then vote as a body to elect the members of the Council.

(ii) If certain constituencies were allocated an additional seat in order

to 'equalise representation on a broadly geographic basis and

thereby provide an additional seat for the purpose of providing for

Council membership, one of the elected members for that

constituency would be chosen by all the elected members for that

constituency. If the members for those constituencies could not

agree on who should go to the Council then a vote by Tynwald

Court could decide the matter. This is the solution proposed by

34 Hon S C Rodan MHK in the second model outlined in his written

evidence (see page 4 of his written submission).

This may be seen as unfair on the electors in those constituencies

that do not have an additional seat, as they would have no input

into choosing the Council.

(iii) In those constituencies that have the additional seat, the member

with the lowest (or possibly highest) number of votes should

automatically be the one to go to the Council.

Having considered all these options, if this model were to be adopted,

your Committee would favour Tynwald Court voting as a body to fill

the seats on the Council. We believe that this is much fairer and

ensures that the electorate all have an input into Council membership.

(e) If the Council were a smaller body of eight members, then some members

of Tynwald may opt to go to the Council believing that they could have

more authority or influence on its collective decisions, particularly if the

Council's powers were equal to those of the Keys.

Your Committee believes that this problem would in practice be

confined only to the legislative power of the Council. The perception of

having more influence in a smaller body could be addressed by

enlarging the Council membership to sixteen.

4.4.8 Having considered the option of directly electing Tynwald and then selecting the

Council from its membership, your Committee has concluded that this model is

a serious option that has much to commend it and could be made to work in the

Manx context.

35 4.5 The Creation of a Unicameral Tynwald

This option is essentially the one suggested by Mr D Cannan MHK in his written

and oral submissions to the Committee.

4.5.1 There is a trend in democracies throughout the world to remove second

chambers. There are various reasons for this trend. In some cases, such as

New Zealand (which abolished its second chamber in 1951) and Belgium, it is to

increase the democratic legitimacy of the legislature. Reform of the House of

Lords is essentially being undertaken for that reason too. In other cases it is to

streamline the structure of government. For one reason or another

approximately 50% of the world's legislatures are now unicameral.

4.5.2 If the Council were abolished, then there would be no need for the Keys and

Tynwald Court to exist as separate bodies. The House of Keys could therefore

cease to exist and Tynwald Court would become the unicameral chamber for the

Isle of Man. It could consist of either -

(i) 24 directly elected members, or

(ii) 32/ 33 directly elected members.

Tynwald Court would undertake all the functions currently undertaken by the

Keys and Tynwald Court separately. It would therefore become responsible for

legislation, policy, finance, secondary legislation and scrutiny of Executive

Government.

36 In such circumstances it would be necessary to devise a new method of scrutiny and revision of primary legislation at some stage. This may be done in several ways -

(a) By the use of pre legislative committees, which could examine Bills prior

to their formal introduction to Tynwald Court. Such pre-legislative

committees could also take evidence from members of the public and

other interested parties. This is essentially what happens in the Scottish

Parliament. In Scotland, when a Bill is proposed it is referred to the

relevant subject committee for consideration. This committee may then

take evidence from interested parties and produces a report, which is

then considered by the Scottish Parliament.

(b) By the legislature instructing the Government to undertake pre legislative

consultation.

passed its Second Reading. Should such a model be adopted in the Isle of

Man, if it were thought that the historic titles "House of Keys" and

"Legislative Council" were important to retain, these could be used as

names for such legislative scrutiny and revising committees of Tynwald.

Your Committee was interested to note that this is essentially the solution

adopted in New Zealand for undertaking scrutiny. Once a Bill has

passed its Second Reading in the New Zealand House of Representatives

it normally is directed to a select committee of eight members who then

examine it. This examination involves inviting the public to make

submissions regarding the Bill, as well as asking for comments from

37 relevant1 government departments. The Committee has the power to

suggest amendments and it reports back to the House, which then has a

two hour debate on the Committee report and may accept or reject any

amendments proposed.

A summaries of the Scottish and New Zealand system are included in this Report

as Appendix 7.

Your Committee sees some merit in all these options, but particularly the third

and could envisage a Bill in Tynwald going to a committee after its Clauses Stage

for revising. Any amendments proposed by the committee would then have to be

approved by Tynwald Court, which could be undertaken by a Report Stage

(where further amendments would be possible) prior to the Third Reading. The

creation of a specific committee for a particular Bill would allow members to elect

to that committee those with some knowledge, expertise or interest in that aspect

of legislation.

4.5.4 Advantages

(text in bold type indicates your Committee's analysis of the claimed advantages)

The advantages claimed for this model include -

(a) The advantage of a unicameral Tynwald (i.e. total abolition of the Keys and

Council) is that there would no longer be a body that is not popularly elected

which exercises some legislative power.

Your Committee has already indicated its fundamental support for full

démocratisation of the parliamentary structure. (See paragraph 3.6 (b)).

38 (b) It would be a fairly easy task to abolish the Council in the sense that

Tynwald already exists and therefore nothing would need to be created in

place of the Council. Professor Kermode highlighted this in his oral

submission to your Committee, (see Hansard transcript of oral evidence 5th

September 2003 which is attached as Appendix 3 of this Report). Such

abolition would remove any possible conflict between the Council and

Keys/Tynwald. Any model that has a popularly elected Council, does run

the risk of causing conflict between the two branches.

Your Committee agrees that abolition of the Council would remove

entirely any possibility of inter-chamber conflict, although as we have

noted earlier (see paragraph 3.7 (c) such conflict can be resolved.

positions since all are popularly elected. Professor Kermode underlined the

importance of this point in his evidence to your Committee, (see Hansard

transcript of oral evidence for 5th September 2003 which is attached as

Appendix 3 of this Report).

Your Committee has already acknowledged the importance of giving the

Chief Minister as many politicians as possible to choose between when

forming an administration (see paragraph 3.6 (c) above).

(d) If Tynwald were to consist of 32/33 members, rather than 24, it would be less

easy for Executive Government to dominate its proceedings and decision

making.

39 Your Committee acknowledges that the balance between Tynwald and the

Executive would be maintained by having 32/33 members of Tynwald

Court

(e) Finally, moving to a directly elected Tynwald of 32 or 33 members with the

fifteen existing constituencies, all be it with some boundary changes, would

give an opportunity to address the present disparity in electoral

representation by providing broad equality of numbers of voters for each

elected member, (see written evidence from Hon S C Rodan MHK

particularly pages 2 to 4 and from Mr G V H Kneale particularly section 2.

This evidence will be found in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 of this Report

respectively.)

Although your Committee understands that this is not the prime purpose

behind this model, it would nevertheless be a most desirable consequence.

4.5.5 Disadvantages

(text in bold type indicates your Committee's analysis of the claimed disadvantages) I The difficulties’ claimed for this model include - I (a) Abolition of the Council would be a radical reform that would destroy the

well established historical constitutional structure of the Isle of Man

parliamentary system.

However, your Committee notes that Professor Kermode pointed out in

his evidence, radical reform has occurred before, such as in 1986 when

the ministerial system of government was established (see Hansard

transcript of oral evidence 5‘h September 2003 which is attached as

40 Appendix 3 of this Report). Therefore radical reform has happened

before and a model is not to be excluded simply because it may be

considered radical by some.

(b) Abolition of the Council would remove any revising capacity for primary

legislation and any additional means of controlling secondary legislation

within a second legislative chamber. This may be regarded as a serious

loss. Your Committee believes that such revising and scrutiny could be

undertaken in a unicameral structure, for example by the use of

pre-legislative or revising committees, (see paragraph 4.5.3 above)

4.5.6 Having considered the option of establishing a unicameral Tynwald, your

Committee has concluded that this model is a serious option that has much to

commend it and could be made to work in the Manx context.

4.6. A Legislative Council elected by the Local Authorities

4.6.1 Your Committee notes that none of the evidence it received proposed this model.

However it is used in other jurisdictions, such as in the German Upper House

(the Bundesrat). Because it is used elsewhere, your Committee felt it necessary to

give at least some evaluate to this alternative. A summary of the German system

is attached to this Report as Appendix 8.

4.6.2 The principle is straightforward, local authorities would elect the Legislative

Council from their own membership. There are a large number of authorities in

the Island and therefore to make the process simpler, local authorities could be

grouped into regions to elect Council members. The Council would in effect

become a voice for the regions of the Island.

41 4.6.3 Advantage

This model is seen to have one major advantage over the status quo, namely that

it permits the differing regional/local needs of the community to be given direct

expression nationally.

4.6.4 Disadvantages

A number of disadvantages have been identified with this model. These include:

(a) The second chamber is not directly elected and therefore lacks popular

legitimacy. This will reduce the scope of the functions it can exercise. It

would be able to retain a role in revising legislation but the Keys would

have thé final say.

(b) The small size of the Island makes the whole concept of a second chamber

representing the regions less relevant.

to be clarified. Would they simply be delegates of their Authorities or

representatives of the area they come from?

i 4.6.5 Having considered this model, your Committee considers that it is entirely

unsuitable for the Isle of Man and rejects this option for the reasons outlined

above.

42 4.7 A Legislative Council elected by Interest Groups

4.7.1 Like the previous model, no evidence received by your Committee suggested

this option. However, it is one used in other jurisdictions and therefore does

require some evaluation. This system is employed in the Republic of Ireland,

where the majority of the Members of the Irish Senate are elected from a list of

key groups in Irish society. A summary of the Irish system is attached to this

Report as Appendix 9. However your Committee is also aware that there are

moves to reform the Irish Senate.

4.7.2 Under this model the Legislative Council could be constituted from various

groups representing sections of society (eg employers, unions, etc) electing

Members to the Council from their own membership.

4.7.3 Advantage

There is one major advantage in support of this model, namely that in a

pluralistic society it may be considered desirable to allow the key interest groups .

a direct input into the legislature.

4.7.4 Disadvantages

A number of disadvantages have been identified with this model. These

include -

(a) It may prove very difficult to decide which groups should be included,

and how many Council Members each group should elect.

43 (b) The Council would still lack absolute popular legitimacy, since it would

not be popularly elected and consequently Council Members could not

presumably be appointed to Executive Government.

between interest groups and politicians are already well developed and

such a model is therefore inappropriate.

4.7.5 Once again your Committee rejects this as an option for reform of the Legislative

Council because of the problems identified above.

PART 5

CONSEQUENTIAL ISSUES WHICH MAY NEED CONSIDERATION

5.1 Reform of the Legislative Council will raise a number of consequential issues

that may need1 to be addressed. Clearly the solution to these consequential issues

will be largely dependent on which model of reform is adopted. Some models

offer solutions to these issues, while others do not. However your Committee

feels that it should highlight some of these issues because they may require

further political determination.

5.2 The first of these issues is the role of the Lord Bishop. If the Bill were to be

passed by Tynwald then the Lord Bishop would retain his seat in the Council but

lose his voting right. Your Committee feels that democratic legitimacy would

suggest that if the Legislative Council were to be popularly elected and the

Bishop does retain his seat, it should be in a non-voting capacity. Equally it may

44 be that other religious leaders should be able to have a voice in Tynwald which

could be achieved by removing the right of the Bishop to sit and using the seat

for church representation, with the leaders of the main denominations (including

the Church of England) sitting on a rota basis. The role of the Bishop was fully

examined by the Keys Select Committee Report on the Legislative Council in

1999, see section 5.6.2 of that Report.

5.3 A further consequential issue is that of the Presiding Officer of the Legislative

Council. This role is currently performed by the President of Tywnald. But your

Committee realises that there may be a potential conflict for an individual being

both President of Tynwald and Presiding Officer of the Council. Therefore it

may be that the Council, in whatever form it finally emerges, should elect its own

Presiding Officer. Once again this matter was fully considered by the Keys Select

Committee Report on the Legislative Council in 1999, see section 5.6.1 of that

Report.

5.4 Your Committee believes that the issue of remuneration of Council members

may also need further consideration. At the present time Council members

receive the same remuneration as members of the Keys. However, even now it

could be argued that they should receive a lower remuneration since they do not

have formalised constituency responsibilities. If the power of the Council were

to be reduced then this argument would become even stronger. However, if the

Council were to be popularly elected and its powers retained to at their present

level, then there would be an argument for maintaining the parity of

remuneration between Keys and Council members. The Keys Select Committee

Report on the Legislative Council in 1999 addressed this issue more fully, see

section 5.7 of that report.

45 5.5 Further matters that may need consideration, in the. light of any future reform,

are those of constituency boundaries and the electoral system to be employed

should the Council be popularly elected. Existing disparities in constituency

boundaries have been identified and the occasion for Council reform may

provide the opportunity to address this issue particularly if there was a single

election for Tynwald Court, from whom the Council would then be chosen. In

addition, the issue of the method of election for the Council will need to be

determined if there is to be a popularly elected Council. The Bill proposes the use

of the existing Simple Majority System ("First past the Post")/ but your

Committee feels that it may be appropriate to examine whether the Single i Transferable Vote should be employed.

PART 6

CONCLUSIONS

6.1 The issue of Legislative Council reform is a highly contentious one, and one that

has already been attempted on several occasions within the last ten years

without success. Whilst there may be a general feeling that "something" needs

to be done, it is clearly much harder to actually select a reform option that will

have a majority of support in the Keys.

6.2 Individual members of your Committee came to the question of Council reform

with their own views and ideas.

i However, at the outset of their deliberations, your Committee unanimously

agreed the principle that reform of the Council is necessary to further enhance

accountability within our democratic system.

46 6.3 Furthermore, your Committee agrees with the statements made by

Mr R E Quine MHK, that it is sensible to consider an option for reform which

may command sufficient support to enable it to be achieved, even though that

option may, at first sight, not represent the preferred option or even an ultimate

solution to the problem of reforming the Legislative Council. Politics has often

been described as "the art of the possible" and your Committee has applied that

principle to its conclusions and recommendations.

6.4 Since the Bill, as drafted, was unable to command the majority support of the

Committee, albeit that it does represent a possible method of reform, the

Committee considered whether the Bill should be discharged altogether. This

option was discounted.

6.5 The amendment to the Long Title of the Bill ("to make new provisions for the

constitution of the House of Keys and the Legislative Council") permitted your

Committee to consider a wide range of alternative means of reforming the

Legislative Council ranging from simply maintaining the status quo with

modified function (see paragraph 4.3 above) to the most radical option of

creating a unicameral Tynwald (see paragraph 4.5 above).

Having given this matter detailed consideration, your Committee was unable

to reach a unanimous, or indeed majority, agreement on which if any of these

alternatives represented the preferred option for achieving a popularly elected

Legislative Council.

47 6.6 Your Committee, whilst itself unable to agree a preferred option for reform,

nonetheless agrees that the difficulties in the Bill previously identified could be

addressed by permitting the tabling of appropriate amendments.

These difficulties are -

(a) Ensuring that each elector has equal voting power in Legislative Council

elections. (See paragraph 3.7 (d) above and Appendix 10 amendment to

Clause 2);

(b) Restricting the number of members of the Legislative Council that may be

chosen to be Ministers by the Chief Minister when forming a Government,

(see paragraph 3.7 (g)) above and Appendix 10 amendment - new

Clause 8).

introduce Private Members Bills, (see paragraph 3.7 (j) above and

Appendix 10 amendment to Clause 5); and

(d) Precisely defining the scrutiny role of the Legislative Council concerning

secondary legislation and EU Instruments, (see paragraphs 3.6 (f) (i), (ii),

(iii) and 3.8.2 to 3.8.4 above and Appendix 10 amendments to Clauses 6

and 7 and new Schedule 2).

6.7 For the assistance of the House, your Committee has drafted a number of

amendments lhat could deal with these issues, and they are contained in this

Report as Appendix 10. It is therefore open to any Member of the House, if they

so wish, to consider them and take the action they feel is appropriate.

48 i 6.8 Your Committee has concluded that in seeking to create a popularly elected

Legislative Council the Bill should proceed to Clauses Stage in order to give

Members of the House of Keys the opportunity to further consider the Bill and, if

Members so wish, to table amendments.

PART 7

RECOMMENDATION

7.1 That the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill proceed to Clauses Stage.

S C Rodan (Chairman)

J A Brown

B J Cannell

H Hannan

J R Rimington

49 House of Keys Select Committee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill i List of Appendices

Appendix 1 Letter inviting Members to submit views in writing, plus replies received.

Appendix 2 Copy of newspaper advert inviting interested members of the public to submit views in writing and replies received.

Appendix 3 Hansard transcripts of oral evidence given to the Committee.

Appendix 4 ' Copy of the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill and copy of amendment to the long title of the Bill.

Appendix 5 Copy of the House of Keys Select Committee Report on the Legislative Council 1999.

Appendix 6 Summary of the Norwegian Parliamentary system.

Appendix / Summary of the procedure for legislative scrutiny in Scotland and New Zealand.

Appendix 8 , The German Upper House, the Bundesrat.

Appendix 9 The Irish Upper House, the Seanad Eireann.

Appendix 1 ) Proposed amendments to the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill.

Appendix 1

Letters inviting Members to submit views in writing and replies received I SECRETARY OF THE HOUSE OF KEYS Legislative Buildings Scrudeyr y Chiare as Feed Douglas Isle of Man COUNSEL TO THE SPEAKER British Isles IMI 3PW Fer-Coyrlee da'n Loayreyder Malachy Cornwell-Kelly i

Our Ref: C/ConLCo/01/mlg

13th May 2003

To all Members of the House of Keys

Dear Member

Select Committee of the House of Keys on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill

At the sitting of the House of Keys on 1st April 2003 the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill introduced by Mr Edgar Quine MHK (Ayre) was given a Second Reading and the Long Title was amended following which the Bill was referred to a Committee of five Members to take evidence in public and to report to the House before the Clauses Stage no later than April 2004.

The five Members elected to the Select Committee were Mrs B J Cannell MHK, Mrs H Hannan MHK, Hon J Rimington MHK, Hon S C Rodan MHK and the Hon J A Brown SHK.

The purpose of the Bill is to provide for the election of the Legislative Council by the electorate instead of by the House of Keys, and to prescribe for the Legislative Council the specific function of scrutinising proposed legislation of all kinds.

The Select Committee invites written submissions by members of the public to reach me no later than 30th June 2003 on the manner in which the Legislative Council should be elected and by whom, whether the House of Keys and the Legislative Council should be elected at the same time and from the same constituencies, whether in that event Members should choose among themselves which Branch they would belong to following such a combined election, and any other matter which is considered to relate to these issues. I Yours sincerely

Malachy Cornwell-Kelly THE CLERK OF TYNWALD Legislative Buildings Cleragh Tinvaal Douglas Isle of Man Malachy Cornwell-Kelly British Isles IMI 3PW

Our Ref: C/ConLCo/01/mlg

13th May 2003

To all Members of the Legislative Council

Dear Member

Select Committee of the House of Keys on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill

The five Members elected to the Select Committee were Mrs B J Cannell MHK, Mrs H Hannan MHK, Hon J Rimington MHK, Hon S C Rodan MHK and the Hon J A Brown SHK.

Yours sincerely

Malachy Cornwell-Kelly LEGISLATIVE BUILDINGS

ISLE O F M A N

I M I 3 P W

Our Ref: DC/ecw

20 May 2003

Mr Malachy Comwell-Kelly Clerk of Tynwald Legislative Buildings DOUGLAS Isle of Man

Select Committee of the House of Keys on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill

I respond to your letter dated 13 May 2003 as follows:-

It is my opinion that the electorate of the Isle of Man have presently no regard for the Legislative Council and the membership/ which is not popularly elected, has no public mandate and no public accountability.

Indeed there is much public resentment at the appointment of Legislative Council Members as Ministers of Departments.

My recommendations to the Committee are: a) Legislative Council to be disbanded. b) The establishment of a 32 Member Tynwald by popular election in 2006. c) Tynwald to become a single chamber parliament with 32 single seat constituencies.

Alternatively the Legislative Council to be disbanded. Tynwald to become a single chamber parliament with 24 single seats.

Yours sincerely

David Cannan LEGISLATIVE BUILDINGS

ISLE OF M AN

I M I 3 P W

Our Ref: AJE/ejm

26 June 2003

Mr M Comwell-Kelly Clerk of Tynwald Legislative Buildings Douglas

Dear Mr Comwell-Kelly

Select Committee of the House of Keys on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill

With reference to your letter dated 17 May 2003 regarding the above, my view is that the present system is sufficiently robust, has stood the test of time and although minor changes may be beneficial, should be largely left alone.

Dealing with the specific points in paragraph four of your letter:-

1) I believe the present system of election by the House of Keys is satisfactory.

2) I do not believe the House of Keys and Legislative Council should be elected at the same time.

3) Arising from that, I do not believe Council members should have constituencies.

One aspect I feel is worthy of debate is the vote of the Bishop and although I would probably support continuation of this, I would be interested in learning the views of others before making a final decision on this point.

I trust the foregoing will be of assistance to the Committee.

Yours sincerely

A J Eamshaw MHK LEGISLATIVE BUILDINGS

ISLE OF M A N

I M I 3 P W

Our Ref: REQ/ecw

27 May 2003

Mr M Comwell-Kelly Secretary to the House of Keys Legislative Buildings DOUGLAS Isle of Man

Dear Malachy

Select Committee of the House of Keys on the Constitution [Legislative Council] Bill

Thank you for your letter dated 13 May 2003 concerning the subject matter. As you will have to hand my address in the Keys when I introduced the Bill the further submission of evidence by me would appear to be unnecessary.

I have no objection in principle to reform of the Legislative Council based on the election of 33 Members of Tynwald Court [as proposed by Mr Rodan].

Yours sincerely

R E Quine MHK LEGISLATIVE BUILDINGS

ISLE OF M AN

I M I 3 P W

From Hon Stephen C Rodan BSc (Hons), MR Pharm S, MHK Member of the House of Keys for Garff Minister for Education

Our Ref: SCR/ejm/ecw

29 May 2003

Mr M Comwell-Kelly Secretary Select Committee of HOK on the Constitution of the Legislative Council Bill Clerk of Tynwald's Office Legislative Buildings Douglas

Dear Malachy

Select Committee of the House of Keys on the Constitution of the Legislative Council Bill

It had been my intention to move amendments to this Bill at clauses stage. With the setting up of the Select Committee, I now submit for its consideration two sets of amendments to Mr Quine's Bill, each providing for the direct election of 32 Members of Tynwald at a single popular ballot, and subsequent division into 2 legislative branches, ie House of Keys and 8 Members of the Legislative Council. Some comments are also submitted in my personal capacity.

1. In the first set of amendments, the Island is divided into 6 multi-member constituencies (based on the areas set down in Mr Quine's Bill), to be elected by STV.

• North

Comprising the present Keys constituencies of Ramsey, Ayre with the addition of the jurby part of Michael, and the Maughold part of Garff. 9,032 electors (based on 2002 figures) with 5 Members (average 1,806 electors each Member). -2-

• South

Comprising the present constituencies of Castletown, Rushen, Malew and Santon. 11,381 electors with 6 Members (average 1897).

• West

Comprising the present constituencies of Feel, Glenfaba and the Michael Parish part of Michael. 6,662 electors with 4 Members (average 1,665).

• East

Comprising the present constituencies of Onchan, Middle and the Laxey and Lonan parts of Garff. 12,735 electors with 7 Members (average 1,819).

• Douglas North and East

Comprising the present constituencies of Douglas North and Douglas East. 8,769 electors with 5 Members (average 1,754).

• Douglas South and West

Comprising the present constituencies of Douglas South and Douglas West. 9,025 electors with 5 Members (average 1,805).

The division of the Island into 6 such multi-member constituencies would achieve 32 elected Members with a broad parity of electorate. Each Member represents electors in the range from 1,665 to 1,897 with an average of 1,800 per Member, (based on 2002 electoral registers).

The use of the STV voting system lends itself to such multi-member seats, but it is acknowledged that the resulting constituencies might be considered unmanageably large from the point of view of campaigning by individual candidates.

However, the further advantage of these 6 constituencies is that they neatly lend themselves to each providing candidates for Legislative Council in a way that achieves fair geographical representation to the whole Island, with rough parity of electors per Member.

Thus,

North with . 9,032 electors 1 Member South with 11,381 electors 2 Members (average 5,690) West with 6,662 electors 1 Member East with 12,735 electors 2 Members (average 6,367) Douglas with 17,794 electors 2 Members (average 8,897) -3-

The formation of Council from candidates nominated as above would be by Tynwald voting as a single body requiring a majority of at least 17 votes for successful election.

I have sought to avoid complicating Board of Education elections, by retaining the existing 15 Keys constituencies as the basis for Board elections. However, there would be a need for separate electoral registers for Tynwald and Board of Education elections, and this is reflected in the complexity of the amendments.

In this scheme, it is intended to keep the present system of Members choosing the President of Tynwald (ie before a General Election), and to retain the Bishop. However, neither the President nor. Bishop would have the right to elect the Chief Minister or Members of the Council. Attorney General's position is as at present.

The Speaker would be elected as currently. Chief Minister would be elected by all Members of Tynwald, as currently (but would be eligible for nomination to Council - a point for debate, no doubt).

There is provision to resolve differences between Council and Keys over primary legislation, by allowing Tynwald to vote as a single body.

2. In the second set of amendments (entitled Alternative Version), for the Committee to look at, I have dropped STV and kept the existing 15 constituencies as the basis for electing 32 Members of Tynwald. (These constituencies would also serve for Board of Education elections, keeping matters simpler).

STV would certainly work in this system (and in my opinion would be superior), but it has been avoided, recognising that the voting system is not the principle issue under discussion.

The intention with these constituencies has been, as before, to achieve the best possible parity of electors per Member, but with the minimum disturbance to existing constituency boundaries. It will be noted from the New Schedule A2, that in some cases there has been some transfer of parish or polling district between seats.

For example, Douglas with 17,794 voters stays as 4 constituencies, but increases from 8 to 10 seats, an average of 1,779 electors per seat. This has been achieved by transferring some polling districts between the 4 constituencies, and giving Douglas North and Douglas South, 1 extra seat each.

Similarly, Santon district has been transferred to Middle. 1 extra seat has been added to Onchan, Rushen, Ramsey, Garff, the adjusted Middle and Peel, which brings these constituencies closer to the Island average of 1,800 for each Member. -4-

The selection of Members of Council would, as previously, need to be done in a way which achieves fair geographical representation to the whole Island, and rough parity in voter representation per Member.

This could be most easily achieved by having the 8 extra seats which have been allocated to Douglas North, Douglas South, Garff, Middle, Onchan, Peel, Ramsey and Rushen as the basis for Council's composition.

The election procedure would be that the elected Members from each of the 8 constituencies concerned would be given the opportunity to agree to nominate one of their number for membership of Council. In the event that no such nomination was forthcoming, Tynwald would vote as a body on nominations from those constituency Members.

The provisions for the positions of President, Chief Minister, Bishop and Speaker are the same as in the first set of amendments, similarly the mechanism for Tynwald voting as a body over primary legislation.

I accept that the question of the Bishop is a controversial issue - 1 am proposing virtually the status quo here to avoid focusing on this issue, and to leave it for separate political determination.

I believe both of these options provide workable systems for electing a 32 Member Tynwald, whether based on 6 large constituencies, or the 15 existing constituencies, and a logical mechanism for establishing 8 of these elected 32 into Legislative Council.

The question will be asked why would anyone want to go into Legislative Council in this way? The answer depends on what particular role Council would have. If purely and solely a revising chamber for the passage of primary legislation, (ie a legislative committee), it would not matter, in my opinion, which legislative committee (ie Keys or Council) a Member served in. Tynwald Court would become the supreme, all powerful body for parliamentary business. That Chamber would become the only forum for Questions to Ministers, Policy Motions for debate, etc and as a result, might well have to meet more often than once a month to fulfil the requirements for regular parliamentary scrutiny of Government.

Keys and Council would have equal value, and membership of either would carry the same status. Giving to either Keys or Council parliamentary roles which went beyond purely the passage of Bills, would be unnecessary, given Tynwald's supreme role - and would simply increase the likelihood of conflict between the branches.

This is the main objection to giving Council a different role to the Keys (scrutiny of secondary or European legislation for example) - it would then indeed matter which branch you ended up in. An elected Member would have been given a democratic mandate, but not necessarily have membership of the body to permit carrying out one's policies, or election commitments. -5-

Hven worse would be establishing one of the branches with a larger democratic mandate of popular support than the other. This is what is proposed in Mr Quine's Bill. The Member for Isle of Man West, for example, one of the eight Legislative Council Members could fairly claim greater democratic support for his/her views and policies than the corresponding Members in Keys for Peel, Glenfaba and Michael, each with smaller electorates.

Again, tension between the branches could be almost inevitable.

This can be avoided by giving everyone in Tynwald the same democratic legitimacy, with a single election by almost equal electorates per seat in Tynwald.

We have recently progressed legislation to have all local authorities elected at the same time. Having different elections at different times, over possibly different issues, to different component branches of Tynwald could introduce further tension.

The principle that in a democracy those wield influence and decision making power should all be elected by the People has been well stated by many others. The difficulty has been "the how".

In accepting the principle of ensuring that Members of Tynwald are popularly elected, it would be tempting to start afresh with a clean sheet of paper and devise alternative mechanisms for revising legislation, giving parliamentary scrutiny or ensuring proper checks and balances, perhaps with Tynwald simply as a uni-cameral body.

What has evolved over time, of course, is a unique tri-cameral parliament of ancient lineage and heritage with traditional institutions which should not, in my opinion, simply disappear.

I would hope it possible to retain the institutions of Keys and Council, within a democratically elected Tynwald, albeit with different roles to now. It is worth noting that the models I am proposing simply reflect the Norwegian Parliamentary Model, whereby after a single popular election, the Members of the Storting elect Members of the Upper House, the Lagting, (and Iceland is a similar Norse model, I think). CONSTITUTION (LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL) BELL 2003

Amendments to be moved by Mr Rodan

NEW CLAUSE A l. Constitution of Tynwald (1) The members of Tynwald are — (a) the President of Tynwald; 0>) the Bishop; (c) the Attorney General; and (d) the members elected pursuant to the Representation of the People Act 1995 ("the elected members of Tynwald"). (2) Tynwald shall consist of the members of Tynwald meeting together pursuant to a lawful summons in that behalf or by adjournment, whether or not constituted as the Council and the Keys. (3) . Accordingly Her Majesty may assent to a Bill by and with the advice and consent of the members of Tynwald in Tynwald assembled, notwithstanding any law or custom to the contrary.

NEW CLAUSE A2. Elections of members of Tynwald (1) For Part 1 of the Representation of the People Act 1995 there are substituted the provisions set out in Schedule A l. (2) For section 11 of the Representation of the People Act 1995 there is substituted the following — "11. Constituencies (1) For the purposes of an election, the Island shall be divided into the 6 constituencies specified in column 1 of the table in Schedule 1, and each constituency shall return and be represented by the number of members specified in relation thereto in column 2 of that table. (2) The areas of those constituencies shall be the areas specified in column 3 of Schedule 1. (3) The Treasury shall prepare a map of the Island upon which shall be delineated the boundaries of each constituency, and shall cause the map to be deposited in the General Registry. (4) The Chief Registrar shall make the map prepared under subsection (3), or a copy of it, available for inspection by any person at the General Registry at all reasonable times, and shall supply a copy thereof to any person on payment of such reasonable charge as the Treasury may determine.

K e y s Page 1 o f21 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 (5) If Tynwald so resolves, the Governor in Council shall appoint a committee of such persons as he thinks appropriate, to review the number and boundaries of the said constituencies and to report thereon to Tynwald." (3) For Schedule 1 to that Act there are substituted the provisions set out in Schedule A2. (4) The Election Rules set out in Schedule 2 to that Act are amended in accordance with Schedule A3.

NEW SCHEDULE Section A2(l). SCHEDULE A1 SUBSTITUTED PART 1 OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1995 "PART 1 TYNWALD Qualifications for membership of Tynwald 1 Qualifications for membership of Tynwald (1) Any person may stand as a candidate for and be elected a member of Tynwald for a constituency if at the time he is nominated as a candidate — (a) he is of full age; and (b) he either is a British citizen or has the right to remain in the Island; and (c) he is not the holder of an office of profit under the government of any country or territory outside the Island; and (d) he is ordinarily resident in the Island and has been so resident for a period of, or for periods amounting in the aggregate to, 5 years or more; and (e) he is not subject to any incapacity by virtue of this Act (2) For the purpose of subsection (I)(b) a person has the right to remain in the Island if— (a) he has indefinite leave to remain in the Island, within the meaning of the immigration Act 1971 (an Act of Parliament)1, as it has effect in the Island2; or (b) he does not under the said Act of 1971 require leave to enter or remain in the Island, by virtue of section 7(1) of the Immigration Act 1988 (an Act of Parliament)3, as it has effect in the Island4; and, in either case, he is not liable to deportation under section 3(5) or (6) of the said Act of 1971. Term of Tynwald 2 Term of Tynwald Tynwald, subject as hereinafter provided and unless sooner dissolved under section 3, shall be dissolved on the Thursday during the fifth succeeding month of October (computed from the day on which the last general election of Tynwald has been held) following the third Tuesday in that month.

1 1971 c.77 2 SI 1991/2630 3 1988 c.14 4 SI 1991/2630

K e y s Page 2 o f21 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 3 Summoning and dissolution of Tynwald (1) The Governor may, whenever he thinks it expedient — (a) by precept under his hand summon Tynwald when not in session, or when Tynwald stand adjourned though adjourned to a more distant date or for a longer period; or (b) by proclamation dissolve Tynwald and issue fresh writs for a general election of members to serve therein. (2) No proclamation under subsection (l)(b) shall be necessary on the dissolution of Tynwald by virtue of section 2. (3) Unless it is impracticable to do so, the Governor shall seek the advice of the Chief Minister before exercising any of the powers conferred by this section. 4 Extension of term of Tynwald in emergency (1) During any period of national emergency the Governor may by order — (a) extend the term of Tynwald or the term of office of any member of the Council elected by Tynwald, by a period of one year from the date when otherwise the term of Tynwald would expire, or the member cease to hold office; and (b) declare that the register of electors in force at the time of the making of such order shall remain in force for a period of one year after the date when such register would otherwise cease to be in force. (2) On any such order being made, the provisions of this and any other enactment relating to members of Tynwald shall be construed as if they were modified in such a manner as to give effect to this section, and the order, or a subsequent order under subsection (1), may make such provision as is necessary to effect such modification. (3) Where an order under subsection (1) has been made, a further such order may not be made with respect to a subsequent year unless — (a) a general election of Tynwald intervenes, or (b) the making of the order is previously approved by Tynwald. (4) If any question arises as to any matter under this section, or the operation of this section, the question shall stand referred to the Deemsters, who shall determine it summarily after hearing any parties they consider ought to be heard. . (5) In this section "national emergency" means any period which, in the opinion of the Governor, constitutes a state of national emergency due to a state of war, or apprehended or threatened war, or international disturbance. Vacancies in Tynwald 5 Report of casual vacancies The President of Tynwald shall, within 7 days of any casual vacancy in the members of Tynwald coming to his notice, report the vacancy in writing to the Governor, stating the name of the constituency by which the new member is to be returned. 6 Vacancy in seat (1) A sitting member of Tynwald may resign his seat by notice in writing to the President of Tynwald or, if the office of President of Tynwald is vacant, to the Governor. (2) If any sitting member of Tynwald is punished by a court in the Island with custody (whether or not suspended) for any offence triable on information, his seat shall be vacant — (a) if he appeals, or applies for leave to appeal, against his conviction or sentence, on the determination or withdrawal of the appeal or, if leave to appeal is refused, on the refusal of such leave; (b) if he does not so appeal or apply, on the expiration of the period within which the appeal or application must be made.

K e y s P a g e 3 o f 2 1 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 (3) Tynwald may by resolution declare the seat of a member of Tynwald to be vacant where he — (a) has been certified by the Clerk of the Rolls to the President of Tynwald to be incapable by reason of mental disorder of taking care of himself or of managing his own affairs; or (b) fails to attend within any period of 12 months — (i) at least three-quarters of the total number of sittings of Tynwald, and (ii) at least three-quarters of the total number of sittings of the Council or the Keys, as the case may be. (4) The Clerk of the Rolls shall not certify a member of Tynwald under subsection (3)(a) except on the written or oral evidence of 2 or more registered medical practitioners, at least one of whom is approved for the purposes of section 12 of the Mental Health Act 1998 as having special experience in the diagnosis or treatment of mental disorder. (5) For the purpose of subsection (3)(b) a member of Tynwald shall not be treated as failing to attend any sitting of Tynwald, or of the Council or the Keys, in respect .of which he is granted leave of absence by the President of Tynwald, or by the President of Tynwald or the Speaker, as the case may be. (6) If the holder of any office of profit under the Government of the Island is elected as a member of Tynwald, his seat shall become vacant unless within 7 days from the date of his election to Tynwald, he gives such notice or takes such other step as is necessary to vacate that office on the earliest practicable day thereafter; and if he subsequently withdraws that notice or revokes that step, he shall be treated for the purpose of subsection (8) as having accepted that office. (7) If any sitting member of Tynwald is adjudicated bankrupt, the High Court shall certify the fact to the President of Tynwald; and if within 6 months of the date of the order of adjudication — (a) the adjudication is not annulled, and (b) the member does not obtain his discharge, with a certificate under section 16(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 18925 (bankruptcy caused by misfortune without misconduct), the High Court shall on the expiry of that period certify the fact to the President of Tynwald, and the seat of the member shall thereupon be vacant (8) If any sitting member of Tynwald — (a) accepts an office of profit under the Government of the Island or the government of any country or territory outside the Island, or (b) becomes a member of a local authority, his seat shall thereupon be vacant. (9) For the purpose of subsection (8) — (a) a person shall not be treated as accepting an office of profit by reason only- (i) of accepting any payment under the Payment of Members' Expenses Act 19896, or (ii) during a national emergency, of enlisting in or being appointed to a commission in any of Her Majesty's forces; (b) a person becomes a member of a local authority on his making a declaration of acceptance of office as such pursuant to section 10 of the Local Elections Act 19867.

5 VIp.312 6 1989 c.4 7 1986 c.10

K e y s Page 4 o f 21 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 (10) À member of Tynwald who accepts an office of profit shall be eligible for re-election to any constituency on his vacating such office. 7 Penalty for sitting or voting when seat vacant If the seat of a member of Tynwald has become vacant and he sits or votes as a member of Tynwald, the Council or the Keys during the vacancy of theseat, he is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £5,000 in respect of each occasion upon which he so sits or votes. Oaths 8 Members to take oaths No member of Tynwald (except the Bishop or the Attorney General) shall be permitted to sit and to vote in Tynwald, the Council or the Keys until he has taken and subscribed the following oaths — Oath o f allegiance I [name] do swear by Almighty God [or do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm] that I will be faithful to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second. In this form the name of the Sovereign for the time being shall from time to time be substituted for the name ofHer present Majesty. Oath of office I [name] do swear by Almighty God {or do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm] that I will well and truly serve as a member of Tynwald, and will use my best endeavours to maintain the ancient laws and customs of this Isle, and will justly and truly deliver my opinion and do right in all matter which shall be put to me without favour or affection, affinity or consanguinity, love or fear, reward or gain, or for any hope thereof, but in all things deal uprightly and justly and do wrong to no man." Privileges 9. Privileges Tynwald, the Council and the Keys, and the members of Tynwald, the Council and the Keys, shall have, exercise and perform the same power, authority and duties, and be subject to thé like obligations (except where expressly otherwise provided by this Act), and be entitled to and enjoy the same rights and privileges, in as full and ample manner as the Keys, and the members thereof, heretofore had, exercised and performed, and was or were entitled to and enjoyed.

NEW SCHEDULE Section A2(3). SCHEDULE A2 SUBSTITUTED SCHEDULE 1 TO THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1995 "SCHEDULE 1 CONSTITUENCIES Name Number of Area members North 5 The town district of Ramsey and the parish districts of Andreas, Bride, Jurby, Lezayre and Maughold South 6 Tlie town district of Castletown, the village districts of Port Erin and Port St Mary and the parish districts of Arbory, Malew, Rushen and Santon West 4 The town district of Peel, the local government district of Michael and the parish districts of Ballaugh, German and Patrick

K e y s Page 5 o f21 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 East 7 The local government district of Onchan, the village district of Laxey and the parish districts of Braddan, Lonan and Marown Douglas North 5 That part of the borough of Douglas comprising the polling and East districts of Glencrutchery, St. Ninian's, Tynwald, Crescent, Strand, Windsor and Derby, that part of the polling district of St. George's lying to the north-east of a line along the middle of Upper Church Street and that part of the polling district of Murrays lying to the east of a line along the middle of Woodboume Road. Douglas South 5 That part of the borough of Douglas comprising the polling and West districts of St. George's and Murrays (except the parts within the constituency of Douglas North and East), and the polling districts of Quay, Pulrose, Garden City, Albany, Ballabrooie and Eastfield. Note: a reference in this Schedule to any district is to that district as it existed on the 1st January 2003.

NEW SCHEDULE Section A2(4). SCHEDULE A3 AMENDMENTS OF ELECTION RULES 1. In rule 17(1) and (2) (method of election), for "vacancies to be filled" substitute "members to be elected". 2. In rule 16 (poll to be taken by ballot), for the words from "result" onwards substitute "votes given to each candidate shall be counted and the result of the poll determined in accordance with rules 42 to 44J". 3. For rule 35(2) (voting procedure) substitute — "(2) The voter, on receiving the ballot paper, shall forthwith proceed into one of the compartments in the polling station and there shall — (a) secretly record his vote by placing on the ballot paper "1” opposite the name of the candidate of his first choice and, if he wishes, by placing "2” opposite the name of the candidate of his second choice, "3" opposite the name of the candidate of his third choice and so on in the order of his preference; (b) fold the paper so that his vote is concealed; (c) show to the presiding officer the back of the paper so as to disclose the official mark; and (d) put the folded paper into the ballot box in the presence of the presiding officer.”. 4. In rule 36(1), for "vote to be marked on a ballot paper" substitute "ballot paper to be marked". 5. In mle 44 (attendance at counting of votes), omit paragraph (4). 6. For rules 42 to 44 substitute — "42. Interpretation of rules 42 to 44 J In rules 43 to 44J — "continuing candidate" means any candidate not deemed to be elected and not excluded;

K e y s Page 6 of 21 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 "count" means all the operations involved in the counting of the first preferences recorded for candidates, the transfer of the surpluses of elected candidates, and the transfer of the votes of excluded candidates; "deemed to be elected" means deemed to be elected for the purposes of the counting of votes but without prejudice to the declaration of the result of the poll; "mark11 means a figure, a word written in the English language or a mark such as "X"; "non-transferable vote" means a ballot paper — (a) on which no second or subsequent preference is recorded for a continuing candidate, or (b) which is excluded by the returning officer under rule 44D(4); "preference" as used in the following contexts has the following meanings

(a) "first preference" means the figure ”1" or any mark or word which clearly indicates a first (or only) preference; (b) "next available preference" means a preference which is the second or, as the case may be, subsequent preference recorded in consecutive order for a continuing candidate (any candidate who is deemed to be elected or is excluded thereby being ignored), and (c) in this context, a "second preference" is shown by the figure "2" or any mark or word which clearly indicates a second preference, a third preference by the figure "3" or any mark or word which clearly indicates a third preference, and so on; "quota" means the number calculated in accordance with rule 44B ; "surplus" means the number of votes by which the total number of votes for any candidate (whether first preference or transferred votes, or a combination of both) exceeds the quota; but, references in these rules to the transfer of the surplus means the transfer (at a transfer value) of all transferable papers from the candidate who has the surplus; "stage of the count" means — (a) the determination of the first preference vote for each candidate; or (b) the transfer of a surplus of a candidate deemed to be elected; or (c) the exclusion of one or more candidates at any given time; "transferable paper" means a ballot paper on which, following a first preference, a second or subsequent preference is recorded in consecutive numerical order for a continuing candidate; "transferred vote" means a vote derived from a ballot paper on which a second or subsequent preference is recorded for the candidate to whom that paper has been transferred; "transfer value" means the value of a transferred vote calculated in accordance with paragraph (4) or (7) of rule 44C . 43. Preliminary proceedings and conduct of the count (1) The returning officer shall — (a) in the presence of the counting agents open each ballot box and count and record the number of ballot papers in it; (b) in the presence of the election agents verify each ballot paper account; and (c) count such of the postal ballot papers as have been duly returned and record the number counted.

K e y s P a g e 7 o f 2 1 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 (2) The returning officer shall not count the votes given on any ballot papers until — (a) in the case of the postal ballot papers, they have been mixed with the ballot papers from at least one ballot box; and (b) in the case of ballot papers from a ballot box, they have been mixed with the ballot papers from at least one other ballot box. (3) A postal ballot paper shall not be deemed to be duly returned unless it is returned in the proper envelope so as to reach the returning officer before the close of the poll and is accompanied by the declaration of identity duly signed and authenticated. (4) The returning officer shall not count any tendered ballot paper. (5) The returning officer, while counting and recording the number of ballot papers and counting the votes, shall keep the ballot papers with their faces upwards and take all proper precautions for preventing any person from seeing the numbers printed on the back of the papers. . (5) The returning officer shall verify each ballot paper account by comparing it with the number of ballot papers recorded by hin^ and the unused and spoilt ballot papers in his possession and the tendered votes list(opening and resealing the packets containing the unused and spoilt ballot papers and die tendered votes list) and shall draw up a statement as to the result of the verification, which any election agent may copy. (7) The returning officer shall so far as practicable proceed continuously with counting the votes, allowing only time for refreshment, except that he may, in so far as he and the agents agree, exclude the hours between 7 in the evening and 9 on the following morning. For the purposes of this exception the agreement of a candidate or his election agent shall be as effective as the agreement of his counting agents. (8) During the time so excluded the returning officer shall — (a) place the ballot papers and other documents relating to the election under his own seal and the seals of such of the counting agents as desire to affix their seals; and (b) otherwise take proper precautions for the security of the papers and documents. 44. Rejected ballot papers (1) Any ballot paper — (a) which does not bear the official mark; or (b) on which the figure "1" standing alone is not placed so as to indicate a first preference for any candidate; or (c) on which the figure ”1" standing alone indicating a first preference is set opposite the name of more than one candidate; or (d) on which anything (other than the printed number on the back) is written or marked by which the voter can be identified; or (e) which is unmarked or void for uncertainty, shall be void and not counted, but the ballot paper shall not be void by reason only of carrying the words "one”, "T\ "three", (and so on) or any other mark instead of a figure if, in the opinion of the returning officer, the word or mark clearly indicates a preference or preferences. (2) The returning officer shall endorse "Rejected" on any ballot paper which under this rule is not to be counted and if an election agent objects to his decision shall add to the endorsement the words "rejection objected to".

K e y s Page 8 o f 21 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 (3) The returning officer shall prepare a statement showing the number of ballot papers rejected by him under each of sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of paragraph (I) and shall, on request, allow any candidate or agent to copy that statement. (4) The decision of the returning officer on any question arising in respect of a ballot paper shall be final but shall be subject to review on an election petition. 44A. First stage (1) The returning officer shall sort the ballot papers into parcels according to the candidates for whom first preference votes are given. (2) The returning officer shall then count the number of first preference votes given on ballot papers for each candidate and shall record those numbers. (3) The returning officer shall also ascertain and record the number of valid ballot papers. 44B. The quota (1) The returning officer shall divide the number of valid ballot papers by a number exceeding by one the number of members to be elected. (2) The result, increased by one, of the division under paragraph (1) (any fraction being disregarded) shall be the number of votes sufficient to secure the election of a candidate (in these rules referred to as "the quota"). (3) At any stage of the count a candidate whose total votes equals or exceeds the quota shall be deemed to be elected, except that at any election where there is only one vacancy a candidate shall not be deemed to be elected until the procedure set out in paragraphs (1) to (3) of rule 44E has been complied. 44C- Transfer of votes (1) Where the number of first preference votes for any candidate exceeds the quota, the returning officer shall sort all the ballot papers on which first preference votes are given for that candidate into sub-parcels so that they are grouped

(a) according to the next available preference given on those papers for any continuing candidate, or (b) where no such preference is given, as the sub-parcel of non- transferable votes. (2) The returning officer shall count the number of ballot papers in each parcel referred to in paragraph (1). (3) The returning officer shall, in accordance with this rule and rule 44D , transfer each sub-parcel of ballot papers referred to in paragraph (l)(a) to the candidate for whom the next available preference is given on those papers. (4) The vote on each ballot paper transferred under paragraph (3) shall be at a value ("the transfer value”) which— (a) reduces the value of each vote transferred so that the total value of all such votes does not exceed the surplus; and (b) is calculated by dividing the surplus of the candidate from whom the votes are being transferred by the total number of the ballot papers on which those votes are given, the calculation being made to 2 decimal places (ignoring the remainder if any). (5) Where at the end of any stage of the count involving the transfer of ballot papers, the number of votes for any candidate exceeds the quota, the returning officer shall sort the ballot papers in the sub-parcel of transferred votes which was last received by that candidate into separate sub-parcels so that they are grouped -

K e y s P a g e 9 o f 2 1 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 (a) according to the next available preference given on those papers for any continuing candidate, or (b) where no such preference is given, as the sub-parcel of non- transferable votes. (6) The returning officer shall, in accordance with this rule and rule 44D , transfer each sub-parcel of ballot papers referred to in paragraph (5)(a) to the candidate for whom the next available preference is given on those papers. (7) The vote on each ballot paper transferred under paragraph (6) shall be at— (a) a transfer value calculated as set out in paragraph (4)(b), or (b) at the value at which that vote was received by the candidate from whom it is now being transferred, whichever is the less. (8) Each transfer of a surplus constitutes a stage in the count (9) Subject to paragraph (10) , the returning officer shall proceed to transfer transferable papers until no candidate who is deemed to be elected has a surplus or all the vacancies have been filled. (10) Transferable papers shall not be liable to be transferred where any surplus or surpluses which, at a particular stage of the count, have not already been transferred, are — (a) less than the difference between the total vote then credited to the continuing candidate with the lowest recorded vote and the vote of the candidate with the next lowest recorded vote, or (b) less than the difference between the total votes of the 2 or more continuing candidates, credited at that stage of the count with the lowest recorded total numbers of votes and the candidate next such candidates. (11) This rule shall not apply at an election where there is only one vacancy. 44D. Supplementary provisions on transfer (1) If, at any stage of the count, 2 or more candidates have surpluses, the transferable papers of the candidate with the highest surplus shall be transferred first, and if— (a) the surpluses determined in respect of 2 or more candidates are equal, the transferable papers of the candidate who had the highest recorded vote at the earliest preceding stage at which they had unequal votes, shall be transferred first, and (b) the votes credited to 2 or more candidates were equal at all stages of the count, the returning officer shall decide between those candidates by lot and the transferable papers of the candidate on whom the lot falls shall be transferred first (2) The returning officer shall, on each transfer of transferable papers under rule 44C — (a) record the total value of the votes transferred to each candidate; (b) add that value to the previous total of votes recorded for each candidate and record the new total; (c) record as non-transferable votes the difference between the surplus and the total transfer value of the transferred votes and add that difference to the previously recorded total of non-transferable votes, and (d) compare —

K e y s P a g e 1 0 o f 2 1 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 (i)the total number of votes then recorded for all of the candidates, together with the total number of non- transferable votes, with (ii) the recorded total of valid first preference votes. (3) All ballot papers transferred under rule 44C or 44E shall be clearly marked, either individually or as a sub-parcel, so as to indicate the transfer value recorded at that time to each vote on that paper or, as the case may be, all the papers in that sub-parcel. (4) Where a ballot paper is so marked that it is unclear to the returning officer at any stage of the count under rule 44C or 44E for which candidate the next preference is recorded, the returning officer shall treat any vote on that ballot paper as a non-transferable vote; and votes on a ballot paper shall be so treated where, for example, the names of 2 or more candidates (whether continuing candidates or not) are so marked that, in the opinion of the returning officer, the same order of preference is indicated or the numerical sequence is broken. 44E. Exclusion of candidates (1) I f - (a) all transferable papers which under the provisions of rule 44C (including that rule as applied by paragraph (11)) and this rule are required to be transferred, have been transferred, and (b) subject to rule 44F, one or more vacancies remain to be filled, the returning officer shall exclude from the election at that stage the candidate with the then lowest vote (or, where paragraph (12) applies, the candidates with the then lowest votes). (2) The returning officer shall sort all the ballot papers on which first preference votes are given for the candidate or candidates excluded under paragraph (1) into 2 sub-parcels so that they are grouped as —■ (a) ballot papers on which a next available preference is given, and (b) ballot papers on which no such preference is given (thereby including ballot papers on which preferences are given only for candidates who are deemed to be elected or are excluded). (3) The returning officer shall, in accordance with this rule and rule 44D, transfer each sub-parcel of ballot papers referred to in paragraph (2)(a) to the candidate for whom the next available preference is given on those papers. (4) The exclusion of a candidate, or of 2 or more candidates together, constitutes a further stage of the count (5) If, subject to rule 44F , one or more vacancies still remain to be filled, the returning officer shall then sort the transferable papers, if any, which had been transferred to any candidate excluded under paragraph (1) into sub-parcels according to their transfer value. (6) The returning officer shall transfer those papers in the sub-parcel of transferable papers with the highest transfer value to the continuing candidates in accordance with the next available preferences given on those papers (thereby passing over candidates who are deemed to be elected or are excluded). (7) The vote on each transferable paper transferred under paragraph (6) shall be at the value at which that vote was received by the candidate excluded under paragraph (1). (8) Any papers on which no next available preferences have been expressed shall be set aside as non-transferable votes. (9) After the returning officer has completed the transfer of the ballot papers in the sub-parcel of ballot papers with the highest transfer value he shall proceed to transfer in the same way the sub-parcel of ballot papers with the next

K e y s P a g e 1 1 o f 2 1 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 highest value and so on until he has dealt with each sub-parcel of a candidate excluded under paragraph (1). (10) The returning officer shall after each stage of the count completed under this rule — (a) record — (i) the total value of votes, or (ii) the total transfer value of votes transferred to each candidate; (b) add that total to the previous total of votesrecorded for each candidate and record the new total; (c) record the valueof non-transferable votes and add that value to the previous non-transferable votes total; and (d) compare — (i) the total number of votes then recorded for each candidate - together with the total number of non-transferable votes, with (ii) the recorded total of valid first preference votes. (11) If after a transfer of votes under any provision of this rule, a candidate has a surplus, that surplus shall be dealt with in accordance with paragraphs (5) to (10) of rule 44C and rule 44D. (12) Where the total of the votes of the 2 or more lowest candidates, together with any surpluses not transferred, is less than the number of votes credited to the next lowest candidate, the returning officer shall in one operation exclude such 2 or more candidates. (13) If when a candidate has to be excluded under this rule, 2 or more candidates each have the same number of votes and are lowest — (a) regard shall be had to the total number of votes credited to those candidates at the earliest stage of the count at which they had an unequal number of votes and the candidate with the lowest number of votes at that stage shall be excluded; and (b) where the number of votes credited to those candidates was equal at all stages, the returning officer shall decide between the candidates by lot and the candidate on whom the lot falls shall be excluded. 44F. Filling of last vacancies (1) Where the number of continuing candidates is equal to the number of vacancies remaining unfilled the continuing candidates shall thereupon be deemed to be elected (2) Where only one vacancy remains unfilled and the votes of any one continuing candidate are equal to or greater than the total of votes credited to other continuing candidates together with any surplus not transferred, the candidate shall thereupon be deemed to be elected. (3) Where the last vacancies can be filled under this rule, no further transfer of votes shall be made. 44G. Re-count (1) The returning officer on completion of each stage of the count shall, before proceeding with the next stage, inform all the candidates and their election agents then present of his intention, subject to a request for a re-count, to proceed to the next stage. (2) The returning officer shall comply with a request from a candidate or his election agent for a re-count of the last completed stage made before the

K e y s P a g e 1 2 o f 2 1 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 returning officer proceeds to the next stage, but nothing in this rule shall require the returning officer to re-count the same parcel or sub-parcel more than once. (3) The returning officer may, if he thinks fit, re-count ballot papers either once or more often. (4) Where as a result of a re-count an error is discovered, the returning officer shall, where necessary, amend any results previously announced by him 44H. Order of election of candidates (1) The order in which candidates whose votes equal or exceed the quota axe deemed to be elected shall be the order in which their respective surpluses were transferred, or would have been transferred but for rule 44C(10). (2) A candidate credited with a number of votes equal to, and not greater than, the quota shall, for the purposes of this rule, be regarded as having had the smallest surplus at the stage of the count at which he obtained the quota. (3) Where the surpluses of 2 or more candidates are equal and are not required to be transferred, regard shall be had to the total number of votes credited to such candidates at the earliest stage of the count at which, they had an unequal number of votes and the surplus of the candidate who had the greatest number of votes at that stage shall be deemed to be the largest. (4) Where the number of votes credited to 2 or more candidates were equal at all stages of the count, the returning officer shall decide between them by lot and the candidate on whom the lot falls shall be deemed to have been elected first. 44J. Decisions of returning officer The decision of the returning officer, whether expressed or implied, on any question which arises in relation to the exclusion of any candidate under rule 44E or to any ballot paper or transfer of votes shall be final, but may be reviewed on an election petition.". 7. For rule 47(1) (declaration of result) substitute — "(1) In a contested election, when the result of the poll has been ascertained, the returning officer shall forthwith — (a) declare to be elected the candidates who are deemed to be elected under rules 43 to 44J; and (b) give public notice o f— (i) die names of those candidates; (ii) the number of first preference votes for each candidate whether elected or not, (iii) any transfer of votes; (iv) the total number of votes for each candidate at each stage of the count at which such transfer took place; and (v) the order in which the successful candidates were elected.'*.

CLAUSE 1 ; SCHEDULE 1 Page 1 line 1, for clause 1 substitute — 1. Constitution of Council and Keys (1) The Council shall consist of 11 members, as follows — (a) the President of Tynwald; . (b) the Bishop;

K e y s Page 13 of 21 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 (c) the Attorney General; (d) 8 members elected under section 1A (’’the elected members of the Council”). (2) The Attorney General shall not have the right to vote in Tynwald or in the Council, and his presence shall not reckon towards the constitution of a quorum of Tynwald or the Council. (3) The Keys shall consist of the members of Tynwald elected under the Representation of the People Act 19958, excluding the members specified in subsection (1). 1 A. Election of Chief Minister and members of Council (1) The President of Tynwald or, if the office of President of Tynwald is vacant, the Governor shall, as soon as may be after a general election of members of Tynwald, summon the members of Tynwald to assemble for the purposes of elections under subsection (2); and the members of Tynwald assembled in pursuance of such a summons shall be to all intents and purposes a sitting of Tynwald. (2) At the sitting held in pursuance of a summons under subsection (1) Tynwald — (a) shall nominate the Chief Minister in accordance with section 2 of the Council of Ministers Act 19909, (b) if the office of President of Tynwald is vacant, shall next elect the President of Tynwald in accordance with section IB, and (c) shall then elect 8 members of the Council in accordance with Schedule 1. (3) Where the seat of an elected member of the Council is vacated otherwise than by the dissolution of Tynwald, Tynwald shall, as soon as may be after the vacancy in the members of Tynwald is filled, or after the election of the President of Tynwald, as the case may be, elect one of their number in accordance with Schedule 1 to fill the vacancy in the elected members of the Council. ivwU (4) * The Bishop shall not have the right to vote in an election under subsection (2)(a) or (c) or (3).

Page 6, for Schedule 1 substitute — Section 1A. SCHEDULE 1 ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL Selection of elected members of Council 1. In any election of members of the Council under section 1A(2) the number of members specified in column 1 of the following table shall be chosen from the elected members of Tynwald representing the constituency specified in column 2 of the table —

8 1995 c.13 9 1990 c.3

K e y s Page 14 o f 21 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 Constituency Number of members North 1 South 2 West 1 East 2 Douglas North and 1 East Douglas South and I West Casual vacancies 2. Paragraph 1 applies with any necessary modifications to an election under section 1 A(3) as it applies to an election under section 1A(2). Procedure for election 3. (1) Any proposal that a person be elected as an elected member of the Council shall be made in writing and delivered to the Clerk of Tynwald not less than 7 days before the sitting of Tynwald at which the election falls to be made. (2) No person shall be so elected unless at least 17 votes axe recorded in his favour. (3) If a person has a majority of the votes of the members of Tynwald present and voting recorded in his favour but the majority is less than 17 votes, the members of Tynwald shall forthwith vote separately on the name of that person and, if he then receives a majority of at least 17 votes, he shall be elected a member of the Council. (4) Where 2 or more persons receive a majority of the votes of the members of Tynwald present and voting but the majorities of those persons are less than 17 votes, Tynwald shall forthwith vote separately upon the name of the person who received the largest majority and so on in the order of their majorities. Where there is an equality in the amount of 2 or more majorities, the order in which such persons shall be voted upon separately shall be decided by lot.

CLAUSE 2 : SCHEDULE 2 Page 2 line 1, for clause 2 substitute — 2. President of Tynwald (1) Tynwald shall from time to time by resolution elect an elected member of Tynwald to be President of Tynwald. (2) The person elected to be President of Tynwald shall forthwith go out of office as an elected member of Tynwald. (3) The office of President of Tynwald shall be vacated — (a) on the death of the President of Tynwald; .(b) on his resignation by notice in writing to the Governor; (c) on his removal by a resolution of Tynwald; (d) the day of the first ordinary sitting of Tynwald held in the month during which falls the 5th anniversary of the sitting at which he was elected; or

K e y s P a g e 1 5 o f 2 1 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 (e) where he was elected to fill a casual vacancy, the day when the person in whose place he was elected would ordinarily have gone out of office; and section 6(2) to (4) and (6) to (9) of the Representation of the People Act 1995 applies to the office of President of Tynwald as it applies to the seat of an elected member of Tynwald, with the substitution of references to the Governor for references to the President of Tynwald. (4) Where the seat of an elected member of Tynwald is vacated, his seat as a member of the Council or the Keys, as the case may be, shall also be vacated; and the seat of an elected member of the Council or member of the Keys may not be vacated otherwise than — (a) on the vacation of his seat as a member of Tynwald, (b) on his election to be President of Tynwald, or (c) in the case of a member of the Keys, on his election to be an elected member of the Council. (5) Where the President of Tynwald goes out of office under subsection (3)(d) or (e), he shall be eligible for re-election; and accordingly the reference in subsection (1) to an elected member of Tynwald includes a reference to a retiring President of Tynwald who is eligible for re-election by virtue of this subsection. (6) The Governor shall, as soon as may be after the vacation of the office of President of Tynwald (otherwise than under subsection (3)(d) or (e)), summon Tynwald for the purpose of electing the President of Tynwald. 2A. Oiflce of Speaker (1) The members of the Keys shall — (a) on their first assembling after the election of members of the Council under section 1 A, and (b) on the vacation of the office of Speaker under subsection (2)(a), O’) °r (c), forthwith proceed to elect one of their number to be Speaker. (2) The office of Speaker shall be vacated — (a) on the death of the Speaker; (b) on his resignation by notice in writing to the Secretary of the Keys; (c) on his removal by a vote of the Keys; (d) on the vacation of his seat as a member of the Keys; (e) on the vacation of his seat as a member of Tynwald; (f) by the dissolution of Tynwald.

CLAUSE 3 Page 2 line 24, for clause 3 substitute —

K e y s Page 16 o f 21 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 3. Voting in Tynwald Notwithstanding anything from time to time contained in the standing orders of Tynwald, the Council and the Keys shall not vote separately bn any question in Tynwald but shall vote as one body.

CLAUSE 4 Page 3 line 26, for clause 4 substitute — 4. Bill rejected by Council or Keys (1) Where a Bill — (a) is passed by either Branch in any session, and (b) having been sent to the other Branch, is not passed by that Branch within 12 months after it is sent, it shall be placed on the order paper of the next available sitting of Tynwald, and the member of Tynwald by whom the third reading of the Bill was moved in the Branch by which it was passed shall move that it be approved by Tynwald. (2) If that member fails or is unable to move a resolution under subsection (1), any other member of Tynwald may at that sitting move that the Bill be approved by Tynwald. (3) A Bill placed on the order paper under subsection (1) and approved by the affirmative vote of at least 17 elected members of Tynwald shall be deemed to have been passed by both Branches and, if it is signed by not less than 17 members of Tynwald, both Branches shall be deemed to have concurred therewith, although it may not have been signed by a quorum of each Branch. (4) A Bill to amend any of the Constitution Acts 1919 to 2003 shall not be treated as having been passed by the Keys for the purpose of subsection (l)(a) unless it has received at least 16 votes in its favour at the third reading. (5) A Bill shall not be treated for the purpose of subsection (l)(b) as passed by a Branch unless it is passed either — (a) without amendments, or (b) with such amendments only as are approved by both Branches. (6) In this section — "Branch" means the Council or the Keys; "elected member” means an elected member of the Council or a member of the Keys.

CLAUSE 9 : SCHEDULES 2 & 3 Page 4 line 29, at the end insert —

K e y s P a g e 1 7 o f 2 1 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 "(3) The transitional provisions set out in Schedule 4 shall have effect.1’

Page 7, for Schedule 2 substitute —• Section 9(1). SCHEDULE 2 AMENDMENT OF ENACTMENTS The Registration of Electors Act 1984 (c.3) 1. (1) In section 13, for subsections (2) and (3) substitute — "(2) The registration officer shall, not later than the 20th August, place the revised lists of electors for all of the polling districts in each Tynwald constituency and Board constituency in order and number the names on the lists in series, commencing with the number 1 against the first name in the first list for the constituency and continuing through every polling district in the constituency. (3) The registration officer shall sign the lists of electors, so ordered and numbered, for each Tynwald constituency and Board constituency, and shall deposit the same in the General Registry not later than the 31st August, and the said lists shall, subject to section 12(4), constitute the register of electors for that constituency as from the 1st September until the 31 st August in the following year." (2) In section 17(1) —: (a) after "In this Act —" insert — ""Board constituency" means a constituency for the purposes of a Board election, constituted by section 11 of and Schedule 1 to the Representation of the People Act 1995 (as modified by Schedule 4 to that Act); "Board election" means an election of a member or members of the Isle of Man Board of Education;"; (b) for the definition of "constituency" substitute — ""constituency" means a Tynwald constituency or a Board constituency;" (c) for the definition of "national election" substitute — ""national election" means a Tynwald election or a Board election;"; (d) after the definition of "revision court" insert — ""Tynwald constituency" means a constituency for the puiposes of a Tynwald election, constituted by section 11 of and Schedule 1 to the Representation of the People Act 1995; "Tynwald election" means an election of a member or members of Tynwald.". The Constitution Act 1990 (c.6) 2. For section 5(2) substitute — "(2) The office of Deputy President of Tynwald shall be vacated — (a) on the death of the Deputy President of Tynwald; (b) on his resignation by notice in writing to the President of Tynwald or, if the office of President of Tynwald is vacant, to the Governor; (c) on his removal by a resolution of Tynwald The Representation of the People Act 1995 (c.13) 3. (1) In section 14(1), for paragraphs (f) and (g) substitute — "(f) any member of Tynwald;

K e y s P a g e 1 8 o f 2 1 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 (g) any person who has served as a member of Tynwald in the session immediately preceding the election, or in the current session in the case of a by-election.” (2) In section 15(a), for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald". (3) In section 55, in the definition of "candidate", for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald". (4) In section 56( 1), for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald". (5) In section 66, for ’’the Keys" (in each place) substitute’Tynwald". (6) In section 77 — (a) in the definition of "election", for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald"; (b) for the definition of "member" substitute — ""member" means a member of Tynwald (other than the President of Tynwald, the Bishop or the Attorney General);". (7) In Schedule 1, in paragraphs 1, 51 and 52, for "the Keys" (in each place) substitute "Tynwald". - (8) In Schedule 3 — (a) in paragraph 6, 8, 15 and 17(1), for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald"; (b) in paragraphs 8, 14, 15, 17, for "Speaker" (in each place) substitute "President of Tynwald"; (c) in paragraph 17(2), for "he shall not sit or vote in the Keys until the Keys have been informed of the report on the petition" substitute "he shall not sit or vote in Tynwald, or in the Council or the Keys, until Tynwald has been informed of the report on the petition". (9) In Schedule 4 — (a) in paragraph 1 — (i) for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald"; (ii) for "Speaker" substitute "President of Tynwald"; (b) for paragraph 8 substitute — "8. In section 11 (constituencies), for "the number of members specified in relation thereto in column 2 of that table" substitute "one member"; (c) after paragraph 10 insert — "10 A. For Schedule 1 substitute — "SCHEDULE 1 CONSTITUENCIES Name Area Ramsey The town district of Ramsey Ayre The parish districts of Andreas, Bride and Lezayre Michael The village district of Michael and the parish districts of Michael, Ballaugh and Jurby. Peel The town district of Peel. Glenfaba The parish districts of Patrick and German. Garif The village district of Laxey and the parish districts of Maughold and Lonan. Middle The parish districts of Braddan and Marown. Onchan The village district of Onchan and the parish district of Onchan.

K e y s Page 19 of 21 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 Douglas North That part of the borough of Douglas comprising the polling districts of Glencxutchery and St. Ninian's. Douglas South That part of the borough of Douglas comprising the polling districts of St. George's (except the part within the constituency of Douglas East), Quay and Pulrose. Douglas East That part of the borough of Douglas comprising the polling districts of Tynwald, Crescent, Strand, Windsor and Derby, that part of the polling district of St. George's lying to the north-east of a line along the middle of Upper Church Street and that part of the polling district of Murrays lying to the east of a line along the middle of Woodboume Road. Douglas West That part of the borough of Douglas comprising the polling districts of Garden City, Murrays (except the part within the constituency of Douglas East), Albany, Ballabrooie and Eastfield. Castletown The town district of Castletown. Malew and The parish districts of Malew and Santon. Santon Rushen The village districts of Port Erin and Port St. Mary and the parish districts of Rushen and Arbory. Note: a reference in this Schedule to any district is to that district as it existed on the 1st January 2003.

Page 7, for Schedule 3 substitute — Section 9(3). SCHEDULE 3 ENACTMENTS REPEALED Reference Short title Extent of repeal X p.390 The Isle of Man Constitution Sections 6 to 23. Amendment Act 1919. Sections 25 and 26. XDCp.586 The Isle of Man Constitution. Act Section 2. Section 10. XXI p. 104 The Isle of Man Constitution Act The whole Act. 1969. 1971 c.13 The Isle of Man Constitution Act The whole Act 1971. 1971 c.34 The Isle of Man Constitution The whole Act. (Elections to Council) Act 1971. 1975 c.l2 The Isle of Man Constitution The whole Act. (Amendment) Act 1975. 1978 c.l The Constitution (Amendment) The whole Act • Act 1978. 1990 c.6 The Constitution Act 1990. Sections 2 and 3. In Schedule 1, paragraphs 3 and 4(1) and (2). 1995 c.13 The Representation of the People In section 17( 1), the words "or (b) becomes a member of the

K e y s P a g e 2 0 o f 2 1 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 A c t 1 9 9 5 . C o u n c i l , ” .

NEW SCHEDULE Section 9(1). SCHEDULE4 TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS President of Tynwald 1. The person holding the office of President of Tynwald immediately before the 19th October 2006 shall remain in office as if he had been elected pursuant to section 2. Existing members o f the Council 2. The elected members of the Council holding office immediately before the 19th October 2006 shall go out of office on that date. Registers o f electors 3. Except for the purposes of elections of members of the Isle of Man Board of Education, the registers of electors to be prepared in 2006 pursuant to the Registration of Electors Act 1984 shall, instead of being prepared for the constituencies specified in section 11 of the Representation of the People Act 1995 as it has effect on the passing of this Act, be prepared for the constituencies specified in the said section 11 as substituted by section A2. Polling districts 4. Not later than the 31st March 2006 the Department of Local Government and the Environment shall exercise the functions conferred by section 12 of the said Act of 1995. Dissolution of the Keys 5. (1) The Keys may not be dissolved pursuant to section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1995 after the passing of this Act. (2) The Keys shall stand dissolved on the 19th October 2006. First election of members of Tynwald 6. The Governor shall, as soon as may be after the 19th October 2006, issue writs for a general election of members of Tynwald.

CLAUSE 10 Page 4 line 30, for clause 10 substitute —• 10. Short title and commencement (1) This Act may be cited as the Constitution Act 2003, and the Constitution Acts 1919 to 1990 and this Act may be cited together as the Constitution Acts 1919 to 2003. (2) The following provisions shall come into operation on the 1 st January 2006 — (a) section 9, so far as it relates to the provisions specified in paragraphs (c) and (d); (b) this section;

10 1984 c.3

K e y s P a g e 2 1 o f 2 1 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 (c) paragraph 1 of Schedule 2; and (d) paragraphs 3, 4 and 5( 1) of Schedule 4. (3) Except as provided by subsection (2), this Act shall come into operation on the 19th October 2006.

K e y s P a g e 2 2 o f 2 1 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 5 CONSTITUTION (LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL) BILL 2003

Amendments to be moved by Mr Rodan (Alternative version)

NEW CLAUSE A l. Constitution of Tynwald (1) The members of Tynwald are — (a) the President of Tynwald; (b) the Bishop; (c) the Attorney General; and (d) the members elected pursuant to the Representation of the People Act 1995 ("the elected members of Tynwald"). (2) Tynwald shall consist of the members of Tynwald meeting together pursuant to a lawful summons in that behalf or by adjournment, whether or not constituted as the Council and the Keys. (3) Accordingly Her Majesty may assent to a Bill by and with the advice and consent of the members of Tynwald in Tynwald assembled, notwithstanding any law or custom to the contrary.

NEW CLAUSE A2. Elections of members of Tynwald (1) For Part 1 of the Representation of the People Act 1995 there are substituted the provisions set out in Schedule Al. (2) For section 11 of the Representation of the People Act 1995 there is substituted the following — "11. Constituencies (1) For the purposes of an election, the Island shall be divided into the 15 constituencies specified in column 1 of the table in Schedule 1, and each constituency shall return and be represented by the number of members specified in relation thereto in column 2 of that table. (2) The areas of those constituencies shall be the areas specified in column 3 of Schedule 1. (3) The Treasury shall prepare a map of the island upon which shall be delineated the boundaries of each constituency, and shall cause the map to be deposited in the General Registry. (4) The Chief Registrar shall make the map prepared under subsection (3), or a copy of it, available for inspection by any person at the General Registry at all reasonable times, and shall supply a copy

K e y s Page 1 o f 13 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 thereof to any person on payment of such reasonable charge as the Treasury may determine. (5) If Tynwald so resolves, the Governor in Council shall appoint a committee of such persons as he thinks appropriate, to review the number and boundaries of the said constituencies and to report thereon to Tynwald.” (3) For Schedule 1 to that Act there are substituted the provisions set out in Schedule A2.

NEW SCHEDULE Section A2(l). SCHEDULE A1 SUBSTITUTED PART 1 OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1995 "PART 1 TYNWALD Qualifications for membership o f Tynwald 1 Qualifications for membership of Tynwald (1) Any person may stand as a candidate for and be elected a member of Tynwald for a constituency if at the time he is nominated as a candidate — (a) he is of full age; and (b) he either is a British citizen or has the right to remain in the Island; and (c) he is not the holder of an office of profit under the government of any country or territory outside the Island; and (d) he is ordinarily resident in the Island and has been so resident for a period of, or for periods amounting in the aggregate to, 5 years or more; and (e) he is not subject to any incapacity by virtue of this Act (2) For the purpose of subsection (l)(b) a person has the right to remain in the Island if— (a) he has indefinite leave to remain in the Island, within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971 (an Act of Parliament)1, as it has effect in the Island2; or (b) he does not under the said Act of 1971 require leave to enter or remain in the Island, by virtue of section 7(1) of the Immigration Act 1988 (an Act of Parliament)3, as it has effect in the Island4; and, in either case, he is not liable to deportation under section 3(5) or (6) of the said Act of 1971. Term o f Tynwald 2 Term of Tynwald Tynwald, subject as hereinafter provided and unless sooner dissolved under section 3, shall be dissolved on the Thursday during the fifth succeeding month of October (computed from the day on which the last general election of Tynwald has been held) following the third Tuesday in that month.

'1971 c.77 2 SI 1991/2630 3 1988 c.14 4 SI 1991/2630

K e y s Page 2 o f 13 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 3 Summoning and dissolution of Tynwald (1) The Governor may, whenever he thinks it expedient — (a) by precept under his hand summon Tynwald when not in session, or when Tynwald stands adjourned though adjourned to a more distant date or for a longer period; or (b) by proclamation dissolve Tynwald and issue fresh writs for a general election of members to serve therein. (2) No proclamation under subsection (l)(b) shall be made on the dissolution of Tynwald by virtue of section 2. (3) Unless it is impracticable to do so, the Governor shall seek the advice of the Chief Minister before exercising any of the powers conferred by this section. 4 Extension of term of Tynwald in emergency (1) During any period of national emergency the Governor may by order — (a) extend the term of Tynwald or the term of office of any member of the Council elected by Tynwald, by a period of one year from the date when otherwise the term of Tynwald would expire, or the member cease to hold office; and (b) declare that the register of electors in force at the time of the making of such order shall remain in force for a period of one year after the date when such register would otherwise cease to be in force. (2) On any such order being made, the provisions of this and any other enactment relating to members of Tynwald shall be construed as if they were modified in such a manner as to give effect to this section, and the order, or a subsequent order under subsection (1), may make such provision as is necessary to effect such modification. (3) Where an order under subsection (1) has been made, a further such order may not be made with respect to a subsequent year unless — (a) a general election of Tynwald intervenes, or (b) the making of the order is previously approved by Tynwald. (4) If any question arises as to any matter under this section, or the operation of this section, the question shall stand referred to the Deemsters, who shall determine it summarily after hearing any parties they consider ought to be heard.' (5) In this section "national emergency" means any period which, in the opinion of the Governor, constitutes a state of national emergency due to a state of war, or apprehended or threatened war, or international disturbance. Vacancies in Tynwald 5 Report of casual vacancies The President of Tynwald shall, within 7 days of any casual vacancy in the members of Tynwald coming to his notice, report the vacancy in writing to the Governor, stating the name of the constituency by which the new member is to be returned. 6 Vacancy in seat (1) A sitting member of Tynwald may resign his seat by notice in writing to the President of Tynwald or, if the office of President of Tynwald is vacant, to the Governor. (2) If any sitting member of Tynwald is punished by a court inthe Island with custody (whether or not suspended) for any offence triable on information, his seat shall be vacant — (a) if he appeals, or applies for leave to appeal, against his conviction or sentence, on the determination or withdrawal of the appeal or, if leave to appeal is refused, on the refusal of such leave; (b) if he does not so appeal or apply, on the expiration of the period within which the appeal or application must be made.

K e y s Page 3 o f 13 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 (3) Tynwald may by resolution declare the seat of a member of Tynwald to be vacant where he — (a) has been certified by the Clerk of the Rolls to the President of Tynwald to be incapable by reason of mental disorder of taking care of himself or of managing his own affairs; or (b) fails to attend within any period of 12 months — (i) at least three-quarters of the total number of sittings of Tynwald, and (ii) at least three-quarters of the total number of sittings of the Council or the Keys, as the case may be. (4) The Clerk of the Rolls shall not certify a member of Tynwald under subsection (3)(a) except on the written or oral evidence of 2 or more registered medical practitioners, at least one of whom is approved for the purposes of section 12 of the Mental Health Act 1998 as having special experience in the diagnosis or treatment of mental disorder. (5) For the purpose of subsection (3)(b) a member of Tynwald shall not be treated as failing to attend any sitting of Tynwald, or of the Council or the Keys, in respect of which he is granted leave of absence by the President of Tynwald, or by the President of Tynwald or the Speaker, as the case may be. (6) If the holder of any office of profit under the Government of the Island is elected as a member of Tynwald, his seat shall become vacant unless within 7 days from the date of his election to Tynwald, he gives such notice or takes such other step as is necessary to vacate that office on the earliest practicable day thereafter; and if he subsequently withdraws that notice or revokes that step, he shall be treated for the purpose of subsection (8) as having accepted that office. (7) If any sitting member of Tynwald is adjudicated bankrupt, the High Court shall certify the fact to the President of Tynwald; and if within 6 months of the date of the order of adjudication — (a) the adjudication is not annulled, and (b) the member does not obtain his discharge, with a certificate under section 16(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 18925 (bankruptcy caused by misfortune without misconduct), the High Court shall on the expiry of that period certify the fact to the President of. Tynwald, and the seat of the member shall thereupon be vacant. (8) If any sitting member of Tynwald — (a) accepts an office of profit under theGovernment of the Island or the government of any country or territory outside the Island, or (b) becomes a member of a local authority, his seat shall thereupon be vacant. (9) For the purpose of subsection (8) — (a) a person shall not be treated as accepting an office of profit by reason only- (i) of accepting any payment under the Payment of Members’ Expenses Act 19896, or (ii) during a national emergency, of enlisting in or being appointed to a commission in any of Her Majesty's forces; (b) a person becomes a member of a local authority on his making a declaration of acceptance of office as such pursuant to section 10 of the Local Elections Act 19867.

5 VI p.312 6 1989 c.4 7 1986 c.10

K e y s Page 4 o f 13 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 (10) A member of Tynwald who accepts an office of profit shall be eligible for re-election to any constituency on his vacating such office. 7 Penalty for sitting or voting when seat vacant If the seat of a member of Tynwald has become vacant and he sits or votes as a member of Tynwald, the Council or the Keys during the vacancy of the seat, he is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £5,000 in respect of each occasion upon which he so sits or votes. Oaths 8 Members to take oaths No member of Tynwald (except the Bishop or the Attorney General) shall be permitted to sit and to vote in Tynwald, the Council or the Keys until he has taken and subscribed the following oaths — Oath of allegiance I [name] do swear by Almighty God [or do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm] that I will be faithful to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second. In this form the name of thè Sovereign for the time being shall from time to time, be substitutedfor the name of Her present Majesty. Oath of office I [name] do swear by Almighty God [or do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm] that I will well and truly serve as a member of Tynwald, and will use my best endeavours to maintain the ancient laws and customs of this Isle, and will justly and truly deliver my opinion and do right in all matter which shall be put to me without favour or affection, affinity or consanguinity, love or fear, reward or gain, or for any hope thereof, but in all things deal uprightly and justly and do wrong to no maw.11 Privileges 9* Privileges Tynwald, the Council and the Keys, and the members of Tynwald, the Council and the Keys, shall have, exercise and perform the same power and authority, and be subject to the like obligations (except where expressly otherwise provided by this Act), and be entitled to and enjoy the same rights and privileges, in as full and ample qianner as the Keys, and the members thereof, heretofore had, exercised and performed, and was or were entitled to and enjoyed.

NEW SCHEDULE Section A2(3). SCHEDULE A2 SUBSTITUTED SCHEDULE 1 TO THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1995 "SCHEDULE 1 CONSTITUENCIES Name Number of Area members Ayre 1 The parish districts of Andreas, Bride and Lezayre Castletown 1 The town district of Castletown Douglas East 2 That part of the borough of Douglas comprising the polling districts of St Ninian's, Crescent, Murrays, Strand, Tynwald and Windsor. Douglas North That part of the borough of Douglas comprising the polling districts of Garden City, Glencrutchery and Willaston.

K e y s Page 5 of 13 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 Douglas South 3 That part of the borough of Douglas comprising the polling districts of Anagh Coar, Ballaughton, Pulrose, Quay, St. George's and Eastiield. Douglas West 2 That part of the borough of Douglas comprising the polling districts of Albany, Ballabrooie, Somerset and Derby. Garff 2 The village district of Laxey and the parish districts of Lonan and Maughold. Glenfaba 1 The parish districts of German and Patrick Malew 1 The parish district of Malew Michael 1 The local government district of Michael and the parish districts of Ballaugh and Jurby. Middle 2 The parish districts of Braddan, feonaa and Marown. Onchan 4 The local government district of Onchan. Peel 2 The town district of Peel. Ramsey 3 The town district of Ramsey. Rushen 4 The village districts of Port Erin and Port St Mary and the parish districts of Arbory and Rushen. Note: a reference in this Schedule to any district is to that district as it existed on the 1st January 2003.

CLAUSE 1 ; SCHEDULE 1 Page 1 line 1, for clause 1 substitute — 1. Constitution of Council and Keys (i) The Council shall consist of 11 members, as follows —- (a) the President of Tynwald; (b) the Bishop; (c) the Attorney General; (d) 8 members elected under section 1A ("the elected members of the Council"). (2) The Attorney General shall not have the right to vote in Tynwald or in the Council, and his presence shall not reckon towards the constitution of a quorum of Tynwald or the Council. (3) The Keys shall consist of the members of Tynwald elected under the Representation of the People Act 19958, excluding the members specified in subsection (1). 1A. Election of Chief Minister and members of Council (1) The President of Tynwald or, if the office of President of Tynwald is vacant, the Governor shall, as soon as may be after a general election of members of Tynwald, summon the members of Tynwald to assemble for the purposes of elections under subsection (2); and the members of Tynwald assembled in pursuance of such a summons shall be to all intents and purposes a sitting of Tynwald.

8 1995 c. 13

K e y s P a g e 6 o f ! 3 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 (2) At the sitting held in pursuance of a summons under subsection (1) Tynwald — (a) shall nominate the Chief Minister in accordance with section 2 of the Council of Ministers Act 19909, (b) if the office of President of Tynwald is vacant, shall next elect the President of Tynwald in accordance with section IB, and (c) shall then elect 8 members of the Council in accordance with Schedule 1. (3) Where the seat of an elected member of the Council is vacated otherwise than by the dissolution of Tynwald, Tynwald shall, as soon as may be after the vacancy in the members of Tynwald is filled, or after the election of the President of Tynwald, as the case may be, elect one of their number in accordance with Schedule 1 to fill the vacancy in the elected members of the Council. (4) The President of Tynwald and the Bishop shall not have the right to vote in an election under subsection (2)(a) or (c) or (3).

Page 6, for Schedule 1 substitute — Section 1A. SCHEDULE 1 ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL Selection of elected members o f Council 1. In any election of members of the Council under section 1A(2) one member shall be chosen from the elected members of Tynwald representing each of the following constituencies — Douglas North Douglas South Garff Middle Onchan Peel Ramsey Rushen Casual vacancies 2. Paragraph 1 applies with any necessary modifications to an election under section 1 A(3) as it applies to an election under section 1 A(2). Procedure for election 3- (1) Any proposal that a person be elected as an elected member of the Council shall be made in writing and delivered to the Clerk of Tynwald not less than 7 days before the sitting of Tynwald at which the election falls to be made. (2) No person shall be so elected unless at least 17 votes are recorded in his favour.

9 1990 c.3

K e y s Page 7 o f 13 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 (3) If a person has a majority of the votes of the members of Tynwald present and voting recorded in his favour but the majority is less than 17 votes, the members of Tynwald shall forthwith vote separately on the name of that person and, if he then receives a majority o f at least 17 votes, he shall be elected a member of the Council. (4) Where 2 or more persons receive a majority of the votes of the members of Tynwald present and voting but the majorities of those persons are less than 17 votes, Tynwald shall forthwith vote separately upon the name of the person who received the largest majority and so on in the order of their majorities. Where there is an equality in the amount of 2 or more majorities, die order in which such persons shall be voted upon separately shall be decided by lot (5) This paragraph has effect subject to paragraph 4. Selection by elected members representing constituency 4. (1) Where a nomination complying with sub-paragraph (2) is delivered to the Clerk of Tynwald not less than 7 days before the sitting of Tynwald at which the sitting of Tynwald at which (apart from this paragraph) the election would fall to be made, the person thereby nominated shall be deemed to have been elected a member of the Council pursuant to section lA(2)(c). (2) A nomination under sub-paragraph (1) shall — (a) be in writing; (b) nominate one of the members of Tynwald representing one of the constituencies specified in paragraph 1 as a member of the Council; and (c) be signed by all of the members representing that constituency. (3) A nomination under sub-paragraph (1) shall be of no effect where the person nominated is — (a) nominated as Chief Minister pursuant to section lA(2)(a), or (b) elected President of Tynwald pursuant to section lA(2)(b). (4) Where a member of Tynwald representing any constituency is nominated in accordance with this paragraph, no member representing that constituency shall be eligible to be elected a member of the Council in accordance with paragraph 3.

CLAUSE 2 : SCHEDULE 2 Page 2 line 1 > for clause 2 substitute — 2. President of Tynwald (1) Tynwald shall from time to time by resolution elect an elected member of Tynwald to be President of Tynwald. (2) The person elected to be President of Tynwald shall forthwith go out of office as an elected member of Tynwald. (3) The office of President of Tynwald shall be vacated — (a) on the death of the President of Tynwald; (b) on his resignation by notice in writing to the Governor, (c) on his removal by a resolution of Tynwald; (d) the day of the first ordinary sitting of Tynwald held in the month during which falls the 5th anniversary of the sitting at which he was elected; or

K e y s Page 8 o f 13 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 (e) where he was elected to fill a casual vacancy, the day when the person in whose place he was elected would ordinarily have gone out of office; and section 6(2) to (4) and (6) to (9) of the Representation of the People Act 1995 applies to the office of President of Tynwald as it applies to the seat of an elected member of Tynwald, with the substitution of references to the Governor for references to the President of Tynwald. (4) Where the seat of an elected member of Tynwald is vacated, his seat as a member of the Council or the Keys, as the case may be, shall also be vacated; and the seat of an elected member of the Council or member of the Keys may not be vacated otherwise than — (a) on the vacation of his seat as a member of Tynwald, (b) on his election to be President of Tynwald, or (c) in the case of a member of the Keys, on his election to be an elected member of the Council. (5) Where the President of Tynwald goes out of office under subsection (3)(d) or (e), he shall be eligible for re-election; and accordingly the reference in subsection (1) to an elected member of Tynwald includes a reference to a retiring President of Tynwald who is eligible for re-election by virtue of this subsection. (6) The Governor shall, as soon as may be after the vacation of the office of President of Tynwald (otherwise than under subsection (3)(d) or (e)), summon Tynwald for the purpose of electing the President of Tynwald. 2A. Office of Speaker (1) The members of the Keys shall — (a) on their first assembling after the election of members of the Council under section 1A, and (b) on the vacation of the office of Speaker under subsection (2)(a), (b) or (c), forthwith proceed to elect one of their number to be Speaker. (2) The office of Speaker shall be vacated — (a) on the death of the Speaker; (b) on his resignation by notice in writing to the Secretary of the Keys; (c) on his removal by a vote of the Keys; (d) on the vacation of his seat as a member of the Keys; (e) on the vacation of his seat as a member of Tynwald; (f) by the dissolution of Tynwald.

CLAUSE 3 Page 2 line 24, for clause 3 substitute —

K e y s Page 9 o f 13 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 3. Voting in Tynwald Notwithstanding anything from time to time contained in the standing orders of Tynwald, the Council and the Keys shall not vote separately on any question in Tynwald but shall vote as one body.

CLAUSE 4 Page 3 line 26, for clause 4 substitute — 4. Bill rejected by Council or Keys (1) Where a Bill — (a) is passed by either Branch in any session, and (b) having been sent to the other Branch, is not passed by that Branch within 12 months after it is sent, it shall be placed on the order paper of the next available sitting of Tynwald, and the member of Tynwald by whom the third reading of the Bill was moved in the Branch by which it was passed shall move that it be approved by Tynwald. (2) If that member fails or is unable to move a resolution under subsection (1), any other member of Tynwald may at that sitting move that the Bill be approved by Tynwald. (3) A Bill placed on the order paper under subsection (1) and approved by the affirmative vote of at least 17 elected members of Tynwald shall be deemed to have been passed by both Branches and, if it is signed by not less than 17 members of Tynwald, both Branches shall be deemed to have concurred therewith, although it may not have been signed by a quorum of each Branch. (4) A Bill to amend any of the Constitution Acts 1919 to 2003 shall not be treated as having been passed by the Keys for the purpose of subsection (l)(a) unless it has received at least 16 votes in its favour at the third reading. (5) A Bill shall not be treated for the purpose of subsection (l)(b) as passed by a Branch unless it is passed either — (a) without amendments, or (b) with such amendments only as are approved by both Branches. (6) In this section — "Branch” means the Council or the Keys; "elected member" means an elected member of the Council or a member of the Keys.

CLAUSE 9 : SCHEDULES 2 & 3 Page 4 line 29, at the end insert -—

K e y s Page 10 o f 13 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 "(3) The transitional provisions set out in Schedule 4 shall have effect."

Page 7, for Schedule 2 substitute — Section 9(1). SCHEDULE 2 AMENDMENT OF ENACTMENTS The Constitution Act 1990 (c.6) 1. For section 5(2) substitute — "(2) The office of Deputy President of Tynwald shall be vacated — (a) on the death of the Deputy President of Tynwald; (b) on his resignation by notice in writing to the President of Tynwald or, if the office of President of Tynwald is vacant, to the Governor; (c) on his removal by a resolution of Tynwald.*'. The Representation of the People Act 1995 (c.13) 2. (1) In section 14(1), for paragraphs (f) and (g) substitute — "(f) any member of Tynwald; (g) any person who has served as a member of Tynwald in the session immediately preceding the election, or in the current session in the case of a by-election." (2) In section 15(a), for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald". (3) In section 55, in the definition of "candidate", for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald”. (4) In section 56(1), for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald". (5) In section 66, for "the Keys'1 (in each place) substitute "Tynwald". (6) In section 77 — (a) in the definition of "election", for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald"; (b) for the definition of "member" substitute — ""member" means a member of Tynwald (other than the President of Tynwald, the Bishop or the Attorney General (7) In Schedule 1, in paragraphs 1, 51 and 52, for "the Keys" (in each place) substitute "Tynwald". (8) In Schedule 3 — (a) in paragraph 6, 8, 15 and 17(1), for "the Keys" substitute 'Tynwald”; (b) in paragraphs 8, 14, 15, 17, for "Speaker" (in each place) substitute "President of Tynwald"; (c) in paragraph 17(2), for "he shall not sit or vote in the Keys until the Keys have been informed of the report on the petition" substitute "he shall not sit or vote in Tynwald, or in the Council or the Keys, until Tynwald has been informed of the report on the petition". (9) In Schedule 4 — (a) in paragraph 1 — (i) for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald"; (ii) for "Speaker" substitute "President of Tynwald"; (b) for paragraph 8 substitute —■

K e y s Page 11 o f 13 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 ”8. In section 11 (constituencies), for "the number of members specified in relation thereto in column 2 of that table" substitute "one member".

Page 7, for Schedule 3 substitute — Section 9(3). SCHEDULE3 ENACTMENTS REPEALED Reference Short title Extent of repeal Xp.390 The Isle of Man Constitution Sections 6 to 23. Amendment Act 1919. Sections 25 and 26. XIX p.586 The Isle of Man Constitution Act Section 2. 1961' Section 10. XXI p.I04 The Isle of Man Constitution Act The whole Act. 1969. 1971 c.13 The Isle of Man Constitution Act The whole Act. 1971. 1971 c.34 The Isle of Man Constitution The whole Act* (Elections to Council) Act 1971. 1975 c.l2 The Isle of Man Constitution The whole Act (Amendment) Act 1975. 1978 c.l The Constitution (Amendment) The whole Act Act 1978. 1990 c.6 The Constitution Act 1990. Sections 2 and 3. In Schedule 1, paragraphs 3 and 4(1) and (2). 1995 c.13 The Representation of the People In section 17(1), the words "or (b) Act 1995. becomes a member of the Council,".

10 1984 c.3

2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 K e y s Page 12 o f 13 11 of the Representation of the People Act 1995 as it has effect on the passing of this Act, be prepared for the constituencies specified in the said section 11 as substituted by section A2. Polling districts 4. Not later than the 31st March 2006 the Department of Local Government and the Environment shall exercise the functions conferred by section 12 of the said Act of 1995. Dissolution o f the Keys 5. (1) The Keys may not be dissolved pursuant to section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1995 after the passing of this Act. (2) The Keys shall stand dissolved on the 19th October 2006. First election of members o f Tynwald 6. The Governor shall, as soon as may be after the 19th October 2006, issue writs for a general election of members of Tynwald Isle ofMan Board of Education 7. Where a casual vacancy in the members of the Isle of Man Board of Education arises after the 30th June 2006 and before the 1st October 2007 — (a) no election to fill the vacancy shall be held; but (b) the Department of Education shall, with his consent, appoint a person qualified to be elected a member of the Board to fill the vacancy, and the person so appointed shall hold office until the member in whose place he was appointed would ordinarily have gone out of office.

CLAUSE 10 Page 4 line 30, for clause 10 substitute — 10. Short title and commencement (1) This Act may be cited as the Constitution Act 2003, and the Constitution Acts 1919 to 1990 and this Act may be cited together as the Constitution Acts 1919 to 2003. (2) The following provisions shall come into operation on the 1st January 2006 — (a) section 9, so far as it relates to the provisions specified in paragraphs (c) and (d); 1 (b) this section; (c) paragraph 1 of Schedule 2; and (d) paragraphs 3,4 and 5(1) of Schedule 4. (3) Except as provided by subsection (2), this Act shall come into operation on the 19th October 2006.

K e y s Page 13 o f 13 2 0 0 3 - 0 5 - 2 6 j Appendix 2

Newspaper advertisement inviting interested members of the public to submit evidence in writing and the replies received

Selec t C o m m ittee of th e H o u se of K eys on th e C onstitution (Leg isla tiv e C o u n c il) B ill

The five Members elected to the Select Committee were Mrs B J Cannell MHK, Mrs H Hannan MHK, Hon J Rimington MHK, Hon S C Rodan MHK and the Hon J A Brown SHK.

The Select Committee invites written submissions by members of the public to reach the undersigned no later than 30th June 2003 on the manner in which the Legislative Council should be elected and by whom, whether the House of Keys and the Legislative Council should be elected at the same time and from the same constituencies, whether in that event Members should choose among themselves which Branch they would belong to following such a combined election, and any other matter which is considered to relate to these issues. Malachy Comwell-Kelly Secretary to the House of Keys Legislative Buildings, Douglas IM1 3PW

TO: Classified Advertising Section

Could you please insert the above in the Public Notices section of the next issue of the Courier, Examiner and Independent newspapers. Please invoice Clerk of Tynwald, Clerk of Tynwald's Office, Legislative Buildings, Douglas.

If there are any queries please contact Mrs Maurren Gray on 685502. MAUGHOLD ALEXANDER DRIVE DOUGLAS ISLE OF MAN IM2 3QX TEL. 01624 675068 18th June 2003

Malachy Comwell-KeUy Secretary to the House of Keys Legislative Buildings Douglas IMI 3PW

Dear Mr Comwell-Kelly

Select Committee of the House of Keys on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill

I enclose my written submission on the issues outlined in the public advertisement which appeared in the press a week or two ago. I apologise for the fact that the views that I have expressed may not be set out under the paragraphs which we are invited to address. In addition, I have referred to issues which in my view relate to the spirit of the Bill rather than the three somewhat narrow issues outlined in the advertisement. I make no apology for this because the contents and indeed the spirit of the Bill include important matters which will influence the Island’s democratic development.

I will of course make myself available if the Select Committee should wish to interview me on my submission provided of course that a mutually convenient time can be arranged.

I trust that the enclosure may be of some interest.

Yours sincerely

MA &***1

Jim Cain THE CONSTITUTION (LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL) BILL

THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF KEYS.

Purpose of the Bill

To provide for the election of the Legislative Council by the electorate instead of by the House of Keys and to prescribe for the Legislative Council the specific function of scrutinising proposed legislation of all kinds.

The Public are invited to submit written submissions on -

1. The manner in which the Legislative Council should be elected and by whom.

2. Whether the House of Keys and the Legislative Council should be elected at the same time and from the same constituencies.

3. Whether, in that event, members should choose among themselves which branch they would belong to following such a combined election.

And

4. Any other matter which is considered to relate to these issues.

Each of the four issues outlined are discussed separately in the following document in the order in which they appear above.

i 1- The manner in which the Legislative Council should be elected and by whom

I am of the opinion that the Legislative Council should be elected by postal ballot in the manner outlined in section 2 and schedule 1 of the Bill.

I have formed this opinion because it is my view that the Island should retain its existing tricameral system of government with each of the present branches being retained with the same total membership in each branch that is 24 in the House of Keys and 11 as outlined in section 1 of the Bill in the Legislative Council.

It is my view that the functions of the three bodies should broadly remain as they are now and that the evolution of democratic government in this island should be a step by step process, to the intent that each step taken should be tested and evolve so that any necessary amendments to each step can be made before the next step is taken.

It is my view that the primary purpose of the Bill should be to remove the power presently vested in the House of Keys for the election of 8 of the members of the Legislative Council and that this function should be performed by the public on the basis set out in the Bill thus giving the public the democratic right to elect eight members of the Council.

The matter as to whether the Lord Bishop should have both a seat on the Council and be able to vote has exercised the mind of many of the members of the House of Keys who spoke during the debate on the second reading of the Bill. It is my view that the Bishop should remain a member of the Legislative Council and should be encouraged to give his opinion on whatever matters he is asked to consider but because he is a Crown appointee and for this reason only I do not think as a matter of principle that he should be able to exercise a vote. The position of the President and the Attorney General should remain as now. 2. Whether the House of Kevs and the Legislative Council should be elected at the same time and from the same constituencies.

It is my view that the members of the House of Keys and the Legislative Council should be elected at the same time from the constituencies presently existing in so far as the House of Keys is concerned and those detailed in schedule 1 of the Bill for election to the Legislative Council.

It is in my view important that a boundary commission should be set up for the purpose of examining and perhaps revising the boundaries of the present House of Keys constituencies with a possible consequent effect on the boundaries of the electoral areas applicable for Council elections as set out in schedule 1 to the Bill. There are large anomalies in the present constituency boundaries, and in any event I am firmly of the opinion that each registered voter in the Island should have the same number of votes for elections to both branches. I think it is wrong for the registered voters in Rushen and Onchan to each have 3 votes and for 8 of the constituencies to have 1 member each. It might be that it would be preferable to have 24 single seat constituencies or indeed 12 2- seat constituencies, but either of these options would in my view be more democratic than the present system. The total number of registered voters as at September 2002 was 57,608, which would give each constituency 2,400 voters if they all had the same electorate. I realise that this ideal is not attainable for practical reasons but would suggest that the present disparity needs careful examination to try and attain a greater degree of democratic equality.

At some time in the future, but not at present, I would suggest that it might be necessary to review and revise the electoral areas set out in schedule 1 under which the members of the Legislative Council will be elected so as to tty and attain the same objective as outlined in the preceding paragraph, perhaps by inviting the registered voters in each of 3 House of Keys constituencies to elect 1 member to the Council by postal ballot.

I see no problem except in an organisational sense in arranging for the elections to both branches to be held at the same time on the basis that the House of Keys would continue as heretofore and the Legislative Council elections would be taken by postal ballot. As a consequence each registered voter would have perhaps either 2 or 3 votes (if the House of Keys constituencies were revised) - 1 or 2 for the House of Keys and 1 for the Council.

It may be outside the remit of the Select Committee, but I think consideration should be given as I believe takes place in Australia, for each voter to exercise his or her vote on the basis that penalties would be imposed if one failed to exercise this democratic obligation. 3. Whether, in that event* members should choose among themselves which branch they should belong to following such a combined election.

It is my view that members should not choose amongst themselves which branch they should belong to following a combined election. The right to choose should belong to the registered voters of the Isle of Man in the knowledge that the present functions of the Council should be varied, but that the primary purpose of Tynwald, that is to deal with policy, finance and in my view questions to ministers, should remain as it is now. I am further of the view that the Legislative Council should as one of its principal functions, be a revising chamber to scrutinise as it does now the Bills which are passed through all their stages in the House of Keys. To this important function should be added the responsibility as set out in the Bill of being responsible for scrutinising subordinate legislation but in my view European legislation should not form part of the responsibility of the Council.

European and indeed constitutional matters have and are becoming of increasing importance in the development of proper policies by the Council of Ministers and I would suggest that these important issues should in a political sense become the responsibility of a department of government headed by a minister who would be both responsible to and accountable to Tynwald. It might be that such a department might include more than one member of the Legislative Council but the overriding principle in electing or appointing members to this new department should be their perceived ability to look after and deal with the important issues involved (section 7).

I do not think that the Council should be given this responsibility as the people elected thereto may not be seen to be those best suited to look after the issues that would be involved. It is my view that the Treasury and indeed this proposed new department would perhaps be the two most important ministerial responsibilities and departments within government.

Thus to existing duties of the Legislative Council, that is scrutiny of both primary legislation and government policies and functions I would add scrutiny of subordinate legislation to the intent that their primary obligation would be to monitor the activities of both Government and the House of Keys. They should however retain the right (rarely exercised) of introducing primary legislation and I would disagree with the provisions of section 5 of the Bill.

The Policy Document issued on an annual basis in the name of the Chief Minister does not in my view apart from an initial appraisal receive the attention that should be given to it. The implementation of approved departmental policies could be scrutinised from time to time by the Council who could be required to report thereon to Tynwald under the provisions of section 6 (i) of the Bill. 4. Any other matter which is considered to relate to these issues.

a. The Chief Minister and the other members of the Council of Ministers should be chosen from the whole of Tynwald on the basis of perceived ability and not as is suggested in section 8 be restricted to members of the House of Keys.

b. The Member for Ayre has suggested quite rightly in my view that the elected members of the Legislative Council should not be involved in constituency matters. I agree with the views that he has put forward on this matter but can understand that problems may well arise when electors in any of the 8 constituencies wish to raise matters with an elected representative who has been appointed as a member of the Council in a democratic election. I do not know how to overcome this problem and doubt whether appropriate legislation would have the desired effect.

c. As I am of the opinion that both the Chief Minister and all other ministers should be elected / appointed from Tynwald, it seems to me that questions should not be allowed in the House of Keys but should form part of the ongoing agenda for Tynwald each month.

d. As you might expect, I am strongly against any form of age limit being imposed on candidates for election to either of the branches. I take this view because in my opinion such an artificial barrier may not be in the interest of either the Isle of Man or of Tynwald and the branches.

e. I have not yet had time to examine the position in other countries but it has been suggested to me and the Select Committee may care to make suitable enquiries as to the position that exists in the Upper Houses of the Australian states.

f. I am a little confused, having attempted to understand both the verbatim Hansard of the debate that took place on the second reading of the Bill on 1st April 2003 and the relevant extract at item 5 of the Votes and Proceedings. I had formed the opinion that the long title of the Bill having been amended, as indeed it was, that the committee of 5 appointed to take evidence would indeed be taking evidence on the Bill with the amended long title. Apparently this is not the case and I am at a loss to understand the remit of the Select Committee as a consequence. Thorstein Mount Gawne Road Colby Isle of Man JM9 4BA

Mr Malachy Comwell-Kelly Secretary to the House of Keys Legislative Buildings Douglas IM1 3PW

Tiri June 2003

Dear Sir

Re: Constitution Legislative Council

I wish to re-submit my views on the Legislative Council, as given to the 1998 Select Committee.

There are persons of proven ability on the Island who would consider it an honour to be nominated for a Legislative Council whose role would be to scrutinise legislation.

These people would not normally stand as constituency M.H.K. ’s and their taient is presently wasted to the government.

If a list of suitable candidates was approved by the Keys Members (as at present) and on an all-island basis, the public election could be held at the same time as the House of Keys election, the nine with the highest votes to be elected.

As these people would not be constituency members they would not have to visit homes electioneering.

Their C.V. would be sufficient and they would hopefully be independent, with an All- Island viewpoint.

I would be in favour of a postal ballot.

With regard to Mr Quine’s proposed Bill, if it was accepted I would agree that it had the essential element of direct public election, but feel that holding a Legislative Council election one year before a Key’s election would cause chaos, with some trying for ‘two bites at the cherry’ causing friction, bitterness and expense.

It would be better to hold the election halfway through Keys Term or at the same

(" r e c e i v e d 2 4 JUN 2003

OFKCE OF Tii£ CLERK OF TYNWALD I would like to comment that I am not in favour of Mr V. Kneale’s solution as it would not give the Public direct election of Legislative Council and would have the effect of making it an ordinary committee of the Keys.

Finally, it seems a little strange that expensive refurbishment of the Legislative Chambers are taking place without the situation of Legislative Council being settled.

Yours faithfully

R.H. Costain iS Cfí.offK80UJiMe A v e n u s J>eu

U B & . s ) 0fec% eZ3*i¿i ¿3~ü62><ï$o& oe.oÿ. ¿ ¿ ^ 4 ,

/ % $o77uJ& $~Jb$bj

cr & 7¿cfó£ Áer& JüíC í m ¿nvZ& n j¿¿¿^Tuas-eaitb f o Qfe/kc& $o7&pU$!¿s &¿ d h & teer/'/ted a ¿á$¿ts/.¿o om tn

tí* , ßaw fi& t& tri. (y¿fóM ¿¿zíó& $< x¿nc¿£j/?>-<& ,

7JL j ¿¿¿7rt4)6 uno ¿&>e_ ¿n, '3 /x z ^ á . s \ / Ì V i . -' J j j a ' a S - ' '/ / r " ( t ) c£jÓ M Cüi trfZC c úaío^J¿¿»i óáaÁaa .

¿oÁlM fe ¿¿fan en ¿tsxé ¿¿wc& '% 4?4^<&$¿c£.

W xo (!> n¿ic!£¡!¿ /& & *£. août eJïtâ s)

ifet& m e. /yew tJetd ^ w L iM w oe.^

Ú f o J f í b tMJÍt/Já OTL M & /3¿¿/ ^/¡fiT'fécfóar-^e¿¿ft¿ ¿)A#¡4.¿7i

aám ¿0n -M o/û/ ar€az& & ¿áaToe. ^ ¿ ^ ¿ M ¿ ú > l ¿% /tn eo& tá a¿~ /p/e)e¿t$.

4 r ¿feM yo ¿h ¿(z: /J& ús.

Á ¿ # z ¿ > ° z ’. (d . /i¿ ¿ (! M tfcgzfóeeát ¿ft^esfé.$ci42/n£¿¡f tv i ÿH ôôû ¿Sxa c& ostJcea /

*/> /*eo& ud $¿/%¿> ¿ feà 'Jìjto fa iià u i& t / / i r - —— / . _ . /V/ , '

7 f tyettuj etJL&r ¿ fé¿/& e&20S¿¿cei¿¿

ao tya?tóM¿£0vL¿. - ., * >-a - i 0) <$ 'rtdttoáp* /5amtc¿u¿*uu¿a

( j ç ^ Q fo é^d w yU d /fa ¿Á& udná $¿¿& ú0ofc¿>/Có7ió¿¿¿u¿nc¿e4 . ^ (d ) Q )e¿a¿¿i o^ /hdcà/m iinâaM ÿ ^ u o - f á m .,

rv i <*h /¿ Se.fa Oiüf. C72l¿ etH óáaez, fctâ ü 0

J¿é¿#4 4¿nce*e¿L

" fíc& r- fáí¿¿A ç. K ti. KMSAk e , C B¿>. * ¿¿C$77UA¿¿4F7L /H T¿Ù- O f& éts/r Æ/fTifovuÆzf.

✓ c& n. c/a¿>n Äave. Aa¿¿ inore,

&CX¿ &r /9¿Z o n t / /99/< tâ i/r & 7?l£- C? ¿J2¿4

atieé /O /njyiúéd t& uwn. ¿t /üfi& e¿r ¿ri

& 44¿r..yüe& a^ks.. & é~ -3 x& x& -a¿ éré #- 4 ¿ ¿ á téítt& t/. '7224M ¿rt¿Z ('$ 1 A nH ^xJ^f- / 97fc c0 M IO ¿Ócs f o y * a ß t <$* H £ ^ r ~ ^ > 7 9 2 J n 4 é é >

~7M eatri c? ?^e4¿¿24n£0¿ /* u i S e¿ ^^/^t é$0¿¿#ic¿/? ¿¿¿u/ ■ S '/ú tft/. f a r - m * t ¿ > ¿ V ¿ ñ /cáete fe r- '* * 7 / cl s i /naó2¿¿>e.'M^r,,A *V^dr,S^.Lï- .Û y.

'ñctr^Z ^ /$ ue&7<4 ¿7\¿n M/£& & Á ítfo & ?i£étn/¡ u¿> ¿to Q jß>ea^0t~ <%¡ ¿ r > t * _ / 9 ¥ / .

Y)¿¿muz /Cui fierio xl J m foz/uaeat ¿iru¿ /'/ /<. £L '¿€#'<*¿0 0 -/ /Q u / z í / í L /!^~~' - - y > ¿réca/t . / / Vi ■érw a£¿~ a ^tyu /ír éudôfarC tiajÆ CÁá^bO ^o ¿?\ tyC¿> /yu iÁ izJl.

¿ /z. o& art/afcoe. Satvnccß* , . ¿í lü7 ¿s

a v e ,

C 07L /& ñ¿> ¿ & M Ú i/m v {áá¿¿Á Á&o faxán /)& ££’ asa*tj /¡y /WtM- 071. (/

(¿) <$?L ájpnX /9fóá> t44i¿/to£i/'- ^ É c¿ /

d & > ¿ a h e d ^ r &7vo¿¿re- j/t ¿9^a»úáJi¿j ¿S $z J¿4¿> Jìdd a. ■/&!. <@¿t*ár7i¿n¿ó i&

/O an¿¿ ¿sao ¿úh. ^0yr/~¿F v9ni¿ZéiL t-efitrdeZ f <&- £ & 0 c£ t*~ ¿¿t &

/è st ¿4/£& /¿ u to $*t vtf~ v-tt/ëa -á r-2 • $u/~ a* /96& tfedznt/! J&é%>eo^Q~/KenÁíí '/ Ù L < z ¿ c é ¿ * ¿ . < / * fíu rr t$ tÁg, $w uini£ S& cfórrLj en. ¿UL / s¿tfro&7nj¿4r- /<)4¿> ¿&L ' e£ic/<5 inavn/ery ¿$- ¿¿^ $otm ¿¿£,

nÁ rt ¿ rfrt. rt~e/ec£¿c/<~ ¿ ét tá r jl /n& »dí>r ■& f f t f K & r r & ¿& iJa/a,£/óaau¿oz. o f ¿ fe rt£¿bm e¿á

*y<í0i&r-¿U- & -< j¿ctclii4 /& £. c¿&ÓL ¿ er & /& c/c0?t4 /¡ r $ 0 ¿ ¿ ? tec/ 4 / & 0 - ¿ ¡ ¿ ¿ fc - CÂam^&d £r~M g G ru/ 0^$s/rM ¿l*u^

¿ 2 /& h ~ c l o&*L S tfár- e/ecÙ jyi (kJ^Uxuan. -¿fort ¿itére. m e^tle^é avi ¿tèi* c$b*¿t-e- /3tÿ& . * « . 0

irifcvz/uaL Á¡^> -0onoá^i /¿ ¿ > > t /faz07idot0)U~ ¿&*rt

Á r Ó o ¿ > o 7 i £ - ¿ o c . Áá¿¿ é tr ¿zÁt?i¿¿¿/?i. fó&u¿&e_ ¿ /M z, $ fa ß r& /

IsfeätZ iyL j <&*s( ¿ fe o& ërs- ú& ea¿~ M ía Ár£ü¿& aonaJn ¿5(fg ? v4 ¿ /4 /2 éí¿

$ w & r y i 4 - r - ¿ & ~ ¿t/fiom é" /tv ó pU hn^& o fír& 0& M £¿& C $0&n¿¿/ &WI ttß sri£?}t¿&*3 ajétr/& r~

e á a f á f V *

ú J/ l d £s% e /$¿/¿á *foo ®u>en .

fty~(STr¿&á é r * f ¿¿z £8^y& áv9¿^ ¿k

-lo&re. ¿¿fá/0ndfe¿( ¿L $24¿¿¿ya c¿>rr < & / - ¿2¿&r- cfe&Áe4¿a ¿acúc¿ Jh ^U àéà2ù>e- ■pQjO$££¿ ij a?u!¿ a/faF -

M je r£ r '£ ¿ ¿ 4 j? 0 >v 4 ¿ M ¿ j J ( j i l SW -ÜZZO a û ^i tu ¿ á ^tú a d L « jJ t/à zJ- de/vtfej (fot' $ôanÀsC dz¿uje¿¿ 26 cwü!¿¿

0 # l¿{ ¿o áM á AfüV&»iÁ&*~ /9& 7 ¿Ly Ját J? /*? ( § ) f in - 3 ^ Al&rsÁ. /97& c / ¿¿2fá. ~ ~ ^ -■-*•-■ -°’'- ^

-ô à e > oQ m ú &í ¿C(H- (/éou tiad. (tf/Ly/& // /¿3¿, v&^/fóA/ /97&S c?j6eroua¿¿e/té& ve*. ¿£- Se¿o/w i4¿j?i & i of/& > takyf ßrtde*) ¿?i ¿rafe*- ■> cm á£zda?*ie-.e& kx an a?ad?¿vere, cfrrrv ea/ etá & C p u /’ æ . ¿/c& ¿occm .

tfX /z. ¿feft. ¿*j &h / ~ ¿ ( P i # é e $€- i ¿ / anç{ kmo $2ß*»£_ /&—&£& h a?v /áz &4¿JÚ¿, /9 7 0 - ,

0 ? l ¿¿e. a/M z, &/3h/~o/ /t&ô S€ó¿< y h/fo A e¿id ¿i fê/èvK & j on¿C ^ t^ ¿ 3 ^ '^ taaíi^ e}

emZJ'L- . /jfc l ^3*2^A ~ , V faoév*Ur ^ >er- ¿¿O w >/ëd ¿$y£. -@OUmco/ &&(/€. ¿O CL /$¿t¿ú*L£í ¿m. ¿¡&L /z/j& eee& dtër- /9 7 0 „ . j J a A a n d atw C a. cäxJkr& njL# 6X $,

/■¿eua /tfi& j 4>*Ÿ€- a. ¿2t?$jt2a¿/¿*ua a* ¿ ¿ é . /â ^ d¿Mu¿a*% l. cm âéa Ÿ^/yaJ& i /97/. *

(llM /Ë o-é' c¿áa/¿w 2 ¿sc$¿ ¿éfy /& /& û$ &Ùo ¿ té/ïtt/¿¿C a// C(

ßrocttU z M e*nü& f¿ /2i#¿¿>4¿¿Á Â rtven /zd /V& h J& x i * d - 4é¿stá ^ ¿2¿c7¡úrrt&&á J) U

(!?t) 0'TL' /97ty‘ ¿tfiZô /?&ryn¿fej¿¿H & JkfcrtéucJL Sw l/tàù/â, 5 i fêt/g ¿oiú¿Á -um ¿é£& /%? 0 ^ ^ _____

/p tetn éd and ra d iez. a a . j & w í é r . /n& & Jßr e /è â /e j/

&C4 {£¿ ¿duta 9naÁ¿

J , J J/ ,y J, +- . -'07H J>ù2èz. 7>reá0>vá¿/ ^ ^ l o t ä ^

£w 2a¿¿¿¿¿> ¿ tere. & 4/>rcrt>e4/ ^ ¿ ¡ T - 2 -

0 7 1 5 * ^ ff c w t h t y £ ¿ £ ií 3 * ^ /é>P#¿¿ÚC & 2 $2 /2-/$m Á . J t

&U. ¿im

Zt/aa /fé Ju taz /97v- fefire. £^/£ía¿& *$ áX2¿

(C&âfer-, tf& r Sfcìtoàtua M trj ¿í^re st£¿& >u^^ '& ¿(4¿d A ¿0ré/ e^tj¿> /w e0¿ /& _ /£ Ot>¿kd éç n4£~* c^ 3 ^ fêilâdbnci Jtf&O ¿&6ás0-0€&¿ /^& ¿ob 0*1- ^ 0 2 *

^ (Pc¿M¿+~ : y \y O fei/en. atoÿO ¿*2& i\ &n.. &¡& 5^AJÍwes*cÁ -¿¿zó

g& 2¿úá/ ¿ y. &£& /Á xw -e.

é$044bc¿¿ <2? ÍP /v m OsOïèn. ct ¿i*^J. 3*^ ¿&zaaé&y* «w& téó& ér¿t- ¿¿¿£t¿b¿J>i

¿¿¿CCCM ¿ fe*. S /kóa¿£ && u t& é Z , a / w u ¿ ~ ¿ à, ¿ éz, <2tfM * _ a f o c ¿ $ i ¿ tfn ¿ l¿ r c¿*?\, $£>}? t / w V &

¿2n . m ¿¿Cü¿C¿¿U L¿ < / & £> Á J¿¿¡£ d?¡¿¿ C ¿2¿2#7& ¿?te¿¿á>t.

f a n d ' ¿7 /^ù m /E /fen tfó# s $¿¿¿ ¿a,trpt¿¿^^L & f- A s í / J / z ' » - . / * -* 0 - —/ ' y^ v/* ^ -

$ a a n ¿ ¿ 4 frcjeorj 3rSk$¿¿c& % é- âÆ xJ-

~€ & ¿¿c//z¿iO ex cJfa <20 #6 ¿09t¿er- ,/?W nJ^r~ éb jzárétxm cX , A -^ s

Q t J

* * * ■ - (J ■i/?¡ír^oi/¿¿ceaL a ¿& ¿4tÁ¿¿

9^0áu/¿¿d ¿Ti ¿fóij a M í á i s v i ú ¿ ¿ 6 l éa& ¿02¿¿rn & & 1

aw/Âm M i dfroaad& t. ^ u{¿ . u ï c

¿t¿& o tfk¿ r jb0rC 0t?(. <2toyfcup% a¿{^br- cfsdL jZ Í tfa^ y ¿ F r%í¿2z & ve^¿¿3 (W n J?& £ a v , „ e P & C O P L 4 - $A¿Ur&i&ri_ &d c& éé. a¿ //a *i ú /face. 3ó. ^ Q fy fl/972. ¿otJC-ófa

e? s¿ z-^ flan . / ^ W - ¿¿ tf/L im **.

recew z ¿¡»u* sa/íbjL ^

/ 9 S ? /fewd&uú Uct&. . ^ ¿wmzfttL ¿*/¿JC ¿znÿzé& âÉfrt. aw>u¿y*t.i (^e& br' $£a¿tf?n 0?t &¿¡$ÚZ897fh r /

/ j? 7 ^ * $ Ó rf J 0 1 C p 42¿14)j2& /j^C 3S< £f*

ec $fó¿ty> U h^. ad ct /Q o itr0 (j A M faüt fr& ó -¿ ¡fe/? ¿èûS ¿ fà h . ¿2

•ótÁáM r& y^é /?< zçf* O /S ^ fc-e ¿ o & r O L íh - o ¿ec*e/& r¿et£ ¿n^te& ëœ rcÀ. tfü ér oP jói¿ ¿ r ¿n Ò7L ac>e*ïiA g_ ej’

7 & Á & t¿ # 4 ¿2- 071* f!)0+ Á & i> l& t¿£ti*f ¿J& f Æ ¿ftC & dfóffl Pl& z£r& ¿,

r ^ 1 V/ruL. sm 2¿c a¿-<¿¿& / ^ W " e¿a¿in. ¿ fe / dsw enlU /nz^n/*^

a , flaM cer* ¿M rÁ. & *¿t -áéa^n. éé?& g ¿ñ /& & dzi4-ér.

7)^ t¿7n& ao a. a/ób Mÿ#éi£â&£ $0&fuu£ efl d&ca^uL ¿M #r€. 6z^éa¿¿kk áfóó céfouty? Jn r>n . /¿% rdU&&e.Ai„

a^d c¿H¿/d fie. d. $faeÄßt& , '&dj&¿%& o o j l o/úJu¿0yi 40% es &Ct&mQ_ cumÆyU'ç/i/ //& / tfooJL /£ Já eóu/e¿& 1¿¿¿Z ea jíá i fóu st ¿ W $ o w u í ¿

feca& Le_ arruhM -cA ú/ 2 ¡ú /r/£ ^ d i^ 4 k/¿ ¿ ¿ & $ot& n¿>¿¿

é A ó x J d . $€-J2£¿¿/& 0¿ & & /& & & & - 4M ¿ét i£ 0 i£ jn /n ¿kd

cß é-ejj& n. ¿*T (U rn â^d^ 7^3i^n ¿n ^ Gl OTló¿. ao a. canefóátfe t n . / 9 8 1 a^ . ~ , _ ¿

/¿77K ¿S&O c¿#£- ¿trW U l. f í a m ñ d m m m a j ó z . ¿L

¿ n . /b : /áw o fe& ht -á á i, /Q x

& & /¿nz.árS& t/'-eyÓ ao & X Æ eirf^w JLÉz{ ■¿btfhej^jZt-, S/tfaér ¿uai á& 'r& t/-a#

c¿7it/mce¿¿ /rze_. u <7

¿ i / t f i t ¿ l C en ara# SéidZ oy^ 3<&- < á é z cfôe. /tirM w & fd fr-/ffi/

V / b P & ^ h s - .

a a d - Æ / r/ c a u ¿ ' \ 4rrm .j km cÁ, ¿thM t£/À?éô&rts€-.

cm , M ^ , ^ / 2 8 - t . ,s £ % e _ a x £ f Sü2¿d Á f#tí¿0-¿¿r*i &T&Ó Gt ^ e ù c f è è i , <$^¿¿^£ 2, lÿt>eeJe0*~ Ù ïed ÀÇsfajt) á£& e¿&/&¿z ¿a&toa^-áíK.t¿_ ce. /? z j í£ ¿ ? i Z& & - cu¿¿¿¿trzie¿¿ ¿¡be, c é zi^ y ^ ¿¿í~áM3 c¿m¿a#y

¿riáérejzó cd á6& /jip ó . ik£ ^ U ¿ sé& & & ¿£s>i ¿nso ' J * * /ñ> a / y w . .y . V ¿ru- Ù&Z. -éow u îtA' ¿m et J% er¿¿e/a¿g, ¿¿¿¿¿A _ / /f /lo&m, vt^C sririvuq & t-~& >~£éz,Sk écA ectaM * -á6t ¿¿-'C & #v2r*¿ /% íty $M »2*7L/b&uJy & 4^-¿£& 0riM t)cL£ & rdao€- an . & ¿ t 4 b C ¿ £ ¿rttA (Jnart¿r>w «3& j ú¿eÁ a¿& ¿ ¿n J¿ £ m xcríoyj Jfarc£ J¿ ^m £^Je^) & rdkc& 4^_ *¿¿3L &éiC¿¿t¡rLj c?'n&&¿ó2a¿ &pt>&Frit

CL M 4agtv4L ffu w y d tj / 5 / S / r z e r ^ Z . t & Ù S d W M Arn , tffb o tö& fcs tó¿ s& cand. ¿ eat. o % 2 . Jé ® ¿ r m z . n ^oiKjer-^fccaa6í.f é¿¿¿£^ c/rtw& Jl &e7c¿o& t&brme&ru ¿e& téfi.. a4u¿úrr- &ui¿r &0M ÿt£ tow n ¿

^^tw^d/afá¿cf

¿pJw rftM ^ r S-eeÆ , !p& r7n¿d-í¿0>\ étr¿4t/r£c>ú¿ <3 - c t t u í '¿ r -ß rr/b , S 7~I7 ■¿y¿£hn crfiM ifaa 07is¿. < rf ¿ e a /d ,

3 0 ^ ftfo jc /. Ì98SL £ . rvc& ¿(ie¿¿ o fiá ^é . 3^$2¿ie¿tkq -$o¿i4i¿¿¿

&U. crf t/e& fy tëlég woo O¿v0* et ¿Q 'Jfc ¿ y > t £7¿fyÁ ¿/?8z M .tëirdh ¿¿rj. W ' ^ è : -$ ó ¿ ¿ n £ ¿ 7 &&¿/%rh /Z¿$? Ms# read CL gecú7¿¿ ¿0*4' áfc & e^jté¿i_ s& x¿-¿5' ¿i &

■f Cú& cÁ c@ $ec¿ijn £~. ^ 4 o ¿ ^ y n a ^ i _ . ____ vAz— $07?mÁ$ee, 7p^ec&fi2¿í¿ ¿á a?i fâi

/ J g J l «faaojzpfàìa féí y % l ¿ &

c£¿> cáidá*4i eéecfèdt o% 3 3 / 7 l £ # n ¿ f e ^ »

er4 Ér&e i J. Q )r. rfan n . firvpm & d tfm a*i¿¿ in fa j¿ ¿ x &á f) VV *

ún. ¿Ó i. £ 5*4 dovuta**^- $& 5 ^T??t^rL^è& ^reo& ti/è#/

( s n / e f t m ^ s J ^ o t / í vdvui ¿¿n&7L¿mj€¿ó s& /)Áj?lfcúi ó?¿Jtc¿jb-Z¿ c d -33 Á rfuéará* ¿>7 ( J /ß / L JÁ J~ ¿S>sry,ñ />TOo/¿9t-a> Á fñJ>¿

>_ * / /¡¡¿¿úÚ T ci^e &tW &¿¿7 J& hnjévi &~7ua*rz> &¿é~ 4 ¿ J l_ ¿ i Á o A¿ftué¿¿ ¿m /E^Teárt*2*/} ¿fr~S. • Àas//ecetvet,

- ù F T iâ m 3 5 ¿¿ca/audùrrSfeêJ en*-M¿j¿¿oteü¿A&3 a^u¡(

wru&i2sZ^

¿ç&Ô Û7L tfj£ _ / l s ^ T U T T fU ilá/acáce -m d jpitérT É ao é¡!^¿é#L

Á r t é í [0fu}¿Sc^ tfá& tdJL ¿¡J/tête^ / 7 v o te ) y ~ ú ¿ ñ ~ J¿ Z T A 7& fc á t e r z . ______3 3 'zwnfótd £

a¿Á¿£0e. tâô f&b

i œ & 7 y ^

nâ? tá& r' /^ pr/w ilo aatyÆ ât ff/^¿ á r ¿ i ' cP fc*¿ a/¿ - ¿Ó l $ c¿¿' jbrftnire¿ ¿sao

• v v d f ¿ U i /? ih H& 3 ¿5~/çn & ^ /¡lâv etit fa~ -/9 8 -& ., •¿fée. e¿a¿t*¿a _ ¿o#*#- 4 í w ^ ^ f f y ^ c . -¿ é c s & P t & v - e -

/ 5 O&ÓZ ¿%~Ÿ- . flo to ¿feu* Û-ZL $2ad¿tU ¡J /k¿ ¿ &€0?1_ aÁ¿/1H h°¿¿ -¿t¡üv /3té¿á ío&rtL ¿¿¿acÁ&r&zff on- á¿ü> /9o-3 0&4[

46z. 3 ^ $2A¿Úñg eri ^S /2é*0 /£¿& ü/O# 7 & m { A 3 *? '¿¿ffiJÍ. & 4~

/S - ¿ £ r y ) w tW ¿jhú &&n. 8&h/~Át$o4#¿c¿j£ *.

¿£g_ <& & ¿ó$l¿¿e> fi- (0 O ¿ ¿ 4 í ¿ ¿ £ Ç?2izé~ 0>L /(?é£<2ít¿/-& 4í'á^‘

^ n u a ^ <20¿Á- /HJ2£¿&¿] éú£n¿¡ Û 4S ^ /U ¿/^ *¿2% ~¿?¿v* ^ /^ '3eêrtte*f âUr*L /¿L

¿o ¿tftZú ¿&ri SBfU"^^ú- Gmjn¿J& 2 ¿^ uÁó-Ói. 40c a n d a J á * ' Mâ / tâkj ¿k./&#? Jhzxi^W ¿¿xát. ¿Sij^rtn!¿¿*ze¿. a ¿ÍUóSjt Ár do ústfii ¿2/éú/ ¿0h/~¿tr¿Ú^ _ c / ¿ w _ M 8 / f - ¿h. Jàÿo oü oa^e^ **£ ¿ ^ (S k d¿U4o tPó¿Wict¿ A¿>&/ 3 yúeetr* and & ùraô 0u¿fc céeor- är/njß,

J a ¿ 6 ¿ - < ^ " e c¿zé¿U d4*'Q . âuÛ cÂ d& C &*&> / £ % ; f é ¿ ¿ ? y ■$&/&?€— /£& > ¿? ¿flsute^ 924$

¿ítÁ& n/ávn á tJ & h ¿¿S or*. ás~s€.-J*t& ú ó¿u ee. ■Ùôb /¿ í& á r-¿Ú *} C f> t (< Stt4 tyt¿)0n. 071 ¿£¡r % £ & * •

. / 9 W ~ . . ü W

/ 9 J ? S - $ U ¿ ~ 0 7 t C £ .

¿& L $¿b0fy0¿¿t » - — - -

^A&o .¿Ó h, - oarrced fo t, W ?dv<&â~6ré> , ■ £ *■

■ f a t ¿ á ¿ s && p € - . /^ te y r^ /^ L- 4 $ r / ÿ & S t (0fáse/¿¿x¿> ate*#*, a faß. /3 crt¿¿3 á rfí* 1- fi¿2ít¿¿¿shJj ¿¿âà£L /3¿rtr¿ed ¿ZTŸ'- W W ¿tszrrr¿e¿¿ ■ ¿fe/r ¿ía ¿ábL c f A/ZK) C47UM #t¿¿¿£ <^//éz>C â77^û/~ e¿e¿¿&¿>¿ (ffifTtAXA&L ,c¿¿ ¿oteo úeoe^ k **P ¿Z *4 Ú > 1 _

UA#o ^i& ¿?écr*2. <77v -<&&>

.tn & i^yfàU r cß A á¿í 4¿¿CC££¿ÚM . târè& (& uteÙ !7 ¿ 2 q r S&ÙZC&H , Q)¿>&a/a r / . J. _ ypj// ¿*Á- st l

tál /lí¿¿ a^rtúed a/- cä^i /3tvéd ¿ T o ’' c P é r U W ) t á n . s fe n f c & é ’W M H tfájL . < é ¿ 4 o j tâjieaÀzY- 4 n& A ¿ ia J ^ r-í^ ¿ ai ¿sxhrm. k J O _ yU ifoC ¿C^on. $*€¿í¡it4 & n¿/ ?cr?>i#ûù&&. lfejz ê$ ér- Y m d ¿n /9JÖ mœ&ry-

¿n $¿¿¡fe*/~eó & (/7U>?a¿^ J&m. a^o

(¿Z (^07n?ru/¿2j£

Q n e i ú$ 0fe¿¿¿¿>¿{ Ó rvv/^^jhrM . ¿c*& éái¿ óofriz. et/~téæ r/9 9 / $& i0rti£ <¿ÉbJ¿¡rn. %ftxckj ¿fax. Ófc* Jean 3j&r&ccgi¿ é~Q&c¿

^ $a¿£rtc¿£. ^ Â ioe- sertíÁ é%œ>e0™ æ3Zi (??i *e& ¿¿fof e c & ä ä b i j * ^ ^ & á£& ó//rZ ói>^ ¿M ó M OjCe. a & we?í'?tík^ '¿ u d tj ä W 1a Ú § ¿ ¿ ? , '¿ 4 & y6 ^ . Jdjp& t& Z, £é(2¿toe. .._. i¿útj¿s. t^VüxfâdreH } fô j fê7&< é?o&?i¿¿£. vL£e£tnq Jn. ¿>ru/&ÔL /fa o zesf a. / ? '~~r~J-.W /7 r — m — “ Û 9L

& )7a/6r ^>¿¿é 6)Á¿cÁ ¿ rreftáfea

& n£d ¿d¿¿¿ ¿> C¿¿#¿í¿2j<- _ _ Jzo¿¿*t¿¿£ a*u>¿ w tao^ tf &. ¿úmékt*- jb&rJU&m&tUá H Mrrt&icflc&fóftd.

Oj¿. /y& TL /lcu *& ^ct /ifciF Ítíq j/¿4

^ ¿ &m. fig u red J&------,------^ . ^ G y & zflr ¿2W&¿ ¿ fa té r' ms>^ v¿frr¿0'aràj^-, &*n. c¿rtM ¿ne& 4' Z úo ¿S j N i

' _ km¿c/. e/xl¿¿4 aérÀ t€â& }U '.

f à a i e d . c m . $è> ui& ré Sú>¿3 ¿W - 6 Íb £ 0 0 / i& ew rttC <0é¡c/u m M jé, ds/tond w ifó ¿¡Q 5 ¿i¿reM ôu aœ eo/ëjl ÁTVzfóce. ¿é&

— ¿ 0 1 N c t M. U K te c / d ¿ ¡ e s , 9 4 - f Qúé*S ¿h~ /$M ¿; 491 < ^ g S o i c á ^

//, J?. ! 8..¿/v/&4 '/otr jÁÑaC~ ^& 0 6 ¿ w /fefri /< Jy- /

¿ n . JÓ l (¿¿2â/~ Í2 , $% -/PD-&+4 & y 2 j anW ¿nSd¿yt¿& ¿a¿ 70^ <>2. s5*á£^ d %¿$L 9¿ea*& c¿ -n¿> Q 2?ufófófó ¿zx¿& / C¿MtOtLó 4¿!cÁ _

¿¿rtas'M ÁM X 4 M * ^Q íM taéaa, ¿m% ¿ 6 l / e 2 ^ * 0 . , / / 4 % c a^zZ irn . ¿¡u*t¿e¿ — / M o ¿¿^e&aÆ ütfón n jét, ¿o '¿SÁén. o/¿>/*táóó-e¿¿ />te¿ta7^á^^d o*/ $ ¿Jt¿£ tÔ+J <Á¿C¿r4. c& 4i¿i(¿¿afe4 vedova £Ú ¿/e¿¿ -¿ ¿ n ^ ^ éffo^ í/ ¿rtH ¿¿a/>7i<3

i/¡cútw -e. $ 0 átié¿ £ < rí cP i02& xáer¿& 7i¿e¿/ ____„ ___ SJLe_ '7lóZ¡C«n¿i ¿/n ¿ $ l¿ - 7£¿¿¿ ¿5~ C677149V0?l¿l'¿é ^<2#U>¿ Z&ttÁ. t&L & (T7«4r*¿ke. s£

(l7rie/K

:-. á r ¿ú¿¡£ u /áí^ — M e. /¿¿ m ¿ J t ¿ é £ Z¿f- 'rnmJóri ¿md Æ co/cià^ Sexonccé' m M g w u m /e r t. it (ß dcuH. ¿//raÚé¿¿ 4¿¿cÁ. a. /$ í¿ ¿ J

tih t /£ (/) Íó l/C & Á¿1&€- C & fl££/7lír< bt£0¿ 071 77Ul/& /)iU2 ¿iß -fó o c/¿27U Í£A C¿y4 ¿&iíó¿ui¿éfi¿x&¿

. , . , - -%*Á¿£¿t cáhVTL rfeá^ic. ¿tefeájtrr e&c¿_ fèmncA^ a¿> c? /¿¿¿na. \J0 ¿ tw üa#. áéí

) ^ & £'Ò ?€ò€in £ f CMi£¿ &&¿4Zt¿¿¡j>uj 0&7L - ^ £ ct. c¿cté¡E, , flm¿t M&rua¿¿ ¿n Cm¿&/th**ct4 ¿o¿mcc&tb¿ -&r~ ¿6^&¿Úír^ can •& 'TW knrruduàet 4 /Q

(P ¿ r e a á U f y¿ 5~ acA tiiK (d ie^ ¿ ¿ óJ¿ z. w faáeif¡!k¿á>i &>■ eácÁ . ctm itÁi&nctf. Ä ä oruxlfcòrz. &¿ ¿¿na/e a tu l 7n^¿^-êaé &ne¿ a¿#u&uju( c? ¿e/t&tw. -fáoi c& ctéd ¿ k 9n¿rr^ -âor^j acA¿evóa¿ Sdhafa. if/OTuJéra/éi. ifâ t ('s T y ) ûé^è^yc^ yec07n.rn&u¿ tC z¿ ¿J*#¿¡S fe c¿ea¿¿ tiü ít ¿*x a. ¿^<*ra&

fó& ó& d p?\- -¿Á l £& c£va/ $á¿¿. & rr- ? t e . ¿¿ÛÔ/ Se& er& é -SSícZ /m . $&r<. tü&r>£- ■SC’j S ó 8 yvifiír4 ¿n tS&z, cPséZ&ml, Q)¿tñdea¿ -Á¿j 3 %.

-táa/r a¿¿*eá an . cutem & e. (y/ /77"é> i/ú& rj J¿y-e¿u Á - s b z á .

Q%íe. & ¿& 4A ¿ú>s ¿%jz. Tw m áér- ójTV& Éró ¿ tl -e¿zc&

c U ó & t c & a#ie¿ fów sua## - ¿ e á f c e / u d . & nÁ /á¿¿ ¿zr-Á M e^ cm O frem ^jL.^¿O tír*-.

' !7J0Ù> 9-97 ¿ & zà ( ¿ o

Ô > ,& 7 ^ 3-8y // (» $ ,¿ > 2 5 3

$ h ^ ^ i¿ * e 4 ¿n ¿r&cJuU are. ^cyareü u^> & <¿ZT ¿ÁíL /\¿>&r¿á'¿r ¿à£ùéje~ JL ú /¿ r^ . <— 3 2 . ¿^n ¿ ó£ l¿ , ^ h í o ¿ ¿ ; 4 é

€s¿Ú rfl4cpn C L¿~P ét/ ¿ J i/t ¿M/>y¿40-C $¿¿r m 4 # k J 4*~0^íty¿¿róIL /&¿¿¿Cc_ $ k J am. &ruU#ibru> a. maß. oJ J¡6l cPs¿m ¿¿ íW W QÁát&j '^¿m¿/

vd¿aA £.j am a! á o t m A. ú fó¿ru d¿£tf7*. &¡A¿¿Á ¿& a > ¿ / ¿ & l & k ¿

qfart/irh -fäd ¿ w m Á * ¿ J w L f f i h r & M . < W & /ru¿aía?L é>¿/- tf-o& ró ¿n ty& nfe?*L atfn¿< / ¿itere. < z a íc ¿ e ^ ¿ ¿ é "

t ¿ ¿tWt¿d ¿l c>S S 5& £~¿ltn ¿w eret4£

!~732- f/v& H i Jt>4r T n& iiJer, & /uü(C a / ! 7a£& j! ¿Jc4í / í t 2 © i f & á r i í

- 6 & ó t ¿á^ c g Á . ¿z t ^l v&tu^ cfófé. ¿C& dhéâtuat¿¿vertag,. -

¿toM¿cÚM£¿e4 fca élfó r ac¿#r¿¿¿n¿i 6rN , s, cáotñ cfó -¿4%- Mi/M' ¿ 4 û/r7^tt>ea? ¿tér ! — &

Q ! 0 .~ 7 1 7~7i ^outh ÆuûÀ&rt. ^ 7 í í * 0 - l ______. ¿M ¿>efr 5é>25 \ ' 22 &€t ° 'á>5^ ‘ • ..ZI3 9 J m W * & * l8üérMxl9û3

ÜÓ) / W est /? & / '29/31 , í £ ; ; ; r ) Ä , ~ ^ ' S t Z „ r

(¿¿£, Q /r4- c ¿ & d - e l <¿5~ *£Ce> ¿2#& r-zz^£* * OvtcJuvri- lotáL tyseafa for ù> €&a¿# ?/#& *&- A ^ A far # /V ^ ■■/ V- cáaxded ¿üR> Jl se¿U~ ¿XMfáüén&éá ajUyax e¿wa¿

e¿&o¿nt/*ée. ¿£~ e& éfem C à i f Ù y ^ a^ au /terry u* y ------/ / ------~ y ------y < J í á L 4* ^Fr- ^ 7^0 iszrljfcs tl/ó& & ú € ¿ & M tÚr £ X %- &e¿d~ C0?t0ÚÚB&t¿¿g4 & •<& ”> f?a& ÿj

a?^e- Qsnef $n*¿~ fp?¿n £ 0 4 6 - ífrjL

A - 0)¿H^¿ia ¿¿tfá /o S40¿6 ja r- /~Z7'óé>ÜV%rt t ú r t t ¿w> 3 á ecd r C^TtôÙ^ZBbccêâ avu rf S{ JüH) 2. á¿pt çZ tÉzètuxej ( and 4/¿á^ (Ü d^A ^>^) * fyeMZ/ébí/TlJ&X/f- ¿Tx. 2} fi/v&red-utJOr ¿s—Mz, 4/tr/¡¿- S o*u¿Zl ¿me¿ 7%¿q c¿i¿£d jó r~ d -

fíú ¿ L cfle/trA ^. ¿ 2 é 1$a*r¿¿*i. /Z& rtÿ. d¿o¿fcc¿r ¿n ¿4L Ñcrr¿& jÔ i

¿rt& ia cù&faatû ¿ srd ét ^ r y f ------^

<$• m w anJo “PoM ña dtôôn câ sbxcéaf /w ee. Jh v t /í< frá[ $o% ¿¿¿a d r f a * » * . / W *f m>¿7)úi^o vcáC díñjflúm zzás anc¿ Á /íñ di& ...... J * ¿ « fa é 4Áá¿&T r& ta ß r'fa áf<20¿ Q)á&4&a ¿ér ¿wn /3aÆa$twc&f a^wr7n^e& ,

ßöäxtt\ ü

Ä e ad ^ ú ñ ten fá JtràtH ^cU . ca?>t¿>ac¿- ç^ âfé& u x ài^ 6M&C

eaoi/t« ¿¿ùtiîÙ ozd ^tw téh^ùô ¿d^¿% z>j3á&á>¿*p

ff o A T ffS D o e j q c f f s S o u t h d o ü q iAS

. 9 a r t¿ & a . ¿ 2 f e 1 0 3 3 , \ M ¿¿fao¿ú?t . ,, „ »«tíííi. $&#hcm¿d(0M) S&H-J fit &*►»- J 0 $ l SÚSC> / 3 OZ S s a t ¿ Í X MíAST 7 )Ó Ü 4 tñ 3 J+5(o §¿~, tfu tia rv i( , 9 7$> "\ 735 -föfeocetU- tü f 7 3697

t f f i ñ n d . 1 ¡Jtstaèxl8ï8 ^ß3T ^47 / _ 2Z¿t~) WMKÛcrr-, (p£É>) ßatfdwrfiiHJ!- f$g i 3 5^2. tfûMêj-eeJr 554-12 SeJs X 17SI ^ $ b & a t i r & ¡ /4< «»e/m ¡ 2 . 5 i > j âtt Wt4Ot/-30ôZ &é¿¿tr&¿ , V

(^M ituaA . tô t, fla a *eo M /fexw ^ai' avértz^tu c^

o à b r - W M 1 4 / 4 4 < x n ta Ù Ù 2 â i i t c û 2 j a t& y*e ¿áJefóé/m tJ' ¿ó /> fan#ie¿ ŒL dôÂ râùz ¿t/a¿^hsayú> tCû^c.

4/üuwa

Z ùr* O ts'.d& cidL 4 ¿*A lóL n -* " " ‘ ' i^ â u ^ d t . <§* ciei¿¿c¿¿á7iaÁ e¿ec& ¿ ¿latte, fów , -&4 8" c47i¿t¿ú ce4ic¿e¿ ' "¿TÁ

/ # / 3% >?n- A íff?iá(: %>c ¿r&n ôïicA jm l

/ / e r i ¿ 7 - ^ r r f7 * L .

o’ne, Tm tnfór Jk& n. ea¿Á o ÿ ^¡ú¿€. arMÁ¿¿¿ematz¿. ¿ó 4¿¿c¿Í2á¿

' \&>da/¿o?i. ¿#i ¿¿Z ^ofátyí yxactäfs a¿ t£ ¿á ¿reô& ùi'¿ú / ¿ ¿ £ _ V úátiA ^Z re ri4 ii( o4 A Z /Sc< M ó¿ifáe*£¿a).

¿¿W>é¿ U /to /l& c¿rtá& 7>n£m¿& r-Áv**^

¿ it oa<Á.

ém vuÁ. Az. Afánfa ¿croo fc — a . £ - 4 C tfr ló , ¿á cÁ oofri. j& n . éfò 0¿ér- m atn fer- án>a¿¿¿¿ {

c&~ (£) $/(ß_ eÁc& ¿¿ iM 0piJ&h¿ ¿n &a¿Á.

C á#¿a/ ¿¿¿¿¿afe. /r'0Ú M 4e¿>¿¿ átd tó¿ í c t t u l .

a $ ¿ n ¿ f $óc¿nct¿ _ $ € . tr& ¿¿¿f¿¿g& rzS /

(& ) c fá a& . aíSÚ r- ,weií& 9c¿¿ ¿cz¿¿ QJo?U eXl¿¿)¿ « ^ é j

fat tríj&yua ¿ 2 4 C2Ä ¿O O ^iádl. jfc~4e6~~4L.

4a¿& ]M ieA ( <’pieoná& róÁ ¿4} e>¿.^eo<ói & n¿¿ Ti& ú ¿U db¿.

/è„ tj ¿ fet f /¡4vce¿¿¿¿r€. ?*jbr4oí , . yfovK < ^ é > £¿t/¿e*6*¿r ¿ )O tt¿ r

o4 Jsfo n jt *¿¿e ¿e. ao^c¿re^/

<&A¿. cui¿mn¿3á&d t _ /7i&mJer-s eÁ¿¿2 ¿¿¿ ó ~ ffcrru ott/d Jí¿* á d L O r e . #

j ¿Jt¿£ fe ¿rn&t- Áe*~e. J¡á¿ ^ 4¿í¿¿¿syU> ¿k £¿éw <¿0&r- ¿er¿O t¿. ¿2££. $dc¿¿ 9^r£0&t¿¿áó&j

( § ) c ^ s/rc¿ c a / ¿¿áíaÁ tn . ëézcfàu ^/x4pnJ>e*i> Áráa¿¿9i6í/#ú/yeM ¿% $¿40** h-ancA. can oáufn. ¿ ov& r- ¿G& odÓ h- ao * a ew fersfóv e. ¿€0fi e& cd& t¿£r< f f n . ¿ f e S 'e n t e ^ m ic A ié e ..

* * átÁ icA $7& ncÁ_ lééz, fn¿?U frfer

~~— ¿&L o d j ¿ c ¿ í v ^ 0 r ä ( T ? x _~~

~~f ' sfieaded. <^b y# j f c¿nx¿na ßr^M ^rd /2¿/2~~

~~& M vr* á rtm c/J'—r /b?iottX *>¿) ¿du& a¿H&r- $7U 4tcÁ .~~

J dlcu/e. 4iUMieátí¿¿ tfò à ¿hic/an £.fá¿ú/a?i~ c& tdíd -As. fodó faTt> Â. sea/- Gmó&útewaizc —j / ¿fó, A^ea£hd~ /S c¿rn¿¿ctü&n¿¿&3 a^e~ acceJ>¿g¿¿ là ¿Jtdtf ¿ZT ¿6e> /Zü& rd ¿H &cá¿£¿i¿¿ir>L.. ™

ofic. /ii/¿ j Áa#e. aw d /%& /&¿¿Á¿S ¿t d¿ U¿n-<*d¿ti/i. %2e^de^s °d ¿ ^ ud&^&d¿¿HL Sotm ct/ and $MMd¡a£>¿, <¿%e %i¿Áájb M Æ& ékaé-df¿&> '3ar&>t¿ ¿md- Áea (xdL nao ^em. ¿¿#id¿r ¿féHada. u étu j. -¿¿%¿i ^ h u e . ,

~~L ijd ibrrth eé ¿¿r adítu á" ScóÁap d SÁareA. cd tâuzfond ütao a. Á~~

~~'7iM ¡r úJ)Á /H n¿ v h É h / t — $Ù , $¡ceeti SdiÁíd. /fam e~~

~~¿ ÿ A o z e * j ¿abó ctrtd^rvu d & x/C Á l ¿ afí-táí '¡¿&J ¿d & d^tÁ y/l>c¿^-j @ ?td ¿~~

* * * % . ¿ Á j l ¿¿¿¡by /c i Jfa z /n ix é. /y¿M ¿4¿6r¿?i d& aJhua üd% C l¡£k, '¿ d & . n e ¿ ú féioÁ jd, td tyfodâr- atud/ÿt& n. a ru d

~~^¿U ôjld 04 ¿ l H & . * v . . fl*d ¿ L cd&avh 2â ¿O US7tfH¿f ~Âr~ '$'M¿Cád /k& U . //¿9U â/î*~~~

&>~ ÂÀj L ÿf/ùtoer- ÊT '•^ââloé' * 4- (^td¿d-a Shnvad/_ & nd /d z. t/&4¿4&dc¿*-(L $ó¿¿ruco£j &jbec¿/¿díy üdfrz M fu/er- $-£■ £&c~tiJ>f JUo !¿tdí- cavi jd&JtK¿2id. U ld£ iàd^cd- - 2 : c f e c i c k ó ¿zfcm and / ifeiófoÁ faw rw un. m tá m /a // <*M¿ $& ti9ic¿£ ß } a a . d a ú n - *" iW 7xJ& r'' fi¿i¿4 flw n PK ih ¿ ¿am e. Áoo<¿¿o?i_ o ó ~& ¿£> W & m . é ¿n £bnA&$ (¿Mí/ s&tns/ L ‘ ' ' ‘ <& 7 1 c Ur?u&&t/&r- o 4 / ¿ E / c u f á

~~f c a c / ¿ e & z /n£U *lJfan cfcrX .t¿¿ úfe/iÚ rM ¿ # /( /b^/¡L ¿¿j>L ^~~

~~/n afáró a n ¿ ¿ ¿fe¿cá¿¿ $c*n ¿jzt/ó¿—and aM & deeât& tà /¿U & i ¿ W / n a d ^~~

~~/£ ¿ /& > M , y t p u u a / e ¿ .~~

~~'ctfjLt. éJk& dM é¿- /su elte**/ 2¿> . " ¿ é ¿ - $ ó ¿ m c ¿ é~~

~~a ticl Jjí^ ó ¿9x <Í/^nuKL& /' tZ O ¿em /& d * . _ ,~~

~~&/U. ß lii ¿ fa t et Âu«L û fa v flfi/ frttH Íáá <2. ¿¿fri/Æ Sa/¿/uo.~~

~~¿ 5 ~ ¿ ( t , Ó r t Á & t n ¿cK// í 6¿£/~ MLtUtrr' ¿/a?ia¿4~~

~~e& tí f r d f ó u / <&u¿ M cre¿&e. 4?} — ¿ /~~

~~<&n- t¿¿£ ¿6 l jßr& t-/> aa/-C 0i. -/?& $/y "¿¿¿ó& r w ri^ *¿ l ST lS sy jfeL ¿¿~~

~~jhwiKd&Ó " (PW. v A . " .~~

$Á n- f^ca^U - JbjL -e/u/¿s> y. Jn. ( £ u 4 / o ? l w ck& i/ë# /feJ& tj J fa o /~ ^ }O 0 ¿ --t/g , —d)&&¿- Swtâ&T. ¿j/#r4L$í¿ St¿cc£0s jíc t CtnjddaÉL ?ec&iá-e¿¿.. / / 7 7 MXfaà andÂa

~~r^ccr-c¿e¿¿ (2sZa& k)& J u ? n . Á r ¿ f e . S~~

~~_____ M¡ ¿ m d e ? < .~~

~~ú á U ~ ¿ f t k <#&&. < tf-fÿo n . Â a L~~

~~______< ¿ l £ ó u > £ — & uj3n¿dó£¿Q t~~

~~¿d&~e dCaaZänq ¿oA¿eÁ '28£t% dst^e¿e¿désC¿i?~~

~~i RepÁñsetf-TftTloti- OF THE P£OpL£ BILL 2 Ö 0 3~~

~~& ) < p /^em^rn^u¿í¿7rL .~~

/ . üfßm. oS-t¿cfc crf $¿¿C ¿ó ‘¿Ö' Ároixdg, ¿rr ¿fó ¿óéday- z é c & a n . # f 0 - 2 'memJxm <>f % ju ^ zt£dfevt ¿rá&n. 8eác£ü¿ wiembúd of $öä/üci£> fó- eAââerLj t&¿, ?& n¿ún¿7w ¡S fy WjemM&rt) ß w Ä y A á ^ é ,

/?. ^&¿¿3-e / jhw tck/) Jer c¿rno¿i7a¿¿ón. crf ¿£& $at¿nc¿Z, QrtdotóiMó f <2#ú¿ rem óos fái, u&ógj #k $uvi¿c‘zd/an d $¿%avc¿£, é>éat¿,)e. ¿I ¿&7w¿ ofeÁ&fuÁ.l / jbrw iaej j& ** UT nàTTunatò -¿áz> S /ü ef /Ÿâniàé&rf ¿m d t *~ <3& a¿- S 'T névnJers o - f -(>yZ& deaá tâ £ trztcàëen ° f ?a-o¿¿¿b fír - ¿Qi e¿¿¿É¿>i ^^> a^e. a f. J j &u 4> , t$ééu¿#e. ¿5ú*jSc¿& ¿jdí-2. ^¿¿Ádcádel a. /U2&>:fia#u¿ / íh. C&b -áée. P e & é - é e ^ & > ¿ r / 9 9 J 5 úr¿frr& tK¿¿z> -fífr - eÁ cfefaó 4^y7i£M ¿& >*i ^ &c+7Uiiti¿tt¿f (2nd &¿2¿¿á4. Ê a/>ud -ÇkÀéôbÆ 3 ^éea¿Áf ______¿oA icA - -fitz . c/¿¿a#u >¿ ¿$ c¿$éd¿dife>-' ¿baiybod-e. o f¿u¿Á_ e£t¿¿¿E¿&i¿, $¿¡nu¿-e. *7 u£éz. vt>Úó im , ¿ $^/7i&mÁ&rd ehrâiù ao o**- ■ $¿2004. 3 frrvixdéá '77l¿tdwtz#¿3 ftr>- ¿é& ^¿¿$¿¿#¿1 e¿a^/2 ¿¿¿ $u7u>iíi£¿¿ bdíer^iér/1¿2 q fógjL /^ cec^ d 4^cr>Í£-/Q>/&nd., 'ùuM) 7n¿i^é~¿7ano¿¿cb^¿i£

~~5 . $/L¿_ S d ¿ (iitÆ 'PZá/~U L¿~~

~~a d &¿¿c¿¿0k*> a t í2¿> ¿n táz: n ^ 9 n /^ p í- (umàâùcërbuzô i&McÁ iú tí£ TW tüJn, ¿té-/5j Q#vc¿■úJt/gvlfr¿r~~

~~eélc& rw /écT3>rc¿cÿ, ^cá¿cct/¿d?l , Æ B P fie s T/) T/oa! OF T fte V^OpJLS ZôOS,~~

~~¿27rtiongmmJr ^ ¿eà^pti .~~

~~!• WffMÜÙitôrH. YacaferK cffl& e. ¿piept/erv~~

~~H'- d .<3iß<2aÄ&?'- 1 5- G?ék¿Ú¿f¿s crf~~

~~& • $ t ______7, y&ùïu? fri • S, /£d&se¿ec¿e%! -dei-~~

~~J , & r& 7id-4% & ruz£y ______v~~

~~to , w kv /~ ¿¿fée. œ âd ¿&7n/n0W C&'77i&toJ'.~~

~~W c/iZskÆ f, o f sn&pufax) ¿/s i¿é0ü6 eow tèìg.~~

~~ofcÂ & duJk. £ . tfu/o¿t¿u¿e£t $¡n d~/ ¿ f J & £ & à /9 2 M~~

~~rfc6 zcàcik_ 3 • &fe¿Jú¿i¿td&¿ Qfc/e¿fa¿z / dî~~

~~âà& ¿2cfr /3 dS~~

~~Waíte¿á¿¿L ¿f-. /rrzwtd¿¿7L¿ .~~

~~'e?2a£¿7ñ& t¿< f.~~

~~O fcÁ & dioée. Cr . A . BILL.~~

~~/lé tí ^>7TH ^0¿¿7i <£& fé f f O & M ¿~~

~~í ^ s a i á á i ¡ ^ Q $ o ¿ m £ ¿ £ j an œ ^ rr ¿m ¿teó/e¿¿¡ß u iß ai-e/~~

~~L /£ , UM~ M zf&dÿù ‘~~

~~J h . 4 > ¿ J t & j ^ J f ó e e x Á V M t r /%je0¿M fe0M ad^ja*i¿s¿& iíó~~

~~evuióféJíj fa i áí¿ Ç^Le&nt) /f^ ~ /^ êà^ j~~

~~¿6& ad d kk, <&á¿¿ c& ?u$0n/-tó¿¿aó& Á éud s h '£ftf?u*)n¿M <2 úse??vlée¿¿ a?w¿ ~ ^ ^ ^ Oú & é& e~~

~~/ » üm täufon $oawt¿& &ru¿ ‘~~

~~(-O Zfixu & ¿xióéa¿H he. Sotm ciÇ j éA aÆ ¿ ttn ö T t/r¿ 4 //m & fiiA eitf~~

O ù & & 1 0 Í— . ' v . . ' G ) ¿ÉL P/-&u¿fóvUr ) á b - /é>¿áJLcj6 (c) tís- ólfárau&i &0ti&nd(L. (dL) $ pt&rn¿>0n e£zcÙ2>L u/W.fef~- SScÉ&n. ¿>L € ¿ 2 ¿ ¿ £ & ( f x e n t é e ™ 0 / ¿ét> & o¿¿rió¿£ 5 ) .

( £ .) (fjfczS¿ÍÁ ¿jé 0/)U ¿ tâz> ¿& ¿77i£jy d&n& ntA-SÁ a $ fiüL M4Á¿r fv-P-fi& j M & tsn¿tniú( 0& ¡fttct¿; an¿f_ /te ir J>ré&&n¿e- .n¿ü!r f t c Á m ~¿#w&ri¿) & ¿m )£k¿¿¿r>i o f a $a¿¿wcc£. ( * 3 ) CúTióC^ <^J^/n£ypu6ffK )

~~£¿ec& ¿t ton dír- /^t& m fó¿¿hí o¿-á¿c /bdi/é-¿¿¿ér / 9 9 S j~~

~~& X C ¿ ¿ U Ú 4 U 7 ------(a ) 4^2. Pt-éáidS'nJr crû 's% Jv¿v& ¿ó{ Q> ) -á¿L -eSzcá^¿ ¿f ¿¡£& $a£¿K £¿& Ur~~

m aw der*

~~$ A j ¿_ ^fit>e¿7Ufir- ¿Otm ao ¿e <3¿fcp~~

~~e & c Z c r ?a~~

~~(a^ 7un>w tí¿¿ña ¿( j e /y¿fi¿Q/¡gy. ¿ t i a& % rc¿oft~~

~~d e^ A . % j¿ ¿é> éU n cU fflt*¿ óé*> <2c¿r W 9 & , ^~~

( b ) & é j2o fr ) U 9 #{ $OWLC¿j£fa <2 ¿!¿>TY r¿>/¡ts* ¿g ¿rí^vpfcfóeíu /é. / , *

~~3 . Ÿ û jC o fZ tr n Q% 4~~

~~6 // 0 re_fée, ü ea é-^ct m eM d& ^df ü j/n w -a /f. 4 4 c u z c o Á / /M a d o r i, o& 0rU H 44- -¿(¿m . ¿b & £ &?&&-*£ fflam Sún^Zc¿u¿ür?i_ ¿% 7?ti2n¿f?n£*idr¿2c¿r/J/J -tß~~

~~¿Ól> /yuly> d& t~ -¿o ¿ ztl & é¡¡Zc¿¿0¿ /7l& )n/)& u’ 0 / $ o tí# icd ¿fu^M ^éfC~~

~~'iJia Æ j û/> óoon. ao 7)UUi fe . aßzr* Á 2 . u& cavictt ¿fe rn&mó&K~~

~~Ä J sS zct on e. ¿ /T teór /W 9?i&&r- sn ¿iccvnafasiz*.~~

0 * f $ ¿ jí- yn&0L¿0*ó rítá í, ¿Aci£ £ — ( o .) (m . ^/¿ùrjG rw ttòò& fà/w y) aÊ ïÿ--$£,eÀ c& r\ & *á of éfój ¿¿na^djkóufyi -3; <27uf V ( b ) 0 7 t 1& V & ca& ryi. o f áÉz ¿ fficjL a f Q&xuiÁe*- 4àitaà^ -4¿Uec¿¿n G )(«)p) tr 'fy i f '& rr¿Áu>t¿/. Ó rtrc£jf¿¿i¿ ^ e£¡zc& 07ie. V ( s l ) $U . o 0 ^ *1 ^¿eakór- ■fit l¡tlca/¿¿>L (a) cm î^ Æ î Za . %>4&&/r' ; Ü>) cm. A¿a < ? ^ c m c ¿cü>?i . ih , vij&c*. ¿#i Asná** étrá& í S&Oheówj)- of * Cpy ¿r>L 1¿c¿ b í A . ^ f £ ¿ . (<*-') cot_ ¿Ôl VH&tÙè* WA¿q 4¿¿U~ao ctsn& *^ d$g Júwí^ Csÿ cn\ -¿/jl_¿ ls-tZc¿L¿¿jn (q f&oo ■&£¿¿¿r~ OS) (I Oi£tnJ>Oy' ¿ f $é*n/JbÀ4¿ (/) #tíL ¿¿áso/tdZrrv r Ciftr- f^od~ f ''re&&ük/¿4>L ¿¿e>/byt¿£.¿feé~/9?,5-

* ¿ /& r e , O t -^ l ¿ ¿ o f ó />f&o¿<0 MW seJ-aafoi 2 .

~~/ 9 9 S $ & € -£d -¿Uéol “ / / , $ ¿ ¿ 1 ¿ é ^ Jtyé%ái¿¿n& an d e&c¿ aái2á ¿c/á£0¿ófy ¿4*4? M Z & n i. c m d 7K07H¿W*i~~

~~y ^ : ^ / Saât& Jâijn. / tf)o¿¿4/ao f ë a o ô ~ Z ®~~

~~Q)e#g&o o/oa/fc 3~~

~~(2)& & 2¿i!K) ¿ Jéb ér' 2 - I c t r f f~~

~~ffiaXjíiú ! ■77l¿cÁae£ / ? m ¿ & . z~~

~~U n c A á ^ i , H- P & í¿ ¿~~

~~/ ^ d p i Ä ß H . 3~~

~~¿ Z u A ^ ÿ n . & ) $ß& - Q/>€¿M o J tfinSQ O úH á¿c¿ú3^t£¿e4 ûrfXLà ófiec¿ Ji£ ¿ L ¿h kfeÁiz¿¿¿c¿e__ / ,~~

~~( 3 ) ffiC z.á Tfi-ea/)Lù>yu ¿-kiééL a. /na¿ CjiáK~~

~~tohM , ç-laM - - f ó - w e s à n A lkaviá¿afivk¿ & / e a ¿ Á . C trh -ztàz& ic^ jO ^ f**/ ¿&M ßiqtäJrar' ¿A a/£ ftiaÁ&./&¿ U/?ic¿£ir- 6¿¿£~~

~~¿M ^éCCÓCH. 6 # c***4 J)ûx)< m . aé~ <2¿%f A€0007UlMg_ 'Ùffî&jj <27kC¿ ¿ ¿ la ß ?¿ ly jji~~

~~/>&rOo7 i_ on.^^cu*m 0n6 ~o#r s i '¿ P L a Á ^ i. GO <£f¿éo4(¿#vu ¿noté. c¿z& ¡frn¿0uí •~~

(ß>.) d jf €/ € ¿ ¿fój €ôû& r7ltn*- $L 4Aa¿(L aJw & rU r A cáT om U Í^ <¡d&¿¿cÁ,^& rô07tâ ¿& tev¿é¿ó A¿¿wtéeif- otu i S a ¿ ¿ > ( oc^/c¿í¿m /^ andar?ó¿ad~¿¿Pr^¿&$L (jZ) 3 tn - Q/cÁaduÁr / ¿g~ ¿ódr û c£ éê&g, a r ç . s u á ¿ ¿ é ¿ É ¿ «^L, hrw& ioña ge¿~(>¿c¿rjn ofctf& átéL^,

~~~ Ú t t u ¿, ¿ á r z é ^ e cÿ& M itid& Ù Ç ¿ fe $aa#u dlj~~

~~Qfìui kjuJa ¿Áaé£. Ú 7 t~ ¿k &¿¿-SÁA¿¿-tM¿Z . 7 Áo VTUll'&Kéff.~~

~~9 , 6 ¿ M ¿ 9 ~~~

~~0 ) / l &~~

~~fe? ^ fiew¿ée¿ ¿k± eiÓ br/Q /ttoióÀ . ¿n Á& ki¿¿7L. <&u>( (¿ ) n&ot>na /g ib . -¿0?U~ ¿£r“z^& oâ^Ër* Jßf& tve/i) ¿o /2~&¿r- ¿ ú tá b fi /2 . s?t¿ T u á ^ r~~

~~¿ fc éÁ a/£ fe . A éíuié£¿ir7L &%> a^j0fU ¿O L^àéz gcàfao $*nuxz¿s¿. ^ &~~

~~( z / C l /£■&■ fiéh ce¿ ¿ on . HCz. ajsex d t^ L . w u /e?- ¿ /¡Jsa ifa CÇ~~

~~y ‘ ' " p & o é f ó f ó r n a /~~

~~d& w-eM £r/?a¿M í ¿ f e f i a á O M~~

~~■¿¿¿te#? éU ¿fan /fßz& vd^ ^~~

~~Ç§s& nc4ûà ¿Á zé?é^c¿2e#>tej¿-¿5-y£t0<. caruiucrreet '^ ^ ¿ c^ y a ^ k c^ í ¿¿/P¡¿& * ó £ - & M M * i S¿¿^7UL¿1 p ^ . c i < t á . 7~~

( 3 ) ¿ i /£ l¿¿ ¿ 5 - a m e n d . — Ca) Me. é(^3¿& t¿ú*a£ ¿2c¿S /S/Jfir/^o cn^ ( i ) i U ¿ k t , *¿áa£¿ n¿& St. fieä& ci ao /uuw i fe r- ¿te.jbatáooe. fif ¿¿tfóed& m ,\*)C *) ¿¿nés ~~TÍÚ rel9 &U¿ í J\ c l~~

~~~~Q fi) ¿Z nó¿r¿e. TreÂfàU jcr- ¿fe '^buÿoo-Ç .'.a/su Jsecfó~~~~

~~~~C i ) ( b ) 0 0 ka o ó ed & i a í& savuÁ. -im án @ £uo ¿booted. eh fo tfa — (* ) UH¿h«¿v am anefanóM ?",~~~~

~~~~Q> ) ioíáL ¿ucA cw nin c¿7n0)it0' onÁ i ao ¿&r£- o Já rw ed -& t.~~~~

~~~~¿ efli ßran cÁ u a fífr- ¿t e&JbwHX-, , ^ ( 5 ) A Ùhô sectùm. ' ß/aacA cr&L wf¿-~~~~

~~~~$ i Q/^yg73¿ ¿/¿Ó Aá/ ) QflKêPLcla*i0ab¿3 & 7l¿( S^bé¿U&,~~~~

~~~~(t) $Á a.Í7tM dteruU ¿rtrM óunw ¿ eé o jJ t m ^ c ú ¿ ¿ ¿ ¿ Á ^ ^ J Ì a ó C -Âa^e. e¿¿ec¿7~~~~

~~~~tn ofcÁ £dh¿t.S&>*€- ¿M neridzdl r i O Æ cjrrflaW A i. io c o C t$^TdcAe¿¿¿¿JZ£.. A l ofc/etd a/k. é a*e. c&á¿mn.3 oí Se~~~~

~~~~%fAór& ¿W o o/n d CO)7W1091C&?>■mJr- (1)\M¿o ¿Icé <7TUUi 4 t Cúfácí ¿K> â c à 2 0 0 5 .~~~~

~~~~an d thcá ¿¿cér m aq~töTte$& y- fó - C¿¿3&¿ 0 4 - U / C c r / c¿ Pe¿já&- @ a??r"/9S/ t t r Z O O ^ ,~~~~

~~~~£ 3 ) $ ù - jpV-tH K 4¿¿r?u0, ‘7Ufr?>U2Jb_~~~~

~~~~Q l) $e^¿é¿¿á¿m a/ ¿2cár /J/Q $&- /99 O. [ / > ) - < 5 4 c ¿ y x á ( c ) a ^ u t ¡ S r ix > ¿ < > 4 cH. /y íy ¿B -/9JC~~~~

~~~~¿ ¿ c é ô / ÿ / J J L Ú O ^ t /(§■ ) ao 2¿r á rtá j& (a ¿ ¿ córti w úfá oÁ & nz¡ttij?\ ár/U fi /~~~~

~~~~Q*) ^ify- ¿¿JL JOo*t^r>y¡¿j f¿ 3 y 3 9-C*-) £. S <± de¿Z4¿te£(. -¿{¿0 ¿£y¿'~ ¿#7*4. ¿n¿d~9¿>&n~~~~

~~~~<*n. ~ fác 19 3 . & o é > . 'A~~~~

~~~~Sookuvis 5 oml Sott£D U /L£ I , El £CT(OiH~~~~

~~~~tfel& dim - e& cÆ cL TrvewJ&ro oÿ Sôüw tté\~~~~

~~~~icÆ iC>C^4 ¿áwJL Se. oÁ #3fKjbvn. /M nJertCr,~~~~

~~~~¿!¿& Sjbecÿted *n~~~~

~~~~cc£¿b}tvn,f* Stfífi A* J¿ Q V \J Hvunb^r ^A/ec/W Consirt á¿iQA cM . m e m i e s - s .~~~~

^ ^nrm ib , Jf-jn& m '/xm ‘fy fa y fó fa * 0 n a/ß ? j. • ÿ r e m . ^ m m i & f ó ^ttoe9i¡ú ¡ 'RuSHEH } j f e * - J 5 ftpteoeM çi H fttfS /5Y J ^ fny- * 3 tns/miuM t^ u säftih j & óí/¿i-í-A S t f • / ^ nambu* DûÛte/fë. S

~~~~fi™ . éfa. <2. rnsfiée* Ñ fiw eJL 7> B£U~~~~

' ¿¿ /nJirmla^ W a j i J / ( j f H Z F F ^rrn^ib, SL fa&mèô*i ¿eJ)Wé*Â. tflDDLE? -£ D/Ct- &L.& ßtyi/udia~ ím¿¿ San „„ û ya^„ M ^ * 2 < unM . ^ e & J ^ n 3 . & Troce.cítu-e. fin - é/kcfá-H

~~~~r r~~~~

~~~~¿v $~~~~

1 7 H > ù à ^ a / - S e c t i o n 6 . SCHEDULE 2 SUBSTITUTED PART 1 OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1995 "PART 1 TYNWALD Qualifications for membership of Tynwald 1 Qualifications for membership of Tynwald (1) Any person may stand as a candidate for and be elected a member of Tynwald for a constituency if at the time he is nominated as a candidate — (a) he is of full age; and (b) he either is a British citizen or has the right to remain in the Island; and (c) he is not the holder of an office of profit under the government of any country or territory outside the Island; and (d) he is ordinarily resident in the Island and has been so resident for a period of, or for periods amounting in the aggregate to, 5 years or more; and (e) he is not subject to any incapacity by virtue of this or any other Act (2) For the purpose of subsection (l)(b) a person has the right to remain in the Island if—- (a) he has indefinite leave to remain in the Island, within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971 (an Act of Parliament)3, as it has effect in the Island4; or (b) he does not under the said Act of 1971 require leave to enter or remain in the Island, by virtue of section 7(1) of the Immigration Act 1988 (an Act of Parliament)5, as it has effect in the Island6; and, in either case, he is not liable to deportation under section 3(5) or (6) of the said Act of 1971. Term of Tynwald 2 Term of Tynwald Tynwald, subject as hereinafter provided and unless sooner dissolved under section 3, shall be dissolved on the Thursday during the fifth succeeding month of October (computed from the day on which the last general election of Tynwald has been held) following the third Tuesday in that month. 3 Summoning, prorogation and dissolution of Tynwald (1) The Governor may, whenever he thinks it expedient— (a) by precept under his hand — (j) summon Tynwald when not in session, or when Tynwald stand adjourned or prorogued though adjourned or prorogued to a more distant date or for a longer period; or (ii) prorogue Tynwald; or (b) by proclamation dissolve Tynwald and issue fresh writs for a general election of members to serve therein. (2) No proclamation under subsection (l)(b) shall be necessary on the dissolution of Tynwald by virtue of section 2.

3 1971 c.77 4 SI 1991/2630 s 1988 c.14 6 SI 1991/2630 (3) Unless it is impracticable to do so, the Governor shall seek the advice of the Chief Minister before exercising any of the powers conferred by this section. 4 Extension of term of Tynwald in emergency (1) During any period of national emergency the Governor may by order — (a) extend the term of Tynwald or the term of office of any member of the Council elected by Tynwald, by a period of one year from the date when otherwise the term of Tynwald would expire, or the member cease to hold office; and (b) declare that the register of electors in force at the lime of the making of such order shall remain in force for a period of one year after the date when such register would otherwise cease to be in force. (2) On any such order being made, the provisions of this and any other enactment relating to members of Tynwald shall be construed as if they were modified in such a manner as to give effect to this section, and the order, or a subsequent order under subsection (1), may make such provision as is necessary to effect such modification. (3) Where an order under subsection (1) has been made, a further such order may not be made with respect to a subsequent year unless — (a) a general election of Tynwald intervenes, or (b) the making of the order is previously approved by Tynwald. (4) If any question arises as to any matter under this section, or the operation of this section, the question shall stand referred to the Deemsters, who shall determine it summarily after hearing any parties they consider ought to be heard. (5) In this section "national emergency” means any period which, in the opinion of the Governor, constitutes a state of national emergency due to a state of war, or apprehended or threatened war, or international disturbance. Vacancies in Tynwald 5 Report of casual vacancies The President of Tynwald shall, within 7 days of any casual vacancy in the members of Tynwald coming to his notice, report the vacancy in writing to the Governor, stating the name of the constituency by which the new member is to be returned. 6 Vacancy in seat (1) A sitting member of Tynwald may resign his seat by notice in writing to the Governor. (2) If any sitting member of Tynwald is punished with custody (whether or riot suspended) for any offence triable on information, his seat shall be vacant — (a) if he appeals, or applies for leave to appeal, against his conviction or sentence, on the determination or withdrawal of the appeal or, if leave to appeal is. refused, on the refusal of such leave; (b) if he does not so appeal or apply, on the expiration of the period within which the appeal or application must be made. (3) . TynwaJd may by resolution declare the seat of a member of Tynwald to be vacant where he — (a) has been certified by the Cleric of the Rolls to the President of Tynwald to be incapable by reason of mental disorder of taking care of himself or of managing his own affairs; or (b) fails to attend within any period of 12 months — (i) at least three-quarters of the total number of sittings of Tynwald, and (ii) at least three-quarters of the total number of sittings of the Council or the Keys, as the case may be. \ l

(4) For the purpose of subsection (3)(b) a member of Tynwald shall not be treated as failing to attend any sitting of Tynwald, or of the Council or the Keys, in respect of which he is granted leave of absence by thé President of Tynwald, • or the Speaker, as the case may be. 5 (5) If the holder of any office of profit under the Government of the Island is elected as a member of Tynwald, his seat shall become vacant unless within 7 days from the date of his election to Tynwald, he gives such notice or takes such other step as is necessary to vacate that office on the earliest practicable day thereafter, and if he subsequently withdraws that notice or revokes that step, he shall be treated for the purpose of subsection (6) as having 10 accepted that office. (6) If any sitting member of Tynwald is adjudicated bankrupt, the High Court shall certify the fact to the President of Tynwald; and if within 6 months of the date of the order of adjudication — (a) the adjudication is not annulled, and 15 (b) the member does not obtain his discharge, with a certificate under section 16(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 18927 (bankruptcy caused by misfortune without misconduct), the High Court shall on the expiry of that period certify the fact to the President of Tynwald, and the seat of the member shall thereupon be vacant 20 (7) If any sitting member of Tynwald — (a) accepts an office of profit under the Government of the Island or the government of any country or territory outside the Island, or (b) becomes a member of a local authority, his seat shall thereupon be vacant 25 (8) For the purpose of subsection (7) — (a) a person shall not be treated as accepting an office of profit by reason only- (i) of accepting any payment under the Payment of Members' Expenses Act 1989*, or (ii) during a national emergency, of enlisting in or being appointed to a 30 commission in any of Her Majesty's forces; (b) a person becomes a member of a local authority on his making a declaration of acceptance of office as such pursuant to section 10 of the Local Elections Act 1986s. (9) A member of Tynwald who accepts an office of profit shall be eligible for 35 re-election to any constituency on his vacating such office. 7 Penalty for sitting or voting when seat vacant If the seat of a member of Tynwald has become vacant and he sits or votes as a member of Tynwald, thé Council or the Keys during the vacancy of the seat, he is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £5,000 in respect of each 40 occasion upon which he so sits or votes. Oaths 8 Members to take oaths No member of Tynwald shall be permitted to sit and to vote in Tynwald, the Council or the Keys until he has taken and subscribed the oaths required by law.

~~~~4 5~~~~

~~~~7 VI p.312 B 1989 c.4 9 1986 c.10 Szotlofi (y ’S cn ev tJi.E ' 3 Si/ßST/ TOTST) Sai£t>Ui.£ i To TH&'RePfZESSrtf7rt770Ñ d f Tti&T'&PiS'JlCT/?ßS~~~~

~~~~>% S C H W O V L & / . CôNSTfTOÆfiJCJæS, . Ntwtz. o r Co/isl-ttiuehc<* . Jfr-ea. e>p Cois ¿rt(ruenc~~~~

~~~~AYXE çjfdL ¿út¡¿M¿o <>fSndreßäj~~~~

~~~~CASTL& rôlùM~~~~

SDoi/çuftS £ftST Èffadr o¿ ¿ét SsM & k/l trf Ç& 0 0 4 / 4 *

~~~~( J m c h o r ■~~~~

~~~~3)OÜ£i¿,ftS Ho^Tti $/U ¿- /beUrd 7KS>oí,ún^t ¿ég> ¿~~~~

~~~~êartà*. è ifa , ê&HQH&fô»* £ ¿J< J~~~~

~~~~Douglas S outh. $ < U ' £ W < 4 ?~~~~

~~~~i T k & o d e - f~~~~

~~~~T>0(JCtAS Mz s t~~~~

~~~~C f f U - p a y Â . c¿ ¿ 4 ¿ h Z ¿ 4 y G flR F h f* J L é f a j í * ¿ ^ 4 C . ó¿óí¿PL¿$'0'/ ^~~~~

~~~~Q u Z t íF A - 3 & v¡Zt>. bcm Jx. d iä ä ^ j f f e f / n a t x~~~~

~~~~f l ( U £ U />a*¿S£ d-iáfád^ 0/ ff a £ e ¿ ú .~~~~

~~~~f A l c H ñ E L /Ÿ c c À ü tÀ t y / _ ^ v¿?_\Ji& ^¿U sp- & ? L 4 ¿ ^ %~~~~

~~~~M/ODLE TTdL-pctwyh <¿uiÉru£f ^rôéé'n^è0fK^ ‘ _ # l\färK&.<7^ & 1^¿¿¿cóii& j O C fisIiX c^^~~~~

~~~~V N C fi ñ M~~~~

~~~~rp £ ^ U * ¿ á ¿ í ñ ^ < ^~~~~

~~~~R f t f l S < S Y -T ïftP is Æ Y~~~~

* ' R u s h b n $Á ¿. j)ar¿d3\ d¿d£hc¿ó cr¿ frtâ&y* ^n¿

~~~~P f f T ^ ß w * , £ f c « V A p J'M'. t f a 'W • Section 10(1). SCHEDULE 4 TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS~~~~

Registers o f electors I ► The registers of electors to be prepared in 200 b pursuant to the Registration of Electors Act 19 8410 shall, instead of being prepared for the constituencies specified in section II of the Representation of the People Act 1995 as it has effect on the passing of this Act, be prepared for the constituencies specified in the said section 11 as substituted by section 7. Polling districts Not later than the 31st March 2006 the Department of Local Government and the Environment shall exercise the functions conferred by section 12 of the said Act of 1995. Dissolution of the Keys 3 . . (1) The Keys may not be dissolved pursuant to section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1995 after die passing of this A ct j (2) The,Keys shall stand dissolved on the Y $ h . October 200fc First election of members of Tynwald The Governor shall, as soon as may be after the J ^ th October 200^ issue writs for a general election of members of Tynwald. Section 10(2). SCHEDULE 5 AMENDMENT OF ENACTMENTS

The Representation of the People Act 1995 (c.J3) / i (1) In section 14(1), for paragraphs (f) and (g) substitute — "(f) any member of Tynwald; (g) any person who has served as a member of Tynwald in the session immediately preceding the election, or in the current session in the case of a by-election." (2) In section 15(a), for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald". (3) In section 55, in the definition of "candidate", for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald”. (4) In section 56(1), for "theKeys" substitute "Tynwald". (5) In section 66, for "the Keys" (in each place) substitute "Tynwald". (6) In section 77 — (a) in the definition of "election", for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald"; (b) for the definition of "member" substitute — ""member" means a member of Tynwald (other than the Bishop or the Attorney General);". (7) In Schedule 1, in paragraphs 1, 51 and 52, for "thé Keys" (in each place) substitute "Tynwald". (8) In Schedule 3 — (a) in paragraph 6, 8,15 and 17(1), for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald"; (b) in paragraphs 8, 14, 15, 17, for "Speaker" (in each place) substitute "President of Tynwald"; (c) in paragraph 17(2), for "he shall not sit or vote in thè Keys until the Keys have been informed of thè report on the petition" substitute ’’he shall not sit or vote in Tynwald, or in the Council or the Keys, until Tynwald has been informed of the report on the petition". (9) In Schedule 4, in paragraph 1 — (a) for "the Keys" substitute "Tynwald"; (b) for "Speaker" substitute "President of Tynwald". The Copyright Act 1991 (c.8) In section 160, for subsection (3) substitute — "(3) For this purpose a person who on the dissolution of Tynwald was Speaker may continue to act until the corresponding appointment is made after the dissolution," \1

Section 10(3). SCHEDULE 6 ENACTMENTS REPEALED Reference Short title Extent of repeal X p.390 The Isle of Man Constitution Sections 6 to 23. Amendment Act 1919. Section 26. XIX p.586 The Isle of Man Constitution Act Section 2. 1961. Section 10. XXI p. 104 The Isle of Man Constitution Act The whole Act. 1969. 1971 c.13 The Isle of Man Constitution Act The whole Act. 1971. 1971 c.34 The Isle of Man Constitution The whole Act. (Elections to Council) Act 1971. 1975 c.12 The Isle of Man Constitution The whole Act. (Amendment) Act 1975. I „ 1978 c.l The Constitution (Amendment) The whole Act. Act 1978. v 1990 c.6 The Constitution Act 1990. Sections 2 and 3. In Schedule 1, paragraphs 3 and 4(1) and (2). 1995 c.13 The Representation of the People In section 17(1), the words "or (b) Act 1995. becomes a member of the Council,".

~~~~5 Uf£S T~~~~

~~~~S ô OTH ~E>ô 2. sefirrs Dooc, Lf\ ¿ ISLE OF MAN showing TOWNS, VILLAGE and PARISH DISTRICTS~~~~

~~~~LAXE Y VILLAGE~~~~

~~~~ONOHAN VILLAGE DOUGLAS _ If. CoftSTi TCf£*J e t c S~~~~

~~~~TOWNS~~~~

~~~~¡M VILLAGE DISTRICTS~~~~

~~~~MILES * -1 Jl0Q >4 a $eM 0m j¿.~~~~

~~~~/ 5 3 rn ew dhi, à rtâ i, S T O R T t N G ¡ . & U STORTINq ¿¿ tâën. cüvctáid ÀMÏ> 0 D Æ L & T / A J Q a n d ¿ ¿ z . ¿ r t Ç T / A J G .~~~~

~~~~' T n e m fa r d O d£t.ST/A !ç.~~~~

$%&. n ecvêtg. & ¿2c/ú¿ S T O / Z T / N ¿ r ¿ stïû j ¿s~céc¿^é ¿û &À*

~~~~¿ A ú¿dfá fóÁ rtM j ¿z?~/¿£, ¿A Ç T/M Ç , 3 9 - d f c ¿ Ó L v9^cm for*j 2 /km c¿M taá»éa( y t â à / u f r a & c f a n t f ó r - 2 /¿ó ¿em , aâ éi~~~~

~~~~/ K â m ô é h c ù M ù 0 * e - 'xif.tr m e u s f *)/tH>cdç. a p œ t ç £ ' c a J h n 7 u & r ¿txrfC J(Zmu¿¿¿¿ tr/.yoang e4¿/& m~~~~

~~~~^ 5 ~ c / ¿ u r - ‘ < r r - / è j L $ 4 4 , iu trtzeafà*« Â fo fa ! ft& d /7i£m ¿é*J _ A... ¡ A ------ß / b t e e . ¿ B - & & * v~~~~

~~~~_ _ ~ a r f a t â s /7l£4>vO & yQ~~~~

~~~~...... Á ~ ~~~~~

~~~~w- w u r / ¥ L V~~~~

~~~~a & * .~~~~

~~~~- T ë b n y . Q Zw^at& k^ - ¿ ß e a / o K d * 7 , ¿ è r Û À L ¿ o & n . L a. /7U 07?t0& i-- oy~ /> 0 d~~~~

~~~~o ß ä f c . ... jp t n u n r à& Â r^êlO 7¿w Á . yS fâfëe. / ^ ~ z ¿ c & n 0 u % > /£¿¿t7)tá ¿¿T ¿ J ifa 0?*~ ______r , m - 4~~~~

~~~~/7l£/M £*r4-~Á eí~~~~

~~~~á é z . JsO H ¿ -zC~~~~

~~~~$ ¿ ¿ f e . O r / /~~~~

~~~~'M arl ¿ fen . ú¿e¿ij¿C , f l / # A £ ¿ S~~~~

~~~~töTnJnjlfx& rdlB /tt& fi P€~ \ (% Ù L Ô 0 & J& 0‘¿¿&r-iA& 9i¿( & 09t0O 4¿0¿{ <7*~ ¿Ó&~~~~

~~~~S&ó&um á?~ 6¿£ajbo*Q . z?f V /J ^ .. ~Jh^. . 6 / / S o~~~~

~~~~¿ H 4 & / %¿T ¿tá¿4t¿¿r>l~~~~

~~~~c£&- 4? l G 0 J C Ó V F 0 Z +~~~~

~~~~t C E t - A t f P / f ó o <2 ¿¿frÚ /O r- éU iÉïèyi. £>£) 'p/ze^td¿^<í~~~~

~~~~Ct/^_ é& ¿£¿t ZlJ~~7~ff//v^ Ct/?Vfi( Ú/)*4L ¿ ú n . £3¿COCC¿¿^/ •~~~~

~~~~J # ï É )~~~~

~~~~'m&vd&o a¿h¿ -¿¿g fyosE £0. * Liverpool John Moores University~~~~

~~~~Malachy Comwall-Kelly Professor David Kermode~~~~

~~~~Clerk of Tynwald~~~~

~~~~Office of the Clerk of Tynwald~~~~

~~~~Legislative Buildings~~~~

~~~~Douglas IM1 3PW 11 June 2003~~~~

~~~~Dear Mr. Comwall-Kelly,~~~~

~~~~Select Committee of the House of Keys on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill~~~~

~~~~1 Introduction~~~~

~~~~In responding to the request for written evidence, I do so as an interested outside observer of~~~~

~~~~the Manx political system, who has studied and written about Manx constitutional matters in~~~~

~~~~Devolution at Work: A Case Study of the Isle of Man (Saxon House, Famborough 1979) and~~~~

~~~~Offshore Island Politics: The Constitutional and Political Development of the Isle of Man in the~~~~

~~~~Twentieth Century (Liverpool University Press 2001). The latter includes detailed analysis of~~~~

~~~~the attempts to reform the Legislative Council since the Manx National Reform League first~~~~

~~~~advocated démocratisation a hundred years ago in 1903; Chapter 8, pp. 278-82 covers the~~~~

~~~~attempts to provide for a directly elected Legislative COuncil/Tynwald since 1980.~~~~

~~~~At the centre of the most recent debates about recruitment to the Legislative Council or~~~~

~~~~Tynwald as a whole has been the conviction that only direct election by the people can confer~~~~

~~~~legitimacy on members of Tynwald in carrying out their various political functions. The current~~~~

~~~~political role of members of the Legislative Council, whether as members of Tynwald, the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council or the Government is questioned by the “democrats" simply because they~~~~

~~~~are indirectly elected by the House of Keys ( 8 ) or serve as ex-officio members ( 3 ). These~~~~

School of Social Science Henry Cotton Campus, 15-21 Webster Street, Liverpool L3 2 ET Tel: +44(0)151 231 4043/44 Facsimile: +44(0)151 231 4359 debates also show that the reform of the Legislative Council cannot be considered in isolation from the rest of Tynwald, direct election providing a strong case for the restoration of equal bicameralism and creating the potential of a Legislative Council capable of challenging the hard won supremacy of the House of Keys.

~~In section 2 it is proposed to judge the way in which Tynwald currently performs five main functions against the yardstick of democracy and in section 3 to consider how to improve that performance.~~

~~~~2. The Functions of Tvnwald~~~~

~~~~2.1 Representation of the People~~~~

~~~~a) House of Kevs: directly elected but via an electoral system that fails to satisfy the basic~~~~

~~~~principles of fair elections. The combination of one, two and three member constituencies~~~~

~~~~with electors having as many votes as there are seats results in gross inequality of voting~~~~

~~~~rights. The first past the post system of deciding the winner makes possible the election~~~~

~~~~of candidates on a minority vote as was seen in several constituencies in the 2001~~~~

~~~~general election and in Rushen at the by-election in 2003. b) Legislative Council: the combination of election by the House of Keys and ex-officio~~~~

~~~~membership results in a Legislative Council that is in no way representative of the people.~~~~

~~~~The process of election by the House is not only controversial because of the denial of~~~~

~~~~choice to the people, but also because of the difficulty in finding candidates that are both~~~~

~~~~willing and acceptable to the House and the need for by-elections whenever an MHK is~~~~

~~~~chosen to fill a vacancy. The three ex-offido members do not represent the people.~~~~

~~~~2.2 Executive Recruitment:~~~~

~~~~a) the Chief Minister is chosen by members of Tynwald voting as a single body. There are~~~~

~~~~two main problems with this system. First, it allows the Bishop and the indirectly elected~~~~

~~~~2 M LCs equality of voting rights with MHKs. Second, although the Chief Minister may be~~~~

~~~~recruited from either the House of Keys or the Legislative Council, in practice the fact that~~~~

~~~~M LCs are not directly elected narrows the pool of recruitment. While in 1981 and 1985~~~~

~~~~members of Tynwald selected Percy Radcliffe and Edgar Mann, both MLCs at the time, to~~~~

~~~~chair the Executive Council, in the political context of debates about démocratisation the~~~~

~~~~prospect of such a choice in the 21st century seems quite remote, b) Council of Ministers: the status of M LCs is such that Chief Minister’s pool of recruitment is~~~~

~~~~severely constrained. While the best person for the job may be in the Legislative Council,~~~~

~~~~there are powerful political pressures on the Chief Minister to appoint MHKs. When taken~~~~

~~~~with other factors limiting choice - lack of experience, political unacceptability, the known~~~~

~~~~retirement or semi-retirement of members from the front line of politics - this amounts to a~~~~

~~~~serious weakness of the Manx system.~~~~

2.3 Policy and Finance: debating and approving resolutions on policy and finance is perform ed by Tynwald, but with the branches voting separately except under the arrangements agreed in 1961 whereby an absolute majority of members of Tynwald can override the opposition of the Legislative Council to a resolution. From a democratic point of view it is dearly unacceptable for M LCs to be in a position where they can defeat or delay the wishes of a majority of eiected members.

2.4 Legislation: the legislative function is performed primarily by the branches, sitting and voting separately. In the event of conflict between the branches, the House of Keys has the power to override opposition from the Legislative Council. In recent years there have been few instances of serious conflict between the branches and the Legislative Council’s role is widely regarded as one of checking the quality of bills rather than challenging their substance.

~~~~From the “democrat’s” perspective there should not be an unelected Council with the powers to defeat or delay the wishes of the eiected representatives.~~~~

2.5 Accountability: members of Tynwald share the responsibility for holding Government to account through debates on policy and legislation, questions and the work of scrutiny committees. The democratic argument is that the elected representatives in the House are much better placed to hold Government accountable than their colleagues in the Legislative

~~~~Council.~~~~

~~~~3. Democratic Reform~~~~

~~~~The inescapable conclusions to emerge from the discussion so far are that the current~~~~

~~~~method of recruiting M LC s denies them the legitimacy accorded to the directly elected~~~~

~~~~members of the House and that any scheme of reform must focus on Tynwald as a whole and~~~~

~~~~not just the Legislative Council. The logical answer is a scheme in which the power house of~~~~

~~~~Manx politics becomes a directly elected Tynwald. Whether or not the House of Keys and the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council have a place in this scheme Is a matter for debate, but if they do that~~~~

~~~~should be solely in connection with the performance of the legislative function.~~~~

~~~~3.1 Representation: a directly elected Tynwald would be more representative of the people.~~~~

~~~~Assuming a 35 member Tynwald as at present, the recruitment of members should be as~~~~

~~~~follows:~~~~

~~~~President of Tynwald - no change..~~~~

~~~~Attorney General - no change.~~~~

~~~~33 members elected by STV from 11 three member constituencies.~~~~

~~~~The replacement of the Bishop by an elected member will be controversial but a logical~~~~

~~~~democratic step continuing the progressive removal of ex-officio members commenced in~~~~

~~~~1919; an alternative, should complete removal be politically unacceptable, would be to make~~~~

~~~~the Bishop a non-voting member. The arguments in favour of ST V were extremely well~~~~

~~~~presented by the Butler Commission in 1980 and remain every bit as valid today. With STV,~~~~

~~~~alternatives to 11 three member constituencies could be adopted without the present~~~~

~~~~inequality of voting rights. If, however, ST V were to be rejected in favour of the first past the~~~~

~~~~post system, equality of voting rights demands constituencies with the same number of~~~~

~~~~members.~~~~

~~~~4 A s well as being more democratic, this reform would overcome the difficulties of recruiting~~~~

~~~~M LCs and the need for by-elections every time an MHK was elevated to the Legislative~~~~

~~~~Council.~~~~

~~~~3.2 Executive Recruitment: a directly elected Tynwald would provide a much larger pool of elected members from which to select the Chief Minister and Ministers.~~~~

3.3 Policy and Finance: all voting members would be directly elected and should vote on resolutions as a single body, thus removing the potential for conflict between the branches and potential delays in policy making.

3.4 Legislation: two alternatives are proposed, one involving a major break with tradition and a move to a unicameral legislative process, the other retaining distinctive legislative functions for the House of Keys and the Legislative Council as legislative committees of the directly elected Tynwald.

~~~~a) A Unicameral Tynwald in which the legislative function is performed in Tynwald rather~~~~

~~~~than in the branches as at present. This would simplify the legislative process, reduce the~~~~

~~~~potential for conflict, enable conflict to be resolved by the members voting as one body~~~~

~~~~and still allow each member to participate in the process of contributing both to the~~~~

~~~~substance and the technical quality of bills. In a small island like the Isle of Man there is~~~~

~~~~no obvious alternative constituency for a second chamber to represent. Moreover, there~~~~

~~~~is no distinctive legislative function that can justify the retention of a second chamber that~~~~

~~~~cannot be equally well performed by a single chamber- reports on the drafting quality of~~~~

~~~~the bills can be made by the Attorney General or a committee involving the Attorney~~~~

~~~~General prior to the final reading of the Bill in Tynwald.~~~~

~~~~b) The Retention of the House of Kevs and the Legislative Council as legislative committees~~~~

~~~~of Tynwald: this option has the advantage of being more in keeping with tradition, but it~~~~

~~~~poses two problems that are not easily resolved, how to how to divide up the legislative~~~~

~~~~responsibilities between the two committees and how to select members.~~~~

~~~~5 On the issue of responsibilities, there are three obvious options, equal legislative powers,~~~~

~~~~unequal bicameralism as it has operated since 1978 or a specially tailored division of~~~~

~~~~labour to suit the island’s needs. Neither equality of legislative power nor the inequality~~~~

~~~~that developed in the Isle of Man under the Constitution Acts of 1961 and 1978 make~~~~

~~~~sense if the Keys and the Council are to serve as committees of Tynwald. There seems~~~~

~~~~little point in Tynwald delegating the same or similar functions to two committees,~~~~

~~~~encouraging duplication and conflict and then having to step in to resolve conflict by~~~~

~~~~voting as a single body. It would make far more sense for the conflict to be played out in a~~~~

~~~~single chamber. A two committee system might work if it was possible to differentiate their~~~~

~~~~legislative functions clearly, one being given prime responsibility for the substance of~~~~

~~~~primary legislation and the other responsibility for the technical quality of primary~~~~

~~~~legislation and scrutiny of European and secondary legislation.~~~~

~~~~With membership - assuming the size of the two committees corresponds to the current~~~~

~~~~size of the two branches - equal bicameralism poses fewer problems than the two models~~~~

~~~~of unequal bicameralism. Equal legislative powers would avoid the problem of a group of~~~~

~~~~directly elected representatives being denied the right to participate equally with other~~~~

~~~~representatives. Apart from the problems of duplication and conflict already identified~~~~

~~~~above, under this model the actual power of the branches may be influenced by their~~~~

~~~~respective size. If the Keys retained the right to override the opposition of the Legislative~~~~

~~~~Council, MHKs would have powers denied to MLCs.' It would be easier to overcome this~~~~

~~~~problem of inequality if the two committees were to exercise distinctive legislative~~~~

~~~~functions, but leave the final decision on both primary and secondary legislation to~~~~

~~~~Tynwald.~~~~

~~~~4 .1 hope the members of the Select Committee will find these observations helpful.~~~~

~~~~Yours sincerely,~~~~

~~~~David Kermode.~~~~

~~~~6 MAUGHOLD ALEXANDER DRIVE DOUGLAS ISLE OF MAN IM2 3QX TEL. 01624 675068 18th June 2003~~~~

~~~~Malachy Comwell-Kelly Secretary to the House of Keys Legislative Buildings Douglas IMI 3PW~~~~

~~~~Dear Mr Comwell-Kelly~~~~

~~~~Select Committee of the House of Keys on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill~~~~

~~~~I will of course make myself available if the Select Committee should wish to interview me on my submission provided of course that a mutually convenient time can be arranged.~~~~

~~~~I trust that the enclosure may be of some interest.~~~~

~~~~Yours sincerely urn bm~~~~

~~~~Jim Cain THE CONSTITUTION (LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL) BILL~~~~

~~~~àSÜ~~~~

~~~~THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF KEYS.~~~~

~~~~Purpose of the Bill~~~~

~~~~The Public are invited to submit written submissions on -~~~~

~~~~1. The manner in which the Legislative Council should be elected and by whom.~~~~

~~~~2. Whether the House of Keys and the Legislative Council should be elected at the same time and from the same constituencies,~~~~

~~~~3. Whether, in that event, members should choose among themselves which branch they would belong to following such a combined election.~~~~

~~~~And~~~~

~~~~4. Any other matter which is considered to relate to these issues.~~~~

~~~~Each of the four issues outlined are discussed separately in the following document in the order in which they appear above.~~~~

~~~~1 1 The manner in which the Legislative Council should be elected and by whom~~~~

~~~~I am of the opinion that the Legislative Council should be elected by postal ballot in the manner outlined in section 2 and schedule 1 of the Bill.~~~~

The matter as to whether the Lord Bishop should have both a seat on the Council and be able to vote has exercised the mind of many of the members of the House of Keys who spoke during the debate on the second reading of the Bill It is my view that the Bishop should remain a member of the Legislative Council and should be encouraged to give his opinion on whatever matters he is asked to consider but because he is a Crown appointee and for this reason only I do not think as a matter of principle that he should be able to exercise a vote. The position of the President and the Attorney General should remain as now. 2. Whether the House of Kevs and the Legislative Council should be elected at the same time and from the same constituencies.

At some time in the future, but not at present, I would suggest that it might be necessary to review and revise the electoral areas set out in schedule 1 under which the members of the Legislative Council will be elected so as to try and attain the same objective as outlined in the preceding paragraph, perhaps by iitviting the registered voters in each of 3 House of Keys constituencies to elect 1 member to the Council by postal ballot.

I see no problem except in an organisational sense in arranging for the elections to both branches to be held at the same time on the basis that the House of Keys would continue as heretofore and the Legislative Council elections would be taken by postal ballot. As a consequence each registered voter would have, perhaps either 2 or 3 votes (if the House of Keys constituencies were revised) - 1 or 2 for the House of Keys and 1 for the Council.

It may be outside the remit of the Select Committee, but I think consideration should be given as I believe takes place in Australia, for each voter to exercise his or her vote on the basis that penalties would be imposed if one failed to exercise this democratic obligation. 3. Whether, in that event, members should choose among themselves which branch they should belong to following such a combined election.

b. The Member for Ayre has suggested quite rightly in my view that the elected members of the Legislative Council should not be involved in constituency matters. I agree with the views that he has put forward on this matter but can understand that problems may well arise when electors in any of the 8 constituencies wish to raise matters with an elected representative who has been appointed as a member of the Council in a democratic election. 1 do not know how to overcome this problem and doubt whether appropriate legislation would have the desired effect.

~~~~Appendix 3~~~~

~~~~Hansard transcripts of oral evidence given on 5th September 2003 and 26th November 2003~~~~

~~~~KCLC, No. 1 2003~~~~

~~~~HOUSE OF KEYS OFFICIAL REPORT~~~~

~~~~RECORTYS OIKOIL Y CHIARE AS FEED~~~~

~~~~SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION (LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL) BILL~~~~

~~~~BING ER-LHEH MYCHIONE Y CLATTYS AGHT-REILL (Y CHOONCEIL SLATTYSSAGH)~~~~

~~~~PROCEEDINGS DAALTYN (HANSARD)~~~~

~~~~Douglas, Friday, 5th September 2003~~~~

Published by the Office of the Clerk of Tynwald, Legislative Buildings, Bucks Road, Douglas, Isle of Man. © Court of Tynwald, 2003 Printed by The Copy Shop Limited, 48 Bucks Road, Douglas, Isle of Man Price Band C 2KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003

~~~~Members Present:~~~~

~~~~Hon. S C Rod an MHK (Chairman) Mrs B J Cannell MHK Mrs H Hannan MHK Hon. J R Rimington MHK Hon. J A Brown SHK~~~~

~~~~Clerk: Mr M Comwell-Kelly, Secretaiy of the House of Keys~~~~

~~~~Business transacted Page Procedural...... 3~~~~

~~~~Evidence of Professor D Kermode...... 3 Evidence of Mr G V H Kneale...... 10 Evidence of Mr J C Cain...... 17~~~~

~~~~Procedural...... 24 Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 3KCLC~~~~

There are all sorts of groups who oppose the Bill for House of Keys Select Committee different reasons. Some because they prefer the status on the Constitution quo; some because they do not like the idea of a possible diminution of the power of the House of Keys; others because (Legislative Council) Bill they think the Bishop should have a vote and so on, and others because the constituencies that are proposed do not make any sense. The Committee sat in public ai 2.05 p.m. So, you get a series of different reasons for opposing in the Millennium Conference Room. legislation coming together to defeat an attempt to implement Legislative Buildings, Douglas a principle which has majority support I think one of the difficulties facing anyone trying to introduce reform in this area is finding a way round that fundamental problem - and [MR ROD AN in the Chair] I do not pretend to be able to give you the answer - but, as a Committee, you need to go a little further than Edgar Quine did, in trying to identify where there is common cause, Procedural where there is an unwillingness on the part of people to go along with démocratisation and find out where the real stumbling blocks are. That is all I would like to say by way The Chairman (Mr Rodan): Well, good afternoon to you all and welcome to this meeting of the Select Committee of introduction. of the House of Keys on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill.-- ...... ~ - — - - The Chairman: Thank you very much for that. We are convened in public session this afternoon to If I could, perhaps, start by just asking you a ’fitde bit receive oral evidence from three members of the public about Mr Quine’s BÜ1. who have written to us and we are starting'with Professor His Legislative Council Bill, of course, provides for David Kermode. the election of the Legislative Council by the electorate of I would like to welcome you, Professor Kermode, to this the Isle of Man to the eight seats, with a particular basis of Committee. Can I begin by introducing ourselves to you: my constituency - eight regional constituencies. The Bill also name is Steve Rodan and I am Chairman of the Committee; provides for specific functions of scrutinising proposed on my right is Mr Speaker, the Hon. Tony Brown and legislation - secondary and European legislation, for Mr Rimington MHK; on my left, Mrs Hazel Hannan MHK example - to the Legislative Council. and Mrs Brenda Cannell MHK. Do you have any comments about the fact that what is Welcome, Professor Kermode, and thank you very much being proposed in that Bill is an election from a different base for your most interesting written submission. of electorate than is the case for the House of Kéys? Would The purpose of the next hour, if we may, is to invite you there be any advantages or disadvantages to that? to expand further on your written submission in any way you would wish and to accept some questions from the members Prof. Kèrmode: I think there are some problems with of the Committee, if we seek further information from you. the Bill and one of the major problems occurred to me as Could I invite you, therefore, to speak to us and perhaps Mr Quine was speaking in the House of Keys, when he elaborate oh your written evidence, or as you see fit? envisaged a body of elder statesmen looking at legislation, revising it, looking at European and subordinate legislation, and yet the proposal itself is for a chamber that is inferior to the House of Keys. It does not have the powers, it can be EVIDENCE OF PROFESSOR D KERMODE overridden by the House of Keys, it retains its inferiority within Tynwald and, with the best will in the world, you are Prof. Kermode: Well, I had anticipated just coming not going to attract elder statesmen to take on that role. along and answering questions on the basis of what I had I think it is a role that does require at least some people already submitted. of experience and, of course, initially, you are going to have a direct election where everybody could be new and I think The Chairman: Well, we are quite happy if you would that is a real problem. Over time, of course, there will be like to proceed on that basis. people standing for election again and there may be some Members of the Legislative Council who would stand for Prof. Kermode: I would just make one comment which election - 1 do not know - but there is a danger that, initially, is additional to what I have written and that is, obviously, at any rate, you would not have the elder statesmen figures looking at the history of this particular subject, there have that Edgar Quine was talking about. been many attempts to democratise the Legislative Council, either as a chamber in its own right, or as part of Tynwald. The Chairman: What you would have, of course, All these attempts have failed for various reasons and it would be representatives on the Legislative Council directly struck me, on looking at all of the debates into this subject, elected by die public, whether they be put there, or, indeed, that, very often, there is a clear majority in support of the whether they were elder statesmen or not. Would you see principle of démocratisation - in support of the idea of having advantage from the fact that they could claim democratic democratically elected Members of the Legislative Council, legitimacy for the functions that the Council were being rather than indirectly elected Members - but, when it comes asked to perform? to finding a model to implement that principle, there is unity in opposition. Prof. Kermode: Yes, I think it is one of those situations

~~~~Procedural~~~~

H ouse of K eys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of Professor D Kerm ode 4KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence of incrementalism. You are making things better, but you are a requirement to split into two bodies, one the Keys and leaving a lot of questions unanswered. one the Council. Clearly, if you can agree on the constituencies - the Could you just expand a little bit on why you see these democratic election of Members of the Legislative Council, two issues as problems? We have had evidence that proposes from a democratic point of view - it is better than the present a fairly neat method of actually dividing into these two arrangement, but I think the Bill, as it stands, leaves a lot of component parts of Tynwald, following an election, but I things unanswered. For example, if you are going to have think it would be quite useful to hear what you see as being directly elected Members, they will want to know why they the problems there. should have this position of inferiority vis-à-vis the House of Keys. Why should they be denied access to the Chief Prof. Kermode: Well, I think the main problem is the Minister’s position? Why should they - at the end of the one of responsibility. So, if you have a directly elected day, in a conflict situation - be potentially overridden by the Tynwald and then you subdivide the Members, it is important House of Keys? Why, in Tynwald, should the House of Keys to remember that they have all been elected on a similar have the superiority when it comes to resolutions? franchise in constituencies of a similar size and so on, and would expect, therefore, to have powers similar to each The Chairman: Would you, therefore, say that that other. particular model of a separate election from a different basis Yet there is, clearly, in the debate that has taken place of electorate would be a recipe for conflict between the Keys so far, a concern to see a second chamber that is essentially and the Council? a revising body and which may take on responsibility for matters that are not currently adequately covered and this Prof. Kermode: Well, it could be. I think,, whatever- is certainly in Edgar Quine’s Bill that we discussed a few arrangement you set up, whether it is this particular model, moments ago. ' ' ' or the sort of model that was proposed by Victor Kneale and One of the important features of dividing Tynwald up into others over the years, there is the potential for conflict and two is to restore the equality that they enjoyed until 1962 and 1 think quite a lot of attention needs to be paid to how you that carries with it some problems. Obviously, people would are going to resolve conflict say, ‘Well, this is going to usher in conflict again.’ I think, if you have got directly elected Members in both I think, if we look at the history of the relationship between the Legislative Council and the House of Keys, Chambers, it seems to me that, whether you have a directly certainly when they did have equal powers there were elected Tynwald or not, there is an obvious mechanism for conflicts. They tended to occur on a fairly limited number of resolving conflict which is missing from this Bill, which is subject areas - constitutional matters being one of the most simply to allow the decision to be taken on a joint vote in frequent sources of conflict - and the number of occasions Tynwald. relatively small. If you had a mechanism to resolve that conflict by a The Chairman: If I could just ask a little bit more about joint vote in Tynwald, then it would not carry with it the that point, before I ask my colleagues to come in. repercussions that it carried traditionally, where, if the In your written submission, you talk to us about that Legislative Council opposed the Bill, the Bill was lost or, very point and - if I can just quote to you from page 5 of after 1962, if the Legislative Council opposed the Bill, the your letter to us, in which you are talking about democratic Keys could get it through after a period of delay. reform, in paragraph 3.4. Up to that point you have talked In the Norwegian situation, where there is conflict about policy-making, financial votes, recruitment into the between the two chambers, if they cannot resolve this by a executive and then, in paragraph 3.4, you specifically talk committee of the two chambers then it goes to a joint vote about the processing of legislation and you describe two in the Storting. In the Norwegian example they require a alternatives. two-thirds majority in the Storting to carry the day, but One, as you say, there have been proposals, in the context of Tynwald, to have an absolute majority of the membership of Tynwald * involves a major break with tradition and a move to a unicameral as being sufficient to win the day. I think 17 is the figure legislative process in which the legislative function is performed in Tynwald, rather than in the branches at present,’ that is mentioned. So, there are a number of alternatives, but what you and you say this would simplify the process, reduce did not have traditionally was a mechanism in Tynwald for the potential for conflict that you talked about a moment resolving conflict and, as long as that is available, I do not ago - enabling conflict to be resolved by the Members voting think conflict need be a serious problem. as one body. Conflict is there, anyway. Conflict is there within the The other alternative you describe as House of Keys, within Tynwald, and so long as you have got a mechanism for resolving it, that is the important thing. ‘retaining distinctive legislative functions for the House of Keys and the Legislative Council, as legislative committees of a directly elected The Chairman: Thank you very much, Professor Tynwald.' Kermode. Can I ask Mr Speaker if he wishes to...?

At the bottom of the page you say that this option has The Speaker: Yes, thank you, Chairman. Good the advantage of being more in keeping with tradition, afternoon, Professor Kermode. but it poses two problems: one being how to divide up the Could I just ask you, maybe, to expand a little bit further legislative responsibilities between the two Committees and on your written submission on your reasons why you believe the second problem how to select the Members. Having had that the Legislative Council should be subject to popular a single election to a directly elected Tynwald, there is then election?

~~~~H ouse of K e ys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of Professor D Kerm ode Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 5 KCLC~~~~

Prof. Kermode: I think there are a number of reasons. If you look at recruitment to the Legislative Council I think there is, in the world at large, a concern that public from the House of Keys since the Legislative Council lost officials with the responsibility for policy-making, should the comparative power with the House of Keys, there have be directly elected and accountable to the people, and you been quite a number of occasions when it has been difficult see in country after country attempts made to implement that to find a senior Member of the Keys to take on that post A principle, sometimes not very effectively. number of senior Members have made it clear that they do Certainly, if we look at the United Kingdom, they have not want to be considered and, on a number of occasions, been very slow to move on that front, but I think, if I read you have had relatively new Members of the House of Keys the debates in Tynwald and the Keys that have taken place being appointed to the Legislative Council. And there is a on this subject, there does seem to be a belief that democratic real danger that, if you further reduce the powers of the election brings with it a legitimacy that other forms of Legislative Council, to give it greater legitimacy, then you recruitment do not. are going to be in that vicious downward spiral. There is one other extremely important reason in the context of the Isle of Man - and I made the point in my The Speaker: Can I just follow that through, Chairman, paper - and that is where you have a situation where you and then I will pass after this, hopefully, subject to the are electing the Chief Minister, and the Chief Minister is answer. selecting Ministers, and Tynwald - in practice, not in theory Could I ask, Professor, for your views on the issue. - is effectively precluded from selecting eight Members of The Isle of Man, in common with most democracies in the Tynwald because they are not directly elected. western world, has a substantial number in proportion to our I know, in the past, Percy Radcliffe and Edgar Mann population of people who are elected by Tynwald to serve were both chosen to lead the Executive Council when they on Statutory Boards and quangos, which are not elected by were in the Legislative Council^ but I cannot^ somehow, see the people and they have policy-making powers. Can you that being in accord with the wishes of the people in the Isle tell me how you see that? of Man today - I think, as long as you have a significant Is that not contradictory to the view that the Legislative proportion of Members of Tynwald effectively precluded Council should be elected, but they should not be, because from those roles... they outnumber the Legislative Council Members in There has been a lot of criticism in the House of Keys, numbers? Could I ask for a view on how you see that marries even, regarding the two Members of the Legislative Council up in our system, and it is not uncommon to what goes on in who currently serve in the Council of Ministers. When the the UK or within Europe? Why is there a difference for the Chief Minister came to select Members of his Council on Legislative Council, who are directly elected by the Keys? this last occasion, his choice, or the pool of recruitment, was very small, because, at any given time, there are going to Prof. Kermode: Well, I think for a variety of reasons, be... I think, in 2001, there were four new Members in the there are a number of bodies where it has been felt that it House of Keys and it would be unusual for them to move makes more sense to have people at one step removed from straight into a ministerial position, although I know it has politics. happened on one occasion. There is also the possibility of having a political group, The Speaker: But they make policy that affects every such as the APG, which, at that time, was not invited to man, woman and child on the Island. participate in Government So, again, there is a small group Prof. Kermode: They make policy, but, ultimately, of people who are precluded from membership, although one they are making policy within a framework that has to be or two, if you like, semi-retired politicians, who, having just approved by Tynwald. been in high office, did not want to continue, and there are one or two politically unacceptable people. The Speaker: Only a statutory framework that says, So, the real choice was probably to select a Council of ‘these are your responsibilities’, not in terms of what policies Ministers out of 12 or 13 Members. And I think that is a they can make - and not answerable directly to Tynwald. So serious weakness and having a directly elected Tynwald with I am just looking... do you see that as a conflict? a much bigger pool of recruitment strengthens the arm of any future Chief Minister in recruiting an efficient Council. Prof, Kermode: There are so many different kinds of bodies. I think there are some, of course, like the Financial The Speaker: Could I just ask, then, Chairman: in terms Supervision Commission and so on, where there is some of the issue of whether or not the Legislative Council should political membership, but that sits side by side with non be changed, in how it is elected to the Council of Ministers, political members, because the functions that that body do you envisage any system that could work where they performs, like the functions the Electricity Board and so on, would continue to be elected by Members of the House of perform, are technical and require the expertise of someone Keys, and they would have legitimacy? which you are not necessarily going to get through election. But it is a big... There are so many bodies, it would be very Prof. Kermode: For them to have legitimacy, I think, difficult to come down with a single answer to meet all of perhaps, you are going back to the recommendations of the those situations. Select Committee that reported in 1999, whereas, if it was the alternative option - if Tynwald or the House of Keys did The Speaker: The principle is the same in terms of not go for a direcdy elected Tynwald and that was to reduce people being put into the Legislative Council by the House further the powers of Members of the Legislative Council of Keys, or people being put onto a Statutory Board by - 1 think the problem you have then is going to be even more Tynwald. difficult than it has been in recent years to attract people to serve on the Legislative Council. Prof. Kermode: Well, the principle is not the same,

H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of Professor D K erm ode 6KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence because, if the elected Members of the Isle of Mao tricameral assembly. Legislature decide that they believe that a particular set of Insofar as the Norwegian model is concerned, I think ( functions should be performed by an independent body, this was first proposed for the Isle of Man in the early then, just as the British Government decided the Bank of 1980s, when a similar Select Committee was looking into England should be freed from direct political control, that is the whole question of reform, and I think it was Eddie something that has happened with the blessing of the directly Lowey who came up with the suggestion of looking at the elected Members, and there are reasons that were acceptable Norwegian model, the model of the Storting, where you do to the directly elected Members in making that move. have direct election of the assembly and subdivision into In the Isle of Man, of course, you could go back to two legislative bodies together, with the means of resolving the situation that you had under the Board system, where conflict between them. the majority of members on every body was a Member of In that proposal I see no reason why most of the non Tynwald, but we moved away from that, in part because of legislative business should not be carried on in Tynwald, or the sheer burden of work that was involved and, of course, in Committees established by Tynwald to advise it Even with with only 30 or so eligible Members there is a limit to how other proposals, such as Edgar Quine’s proposal for a directly much time and energy those individuals can provide. So you elected Legislative Council, I see no reason why that should have to find some mechanism. not be accompanied by steps to modify the relationship I suppose what you are driving at is that you could argue between the two branches inside Tynwald, because the main for the sort of system that has been adopted in parts of the reason for weakening the Legislative Council in Tynwald was United States, where elections involve public office holders the fact that it was not directly elected. Initially, it still had a from the mayor downwards, but I think, there, you are talking number of ex-officio Members. Those have gone down since about radical change in a completely different league from 1962, but that was the original reason for giving the Keys the what we are talking about here. power to override the Council, both in the legislative sense" and within Tynwald itself. The Speaker: Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. Mrs Hannan: If there was just Tynwald - if we decided The Chairman: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mrs Hannan, that Legislative Council would no longer be, and the House have you any questions? of Keys would no longer be - how would you envisage the legislative side of it, the actual primary and secondary Mrs Hannan: Could I just briefly go over what you are legislation being dealt with? suggesting? You are suggesting that - Prof. Kennode: Well, I think you would not have to M r Cain: Mr Chairman, could the members of the look very carefully at the ways in which other unicameral Committee speak up a bit louder? legislatures operate, but there is a lot of common ground there, and most of them have a series of readings with an Mrs Hannan: Yes, sorry. opportunity for legislative proposals to be looked at in detail by Committees, either specialist Committees in the The Chairman: Okay, thank you. larger assemblies, or by an ad hoc committee in a smaller assembly. Mrs Hannan: Could you just go over how, obviously, In the Scottish Assembly, for example, there is the the constituencies would change by your proposals? There possibility of dealing with bad drafting as a result of would be more people elected; would you see, once they amendments passed in the process, by moving those sort are elected, that Tynwald would split into Committees just of drafting amendments at the third reading, at the third for legislative purposes, or would they mix and match to go stage. into Committee, maybe, to look at a particular issue within I believe, in Tynwald, it is already possible for that sort of legislation? thing to happen at the signature stage. It does not happen very often, but it is possible to make minor drafting amendments if Prof. Kermode: Well, I did suggest two alternatives. they are deemed necessary by the legal advisers and so on. The first alternative I do not think would be politically acceptable in the Isle of Man, because that is a unicameral Mrs Hannan: You stated here on page 5: Tynwald. I think, if I was starting from scratch, as they were doing in Scotland, and 1 looked around the world for best ‘Reports on the drafting quality of Bills can be made by the Attorney General, or a Committee involving the Attorney General, prior to the practice, I would have probably gone down the line that final reading of the Bill in Tynwald.’ was adopted in Scotland to have a unicameral assembly and then to consider the best way within that of devising, of Would you see that as a role for the Attorney General, or for, considering legislation, and ensuring that you avoided ill- maybe, a parliamentary legislative officer? considered legislation by having, perhaps, a more thorough scrutiny m certain stages of the legislative process. Prof. Kermode: Well, it could be a Committee involving As I say, my reading of the debates on this subject those with legal experience, so long as it is understood that suggest that that might be a step too far, but it has got a lot the responsibilities of that individual or group was essentially of attractions to it, apart from the fact that you would no concerned with drafting and not concerned with substance. longer have a Legislative Council, or a House of Keys, and I believe the Attorney General already has to signify I think the debates suggest that there is quite a lot of support the legislation is appropriate for the Royal Assent and so for the tradition of a tricameral assembly, not necessarily it is, in a sense, a similar function to that which is already exactly in the way in which it has developed in the Isle of being performed. I only suggest that as one possible way, Man, but preserving the three main bodies that figure in that but there are a number of other ways in which you could

~~~~H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence o f Professor D Kerm ode Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 7KCLC~~~~

sort that problem out You could involve the President of problem to confront the legislature, together with the Attorney General and two Members, or something of that sort. There are different The Chairman: Unless the branches were equal, would possibilities. there not be an attraction for a politician to go to the smaller component and have more influence? Mrs Hannan: Just mentioning the President, then: there is a problem, as I see it, that, if we did not have a House Prof. Kerraode: Yes, I could see that could be a problem, of Keys, we would lose the Speaker of the House of Keys, because you could argue that it is going to be easier for which is a noble and long-standing position. Would you an individual to, perhaps, exercise his influence with a envisage a Speaker instead of a President, or...? smaller group than with a larger group, although it does not necessarily follow. Prof. Kermode: I think there would be a lot to be said I do not know enough about the Norwegian experience for having a Speaker of Tynwald in that particular context. to know how often the chambers are in conflict, but. . . I am not quite sure how the Island came to have the present method of selecting the President of Tynwald, but The Chairman: In Norway are the two components the traditional means of recruiting the Speaker from one of purely for the purposes of legislation? the directly elected Members seems to me to be one that has a lot to be said for it and, historically, experience has shown Prof. Kermode: Yes. that it does not mean that that individual is no longer able to represent the interests of his constituents. Mr Rodan: So the legislative committees - I am sure the present Speaker is well able to represent the interests 6f the ’constituents" o f Castletown and, Prof. Kermode: In other respects they operate' as certainly, I remember, on many occasions, a predecessor, a Storting, which is very similar in many respects to also representing Castletown, who was one of the longest Tynwald. serving Speakers, arguing about that issue again and again and always coming round to the view that he was well able The Chairman; So the Isle of Man parallel would be to represent his constituents, even though he did not take an Keys and Council retained as two legislative committees, active part in the debates in the Keys. (Prof. Kermode: Yes.) with defined powers, and would it matter then, which branch introduced legislation and which Mrs Hannan: But was that not because he had a different did the revising? role in Tynwald itself? Prof. Kermode: No. It could not be a means of making Prof. Kermode: Partly, yes. better progress, with legislation being able to introduce a Bill into either branch because, of course, members of The Chairman: Thanks, Mrs Hannan. the Government could be sitting in either of the legislative Before I ask Mrs Cannell to come in, can I just ask on committees. There is no real reason why they should be in one issue that you brought up when you talked about the either one or the other. Norwegian system. You referred to the fact that, after an election, they divide The Chairman: Government, of course - if you looked into an upper house of the Lagting and a lower house, and a at Government as meaning simply Ministers - could be quarter of the members go to the upper house and they elect outnumbered in one branch, if that was the branch initiating a presiding officer. What would be the incentive for anybody the legislation and there could be difficulties for Government fresh from an election to go to an upper house if that were in getting it through in that particular branch. to be the model adopted for Tynwald? Why would anybody want to go to one branch, rather than another, bearing in Prof. Kermode: Well, that is true, but then a lot of mind that, of course, at election time, neither they nor the legislation comes about as a result of policy-making in electorate would know which branch they would end up in Tynwald and a lot of legislation also falls into the category after an election? of being heavily based on UK legislation, but a lot of legislation of a technical nature, again, which tends to go Prof. Kermode: Well, I think, in that situation, the two through relatively smoothly in both Chambers. branches would have to have equal powers, as they do in So a lot of legislation that goes through the legislature Norway. in the Isle of Man is non-controversial, except at the edges. We are really talking about problems that more often occur The Chairman: Equal numbers as well? with Private Members’ Bills, rather than with Government Bills. I am not saying that there are no Government Bills Prof. Kermode: No, they do not have equal numbers in that get into difficulty. Norway and, of course, if you respect tradition in the Isle of Man, you would not have equal numbers there, either. The Chairman: Okay, I thank you very much. As I have said, I can see a certain attraction in the Mrs Cannell. Norwegian model, but I do not regard it as efficient as the unicameral alternative that I have just mentioned - Mrs Cannell: Thank you, Mr Chairman, and good afternoon to you. Very interesting and thought-provoking The Chairman: Would it be - ? comments from you. What I would like to ask is: following up from what you Prof. Kermode: - where you do not have that particular said to Mrs Hannan about looking at the world situation and

H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of Professor D K erm od e 8KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence making comparisons and looking for best practice in terms Keys or Members of Legislative Council, and then, once of the models of different parliamentary situations across they are elected and they form the parliament, we then the globe - other than the Norwegian one, which is vaguely envisage - going by previous reports’ recommendations, similar to what we have in the Isle of Man - have you come and, of course, the divide within parliamentary debates thus across any other tricameral system of parliament? far - they then look in terms of dividing that and selecting eight to serve as Legislative Council Members and the rest Prof. Kermode: I think there is one roughly similar to the to provide for House of Keys. Norwegian one in Iceland, but it is very much a Scandinavian Would you agree with me that, perhaps, that is where model and, of course, the Isle of Man does have a... the problem lies that, once having, perhaps, established that the election should include 32 Members, as opposed to the Mrs Cannell: Going from tricameral to unicameral, of current 24 by public election, having got that far, to then want course, you have in the middle bicameral, which I think you to divide and operate on the same basis as we currently are, are really talking about in one way, although I seem to have to a degree, is the one that would cause the greatest conflict picked up that your preference is for unicameral. and disharmony than we currently have? In your experience, when looking at other situations Further, have you considered that, if we were to establish where they have a unicameral assembly, have you been able a unicameral system - Members being voted in as Members to probe, or test, or assess, the efficiency of a unicameral, as of Tynwald - there would be no need to have the separate opposed to bicameral or tricameral? areas of the Legislative Council, vis-à-vis the House of Keys Members, in terms of title and position? But, out of the 32, Prof. Kermode: I think it is very difficult to do there could be then selected standing committees who would comparative analysis on the detail of the arrangements in have specific roles ,and be able, from time to time, when different countries because they differ-so significantly arid," we talk about legal expertise, for example, to have ad hoc of course, most of the countries have party systems and that committees on various issues or technical issues regarding makes their operation very different from anything the Isle legislation, to be able to scrutinise, and, perhaps, the standing of Man has experienced. committees to do the work of the cross-checking, the scrutiny To that extent, I would be reluctant to push some of these prior to the assembly then considering it. comparisons too far, because you can have a constitutional In other words, what I am suggesting is, I would envisage, model and then you have a party system and the party system impacts directly on the way in which the constitutional model from what you are suggesting, that, having established the works. If you have the same model in a situation that you unicameral - everybody out for election elected by the people, have in the Isle of Man, where there is no party system, then, forming the parliament - it would then form the standing of course, it could work in quite a different way. committees and provide for a proactive role in scrutiny of So, I think you have got to be very careful in making these legislation and European legislation in particular - and then comparisons, but I think on a general basis.., I do not know, the assembly to debate. but I have read various estimates to suggest that half the world operates unicameral legislatures and, certainly, there The Chairman: Okay. is no evidence to suggest that those are any more inefficient than the bicameral ones. Prof. Kermode: I think the great attraction of the I think there is a lot of evidence to suggest that, where unicameral model is that you have got the membership then you have bicameralism, there can be unnecessary delays available to serve on whatever committees you feel need to and conflicts unless, as I said earlier, you have a satisfactory be established. If you see there is a major gap that currently mechanism for resolving conflict and, of course, in the United no-one is looking at - European legislation, to see what Kingdom the only way they found to be able to do that, in impact it is having on the Isle of Man - then you can set up the final analysis, was to give the House of Commons the a committee of five members - a standing committee - and power to override the House of Lords, which is a model you have got a committee that is reporting regularly to that has been followed with slight qualifications in the Isle Tynwald on that subject. of Man. (Mrs Cannell: Okay.) If you want someone to take on subordinate delegated But I am just going on to say, I think moving from a legislation, again, you can deal with that You can address tricameral system to a unicameral system, with Tynwald your particular needs in a much easier way with the as the single chamber, is quite radical but straightforward, unicameral model than you can with the tricameral one. I because Tynwald exists and already performs non-legislative think, when this subdivision of the elected Members into functions as a body. a Legislative Council and the House of Keys is, in one I do not think I would ever suggest a bicameral model, sense, artificial, because what you are doing is carrying because I think, in a bicameral model, you would lose on a tradition of two legislative chambers, one called the Tynwald and I think Tynwald is one of the great strengths Legislative Council, which, of course, started off life as of the Manx system and I think it should be retained and, a very different body, a group of officials advising the if possible, democratised to a greater extent than it is Governor, and was the dominant policy-making body in the currently. Isle of Man, and the other called the House of Keys. I do not suppose that, if you were starting from scratch, anyone Mrs Cannell: Okay. Well, thank you for that. would think of suggesting, ‘Right, well, we will have these Following on from that, then, what I understand that eight Members sitting with the Bishop and the Attorney you are suggesting, or that you would advocate, is that there General in one chamber and these 24 sitting in the House would be an election requiring 32 Members of Tynwald to of Keys because they happen to fit into a chamber we have be voted and elected to a Tynwald assembly. So, we would got in the legislative buildings!' have Members of Tynwald, as opposed to Members of Having said that - and I am being a little flippant about

H ouse of K e ys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of Professor D Kerm ode Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 9KCLC tradition - I do recognise that there is a lot of respect in this mixture of one-, two- and three-Member constituencies the Isle of Man for some of the traditional strengths of the with electors having as many votes as there are Members tricameral system, and, of course, one thing that having two to be elected. chambers of a different size can produce, is a very different approach to considering the same legislation. If you are The Chairman: Would you say that was a perverse sitting as a committee of five, you are probably going to decision? operate differently. You will have a different'modus operandi from if you are sitting in a group of 24 or a group of 35. Prof. Kennode: I think it was a perverse decision - since So, over time, with two directly elected legislative you have put the words into my mouth. (Laughter) committees, you could find that the smaller group may raise certain broader issues which are not raised in the larger group, The Chairman: Okay. Mr Rimington. and vice versa, and that, by considering legislation in two different sized groups, in a sense you are doing what many Mr Rimington: Yes. I am playing devil’s advocate a bit legislatures attempt to achieve by setting up committees to here with my question. We talked a lot about the change to look at legislation. In a sense, the Legislative Council could the constitution, and the way we might be set up, in abstract - be regarded as an unusually large committee, but it would something that would be more democratic or more legitimate undoubtedly look at legislation in a slightly different way. in democratic terms - but, from a pretty different point of view, the purpose of this whole process is to provide good The Chairman: Thank you, Professor. I would like to government for the people that we serve. So, it is finding bring in Mr Rimington, finally, and ask him if he has got that balance between democracy and the end result, which any questions. ______...... ______. _____ we are trying to do. The .changes that have been suggested in terms of a unicameral, directly elected, second chamber Mr Rimington: I am sorry, Mr Chairman, I have a few, or Legislative Council, whichever one of those, do you think even though time is passing. either of those will actually improve the end result for the I think you have answered the point I was going to people? Will better decisions arise? make - well, not point but question - on the importance of tradition in relation to constitutional matters and, perhaps, Prof. Kermode: I think, ultimately, the quality of the you could just briefly comment about, if there is a change, decisions that are made within any system, whether it was what sort of pace do you think is acceptable? governed by the Lieutenant-Governor or by a democratically elected Tynwald, depends upon the individuals and groups Prof. Kennode: Well, I do not know about the acceptable that emerge within it Sometimes countries are fortunate pace. I think, once you agree to move in a particular direction, in that a leader emerges just at the right time and he or she it makes sense to move as expeditiously as you can towards captures the imagination of people and you get a period of that goal. rapid change which seems to be in accord with what the Just before we leave the subject of tradition, I think there people want Other times, you can have a bunch of democrats is a parallel where the Isle of Man agreed in 1983 to move who do not seem capable of doing anything and so I would towards a ministerial system. Once there was an attempt to not want to generalise. implement it, some Members drew back a little and they were I think the efficiency of Government is likely to be helped not quite sure, they wanted more details spelling out and so if it is also democratic, because I think a government that is the timetable had to be modified and, eventually, it was only accountable to the people is more likely to be a government fully implemented over a period from 1986 to 1988. But, if in the interests of the people than a government that is we look at that, if we look at the transition from a system of accountable to, shall we say, the United Kingdom Home government by boards to a ministerial system, that is every Office. bit as radical as a move towards a unicameral legislature, because there you are talking about the key policy-making M r Rimington: Right Just for the sake of time I will bodies. try and wrap my last two questions into one, even though So, the Isle of Man has grappled with radical change they are separate. and did so much more rapidly than some of the other Crown One is that we talked about the delaying power of a dependencies that were sorely in need of similar radical second chamber, not just here but elsewhere as well, and it change, where they are only just beginning to address it at has always been promoted as one of the traditional facets of the moment. So, whether you go for a unicameral elected the British constitution, anyhow, that they should have that Tynwald or a directly elected Tynwald, which you then delaying power, i.e. it was an essential element of the checks break down into two separate legislative bodies, I think it and balances, so it forced people to sit back and rethink and, is a change that - particularly the latter change - is not all if appropriate, go ahead as they originally intended, but at that far removed from the present tricameral arrangement, least it made them sit and think. except in respect of certain important details. The last question, which is completely separate, again, is I think the move towards direct elections would take some really to do with size of constituencies. In comparison to other time because one of the biggest difficulties that always crops jurisdictions, our constituencies are very small and, therefore, up with something like that is the constituency. How do you there tends to be a far greater element of parochialism that devise the constituencies? How many Members do you have comes into the process through that inevitably. Do you see in constituencies, given that we are moving towards a more any advantage of having larger constituencies? democratic system? Do we need to modify our electoral system? I still do not fully understand how you managed Prof. Kennode: Well, there are two questions and they to repeal the single transferable vote system and go back to are not really related -

~~~~H ouse of K e ys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) Bill - Evidence of Professor D K erm ode 10 KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence~~~~

Mr Rimington: They are not. Liverpool today to meet with the Committee and I would like to thank you very much indeed for your contribution. Prof. Kermode: - but on the delaying power thing, a Thank you very much. lot of words have been spouted in favour of the delaying powers making people think hard about something again. Prof. Kermode: It has been a pleasure. I hope it has If you go back over history and look at the things where been helpful. conflict necessitated the exercise of the power to override the House of Lords or the Legislative Council, first of all, it only The Chairman: Thank you so much. happens on a handful of occasions, but, usually, you have the sort of situation that you have exemplified classically by the debate about the abolition of fox hunting in the United Mr Kneale was called at 3J5 p.m. Kingdom, where the overwhelming majority of the elected representatives of the people want to abolish fox hunting. It EVIDENCE OF MR G V H KNEALE has not been abolished, because of the overwhelming support for it in the House of Lords and so you get two very different The Chairman: Right. Well, good afternoon, once interpretations of the power of delay. again. We resume now thè oral evidence being heard by the One is that it is an irritant, it is a nuisance, it is an Select Committee of the House of Keys on the Constitution interference with the wishes of the elected representatives. I (Legislative Council) Bill and I would like to give a very think, if you look historically, in the case of the Isle of Man, warm welcome to you, Mr Kneale, both for your written you will find plenty of examples of that sort, particularly in evidence, which was extensive and most interesting, and the constitutional arena.— ------— ------. which the Committee has had an opportunity to look at, and The House of Keys was anxious for reform in the 1960s, I would like to thank you for coming this afternoon.' and, on a number of very important issues, the Legislative I do not think introductions are necessary, so could I Council opposed its own diminution of power, or the loss invite you, sir, to put your points to us, after which we shall, of the deemsters as Members of the Legislative Council, no doubt, have some questions. and so on. It was a classic case of the Legislative Council defending vested interests - M r Kneale: Right, thank you. Mr Chairman, I have made it quite clear in my written Mr Rimington: Possibly a remnant of - submission that I think that Edgar Quine’s Bill would create a worse situation than exists at present and should be rejected Prof. Kermode: - and I do not think any... Obviously, without further consideration. time passed and people did have time to think, but, in most I am surprised that Mr Quine did not stick to the instances, where that happened the House of Keys went amendments he moved to the Bill that Geoff Cannell on to pass legislation, although, occasionally, an election introduced in the year 2000 as a basis for a new Bill; that intervened and, of course, the subject was then dropped. would have been a much better starter than the one he has As with reducing the power of delay from two years to one introduced. He has made the mistake that so many others have made in the past; instead of sticking with an idea which year, that was defeated initially and then you had an election has strong support, he has looked for a new starting point intervening and it was quite some time before the matter and come up with a nonsensical idea, which, in my opinion, was raised again. has no merit at all. On the question of constituencies, I think the classic There is nothing that the opposition likes better than to example, I suppose, is that, over a period of time, you have see the supporters of an idea arguing over how best to achieve had in Rushen, which - albeit the constituency boundaries it. The vast majority of the Keys have said they want to see have changed over time - has been a three-Member an elected Legislative Council. Although there are probably constituency since 1867, and I think there are a lot of a few misguided Members who think that the Keys should advantages in having three-Member constituencies that remain as the only elected body so they can claim to be the are larger. I certainly would not be an advocate of 32 representatives of the people - even though far more people single-Member constituencies. I think the constituencies have voted against them than have voted for them - such would be just microscopic and I do not think that would be ideas should be discounted. a healthy thing at all. It is time that everyone recognised that Tynwald is the supreme body and, that being so, it is time that the people Mr Rimington: I hope that you mean to say that history elected all the voting Members of Tynwald. That is why shows you get far better people coming from Rushen. I applaud the amendment that may be moved by you, (Laughter) Mr Chairman, which has recognised this. Since 1982, after I had resigned my seat on the Legislative Mrs Hannan; Excuse me! Council and successfully contested my old seat in Douglas West, there have been several attempts to bring about an The Chairman: On that note, I would like to thank you, elected Tynwald, the first three being Bills that I introduced. Professor Kennode. Unfortunately the clock has caught up I would add that the first went through the Keys and it was with us. I would like to thank you very much for the most the Legislative Council, sitting in private, that sat on it for interesting evidence that you have presented and for allowing so long that it killed that off. Time ran out on us and that the Committee to put questions to you. You are, of course, is one of the faults with the Legislative Council, as it was well known to Members of Tynwald from your books and operating in those days. your academic publications on Manx political history and we Since then, the Keys have appointed several Committees are extremely grateful to you for coming over specially from to examine the situation and have all come to the conclusion

House of Keys Select Committee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill - Evidence of Professor D Kermode House of Keys Select Committee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill - Evidence of Mr G V H Kneale Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 11KCLC

that the best way to achieve a truly democratic parliament for He did not think Members of the Legislative Council the Isle of Man is to have an elected Tynwald every five years. should be involved in Government and he took exception That is what I have been advocating since 1982 - that is for to them referring to their constituents. Well, he might be 21 years - and it is time that Tynwald became of age. right about the present Members of the Council, some of The correct answer should be obvious to everyone and whom are political nonentities, but it certainly was not true I have submitted a draft Bill which will bring this about, in the past when you had such people as Jack Nivison, John which then allows for Tynwald Members to divide into two Bolton, Cecil McFee, Howard Simcocks, Roy MacDonald branches, Legislative Council and the House of Keys, to and even Victor Kneale, to name just a few. Electing them deal with legislation. to the Legislative Council did not turn them into meek little Policy and financial matters have been decided in Tynwald lambs. They were just as active politically in both branches for many years now, since the power of the Governor to be and made their presence felt in Tynwald on many occasions, ‘Lord High Everything’ was removed. We like to claim we but then, they were really elder statesmen, speaking from have a continuous parliament for over a thousand years. This experience. is a lovely little fairy story, for the only similarity is an open After all the reports that have been prepared on this air meeting each year. subject - and I make special reference to the one prepared by The present day parliament bears no resemblance to that a Committee of five - who I see are Quine, Cretney, Cringle, of the early days. In fact, it is only 137 years since the House Rodan and Mrs Cannell - which sat for over two years and of Keys became a popularly elected body and, even then, the included full details of the history of the subject in the two Governor could veto just about everything they did and here Reports they produced. With all this evidence available, I we are, 24 years after celebrating our millennium, and we am surprised there was any need for the present Committee still have not achieved ajbruly democratic parliament to go through die whole procedure again. ______I believe that the best way to achieve resufts is to go one If anything is going to fie achieved, you have to act step at a time and, in drafting the Bill 1 have submitted, I quickly, because two years of your active membership has have made as few changes to the existing system as possible. already gone and you have to take note that the Legislative I have retained the existing 15 constituencies and provided Council can hold up any Bill for 12 months, so your objective for the election of 32 Members based on the average number should be to get the Bill through the three readings in the of votes and I have given details of this in my written Keys before the end of April 2004. This gives the Council submission. May and June to deal with it before the summer recess. If From these it will be seen that eight constituencies they reject it it should be reintroduced at the beginning of would be entitled to an extra Member to that at present in the new session, so that it will become law in 2005 and so the House of Keys. The eight Members of Tynwald to go allow time to make preparations for the general election in into the Legislative Council should come from those areas, 2006 to be for an election to Tynwald. leaving the representation in the House of Keys exactly as I believe that all elections in the future should be under it is at present the single-transferable-vote (STV) system. I got such a I have suggested various methods as to how the person Bill through in 1982 but after two elections, the Keys were from these eight constituencies could be chosen as an MLC: misguided enough to throw it out and return to the discredited one method being that the person who topped the poll could first-past-the-post system, which allows candidates with a have the choice of being an MLC or an MHK. A question minority vote to be elected and also allows some voters to arose about the votes - Members being elected to Tynwald vote for three members, some for two, and the rest only - during the last person’s evidence and it was suggesting that one. people would then become ‘Members of Tynwald’. Well, if Under the STV system, voters only havie one vote and you look at the initials ‘MT’ that might be misconstrued by it does not matter how many seats there are to be filled the public, so I would say that the two branches should stick in a constituency, it is one man, one vote. The successful to the titles MLC and MHK. candidates will have majority support, but I do not I do not think there is any need to change the functions of recommend mixing it up with this Bill. either branch, as there is no real criticism about the present I know there are three strong supporters of the STV method of operation. All the criticism is about the farcical system on this Committee. I hope a Bill to bring it about will situation which has arisen over the election of Members, be recommended by this Committee and introduced without some allowing their names to go forward five or six times, delay to correct the foolishness of a previous House. before finally getting 13 votes, possibly in desperation to Turning now to the role of Bishop in Tynwald. I am end a farcical situation. strongly of the opinion that he should be a Member of The Legislative Council used to consist of senior Tynwald, but he should not have a vote. It has always been Members of Tynwald, who had served in the Keys for many claimed that he was a Crown appointment and, by a series of years, having topped the poll on several occasions. They letters to the press, including The Church Leader, I tried to were the elder statesmen, who could advise. At present the get the local church authorities to admit to the real situation Members have very little experience and the Council could and admit it was a political appointment, and when they become a funkhole for Keys Members who are frightened failed to admit this, I wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury to face the electorate. and he failed to admit this also, but now, at last, the truth is Reading through the debates in Tynwald, I note the out The final decision is made by the UK Prime Minister and Member for Castletown, as he then was, Mr Brown, is simply rubber-stamped by the monarch, and the delay in commenting on why it was difficult to get Members into the appointing a new bishop for the diocese of Sodor and Man Legislative Council and he said: underlines this process. One of the reasons dished up in the past as to why there i f you want to be an active politician, you stay in the House of Keys. should be two branches of Tynwald and why they should If you want to really do something, you stay in the House o f Keys.’ be elected at different times was to"achieve stability and

H ouse of K e ys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) B ill - Evidence of M r G V H Kneale 12KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence continuity. This claim overlooks one important point Prior it does not matter where the starting point is; they are going to every general election, although the House of Keys has to go to the other branch for consideration, so you are getting been dissolved in October, a resolution goes before Tynwald the second look at everything. I do not see any big problem which provides that all Members continue their departmental there and I advocated this long ago. duties until their successors are appointed, so there is no break in Government The Chairman: Would there be a potential for conflict Also, if you look back through the records of the House if the branches were unequal in size, whereby a politician of Keys to 1919, you will see that the majority of Members might wish to be in the smaller branch, where he would have are usually re-elected. This situation debunks the myth of more influence over that legislation process? lack of stability and continuity and I think it is emphasised by the nonsense you have had over, not the last five years, Mr Kneale: I do not think so. I have got the benefit of but over the last 20 years, of trying to elect people to the having been a Member of the House of Keys and a Member Legislative Council. There is no stability or continuity about of the Legislative Council. I found no difficulty in dealing such a system. with legislation in either branch. The size did not matter, it I believe that the Bill I have submitted provides an was the content of the debate that made the decisions. adequate answer to all the problems and, after a period of experience with it, a little fine-tuning may be necessary, but The Chairman: And, therefore, you do not see a potential this can be easily done by resolution of Tynwald. I would, for conflict between the two branches, in the circumstances again, underline the fact that Tynwald is the supreme body. that they each have powers that go beyond legislation? The Council of Ministers, the Departments of Government et cetera, are all answerable to Tynwald for the exercise of their. „ Mr Kneale: My view of what is in my Bill? 1 have functions. That in itself is sufficient reason why Tynwald covered that point If there was conflict between the two ~ should be elected by the people of this Island. branches, you took them to Tynwald and Tynwald made Finally, I do not think I need remind Members that the decision by a majority vote of the elected Members of the definition of democracy is a form of government in Tynwald. which sovereign power resides in the people as a whole and is exercised either directly by them, or by their elected Mr Rodan: And, just lastly, on a similar vein, at election representatives. It is time the Members of the Keys faced up time neither the electorate nor the candidate would know to that situation and stopped running round in circles. The what branch of Tynwald they would end up in. Would this reality of the situation is staring them in the face and the matter? solution is clear, an elected Tynwald. Stop looking for snags which do not exist The Bill I have submitted will get rid of Mr Kneale: It would not matter at all as long as you most of the present problems which do exist and ensure that emphasised the point that Tynwald is the major body, the all the voting Members of Tynwald are truly representatives supreme body. It is the supreme court All the decisions are of the Isle of Man people. Thank you. made there on policy and finance. It would not matter, as long as the message is made The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr Kneale, That clearly for the people, that they are now electing Tynwald. was a veiy interesting submission and we thank you for that, Tynwald, when we served there, celebrated the millennium but before I ask Mrs Cannell if she has any questions, I just of Tynwald. The House of Keys is only a relatively new want to ask you on a specific point body, if you look at history, and they only started to get any You were very clear that the model that you are real control in about 1950. So, Tynwald has been there - we recommending is one of a single election, based on the 15 claim continuously - for over 1,000 years, and Tynwald is existing constituencies, to elect 32 Members who would the supreme body and always will be. then, after the election, be formed into a House of Keys and Legislative Council. Mr Rodan: Why not abolish the Keys entirely and just In your evidence you very clearly said that you did not have Tynwald? see the need for any change to the functions of either branch. Can you confirm, then, that what you are talking about is Mr Kneale: Well, I would say that there is a need - unlike the model that Professor Kermode pointed out to for two branches to deal with legislation and I do not see us, as an alternative to a single-chamber Tynwald - you do anything wrong with that I advocate .. . Well, it is nothing not see the Keys and Council as being purely legislative new. Tynwald decides on the policy. Tynwald deals with all committees, with clearly defined legislative functions. You matters of finance, so you are not doing anything new by this. see their functions as something more than that similar to All you are doing is ensuring that the whole 32 Members are what we have now, where they have the ability to question democratically elected by the people of the Island. Ministers, scrutinise legislation, take part, while they are in Tynwald, in policy-making matters. Mr Rodan: I will bring Mrs Cannell in just after this point M r Kneale: Yes, well, in the main, when they go into Just following on from that, would it not be equally their separate branches, they will be dealing with legislation as effective to have a committee stage for legislation in the same way as they do now, with the three readings of each a directly elected Tynwald, rather than a need for two branch, but I do not see any reason why all legislation should branches? One could do the necessary scrutiny or revision be introduced into one branch. by having a Committee of Tynwald for that purpose? There is some legislation that is, obviously, not really controversial and that could be introduced in either branch Mr Kneale: Well, it could be, but give it whatever name and if all Members are elected representatives of the people you like, they will still be doing the same function. So, we

H ouse of K eys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of M r G V H Kneale Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 13 KCLC might as well retain this tradition of the Council and the Mr Kneale: What would you call these two House of Keys and, during the discussion, there was - with committees? your last person - the question of whether the President of Tynwald should be in the same role as another Speaker. Mrs Cannell: Is that what it is all hingeing on? I believe that the present President - forgetting about the individual - 1 think it is a nonentity. He represents nobody. M r Kneale: That is it. He is dressed in a fine costume to parade on Tynwald Day - one that Tynwald, I might add, never approved - but, other Mrs Cannell: The change of name? than that, he is not representing anybody and I think that position needs looking at afresh. But that is just an aside M r Kneale: MLC and MHK are recognised names and from the main issue today. there is no reason to alter them. It is no good calling them ‘number one committee’ and ‘number two committee’. Mr Rodan: Right, thank you, Mr Kneale, Mrs Cannell, thank you. Mrs Cannell; Well, could it not be Tynwald Standing Committee on Scrutiny of Government Policy? Tynwald Mrs Cannell: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Committee on Legislation - Good afternoon, Mr Kneale. It is always refreshing to read and hear of your ideas in regard to this particular issue, M r Kneale: You have that many Tynwald Standing because you have great experience with all the lobbying, the Committees and other Committees, you will only cause Bills and the debates that you have been involved in. confusion. Stick to what the public understands: Legislative . You did say, at the start, when you came to the table that Council and House of Keys. There is no problem. People you felt that the elections should be Tynwald elections and Took for "snags tKafdcThot exist ' ------...... - that Members of the House of Keys should be titles, or the letters after the name should remain MHK and MLC. If that Mrs Cannell: Right. Well, following on from that then, is the case and we abolish House of Keys elections and we go if that was to be the case, would you envisage both of those for elections of Tynwald, that is fine. I can see that happening. branches having equal power? You did touch upon, before, I can see the practicality of doing it that way. the difficulty with the slowing of the passing of legislation. But, then, after having elected your 32, as suggested in So you felt that, in either branch, legislation could be your papers, to then start, as a parliament of 32, picking off introduced and taken through the various stages. Would you one out of two from Peel, one out of two from Garff, one have then envisaged them having equal power and that the out of three from South Douglas, North Douglas and so on, only difference would be that one would be smaller than and put them into a Legislative Council role for the duration the other? of their term of office seems to me to be confusing for the Mr Kneale: Of course, they have got equal power. They public, who will elect in the first place. When they elect a have all been elected by the public to the main body; the Member of Tynwald, they elect a Member of Tynwald, but supreme body to Tynwald, so they are all equal. then, if Tynwald is to split and to divide, and replicate what we currently have — Mrs Cannell: And what about the appointment of the Cabinet of Ministers? Should it come from either branch? Mr Kneale: You must think that the general public are a lot of stupid idiots that cannot understand anything! The Mr Kneale: The Cabinet of Ministers should come from public will realise the significance, as long as it is put over either branch. You should be electing the best person for the to them. job, but they should be representatives of the public, not like The main view of the public is that they want to see the situation you have got at the moment an elected legislative body and Tynwald is the obvious one. After Tynwald has been elected, dividing into the two Mrs Cannell: Thank you, Mr Kneale. branches - that to be made clear at the election - I do not think that the public are as stupid as some people try to make Mr Rodan; Thank you, Mr Kneale. Thank you, Mrs out. They can understand these things, the same as they can Cannell. Mr Rimington? understand the STV system. It was Members who could not understand it. Mr Rimington: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Just on the Bill they presented as evidence: there were Mrs Cannell: Mr Kneale, if I might, just for the record, just two points there that I would like to question on. You are I am not suggesting the Isle of Man public are stupid at all, sticking to the 15 constituencies, with the possible suggestion I am just trying to get my head round the rationale behind that Onchan and Rushen might divide into two, as they your suggestions of how you envisage it would work. would, under that system, have four members’each. Do you Would it not, as you agreed with the Chairman, be think that having a number of constituencies, even with the possible after your 32 membership is elected as a Tynwald, proviso that we would have STV - and for the record, there as a unicameral-type election, if you like, to then start are possibly more Members on this table that support STV dividing off into standing committees who can perform the than you might estimate - role of both the Legislative Council and a House of Keys, but keeping the Tynwald together voting as one as the M r Kneale: Well, I am glad to hear that! (Laughter) policy-makers on those who approve or not, expenditure and budgets et cetera? Would that not work also? Mr Rimington: - but, having said ‘single’, there are a

H ouse of K eys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill — Evidence of M r G V H Kneale 14 KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence number of single-seat constituencies, do you think that is Mr Kneale: I just have one point that if you had an ad beneficial, or would you agree with my assertion that there hoc election from the 32 Members and sent eight up you should be at least two, possibly three, constituencies to get would destroy the balance that I have tried to get in Council, a less parochial outlook? Keys and Tynwald.

M r Kneale: Yes. Well, I agree that the STV system does Mr Rodan: Geographical balance. operate best when there are multi-seat constituencies, but if you sit down and try to work out, just for example, two-seat Mr Kneale: Yes. constituencies for the Isle of Man without really belting into the boundaries of the recognised parishes, you are a better Mr Rodan: Thank you. man than I am. I have tried to work it out for groups of two, for three, for four, for five, and it is very difficult. Mr Rimington: Yes, the last question is - obviously, Martin Quayle has got permission to introduce a Bill to you reject Mr Quine’s Bill and, noting that Mr Quine was have two-seat constituencies for the House of Keys. I have not necessarily firmly committed but trying to find a way written a long letter to him pointing out the futility of it and forward, in fairness to Mr Quine, what is your root objection how difficult it is to align people up. The STV system: it to having the eight members of the Legislative Council does not really matter whether there is one, two, three, four directly elected by whatever size of constituency, rather or 24 seats in the constituency, the STV system will ensure than- that the person that is elected has the majority support, but there is one thing the last STV Bill that we got through was Mr Kneale: Like separate election? ruined by, an amendment that was put into, allow, for plump voting. I believe that, in the one-seat constituency, there Mr Rimington: Yes. must be at least two preferences recorded. Number one is the vote. Number two is the second preference, which allows for Mr Kneale: Well, simply because, at the moment, you transfer. If you have plumps, you have destroyed the whole are having difficulty in getting the people to come to vote idea of a transferable vote. with one election a year. If you are going to have two, you are going to confound the issue further and then, again, M r Rodan: Thank you, Mr Kneale. Mr Rimington? dividing it up, as he did, as I pointed out in my submission, you are going to have such big areas that people could not M r Rimington: Yes. Just one more: in your proposals for possibly canvass them. after the 32 people are elected, and then they would divide You must have an awful difficulty dealing with 6,000-odd out and elect the eight Legislative Council Members, in that people. Think of Douglas, where they are putting 17,000 for procedure, it appears, having looked at it, that there are nine you to canvass. I know it used to take me three solid months Members who, at the first instance, would not have any part to get around 4,000 people. I would not even attempt to get of that procedure. So, you are taking one out of two from around 17,000. Then there is the cost of your manifestos Peel, the person with the largest vote having the first option. and all the other expense, so who is going to stand for the If they fail to resolve that within those two Members of Peel, Council as a separate election? The rejects from the Keys? then the rest of the House would then elect, but, under your Or Mr Quine had an experience up in the north of the Island proposed procedure, the Members for Ayre, Castletown, of the type of candidates coming forward. some of the Douglas Members and so on would have no part We have had experience of candidates virtually coming in that subdivision. Do you think that is not a weakness? off the boat and putting their names down and not spending a penny on elections in the past. You could finish up with M r Kneale: No, I do not think it is a weakness. I think eight people in the Council with absolutely no experience what we are trying to do is to get 24 onto the Keys and of legislative work at all and they would be an important eight onto the Council and whether you are going to do it part of Government Again, if you did get decent people by separate elections to each branch, or whether you do it by coming forward, do you think they would accept the role this method, does not make any difference. The final answer that Mr Quine forecast for them? More or less, ‘You lot sit will be the same. in the comer, we will send you a bit of this and a bit of that I think that Tynwald is the one that makes the decision. now and again you can have a look a t’ The whole Bill was The fact that a group, say the four in Rushen, get together a nonsense and I am amazed that he even wasted the time and one says, ‘Well, I am prepared to go up’, well, that of the House and himself bringing it forward. answers the problem. If they cannot get an agreement, then Tynwald makes the choice between the four and I do not Mr Rodan: Thank you, Mr Kneale. Mrs Hannan. see any problem in the whole of Tynwald, the whole 32 Members, taking part in that, but the whole 32 Members Mrs Hannan: Yes. How would you describe decent will be sanctioning the people who are going up - at any rate people? * whether it was by people volunteering, or the person who had been elected top of the poll agreeing to go up. I do not Mr Kneale: Decent people - you and I. see any problem and I think that time will tell, if the thing comes into being, that this method will work. If it does not Mrs Hannan: Well, that is it, Mr Kneale, (.Laughter) work after a while, then, I say, there is time for fine-tuning, and when we get to it, I am not so sure about you! So this but you do not need to have new legislation to bring that is the thing.. Are we not down to talking about democracy about. That can be decided by Tynwald. and is it not the point that you have been making here today that democracy, the actual debate, whether it is in the Mr Rimington: Lastly, Mr Chairman, if I may - House of Keys, lost in the House of Keys, or whether it is

H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) B ill Evidence of M r G V H Kneale Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 15 KCLC lost generally, it is down to democracy and the actual vote The Speaker: Thank you, Chairman. Good afternoon, taken at the time? Mr Kneale.

Mr Kneale: It depends on the vote taken at the time, but, Mr Kneale: Hello, Tony. as you know full well, the vote does not reflect the view of the majority of the people in an area under the present system The Speaker: Really, it just follows on: it was a question of first past the post You can get a person, as you did in Peel I had in my mind I wanted to ask you and I understand partly some years ago, where a fellow got in with 400 votes and your answer but how important do you think, in recognising there were 1,100 votes cast against him. the supremacy of Tynwald, is the numbers game?

Mrs Hannan: Can I just return back to the point that Mr Kneale: In recognising the - Mrs Cannell made about what you are suggesting when people are elected. You have suggested that there are going The Speaker: In recognising the supremacy of Tynwald, to be two Legislative Council Members for Douglas, one which you mentioned, how important, then, is it to retain the for Onchan, one for Ramsey, none for Castletown, one for numbers as they are now? Peel, one for GarfT, one for Middle and one for Rushen. Now, in those areas, the people are not electing these people Mr Kneale: Well, I do not think there is any firm reason to this Legislative Council, the people are electing bodies for retaining 32. In fact, there are a lot of people who think to Tynwald. that we have got far too many people in Tynwald with 32, but I have had the experience of working on committees and Mr Kneale: That is right . I know that there is a need for people toJ&U a lot of posts and if we reduced it to 24 and said we will elect 24 to Tynwald, Mrs Hannan: And then somebody has got to decide who you might find that the pressure is a bit too difficult So, I do is going to be - and if we are talking about the statespeople not find any real problem with the number of 32, but I will that you were talking about going to the Legislative agree that it could be any number you choose. Council - a lot of that is the experience that is going there. So, you are losing that experience in the Keys, where Bills are The Speaker; Thanks for that - discussed initially, generally. So how do we get over that? So, following that through, then, just based on the Bill that you put before us in terms of a draft, and the one I know Mr Kneale: You are thinking back to the old days when you supported over many years, and this idea of getting the Council used to be looked at as a revising chamber only elected to Tynwald and then going off to whichever branch, and then you needed the experienced people to look at the under whatever system, whether it is first choice because you Bill afresh and revise it. I do not foresee that happening. I topped the poll, or whether you are elected, or whatever, if believe that each branch should be made up of people of I come to that how do you envisage somebody - 1 do not experience and newcomers, so that they will have somebody know if you can answer this - making up their mind which to guide them to get the experience. branch they go to? Mrs Hannan: Why would somebody stand forelection In other words, they fought an election, they have been politically and then, when they become elected, if they elected to Tynwald and then they have to decide whether they become elected, they then have just the responsibility of go into Legislative Council, which, based on your proposal, revising legislation? is the smaller chamber, or go into the Keys. I suppose we are all a little hung up on the point that we see it operating now, Mr Kneale: No, not if the legislation can be introduced but knowing that, in fact, in dominance terms of reporting in either branch. Each branch is then the revising chamber and publicity and so on - because that is where the Bills do for what the first branch has dealt with. start, most of that comes from the Keys - do you envisage a difficulty, or how do you see an individual who successfully Mrs Hannan: Right Well, why just have eight members fought die election, topped the poll, then deciding which in Legislative Council? Why not split it straight down the branch they go into? What do you think would influence middle, half going that way, half going that way, some look how they went into that branch? at some legislation, some revise it? Mr Kneale: Well, I will put it in my own position. I M r Kneale: Well, that is a matter that could be have been asked to allow my name to go forward for the considered, but what I have done, as I said, ‘try to retain, as Legislative Council in recent years. I have rejected it out far as possible at this stage, little change and if you do things of hand. No way would I allow myself to go up under one step at a time, instead of trying to do everything in one the present system. I would have no hesitation in going bite, you get nowhere, but if you do it - into either branch if I was elected under the Bill that I put forward, because I would have still had as much influence Mrs Hannan: We have not got anywhere yet, in effect, in either branch and, remembering that Tynwald is still the Mr Kneale. supreme body, and everybody has their say in Tynwald, and the Bill would ensure that their representation in Tynwald Mr Kneale: I will give you the reason for that. I resigned was a fair one. in 1991. You would have had it long before this if I had stayed At present it is ad hoc. All the people can come from for another five years, I can assure you of that one area and destroy the whole representation in Tynwald. Now this happened some years ago when you had most of Mr Rodan: Thank you, Mrs Hannan. Mr Speaker. the Members in the Legislative Council coming from Ayre

~~~~H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of M r G V H Kneale 16 KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence~~~~

and Michael and areas like that At the present, pointing The Speaker: Right, okay. Thank you for that Could I to Rushen: Rushen is over-represented. Onchan is over' just ask if, in the new set up, you envisage the practice that represented. Peel and the West have got no representation presently exists continuing, in other words, Tynwald sitting at all. only once a month, or do you think that under a new system, This Bill would solve that problem and, again, come where the 33 Members are elected, that might change? back to the foundation of the whole principle: Tynwald is the dominant body. Tynwald makes the policy. Tynwald deals Mr Kneale: I do not see there is much problem there. with finance and Tynwald, in this Bill, would have the last If the legislation is coming through at the rate it should say in controversial legislation. Tynwald would be, in fact, be coming through, I think that both branches should be the Government of the Isle of Man. occupied for the other three weeks dealing with legislation and Tynwald can meet for three or four days, or going into The Speaker: If I can just follow through on that. As we the next week, at any time if the work is there. That can be know, the primary role of the House of Keys and the primary varied to suit the needs. role of Legislative Council is to pass legislation and, under this system that you envisage, that would continue. The Speaker: Thank you. So the real decision-making on legislation, in its details made within those branches, and, presumably, the dominance The Chairman: Thank you, Mr Speaker. of 24 against eight is, as we can see it, anyway, that, in fact, Just a follow-up on one of Mr Speaker’s points there. You the Keys would tend to be the place that, whether we like it or gave the example of an Agricultural Bill being introduced in not, there would be pressure to move most of the legislation. the Legislative Council - and let us say, the eight-Member Also, of course, once 24 have passed it,-the Legislative - • chamber. Supposing that there was a strong politician in there. Council in its new format would still make an influence. who was determined, who was anti-Govemment let us say, It could change it or whatever, and there would have to be because he or she was operating in that smaller forum and new rules, but I think it could be a fair sort of view that it is could potentially have a lot more influence on the ultimate likely to be that the majority numbers game would actually outcome, would there not, in reality, be the potential for determine the legislation. Not always, but in most cases some difficulty, from a Government point of view, getting and, as now, Tynwald, of course, has to pass legislation by legislation initiated in this case in the Legislative Council? a majority of Members signing it in both branches and the Would Government not wish to maximise its chances of only difference there, with change, is that they would be as getting legislation through by promoting it in the larger one signing it and not as two. chamber, rather than the minority chamber, unless, of course, So how - and I suppose I am just trying to understand, they were of equal size when, perhaps, it would not matter really - do you see that system working? In fact, forget the so much? Government side of it, because most of the Government work is done outside of Tynwald, it comes to Tynwald for Mr Kneale: I have allowed in the Bill for any matter that endorsement for its budget, endorsement for its programme becomes contentious to come to Tynwald, and Tynwald then of investment and its policies, but the legislation which is makes the decision. You have got 24 Members of the Keys really the branches’ work, is the bit I am concentrating on. in Tynwald against the eight. The balance is well in favour How do you see that operating in this new system, which of the Keys there. is different from what we have today? And what would encourage a person to go into whichever branch, taking that The Chairman: But the conflict would have occurred. into account? We accept that you have got a method of resolving it

Mr Kneale: Dealing with the introduction of legislation Mr Kneale: I am sure that if there is no conflict there will and your belief that, because there are 24 Members in the be no politics. So there is conflict always, (The Chairman: House of Keys and only eight in the Legislative Council, Thank you.) even within the boards. there is more chance of it being introduced there. I do not see that at all. I think you have got to forget the present system Mrs Cannell: Mr Chairman. and what has gone on in the past and look to the future. Just for example, here, it would not matter which branch The Chairman: Mrs Caimell. the Ministers come from. Take the Minister for Agriculture - we just use that as the example - and say there was a Bill Mrs Cannell: Yes, Mr Kneale, just following on from coming forward dealing with agriculture and he was in the that. You built in a mechanism to deal with conflict but if a Legislative Council, That is the obvious place to introduce scenario develops such as the Chairman has described, and that Bill and let the Minister progress it; the same in the Keys, a Government Minister in a smaller chamber is trying to get If there is anything coming frefm a Department, whichever his Government Departmental Bill through and it falls and is branch it is, that is the branch that should introduce it, I do thrown out, as can happen at second reading, as you know, not see any difficulty at all in legislation being introduced in the House of Keys and, therefore, it is rejected, how could in either branch. that Minister then bring the issue back to Tynwald to try and Under the present system, I agree entirely that there is a force the hand of the consideration? need for the majority of legislation to go through the Keys, There seems to be a difficulty there in that it is the first, because if it went through the Council and they threw majority in any situation, irrespective of the numbers that it out, the Keys are stymied, sitting down there. So that is the wiU win if the Bill were contentious and it fell because the reason why it has got to be introduced there. If the Council stronger Member within the Legislative Council, or the anti- throw it out, they can only delay it for one year. Govemment Member, whipped up sufficient support to block

~~~~H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill — Evidence of M r G V H Kneale Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 17 KCLC~~~~

that legislation, throw it out How could it then be suddenly me up at quarter past four outside. (Interjections) revived by the conflict mechanism to bring it back into the big parliament to say, ‘Look, this has happened here, sort it The Chairman: So, we would like to thank you very out’? Would it not, then, be asking the Tynwald to override, much and can I say on behalf of the Committee how much we perhaps, good reason for the Bill being booted out? appreciate your contribution to the work of this Committee and for your presence here this afternoon. M r Kneale: No. There are always ways of dealing with Thank you, Mr Kneale. legislation. If it failed in the Council, there is nothing to stop it being introduced then in the Keys. Mr Kneale: Thank you. All the very best. Thank you.

Mrs Cannell: Well, that is an alternative to your conflict mechanism, is it not? Mr Cain was called at 4.15 p.m. Mr Kneale: Yes, but I say the conflict method does give the two branches the chance to get together and have EVIDENCE OF MR J C CAIN a conference and there is many a mind being changed by a conference in legislation, as old Members will remember. The Chairman: Now, Mr Cain, would you care to come forward, sir? Please take a seat. Mrs Cannell: But, Mr Kneale, that we currently still have and we have utilised it within my short time - the seven Mr Cain: Thank you. years - that.I.have been her. It.has.been utilised^where. a. selection from either side has gone into conference to try and The Chairman: Good afternoon, Mr Cain. compromise over an amendment, perhaps, to legislation. M r Cain: Good afternoon, Mr Chairman. M r Kneale: This is one of the things - The Chairman: Thank you very much, indeed, for your Mrs Cannell: That is different to the conflict that you presence here this afternoon and for submitting to us your say you have built into your proposed legislation to bring written evidence. about what you would like to see. Totally different. As you will know, this Committee has been set up as a Select Committee of the Keys to examine the Bill brought Mr Kneale: Well, I have just showed you there is an in by Mr Quine, which provides for the election of the alternative as well. It can be reintroduced into the Keys - Legislative Council by the electorate, instead of solely by the House of Keys, and to prescribe for the Legislative Council Mrs Hannan: Would that be after a timescale? Would specific scrutinising functions. that be after six months, a year? In addition to that, the long title of the Bill was amended to provide for a new constitution for Keys and Council Mr Kneale: Well, you do not need it. It can be introduced which will broaden out the roles of those bodies. We, in the next term, straight away. therefore, would be very interested in any further evidence or elaboration on your written evidence that you can provide The Chairman: Thank you very much. Just a final for the Committee and, if we may pose questions thereafter, point: on a couple of occasions you have stressed the need Mr Cain. to proceed one step at a time and that has been your guiding philosophy with the various constitutional measures you have Mr Cain: Certainly; thank you. promoted. Just to get this straight, then, retaining the names I think the premise on which I decided to make a House of Keys and Legislative Council is for the reasons of submission to the Select Committee is a very important one not taking a more radical step, or a more unpalatable step, and that is that I fundamentally believe that, on a step-by- than is necessary. step basis, and over, perhaps, a very long period of time, Coming back to Mrs Cannell’s point that she made the Island should evolve towards complete self-government earlier, about a directly-elected Tynwald having a standing and this, to my mind, is fundamental to the way in which committee for legislative revision or legislative scrutiny, democracy should develop. would I be right in saying that,, in your view, that could Having said that, I believe that the Bill that has been be just as effective if it was by virtue of it being a standing prepared by the Hon. Member for Ayre is a very helpful committee, rather than being called Legislative Council or step in this evolutionary process. While I do not agree with the House of Keys? It is just a matter of nomenclature we everything that is in the Bill, nor perhaps would you expect are arguing about there. me to, if you know anything about my relationship with Mr Quine - in a political sense, I would hasten to add - 1 am M r Kneale: What is in a name? of the opinion that there is a great deal of merit in the Bill, but I would be happy to discuss particular issues in relation The Chairman: What is in a name? Yes. Okay, that is to the memorandum that I have submitted. fine. In introducing the three sheets of paper that I have Well, is there any final point, Mr Kneale, you would wish submitted, I would like to suggest, Mr Chairman, that paper to make to the Committee? no. 2, which is entitled ‘Whether the House of Keys and the Legislative Council should be elected at the same time M r Kneale: No, I have actually got somebody picking and from the same constituencies’, it might be beneficial,

House of Keys Select Committee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill - Evidence of Mr G V H Kneale House of Keys Select Committee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill - Evidence of Mr J C Cain 18KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence certainly from my point of view, and perhaps from general People would start off by being elected to a parish discussion, if that issue was discussed first, rather than issue council, which, in my view - and this may well be far 1 no. 1, which is ‘The manner in which the Council should be outside your remit, but it is nevertheless my view as part elected and by whom’. I think - of the structure - you would have a much more limited parish council. Perhaps, instead of 17, you might have five The Chairman: It is quite acceptable. Yes. Would you or six, something of that order, and they would be given care to have this dialogue now? real.power, particularly in matters relating to housing, to actually make decisions which would affect the people that M r Cain: Well, I have done a little bit of research. they are responsible for and then people, perhaps, would I would emphasise the word ‘little’, I think, and I have be encouraged to stand for the House of Keys and then, obtained a copy of the registered voters by constituency as perhaps, they might even say, ‘Well, look, I will have a go at September 2002 and I started off from the basis of saying at the Legislative Council5 and I foresee a political progress we have 57,500 voters, which, if you divide by 24, gives you from people who are really interested in the long-term future an approximate number of 2,400 electors per constituency. development of this Island. I am firmly of the opinion - and this may be outside So, that is why I think it is important this item 2, whether the terms of the Bill and outside the remit of the Select the House of Keys and the Legislative Council should be Committee, but it is fundamental to my line of reasoning in elected at the same time, and I think they should be. One terms of the Legislative Council - 1 believe very strongly would be a historic basis for the House of Keys, of going indeed that it is completely and utterly wrong for the along to a polling booth, and for the Legislative Council you Members for, shall we say, Onchan or Rushen to each have will just fill in a form and send it back to a returning officer. three votes and for the Members for Ayre or Peel to have - And it says,-Should be elected the same time and from the _ one vote. Also, if you look at the paradox of the numbers same constituencies.’ I have attempted to answer that and per constituency, as they presently exist, in my opinion, I am happy to attempt to answer any points that you may they do not stand up to close scrutiny and they are too much wish to raise. centred perhaps on history and on the historical 17 parishes of the Island. The Chairman: Thank you, Mr Cain. That is most So, if I start off from that premise, which I have done, interesting. Could I, perhaps, start by asking: if I were a and then try and develop that by saying that there should candidate, what would make me stand for one or other, Keys be a boundary commission - an important boundary or Legislative Council? commission - to look at the issue that I have tried to outline to you. Then, having, perhaps, determined the 24 new Mr Cain: Yes, well I would like to answer this. I think single-seat constituencies, in a perfect world, each should, if you were standing for the Legislative Council, you would in my view, elect one Member. I know there is quite a valid potentially be a man of some political experience. I think argument to have 12 two-seat constituencies, but, if during you would. a period of two months or whatever - it may be when the House rises and a general election takes place the following The Chairman: Or woman. November, or whenever it may be - you have to do proper solid constituency work in terms of canvassing and, at the M r Cain: Yes, I am sorry. Of course. same time, get together a cohesive structured programme for you as an individual potential Member to put before your Mrs Cannell: Thank you. constituents, it is difficult I know, from experience, if you have got a two- Mr Cain: I think you would be a person, perhaps, who seat constituency, I would prefer them to be one-seat has no political experience, but who is recognised in the constituencies, not only from the point of view of the Isle of Man for whatever qualities he or she may possess. Member, but the point of view of the elector, who then They may be qualities of leadership. They may be qualities knows unequivocally that he is voting for one person, and of business acumen, they may be - 1 do not know - any sort he can make a choice, as he may or may not wish. So that of sporting qualities which have brought them to the public is the first point eye and have made them well-known figures. The second point, if you have got that basis and you have I would also expect that Members of the Legislative the election under the same procedure as you do now, it is Council, who would have a slightly different role - as, my view that the Legislative Council could be elected by hopefully, we can develop - than the Members of the House apportioning three seats each of roughly 2,400 constituents, of Keys, would not be involved, or that involved, in what which is just over 7,000 constituents for each Member of I would call constituency matters. This, I know, is a very the Legislative Council, and they could be done obviously difficult area, because you cannot, in my experience, prevent on adjacent constituencies. They would have to be done on people from getting in touch with you over constituency a regional basis and I think that could be done quite happily matters. But I would like to think that the Members of by postal ballot. I do not accept the concept that, if you the House of Keys would be far more interested in their have got three or 7,000 constituents, that they all have to be own area of representation and, in fact, in dealing with individually canvassed. I think they can be happily canvassed constituency problems than would the Members of the by postal means. I think they can, if people get a document Legislative Council. They would be people who, hopefully, in front of them, which indicates the views of the potential would be progressing up this ladder that I have attempted Member of the Legislative Council, and I would suggest, to outline to you. in saying that, that I foresee, in the long term, a three-tier political structure within the Isle of Man. The Chairman: If they had no constituency

H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of M r J C C ain Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 19 KCLC responsibilities, then where would their responsibilities Mr Cain: Well, they might well disagree on issues. mainly lie? So what? That is not of any real importance in my mind. I think the primary issue is this: that, of the 32 Members, 25 Mr Cain: The Members of the Legislative Council? per cent of whom would be Members of the Council, their primary concern always should be the good government of The Chairman: Yes, the Legislative Council. this Island and they are going to have conflicts of interest, differing views and this is part of political life and these will Mr Cain: They would lie in acting as they do now, or be thrashed out in Tynwald because Tynwald is the fount, in they should now, as a revising chamber, that is point one. my view, of good government of this Island Secondly, I believe that they should deal with secondary It is not the House of Keys, it is Tynwald, because legislation, which I would dare to suggest is not dealt with Tynwald determines policy and Tynwald determines financial as adequately now as perhaps it should be, but I disagree matters and Tynwald should, in my view, be the primary with Mr Quine in the terms outlined in his Bill, where source from which Members’ questions are answered. he suggests that the Legislative Council could deal with And of two branches, their primary function is progressing European matters. legislation, which should, in my view, emanate from policy I think that European matters, which have started to decisions which are made in Tynwald. become of increasing importance to this Island and to Tynwald, are going to continue to develop as being of prime The Chairman: Thank you very much. Mr Rimington. importance and I think it is wrong - says he, referring to the annual accounts of the Isle of Man, which state that the Mr Rimington: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Treasury has an International Services Division - 1 am firmly Mr Cain, may I just agree with you on the subject of "of the'opinion that' European issues are“ matters of priine European matters “as that is something that constitutes a lot political importance to this Island now and that there should of the time that we spend in the Department of Agriculture in be a Department of Government whose prime responsibility relation to agriculture and fisheries and it might be difficult is to look after external matters and it should be, in my view, for somebody who is outside of the Department to understand looked upon as second only to the Treasury in terms of its the issues in relation to agriculture and fisheries, coming at importance to the development of policy for this Island. I them cold. They need to be understood in the context of our would hive off, reallocate the International Services Division departmental business. from the Treasury and put it in this new division as part of But, having said that, can I first of all ask you on the way their remit. you have answered, seeing the two bodies being elected at the Otherwise, I would look upon the Legislative Council same time? It was suggested in the Bill that they would be as being a body whose prime responsibility is in legislative elected at a different time, (Mr Cain: Yes.) possibly allowing terms to act as a revising chamber for legislation which for this coticept of natural progression which you outlined has gone through the Keys, and the Keys, in my view, earlier in your introduction, whereby, say, a Member of the should always be the primary source from which legislation Keys, having, maybe, gained some experience, felt that, originates. possibly, the Legislative Council might be the right place for them to be, for whatever reason. If you had them elected at The Chairman: Thank you. That is very clear. Would it the same time they would then be endangering possibly their then not be of some importance that, amongst the qualities Keys seat, which, obviously, is always in danger anyhow. If and attributes that our candidate could put before the they were at different times it would give an opportunity for electorate, in addition to the ones you mentioned, might somebody to more easily go through that process of natural be, in fact, experience of progressing legislation if, indeed, progression. their prime role were to be the revising of legislation or scrutinising secondary legislation. Would it not be fairly Mr Cain: Well, is that necessarily in the best interests important that, whoever was successful in elections^ had of the Isle of Man? This must be the key question to be some prior experience of these matters? answered on all these issues. I am of the opinion that there is no real reason why - in Mr Cain: No, I would disagree with that view. I think it fact I would go a little bit further- the electors of this Island would, by the very nature of things. could not fulfil their electoral responsibilities at one and I would like to see, in an ideal world, a Council which the same time during the same period of 24 hours. I think, comprised some people as you have described, Mr Chairman, if you were to arrange it in that way, that it would heighten but other people who come from outside who can give a interest, which, perhaps, from time to time, has been shown background of experience, in whatever area of activity that in various types of election in this Island not to be as great we have talked about, to the proceedings of the Council. as it might be. It would heighten interest if you had both So I do not think it would necessarily follow that every the elections by postal ballot, and by the present means of person would have to have a background of dealing with going to a polling booth at the same time. I think I would legislation. add to that and say that I think that - and this may be, again, outside your remit, sir - 1 cannot see why the Isle of Man The Chairman: Thank you. should not at least consider the Australian system, whereby And, lastly, before I ask Mr Rimington, would there be a voters are required to vote, rather than just being permitted potential, do you feel, for political conflict between a Member to vote, if they so wished. for a constituency who was in the Legislative Council and I think it is a very serious and a very important the Member for the same area, same constituency or part of democratic responsibility that should be placed on, or at least the same constituency, who was in the Keys? consideration should be given to placing this responsibility

H ouse of K eys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of M r J C C ain 20 KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence on, every person who is on the electoral roll. reform, in terms of the establishment of county councils. I do not think I have answered your question, I think I have gone off the tracks which - Mr Cain: No, not county councils.

Mr Rimington: It does not matter. Mrs Cannell: Well, something to replace local authorities. M r Cain: - if anybody who knows me from our past experience, I have been known to do, but please if you would The Chairman: Parish councils. like to come back, I will happily try. M r Rimington: I am always going off the tracks. Mrs Cannell: Parish councils. . (Laughter) You would wish to see, or, ideally, you would prefer to see, 24 single seats for the Keys? Mr Cain: Parish councils. Mr Cain: Yes. Mrs CanneH: All right, that perhaps may number up to around five or something like that. Mr Rimington: And, again, in the context of what is best for the Isle of Man, do you think having those single seats Mr Cain: Yes. might lend itself to more parochialism? Mrs Canneli: Okay. So, if we were to start from that Mr Cain: Yes, I think there might be an element of that, premise, that the Island would be divided into the five areas but this is one of the most onerous responsibilities of every - and people would be elected at that level. Then, on top of that Member of the House of Keys to differentiate between their the next tier, as you said three tier - which is almost the same parochial responsibilities, which are heavy and can be, at as the situation we have now, but slight modification - the times, overriding, and their responsibilities towards the good next tier would be 24 single constituency seats to the House government of this Island and that is a political responsibility of Keys, which would reduce the constituency responsibility which, as you will be well aware, all 24 Members bear at this per Member, but you would have 24 single seats split over time. It is there and I would hope that, if there is the conflict, the same area. Then, on top of that we would have the eight that the good government of this Island would always prevail Members of the Legislative Council being independently in those circumstances. elected from the Keys, so there will be a separate election, as I understand you. (Mr Cain: Yes.) That would be a M r Rimington: And, lastly, Mr Chairman, if there were combination of both voters being able to go out and vote at eight directly elected Members of the Legislative Council, by a polling station, or alternatively by postal ballot however it came about, would you be happy that any of those eight, or any number of those eight, could be considered for Mr Cain: No, it would be entirely by postal ballot a ministerial position and also Chief Minister. Mrs Cannell: Entirely by postal ballot. M r Cain: Yes. My overriding thoughts on the government of this Island is that you want the best people that the 32 Members of Tynwald can choose for the task, full stop, and Mr Cain: Yes if they happen to be in the Legislative Council, so be it, or if they happen to be in the House of Keys, so be it. So Mrs Cannell: Okay. And once they are elected, they then I have no problem with that at all. I do not think that the would not have any constituency responsibilities whatsoever, House of Keys should attempt to elect all the Members of but their prime function would be to revise legislation. Was the Chief Minister’s Council of Ministers, I think that is I correct? wholly wrong. I think that, again, it is what is in the best interest of this Island. Mr Cain: No, that is not entirely correct In an ideal world I do not think that they should have constituency M r Rimington: Thank you. responsibilities, but, in my experience, you will never stop individual voters from getting in touch with such Members The Chairman: Right, thank you, Mr Rimington. of Tynwald as they think they want to get in touch with over Mrs Cannell. whatever problem or perceived problem that they may think they have. So, I think they will still have to react to problems Mrs Cannell: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Good posed to them from time to time. They may try and pass them afternoon, Mr Cain. down to Members of the House of Keys or whatever, but I think they will be there. Mr Cain: Good afternoon, Mrs Cannell. Mrs Cannell: I did understand you correctly, because, Mrs Cannell: Rather an interesting sandwich of at the moment, of course, with the Members of the House proposals, as I understand it. If I could just recap what I of Keys being popularly elected by public ballot they have envisage, or understand, that your vision is for the future, a mandate from the people and. of course, the argument the way it has come over to me. prevails that the Members of the Legislative Council do not have an equal mandate, because they are elected by the Mr Cain: Right Members of the House of Keys, who have subsequendy been elected by the members of the public. Mrs Cannell: You began by talking about local authority What you are suggesting to me is strange and I come back

H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of M r J C C ain Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 21 KCLC to the strange sandwich. It is a sandwich with a very odd Mrs Cannell: He has a bigger mandate, a larger filling and the odd filling to my mind is the 24 single MHKs electorate. that would be in there occupying a single constituency, one seat of that particular area. So you could have a situation, Mr Cain: Yes, but one vote. therefore, with what you are suggesting, where the Member of the Legislative Council has been elected by the people, Mrs Cannell: Nevertheless, he or she could exercise but does not have to acknowledge the public mandate, so. supremacy with the three other MHKs, in terms of passing therefore, can ignore it in terms of constituency - on the constituency burden, while he or she focuses on the more important task of scrutinisation of legislation. Mr Cain: No, I am sorry. I do not understand what this public mandate issue is - Mr Cain: Well, all I can do is to give the views that I have attempted to outline. If I was in another position, I Mrs Cannell: Well, I am just wondering whether - would start throwing questions the other way, but I do not think it is appropriate for me, as your witness this afternoon, Mr Cain: I just do not understand what you are talking to do that about Mrs Cannell: 1 appreciate your coming, Mr Cain - Mrs Cannell: Mr Cain, if somebody is elected, then surely they are accountable to the people who have elected Mr Cain: No, no. them to office at whatever level. Mrs Cannell: - and appreciate the opportunity to cross- Mr Cain: That is right and they are accountable through' examine you, but I'am trying to get my head around what their activities in Tynwald. Full stop. you would see as your ideal vision of the future.

M rsCannell: But I would see that if a Member of Mr Cain: All I say is that every Member of the Legislative Council, or the Council en masse, were to Legislative Council, once they are elected, has one vote be elected through popular franchise, that they would be and he has exactly the same voting power as an individual accountable to the public who elected them. So, therefore, Member of the House of Keys. The House, of Keys would there are bound to be constituency demands. represent three quarters of Tynwald and the Legislative Council would represent 25 per cent of Tynwald So, the M r Cain: Yes, I have acknowledged that fact, although Members of the House of Keys would always, if they so I think, in an ideal world, one would try and distance the wished, be able to predominate, as they can at the present Members of the Legislative Council from that area, but I time, in terms of any voting on any issues that come before acknowledge that that will happen. them and the Members of the Council, having been elected, would still have one vote. I see no problem. Mrs Cannell: Okay. So I have read the tier system correctly, therefore, but what does concern me about the way The Chairman: I think they might claim a greater degree in which you have elaborated upon your presentation is that of support for their political views. you could have a situation where a Member of the Legislative Council, representing perhaps the equivalent of four MHKs Mr Cain: Who from? Who are they claiming this support areas, so you have four MHKs who are representing an area from? equivalent to the MLC - The Chairman: From the electorate. Mr Cain: It would be three. Mrs Cannell: And the larger constituency. Mrs Cannell: Well, even three, there is supremacy there, surely, which will provide for continual conflict The Chairman: Larger constituency basis.

M r Cain: No, but once the elections have taken place, Mr Cain: No. Well, I am sorry. I will just have to disagree that is it, finished. I do not see any potential for conflict at with you, Mr Chairman. all. The Chairman: Okay. Right. We will move on, Mrs Cannell: But the MLC would have a larger vote, a Mrs Cannell. larger constituency, a .larger- Mrs Cannell: No. That is all, thank you. M r Cain: No, because he or she has one vote as a Member of the Legislative Council, as they do now. Full The Chairman: Mrs Hannan, would you like to come stop. in at this point?

The Chairman: Whilst supporting this larger Mrs Hannan: Yes. Could I just go back to being elected electorate. by postal ballot and not being seen to have any electorate. Do you think the Isle of Man will actually accept that premise? Mrs Cannell: Electorate, I am talking about yes. You said, initially, it was not necessary to go around to canvass people door to door Is that not one of the... We are The Speaker: He has a bigger mandate. close to our electorate and -

~~~~H ouse of K eys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of M r J C C ain 22 KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence~~~~

M r Cain: No. I think when you get up to a constituency The Speaker; Would you like to expand a little bit which maybe covers a fair area of the Island and which wider? comprises over 7,000 individuals, it is difficult, if not impossible, to canvass their views on an individual basis. At Mr Cain: Yes. I think that the first issue that I would least, that is the premise from which I start. I think you can like to deal with is this, that the evolution of parliamentary do it, do it properly and, indeed, look after their interests if democracy in this Island should be and is and has been a the numbers are 2,400, or whatever, but I find it very difficult step-by-step development and to attempt to have an election to see how you can possibly do it with a constituency of over of 32 individuals is, at this stage of the Island’s development, 7,000, unless you have got a big team with you and you can too radical a step to take. develop. I would hate to see Manx politics developing in the People are used to the concept of electing the House of way in which politics have developed in the UK. Keys and going to polling booths, or going to the church hall, or whatever it might be, and I think that that should continue Mrs Hannan; But do you not think, under these and that the House of Keys should, for the time being, at this circumstances, that people would not just sit back and wait stage of development, be looked upon as it always has been, for the vote to be taken, they would actually be out there on as the primary source from which politicians are elected by the streets calling meetings and do you not think that they the voters. would aim at the biggest population? Therefore, it could be If you look in historic terms to the Legislative Council, that they would aim at the biggest population to get the most I like to think of them as being a little bit divorced from interest in, for argument’s sake, say, Ramsey, as opposed to the House of Keys and being a little bit like ‘wise men’, the surrounding areas to get elected? wiser men, perhaps, because they have a different function, a different role, they have a revising role which is very M r Cain: Yes, I think that is a danger. I would accept important and, in a tricameral situation, I think it is very that there is a danger there, but, having said that, and having important that this revising role continues. Now, if you had members of my family who served rural constituencies have this revising role and there is something going round within the Island, they certainly were well used to having the back of my mind which I cannot bring to the front at the what I would call ‘well-attended country meetings’. moment: this is the problem of passing years, I am afraid. No, it has gone. Mrs Hannan: You spoke about these three levels of There is another point that I wanted to bring out, but I representation at local level, at Keys level and at Legislative think that the Members of the Legislative Council should not be appointed by the House of Keys. I think the electorate are Council level, looking at it as a (Mr Cain: Progression.) mature enough and are quite capable of electing the totality of progression. Would that have to be a prerequisite of somebody Tynwald, which is the totality of our parliamentary system, in standing for Legislative Council, to have been — ? the knowledge that the House of Keys and the Council, which have different functions, they should recognise that, when M r Cain: No. As I have tried to explain, I would they are performing their function of actually appointing think that people who became what I would call ‘lifetime people to the respective bodies, and they should not... They politicians’ - and there are individuals within Tynwald who are not the same people at all. And how are you going to have served, and are serving, and giving long service to the divide them if you do, if you have 32? Who is going to make Island who have progressed from the House of Keys up to the decision? Is that going to be made by Tynwald and not the Legislative Council... in fact, there is an argument which by the voters? That is nonsense, with respect, sir. says that, because it is the House of Keys that presently elects the Council, that the House of Keys, because of its The Speaker: Could I ask then, Mr Cain, the issue of very nature, tends to be narrow and restrictive in choosing electing them. Your proposal, if I have got it right, in hearing the people who can best represent the interests that the what you say, is that, at the same time as the election to Legislative Council is responsible for in dealing with its the House of Keys is undertaken, which is people going to responsibilities. a polling station, the election for the Legislative Council Members would be taken, but that would be postal vote? Mrs Hannan: We are back to democracy, aren’t we? Mr Cain: Yes. M r Cain: Yes. Absolutely. The Speaker: Could I ask why you do not think that Mrs Hannan: And the democratic vote of one Member the people should just go to the polling station and elect the one vote. Members of Legislative Council when they elect -

The Chairman: Thank you, Mrs Hannan. Mr Speaker. Mr Cain: Well, I think, at least in evolving, that might be the ultimate determination, but I think, in an evolving The Speaker: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Good situation, it might lead to a little bit of confusion, at least in afternoon, Mr Cain. the beginning and this is why I suggest that they be dealt with in the manner that I have put forward. M r Cain: Good afternoon, Mr Speaker. The Speaker; And again, through you, Chairman, one of The Speaker: Could I just ask, interestingly, you seem the issues that is interestingly bandied about here is about this not to support Tynwald being elected en bloc as 32? issue of constituencies and the point that Legislative Council Members elected from an area will perceive and will, some Mr Cain: No. would say, rightly perceive they have a constituency and you

H ouse of K eys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of M r J C C ain Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 23 KCLC are saying, no, that is not really an issue because of their role. for Ramsey, Douglas, or whatever, than you are... But I Could I ask what your thoughts would be, if, in fact, electing think, as political knowledge develops and political interest the Legislative Council by popular vote, it was actually done develops, you will get to a stage where you could possibly that eight were elected on an all-island basis? have an all-Island situation.

Mr Cain: If it were done on that basis... I come back The Speaker: Mr Chairman, just to finish, what I am to this, I think that may be the ultimate objective, eight on trying to get in my own mind is trying to avoid two Houses an all-island basis. that are popularly elected, with conflict between the two I think your problem, at this stage, it is an evolutionary Houses because of their mandates. problem in that you have got to, if you are going to go down that road, do it in such a way as to enable all the voters in the Mr Cain: No. People should be big enough to deal Isle of Man to make a reasoned decision on the qualities of with that issue all the time, because their primary thoughts the eight people that they are going to vote for in an all-island always should be the good government of this Island, not election. I do not think that, if you are taking it on a step-by- petty politicking within their constituency boundaries. I step basis, I would rather do it on a three-constituency basis, think that is absolutely.,. If people are going to be involved where you are more likely to have some knowledge of the in Manx politics on that basis, I do not know where we are people who arc putting themselves forward as candidates. going to. Does that - ? The Speaker: Bigger countries than us have problems The Speaker: Well, I understand what you say, but, just dealing with it. following that through, if you are going to retain, as you are- suggesting, that the House of Keys has its own identity and Mr Cain: That is no excuse for what we should and Members are elected as they are today, 24, and what you are should not do. trying to do is achieve a way forward that the Members of the Legislative Council are elected by the people in some The Chairman: Thank you very much. format, dare I say that the actual step is irrelevant, because I will just finish, if I may, on a couple of points which you are making the step that they are elected, so it is as easy have arisen as a result of some things you said earlier. to go straight to saying, well, all-island, so your constituency Would you accept that, by virtue of being elected a Member, is the Island constituency, as it is to go to the constituents. wherever that Member is elected to becomes by definition a constituency representative, and has constituency Mr Cain: No. The issue is as simple as this. There may responsibilities - by way of example, a Member of the be a person who is properly elected, shall we say, by a new European Parliament elected by many hundreds, thousands constituency which comprises Ramsey and Ayre, and, say of people in the United Kingdom, has constituency that is one constituency, and they say, ‘Well, we will vote for responsibilities in relation to Europe - why do you then Harry’, who is well known in that area. But forme, living say that Members of Legislative Council would not have in Douglas, I have heard of him, but I do not know anything constituency responsibilities? about him, nothing. How can I form a balanced view as to his attributes and his qualities, as compared with me forming Mr Cain: No, I do not say... I am expressing myself an opinion on the qualities of the people who have put rather badly on this issue. I think that they will have themselves forward for election within the area of Douglas, constituency responsibilities, because their constituents will within the new constituency of Douglas, whatever? give them those responsibilities because they will approach them and they will demand action or answers. I say, in an The Speaker: So, therefore, to get the balance of a body ideal world, people whose primary responsibility is to look that is supposed to look all-island without a constituency, after secondary legislation, is to act as a revising chamber, why does the present system fail? Purely because they are give a second view and then participate fully in the issues not elected and nothing else? which are laid before Tynwald. In an ideal world, they should not have the same constituency responsibilities as the Mr Cain: Yes, I mean they are elected by the Keys and Members of the House of Keys, but I think they probably I think that... Why is there this progression and why, if will be unable to avoid such responsibilities. the House of Keys are qualified to appoint the Legislative Council, are the voters not qualified? Why do you have The Chairman: It is just that one of the mechanisms to have this intermediary of the Keys? I think it is anti for an elected Member to discharge their constituency democratic and it is a situation which should long have responsibility can be to introduce primary legislation and a been overturned. Member of Legislative Council would expect, would they 4' not, the ability to introduce primary legislation within the The Speaker: You do not believe that, on an all-island body to which they have been elected and yet you see that basis, people would be able to just - as very much a rarely exercised right.

Mr Cain: No, not at this stage, for the reasons I have Mr Cain: Yes, in my 10 years in the House of Keys, my attempted to outline. I think that you may well ultimately recollection is that the number of occasions when legislation develop to that situation, but I think, on a step-by-step originated in the Legislative Council was comparatively basis, you do it on a three-constituency basis where you rare. There were Bills that originated in the Legislative are more likely to know the qualities of the people who are Council and I do not think that I would, on an evolutionary putting themselves forward for Rushen, or for the west, or basis, again, attempt to stop Members of the Council from

H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of M r J C C ain 24KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence introducing primary legislation, if they so wished. should be left to the Members of Tynwald.

The Chairman: Oh, no, indeed, if they were popularly The Chairman: Thank you very much. elected, I think they might fully expect to have that ability. Were there are any final issues you wished to conclude on or shall we leave it at that? Mr Cain: But I would still expect their primary function to be one related to revising legislation and I think that Mr Cain: I think we should leave it at that There is an function is terribly important, I really do. issue, but I cannot remember it. (Laughter)

The Chairman: Just one last point: when Mr Speaker The Chairman: Well, can I thank you, Mr Cain, very asked you on the question of a directly elected Tynwald as much on behalf of the Committee for coming and giving us a single body, you expressed the view that you preferred the benefit of your extensive experience and say how much separate elections for Keys and Council and you gave your we do appreciate it. reasons for that and one of the objections to a directly elected Tynwald was how you would divide them up. - M r Cain: Thanks very much, ladies and gentlemen. Why could it not simply be done the way standing Thank you. Committees of Tynwald are presently elected by a vote of all the Members of Tynwald?

Mr Cain: Well, that is right. Yes. But the problem that Procedural you have there, Mr Chairman, in my opinion, is that you are taking the responsibility of appointing Members to the The Chairm an: Well, ladies and gentlemen, that Legislative Council away from the electorate and I think that concludes the public session of this meeting of the Select is fundamentally wrong. The electorate are mature enough to Committee and I thank members of the public for their appoint people of the right calibre, given the right options. attendance. Thank you very much. Or, given the options that are laid before them, they are well capable of making the right decisions and I do not think it The Committee sat in private.

~~~~House of Keys Select Committee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill - Evidence of Mr J C Cain Procedural KCLC, No. 2 2003~~~~

~~~~HOUSE OF KEYS OFFICIAL REPORT~~~~

~~~~RECORTYS OIKOIL Y CHIARE AS FEED~~~~

~~~~SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION (LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL) BILL~~~~

~~~~BING ER-LHEH MYCHIONE Y CLATTYS AGHT-REILL (Y CHOONCEIL SLATTYSSAGH)~~~~

~~~~PROCEEDINGS DAALTYN (HANSARD)~~~~

~~~~Douglas, Wednesday, 26th November 2003~~~~

Published by the Office of the Qerk of TVnwald. Legislative Buildings, Bucks Road, Douglas, Isle of Man. © Court of Tynwald, 2003 Printed by The Copy Shop Limited, 48 Bucks Road, Douglas, Isle of Man Price Band B 26 KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003

~~~~Members Present:~~~~

~~~~Hon. S C Rodan MHK (Chairman) Mrs B J Cannell MHK Mrs H Hannan MHK Hon. J R Rimington MHK Hon. J A Brown SHK~~~~

~~~~Clerk: ' Mr Phil Lo Bao (Third Clerk)~~~~

~~~~Business transacted~~~~

~~~~Page Procedural...... 27~~~~

~~~~Evidence of Mr R E Quine M HK...... 27~~~~

~~~~Evidence of Mr J D Q Cannan MHK...... 36 .~~~~

~~~~Procedural 44 Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 27KCLC~~~~

introduced this Bill, and in my consultative documentation House of Keys Select Committee - the past debates and reports, and sought to identify the sticking points, to come up with a Bill which took into on the Constitution account the worries that had been expressed in the earlier (Legislative Council) Bill debates and yet provided a meaningful solution to reform of the Legislative Council. So, I think that is the backdrop that I should explain. The Committee sat in public at 10,35 a.m. In terms of this Bill, I think the easiest most succinct way in the Millennium Conference Room. forme to explain it is to just give you, essentially, a ten-point Legislative Buildings, Douglas summary as to what I was hoping it would achieve. Firstly is that the membership of the Legislative Council would remain as at present We have a President of Tynwald [MR RODAN in the Chair] Court who would be the President of the Legislative Council, eight elected Members. The Lord Bishop and the Attorney General would be there, but neither the Lord Bishop nor the Attorney General would have a vote. That is the first key Procedural point I think. Secondly, the popularly elected Members would be The Chairman (Mr Rodan): Good morning everyone chosen on the basis of the first-past-the-post system. There and welcome to this meeting of the Select Committee of the is nothing magic about that but that is what the Bill provides House of Keys which has been established to report on the for. Qualifications for candidacy would remain as at present Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill introduced into the but nomination would be subject to the endorsement of Keys by the Hon. Member for Ayre, Mr Quine. the proposer, seconder and ten assentors from within the In welcoming Mr Quine, the purpose of our deliberations designated electoral areas - I say ‘electoral areas’, not this morning is. to hear further evidence from you, if we may, constituencies. in support of your proposition that the Legislative Council Thirdly, for election purposes, there would be, as I should be established through a process of direct election by said, five electoral areas and they would be related to voter the public, rather than by Members of the House of Keys, distribution. The voter qualifications would be the same as from a base of five constituencies, as described in your Bill, for the House of Keys, so there would be no change there. and that election to take place at a separate time from Keys The fourth point: Members would serve for five years, elections. the election falling a year before the House of Keys general Additionally, your Bill is proposing certain specific election. This would enable unsuccessful candidates to stand functions for the Legislative Council in terms of subordinate in the following House of Keys general election if they were and European legislation. so minded. So, could I invite you, Mr Quine, to elaborate on your The fifth point - and I believe one of the most important - written evidence and on your Bill, to the Committee, is that the functions of the Legislative Council would be following which we will, perhaps, take you up on one or laid down in statute and would consist of, first revision two points. of primary legislation — that, of course, is what they do at present; secondly, scrutiny of secondary legislation by examination of statutory instruments - that would be a new function; thirdly, they would have a responsibility for scrutiny of EU legislation - that would be a new function; EVIDENCE OF MR R E QUINE MHK and the fourth function would be scrutiny of Government policy, activities and expenditure - to a certain extent they M rQnine: Yes, certainly. Perhaps I should explain, presently do that; it is presently done, I suppose you could first of all, of course, as I explained when I introduced the say, in a limited way by questions in Tynwald and Council, Bill, and also in the letter which I put out to Hon. Members in conjunction with the Keys through standing or select and others during the consultation process, the Bill that I committees of Tynwald. have introduced represents a pragmatic approach to find a The sixth core feature is that the Legislative Council way forward to reform the Legislative Council. It does not would function as a separate entity in carrying out the represent in totality my own views on the position of the functions which I have just outlined and they would report Legislative Council. to Tynwald Court The extent of the Legislative Council’s I have the reports. I have been involved, of course, in authority in relation to the scrutiny of Government policy, several of these exercises over 15 years, I suppose, or more, that is a matter that would need some further study, because and I started from the position - I remain of the position some parameters would have to be attached to it The - that the Legislative Council should be abolished and that Legislative Council would be required to report to Tynwald we could introduce compensating procedures within the Court on the correctness and appropriateness of statutory Keys to deal with it. instruments, which would be considered then by Tynwald That proposition has been debated on numerous occasions Court and, quite clearly, it was going nowhere. I then was involved The eighth point again relates to EU legislation and also in lending support, I suppose is the best way to say it, as it to the matters of policy and activities of Government. The certainly was not opposed by myself, to the concept of having Legislative Council would be required to issue periodic an election to Tynwald, a 32-Member Tynwald. That ran its reports on those matters to Tynwald, to draw Tynwald’s course, foundered and, again, the exercise came to a halt attention to what the Legislative Council felt were matters So, I then went through - as I explained when I of importance.

~~~~Procedural~~~~

~~~~H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of M r R E Q uine M H K 28 KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence~~~~

Number nine: the Legislative Council would remain a you have got the Keys taking the conventional route and component of Tynwald Court and Tynwald Court would putting their policies et cetera to them and having, in effect, continue to function as at present. a different form of election for the Legislative Council, Ten: the elected Members would remain available for where, because of the constraints which would be applied - service in executive Government as chairmen, Ministers geographic constraints, demographic constraints - you are and members of Statutory Boards and Members of not going to have the same ability to... and not necessarily Departments. would it be desirable to put to the public policy issues, I am not minded... my inclination is that Members of because that is not their role. You would be looking at the the Legislative Council should not be either Chief Minister, Legislative Council in terms of their statutory functions, which is provided for in the Bill, neither should they be which is not policy formation, and they would be putting, Ministers, but I have left the Bill open to allow for Ministers in effect, a CV to the electorate, rather than a statement of to be drawn from the Legislative Council. policies, which is what the Keys would be putting. I suppose I could add an additional point there, that, while elected Members would not have statutory constituency The Chairman: And hence, towards the end, you said responsibilities, they would,,of course, as do all members of they would be serving as a conduit between the public and parliament, of the legislature, act as a conduit between the Government and you did clearly say would have no statutory public and Government and they would pass things along constituency responsibilities. (Mr Quine: Yes.) How, in in the interest of enhancing communication between the practice could a Member elected by the public escape parliament and the public. inevitably from having constituency responsibilities? You I think they are the main features. define what the constituencies are -

The Chairman: Mr Quine, that is very helpful. Could I M r Quine: Yes, he could not escape"entirely from that ask you: at the outset you said that this legislation is being role, because, if you are a member of parliament, whether promoted as a pragmatic way forward; can we take it that you be, taking the scenario that is obviously here, and a your preference, your preferred model, is a directly elected member of the public comes up to you with an issue, you are Tynwald through a single process of election? going to have to feel that in one way or another. Under this proposition, if you were a Member of the Keys you could feel Mr Quine: My preferred syste m would be to abolish the it as we do now. You have got a range of options available to Legislative Council and simply adopt or change the manner you: you can put down motions, you can put down Questions et cetera. The same scope would not be available necessarily, in which the House of Keys functions and have a committee depending where you drew the parameters, to the directly stage in that, leaving Tynwald to be as it essentially is, elected Members of the Legislative Council, because that which is, of course, concerned with the approval of finance, was not their role. It flows from their role. approval of policy. They have got a specific role to fill and 1 think the public, But that is water under the bridge. I moved on in 1992 to over a period of time, would come to accept that very endorse the proposition of election to Tynwald on the basis significant difference between the Keys and the Council and of 32, or whatever it was, number of seats. the roles that the two play. But if somebody, as would happen, went to a Member of The Chairman: Yes, and does that model of 32 directly the Legislative Council with a concern or a worry of some elected Members have clear advantages over what you are sort, then he would clearly feel that and pass it along, as a suggesting now, which you have told us is a pragmatic way conduit, and he would either pass it to an MHK, if he wanted, forward (Mr Quine: Yes.), and, if so, what advantages or he could just write in on behalf of the party - would you see? The Chairman: But he would not be allowed to deal Mr Quine: I would, of the two propositions... 32 with the solution, (Mr Quine: No.) whether it be through Members of Tynwald being elected through one election - 1 promoting legislation - would prefer that approach to what I have embodied in this Bill and I have made that quite clear all along. But politics is M r Quine: - because that is not his role - the art of the possible and I am trying to move along reform of the Legislative Council. The Chairman: - because it is not his role.

The Chairman: I would just be interested in hearing M r Quine: - and that is why it is so important to have what you see as the reasons for a directly elected Tynwald the statutory role. being a better or more workable model, albeit politically unachievable, as you have said, than the model you are The Chairman: Okay. Well, thank you, Mr Quine. presently advocating of separate elections to a body with Well, 1 will ask my colleagues if they would like to put clearly specified functions. questions. Mr Speaker.

Mr Quine: Well, putting aside the administrative aspects The Speaker: Thank you, Chairman. of it - running two elections as opposed to one, the costs of Really, just picking up on the last point which Mr Quine servicing it - putting that to one side, I think going to the raised: if the Members of the Legislative Council, based electorate with one election, where you are putting before under the proposals that you see, have no role in terms of the electorate policies and the whole range of matters that policy development determination, although there would be we normally put before our electors in the House of Keys a slight role if they stay in Tynwald, because, of course, they election, is highly preferable to having two elections, where would affect policy -

~~~~H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) B ill-E vid en ce of M r R £ Q uine M H K Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 29 KCLC~~~~

Mr Quine: Yes, but not dedicated. Mr Quine: That is right, because in coming up with this solution - and I have explained how I arrived at this The Speaker: - but if they have no specific role in that particular proposition - 1 have taken that into account. and they have no specific role in being able to promote legislation, what would attract somebody to stand to be a The Speaker: Okay, could I just ask some points about Member of the Legislative Council, do you think? your Bill that you have brought to the Keys and you mention part of it You mentioned about the President of Tynwald Mr Quine; Oh, I think there are people who would be being the President of the Legislative Council, (Mr Qoine: much happier with this role. There are people who, I think, Yes.) right, and, again, looking at the Bill, the only reference would be inclined to stand for the Legislative Council on is to the ‘President of Tynwald’, so I think you envisage the basis that they are not going to have to pick up all the him being President of the Council, which is fine. I only concerns that flow from a constituency responsibility. ask that, because, at one stage, there was a view of having The very large part - perhaps the largest part - of two separate people. the commitment of a Member of the House of Keys is constituency and there are those who, if they were standing Mr Quine: I have to hold my hand up and say that I for an office that had a specified, revising, scrutiny role, if moved a Bill once, of course, to - that was on offer to them, they would be happier to offer themselves for that particular function. The Speaker: That is why I asked the question, Mr Quine! But, also, I think there are people who would be prepared to stand on the basis of ‘I am offering myself Mr Quine: - to remove the President of Tynwald, to for the Legislative. CouncU,...thisJo?y.,CV.J[ have these move.him. from, his role as. Chairman of the Legislative qualifications. I have this experience, I am offering myself Council, (The Speaker: Right) coining at it, as you well for service in this role. ’ There are people who would be happy remember, from an entirely a different situation. It was a to do that, but not happy to get involved in the cut and thrust question of the way that he could use his casting vote and of what I would call die daily political life. that was debated, that was decided, it was rejected So I have So, I think there are people. I have spoken to numerous not carried it forward; if that is the view of Tynwald, that is people, very able people, people with a wealth of experience the view of Tynwald. that are around the Island here, who are quite keen, in a way, to play a part, but they are not prepared to get involved, taking The Speaker: I just wanted to clarify that and the other on board all the import of being an MHK. issue is, I note in clause 1 (2) of the Bill, you are quite specific that the Bishop and the Attorney General shall not have a The Speaker: Therefore, if I follow that through, if I vote (Mr Quine: Yes.) within the Legislative Council and, may, Chairman: on the other side of it, could it not also of course, this Bill is about the Legislative Council. It is be an opportunity for somebody who has failed to get not specific that the President of Tynwald should not have elected in the House of Keys general election, to go for the Legislative Council the next time as a way to try and break a vote. into the Keys? Mr Quine: No, it is - M r Quine; Oh, it is quite possible, it is open - The Speaker: I presume you believe he should not, The Speaker: And do you not see that as a problem? except a casting vote.

M r Quine: No, it is a democratic process, You can stand Mr Quine: He should not, no, it is important that the for election, either you are considered by your electoral base President of Tynwald be apolitical - and, indeed, a different as being a suitable person to fulfil those designated functions, issue, a debate for a different time: it is important, subject to or you are not considered, but if they consider you suitable, I constituency responsibilities, that Mr Speaker be apolitical as think it is secondary whether or not you have failed in some far as that can be taken and reconciled with his constituency earlier election and what matters is whether the people in responsibilities. It is not an issue here today, but it is an issue the area that are voting for you feel that you are a suitable which I think we should be debating. person to fill that role. If we were to work on the basis that, somehow, it is an The Speaker: I think it was 100 years ago! Could I indictment if you stand for election and fail, there would be ask -? a significant number of Members of the House of Keys that is here today that would not be here now. They really would Mrs Hannan: Less than 100! not be with us today, because there are people in the Keys that have stood and failed and come back at other elections The Speaker: Or less, maybe. Could I ask: the other and have come in. thing I am interested in is that you stated in your Bill that there should be eight elected Members of the Legislative The Speaker: But I think the difficulty seems to be that Council. Could I ask why you have stuck to that number? they will not be able to stand and determine policies, because that is not their role. Mr Quine: Just because it is what we have got - nothing magic about that I carried a number of these figures over Mr Quine: No, that is right. from Mr Cannell’s Bill - 1 had collaborated with Mr Cannell in putting that Bill together - but there is nothing magic The Speaker: So that could cause a slight - about this, it is just -

~~~~H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill - Evidence of M r R E Q uine M H K 30 KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence~~~~

The Speaker: The reason I asked the question is because, statutorily prescribed duties or whatever, but if you look at it at the moment, there are nine people who have a vote, you the other way and say that the predominant trend is towards are reducing it down to eight. (Mr Quine: Yes.) You did not unicameral legislatures and they seem to function efficiently, see there was a need to have nine voting still. (Mr Quine: you can come at it from either side. No.) And you did not see a need to reduce it even still? The Speaker: Do you think there is any merit in - because Mr Quine: No, but I have no strong views on whether of our situation, where we have quite a unique system of it is up one or down one. I do not think it matters one iota Tynwald - the Legislative Council Members being elected in relation to the principle, or to the basic concept, that is on the basis you have, being able to participate in debate in mooted in the Bill. Tynwald, but not actually having a vote in Tynwald?

The Speaker: No, that is fine. Mr Quine: It has some attraction, yes. I mean I have not The other one, Chairman, if I could just ask: the power thought it through in those terms, but it has some attraction, base issue is, of course, a crucial issue. On the proposals that yes. you have put forward there would be two elected bodies, elected on a different basis, but still two elected bodies. The The Speaker: Thank you, Chairman. Thanks, Mr Quine. Legislative Council, whilst restricted within the Legislative Council, have no restrictions within Tynwald on the basis The Chairman: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mrs Hannan. of this proposal and, therefore, will have the ability to affect policy and how the Island goes forward in terms of finances Mrs Hannan: Could I ask: you have said one of the and policy and so on, and, therefore, it could.be argued, it . main functions,.. you have got 10 functions, or 10 areas, would naturally be dragged into the politics of the Keys/ that you have displayed to us today, but one of them is Tynwald basis in terms of policy, finance and so on. scrutiny of Government policy. Now, how does that fit in Do you see any clash potentially there in terms of one when they are not policy makers, or are you suggesting that House being elected by the people by direct election, in terms of voting, going out and it may come postal, and the it is policy in regard to expenditure? Could you just explain other lot who are not? your thinking there?

M r Quine: Within the whole context of political activity Mr Quine: No, there is a dedicated role that they would there are going to be points of conflict - well, that is not quite have, which, of course, is the one that I am talking about right, I think that is giving it a degree which is not necessarily prescribing here, but I do not see any conflict, by virtue of the right - but there will be points of contention. There always fact that they do not have... The fact that their statutary role will be within politics; that is the nature of politics. The does not embrace policy formulae does not mean that they approach I have taken to it is that I certainly start from the cannot objectively and efficiently scrutinise policy. There premise that I think you can overplay that I do not think it are parliamentary arrangements where non-parliamentarians is an important consideration. form the committees that examine and report - scrutinise, in But, in any event, if you have got people who have a other words - policy and Government activities; the point is specific statutory responsibility then I think it will flow from that they report to the parliament and the parliament decides that, that they will accept - most of them will accept - that whether anything should be done about it their role is that and that alone and we will not get any great So, I do not see a diffculty there. conflict. But we have conflicts now. There are ways to resolve Mrs Hannan: But how do you see them doing that them. scrutiny of the policy? Certainly, if you look at the arrangement we have got, with some fine tuning Tynwald can be the arbiter of whether Mr Quine: I would see them calling for the documents - a thing falls of not. We have that arrangement now. We have in fact I have got a specimen here of a document that is from a combined votes arrangement: if it passes in Council and another parliament. If it was taken as a delegated instrument, does not pass in Keys we can come back next month or they would take that instrument and they would go through it give notice this month or the following month and have a and they would obtain the evidence, further evidence if they combined vote. There are ways around that wanted, they would consider their view on that document, I do not see it as an important issue. I think it is another they would scrutinise that document, form a view on it and one of the endless excuses that have been floated over the they would report to Tynwald in their case. years because people simply do not want - there is a block Now, it you look at some of the other parliaments, you of people in the Keys that do not want - to change and the can get a good flavour of just what can be achieved through truth is, they are excuses, they are not reasons. They are that form of scrutiny by looking at one or two of these simply looking ahead and saying, ‘That is where I am going documents. I have got one here which I have just taken off the . when my Keys days are finished’ and they are not taking into pile: there is a document here and you can see precisely how account the public interest. they work, they examine it, they consider it, call evidence if they need to call evidence, they do a report and then it is The Speaker: Except that if you look round the world for parliament to pick it up and decide whether it is of any where there are democracies with two chambers, there merit or not. They decide what to do with it. are often clashes between the chambers, so it is not an unusual - Mrs Hannan: The thing is, you said in your introduction that people standing for this position would stand on their M r Quine: You have to look at whether they are CV and not on policy.

~~~~H ouse of K eys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of M r R E Q uine M H K Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 31KCLC~~~~

Mr Quine: They would stand on the basis of what the deciding, ’Well, to perform these functions, of these four, functions were that they were standing for. that person is, clearly, in my view, best placed.’

Mrs Hannan: Right. But they would, often as The Chairman: Would that, though, with respect, not necessity, as part of their job, either as a committee or a assume - and with respect to the public; I must be careful smaller committee, or as the body itself, look at policy of how I phrase this - that the public has a thorough working Government. understanding of how parliament works, how Government relates to parliament, what can be reasonably expected in Mr Quine: They would scrutinise it and report on it I terms of delivery by anybody elected to public office? As would imagine, to cover the ground, they would more or less we know, from just standing for a House of Keys election, have to function the same way as the PAC does. There would there are many members of the public who confuse the role be committees, within the Legislative Council, which would which a Keys Member carries out with the role of a local carry out these particular tasks, and the Legislative Council authority, and with the role of a Commissioner. as a whole would then report back to Tynwald. So, do you not assume that the public, for this system to work, are really going to have to be able to distinguish? Mrs Hannan: You said, also in your introduction, that - These are eminent people with splendid CVs on the one hand; or, at least, I think answering another question - you knew can you expect the public not to have expectations of these of people who would like to be involved in this particular eminent people to deliver things that, in fact, your system area. Are they just people who would like to be involved, or is not going to allow them to deliver? are they people that actually understand legislation? There is a bit of a difference between legislation, which is a main Mr Quine: I would just make two points there. The principle of the House of Keys, and policywithin’ Tynwald difficulties that" you are pointing to; that you envisage; are or even the revising chamber how. inherent in the House of Keys election. You have got exactly the same problem and we are not suggesting that we should Mr Quine: I know people who fall into both categories, change it because there is not proper scrutiny of candidates I certainly know, for want of a better term, ‘professional prior to their election to the House of Keys, and, therefore, people’ who are recently retired, or have time available, who I see it on the same basis. I do not see why there should would be prepared to take up this sort of function. As you be a greater weakness in the application here than in the said, it is probably because they would feel well placed to application in that scenario. scrutinise EU legislation, or delegated legislation, or primary But, in terms of judging, no, they are going to look at legislation, and because of the breadth of professional or the task to be done and the people that are on offer to do business experience they would be perfectly competent in that task. Then it would be up to us to draw out the voting determining whether activities of Government were being papers and put across the information relevant to that election run effectively and efficiently or not They would be well on that basis, because it is not going to be tied in with the placed to pass judgement on that House of Keys; it is going to be a separate election, and, if But there are also people who come from a different walk we cannot get that message across, then we are pretty poor of life and that is the university of life and their views could communicators. easily contribute to the betterment of the scrutiny process. The Chairman: Before I come back to Mrs Hannan, The Chairman: If I may, Mrs Hannan, just continue that just a final point on that, then: anybody elected under point: those people, therefore, could be reasonably expected this situation - notwithstanding the perceptions of the to subject themselves again to public approval. Having been public of what we are going to be hoping to get across the elected, they are accountable for the way they conduct their message to the public about, just what the role of these statutory role, they are going to be accountable ultimately at people are - you do not see, as time goes on, those elected the next election to the public again, are they not? individuals being under, or feeling themselves to be under, considerable pressure in response to public expectation, Mr Quine: In the sense that they would need to be however reasonable or unreasonable that expectation, to voted in to Legislative Council, yes; but not in the sense make certain things happen. Because their role is constrained that they would be running to the electorate, going into the along the lines that you are suggesting, you do not feel that election, with a whole package of policies. That would not will contribute towards an institutional tension, perpetually, be their role. with the other elected body who would have the ability to promote legislation in response to a difficulty that a The Chairman: Well, therefore, I would ask: other constituent has raised. than their CV, candidates are not going to stand on a policy platform, according to this view, how are the public going to Mr Quine: I do not see the problem. That is why the key judge and hold to account if there is no manifesto to judge is the statutory prescription of duties. If their role is quite their performance? clear, if the role is quite distinct, then I do not see why there should be a difficulty with it Mr Quine: Well, to my mind I do not see a difficulty there. They would judge them, first and foremost, in terms The Speaker: Maybe, if Mrs Hannan would not mind, of the qualities and the qualifications that they had to offer just to follow this - I do not lose the train of thought on to perform duties that were clearly laid down by statute, this, if I may: under the proposed Bill, Mr Quine, that you and they would have a selection of three or four people who have put forward, clause 6 says in the side note: ‘Scrutiny were offering their services to perform a specific role, this of subordinate legislation’, and then the clause goes on to particular role, and I do not see any difficulty in the public say, and I quote:

~~~~H ouse of K eys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) B ill - Evidence of M r R E Q uine M H K 32 KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence~~~~

’The Council may consider any public document which is laid or to be scrutinise policy and they are entitled to, and do, I presume, laid before Tynwald and report thereon to Tynwald.’ ask questions, but I think, in a way, whether it is a good thing Could I just ask, where it says, ‘any public document’, or a bad thing to have a Board of Education, I think it tends surely that would take into account the budget document, the to support my contention that a body - an elected body - can policy document if there is one, any report of a Government work quite compatibly with the other - Department and so on, so we are not talking in that of just Mrs Hannan: I am meaning about the perception of the scrutinising subordinate legislation, which then surely flows public electing. into the position, potentially, that, whilst these people who stand under the system you are proposing, do not stand on Mr Quine: You may be right, I am not sure, because a policy basis, because that is not what they are asked to, I am not in a position to say, authoritatively, what the but, in fact, the law, as you have proposed it, actually draws perception of the public is and the Board of Education is; it them into policy debating, because it actually asks them is not something that I have addressed myself to. We have to consider it and report to Tynwald? Do you not see that an elected member and that elected member goes about their the Legislative Council under this new format would then, particular role, and, certainly, I have not had any points of potentially, become an opposition to the Government if it conflict or anything else with them. disagreed on Government policy, and was then a block vote of eight Members saying: ‘We do not agree’, in Tynwald.. Mrs Hannan: You talked about policy and you have said that Members would remain either as Chairs, Ministers or M r Quine: I do not see that at all. They would be calling Members of various Departments, Boards, whatever. You upon... there is no reason why, in the context of scrutiny, do not see that as being in conflict with - they do not look at financial documents; it would depend, as- I said, where the parameters were drawn. If you have got a Mr Quine: I referred to this a little earlier. I hold the view fully activated and resourced Public Accounts Committee, that Ministers should not come from the Legislative Council, it may be when you draw the legislation, you are going to but, in putting this Bill together, as I have said, I have tried to exclude certain things from it But, in terms of this Bill, it is take a pragmatic view and to take into account the objections open to them to do that on a selected basis. that were raised in earlier attempts to get reform of this in Why should they be able - in fact, it would be Council, and there have been quite strong views expressed impracticable - to say: ‘You will not look, you can look at that Members of Legislative Council... within Legislative policy but you cannot look at the funding that is attached Council there are very able people, and they should not be to that policy’. I think that would be impractical. The two excluded from Government, so I have compromised to the things are clearly connected. extent that I have left it open for Ministers to come from the Legislative Council. The Chairman: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mrs Hannan, do you wish to - ? Mrs Hannan: I am just wondering whether that they, with regard to policy and obviously developing policy, as Mrs Hannan: Can I just go back to the perception of a Minister - people being elected: do you see any difference between members of the Board of Education being elected, and Mr Quine: It is, admittedly, running against the Members of the Legislative Council being elected, in that underlying concept that the Bill is otherwise founded on, the Board of Education members have a specific constitution, there is no doubt about that, and my own preference is - and you might say, they have a specific responsibility, which my I am convinced there is no reason why it should not be so understanding is to advise, and yet they stand forelection and - that we do not need to draw Ministers from Legislative say to the public that this is what they want within the scope Council. of education; do you see the same sort of thing happening But, on the consultative exercise I have carried out, in regard to Legislative Council Members? there has been a strong view that the Isle of Man should not be denied the services of able people from Legislative Mr Quine: Well, I do not want to comment on the Board Council to serve as Ministers, so I have accommodated that of Education, that would be a debate in itself, I - in the Bill.

Mrs Hannan: But it is the election I am talking about. The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Quine. Thank you, Mrs Hannan. Mrs Cannell. Mr Quine: Put it this way: I do not see that, by having the Board of Education as an elected body, that brings Mrs Cannell: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman. Good them into conflict with either the Department or individual morning, Mr Quine. Members of the Keys. Just a couple of things, following on from what Mrs Hannan said, assuming this were to pass, were to become law, Mrs Hannan: I am talking about perception in actual Legislative Council Members were elected, by postal ballot, fact what they perceive the reason for standing and the public by larger constituencies, as is the case of Keys Members perception of their being able to - and they were in post, and, bearing in mind that there could be appointed as Ministers, chairpeople of Committees, Mr Quine: I am not sure what their individual perceptions Members of Departments, how could they remain impartial are, but I would think, in most cases, they are offering their in their assessment of Government policy, without having services because they have something to contribute in the to exclude those who are directly involved? education field. But it is by way of an advisory role and a scrutiny role that they seem to do that They certainly Mr Quine: I have addressed the question of Ministers.

~~~~House of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill - Evidence of M r R E Q uine M H K Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 33KCLC~~~~

I have said that is an exception to the concept that underlies, again, the qualifications that were on offer, the experience the Bill and that is because there is a predominant view that that was on offer. I think that is one of the strengths of it says that they should be available to serve as Ministers. I do because then they are removed from active politics. That is not agree with it, but it is there. not the role that we would wish them to. fill. With chairmen of Boards it is entirely different, there is a substantial difference between a Minister and chairman Mrs Cannell: Finally, through Mr Chairman, it would be of the Board, as I think we are all aware. A chairman of a fair to say, would it not, that this legislation is a compromise Board acts as one of four people, it is what the Board decide; situation, because you have said this morning that your as Chairman of the Post Office, as Chairman of the Water preferred option would be a directly elected Tynwald? Authority, it is not what the chairman decides, it is what the Board decides, that is how the legislation is drafted. Mr Quine: Yes, that is why I made that point at the outset So I do not see any difficulty in having chairmen of My preferred option is abolition of the Legislative Council Boards drawn from the Legislative Council, because they and to accommodate the scrutiny by a committee process are not going to be, in effect, formulating policy on their within the Keys, which is what can be done and is being done own account; it is going to be a Board decision in relation in numerous places that operate on a unicameral basis. to policy. . If that is not available, then a single election for the So, I do not see a difficulty with Boards, but I have put Members of Tynwald, with a number performing the duties the marker down that I think that you would have to view - if of a Legislative Scrutiny Committee, would then, to my the Bill went through, and was not amended in respect of mind, be the second best option. But we have been there, we Ministers - Ministers coming from the Legislative Council have done that, we have lost all that - not for reasons that do as an exception to the rule. us any credit - and, therefore, this is brought back as being a reasonably meaningful’solution that leaves undisturbed Mrs Cannell: Thank you for that those matters which have been raised previously as being Assuming they are in post and we can be in Tynwald so important to so many Members. Court and we have Members of the Legislative Council, elected with their different qualities and expertise and there Mrs Cannell: Just to finish off on that aspect, would it are 24 popularly elected Members of the House of Keys, be fair to say that you favour the New Zealand parliamentary representing a wide range of public view and opinion, would system? you envisage that the Members of the Legislative Council would still have votes and would still be able to influence Mr Quine: Yes, I do.. I have said that on record before, vote on policy and expenditure? yes.

Mr Quine: Operating as Members of Tynwald, in Mrs Cannell: And in so doing, you would agree with Tynwald? me that, in the New Zealand system, of course, once they are elected they then divide into various Standing Committees Mrs Cannell: Yes. to undertake various functions. What are your thoughts and your views in terms of Victor Kneale’s idea of a directly Mr Quine: Oh, yes. elected 32-Member Chamber, that, once elected, then divide into Keys and Legislative Council? Mrs Cannell: They would have the vote. M r Quine: Well, it is essentially the same thing. I think Mr Quine: Yes. But we have already touched on the fact that the variation is more relaxed and there is more an that you can... that block of votes at the moment, technically, accent than substance. I do not think there is a great deal of can defeat the Keys, but, by a minor adjustment that can be difference between what Mr Kneale was proposing and what taken into account, so as they cannot defeat the Keys. In others have proposed. For example, what we have before other words, the majority would prevail, and there would through Mr Cannell’s Bill, for example, although there have be a need to fine tune that been other Bills as well. But that has been recognised separately, anyway, quite apart from this exercise; it has been recognised that is Mrs Cannell: Thank you, Mr Quine. something which should be corrected, but that is only a matter of Tynwald Standing Orders. The Chairman: Thank you, Mrs Cannell. Mr Rimington. Last, but not least Mrs Cannetl: So the Legislative Council are elected on the basis proposed within the green Bill and they do five Mr Rimington: Can I confirm that the Bill does not, as years’ worth of office, and they want to seek re-election written, correspond with the ideas that you expressed this to the same position; with the absence of a manifesto on morning in terms of the limitation that has been placed on policy deliberations and aspirations and ideas, how do they those elected Members in terms of policy formulation and then seek re-election for that post with the public, bearing their role within Tynwald? in mind that there appears very little for the public to be able to judge their performance throughout the preceding Mr Quine: I think it is essentially the same. I concentrated five-year term? on the designation of their roles, the statutory promulgation of their roles. The Bill does not cover, for example, the way Mr Quine: Yes, I think that is true. They are going to, that they operate in Tynwald, because that is considered to of course, have a role within Tynwald but it is going to be be an area where there would be, literally, no change - they that their re-election would be mounted on the basis of their, would be working, they would join Committees, et cetera. So

~~~~House of K eys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) B ill - Evidence of M r R E Q uine M H K 34 KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence~~~~

I do not readily recall that there are any material differences - they are performing, frankly, the same duties as the Keys, unless you have got a particular one in mind, then I think one is drawn towards having a single election, calling it a 32-Member Tynwald, and forming a Legislative Mr Rimington: No, just the explanation you have given Committee. this morning behind your views on the ‘compromise’ Bill Again, I think we are overplaying this point of conflict, seems to me to be different from what was actually in the Bill but if there is any substance in this issue of conflict, I think itself. As Mr Speaker has pointed out, section 6 introduces it would be greater on the basis that they had an open equal the Council into the area of policy (Mrs Cannell: Yes.) by role with the Keys than if they had a defined, narrower, considering any document that was to be laid and gives this specified role within legislation, additional power than they have at the moment to report thereon. M r Rimington: I hope, for the future, that if you Mr Quine: Oh, no. They could do this now. There is have Members elected on a somewhat larger constituency nothing to stop them doing this now, if they were minded basis - whether divided into five eighths or all-island, it to do it does not really matter - that would bring some form of The point here is: I am seeking, through statute, to make new dynamic into the electoral process, and that you would their role clear and discemable to the public. That is their role, attract candidates who are putting forward policies, views this is what it hinges on, these four key considerations. which reflected wider concerns and focus more on the wider There is nothing to say now that Council could not sit, as I Island concerns than, possibly, too much on the narrower of understand it, on their own and look into policy matters; they the small constituencies which they represent. have done this. In fact, I can think of at least two exercises where, they have done this. . ______M r Quine: The first thing I would say is: I do not think But that is not the reason I am putting it in; I am putting you have got any chance of getting it through,'I think that it in because, in past exercises, criticism has been that they would be a non-starter. Politically, we have gone round these are going to be in conflict with us. We are going to have this various approaches over the years and I think they would conflict between the Keys and the Council, and, therefore, then probably have some greater claim to say that ‘we have what I have sought to do in this Bill is to say one way that a stronger electoral basis, we have a superior role to you’. that can be addressed is by making their role very clear in I do not think it would help really and I do not think it is statute, in that their role is different from the Keys role. necessary. I think a specific role for them is what is called for - short of getting rid of them. Mr Rimington: I do not agree. I think you have intimated yourself you think it is overplayed: I do not agree with this Mr Rimington: Yes, I would quite contrast the worry about conflict two approaches: one I would say - yours - is trying to downgrade, decrease the democratic element I would say Mr Quine: I do not agree that it is a serious worry; I the ideal approach is, by whatever means, to increase the think it is another one of the endless excuses. democratic level. Mr Quine: My first preference, which is the abolition, is Mr Rimington: It is the essence of political activity. The founded on the basis - and it is set out here very clearly, in way you have described it this morning is slightly different fact, two reports set it out - that there was a highly objective from the bare bones that are in the Bill itself. It would appear assessment done only three or four years ago, which analysed that you are wishing to elect what might be a glorified Public all the duties that they are doing and there is really no case Accounts and Expenditure Committee. of any substance for retaining them in that role. What they do could be done through a committee approach and done Mr Quine: No. I hope I have not created that impression. better, basically. It is a general... I am trying to make provision within the So, we are in a situation where, nonetheless, Tynwald legislation for a general role which would involve scrutiny seems to want to retain them, and it is a question, therefore, on a general basis, and it is specific to primary legislation, of finding a framework which accommodates that view - and delegated legislation and the EU. I am not saying I do not subscribe to it, but it is there and it seems to be a predominant view - giving them a specific Mr Rimington: Can I ask your view - coming from a duty to perform, finding the role, direct them to fill these gaps different angle - what would your view be if the Legislative given in that role and that is what this would do. Council, say, was elected on die basis that you had, or some sort of larger constituency or all-Island - that is a mechanic M r Rimington: The desire to retain them would be the we can skip over for the moment - but not on the very concept of the checks and balances. localised constituency basis we have at the moment, if, in fact, they were elected without any prescription that exists M r Quine: I could suggest better ways to introduce at the moment, but as equal Members of Tynwald? So they checks and balances than to prolong the life of the Legislative would have their role in revising legislation, as they have Council. now, they may or may not have that extra role of looking at subordinate legislation - which is a gap in our system - but, M r Rimington: I think that is all from me. beyond that, they are equal in every respect to an elected Member of the Keys, and, therefore, they could be a Minister The Chairman: That is fine. or a Chief Minister and they would be in Tynwald voting as In the few minutes we have got remaining, I would one body. How would you view that? just like to come back on a couple of points and I think Mr Speaker would, as well. Mr Quine: If we are going to produce a situation where One of the objections that has been raised with us for

H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of M r R E Q uine M H K Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 35 KCLC the proposal of five large constituencies from which the would be problematic, at least Certainly, you could do it, candidates would be drawn - the eight Members would but you would have to commit a tremendous amount of time be drawn for Legislative Council - is, of course, that they, to it It is not what I have envisaged and that is simply that if in practical terms, would be very large unmanageable you make known your qualifications for a particular role and constituencies to canvas. For example, in the case of you can do that through the normal line of communication; Douglas, which is one of the five constituencies proposed, you - a constituency of two Members, you are talking 17,000 or 18.000 electors. What would you say to that objection? The Chairman: You would not expect a candidate to be tested, therefore, on the doorstep over their qualifications Mr Quine: Well, the first point is that they are not for the role? constituencies; they are electoral areas and, by design, that is the term that is used in the Bill ‘Constituencies’ Mr Quine: I do not think it would be feasible. Some infers that they are the same as the Keys and they have a candidates might feel that they could strengthen their constituency role and that is not the object; the object is to claim by making themselves available at church halls and find an electoral area - parish halls et cetera, so people could come and ask them questions - nothing wrong with that, but the practicalities The Chairman: Well, let us not use that terminology of going door to door would be... then. ‘Electoral area’ for the purpose of electing one or two persons - The Chairman; Thank you. Mr Speaker.

Mr Quine: That is right. Yes. The Speaker: Thank you, Chairman,...... Just very briefly, in response to a question from Mr The Chairman: So these electoral areas would be the Rimington, Mr Quine, you said that you envisaged the role territory in which competing candidates would play out the of the Legislative Council - the new role as under your Bill election. How would those candidates, in practice, achieve -is specific to scrutiny of primary legislation and secondary canvassing or getting the message across to the 17,000 or legislation regulations and EC registrations/instruments. 18.000 people in that electoral area? That is the purpose of what you are trying to create. (Mr Mr Quine: Well, I presume, principally through the Quine: Yes.) I come back then to clause 6, as written, which, in fact, propagation of their own qualifications and experience. If they were putting out their own - call it a ‘manifesto*, goes further than that, and that is an issue in terms that clause for want of a better description - they would be able to 6 brings potentially the Legislative Council under your say exactly who they are, what they have done and what proposals into the issue of actually considering any public their experience is and people will be able to assess them document So, therefore, in fact, what you have said which on that you see as a reason for them - But the vast majority of people in - take Douglas, because it is a large one - who would be offering themselves, if they M r Quine: In the context of scrutiny of subordinate were going to have a realistic prospect, they would probably legislation. be known to a considerable number of people within the electoral area. The Speaker: But the Bill does not say that; so, I just really wanted to get it clear what you are actually The Chairman: One Member, for example, is to be intending. elected from the north electoral area; how is that person going to hope to be able to canvas, call at all the households Mr Quine: Scrutiny of subordinate legislation. of the electors of Ramsey, Andreas, Bride, Jurby, Maughold, Lezayre? It cannot be done! The Speaker: So your intention is purely that

Mr Quine: No, you are coming back to the question that Mr Quine: Yes. they are going to be canvassing; that is not the proposition that is in that Bill. The proposition is that they are going to Mrs Hannan: It is not how it is written. promulgate what their experience is, that is going to go out to each electorate and they are going to take a view on that The Speaker: Okay, that is fine, I just wanted to be There is nothing to say that individual candidates should not clear. make themselves available at church halls, or whatever, to answer questions. Mr Quine: I know the marginal note is not the role, but that is what the marginal note says: ‘scrutiny of subordinate The Chairman; But, with respect, when you say legislation*. to ‘promulgate’, the way in Keys elections candidates promulgate their views is by knocking on doors and holding The Speaker: I just want it to be clear your intention is meetings and sending out through the post a manifesto. that. (Mr Quine: Yes.) Right, okay. Thank you, Chairman. Would you accept that, in practice, any candidate for a Council election is going to find it impossible to call, The Chairman; So this point could be clarified by knocking on doors? amendment, presumably.

~~~~M r Quine: I think going on an individual door basis The Speaker: I just want it to be clear.~~~~

~~~~H ouse of K eys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) B ill - Evidence of M r R E Q uine M H K 36 KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence~~~~

The Chairman: That is fine, that is very helpful. a single chamber parliament with 24 singlé seats. Now, unfortunately, time has beaten us, so I would like If I can expand on that, Chairman, I have expressed to thank you, Mr Quine, and I give you the opportunity, if an opinion about .the Legislative Council as it is. That is you wish, to make any closing remarks to the Committee, an opinion, and also my opinion that it is wrong that the please feel free to do so. Legislative Council, as presently constituted, has Ministers appointed who have no public mandate and no public M r Quine: No, I do not think there is anything further I accountability. need to add. I think I have explained where I come from on So I will move on to how I would like to see - and I think reform of the Legislative Council. If I could turn the clock back this is what the purpose of the Committee is - the future 15 years I could have saved myself a lot of time and effort by parliament of the Isle of Man. taking a different approach to this, but that is another matter. I would like, in order that there is democracy - and I mean universal democracy - the establishment of a 32-Member The Chairman: Well, can I thank you very much. We Tynwald by popular election and, then, when you have got are very conscious, all of us, that this is a path that is well the 32 Members popularly elected, Tynwald sitting as one worn by your shoes, to say the least, and we would like to and voting as one would elect an eight-member Legislative thank you for giving us the benefit of your experience and Scrutiny Committee. Now, that Legislative Scrutiny your thoughts on this. Committee would not sit when legislation was debated So thank you, Mr Quine. primarily. In other words, they would be a Committee of Tynwald - no more, no less - a legislation Committee that Mr Quine: In that the Bill has got through its second was separate from the rest of the Members of Tynwald. The reading and it is before a select committee, if I was a real rest of the Members of Tynwald would, like the House of optimist I could feel that we are moving forward, but I will Keys now, go through the legislative process - first, second, reserve my judgement on that (Laughter) third readings and so on - the legislation would then go to the Scrutiny Committee. The Chairman: Thank you very much. We shall now The Scrutiny Committee would do the functions of the take a five minute recess and we will then call Mr Can nan. Legislative Council in legislative terras, so there would be Thank you very much. a complete break. Right, ladies and gentlemen, welcome back to the The main body of the 32-Member Tynwald would deal consideration of the Select Committee of the House of Keys with the legislative business and then the Scrutiny Committee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill. The next part elected by them, would deal with it in its second phase. Do of our programme this morning is to hear oral evidence you follow what I am saying? from Mr David Cannan, Member of the House of Keys for Michael and if I could invite you Mr Cannan to step forward. The Chairman: Yes. Welcome to the Committee. Mr Cannan: So that would be legislation. All 32 Members would have all the same duties in terms of policy, they would all be debating in Tynwald policy, they could be Mr Cannan was called at 11.55 members of Departments, Ministers, whatever. They would all become Members of Tynwald by popular vote. EVIDENCE OF MR D CANNAN MHK The only difference is to maintain scrutiny of legislation and that is the purpose of the Legislative Council at the Mr Cannan: Thank you, sir. moment. They do not determine Tynwald policy; Tynwald policy is determined in Tynwald, executive Government is -The Chairman: Mr Cannan, we received from you, in Tynwald, they may vote separately, but they are all more in May of this year - you were one of the Members that or less equal, but not equal because they vote separately responded to our invitation to submit written evidence on this and there are the voting rules if two branches are not in Bill and we thank you for that We have your letter before agreement. us, and you make a number of recommendations in respect But, in this case, you would have the 32-Member of the Legislative Council, so I would simply invite you to Tynwald all voted in, eight or nine members, whatever you present them to us and expand upon them, if you would. chose to be the Legislative Scrutiny Committee, and the rest would b e -in effect what you have is - the main Legislative Mr Cannan: Thank you very much, Chairman. Committee, which is the House of Keys, as you call it at the In my letter of 20th May, I expressed an opinion that moment, but the Scrutiny Committee would be like every the electorate of the Isle of Man have, presently, no regard other Member of Tynwald - Members of Departments, for the Legislative Council and the membership, which is members of Select Committees, Ministers - because they not popularly elected, has no public mandate and no public would all have a public mandate to perform. accountability. Indeed, there is much public resentment at the So, nobody could then point and say ‘Ah, but he is on the appointment of Legislative Council Members as Ministers Legislative Scrutiny Committee, he does not have a public of Departments. mandate! * Of course he has a public mandate: he is a Member My recommendations to the Committee are (a) the of Tynwald, he is voted in on a new 32-seat Tynwald. Legislative Council to be disbanded, (b) the establishment Now it may be you can have a 24-seat Tynwald; that is of a 32-Member Tynwald by popular election in 2006, and a matter for Tynwald to decide. (c) Tynwald to become a single chamber parliament with 32 But what I am talking about is a single-chamber single-seat constituencies—alternatively, Tynwald to become government And then there is no finger pointing and saying,

House of Keys Select Committee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill - Evidence of Mr R E Quine MHK House of Keys Select Committee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill — Evidence of Mr D Cannan MHK Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 37 KCLC

‘Ah but that Minister on the Legislative Council can cany would be on a par with all the other Standing Committees on his or her duties with complete arrogance’, in the sense of Tynwald that exist currently. Would you see the way that they are not accountable to the public, as long as they Members would serve on such a Committee as being in the have got the support of the Council of Ministers, or whatever, hands of Tynwald voting as a single body? and the Council of Ministers may be supporting the Minister, because they can get policies through with the Minister, Mr Cannan: They would be appointed by Tynwald whoever it is, taking the flack because the Minister does not voting as a single body, just as you vote as a Tynwald body have to face the public. to appoint the Public Accounts Committee, (The Chairman: I am expanding on what I am trying to say, but if we Yes.) except that, in terms of Tynwald Committees, because are to be truly democratic and to truly have a democratic they are the Legislative Scrutiny Committee, they would be government then we have 32 elected or 24 elected. But if you primus inter pares - but have no other privileges, except they are going to have a Legislative Scrutinising Committee, it is, were primus inter pares. in my view, best that there are 32 elected persons; and out of the 32, all elected equally, Tynwald then nominates eight for The Chairman: Standing, then, for election as a Member the Scrutinising Committee. The Scrutinising Committee sit of Tynwald, one would not know in advance whether one on the same basis as the Legislative Council sit now. would be a member of this Legislative Scrutiny Committee, any more than one would know whether you were going to be on the Standing Committee on Economic Affairs (Interruption due to technical difficulties) or anything else, but would you not see that, because of the Legislative Scrutiny Committee’s work in terms of a direct role in legislation, it might well be important for a The Chairman: There is a technical hitch. Sorry to candidate" to know in advance whether they would have the - interrupt your flow. ability to bring forward a Private Member’s Bill in pursuit of a particular policy, which they put to their electors and Mr Cannan: Not unusual, Mr Chairman, to have a voice which they wish to promote on election. If that successful from somewhere trying to derail me! (Laughter) candidate was put on a Legislative Scrutiny Committee, he would only be able to scrutinise legislation and would not The Chairman: I think we are okay now. Had you have the ability to promote it. anything further, Mr Cannan, at this point? M r Cannan: No, sir, the Members of Legislative Mr Cannan: Well, it stopped my flow, so I have lost it! Council, as I understand it, have every right to bring in a Private Member’s Bill in the Legislative Council to go (Laughter) So, I will leave you now, to... through, I think that that is correct

The Chairman: Okay, you have set out very clearly that The Chairman: I am not talking about Legislative you believe in a unicameral model, which would involve Council; I am talking about a Legislative Scrutiny direct election of 32 or 24 Members by the public at a single Committee. election. Would it be fair, then, to say that there would no longer, under this model - direct election to Tynwald - be an Mr Cannan: What I am saying is that Scrutiny Committee entity known as the ‘House of Keys’? would have the same powers and privileges as any other elected Member of Tynwald, so they could bring the Private Mr Cannan: Well, you could continue calling it by Member’s Bill through the Scrutiny Committee. whichever name you wanted to. You could have it called... In the United Kingdom they call it ‘Parliament’, but there The Chairman: So the Scrutiny Committee could is the ‘House of Commons’; we are going into names now. initiate legislation. The ‘Legislative Scrutiny Committee' is, basically, the old Legislative Council. Mr Cannan: What I am trying to say, I hope, I am trying to get it clear, is that the Scrutiny Committee would have The Chairman: If the Legislative Scrutiny Committee the same rights under Standing Orders as the Legislative were to be renamed the ‘Legislative Council’ and everyone Council. else, the other 24, were to be named ‘Members of the House of Keys’, you have essentially got the same model The Chairman: So it would not be solely scrutiny; it as advocated by Mr Kneale and others. would be a legislative Committee, and if, for any reason, legislation were to be initiated there, a Private Member’s Mr Cannan: Not quite, but I have got you all as Members Bill, who would do the scrutiny in that situation? of Tynwald and you all stand for Tynwald. You have a general election, which I have tried to explain: on general election Mr Cannan: Well, because it would have to go to the day, all 32 - and my preference is for 32, because, if you took second Chamber again, or the first Chamber. If, at the present a scrutinising Committee out of 24, you would have very few time, a Member of the Legislative Council wants to bring people to deal with the first phase of legislation. in a Private Member’s Bill - 1 understand, and, perhaps, the Clerk can confirm that, they can at the moment bring in a The Chairman: So, the Scrutinising Committee would Private Member's Bill - that Private Member’s Bill goes in be called the ‘Legislation Scrutiny Committee’; I suppose it reverse order. could be called, if it was the wish, the ‘Legislative Council’. No matter, what is in a name? The fact would be that they The Chairman: So, under your system -

~~~~H ouse of K e ys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) B ill - Evidence of M r D C annan M H K 38 KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence~~~~

Mr Cannan: Nothing would change. that they were all elected on a universal franchise at the start, so nobody is there by right or from electoral college The Chairman: So, under this system, the 24 Members or anything else. Now, what I am trying to say is that if I put of Tynwald who were not on this Legislative Scrutiny a Private Member’s Bill in I have got to persuade at least Committee would, in effect, be a revising chamber for that 13 people to carry it and I have no powers of persuasion for particular legislation? the nine votes as there are currently up in the Legislative Council. M r Cannan: Exactly as it is at present, sir. The Chairman: Would you need to have a mechanism The Chairman: Exactly as it is at present. Right to resolve conflict or - ?

M r Cannan: So, there would be no change, but you M r Cannan: I have been trying to say all along that you would have 32 elected. The 32 elected would then vote would have the same system as it is now. So you would have a for eight, like they do for the Public Accounts Committee, Legislative Council, same as now, appointed by Tynwald, but who are then, in effect, with all the Standing Orders of the they would have all the same powers as any other Member of Legislative Council. They would only be in for the same five- Tynwald. They would be Members of Departments, voting as year term; the only difference is that they would not be in the a block on executive Government, be Ministers and nobody House of Keys doing the first phase of the legislation, they could... there would just be a Committee of Tynwald primus would be doing the scrutiny part, but they would have the inter pares, first amongst equals, and so nobody could go to same opportunities as Members of the Legislative Council the electorate at the end of five years and claim any greater now, to put in amendments and all the rest of it— mandate from the public than any other person, because by saying:4 Oh, well, I was a Member of the House of Keys, or The Chairman: But, as a member of an eight-person I was a Member of the Legislative Committee’ because they Committee, would there be an argument, then, that a Member have got the same rights, right the way through. might get their legislation through simply by virtue of there being less opposition because there were eight? There would The Chairm an: I accept that. Would the smaller be seven potential opponents, as opposed to 23 potential body - the Legislative Council or the Legislative Scrutiny opponents to the legislation. In order to achieve a second Committee - should there be a right for its views to be reading, let us say, in a Private Member’s Bill you need overridden by, as is currently the case, by the House of Keys, to persuade... it is easier to persuade, as one out of eight, by the larger component of the elected body, by the 24? support for your cause, than one out of 24. Mr Cannan: Yes, because if it were put to a joint vote, M r Cannan: Yes, but on the reverse issue, if you are the larger body would overrule it, anyway. (The Chairman: putting a Private Member’s Bill in the House of Keys now, Right) Because, with the present system, even if the House I have got to persuade 23, so you have still got to persuade of Keys and Legislative Council still cannot agree, the House 23 either way. And, then, if I can persuade the 23,1 have got of Keys, at the end of the day, as Mr Speaker will tell you, to persuade the Legislative Council. has the ultimate right.

The Chairman: But having gone through first, second, The Chairman: Other Members may want to pick up clauses and third reading in the smaller Chamber and it those points, but I will let someone else have a turn. Mrs passes, then, to the larger one for the scrutiny, would there Cannell. need to be separate mechanisms or - Mrs Cannell: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Good morning, M r Cannan: No. No more than there are now. If the . Mr Cannan. cause is right, sir, whether you start from first post in the House of Keys, or first post there, they have still got to go Mr Cannan: Good morning. through both Chambers. Mrs Cannell: I would just like to ask what your thoughts The Chairman: Would you see any scope for potential are with respect to 32 single-seat constituencies for the conflict between the Scrutiny Committee with this role and election to Tynwald. Why single-seat? the larger component of Tynwald? M r Cannan: I have always fought for single seats. In M r Cannan: Because they have all been elected, sir, fact, I have introduced two Private Member's Bills for single and, therefore, even now if there is disagreement, as there is seats, and in, let me see... the first Bill was in 1989.1 think presently on the Fireworks Bill, or we are having - Mr Brown will recall that I introduced the Bill, that went through the clauses stage and only fell on the third reading. The Chairman: What I am getting at is that the 24 It passed the third reading when it was a tie vote and the elected Members who were revising a particular Bill could Speaker, Sir Charles Kemiish, then voted for it, when he claim a greater degree of democratic support for their point should have voted for the status quo, and Mr Kneale... and of view. It is expressed by a vote of, let us say 13 to 11 f as then there was a little row as to the Speaker misusing his against the smaller legislative body who was promoting the casting vote and Sir Charles had to withdraw, and I think, legislation. Mr Brown, you would confirm that, would you?

~~~~Mr Cannan: But you have got to bear in mind, Chairman, The Speaker: I can.~~~~

~~~~H ouse of K eys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) Bill — Evidence of M r D C annan M H K Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 39 KCLC~~~~

M r Caiman: So what I am trying to say is that I have Tynwald - a Committee that was primus inter pares. consistently gone for single seats: one man, one vote, one person, or one constituency, because it is quite wrong that M rs Cannell: Finally, Mr Cannan, I have had the the people that an elector - in Onchan, for instance, can have opportunity to visit New Zealand Parliament — three votes or one vote or two votes. One man, one vote. M r Cannan: Yes, I have visited the New Zealand Mrs Cannell: I do not think anyone would quibble with parliament and I have met many Members of the New you in terms of the inequality that presently exists, but had Zealand Parliament over the years. Yes, it is bicameral. you considered, perhaps, 16 two-seat constituencies? No, because, and I am only re-iterating my arguments Mrs Cannell: You have actually had the opportunity to both in 1988-89, and when I tried to put them again in 1992- see it in action, as it were, as a unicameral? Have you had 93 with the help of the then Speaker, Mr Speaker Cain. I the opportunity to see it in action? had a similar Bill through in the next legislative... because it had been seen that Members of a multi-seat constituency M r Cannan: I have not sat in while it has been in session, were being played one off against another. It was neither because the time of the year when I visit New Zealand is, advantage to. the Government of the Isle of Man, nor the obviously, their high summer. It may be winter here, but advantage to anybody. it is high summer down there and they have their summer So, if you have one person of a single seat, at least they holidays, like we have our Summer holidays. know who their Member is, and, take my seat, for instance: they vote for me, they know who is responsible, I cannot Mrs Cannell: Do you have an understanding, then, of blame anybody else. I and I alone, just as others who accept the unicameral aspect of the parliament? single seats, accept responsibility for the way that they vote and, if there are people in the constituency who feel that they Mr Cannan: I have a clear understanding, and they had have a minority view that is not being properly represented, a senate up to 1948. they go to a Member of an adjoining constituency. I know, because people who, in my constituency, feel that with a The Chairman: Okay. Thank you, Mrs Cannell. Mr viewpoint they have, they go to a Member in an adjacent Rimington. constituency just as people from an adjacent constituency come to me because they basically say, ‘he is not representing M r Rimington: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman. Can I congratulate you, Mr Cannan, on putting a very clear our view’. exposition of your position and quite straightforward and- Mrs Cannell: There could be problems, practically speaking, though, couldn't there, in terms of the distribution M r Cannan: I am always straightforward, aren’t I? and the reassessment of boundaries? For instance, Douglas at the moment has eight MHKs representing Douglas and there M r Rimington: - and not encumbered by too many are four two-seat constituency positions there, so. in order wandering qualifications which sometimes we are all guilty to redefine those into single-seat constituencies it would be of. I happen not to agree with it, nevertheless! rather, I would suggest, problematic. I just wondered if any Can I just question you on one issue, which is having of the practical considerations had been thought of? 32 single seats. My concern would be that, by having 32 constituencies, that would then make the elected Members M r Cannan: Yes, the practical consideration is a from those 32 constituencies even more parochial than they boundary commission to divide Onchan into Onchan North, possibly might be at the moment Onchan South and Onchan Central. This was done in 1989 when, as I say, it went to the third reading: Ramsey North, M r Cannan: Can I answer that: at the moment, Onchan Ramsey South. It was all set out and done and it would has three MHKs and two MLCs, I think - it isn’t three, is it? be done, not by politicians, but the legislation says by a No; it is certainly two. So they have five Members and you ‘boundary commission’. will notice, from time to time, that the two MLCs involve themselves in the parochial issues of Onchan, as much as the M rs Cannell: Okay, Mr Chairman, I just have one MHKs do. And I have noticed, if I may just say, that MLCs remaining question in terms of your suggestion of the Scrutiny before have involved themselves in the parochial issues of Committee (Mr Cannan: Yes.) and you emphasise that their the areas which they originally were elected from, and that is most important role would be the scrutiny of legislation. only natural, because, if you are a resident of a constituency, Would you envisage them, in that role, being responsible and you have elected J Bloggs for three or four terms, and for scrutinising secondary legislation, Government policy, he suddenly goes up to the Legislative Council and there is EU directives or instruments? a new guy on the block, public nature is to go and ask the experienced chap to deal with it. That is my experience. I Mr Cannan: No. Well, Tynwald could possibly put have not been on the Legislative Council, but I have just that onto them, but their role would be similar to the watched from this end. Legislative Council at present. They can bring in a Private Member’s Bill, they can ask questions and they would ask Mr Rimington: If we accepted the format that you are questions because they would all be on Departments and proposing - and just take that as granted for the purposes the Department would speak for them. They would have of the question - so that everybody was directly elccted none of their democratic rights curtailed, none whatsoever. Members of Tynwald, can I then rephrase it again to you They would just be a Committee of a universally elected that you need to achieve a balance in that election process

H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill - Evidence of M r D C an nan M H K 40KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence between constituency interest and wider national interest and Member into those positions, but to fill the other ones there that, by having it in very small constituencies, you push the may be one new one in, to give a fresh colour, but I would balance towards the constituency interests, without regard envisage the scrutiny of election - but who am I to say? It to the wider national interests. is a secret ballot.

M r Cannan: I answer that by saying that, with over 20 Mrs Hannan: But none of these people who were elected years’ experience, there are Members who do not confine to the Scrutiny Committee or Legislative Council, whatever themselves to the constituency interests; of course, they do we want to call it, would be involved with the formation of because they wish to be re-elected. But they are also big policy within legislation, amending it or whatever, in the enough to vote in the national interest There are so many Lower House? occasions. We had the Douglas Electricity Authority and the Isle Mr Cannan: Well, we can amend it in the Upper House. of Man Electricity Authority way back in the 1980s and it was in the national interest when we had a Manx Electricity Mrs Hannan: And you can see that happening in the Authority. Now, you could say the Douglas constituents Upper House? They are looking at it from a scrutiny point would try to prevent, because Douglas was getting cheaper of view. electricity than the old Isle of Man Electricity Authority customers, but the national interest decreed that we had one M r Cannan: They are looking for a scrutiny and - electricity authority, and I can go on giving several other examples, but that is just one that comes to mind, where the Mrs Hannan: If it works. national interest prevails over the constituency interest. And if there is a particular constituency interest, the Member of M r Cannan: If it works, but if they feel... I have that constituency can fight as much as he likes about it but if been here long enough to see amendments come from the he cannot win over the rest, so be it he is only one of 32. Legislative Council.

M r Rimington: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mrs Hannan: Policy amendments? (Mr Cannan: Yes.) Right Would you see this Committee as being... you said The Chairman: Mrs Hannan. that, once people are elected to the Legislative Council, Scrutiny Committee, whatever we are going to call it, they Mrs Hannan: Yes, could I just raise the question of could be Ministers. Would you envisage them being Chief election to this Scrutiny Committee that you are talking Minister* maybe? about, Legislative Council. Who would you see being elected to the Scrutiny Committee? M r Cannan: Well, they could be because they would come in on an equal public mandate, they would, in all Mr Cannan: It would be presumptuous of me to respects, be equal Members of Tynwald and they are just predetermine who the 32 Members elected would be, but I another Committee of Tynwald primus inter pares, so they all would suggest that they would elect, possibly, Members who come in. Now, the first thing after an election, as you know, had been in Tynwald for a longer time than the chap that had is to elect a Chief Minister before any other Committees are just airived that day. You know what I am trying to say: the elected and then, after that, I would envisage - 1 am not going new Member - after your general election you have got 32 into the detail - the Legislative Committee and I have my Members, your first job is to elect the first Committee, which faith in the wisdom of elected Members - 1 cannot speak for I have just said, primus inter pares. Tynwald may - but I what Members would do, but Members would do what they find it difficult to envisage - elect a chap who had just been saw best for the conduct of business of Tynwald. elected for the first time that day. The Chairman: Thanks, Mrs Hannan. Mr Speaker. Mrs Hannan: So you would envisage that it would be the more experienced Members - the longer serving The Speaker: Thank you, Chairman. Members, the - Mr Cannan, just to get clear, my understanding is that you are talking about a single legislature to deal with everything Mr Cannan: I would envisage that Tynwald Members are at Tynwald Court, or the Keys, whichever is determined (Mr reasonably intelligent and they would use their intelligence Cannan: Yes.) and it could consist of 32 or 24 - and not elect somebody who had just been elected for the first time that day. We are all reasonably intelligent and when M r Cannan: But I would recommend 32. we have a secret ballot we, for most part, unless we have some personal whatever - The Speaker: But you would recommend 32. Could I just clarify: in that do you then add in the Bishop* the Attorney Mrs Hannan: Tynwald elects newly elected Members General and a President, as additions to that? to the Public Accounts Committee, which is a scrutiny committee. M r Cannan: The President, because Tynwald sitting en bloc would be the President You would have the House Mr Cannan: It is a scrutiny committee of public of Keys or the primary legislature, the first block, and the accounts, but they do not elect a newly elected Member Speaker would be Chairman, which he is now, and the to be chairman because that is a separate vote. The vice- President would act as Chairman of the Legislative Scrutiny chairman is a separate vote. I have never seen a newly elected Committee.

~~~~H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative C ouncil) Bill - Evidence of M r D C annan M H K Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 41 KCLC~~~~

The Speaker: Right. So you do not envisage, then, that Could I just ask: you talk about a scrutiny committee and the Tynwald Court in its new form, as you propose, would we all tend to continue to try and reflect what we have - 24 sit, for example, similar to the Scottish parliament, with a and 8 - and, again, you have done the same here in terms of presiding officer in charge? You actually see there are still saying ‘Well, let us have a scrutiny committee that consists two distinctions. of eight people.’ Could I ask, in your thoughts of a new structure of a single-chamber Tynwald Court, or whatever Mr Cannan: No, no, it would sit as one body. (The it is, but parliamentary legislature for the Isle of Man, why Speaker: Right.) No, no, it would not be separate. Tliere do you feel it is not desirable to undertake the scrutiny of would not be a top bench any more. After election day you legislation? We are only relatively small, whether we be 32 are all equal. or whether we be 24, in the public arena within Tynwald Court? Why go off to a scrutiny committee? The Speaker: So, taking that, then, if you have that and you have a presiding officer, do you still see the Lord Bishop Mr Cannan: The scrutiny committee would be in the being in Tynwald? public arena, as it is at present

Mr Cannan: I see the Lord Bishop being in Tynwald, The Speaker: Well, why not do that within 32, within but we are not debating that today. I see him being a Member the Tynwald’s Court Chamber? of Tynwald. The matter of the voting rights of the Bishop, I would defer that to a later consideration, when the Bill is Mr Cannan: Because it is always better, in my view, for there. the 24... if you are going to scrutinise, it is better to have a clearer separation to scrutinise; in other words, to have - Mrs Hannan: The actual Bill that is before us says that somebody who was not there at the beginning to have a look he should not have a vote, I think. at what the first phase was, for a second time.

Mr Cannan: He certainly - The Speaker: So, if I can follow that through: then it would be, would it not, a bit contradictory to allow Ministers Mrs Hannan: Clause 1(2). to be on that Committee, because they will have determined in the Council of Ministers that it is their policy to have that Mr Cannan: - should not be voting on secular... Wait a legislation? So, therefore, they are not going to change that moment I would see the Bishop endeavouring to influence view and might try to influence the scrutiny committee of social issues. their way.

The Speaker: Yes, but it is not essential. The point that M r Cannan: Therefore, it is Tynwald as a body are I am getting at, if I can just clarify - voting for the Legislative Committee, so they, in their wisdom - Mr Cannan: ‘Does he have a vote or doesn’t he?’ - The Speaker: Take at the moment, for example - The Speaker: Well, firstly, in the new structure of a single chamber, would you envisage the Bishop and the Attorney M r Cannan: You have got no choice. General still sitting within that form? The Speaker: Well, but at the moment, for example, Mr Cannan: The Attorney General would sit to give Tynwald, by its own Standing Orders, does not permit guidance, as he does now. Ministers to be on the PAC, so would it not be, if you went down the road that you are talking about, having a standing The Speaker: All right, okay, and do you see the Bishop committee, really, for scrutiny, that, in fact, Ministers should being part of Tynwald? not be allowed to be part of that?

Mr Cannan: I see the Bishop being part of Tynwald, I M r Cannan: And the Chief Minister? have not yet determined my mind whether he should have the vote or not The Speaker: And the Chief Minister - well, I include him. The Speaker: Well, that is fine. I just want to be clear that those two officers are still - M r Cannan: Well, we are going into the minutiae of the detaiL Mr Cannan: They would be present. The Speaker: I am trying to, really, get clear your The Speaker: That is fine. thoughts on how you see this, so just to get it clear: a single chamber with the Bishop and the Attorney General within Mr Cannan: The Attorney General would not have a the chamber. The next point is that the scrutiny committee vote. He would be present, in the present arrangements. would be set up as a standing scrutiny committee -

The Speaker: Right, I just wanted to be clear that you Mr Cannan: Known as the Legislative Council. saw them as additions to the 32 elected. That is fine. I am clear on that, Mr Cannan. Thank you. The Speaker: Whatever you call it That would not

H ouse of Keys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill - Evidence of M r D C annan M H K 42KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence include anyone who is a Minister. eight of those Members get elected to become a standing scrutiny committee. They go away, they consider in depth, Mr Cannan: It may be that Tynwald - yes, maybe - if the legislation, do whatever they have to do, come back and Tynwald, in determining the minutiae of the thing there, it report to Tynwald. may be best that they are not Ministers, but I would have no great... M r Cannan: No, sir.

The Speaker: So, could I ask why you do not feel The Speaker: Where do they go? that if we had, let us say, Tynwald Court as 32 Members, who would then deal with everything - policy, budgets, M r Cannan: It goes from the 24 to the eight now and everything to do with Government, as Tynwald does now, when the eight have passed it, without alteration from what but then incorporates the work of the Keys and Council the House of Keys have passed it, it then goes on to be signed within Tynwald Court as one body - why do you not feel by Tynwald, yes? That is the present arrangement. that it would work that you could then continue to scrutinise the legislation in Tynwald Court, and if there was a specific The Speaker: That is now. problem, then set up a select committee as and when necessary? Why do you not think that would work? M r Cannan: Yes, and that would be the arrangement. All I am trying to say is that you would have a legislative Mr Cannan: No, because I think that, instead of going Scrutiny - through the legislation from day one, it is best for another body to look at it from day 6ne; toor after the amendments The Chairman: Can we just clarify: what we are getting made by the House of Keys, and so on and so forth. It has hung up on is this scrutiny, but it is very important to identify got its third reading with all its amendments done, then for the stage at which the scrutiny takes place. We are all agreed the next body to just give a fresh look at the whole thing. the principle of scrutiny is an important and essential part of the legislation-making process. The Speaker: Okay, so if we had a structure similar to Under Mr Cannan’s model, that scrutiny would take place now - 10 Ministers within Tynwald, eight Members who as an exercise, once the main body, the body in which the would be a scrutiny committee and - Bill was introduced, had gone through first, second, clauses and third reading, as is the case now, that piece of legislation Mr Cannan: Yes, but they would be all Members - they would then go to this scrutiny committee for first, second, could also be... sorry, carry on. third readings and so on. (Mr Cannan: Correct.) Now, essentially we have then got the same process we The Speaker: Eight Members who would be a Scrutiny have the now, and the same mechanism for resolving conflict Committee, right - and, let us say, excluding Ministers, as we have now. because it could be seen that that would not be desirable The New Zealand model - and we have not talked about because they are looking independently - who then come, it in any detail, of course - has the scrutiny taking place at back to Tynwald Court and, let us say, recommend to support a particular point within a progressive sequence of events the Bill as the Government has written it, before the rest and it takes place after the second reading, we understand. of the Members have the debate on whether or not that is After the second reading of a Bill, a scrutiny committee or acceptable, you would then have a built-in number of votes a select committee looks at the detail, and then, that having of 18 Members. Do you think 18 out of the 32 would be happened, it progresses towards finality. desirable to proceed, where, in fact, you have neutralised, That is a different model, particularly in the sense of really, the rest of the Members of Tynwald? They can have where the scrutiny is put into this process. If we were to their say, but their voting is not going to influence it. have that model and there are unicameral parliaments, which New Zealand Parliament is... would that not be an easier one Mr Cannan: At the moment, legislation goes through the to operate than having the need to build in a mechanism to House of Keys with Ministers and ordinary other Members, resolve conflict, as there would inevitably be between two members of Department, the Legislative Committee - the directly elected components of the legislative process? Legislative Council will do exactly as the Legislative Council does now - and if there is a disagreement between the M r Cannan: No, I do not believe so. Practice and custom Legislative Committee and the House of Keys Committee are quite used to the House of Keys/Legislative Council. It we have a conference. Yes? would not affect what I am proposing, it would be exactly the same, except that the Legislative Council would be in The Speaker: Now? Yes. But I do not envisage that under there by direct election, they would have all the powers, what you have said is your system. privileges and votes and say so of everybody else. They can put in amendments, they can - Mr Cannan: Oh yes, no, no. That is what I have said. It would be the same. The scrutinising Committee that would The Chairman: Sorry to interrupt you, Mr Cannan, but be... I think I tried to make that, Chairman...? the key difference now would be that they would both be elected chambers, both directly elected, and, therefore, could The Speaker: I am just trying to get in my own mind, rightly claim a mandate - the individual Members could Chairman, this issue that we have on Tynwald of 32 seats, c la im a direct mandate — from the people for a particular all elected, which is fine - sorry, Chairman - just to get it policy position. Would that not tend towards conflict clear, based on what you said. You, then, are proposing that situations and a standoff situation, if the eight members of the

~~~~H ouse of K eys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) B ill - Evidence of M r D C annan M H K Oral Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 43 KCLC~~~~

Legislative Committee wanted to dig their heels in and there Mr Cannan: Well, I am trying to answer yours, but I would be no Government Minister on that Committee? hope I have made it quite clear that the Scrutiny Committee would - the final point is - have all the trappings of Mr Cannan: There could be, I did not say no. the Legislative Council, Standing Orders virtually the same -there might be adjustments, I am not going into The Chairman: No, but I think we have agreed reasons minutiae - but they would all be Members elected, and why it would be desirable for that not to happen, and let us elected by Tynwald. say it did not happen. If they wanted to dig their heels in with a public mandate, a public vote in support of them, they The Chairman: And there would be no need for any could be in a conflict with the rest of Tynwald. geographical balance necessarily. Would there need to be a mechanism to - ? Mr Cannan: I think you are making conflict where conflict would not necessarily occur. I would have no hang Mr Cannan: No. ups about a Minister being on the scrutiny committee, no hang-ups at all, because that person would have a public The Chairman: Other witnesses have stressed the need mandate and would have to be accountable at the end of to get the south and the north further represented. five years, if that person wished to continue to be a Member of Tynwald. M r Cannan: At the moment sir, there is only one Member in there from the north, I think. The Chairman: One could also say from that argument The whole thing is controlled by Douglas and the that it would be essential for at least there to be one Minister south. on that committee, in order to take through Government legislation. In theory, if you did not, you would have The Chairman: But they are not directly elected. eight members who were resolutely against Government’s position, refusing to move Bills: M r Cannan: They are not directly elected.

Mr Cannan: Well, you could have had that before Mrs The Chairman: If they were directly elected, would it Crowe joined, because there was only one Minister, but not be important to have this important body (Mr Cannan: other persons who are Members of Departments moved No.) to reflect the Island’s interests geographically. Departmental Bills. Mr Cannan: No, no. Because they would all be equal The Chairman: Which might be an argument why, Members ofTynwald. under the present system, the Chief Minister takes a position, historically, that there should a Minister in Legislative The Chairman: So, if they were all from Douglas, Council. let us say, because Douglas might have 10 of the 32 - in fact, probably they would have to, to get parity of Mr Cannan: I have got no hang-up about that; what I representation - you could, in theory, have all eight Members object to - and seriously object to - is appointing a person from Douglas. on the Legislative Council who has been defeated at the polls, has no public mandate, no accountability and then M r Cannan: The Chief Minister could possibly have is appointed a Minister and who knows that the only thing the whole of his Cabinet, if he had judged it carefully, just required is to get re-elected by the House of Keys, with the comprising Douglas, Rushen and Malew and Santon. backing with an inbuilt possibly eight votes from the Council of Ministers requiring only another five more, to get back The Chairman: This is why others have suggested that into perpetuity on the Legislative Council without any public you want to avoid any geographical imbalance by having representation at all. two from the south or two from the north, or whatever - (Mr Cannan: No.) You do not subscribe to that? Mrs Hannan: That is the constitution at the moment: that people can be elected, anyone can be elected and they have Mr Cannan: I believe in the judgement of the people been put forward without ever standing for election. who have been elected. I think it was Mr Churchill who said ‘trust the people’, sir. Mr Cannan: I am objecting to it. Those are the rules, that is why I want to change it, Mrs Hannan. That is what I The Chairman: Thank you, Mr Cannan. am saying and that is what I object to. Mrs Hannan: Mr Chairman, for the record I think it is Mrs Hannan: To stop it now. important to state that, whilst there might only be at present one Member in the Legislative Council representing the Mr Cannan: So, if the Minister or two Ministers are north, there is equally only one Member in ¿he Legislative on the Legislative Council that does not worry me, because Council representing Douglas. they are all equal; we have all the elected. The Speaker: They do not represent those areas. The Chairman: Time, unfortunately, has beaten us once again. Are there any final points, Mr Cannan, you wish to Mrs Hannan: They do not represent, and there are make? two people who live in the north in the Legislative Council

~~~~H ouse of K e ys Select Com m ittee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill - Evidence of M r D C annan M H K 44KCLC SELECT COMMITTEE, WEDNESDAY, 26th NOVEMBER 2003 Oral Evidence~~~~

at the moment. They only live there, they have not got Procedural constituencies. The Chairman: That brings our proceedings to an The Chairman: I think that is the point you need to end, I would like to thank the witnesses, and the public clarify: whatever their origin, they are not representing a and the press also for their attendance, and we will move region. into private session as a Committee at this point Thank you very much. M r Cannan: I am not into that, sir; I am into public election.

~~~~The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr Cannan. The Committee sat in private at 12.50 p.m..~~~~

~~~~House of Keys Select Committee on the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill - Evidence of Mr D Cannan MHK Procedural Appendix 4~~~~

~~~~Copy of the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003 Copy of the amendment to the Long Title of the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003~~~~

~~~~IN THE KEYS CONSTITUTION (LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL) BILL 2003~~~~

~~~~Explanatory Memorandum~~~~

~~~~1. The object of this Private Member’s Bill is to provide for the direct election of members of the Legislative Council, and to confer additional functions on the Council.~~~~

2. Clause 1 specifies the constitution of the Council, and provides for the Bishop arid the' Attorney General to be non-voting members. Clause 2 provides for elections of 8 “elected members’* of the Council by popular franchise, and Schedule 1 specifies their electoral areas. Clause 3 provides for qualifications and disqualifications for election. Clause 4 provides for elections to take place one year before general elections to the Keys. Clause 5 precludes a Bill being introduced in the Council. Clauses 6 and 7 require the Council to scrutinise subordinate and European legislation. Clause 8 disqualifies members of the Council for the office of Chief Minister. Clause 9 and Schedules 2 and 3 make consequential amendments and repeals. Clause 10 is supplemental; it provides for the Bill to come into force in time for elections to the Council in 2004.

3. The holding of general elections of members of the Council is expected to involve public expenditure of the order of £100,000 in every 5th year. By-elections will involve occasional expenditure in proportion. ii Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003 Arrangement of Sections

~~~~The Legislative Council~~~~

~~~~1. Constitution of Council.~~~~

~~~~2. Election of members of Council.~~~~

~~~~3. Qualifications etc. \ 4. Term of office of members of Council.~~~~

~~~~...... Functions o f Council~~~~

~~~~5. Bills.~~~~

~~~~6. Scrutiny of subordinate legislation.~~~~

~~~~7. Scrutiny of European legislation.~~~~

~~~~Supplemental~~~~

~~~~8. Disqualification for office of Chief Minister.~~~~

~~~~9. Consequential amendments and repeals.~~~~

~~~~10. Short title and commencement.~~~~

~~~~SCHEDULES —~~~~

~~~~Schedule 1 — Electoral areas for purpose of Council elections.~~~~

~~~~Schedule 2 — Amendment of enactments.~~~~

~~~~Schedule 3 — Enactments repealed. Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003 1~~~~

~~~~A BILL~~~~

~~~~to require members of the Legislative Council to be subject to popular election; and for connected purposes.~~~~

E, your Majesty’s most dutiful and loyal subjects, the WCouncil and Keys of the said Isle, do humbly beseech your Majesty that it may be enacted, and be it enacted, by the Queen’s Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Council and Keys in Tynwald assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows (that is to say):—

~~~~The Legislative Council~~~~

~~~~1. (1) The Council shall consist of — Constitution of Council. (a) the President of Tynwald;~~~~

~~~~(b) the Bishop;~~~~

~~~~5 (c) the Attorney General; and~~~~

~~~~(d) 8 members (“elected members”) elected pursuant to section 2.~~~~

(2) Neither the Bishop nor the Attorney General shall have the right to vote either in Tynwald or in the Council, and the 10 presence of the Bishop or the Attorney General at a sitting of Tynwald or of the Council shall not reckon towards a quorum of either body. 2 Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003

~~~~Election of 2. (1) The elected members shall be elected by postal ballot members of Council. in accordance with regulations under subsection (2).~~~~

~~~~(2) The Governor in Council shall by regulations make provision for the election of elected members by postal ballot.~~~~

(3) Regulations under subsection (2) shall reproduce the 5 [cl 3] provisions of the Representation of the People Act 1995 (except Part 1) with such exceptions, adaptations and modifications as appear to the Governor in Council to be necessary or expedient.

~~~~(4) Regulations shall not be made under subsection (2) unless a draft thereof has been approved by Tynwald. 10~~~~

(5) For the purposes of an election of elected members, the Island shall be divided into the 5 electoral areas specified in columns 1 and 2 of Schedule 1, and each electoral area shall return the number of elected members specified in relation thereto in column 3 of that Schedule. 15

~~~~(6) The Treasury shall prepare a map of the Island upon which shall be delineated the boundaries of each electoral area, and shall cause the map to be deposited in the General Registry.~~~~

(7) The Chief Registrar shall make the map prepared under subsection (6), or a copy of it, available for inspection by any 20 person at the General Registry at all reasonable times, and shall supply a copy thereof to any person on payment of such reasonable charge as the Treasury may determine.

~~~~Qualifications 3. (1) A person is qualified to stand as a candidate for election etc. and be elected as an elected member if at the time he is nominated 25 as a candidate —~~~~

~~~~(a) he is not less than 21 years of age, and~~~~

~~~~(b) he is ordinarily resident in the Island.~~~~

~~~~(2) If an elected member ceases to be qualified as provided by subsection (1), his seat shall be vacated. 30~~~~

(3) If the holder of any office of profit under the Government of the Island is elected as an elected member, his seat shall be vacated unless within 7 days from the date of his election, he gives such notice or takes such other step as is necessary to vacate that office on the earliest practicable day thereafter; and if he subsequently withdraws 35 that notice or revokes that step, he shall be treated for the prnpose of subsection (5) as having accepted that office.

~~~~(4) If an elected member —- Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003 3~~~~

~~~~(a) is adjudicated bankrupt or makes a deed of arrangement for the benefit of his creditors, or~~~~

~~~~(b) is suffering from mental disorder (within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1998), [c. 3]~~~~

~~~~5 the High Court shall certify the same to the President of Tynwald, and thereupon the seat of that member shall be vacated.~~~~

~~~~(5) If an elected member —~~~~

~~~~(a) accepts an office of profit under the Government of the Island or the government of any country or territory 10 outside the Island, or~~~~

~~~~(b) becomes a member of the Keys or a local authority,~~~~

~~~~his seat shall be vacated.~~~~

~~~~(6) For the purpose of subsection (5) a person —~~~~

~~~~(a) becomes a member of the Keys on his taking and 15 subscribing the oaths referred to in section 8 of the Representation of the People Act 1995;~~~~

~~~~(b) becomes a member of a local authority on his making a declaration of acceptance of office as such pursuant to section 10 of the Local Elections Act 1986. [c.lO]~~~~

20 (7) If an elected member remains out of the Island, or is absent from the meetings of Tynwald or of the Council, for a continuous period of 6 months without the consent of the President of Tynwald, the seat of that member shall be vacated.

~~~~(8) An elected member may resign on giving to the President 25 of Tynwald one month’s notice in writing of his intention to do so.~~~~

4. (1) Every elected member of the Council shall, unless he Terra of office of sooner resigns or his seat is otherwise vacated, go out of office on members the Thursday following the third Tuesday in October in 2009 and of Council. in each fifth year thereafter*

~~~~30 (2) Nothing in this section affects section 4 of the Representation of the People Act 1995.~~~~

~~~~Functions o f Council~~~~

~~~~5. No Bill, other than a Bill which has been passed by the Keys, Bills, may be introduced in the Council. 4 Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003~~~~

Scrutiny of 6. (1) The Council may consider any public document which subordinate legislation. is laid or to be laid before Tynwald and report thereon to Tynwald. (2) Nothing in this section applies to a draft measure presented pursuant to Schedule 1 to the Church Legislation [c. 8] Procedure Act 1993. 5

Scrutiny of 7. (1) If it appears to the Council of Ministers that a European Community instrument has or will have effect in the Island by legislation. virtue of section 2 of the European Communities (Isle of Man) [C.14] Act 1973, it shall refer the instrument to the Council, who may consider it and report thereon to Tynwald. 10

~~~~(2) Nothing in this section applies to a Community instrument made before the commencement of this Act.~~~~

~~~~(3) In this section “Community instrument” has the same meaning as in the said Act of 1973.~~~~

~~~~Supplemental 15~~~~

~~~~Disqualification 8. In section 7 of the Council of Ministers Act 1990 for office of Chief Minister. (disqualifications) — [c. 3] (a) after subsection (1) insert —~~~~

~~~~“(1 A) An elected memberof the Council shall not be eligible for nomination or appointment as Chief 20 Minister”;~~~~

~~~~(b) after subsection (2) insert —~~~~

~~~~“(3) If the Chief Minister becomes an elected member of the Council, he shall go out of office as Chief Minister”. 25~~~~

Consequential 9. (1) The enactments specified in Schedule 2 are amended amendments in accordance with that Schedule. and repeals. (2) The enactments specified in Schedule 3 are repealed to the extent specified in column 3 of that Schedule.

Short title and 10. (1) This Act may be cited as the Constitution (Legislative 30 commencement. Council) Act 2003, and the Constitution Acts 1919 to 1994 and this Act may be cited together as the Constitution Acts 1919 to 2003. Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003 5

~~~~(2) This Act shall come into operation —~~~~

~~~~(a) on the 1st January 2004, for the purpose of the preparation of registers of electors for the electoral areas referred to in section 2;~~~~

~~~~(b) on the 21st October 2004, for all other purposes. 6 Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003~~~~

~~~~Section 2(5). SCHEDULE 1~~~~

~~~~ELECTORAL AREAS FOR PURPOSE OF COUNCIL ELECTIONS~~~~

~~~~Name Area Members~~~~

~~~~North The town district of Ramsey and the parish districts of 1 Andreas, Bride, Jurby, Lezayre and Maughold~~~~

~~~~South The town district of Castletown, the village districts of 2 ■ Port Erin and Port St Mary and the parish districts of Arbory, Malew, Rushen and Santon~~~~

~~~~West The town district of Peel, the local government district 1 of Michael and the parish districts of Ballaugh, German ...... and Patrick ......~~~~

~~~~East The local government district of Onchan, the village 2 district of Laxey and the parish districts of Braddan, Lonan and Marown~~~~

~~~~Douglas The borough of Douglas 2~~~~

~~~~Note: the reference in this Schedule to any district is to that district as it existed on the 1st January 2003. Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003 1~~~~

~~~~Section 9(1). SCHEDULE 2~~~~

~~~~AMENDMENT OF ENACTMENTS~~~~

~~~~The Isle of Man Constitution Act 1961 (XIX p.586)~~~~

~~~~1. In section 10(1), for “1990” substitute “2003”.~~~~

~~~~The Registration of Electors Act 1984 (c.3)~~~~

~~~~2. (1) In section 13, after subsection (3) insert —~~~~

“(3A) The registration officer shall, not later than the 20th August, place the revised lists of electors for all- of- the polling districts in each Council area in order and number the names on the lists in series, commencing with the number 1 against the first name in the first list for the area and continuing through every polling district in the area.

(3B) The registration officer shall sign the lists of electors, so ordered and numbered, for each Council area, and shall deposit the same in the General Registry not later than the 31st August, and the said lists shall, subject to section 12(4), constitute the register of electors for that Council area as from the 1 st September until the 31st August in the following year.”.

~~~~(2) In section 14 —~~~~

~~~~(a) in subsection (1), after “constituency” insert Council area”;~~~~

~~~~(b) in subsection (3), after “national election” insert “or Council election”.~~~~

~~~~(3) In section 17(1) —~~~~

~~~~(a) after the definition of “constituency” insert —~~~~

~~~~“ “Council area” means an electoral area constituted by the Constitution (Legislative Council) Act 2003;~~~~

~~~~“Council election” means an election of an elected member of the Council;”;~~~~

~~~~(b) in the definition of “election” after “national election” insert a Council election”;~~~~

~~~~(c) in the definition of “polling district”, after “ 1995” insert “or the Constitution (Legislative Council) Act 2003”.~~~~

~~~~The Council of Ministers Act 1990 (c.3)~~~~

~~~~3. In section 4(4), after *7(2)” insert “or (3)”. 8 Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003~~~~

~~~~SCH. 2 The Constitution Act 1990 (c.6)~~~~

~~~~4, In section 9, in the definition of “elected member”, for “Isle of Man Constitution Amendment Act 1919” substitute “Constitution (Legislative Council) Act 2003”.~~~~

~~~~The Representation of the People Act 1995 (c.13)~~~~

~~~~5. In section 4( 1 )(a), for “member of the Council elected by the Keys” substitute “elected member of the Council”. Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003 9~~~~

~~~~Section 9(2). SCHEDULE 3~~~~

~~~~ENACTMENTS REPEALED~~~~

~~~~Reference Short title Extent of repeal~~~~

~~~~X p.390 The Isle of Man Constitution Sections 6 to 26. Amendment Act 1919.~~~~

~~~~XXI p. 104 The Isle of Man Constitution The whole Act. Act 1969.~~~~

~~~~1971 s. 13 The Isle of Man Constitution The whole Act. Act 1971.~~~~

~~~~1971 c.34 The Isle of Man Constitution The whole Act. - (Elections to Council) Act 1971.~~~~

~~~~1975 c. 12 The Isle of Man Constitution The whole Act. (Amendment) Act 1975.~~~~

~~~~1989 c.4 The Payment of Members’ Section 7(6). Expenses Act 1989.~~~~

~~~~1990 c.6 The Constitution Act 1990. In Schedule 1, paragraph 3.~~~~

~~~~1995 c.13 The Representation of the People In Schedule 7, paragraph 1. Act 1995. IN THE KEYS~~~~

~~~~Constitution (Legislative Council)~~~~

~~~~A BILL~~~~

~~~~to require members of the Legislative Council to be subject to popular election; and fo r connected purposes.~~~~

~~~~Leave to introduce given in the House of Keys on 25th June 2002.~~~~

~~~~MR. QUINE~~~~

~~~~MARCH 2003~~~~

~~~~Printed (by Authority) by The Copy Shop Limited 48, Bucks Road, Douglas, Isle of Man No. 1010495 Extract from the Votes and Proceedings of the House of Keys Tuesday 1st April 2003~~~~

~~~~Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill~~~~

~~~~Motion made - that the Bill be now read a second time. Mr Quine House divided. Motion carried.~~~~

~~~~Motion made - that Standing Orders 37(3) and 155 be suspended to allow amendments to the long title of the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill 2003 to be moved at this sitting. Mr Rodan~~~~

~~~~House divided. Motion carried.~~~~

~~~~Motion made - in the long title of the Bill delete the words "the Legislative Council" and substitute "Tynwald'"; and after "election" insert -~~~~

~~~~"to make new provision for the constitution of the House of Keys and the Legislative Council;". Mr Rodan House divided. Motion carried.~~~~

Motion made - that a committee of three Members be appointed to examine and consider the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill, to take evidence thereon in public and to report to the House before the Clauses Stage. Mr Riming ton

~~~~Amendment moved -~~~~

~~~~For the term "three"' substitute "five" Mrs Hannan Amendment withdrawn.~~~~

~~~~Amendment moved -~~~~

~~~~For the term "three" substitute "five" and add at the end -~~~~

~~~~"no later than April 2004." Mr Rodan House divided. Amendment carried. House divided. Motion as amended carried.~~~~

~~~~Mr Anderson, Mrs Cannell, Mrs Hannan, Mr Quine, Mr Rimington, Mr Rodan and Mr Speaker were nominated and seconded.~~~~

~~~~After a ballot Mrs Cannell, Mrs Hannan, Mr Rimington, Mr Rodan and Mr Speaker were elected.~~~~

~~~~Appendix 5~~~~

~~~~Copy of the House of Keys Select Committee Report on the Legislative Council June 1999 (without appendices) I R e po r t of th e S elect C o m m it t e e o n th e L e g isl a t iv e C o u n c il~~~~

~~~~1. INTRODUCTION~~~~

~~~~1.1 TERMS OF REFERENCE~~~~

~~~~At its sitting on 22nd April 1997, the House resolved to appoint a Committee~~~~

~~~~of five Members~~~~

~~~~"to consider -~~~~

~~~~(a) the rôle, constitution and election of the Legislative Council; and~~~~

~~~~(b) the implications for the remuneration of Members of the Council of~~~~

~~~~any recommendations which it may make under paragraph (a)...".~~~~

~~~~1.2 MEMBERS AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE~~~~

~~~~At the same sitting, we were appointed to serve on the Select Committee. At~~~~

~~~~our initial meeting the Hon Member for Ayre, Mr Quine, was unanimously~~~~

~~~~elected as Chairman.~~~~

~~~~C/LC/gmw 1.3 MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEE~~~~

~~~~We have held 25 meetings of the Committee. They were held on~~~~

~~~~. 13th May 1997; 27th May 1997; 18th June 1997; 18th August 1997;~~~~

~~~~2nd September 1997; 29th September 1997; 31st October 1997;~~~~

~~~~28th November 1997; 13th February 1998; 25th February 1998;~~~~

~~~~7th April 1998; 23rd June 1998; 17th July 1998; 30th September 1998;~~~~

~~~~26th October 1998; 23rd November 1998; 7th December 1998;~~~~

~~~~30th December 1998; 12th January 1999; 27th January 1999;~~~~

~~~~9th February 1999; 5th March 1999; 30th March 1999; 10th May 1999 and~~~~

~~~~12th May 1999.~~~~

~~~~1.4 WRITTEN EVIDENCE~~~~

~~~~Following invitations to Members of Tynwald, and by public invitation, we~~~~

~~~~received the following written evidence (dated as in parentheses):~~~~

~~~~Mr F C Smith (5th May 1997); Mr J A McKenzie (28 th May 1998);~~~~

~~~~Mr R C Rawcliffe (22nd May 1998); Mr J D Q Cannan MHK (26th May 1998);~~~~

~~~~Mr C A Cain (25th May 1998); Mr W A Gilbey MHK (3rd June 1998);~~~~

~~~~Mr E A Crowe MLC (4th June 1998 and 9th March 1999); Mr G V H Kneale~~~~

~~~~(5th June 1998); Mr R H Costain (2nd June 1998); Sir Miles Walker MHK~~~~

~~~~(10th June 1998); the Legislative Council (28th July 1998); Sir Charles~~~~

~~~~Kerruish (7th December 1998 and 30th December 1998).~~~~

~~~~The written evidence is set out in Appendix A.~~~~

~~~~2 C/LC/gmw 1.5 O RAL EVIDENCE~~~~

~~~~The Committee took oral evidence on 23rd November 1998 and~~~~

~~~~30th December 1998 from the following: Mr G T Cannell MHK; Mr C A Cain;~~~~

~~~~Mr R C Rawcliffe; Mr G V H Kneale; Mr R H Costain; Mr } A Mackenzie; Sir~~~~

~~~~Miles Walker MHK and Mr E G Lowey MLC (on behalf of the Legislative~~~~

~~~~Council).~~~~

~~~~The oral evidence is set out in Appendix B.~~~~

~~~~2. THE INTERIM REPORT~~~~

~~~~2.1 In February 1998 we published an Interim Report and it was debated at~~~~

~~~~24th March 1998 sitting, at which the House resolved, without a division, that~~~~

~~~~it be received.~~~~

~~~~2.2 The Interim Report sought "to present a preliminary objective and functional~~~~

~~~~analysis of the contemporary role of the Legislative Council in the context of~~~~

~~~~the widely recognised constitutional functions of a parliament and of the~~~~

~~~~commonly recognised attributes and limitations of second chambers" (para~~~~

~~~~1.3.1).~~~~

~~~~2.3 In paragraph 3 of the Interim Report we identified the contemporary~~~~

~~~~functions of the Legislative Council. We considered that the primary function~~~~

~~~~of the Council when sitting separately was the passage of primary legislation,~~~~

~~~~with the power under the Isle of Man Constitution Act 1961, s 10, to delay~~~~

~~~~3 C/LC/gmw Bills which have been passed by the Keys; the Council, when sitting~~~~

~~~~separately, may also scrutinise the policy and administration of the~~~~

~~~~Government, although in practice it devotes relatively little time to this (para~~~~

~~~~'3.2). We reported that, when sitting in Tynwald Court, the functions of the~~~~

~~~~Council, which it shares with the Keys, are to scrutinise delegated legislation, authorise the vote and appropriation of public monies and scrutinise~~~~

~~~~Government policy and administration (para 3.3). It was our conclusion that all of these functions either should or could be performed solely by the Keys.~~~~

~~~~INTERIM REPORT: PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS~~~~

~~~~On the presumption that its Members, other than the ex officio Members, continued to be elected by the Keys rather than be directly elected, the~~~~

~~~~Interim Report reached three provisional conclusions on the rôle of the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council:~~~~

~~~~(i) the vote and appropriation of public monies is a function which~~~~

~~~~should more appropriately be within the exclusive competence of the~~~~

~~~~Keys as the directly elected parliamentary body (para 3.3.3.2);~~~~

~~~~(ii) it no longer remains appropriate for Members of the Council to be~~~~

~~~~appointed Ministers of the Isle of Man Government, but they might~~~~

~~~~be appointed to other Government posts (paras 3A.2, 3.4.3); and~~~~

~~~~(iii) there are cogent democratic arguments for the nomination of the~~~~

~~~~Chief Minister to be exclusively a matter for the Keys, whatever the~~~~

~~~~future functions of the Council (para 4.2.4).~~~~

~~~~4 C/LC/gmw INTERIM REPORT: OPTIONS FOR REFORM OF THE RiLE OF THE LEGISLATIVE~~~~

~~~~COUNCIL~~~~

In our Interim Report we also identified five options, other than the status quo, for the future role of the Legislative Council. These options set out below, with exception of option (i), were again based on the presumption that

~~~~Members of the Council, other than its ex officio Members, continued to be elected by the Keys rather than be directly elected.~~~~

~~~~(i) Abolition of the Legislative Council (para 4.2).~~~~

~~~~Essentially this would create a unicameral legislature, although~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court could remain with a very limited role.~~~~

~~~~(ii) Limiting the functions of the Legislative Council exclusively to~~~~

~~~~revising primary legislation (para 4.3).~~~~

~~~~In substance a bicameral legislature would remain in being, but the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council would not sit in Tynwald.~~~~

~~~~(iii) Limiting the functions of the Legislative Council to revising primary~~~~

~~~~legislation and scrutinising delegated legislation (para 4.4).~~~~

~~~~A bicameral legislature would remain in being, with the option of the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council carrying out scrutiny of delegated legislation in~~~~

~~~~Tynwald or separately.~~~~

~~~~(iv) Limiting the functions of the Legislative Council to revising primary~~~~

~~~~legislation, scrutinising delegated legislation and scrutinising~~~~

~~~~Government policy and administration (para 4.5).~~~~

~~~~5 C/LC/gmw Again, the option would remain for the Legislative Council to carry~~~~

~~~~out most of its designated duties in Tynwald or separately.~~~~

~~~~(v) Limiting the functions of the Legislative Council to revising primary~~~~

~~~~legislation, scrutinising delegated legislation, scrutinising~~~~

~~~~Government policy and administration, and maintaining the capacity~~~~

~~~~of its Members to be appointed to posts in the Isle of Man~~~~

~~~~Government, other than as Ministers (para 4.6).~~~~

~~~~In terms of parliamentary structure this would maintain the status quo,~~~~

~~~~except that Legislative Council Members would not be appointed as~~~~

~~~~Ministers.~~~~

As our Chairman observed when moving the motion that the Interim Report be received, the purpose of tabling it was to "enable Members to have a meaningful debate on what we believe is clearly a very important matter", on the basis that the report contained sufficient information "to assist Members on forming a view on the issues" (Proceedings, K361 (24th March 1998)).

~~~~However, analysing the debate on the Interim Report has suggested to us that, perhaps unsurprisingly, there was relatively little consensus in the~~~~

~~~~House. On the other hand, we did not identify in the debate any suggestions from~~~~

Members of other significant alternative proposals for reform which were not addressed in our Interim Report. Nevertheless, consideration of the Interim Report by the House, together with the written evidence received and the oral evidence taken, proved a valuable basis for the completion of our inquiry.

~~~~6 C/LC/gmw 3. THE SCOPE OF THIS REPORT~~~~

~~~~3.1 Our Interim Report identified the contemporary functions of the Legislative~~~~

~~~~Council and proposed various options presented in the context of three~~~~

~~~~provisional conclusions. As indicated above, this analysis was based on the~~~~

~~~~presumption that, other than its ex officio Members, the Members of the~~~~

~~~~Council would continue to be elected by the Keys. In this report, we have~~~~

~~~~revisited and refined our analysis, taking into account observations made~~~~

~~~~during the debate on our Interim Report. Whatever the refinements~~~~

~~~~adopted, maintaining the mechanism of election to the Council by an electoral~~~~

~~~~college of the Keys has advantages and disadvantages. It enables the duties~~~~

~~~~and responsibilities of the Council to be modified in a way which would not~~~~

~~~~perhaps be characterised by most people as radical, but would accommodate~~~~

~~~~our three provisional conclusions. Others may, however, consider that a~~~~

~~~~limited modification of the rights and responsibilities of the Council, together~~~~

~~~~with the tenure of membership of the elected Members, is insufficiently~~~~

~~~~radical to address popular democratic concerns and could open further debate~~~~

~~~~on consequential issues such as the appropriate remuneration of Members of~~~~

~~~~the Council relative to that of Members of the Keys.~~~~

~~~~3.2 There is, however, an alternative to the Legislative Council being elected by~~~~

~~~~an electoral college of the Keys. The Council, other than its ex officio~~~~

~~~~Members, could be directly elected by the people of the Isle of Man. There is,~~~~

~~~~of course, a well-rehearsed argument that if the two Branches of Tynwald~~~~

~~~~were to be independently and directly elected that this would create a tension~~~~

~~~~between the Branches which has not been seen for many years, although it~~~~

~~~~was then attributable to quite different constitutional and political pressures.~~~~

~~~~7 C/LC/gmw We accept that an independently and directly elected Legislative Council~~~~

~~~~would be extremely likely to assert and seek at least an equal parliamentary~~~~

~~~~competence with the Keys and that this would indeed create undesirable~~~~

~~~~tension.~~~~

~~~~3.3 These concerns could be addressed by the direct election of the Members of~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court, other than the ex officio Members, as one body by the people~~~~

~~~~of the Isle of Man at regular general elections. This too would have its~~~~

~~~~advantages and disadvantages. It would enhance the rôle of Tynwald Court~~~~

~~~~as a democratically elected parliamentary assembly; and, in doing so, would~~~~

~~~~develop a meaningful rôle for both the Keys and the Council. It would~~~~

~~~~provide an opportunity to meet modern democratic standards without~~~~

~~~~creating conflicts of interest between the two Branches of Tynwald, yet still~~~~

~~~~enable the Branches to continue to provide constitutional checks and balances,~~~~

~~~~in particular with respect to the consideration of primary legislation. No~~~~

~~~~doubt for some this may be viewed as rather too radical a solution, and one~~~~

~~~~which is likely to bring in its wake extensive debate on single and multiple~~~~

~~~~seat constituencies and the system by which Members should be elected. On~~~~

~~~~the other hand, it is an approach which would resolve debate on other issues,~~~~

~~~~such as the desirability of introducing differential remuneration for Members~~~~

~~~~of the Keys and Council.~~~~

~~~~3.4 We recognise that the various aspects of our terms of reference are closely~~~~

~~~~related, and sometimes interdependent. We have attempted initially to~~~~

~~~~address them separately, first in the context of the elected Members of the~~~~

~~~~Council continuing to be elected by the Keys and, secondly, being directly~~~~

~~~~elected at a general election to Tynwald Court as a whole.~~~~

~~~~8 C/LC/gmw 3.5 However, prior to that we report on our further consideration of the option~~~~

~~~~of simply abolishing the Legislative Council.~~~~

~~~~4. ABOLITION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL~~~~

~~~~4.1 We have revisited the first of the options presented in our Interim Report, the~~~~

~~~~abolition of the Legislative Council. In the Interim Report we took the view~~~~

~~~~that the principal parliamentary functions of the Council, identified in~~~~

~~~~paragraph 3 of that Report, could theoretically be performed exclusively by~~~~

~~~~the Keys (para 4.2.1) but we considered that there were constitutional and~~~~

~~~~practical implications of adopting this approach and these were set out in~~~~

~~~~paragraph 4.~~~~

~~~~4.2 We have reached the conclusion that while these consequences do not~~~~

~~~~amount to insuperable difficulties in adopting this option they are~~~~

~~~~sufficiently significant to make its political pursuit impractical.~~~~

~~~~5. REFORM OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTED BY THE KEYS~~~~

~~~~5.1 INTRODUCTION~~~~

~~~~As indicated earlier, we offered four options, other than maintaining the~~~~

~~~~status quo, for the future rile of the Legislative Council were it to continue to~~~~

~~~~be elected by the Keys. During debate in the House on our Interim Report no~~~~

~~~~further significant option for reform was mooted, although there were some~~~~

~~~~variants of the options which we presented. Consequently, we have~~~~

~~~~9 C/LC/gmw completed our examination of the reform of the Legislative Council in the~~~~

~~~~context of the Interim Report.~~~~

~~~~Adoption of any of these options effectively implies the acceptance of the~~~~

~~~~three provisional conclusions in our Interim Report, which have been restated~~~~

~~~~in paragraph 2.4.~~~~

~~~~5.2 LIMITING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL TO REVISING PRIMARY~~~~

~~~~LEGISLATION~~~~

~~~~5.2.1 In our Interim Report we suggested that this option, in its most absolute~~~~

~~~~form, would entail the rôle of the Legislative Council being limited to~~~~

~~~~examining and reporting to the Keys on primary legislation, the adoption of~~~~

~~~~any recommended changes being a matter for the Keys (Interim Report, para~~~~

~~~~4.3.1). On any view by adopting this option the Council would cease to be~~~~

~~~~concerned with delegated legislation and the scrutiny of government policy~~~~

~~~~and administration; nor would appointment to the Isle of Man Government~~~~

~~~~be open to its Members. Effectively, the option assumes that the Legislative~~~~

~~~~Council would sit separately to perform this very limited function and not as~~~~

~~~~part of Tynwald.~~~~

~~~~5.2.2 One implication of this option is that all primary legislation would first be~~~~

~~~~considered in the Keys. Although this is in practice the present position it has~~~~

~~~~not always been so, and indeed some thirty years ago the practice was that all~~~~

~~~~Government-sponsored primary legislation was initially considered in the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council. From time to time, the Legislative Council has proposed~~~~

~~~~that some primary legislation should first be considered in the Council. The~~~~

~~~~1 0 C / L C / g m w formal position is that the Council of Ministers can instruct Government-~~~~

~~~~sponsored Bills to be introduced either in the Keys or the Council, and that~~~~

~~~~Private Members' Bills, subject to procedural requirements, may be~~~~

~~~~introduced by Members of either the Keys or the Council.~~~~

~~~~5.2.3 Such an arrangement would only be sustainable on the assumption that there~~~~

~~~~would not be a significant increase in the volume of primary legislation. The~~~~

~~~~argument for allowing Government-sponsored primary legislation to be~~~~

~~~~introduced in either Branch is that it enables the Branches to share the burden~~~~

~~~~of legislative scrutiny thus providing for a substantial volume of primary~~~~

~~~~legislation to be scrutinised adequately by the Legislature. If there were a~~~~

~~~~significant increase in the volume of primary legislation, even if it remained~~~~

~~~~sustainable to consider it all initially in the Keys, a consequence might be~~~~

~~~~formal or informal limitation on the capacity of the Keys to introduce Private~~~~

~~~~Members' Bills with, in this context, a further shift towards Executive~~~~

~~~~dominance of the legislative process. As Table A shows, it should not be~~~~

~~~~assumed that the present volume of primary legislation introduced in the~~~~

~~~~Legislature is a constant.~~~~

~~~~1 1 C/LC/gmw TABLE A~~~~

~~~~NUMBER OF BILLS ENACTED 1969 - 1998~~~~

~~~~Year * Bills enacted~~~~

1969 27 1970 26 1971 39 1972 16 1973 19 1974 37 1975 31 1976 30 1977 8 1978 15 1979 26 1980 19 1981 41 1982 16 1983 25 1984 26 1985 29 1986 51 1987 14 1988 18 1989 16 1990 19 1991 25 1992 15 1993 20 1994 12 1995 19 1996 24 1997 6 1998 12

~~~~For simplicity the year of enactment is taken as the year included in the short title~~~~

~~~~.2.4 There would also need to be some refinement of the notion of revising~~~~

~~~~primary legislation by the Legislative Council The present position is that the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council revises primary legislation in its own right as a Branch of~~~~

~~~~1 2 C/LC/gmw Tynwald. A Bill coming from the Keys may be amended in the Council and~~~~

~~~~on its return to the Keys, the amendment may be agreed, disagreed, or~~~~

~~~~disagreed with a view to a conference. Where there is an unresolved~~~~

~~~~disagreement between the Branches, the statutory position is that, where the~~~~

~~~~Council has completed its consideration of a Bill, the Keys may override the~~~~

~~~~views of the Council. This, in practice, gives the Council a capacity to delay~~~~

~~~~enactment for approximately twelve months, although the period may be~~~~

~~~~shorter.~~~~

~~~~5.2.5 This option, in its most radical form, would effectively reduce the Council~~~~

~~~~from being a Branch of Tynwald with its own legislative competence to being~~~~

~~~~a committee of the Keys. The Council would examine Bills under~~~~

~~~~consideration by the Keys and report to the Keys with recommendations for~~~~

~~~~amendment, but without the capacity formally to amend the legislation. This~~~~

~~~~would have procedural implications. For example, Bills which have been~~~~

~~~~passed by both Branches at present require to attract the signatures of a~~~~

~~~~quorum of each Branch sitting in Tynwald before they may be submitted for~~~~

~~~~Royal Assent; so, for instance, the Licensing Bill 1973 did not attract the~~~~

~~~~signatures of a quorum of the Council and consequently could not be~~~~

~~~~submitted for Royal Assent. If the Council were to be effectively a committee~~~~

~~~~of the Keys, this procedure would cease to be appropriate.~~~~

~~~~5.2.6 The question of whether the Members of the Legislative Council should lose~~~~

~~~~the capacity to introduce Private Members' Bills in the Council would also~~~~

~~~~require to be addressed in the context of this option.~~~~

~~~~13 C/LC/gmw 5.2.7 In addition to these practical considerations, the option is open to the criticism~~~~

~~~~in the words of the Honourable Member for Rushen, Sir Miles Walker, that~~~~

~~~~there would be "a danger.... of emasculating the second chamber to such an~~~~

~~~~extent that it is hardly worthwhile, that it holds little interest for people to~~~~

~~~~stand for its membership, and if that is the case then in due course I think it is~~~~

~~~~simple to imagine that the next step is quite easy, to do away with it..."~~~~

~~~~(Proceedings, K366 (24th March 1998)).~~~~

~~~~5.2.8 The implications of pursuing this option, while again not insuperable, are~~~~

~~~~substantial, would require primary legislation and are seen, both in the~~~~

~~~~short and the long term, as less politically attractive than the more radical~~~~

~~~~option o f abolishing the Council.~~~~

~~~~5.3 LIMITING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL TO REVISING PRIMARY~~~~

~~~~LEGISLATION AND SCRUTINISING DELEGATED LEGISLATION~~~~

~~~~5.3.1 This option, which again would require primary legislation, was presented in~~~~

~~~~the Interim Report, at paragraph 4.4, as one which: "would additionally~~~~

~~~~retain the capacity of the Legislative Council either to scrutinise and, where~~~~

~~~~appropriate, resolve to approve or annul delegated legislation. If the Council~~~~

~~~~were to exercise this capacity in Tynwald, under this option it would be its~~~~

~~~~only function when sitting in Tynwald Court and would thus have an~~~~

~~~~extremely limited participation in its proceedings. If the Legislative Council~~~~

~~~~were to scrutinise delegated legislation while sitting separately, it is unlikely~~~~

~~~~that the Keys would wish it to be exclusively a function of the Council and~~~~

~~~~consequently the Keys would be required to undertake similar scrutiny~~~~

~~~~sitting separately. While this would have the advantage of separate and~~~~

~~~~14 C/LC/gmw independent scrutiny of delegated legislation by the two Chambers, it may be~~~~

~~~~seen by many as somewhat over-elaborate if the Legislative Council were to~~~~

~~~~be limited to this function and the revision of primary legislation."~~~~

~~~~5.3.2 We have already considered the notion of the Legislative Council revising~~~~

~~~~primary legislation under the previous option. Here we consider some of the~~~~

~~~~implications of the Council scrutinising delegated legislation.~~~~

~~~~5.3.3 Scrutiny o f delegated legislation by the Legislative Council in Tynwald~~~~

~~~~Court~~~~

~~~~If the Legislative Council were to maintain the capacity to scrutinise, and to~~~~

~~~~approve or annul, delegated legislation in Tynwald Court, the position would~~~~

~~~~be essentially the present one. Under the existing arrangements a motion~~~~

~~~~with respect to delegated legislation which is carried in the Keys and lost in~~~~

~~~~the Council may be reconsidered at a subsequent sitting where Tynwald~~~~

~~~~Court votes on it as a whole.~~~~

~~~~Alternatively, the Legislative Council could be limited to reporting to~~~~

~~~~Tynwald on the delegated legislation without the capacity to resolve to~~~~

~~~~approve or annul the delegated legislation. It could do so either by individual~~~~

~~~~Members contributing to the debate but without a capacity to vote, or by the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council as a body making a formal report to Tynwald, again~~~~

~~~~without the capacity of its Members to vote. In the latter case, there could be~~~~

~~~~a capacity for individual Members of the Legislative Council to contribute to~~~~

~~~~the debate and to comment on the report of the Council. A procedural~~~~

~~~~variation of this, which would give somewhat more force to the deliberations~~~~

~~~~15 C/LC/gmw of the Legislative Council, would be that where the Legislative Council in a~~~~

~~~~formal report recommended that delegated legislation should not be~~~~

~~~~approved or should be annulled, the motion to approve would require an~~~~

~~~~enhanced majority of the Keys to carry and there would be a requirement to~~~~

~~~~move a motion to annul.~~~~

~~~~As we indicate below, these arrangements would result in a rather untidy procedure~~~~

~~~~in Tynwald Court as the Legislative Council would be present for some of the~~~~

~~~~business of the Court only.~~~~

~~~~A Scrutiny o f delegated legislation by the Legislative Council sitting~~~~

~~~~separately~~~~

~~~~Were the Legislative Council to be given the capacity while sitting separately to~~~~

~~~~scrutinise delegated legislation and, where appropriate, to resolve to approve~~~~

~~~~or annul the delegated legislation, there would be a number of implications.~~~~

~~~~First, as we indicated in our Interim Report, it would be unlikely that the~~~~

~~~~Keys would be willing to agree to this while not having the same capacity~~~~

~~~~itself. Secondly, if both Branches were to scrutinise delegated legislation~~~~

~~~~sitting separately and each have the capacity to resolve to approve or annul~~~~

~~~~the delegated legislation, there would be a potential for conflict between the~~~~

~~~~Branches. At Westminster, primary legislation commonly provides that~~~~

~~~~delegated legislation must be approved by both Houses or may be annulled~~~~

~~~~by either House. Such arrangements may not be acceptable in a Manx context~~~~

~~~~as it would remove the present capacity of the Keys to override a~~~~

~~~~determination of the Legislative Council at a subsequent sitting. Thirdly,~~~~

~~~~there is a major exception to the general Westminster practice, in that~~~~

~~~~16 C/LC/gmw primary legislation which empowers the making of delegated legislation~~~~

~~~~relating to finance usually requires only the approval of, or may only be~~~~

~~~~annulled by, the directly elected House of Commons. Apart from other~~~~

~~~~considerations, this approach might be adopted if the Branches were to~~~~

~~~~consider delegated legislation sitting separately.~~~~

~~~~5.3.5 Parliamentary considerations~~~~

~~~~This option is based on the notion that the Legislative Council should have a~~~~

~~~~rile in the enactment of primary and delegated legislation, but have no rile in~~~~

~~~~approving or scrutinising government policy and administration, or in the~~~~

~~~~vote and appropriation of public monies. However, drawing such~~~~

~~~~distinctions, either in principle or procedurally, does not of itself address the~~~~

~~~~fact that government policy is not infrequently implemented by means of~~~~

~~~~legislation. It is not very meaningful, for example, to grant the Legislative~~~~

~~~~Council the capacity to amend primary legislation but deny it the capacity to~~~~

~~~~scrutinise and approve the policy which the legislation seeks to implement.~~~~

~~~~To put it another way, if the Legislative Council has a capacity to amend~~~~

~~~~legislation it effectively has a capacity to affect policy. Again, if the Legislative~~~~

~~~~Council is granted the capacity to scrutinise and, where appropriate, to~~~~

~~~~resolve to approve or annul delegated legislation, and it does so on the basis~~~~

~~~~of the merits of the delegated legislation rather than on its technical aspects, it~~~~

~~~~is effectively affecting policy.~~~~

~~~~5.3.6 This option, limiting the functions of the Council to revising primary~~~~

~~~~legislation and scrutinising delegated legislation, has procedural implications.~~~~

~~~~17 C/LC/gmw Some of these implications have been considered at paragraphs 5.2.5, 5.3.3~~~~

~~~~and 5.3.4.~~~~

~~~~However, the principal procedural implication is that this option removes the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council from the deliberations of Tynwald Court, either totally or~~~~

~~~~for all the business of the Court other than consideration of delegated~~~~

~~~~legislation. The parliamentary effect of this would be that the Keys would~~~~

~~~~consider all parliamentary business other than legislative business. As~~~~

~~~~regards legislative business, the Keys would, on any of the variations of this~~~~

~~~~option, have the capacity to override the decisions of the Legislative Council~~~~

~~~~with respect to primary legislation within approximately twelve months and~~~~

~~~~to override decisions of the Legislative Council on delegated legislation within~~~~

~~~~six months.~~~~

~~~~5.3.7 In the final analysis we consider that this option would set parameters on~~~~

~~~~the competence of the Legislative Council which lack a convincing~~~~

~~~~constitutional rationality.~~~~

~~~~5.4 LIMITING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL TO REVISING PRIMARY~~~~

~~~~LEGISLATION, SCRUTINISING DELEGATED LEGISLATION AND SCRUTINISING~~~~

~~~~GOVERNMENT POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION~~~~

~~~~5.4.1 This option, which would also require primary legislation, was presented in~~~~

~~~~the Interim Report, at paragraph 4.5, in the following terms:~~~~

~~~~"Adopting this option effectively assumes that the present functions and~~~~

~~~~capacities of the Members of the Legislative Council would be maintained~~~~

~~~~18 C/LC/gmw with two restrictions. They are that Members of the Council would not have~~~~

~~~~a capacity to consider the vote and appropriation of public monies, which~~~~

~~~~would be a matter exclusively for the Keys either sitting separately or sitting~~~~

~~~~in Tynwald Court, and that Members of the Legislative Council would not~~~~

~~~~have the capacity to be appointed to any post in the Isle of Man~~~~

~~~~Government/'.~~~~

~~~~5.4.2 There are a number of considerations in adopting this option. First, the~~~~

~~~~underlying rationale for removing the capacity to vote and appropriate public~~~~

~~~~monies is that this should be a matter solely for a directly elected legislative~~~~

~~~~chamber. Secondly, as reflected in the Interim Report, were the Keys to~~~~

~~~~exercise the competence to vote and appropriate public monies in Tynwald~~~~

~~~~Court, the determination would be by the Keys re-flagged as Tynwald Court.~~~~

~~~~Thirdly, the proposal would have the effect of the Legislative Council having~~~~

~~~~the capacity to approve government policy but being be denied the capacity~~~~

~~~~to approve the resources to carry it out. To put it in another way, the Keys~~~~

~~~~would have a subsequent financial veto on the approval of policy by Tynwald~~~~

~~~~Court. Fourthly, there would again be procedural untidiness in Tynwald~~~~

~~~~Court in adopting this approach. So, for example, it would not be possible to~~~~

~~~~table a motion in Tynwald Court which sought both the approval of a policy~~~~

~~~~and of the appropriation of public monies to implement it.~~~~

~~~~5.4.3 It may, however, be possible to proceed on a modified form of the~~~~

~~~~provisional conclusion in our Interim Report that the vote and appropriation~~~~

~~~~of public monies should be in the exclusive competence of the Keys. So, for~~~~

~~~~example, the Legislative Council might retain the capacity to vote on such~~~~

~~~~matters, provided that where Tynwald Court voted as one body (following~~~~

~~~~19 C / L C / g m w such a motion having been previously carried in the Keys but lost in the~~~~

~~~~Council) the required vote in Tynwald was a majority of the Members~~~~

~~~~present and voting, such a vote including the votes of at least 13 Members of~~~~

~~~~the Keys.~~~~

~~~~5.4.4 The rationale of excluding Members of the Council from government~~~~

~~~~appointments is that such appointments should only be open to directly~~~~

~~~~elected Members of Tynwald. There are other considerations. First, if there~~~~

~~~~were no ministers, members of departments, or chairmen or members of~~~~

~~~~statutory boards in the Legislative Council, the Government would be at~~~~

~~~~some disadvantage in promoting its primary legislation in the Council and, if~~~~

~~~~the Branches were to consider delegated legislation separately, there would~~~~

~~~~be similar difficulties for the Government in promoting delegated legislation~~~~

~~~~in the Council. Secondly, if all government posts were to be held by~~~~

~~~~Members of the Keys the number of such posts would probably have to be~~~~

~~~~significantly reduced. This would have considerable implications for the~~~~

~~~~structure and management of the Government.~~~~

~~~~5.4.5 It appears to us that this option for reform of the Legislative Council would~~~~

~~~~bring in its train some constitutional difficulty. This proposed rile for the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council would tend to concentrate responsibility for developing~~~~

~~~~government policy and conducting government administration in the Keys~~~~

~~~~and the rile of scrutinising government policy and administration in the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council. This would tend to emphasise the parliamentary rile of~~~~

~~~~the Legislative Council (to the institutional detriment of the Keys), together~~~~

~~~~2 0 C/LC/gmw with the prospect that critical public opinion might coalesce in the Legislative~~~~

~~~~Council and its members.~~~~

~~~~5.4.6 On balance we consider that this option provides a more attractive~~~~

~~~~framework for the reform of the Legislative Council as a parliamentary~~~~

~~~~chamber, although it would carry implications which may be unacceptable~~~~

~~~~for the Keys and the size and structure o f the Isle o f Man Government~~~~

~~~~5.5 LIMITING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL TO REVISING PRIMARY~~~~

~~~~LEGISLATION, SCRUTINISING DELEGATED LEGISLATION, SCRUTINISING~~~~

~~~~GOVERNMENT POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION, AND MAINTAINING THE~~~~

~~~~CAPACITY OF ITS MEMBERS TO BE APPOINTED TO POSTS IN THE ISLE OF MAN~~~~

~~~~GOVERNMENT, OTHER THAN AS MINISTERS.~~~~

~~~~5.5.1 This option, which again would require amendment, albeit limited, of~~~~

~~~~primary legislation, was presented in the Interim Report, at paragraph 4.6 in~~~~

~~~~the following terms:~~~~

~~~~"This option would effectively maintain the status quo with two restrictions.~~~~

~~~~These reflect our unanimous provisional conclusions that the voting and~~~~

~~~~appropriation of public monies should be exclusively a matter for the Keys~~~~

~~~~and that Members of the Legislative Council should not have the capacity to~~~~

~~~~be appointed as Ministers of the Isle of Man Government.".~~~~

~~~~5.5.2 Removing the capacity of Members of the Legislative Council to be appointed~~~~

~~~~as Ministers of the Isle of Man Government is again based on the rationale~~~~

~~~~that such posts should be held only by directly elected Members of Tynwald.~~~~

~~~~2 1 C/LC/gmw 5.5.3 The consequences of this option are similar, although less pronounced and therefore~~~~

~~~~more generally attractive, to those set out in respect of the previous option.~~~~

~~~~Consequently, we recommend this option as the preferred option should the~~~~

~~~~Members of the Legislative Council, other than the ex officio Members,~~~~

~~~~continue to be elected by the House of Keys.~~~~

~~~~5.5.4 Adopting this option has implications for the membership of the Legislative Council,~~~~

~~~~and also for the remuneration of Members of the Council. These are considered in~~~~

~~~~paragraphs 5.6 and 5.7.~~~~

~~~~5.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL~~~~

~~~~5.6.1 The Presiding Officer of the Legislative Council~~~~

~~~~At present, Tynwald Court and the House of Keys each elect their own~~~~

~~~~presiding officer, and we do not suggest that there should be any change in~~~~

~~~~these electoral processes.~~~~

~~~~The President of Tynwald is, however, ex officio the presiding officer of the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council.~~~~

~~~~We recognise that this was the legislative solution adopted when Tynwald~~~~

~~~~Court moved to electing its presiding officer, no doubt to avoid an~~~~

~~~~establishment of three presiding officers in a parliament of 35 Members.~~~~

~~~~2 2 C/LC/gmw Nevertheless, whatever competence is given to a reformed Legislative Council~~~~

~~~~largely elected by the Keys, we see the possibility of a conflict of interest for a Member~~~~

~~~~holding the offices of both presiding officer of Tynwald and of the Legislative Council~~~~

~~~~Consequently, we recommend that there be separate election of a presiding~~~~

~~~~officer of Tynwald and a presiding officer of the Legislative Council. The~~~~

~~~~Members of the Legislative Council would thus elect a presiding officer~~~~

~~~~from one of their number in a manner which they considered appropriate.~~~~

~~~~An establishment of three presiding officers might well also have significant~~~~

~~~~institutional advantages. These are explored at paragraph 62.7, and the analysis~~~~

~~~~there is equally applicable to a Council which is largely elected by the Keys.~~~~

~~~~.2 Crown appointed ex officio Members o f the Legislative Council~~~~

~~~~The offices of HM Attorney General for the Isle of Man and of Lord Bishop of~~~~

~~~~Sodor and Man are appointed by the Crown and the appointees sit ex officio as~~~~

~~~~Members of the Legislative Council, and as a consequence as ex officio~~~~

~~~~Members of Tynwald Court. HM Attorney General for the Isle of Man, by~~~~

~~~~virtue of the terms of appointment, would no doubt advise both the Council~~~~

~~~~and Tynwald Court of the legal view of the Crown in respect of business~~~~

~~~~before the Manx Legislature, and certainly advises the Legislature of the legal~~~~

~~~~view of the Isle of Man Government on such matters. The Lord Bishop~~~~

~~~~would be expected to draw the attention of the Tynwald Court and the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council to the spiritual dimension of matters coming before each~~~~

~~~~Chamber. However, the formal position is that HM Attorney General and~~~~

~~~~23 C/LC/gmw the Lord Bishop, with one exception, enjoy the same rights and privileges in~~~~

~~~~the Chamber which may be exercised by any other Member of Tynwald, and~~~~

~~~~may therefore speak to any aspect of any matter coming before the~~~~

~~~~Legislature. The exception is that HM Attorney General no longer has the~~~~

~~~~right to vote in proceedings of either the Council or Tynwald Court. This is a~~~~

~~~~right still enjoyed by the Lord Bishop in both Chambers.~~~~

~~~~On the analysis of these two offices, the holders of which are expected to offer~~~~

~~~~important advice and guidance to the Legislature but are appointed by the Crown~~~~

~~~~rather than elected by the people of the Isle of Man, we see no justification for the~~~~

~~~~Lord Bishop to continue to have, relative to HM Attorney Generalf enhanced~~~~

~~~~parliamentary rights.~~~~

~~~~Consequently, we recommend that legislation be introduced to remove the~~~~

~~~~right of the Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man to vote in both the Legislative~~~~

~~~~Council and in Tynwald Court.~~~~

~~~~The ex officio membership of the Legislature to which the Lord Bishop of~~~~

~~~~Sodor and Man remains entitled, historically as the last baron on the Island, raises another question for the future. The modern rationale for the Lord~~~~

Bishop continuing to be an ex officio Member of the Legislature is that he is the senior representative of the established Church on the Island, but some may wish to argue that this ex officio membership of the Legislature should rotate amongst the leaders of the other principal Christian denominations which are

~~~~significantly represented on the Island.~~~~

~~~~24 C/LC/gmw 5.6.3 Elected Members~~~~

~~~~In the course of our inquiry concerns have been expressed, which we share,~~~~

~~~~over the common public perception that election of Members to the Council~~~~

~~~~by the Keys appears to be an unnecessarily long and tortuous process.~~~~

~~~~We recommend that the Standing Orders Committee of the Keys should~~~~

~~~~consider and report on the present arrangements, in particular the length of~~~~

~~~~the statutory notice period when making nominations and the discretion~~~~

~~~~exercisable by Mr Speaker to summon sittings of the Keys for the sole~~~~

~~~~purpose of election to the Council.~~~~

~~~~In the context of the Members of the Legislative Council, other than the~~~~

~~~~ex officio Members, continuing to be elected by the Keys, it may be noted that~~~~

~~~~we recommend a reduction in the capacity of the Legislative Council (para 5.5)~~~~

~~~~and that we contemplate the possibility of a reduction in the remuneration of~~~~

~~~~Members of the Council relative to Members of the Keys (paras 5.7.2, 5.7.3).~~~~

~~~~Given the prospect of both reduced competence and reduced remuneration, it~~~~

~~~~may be in the interest of the Legislature as a whole, and in the public interest,~~~~

~~~~to encourage aspiring members of the Council of appropriate quality and~~~~

~~~~ability by giving consideration to extending the period of tenure of elected~~~~

~~~~Members of the Council. This would require primary legislation.~~~~

~~~~25 C / L C / g m w 5.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REMUNERATION OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE~~~~

~~~~COUNCIL~~~~

~~~~5.7.1 The Presiding Officer of the Legislative Council~~~~

~~~~In paragraph 5.6.1 we recommend that the presiding officer of Tynwald~~~~

~~~~Court should no longer be ex officio the presiding officer of the Legislative~~~~

~~~~Council, and that the Council elect one of its Members as presiding officer.~~~~

~~~~Apart from the payment to the incumbent of this post of an additional sum to~~~~

~~~~the basic salary of a Member of the Legislative Council there should be no~~~~

~~~~other financial or infrastructure implications of our recommendation.~~~~

~~~~We note that the additional sums payable to the presiding officer of Tynwald~~~~

~~~~Court and the presiding officer of the Keys differ at present. We also note~~~~

~~~~that the Joint Committee on Remuneration of Certain Public Servants will be~~~~

~~~~reporting on the findings of the Commission on the Remuneration of~~~~

~~~~Members of Tynwald, and perhaps it would be most appropriate for a firm~~~~

~~~~recommendation on the remuneration of the presiding officer of the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council to follow that report.~~~~

~~~~5.7.2 Elected Members~~~~

~~~~We consider that, were the elected Members of the Legislative Council to~~~~

~~~~continue to be elected by the Keys, there is a cogent argument for some~~~~

~~~~reduction in the remuneration of Members of the Legislative Council relative~~~~

~~~~to the remuneration received by Members of the Keys. Depending on the~~~~

~~~~26 C/LC/gmw bases of the calculation, a case may be made for there being a very limited~~~~

~~~~disparity in the time devoted by Members of the Council and the Keys to~~~~

~~~~their parliamentary duties, in their own chamber and in Tynwald. However,~~~~

~~~~whatever the extent to which Members of the Council undertake them in~~~~

~~~~practice, constituency duties are in principle a matter for the Members of the~~~~

~~~~Keys who, unlike the Council, are elected to represent their constituents.~~~~

~~~~Furthermore, subject to Royal Assent, Members of the Keys have the~~~~

~~~~ultimate responsibility for the substance of enacted primary legislation.~~~~

~~~~.3 Consequently we believe that the remuneration of the Members of the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council should be in the region of 15% less than the remuneration~~~~

~~~~that membership of the Keys attracts, on the grounds that this would reflect~~~~

~~~~Council Members' lack of formal constituency responsibilities. A differential~~~~

~~~~of this magnitude would avoid major implications,for the pension rights of a~~~~

~~~~Member of the Keys elected to the Legislative Council. It would also~~~~

~~~~probably serve to reduce unnecessary constitutional tension between the~~~~

~~~~Council and Keys which might arise were Members of the Council to attract a~~~~

~~~~substantially lower parliamentary salary than Members of the Keys and~~~~

~~~~might therefore come to be drawn from a significantly more affluent sector~~~~

~~~~of society than the Keys. Again, it may be appropriate for a firm~~~~

~~~~recommendation on this matter to await the report of the Joint Committee~~~~

~~~~on the Remuneration of Certain Public Servants on the findings of the~~~~

~~~~Commission on the Remuneration of Members of Tynwald.~~~~

~~~~27 C / L C / g m w 6. A LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN A DIRECTLY ELECTED TYNWALD~~~~

~~~~6.1 INTRODUCTION~~~~

~~~~6.1.1 In essence, the nature of the democratic legitimacy of a legislative assembly~~~~

~~~~must be the justification for the scope of its competence and, in a~~~~

~~~~multi-cameral legislature, it may also influence the effectiveness of its~~~~

~~~~parliamentary performance. At present, no doubt as a product of a series of~~~~

~~~~political compromises in the past, the Legislative Council has a democratic~~~~

~~~~foundation which is democracy at one remove. The elected Members of the~~~~

~~~~Council are elected by the Keys, who are themselves elected by the people of~~~~

~~~~the Isle of Man. The political compromises were at the time a democratic~~~~

~~~~advance. However, the arrangement lies less easily with modern notions of~~~~

~~~~democracy which place greater emphasis on a confidence in the democratic~~~~

~~~~choice of the electorate than on a need for institutional paternalism, whether~~~~

~~~~it stems from the Crown, its representatives and nominees, or from the~~~~

~~~~choice of another directly elected body, in this case the Keys.~~~~

~~~~6.1.2 Consequently, if the elected Members of the Legislative Council continue to be~~~~

~~~~elected by the Keys there will continue to be pressure, perhaps increasingly so, to~~~~

~~~~limit both the legislative and executive competence of the Members of the Council~~~~

~~~~This is reflected both in the provisional conclusions of our Interim Report and~~~~

~~~~. perhaps indeed by the very establishment of this Committee. It is of course~~~~

~~~~comforting for some to be satisfied with the existing arrangements, but the~~~~

~~~~consequence is likely to be either to stultify constitutional and parliamentary~~~~

~~~~development or to create the sort of political tensions to which we refer.~~~~

~~~~Neither are desirable consequences for the Isle of Man, which has increasingly~~~~

~~~~28 C/LC/gmw to direct both parliamentary and governmental attention to its place in an~~~~

~~~~inter-dependent and sometimes hostile world.~~~~

~~~~6.1.3 We would anticipate that, were the Keys to remain the electoral college for the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council, in the short to medium term the competence of the Legislative~~~~

~~~~Council would be eroded by the abolition of its competence to consider Bills prior to~~~~

~~~~their consideration by the Keys and of the competence of its individual Members to~~~~

~~~~introduce legislation. It would probably be further eroded by abolishing Council~~~~

~~~~participation both in the nomination of a Chief Minister and its capacity to vote and~~~~

~~~~appropriate public monies, and also by appointments as ministers in the Isle of Man~~~~

~~~~Government being statutorily limited to Members of the House of Keys.~~~~

~~~~6.1.4 An alternative is direct election of Tynwald Court as a whole by the people of the Isle~~~~

~~~~of Man at regular general elections. This would provide for a Manx parliament with~~~~

~~~~increased institutional vigour, without re-establishing constitutional and political~~~~

~~~~tensions between the two Branches of Tynwald; and it is suggested that this vigour~~~~

~~~~would reflect itself in the Isle of Man Government.~~~~

~~~~We consider in paragraphs 6.2 - 6.4 how such a direct election of the whole of~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court might operate, and consider some of its institutional~~~~

~~~~consequences.~~~~

~~~~29 C/LC/gmw 6.2 DIRECT ELECTIO N OF TYNW ALD COURT~~~~

~~~~6.2.1 Introduction~~~~

~~~~The direct election of Tynwald Court as one body would emphasise the~~~~

~~~~parliamentary status of Tynwald. The proposed arrangements which we~~~~

~~~~outline below would effectively shift the parliamentary emphasis within~~~~

~~~~Tynwald. From being a tricameral legislature, with a plenary body and two~~~~

~~~~branches, it would in practice be a unicameral legislature, Tynwald Court,~~~~

~~~~with two "legislative committees", the Keys and Council, having as their sole~~~~

~~~~function the consideration of primary legislation.~~~~

~~~~6.2.2 Election of Tynwald Court~~~~

~~~~We envisage that at a general election 32 Members would be elected to~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court. At its first meeting after a general election, the 32 elected~~~~

~~~~Members would elect one of their number as a presiding officer. We would~~~~

~~~~propose that the presiding officer should have a deliberative, but not a~~~~

~~~~casting, vote in Tynwald Court and that the presiding officer would be~~~~

~~~~debarred from holding any Government appointment.~~~~

~~~~At the second sitting of Tynwald Court after a general election the Chief~~~~

~~~~Minister would be nominated by the existing statutory procedure, by the~~~~

~~~~elected Members of Tynwald.~~~~

~~~~At the same sitting and immediately following the nomination of the Chief~~~~

~~~~Minister, the elected Members would elect seven of their number to sit in the~~~~

~~~~30 C / L C / g m w Legislative Council. The Members elected to serve in the Legislative Council~~~~

~~~~will be required to take office, on the same principle that requires Members~~~~

~~~~elected to committees of Tynwald to serve on them. The remaining 24~~~~

~~~~elected Members would sit in the Keys. It would be at this stage that~~~~

~~~~Members would become entitled to the designations of, respectively, "MLC"~~~~

~~~~and "MHK".~~~~

~~~~If all the Members of Tynwald Court, other than the ex officio Members, are~~~~

~~~~going to be elected directly in the same manner and the Members of the Keys~~~~

~~~~and Council are envisaged as having the same competence, it may be argued~~~~

~~~~that the number of Members sitting in the two Branches should, as far as~~~~

~~~~possible, be equalised. There would be an historical foundation for the Keys~~~~

~~~~having 16 Members representing the Isle of Man which was the case when~~~~

~~~~the Keys was a representative legislative assembly for the more extensive~~~~

~~~~Kingdom of Mann and the Isles. While this may have an historical basis and a~~~~

~~~~contemporary utilitarian rationale, we consider that, at this stage of the~~~~

~~~~institutional development of our Legislature, departing from the traditional~~~~

~~~~number of 24 Keys would be unlikely to attract widespread support. We~~~~

~~~~have below addressed procedural implications of retaining a numerical~~~~

~~~~imbalance of the Members of the Keys and Council.~~~~

~~~~The final procedural aspect of the election of Tynwald Court would be that both the Keys and the Council would each elect one of their number as~~~~

~~~~presiding officer who, like the presiding officer in Tynwald Court, would~~~~

~~~~have a deliberate but not a casting vote and would be debarred from holding~~~~

~~~~a Government appointment.~~~~

~~~~31 C/LC/gmw 3 Obviously the lead time for replacing the present arrangements by the~~~~

~~~~election of all elected Members of Tynwald at a general election would be~~~~

~~~~considerable. It will be important to have careful and extensive consultation~~~~

~~~~on the necessary primary legislation, which would no doubt include interim~~~~

~~~~arrangements. In our view, this consideration takes the urgency out of~~~~

~~~~addressing the question of whether the general election to Tynwald Court~~~~

~~~~should be from single member, multi-member or Island-wide constituencies.~~~~

~~~~This is a matter which would be best considered separately from the future of~~~~

~~~~the Legislative Council as it raises rather different, and broader, issues. The~~~~

~~~~same is true of establishing the constituencies from which Members would be~~~~

~~~~elected, and indeed the procedure for their election. Similarly, we do not~~~~

~~~~comment at this stage on the most appropriate procedure for the elected~~~~

~~~~Members of Tynwald to elect the Members to the Legislative Council. We~~~~

~~~~would expect that in due course this would be the subject of a report from the~~~~

~~~~Standing Orders Committee of Tynwald.~~~~

~~~~4 The roles of the Keys and Council sitting separately~~~~

~~~~We envisage the role of both the Keys and the Legislative Council sitting~~~~

~~~~separately to be to consider, amend and enact primary legislation. Each~~~~

~~~~Branch would do so in a manner which its Members considered appropriate.~~~~

~~~~Subject to their relative numerical strength and the procedure which we~~~~

~~~~propose below for resolving differences of opinion, the two Branches would~~~~

~~~~have equal authority in this regard. Under this arrangement we assume that~~~~

~~~~public Bills promoted by the Isle of Man Government would in practice be~~~~

~~~~capable of being introduced into either Branch at the request of the Council of~~~~

~~~~32 C/LC/gmw Ministers, and that the Members of both Branches might introduce Private~~~~

~~~~Members' Bills.~~~~

~~~~6.2.5 Public Bills, including Private Members' Bills, having been considered and~~~~

~~~~passed in one Branch, would then be considered in the other. Where an~~~~

~~~~amendment to a Bill passed by one Branch was resisted in the other, we~~~~

~~~~suggest that the procedure for resolving this should initially be a conference~~~~

~~~~between the two Branches and ultimately a reference of the Bill to Tynwald~~~~

~~~~Court where the matter would be resolved by the Court voting as one body.~~~~

~~~~As a consequence, the view of the majority of the elected Members of~~~~

~~~~Tynwald would prevail. Again, we would expect that in due course the~~~~

~~~~Standing Orders Committees would consider and report on the detailed~~~~

~~~~procedural arrangements for implementing this,~~~~

~~~~6.2.6 Sittings of Tynwald Court~~~~

~~~~Under this arrangement all parliamentary business, other than the~~~~

~~~~consideration of primary legislation, would be considered by Tynwald Court,~~~~

~~~~and determined by a majority of the elected Members present, and voting as~~~~

~~~~one body. This would include consideration of delegated legislation, and~~~~

~~~~occasional but important matters, such as the nomination of the Chief~~~~

~~~~Minister. It would also include parliamentary procedures for the scrutiny of~~~~

~~~~the Executive, so that question time would become exclusively a matter for~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court, as would the establishment of standing and select~~~~

~~~~committees for purposes other than consideration of Bills. We envisage, that~~~~

~~~~where a division in Tynwald resulted in a tied vote the motion would be lost,~~~~

~~~~but the mover would be entitled to table the motion at a specified subsequent~~~~

~~~~sitting for a further debate and a further division. Again, we anticipate that~~~~

~~~~33 C / L C / g m w the Standing Orders Committee of Tynwald would in due course consider~~~~

~~~~and report on the procedural implications.~~~~

~~~~With respect to committees, and without prejudice to other existing~~~~

~~~~committees, we would envisage Tynwald Court (i) retaining the present~~~~

~~~~Standing Committees on Expenditure and Public Accounts ' and on~~~~

~~~~Constitutional Matters, (ii) establishing a standing committee to scrutinise~~~~

~~~~both European Union legislation and domestic delegated legislation, on the~~~~

~~~~basis of the recommendations in the Report of the Select Committee on the~~~~

~~~~Need for a Mechanism to Scrutinise the Policies and Activities of Government,~~~~

~~~~published in November 1992, and which were approved in principle in March~~~~

~~~~1993, and (iii) establishing a standing committee to scrutinise the policy and~~~~

~~~~administration of the Government.~~~~

~~~~We recognise that these proposals which underline, and indeed enhance, the~~~~

~~~~parliamentary capacity of Tynwald yet again draw attention to the manner in~~~~

~~~~which we vote in Tynwald Court. In consequence, we would expect the~~~~

~~~~Standing Orders Committee of Tynwald to revisit the question of~~~~

~~~~simultaneous electronic voting in Tynwald Court and report to the Court as~~~~

~~~~an aspect of our broader proposals.~~~~

~~~~6.2.7 We also recognise that this proposal for a directly-elected 32 Member~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court, while not original, may be considered innovative and, by~~~~

~~~~some, radical. If adopted it would, however, make it unnecessary to pursue~~~~

~~~~the three provisional conclusions in our Interim Report. Were all Members of~~~~

~~~~Tynwald directly elected and to vote as one body when sitting in Tynwald~~~~

~~~~34 C/LC/gmw Court, it would no longer be inappropriate for the Members of the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council to vote and appropriate public monies, to participate in~~~~

~~~~the nomination of a Chief Minister and to be appointed as ministers of the Isle~~~~

~~~~of Man Government.~~~~

~~~~6.2.8 A directly elected 32 Member Tynwald Court is a proposal which may have~~~~

~~~~other advantages. For example, one consequence would be that all Bills~~~~

~~~~before the Branches and business before Tynwald would fall at a dissolution,~~~~

~~~~which many may feel to be a good parliamentary discipline. Also, if there~~~~

~~~~were to be three presiding officers independent of the government of the~~~~

~~~~day, there would be an opportunity for creating a parliamentary business~~~~

~~~~committee, together with ministers and other members of the Isle of Man~~~~

~~~~Government, to determine the balance of sittings between Tynwald Court~~~~

~~~~and the Branches and the business coming before both the Court and the~~~~

~~~~Branches.~~~~

~~~~6.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL~~~~

~~~~With respect to presiding officers and ex officio Members, our observations at~~~~

~~~~paragraph 5.6 on the implications for the membership of the Legislative~~~~

~~~~Council if the elected Members were to continue to be elected by the Keys~~~~

~~~~apply equally to a Legislative Council which is part of a directly elected~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court.~~~~

~~~~35 C/LC/gmw 6.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REMUNERATION OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE~~~~

~~~~COUNCIL~~~~

~~~~The Members of a Legislative Council which is part of a directly elected~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court would be elected, and have the same responsibilities to the~~~~

~~~~electorate, as their colleagues sitting in the House of Keys. Consequently/~~~~

~~~~there would appear to be no justification for creating any differential in the~~~~

~~~~remuneration of Members of the Council and the Keys.~~~~

~~~~7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS~~~~

~~~~7.1 We suggest in this Report that the democratic imperative is the foundation~~~~

~~~~for the three provisional conclusions in our interim Report, which are~~~~

~~~~restated at paragraph 2.4. In respect of the matters addressed in those~~~~

~~~~conclusions, we consider that these must in a modern democracy be matters~~~~

~~~~which are solely for the determination of those representatives who are~~~~

~~~~directly elected by the people. On that ground, if no other, we believe that~~~~

~~~~there is a contemporary need for reform of the Legislative Council.~~~~

~~~~7.2 The future of the Council, in essence, turns on its democratic legitimacy. If~~~~

~~~~elected Members of the Council were to continue to be elected by the House~~~~

~~~~of Keys, we believe that the capacity of the Council should be curtailed to~~~~

~~~~comply with the three provisional conclusions of our Interim Report.~~~~

~~~~If the elected Members of the Council are to continue to be so elected, we~~~~

~~~~recommend that:~~~~

~~~~36 C / L C / g m w (i) the nomination of the Chief Minister should be exclusively a matter~~~~

~~~~for the Keys; and~~~~

~~~~(ii) the capacity of the Council and its Members should be reduced by~~~~

~~~~abolishing the capacity of the Council to vote and appropriate public~~~~

~~~~monies, and removing the capacity of its Members to be appointed as~~~~

~~~~Ministers of the Isle of Man Government as set out in paragraph 5.5;~~~~

~~~~with the consequential implications for the membership of the~~~~

~~~~Council as stated in our recommendations in paragraph 5.6 and in the~~~~

~~~~expectation that action will be taken in due course on the matters~~~~

~~~~addressed in paragraph 5.7.~~~~

~~~~7.3 However, if thé elected Members of the Legislative Council were to be directly elected~~~~

~~~~by the people, we recommend that the most appropriate form of direct election~~~~

~~~~would be for the Legislative Council to be an element of a directly elected~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court in the manner described in paragraph 6.2, with the~~~~

~~~~institutional consequences contained in paragraphs 6.3 and 6.4.~~~~

~~~~We would reiterate that, in our opinion, a directly elected Tynwald Court~~~~

~~~~would lead to an added parliamentary and governmental dynamism for the~~~~

~~~~Isle of Man. The need to assert the three provisional conclusions in our~~~~

~~~~Interim Report would fall away, as would the need for a differential in the~~~~

~~~~remuneration for Members of the Legislative Council.~~~~

~~~~7.4 Finally, we recommend the proposals for a directly elected Tynwald Court,~~~~

~~~~as set out in paragraph 7.3, should be adopted in preference to the less~~~~

~~~~radical alternative of reducing the present capacity of the Legislative~~~~

~~~~37 C / L C / g m w Council, as set out in paragraph 7.2. However, that in turn would be~~~~

~~~~preferable to maintaining the existing capacity of the Legislative Council,~~~~

~~~~which we consider does not meet modern standards of democracy.~~~~

~~~~8 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS~~~~

~~~~8.1 PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS~~~~

~~~~We recommend the proposals for a directly elected Tynwald Court, as set~~~~

~~~~out in paragraph 7.3, should be adopted in preference to the less radical~~~~

~~~~alternative of reducing the present capacity of the Legislative Council, as~~~~

~~~~set out in paragraph 7.2 (para 7.4).~~~~

~~~~If the elected Members of the Legislative Council were to be directly elected by the~~~~

~~~~people, we recommend that the most appropriate form of direct election~~~~

~~~~would be for the Legislative Council to be an element of a directly elected~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court in the manner described in paragraph 6.2, with the~~~~

~~~~institutional consequences contained in paragraph 6.3 and 6.4 (para 7.3).~~~~

~~~~If the elected Members of the Council were to continue to be elected by the House of~~~~

~~~~Keys, we recommend that:~~~~

~~~~(i) the nomination of the Chief Minister should be exclusively a matter~~~~

~~~~for the Keys; and~~~~

~~~~38 C/LC/gmw (ii) the capacity of the Council and its Members should be reduced by~~~~

~~~~abolishing the capacity of the Council to vote and appropriate public~~~~

~~~~monies, and removing the capacity of its Members to be appointed as~~~~

~~~~Ministers of the Isle of Man Government, as set out in paragraph 5.5;~~~~

~~~~with the consequential implications for the membership of the~~~~

~~~~Council as stated in our recommendations in paragraph 5.6 and in the~~~~

~~~~expectation that action will be taken in due course on the matters~~~~

~~~~addressed in paragraph 5,7(para 712).~~~~

~~~~CONSEQUENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS~~~~

~~~~If the elected Members of the Legislative Council were to continue to be elected by the~~~~

~~~~House of Keys, we recommend that:~~~~

~~~~(a) there be separate election of a presiding officer of Tynwald and a~~~~

~~~~presiding officer of the Legislative Council; with Members of the~~~~

~~~~Council electing a presiding officer from one of their number in a~~~~

~~~~manner which they consider appropriate (para 5.6.1);~~~~

~~~~(b) legislation be introduced to remove the right of the Lord Bishop of~~~~

~~~~Sodor and Man to vote in both the Legislative Council and in~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court (para 5.62); and~~~~

~~~~(c) the Standing Orders Committee of the Keys should consider and~~~~

~~~~report on the present arrangements for election of Members of the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council, in particular the length of the statutory notice~~~~

~~~~period when making nominations and the discretion exercisable by~~~~

~~~~Mr Speaker to summon sittings of the Keys for the sole purpose of~~~~

~~~~election to the Council (para 5.6.3).~~~~

~~~~39 C / L C / g m w OBSERVATIONS~~~~

~~~~If the elected Members of the Council were to continue to be elected by the Keys, we make the following observations:~~~~

~~~~(a) a firm recommendation on the remuneration of the presiding officer of~~~~

~~~~the Legislative Council should follow the Report of the Joint~~~~

~~~~Committee on the Remuneration of Certain Public Servants on the~~~~

~~~~findings of the Commission on the Remuneration of Members of~~~~

~~~~Tynwald (para 5.7.1); and~~~~

~~~~(b) the remuneration of Members of the Legislative Council should be in~~~~

~~~~the region of 15% less than the remuneration that membership of the~~~~

~~~~Keys attracts, on the grounds that this would reflect Council Members'~~~~

~~~~lack of formal constituency responsibilities, but again a firm~~~~

~~~~recommendation should await the Report of the Joint Committee on~~~~

~~~~the Remuneration of Certain Public Servants on the findings of the~~~~

~~~~Commission on the Remuneration of Members of Tynwald (para 5.7.3).~~~~

~~~~If the elected Members of the Legislative Council were to be directly elected, we make the following observations:~~~~

~~~~(a) the lead time for replacing the present arrangements by the election of~~~~

~~~~all elected Members of Tynwald at a general election would be~~~~

~~~~considerable; it would be important to have careful and extensive~~~~

~~~~consultation on the necessary primary legislation, which would no~~~~

~~~~doubt include interim arrangements (para 6.2.3);~~~~

~~~~40 C / L C / g m w (b) other associated matters (such as whether a general election to~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court should be in single Member, multi-Member of Island-~~~~

~~~~wide constituencies, establishing the constituencies and the election~~~~

~~~~procedure) raise rather different, and broader, issues which should be~~~~

~~~~considered separately (para 6.2.3);~~~~

~~~~(c) we would expect the procedure for the elected Members of Tynwald to~~~~

~~~~elect the Members of the Legislative Council to be the subject of a~~~~

~~~~report in due course from the Standing Orders Committee of Tynwald~~~~

~~~~(para 6.2.3);~~~~

~~~~(d) we would expect the detailed procedural arrangements for resolving~~~~

~~~~disagreement between the Branches on Bills, both in the Branches and~~~~

~~~~in Tynwald Court, to be the subject of reports from the Standing~~~~

~~~~Orders Committees (para 6.2.5);~~~~

~~~~(e) we would expect the Standing Orders Committee of Tynwald to report~~~~

~~~~in due course on other consequential procedural changes in sittings of~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court (para 6.2.6); and~~~~

~~~~(f) in particular, we would expect the Standing Orders Committee of~~~~

~~~~Tynwald to revisit the question of simultaneous electronic voting in~~~~

~~~~Tynwald Court and report (para 6.2.6).~~~~

~~~~Mr R E Quine MHK (Chairman)~~~~

~~~~Mrs B J Cannell MHK~~~~

~~~~Hon D C Cretney MHK~~~~

~~~~The Hon N Q Cringle SHK~~~~

~~~~June 1999 Hon S C Rodan MHK~~~~

~~~~41 C / L C / g m w~~~~

~~~~Appendix 6~~~~

~~~~Summary of the Norwegian Parliamentary System~~~~

~~~~The Norwegian Upper House The Lagting~~~~

~~~~1. Composition:~~~~

~~~~The Lagting has 41 Members who serve a four year term of office.~~~~

~~~~2. Appointment:~~~~

Following a General Election, the first meeting of the Parliament (Storting) nominates one quarter of its members to constitute the Lagting. The remainder sit as the Odelsting. Each chamber then elects its own presiding officer. Each chamber meets separately but they also meet together as the Storting for certain purposes, for example supervision of the financial affairs of the nation. In many ways this is very similar to Tynwald Court.

~~~~3. Legislative power:~~~~

If a Bill is passed by the Odelsting it is passed to the Lagting, which can reject a Bill twice, but after that the Bill will pass to the Storting, which can pass that Bill by a two thirds majority without the approval of the Lagting. In the Manx context this would be the equivalent of the Council rejecting a Bill and Tynwald Court then voting as one body over it.

~~~~ELECTIONS~~~~

~~~~STORTING~~~~

~~~~nomi nation ▼ ▼ Lagting Odelsting~~~~

~~~~Appendix 7~~~~

~~~~Summary of procedure for legislative scrutiny in Scotland and New Zealand~~~~

~~~~4/3/04 7:54 am F a c tfilc 3~~~~

~~~~Back X The Scottish Parliament~~~~

~~~~How the Scottish Parliament works~~~~

~~~~Key figures in the Scottish Parliament fCc~~~~

~~~~Towards a working Parliament~~~~

The creation of a new Scottish Parliament provided the opportunity to establish a representative body with new working practices. For example it could aim to use modern information technology throughout its operation. The new Parliament was able to adapt best practice from around the world, as well especially from

~~~~• parliaments of small countries • other devolved parliaments, such as those in Spain (e.g. Catalonia) • federal parliaments, such as those in Germany (e.g. Bavaria)~~~~

The working practices of the Parliament were devised through extensive discussion. An all party Consultative Steering Group was set up in November 1997, under Henry McLeish, the then Scottish Devolution Minister. It conducted a wide public consultation exercise and commissioned expert evidence as well as holding meetings. A report, Shaping Scotland’s Parliament, published in January 1999, contained the results of this process.

~~~~This Report included comprehensive proposals for the working of the new Parliament. Four key principles were identified:~~~~

• Sharing the power: the Scottish Parliament should embody and reflect the sharing of power between the people of Scotland, the legislators and the Scottish Executive; • Accountability: The Scottish Executive should be accountable to the Scottish Parliament and the Parliament and Executive should be accountable to the people of Scotland; • Access and participation: the Scottish Parliament should be accessible, open, responsive and develop procedures which make possible a participative approach to the development, consideration and scrutiny of policy and legislation; and • Equal opportunities: the Scottish Parliament in its operation and its appointments should recognise the need to promote equal opportunities for all.

~~~~Key figures in the Scottish Parliament~~~~

~~~~The Scottish Parliament is made up of 129 elected Members of the Scottish Parliament,~~~~

~~~~http://www.scottish.parliamcnt.uk/factfiles/ff3.htm Page 1 of 9 F actfite 3 4/3/04 7:54 am~~~~

~~~~known as MSPs. One of the MSPs is elected by the Parliament to serve as the Presiding Officer. There are also two deputy Presiding Officers.~~~~

~~~~The role of the Presiding Officer and the two deputies is to:~~~~

• Chair meetings of the Parliament • Convene and chair meetings of the Parliamentary Bureau • 'Decide on questions raised regarding the meaning of the rules for Parliamentary proceedings • Represent the Parliament in discussions with other parliamentary or governmental bodies

~~~~The party, or parties, with the majority of seats in the Parliament forms the Scottish government, known as the Scottish Executive. This is made up of~~~~

• The First Minister. The MSPs select a nominee who is formally appointed by The Queen. As head of the Scottish Executive, the First Minister has a direct relationship with the Sovereign in appointing ministers, law officers and judges of the Court of Session. The First Minister is in effect Scotland’s counterpart of the Prime Minister in the UK Parliament. • The Scottish Law Officers. There are two Scottish Law Officers, the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor General for Scotland who are part of the Scottish Executive. They advise the Scottish Executive on legal matters and represent its interest in court. The Lord Advocate is head of the systems of criminal prosecution and investigation of deaths in Scotland. Both are appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the First Minister, made with the approval of the Scottish Parliament. Since their work is highly specialised, it may not be possible to appoint them from amongst the elected MSPs. If this is case, they can still participate in the work of the Parliament but cannot vote. • The Scottish Ministers are appointed by the First Minister who determines the number of Ministers and their responsibilities, also known as portfolios. The First Minister can appoint Junior Ministers to assist the Scottish Ministers with government business as well.

~~~~http://www.scottish.parlinment.uk/foclfiles/ff3.hlm Page 2 of 9 F a c tfile 3 4/3/04 7;54 am~~~~

The work of the Parliament is supported by its own staff, headed by the Clerk/ Chief Executive of the Parliament. These officials are employed by the Parliament itself, so, while they are like the government’s civil servants, they are independent of the government and act impartially solely on behalf of the Parliament. There are many groups of staff performing a wide range of tasks, from clerks (who advise MSPs on detailed matters of parliamentary procedure) to security and IT staff. The Clerk, as the Parliament’s most senior official, has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring it operates smoothly and efficiently.

~~~~The full working arrangements for the Parliament are set out in the Standing Orders. These contain the rules that regulate the proceedings of the Parliament.~~~~

~~~~Working practices~~~~

~~~~The Parliament works in two main ways, through~~~~

~~~~• full meetings (known as "a meeting of the Parliament" which all 129 members can attend) and • committee meetings (smaller groups).~~~~

~~~~What is a Parliamentary session?~~~~

A full session of the Parliament normally lasts for four years from the date of a general election. After this the Parliament is dissolved and a general election is held. General elections can be called before the four years have lapsed but this can only happen under certain specified circumstances, for example if there is a vote of no confidence in the Executive.

~~~~The first full session of the new Scottish Parliament began on 12 May 1999 which was the date of its first meeting after the general election.~~~~

~~~~What are Parliamentary years?~~~~

~~~~The session is divided into Parliamentary years for the purpose of arranging a calendar of meetings and business. These last for twelve months.~~~~

The first Parliamentary year is the year beginning with the date of the first meeting of the Parliament following a general election. Thus the first Parliamentary year runs from 12 May 1999 as well. The second, third and fourth Parliamentary years will run from 12 May 2000, 12 May 2001 and 12 May 2002.

~~~~When does the Parliament meet?~~~~

~~~~Normally the Parliamentary year is divided into two periods~~~~

~~~~• when the Parliament or its committees are operating, known as "sitting days" and • when the Parliament is not operating, known as "recess" (some committees may meet during this time).~~~~

~~~~The dates for the recess are decided with regard to when schools in any part of Scotland are on holiday.~~~~

~~~~http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/faclfiles/ff3.Klm Page 3 of 9 F a c tfilc 3 4/3/04 7:54 am~~~~

~~~~The Standing Orders state that Parliament can meet on any sitting day during a normal Parliamentary week, which is:~~~~

~~~~• Mondays: 14:30-17:30 • Tuesdays-Thursdays: 09:30-17:30 • Fridays: 09:30-12:30.~~~~

~~~~The full Parliament does not meet when committees are sitting so in practice the hours are divided up as follows:~~~~

~~~~• All day Tuesday and Wednesday morning - committees • Wednesday afternoon and all day Thursday - meetings of the Parliament.~~~~

~~The Parliament can sit later than 17:30 on Mondays to Thursdays or 12:30 on Fridays under certain specified circumstances, for example to complete any voting which is not adjourned to a later date.~~

A period, known as Decision Time, takes place at the end of a meeting of the Parliament. This generally starts at 17:00 on Wednesday and Thursday. This is the time when the Parliament votes on the questions that have been before it that day. MSPs at a meeting of the Parliament normally vote using the electronic voting system.

~~~~Where does the Parliament meet?~~~~

~~~~The Parliament generally meets in its interim accommodation at the Church of Scotland Assembly Hall, The Mound, Edinburgh. This is also known as "the Debating Chamber" or just "the Chamber".~~~~

~~~~Committees generally meet in the Committee Chambers building on George IV Bridge, or in the Assembly Hall itself, or in any other place in Scotland.~~~~

~~~~These are interim accommodation arrangements until business begins at the new Parliament building at Holyrood.~~~~

~~~~How does the Parliament organise its discussions?~~~~

The Parliamentary Bureau arranges the programme of meetings and the business to be discussed. This is a group of representatives of the various political parties and groupings in the Parliament, chaired by the Presiding Officer. Because of the matters it has to discuss and decide upon on the Parliament’s behalf, it meets in private.

The Parliamentary Bureau draws up the business programme for a set period ahead, to include deadlines for parliamentary or committee consideration of any specified business, including Bills or other legislation.

The Clerk of the Parliament draws up a daily business list based on that programme. Both the business programme and the daily business list are published in the Parliament’s Business Bulletin (which also contains committee agendas and other items).

~~~~http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/factfiIes/ff3.htm Page 4 of 9 F a c lfilc 3 4/3/04 7:54 am~~~~

~~~~Is priority given to any particular business for a meeting of the Parliament?~~~~

~~~~• on 12 half sitting days priority is given to Committee business • on 15 half sitting days to business chosen by political parties which are not represented in the Scottish Executive~~~~

~~~~(A half sitting day is a three-hour period from 09:30 to 12:00 or 14:30 to 17:00).~~~~

The Parliamentary Bureau makes sure that enough time is set aside within the business programme for the First Minister to make statements to a meeting of the Parliament. These might be to set out proposed policy objectives or the legislative programme of the Scottish Executive. The First Minister gives notice to the Presiding Officer that he or she wishes to make such a statement. Time is also provided as required for ministerial statements, including those on urgent matters, and these may be debated immediately or at some later time.

~~~~Time is set aside also to discuss financial business as and when required.~~~~

Following the period of Decision Time, up to 30 minutes at the end of each meeting of the Parliament may be devoted to Members’ Business. This means any item of business, other than a Members Bill, proposed by an MSP who is neither a member of the Scottish Executive or a Junior Minister.

~~~~How is a subject brought before Parliament?~~~~

~~~~Topics can be raised by MSPs by~~~~

~~~~• Asking oral questions • Submitting written questions • Giving notice of or moving a motion. The importance of working by committee~~~~

~~~~Using a committee system for much of the work of the Scottish Parliament was preferred because it was felt that this would:~~~~

• encourage significant public involvement in the Parliament’s activities • enable the Parliament to hold the Scottish Executive to account effectively • provide MSPs with significant, worthwhile and satisfying parliamentary work • lead to the more efficient transaction of business, including law-making.

A committee can inquire, on its own initiative or as required by the Parliament, into issues within its remit (these are known as "competent matters"). The committees will report to the Parliament. In particular, they can consider:

• Policy, administration and financial arrangements of the Scottish Administration • Proposals for legislation in the Parliament or in the UK Parliament, and the need for the reform of the law • European legislation and international conventions and agreements.

~~~~Committees can initiate legislation themselves. Committee reports are presented to the~~~~

~~~~http://www.scottish.parliamenl.uk/factfilcs/ff3.hlm P a g e 5 o f 9 F a c tfile 3 4/3/04 7:54 am~~~~

~~~~Parliament or to another committee.~~~~

A committee has between 5 and 15 MSPs as members. These are selected having regard to the balance of the various political parties and groupings in the Parliament, and are chaired by a Convener. A committee can form sub-committees, and can hold joint meetings with other committees.

~~Meetings are normally held in public, and can take place anywhere in Scotland. A committee can appoint one of its members to be its reporter on any specific matter. Advisers can be appointed as well.~~

A committee can invite any person to attend a meeting as a witness. This means giving evidence or producing documents related to the competent business of that committee. Generally MSPs who are not members of a committee can participate in its proceedings but they are unable to participate in a vote.

~~~~Mandatory committees~~~~

~~~~Some key committees are required by the Standing Orders. These are:~~~~

• Procedures Committee • Standards Committee • Finance Committee • Audit Committee • European Committee • Public Petitions Committee • Equal Opportunities Committee • Subordinate Legislation Committee Subject committees

~~The Parliament can establish other committees to deal with a particular subject or area of public policy. These are known as the Subject Committees. The first ones established by the Parliament were:~~

• Education Culture and Sport Committee • Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee • Health and Community Care Committee • Justice 1 Committee • Justice 2 Committee • Local Government Committee • Rural Development Committee • Social Justice Committee • Transport and Environment Committee. What is the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body (SPCB)?

~~~~The SPCB is a legal body of five members (four MSPs, and the Presiding Officer as Chair) which was set up to provide the Parliament with its resources and staff.~~~~

~~~~How the Parliament makes laws~~~~

An important aspect of the arrangements is the provision for pre-legislative examination. This allows the Parliament and interested individuals and groups in society to have a significant impact on the formation of policy. It also allows for an influence on the translation

~~~~http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/factfilcs/ff3.htm P a g e 6 o f 9 F a c tfìle 3 4/3/04 7:54 am~~~~

~~~~of this policy into proposals for new laws.~~~~

~~~~Introducing a Bill~~~~

~~A Bill sets out proposals for legislation. A Bill can be introduced into the Parliament by Ministers and also by Parliamentary Committees or by MSPs. Thus there are various types of Bill including~~

~~~~• Executive Bills • Committee Bills • Members’ Bills~~~~

Prior to introducing a Bill, a Minister can advise a committee on proposals for legislation and outline the proposed consultation exercise. The committee may wish to speak to the Minister at this stage. The committee monitors the consultation and may take its own evidence at this stage.

~~~~On Introduction all Bills must be accompanied by the following documents:~~~~

• a written statement from the Presiding Officer of his or her view as to whether or not its provisions are within the legislative competence of the Parliament (that is, that they concern only devolved matters). This must identify which provisions, if any, are not within the legislative competence • a Financial Memorandum. This contains best estimates of the administrative, compliance and other costs which the Scottish Executive, local authorities and other bodies, businesses and individuals would have to meet, if the Bill’s provisions became law • an Auditor General’s Report for any Bill charging expenditure to the Scottish Consolidated Fund. This contains of his or her view of whether that charge is appropriate.

~~~~If the Scottish Executive wishes to introduce a Bill it must also be accompanied by:~~~~

• a written statement from the appropriate Minister of his or her view that its provisions are within the legislative competence of the Parliament • Explanatory Notes, summarising objectively each provision of the Bill • a Policy Memorandum setting out the Bill’s policy objectives • consideration of any alternative approaches • details of consultation exercises and their outcome • assessments of the effects, if any, of the Bill on

~~~~equal opportunities~~~~

~~~~human rights~~~~

~~~~islands communities~~~~

~~~~local government~~~~

~~~~sustainable development~~~~

~~~~any other matter which the Executive considers relevant.~~~~

~~~~http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/factfiles/fi3.htm P a ge 7 o f 9 h'actfilc 3 4/3/04 7:54 am~~~~

~~~~The Stages of a Bill~~~~

~~~~The Parliamentary process that a Bill follows varies depending on the type of Bill. The following describes the most usual process applied to a Bill.~~~~

~~~~This consists of three stages:~~~~

• Stage 1 - consideration of its general principles, and a decision whether they are agreed to (by Parliamentary Committee and by the Parliament) • Stage 2 - consideration of the details of the Bill (by Parliamentary Committee) • Stage 3 - final consideration of it and a decision whether it should be passed or rejected (by the Parliament).

Stage 1: Initially, a Bill is referred to the relevant subject committee (known as "the lead committee'’), and if it includes provision to make subordinate legislation, to the Subordinate Legislation Committee, for consideration. The lead committee may take evidence at this stage. Other committees may be involved such as Equal Opportunities or Finance plus any other subject committee with an interest. These feed back into the lead committee and their views are included in the Report.

Once the lead committee has reported on the Bill, the Parliament itself considers the general principles as well. Then the Parliament decides whether these principles are agreed to. This decision is taken in light of the lead committee’s report.

The Bill may be referred back to the lead committee for a further report on the principles of all, or any part, of the Bill before the Parliament makes its decision. More evidence may be taken at this stage.

~~~~If the Parliament does agree to the general principles then the Bill proceeds to Stage 2. If Parliament does not agree, the Bill falls and ceases any progress at this stage.~~~~

~~~~Stage 2: In this stage the Bill receives more detailed ‘line-by-line’ consideration either~~~~

• entirely by the lead committee • entirely by a Committee of the Whole Parliament • entirely by a Parliamentary committee or committees other than the lead committee • partly by the lead committee and partly by o a Committee of the Whole Parliament or o a Parliamentary committee or committees other than the lead committee.

~~~~Each schedule, long title to and section of the Bill is considered separately in Stage 2, when amendments may be proposed and made.~~~~

Amendments may be made which would insert or substantially alter any provisions to confer powers to make delegated legislation. If that is the case then the amended Bill is referred to the Subordinate Legislation Committee for its consideration and report.

Stage 3: The amended Bill is then considered by the Parliament, which can further consider and make amendments to its provisions. The Parliament then debates and decides whether the Bill, in this final form, should be passed. At least a quarter of all MSPs must vote (whether ‘for’, ‘against’ or 'abstain’).

~~~~At this point, up to half the sections of the Bill may be referred back for further Stage 2 consideration by the relevant committee or committees. On the Bill’s return to the~~~~

~~~~http://www.scoitish.parliament.uk/factfilcs/ff3.htm Page 8 of 9 F a c tfilc 3 4/3/04 7:54 am~~~~

~~~~Parliament after this, further amendments may be made only to its referred-back provisions.~~~~

~~~~The Parliament then considers and decides whether to approve the Bill.~~~~

~~~~Once a Bill has been passed or approved, it is then submitted by the Presiding Officer to the Sovereign for Royal Assent.~~~~

~~~~On receiving Royal Assent a Bill becomes an Act of the Scottish Parliament.~~~~

~~~~Contacting the Public Information Service~~~~

~~~~For more information on the Parliament or anything in this leaflet you can visit our website at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk or contact the Public Information Service~~~~

~~~~Telephone Enquiries~~~~

~~~~0845 278 1999 (local rate) 0131 348 5000~~~~

~~~~Calls via RNID Typetalk / TextDirect: 18001 0131 348 5000 Textphone 0131 348 5415 Fax 0131 348 5601~~~~

~~~~By email [email protected]~~~~

~~~~By letter Public Information Service The Scottish Parliament Edinburgh EH99 1SP~~~~

For a copy of this leaflet in languages other than English or in Braille, large print, on audio tape or in various computer formats please contact the Public Information Service. We welcome written correspondence in any language. At present we can only accept phone calls in English and Gaelic

~~~~Published by the Scottish Parliament Public Information Service May 2003 (3rd edition)~~~~

~~~~http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/fnctfiles/fG.htm Page 9 of 9 Legislative Procedure '6/11/03 9:49 ai~~~~

T he N ew Z ealand Parliam ent Section 1 - The New Zealand Parliament Section 2 - Legislative Procedure Section 3 - Parliament's Working Procedures Section 4 - Financial Procedure Section 5 - Parliament and Search this Site Accountability

~~~~E l Legislative Procedure~~~~

~~~~A proposed law is known as a "bill". Any member of Parliament may introduce a bill after drafting it and following the appropriate procedures.~~~~

~~~~Most bills are introduced by Ministers and are known as Government bills.~~~~

A bill introduced by a member who is not a Minister is known as a Member's bill. There are two other types of bill that may be introduced either by Ministers or by other members - local bills which are promoted by a local authority to deal with a particular matter in its locality and private bills which are promoted by a company or an individual to deal with a matter relating to that company or individual. Members introducing local or private bills do so as a service to the promoter of the bill and not necessarily because they agree with it. Members', local and private bills are considered at each alternate Wednesday sitting of the House. Government bills may be considered at any other sitting.

A bill must pass through a number of stages in the House before it can become law. These stages are designed to permit members to consider it carefully and to allow members of the public to make known their opinions and put forward their suggestions as to whether it should be agreed to and whether it should be amended in certain respects before becoming law.

The stages which a bill passes through in the House are known as readings. There are 3 readings. At the first reading there is a 2-hour debate (one hour for members', local and private bills). At the second reading a 2-hour debate can be held on the main princ iples of the bill. This is the stage at which the House decides whether it does, in principle, wish the bill to proceed. The third reading is the final stage in the passing of a bill. A 2-

~~~~http ;//www. clerk.pari iament. govt.nz/Publ i cations/O ther/Booklet/2+-+Legistarive+Procedure.htm P a g e I o f 2 Legislative Procedure 6/11/03 9:49 am~~~~

~~hour debate can be held on whether the House agrees to pass the bill in the form in which it then is (it is likely that it has by this time been amended while it was proceeding through Parliament).~~

~~~~In addition to these readings, the House has two further stages that a bill must go through at which it may be amended.~~~~

Most bills, after their second reading, are referred to a select committee for detailed study. The select committee (which usually consists of 8 members) advertises for submissions on the bill and calls for reports from Government departments most closely concerned with it. As well as receiving written submissions from the public it hears witnesses who wish to present their submissions in person. This gives members of the committee an opportunity to question the witnesses about their views,

Once the select committee has fmished consideration of the bill it decides what, if any, amendments it wishes to recommend to the bill and makes a report to the House accordingly. This report is published for the information of members and the public. The House holds a 2-hour debate on the select committee's report and, if the House agrees to the recommended amendments, the bill proceeds with the amendments incorporated into it.

There is one further opportunity for amendments to be made to a bill after it has left the select committee. Before a bill's third reading it is considered by the House acting as if ail its members fonned a committee - the committee of the whole House. At this stage last- minute amendments can be made to the text of the bill before it proceeds to its third reading and then becomes law.

~~~~A bill becomes law when the Governor-General gives the Royal assent to it.~~~~

~~~~Regulations~~~~

An Act of Parliament may give the Government or another body power to make further, more detailed, laws called regulations. It is important that the use which is made of any power to make regulations is kept under scrutiny, otherwise Parliament may find that it has conferred important law-making powers on the Government with undesirable or unexpected results. The House entrusts the task of scrutinising regulations to a select committee, the Regulations Review Committee. The committee reports to the House from time to time drawing its attention to any regulations which it considers objectionable. The Government must within 3 months publish a response to any recommendations made in these reports.

~~~~I HOME 1 PROGRAMME I YOUR MP I PUBLICATIONS I ABOUT I LINKS I CONTACT I~~~~

http ://w w w . c 1 e r k .pa ri i am en t. go vt. nz/ P u b 1 i ca t i o ns/ O th er/B oo kl e t/ 2 + - + L e g i s lat i vc + P ro c e d u r e . h tm P a g e 2 o f Z New Zealand Parliament - Wikipedia 2/12/03 8:37 am

~~~~Main Page | Recent changes | Edit this page Not logged in Page history Log in I Help Printable version Go- Search New Zealand Parliament From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.~~~~

The New Zealand Parliament consists of the Queen and the House of Representatives, which has been the sole parliamentary chamber since 1951, following the abolition of the Legislative Council. Under the UK Parliament's Main Page New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, New Zealand was granted a bicameral Recent changes General Assembly consisting of an appointed Legislative Council and an elected Random page House of Representatives, but under the Constitution Act 1986, the legislature has Current events formally been called 'Parliament'. Edit this page Discuss this page Table of contents fhide] Page history 1 House of Representatives What links here 1.1 Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) Related changes 1.2 Committees Special pages 2 Legislative Council (abolished 1951") 2.1 Abolition Bug reports 2.2 Senate proposal, 1990 Donations 3 External link

~~~~House of Representatives~~~~

The House of Representatives (often called the 'debating chamber', or simply 'Parliament') is modelled on the British House of Commons, with a Speaker as its presiding officer, chosen from within its membership, and the mace as the symbol of parliamentary authority. Members are known as 'Members of Parliament' or MPs. Until 1951, they were known as 'Members of the House of Representatives' or MHRs. Members of the governing party or coalition and the opposition parties sit on opposite sides.

The Prime Minister, is the leader of the largest party in the House, or, since electoral reform in 1996, the coalition with the most seats. The Leader of the Opposition is the leader of the largest opposition party. With the adoption of Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) in 1996, the number of MPs increased from 99 to 120, with the debating chamber being refurbished to accommodate more seats.

~~~~Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)~~~~

Under MMP, 65 MPs, known as 'electorate MPs', are chosen from single-member constituencies, as under FPP. Five of these represent Maori electorates. The remaining 55 are filled from closed party lists, and are referred to as 'list MPsr. They may also contest an electorate seat, in addition to being on the party list, and carry out constituency duties like electorate MPs.

~~~~While some small parties, like United Future have been unable to secure list seats because they have failed to obtain at least 5 per cent of the vote, they survive if~~~~

~~~~http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Zealand_Parliament P age 1 o f 3 New Zealand Parliament - Wikipedia 2/12/03 8:37 am~~~~

~~~~their leaders win an electorate seat.~~~~

~~~~List MPs, unlike electorate MPs, may not normally change party. However, in 1997 the list MP Alamein Kopu, left her party, the Alliance (now the Progressive Coalition), while remaining an MP.~~~~

Following the first election using MMP in 1996, National, formed a coalition with New Zealand First. When this later collapsed, National governed with the support of ACT New Zealand until 1999, when it was defeated by a coalition between Labour and the Progressive Coalition.

~~~~C om m ittees~~~~

Legislation is scrutinised by Select Committees. The Committees call for submissions from the public, thereby meaning that there is a degree of public consultation before a parliamentary bill proceeds into law. The strengthening of the Committee system was in response to concerns that legislation was being forced through, without receiving due examination and revision. Each Select Committee has a Chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson. MPs may be members of more than one Select Committee. There are 18 Select Committees in the House of Representatives, as follows:

• Business • Commerce • Education and Science • Finance and Expenditure • Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade • Health • Justice and Electoral Reform • Law and Order • Local Government and Environment • Government Administration • Maori Affairs • Officers of Parliament • Primary Production • Privileges • Regulations • Social Services • Standing Orders • Transport and Industrial Relations

~~~~Legislative Council (abolished 1951)~~~~

The Legislative Council was modelled on the British House of Lords, as a revising chamber, but it could not initiate legislation or amend money bills. At the time of its abolition, it had 54 members, including its own Speaker. Members of the Legislative Council (MLCs) were appointed for seven year terms, and while a proposal was made to elect them in 1915, this was dropped as a result of World War I. Although women in New Zealand had been among the first in the world to gain the vote, the first women MLCs were not appointed until the 1940s.

~~~~Abolition~~~~

~~~~http://cn. wikipcdia.org/wiki/New_Zealand_Parliament Page 2 of 3 New Zealand Parliament - Wikipedia 2/12/03 8:37 am~~~~

There was increasing dissatisfaction with the role of the Legislative Council, which was regarded as ineffectual and making little difference to the legislative process. In .1950, Sidney Holland's National government passed a bill to abolish the Legislative Council, although this was intended as an interim measure. However, no serious attempts were made to introduce a new second chamber, and the House of Representatives has been unicameral since. Today, the Legislative Council Chamber is still used for the Throne Speech, as following the British tradition, the Sovereign may not enter the elected House. The Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod still summons the House of Representatives to attend the State Opening of Parliament in the Legislative Council Chamber, where the Speech is read usually by the Governor-General. It is also used for some Select Committee meetings, as well as meetings of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and other official functions.

~~~~Senate proposal, 1990~~~~

The National government of James Bolger proposed the establishment of an elected Senate when it came to power in 1990, thereby reinstating a bicameral system, and a Senate Bill was drafted. Senators would be elected by STY, with a number of seats being reserved for Maori, and would have powers similar to those of the old Legislative Council. The House of Representatives would continue to be elected by FPP. The intention was to include a question on a Senate in the second referendum on electoral reform. Voters would be asked, if they did not want a new voting system, whether or not they wanted a Senate. However, following objections from the Labour opposition, and supporters of MMP, the Senate question was removed by the Select Committee on Electoral Reform, and the issue has not been pursued since.

~~~~External link~~~~

~~~~• Parliament of New Zealand • Debating Chamber • Legislative Council Chamber~~~~

~~~~Edit this page | Discuss this page | Page history | What links here | Related changes~~~~

~~~~Main Page | About Wikipedia | Recent changes | ) ____ I Go Search: This page was last modified 20:26, 10 Nov 2003. All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License.~~~~

~~~~http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Zealand_Parliament Page 3 of 3 Appendix 8~~~~

~~~~The German Upper House the Bundesrat~~~~

~~~~The German Upper House Bundesrat~~~~

~~~~Composition:~~~~

~~~~There are 69 members of the Bundesrat.~~~~

~~~~Appointment:~~~~

~~~~Each of the regional governments, Landtag, appoint members from their number to the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat is designed to represent regional interests in Germany.~~~~

~~~~The number appointed depends on the population of the Land;~~~~

~~~~- those with a population of up to 2 million send 3 members;~~~~

~~~~-those with a population of between 2 million and 7 milHon send 4 members;~~~~

~~~~-those with a population of over 7 million send 6 members.~~~~

The nominated members sit for as long as the Land government wishes ands it can recall or replace them at any time, If one is unable to attend a substitute may be nominated instead. BA SIC LAW Art. 50-53 15/8/03 10:31 am

~~~~THE UPPER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT (BUNDESRAT)~~~~

~~~~Article 50 (Functions)~~~~

~~~~The Laender participate through the Bundesrat in the legislation and administration of the Federation.~~~~

~~~~Article 51 (Composition)~~~~

(1) The Bundesrat consists of members of the Laender governments which appoint and recall them. Other members of such governments may act as substitutes. (2) Each Land has at least three votes; Laender with more than two million inhabitants have four, Laender with more than seven million inhabitants, six votes (amended Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990). (3) Each Land may delegate as many members as it has votes. The votes of each Land may be cast only as a block vote and only by members present or their substitutes.

~~~~Article 52 (President, rules of procedure)~~~~

(1) The Bundesrat elects its President for one year. (2) The President convenes the Bundesrat. He must convene it if the members for at least two Laender or the Federal Government so demand. (3) The Bundesrat takes its decisions by at least a majority of its votes It draws up its rules of procedure. Its meetings are public. The public may be excluded (4) Other members of, or persons Commissioned by, Laender governments may serve on the committees of the Bundesrat.

~~~~Article 53 (Presence of members of the Federal Government)~~~~

The members of the Federal Government have the right, and on demand the duty to take part in the debates of the Bundesrat and of its Committees. They must be heard at any time. The Bundesrat must be currently kept informed by the Federal Government of the conduct of affairs.

~~~~• Back to VIEW OF THE ACTS • Next item: THE JOINT COMMITTEE~~~~

~~~~http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/Iaw/GG/gg4.hlri Page 1 of I Appendix 9~~~~

~~~~The Irish Upper House Seanad Eireann~~~~

~~~~The Irish Senate~~~~

~~~~Composition:~~~~

~~~~1. Consists of 60 members who serve a 7 year term.~~~~

~~~~Method of Appointment:~~~~

~~~~1. The 60 members are divided into two sorts:~~~~

~~~~(a) 11 who are nominated by the Chief Minister (Taoiseach)~~~~

~~~~(b) 43 who are elected by five panels representing specific groups across the country.~~~~

~~~~2. The 5 panels are:~~~~

~~~~(a) National language, culture, literature, art, education. 5 are elected from this panel;~~~~

~~~~(b) Agriculture and related industries and fishing. 11 are elected from this panel;~~~~

~~~~(c) labour, both organised and non organised. 11 are elected from this panel;~~~~

~~~~(d) Industry and commerce, including banking, finance, accounting, engineering and architecture. 9 are elected from this panel;~~~~

~~~~(e) Public Administration and social services, including voluntary social activities. 7 are elected from this panel.~~~~

3. Details of which groups make up each panel are attached. Groups apply to be included in a panel who represent interests within the area covered by the panel. Details are given in the Senate Electoral Panel members Act 1947 and basically this allows any group within the area covered by a panel to seek nomination provided it does not exist purely as a profit making body. The Register of groups is organised and annually updated by the Clerk of the Senate.

~~~~4. Each panel nominates candidates for election.~~~~

~~~~5. The electorate for each panel are members of the incoming Dail, members of the outgoing Senate and members of County and County Borough councils.~~~~

6. Each voter marks a ballot paper for each of the panels indicating the in order of preference the candidates he/.she wishes to vote for The Single Transferable Vote System is then used to determine which candidates from each panel have been successful, is used to calculate which candidates from each panel list are successful.

~~~~7. Voting is by means of a postal ballot. Reform?~~~~

1. There is currently a committee investigating potential reform of the Senate both in terms of composition and functions. No report has yet been produced, but public comments were invited by 30th June 2003. HOW THE SEANAD (SENATE OR UPPER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT) IS ELECTED MENU

1. STRUCTURE OF THE SEANAD 2. WHO CAN BECOME A SENATOR? 3. TIME OF ELECTION 4. METHOD OF ELECTION 5. ELECTION OF 43 PANEL MEMBERS 6. REGISTER OF NOMINATING BODIES 7. NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 8. NUMBER OF ELECTED MEMBERS 9. WHO CAN VOTE? 10. THE POLL 11. THE COUNT 12. BYE-ELECTIONS 13. ELECTION OF 6 UNIVERSITY MEMBERS CONSTITUENCIES 14. BYE-ELECTIONS 15. SEANAD ELECTORAL LAW 16. OTHER LEAFLETS

~~~~. FURTHER INFORMATION HOW THE SEANAD (SENATE OR UPPER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT! IS ELECTED~~~~

1. STRUCTURE OF THE SEANAD The Seanad is composed of 60 members. Eleven members are nominated by the Taoiseach (Prime Minister), 6 members are elected by university graduates and 43 are elected from panels of candidates representing specified vocational interests.

~~~~WHO CAN BECOME A SENATOR?~~~~

Every citizen of Ireland over 21 years of age who is not disqualified by the Constitution or by law is eligible to be elected to the Seanad. A member of the Seanad is referred to as Seanadoir or Senator. Persons undergoing a prison sentence in excess of six months, undischarged bankrupts and persons of unsound mind are disqualified for election. Certain occupations are incompatible with membership of the Seanad, for example, members of the judiciary, senior officials of the institutions of the European Union, civil servants, wholetime members of the Defence Forces and Gardai (police).

~~~~TIME OF ELECTION~~~~

A general election to the Seanad must take place not later than 90 days after the dissolution of the Dail (Lower House of Parliament). The dates for the various stages of the election (nomination, polling, etc.) are appointed by order of the Minister for the Environment.

~~~~METHOD OF ELECTION~~~~

~~~~The elections are held on the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote and by secret postal ballot.~~~~

~~~~PANEL MEMBERS~~~~

~~~~5. ELECTION OF 43 PANEL MEMBERS Before each General Election five panels are formed of candidates having knowledge and practical experience of the following interests and services respectively:-~~~~

~~~~(i) Cultural and Educational Panel: - National language and culture, literature, art; education, law and medicine;~~~~

~~~~(ii) Agricultural Panel: - Agricultural and allied interests and fisheries;~~~~

~~~~(iii) Labour Panel: - Labour, whether organised or unorganised;~~~~

~~~~(iv) Industrial and Commercial Panel: - Industry and commerce, including banking, finance, accountancy, engineering and architecture;~~~~

(v) Administrative Panel: - Public administration and social services, including voluntary social activities. 6 . REGISTER OF NOMINATING BODIES The Seanad returning officer (Clerk of the Seanad) maintains a register of bodies entitled to nominate candidates to the panels of candidates. To be eligible for registration as a nominating body, an organisation must be concerned mainly with and be representative of the interests and services of one or other of the panels. A body cannot be registered in respect of more than one panel.

~~~~Organisations which are mainly profit-making concerns are not eligible for registration. The register is revised annually.~~~~

7. NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES Each nominating body registered in respect of a panel may nominate a fixed number of candidates for that panel. These candidates comprise the nominating bodies' sub-panel of the different panels. Any four members of the newly elected Dail or outgoing Seanad may nominate one candidate for any panel but each member may join in only one nomination. These candidates form the Oireachtas (Parliament) sub-panel. Thus each panel is divided into two sub-panels - the nominating bodies sub-panel and the Oireachtas sub-panel. A specified minimum number of members must be elected from each sub-panel.

8. NUMBER OF ELECTED MEMBERS The number of members to be elected from each panel and the minimum number which must be elected from each sub-panel are as follows:- Panel Number of members Minimum number to be elected from each sub-panel

~~~~Cultural and Educational 5 2~~~~

~~~~Agricultural 11 4~~~~

~~~~Labour 11 4~~~~

~~~~Industrial and Commercial 9 3~~~~

~~~~Administrative 7 3~~~~

~~~~Total 43~~~~

~~~~9. WHO CAN VOTE?~~~~

~~~~The following persons may vote at a general election of panel members:~~~~

~~~~Members of the incoming Dail, Members of the outgoing Seanad, Members of county councils and county borough councils.~~~~

~~~~Each elector has only one vote in respect of each panel even if he is qualified in more than one respect. The electorate numbers approximately 1,000.~~~~

~~~~10. THE POLL~~~~

The returning officer issues to each voter a list of the candidates nominated for each panel, indicating the bodies or persons who made the nominations. On the day appointed by order of the Minister for the Environment the returning officer sends by registered post to each voter five ballot papers (one for each panel) showing the names of the candidates in alphabetical order, their addresses and descriptions and the sub-panel for which each is nominated. The political affiliation, if any, of the candidates is not shown on the ballot papers. The voter, after completing a declaration of identity in the presence of an authorised person, marks on each paper the order of his/her choice of candidates and returns the ballot papers by registered post to the returning officer. p>

~~~~11. THE COUNT~~~~

There is a separate count for each panel. The ballot papers are sorted in accordance with the first preference shown on them. To facilitate counting each vote is given a value of 1,000. The appropriate value of his/her first preference votes is credited to each candidate. The quota is the minimum number of votes necessary to guarantee the election of a candidate. It is ascertained by dividing the total value of the valid votes by one more than the number of seats to be filled and adding one to the result. If, for example, the total value of the votes cast in relation to a panel is 900,000 and there are 5 seats to be filled, the quota will be 150,001, that is [(0.9m /6 ) +1] It will be seen that, in this example, only five candidates (the number to be elected) could possibly reach the quota.

If the value of a candidate’s votes equals or exceeds the quota, he/she is deemed elected unless his/her election would make impossible the election of the minimum number of members from each sub-panel. If a candidate receives more than a quota, the surplus is distributed to the remaining candidates in accordance with the next effective preference shown on the ballot papers. Where the maximum number of candidates has been elected for a sub-panel, the values of the votes of the remaining candidates on that sub-panel are distributed in accordance with the next effective preference shown on the ballot papers concerned. If no candidate has a surplus, the lowest candidate is excluded and his votes distributed at the value at which he received them. A candidate cannot, however, be excluded if his/her exclusion would make impossible the election of the minimum number of members from each sub-panel.

12. BYE-ELECTIONS When a casual vacancy occurs in the Seanad through the death, disqualification or resignation of a panel member, the vacancy is filled by bye-election. Nine members of the Oireachtas may nominate a candidate in relation to an Oireachtas sub-panel vacancy; a nominating body for the relevant panel may nominate a candidate for a vacancy in a nominating bodies sub-panel. The electorate at a bye-election is composed of the members of the Dail and Seanad, 226 in all. Voting is by secret postal ballot. The counting procedure is the same as at a Seanad General Election but without the modification necessary to ensure that a minimum number is elected from each sub-panel. UNIVERSITY MEMBERS

~~~~13. ELECTION OF 6 UNIVERSITY MEMBERS CONSTITUENCIES~~~~

The constituencies for the election of university members to the Seanad are the National University of Ireland and the University of Dublin (Trinity College). Each elects 3 members. The other universities and institutions of higher education are not represented in the Seanad at present. WHO CAN VOTE? Every citizen of Ireland who has reached the age of 18 years and who has received a degree, other than an honorary degree, from the university concerned is entitled to be registered as an elector. The electorate of the National University of Ireland numbers 84,000 approximately and that of the University of Dublin 24,000 approximately. The electoral roll is maintained and up-dated by the university concerned.

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES Candidates must be nominated by two registered electors for the university. Eight other registered electors for the university must assent to the nomination. There is no requirement that a candidate must be a graduate of the university concerned or be connected with it in any way.

GENERAL ELECTION Within 7 days after the dissolution of the Dail the Minister for the Environment is required to appoint the relevant dates for the conduct of a general election of university members to the Seanad. The election is conducted by a returning officer who is an officer of the university concerned. Voting is by post and the election is held in accordance with the principles of proportional representation, each elector having a single transferable vote. When issuing ballot papers the returning officer also issues a form of declaration of identity which must be completed by the elector in the presence of a witness and returned with the ballot paper. The count is conducted in the same manner as a count at an election of members to the Dail.

~~~~14. BYE-ELECTIONS~~~~

When a casual vacancy occurs through the death, disqualification or resignation of a university member, the vacancy is filled by bye-election. The procedure at a bye-election is the same as that at a general election of university members.

~~~~15. SEANAD ELECTORAL LAW~~~~

The law relating to the election of members to the Seanad is contained principally in Articles 18 and 19 of the Constitution of Ireland (IR£1.30), the Seanad Electoral (Panel Members) Act, 1947 (IR£14.70), the Seanad Electoral (Panel Members) Act, 1954 (IR£2.10) and the Seanad Electoral (University Members) Act, 1937 (IRE8.55). These publications are available from the Government Publications Sale Office, Sun Alliance House, Molesworth Street, Dublin 2.

~~~~16. OTHER LEAFLETS~~~~

Other leaflets available in this series are as follows: How the President is elected, The Referendum in Ireland, How the Dail is elected, European Parliament: How Ireland's representatives are elected, The Register of Electors, and Voting and disability.

~~~~DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT JUNE 1994~~~~

Further information: Franchise Section, Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Custom House, Dublin 1. Tel. : +353 1 679 3377; Fax.: 874 2710; e-mail: press-office & environ ie Appendix 10

~~~~Proposed amendments to the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill~~~~

~~~~Appendix 10~~~~

~~~~Possible Amendments to the Constitution (Legislative Council) Bill~~~~

~~~~Clause 2 (5) - (see paragraph 3.7 (d) of the Report)~~~~

~~~~Amendment to provide for eight single member electoral areas:~~~~

~~~~Replace Clause 2(5) with the following:~~~~

~~~~"For the purposes of an election of elected members, the Island shall be divided~~~~

~~~~into 8 electoral areas specified in columns 1 and 2 of schedule 1, and each electoral~~~~

~~~~district shall return one member."~~~~

~~~~Consequential amendment will then be required to schedule 1.~~~~

~~~~Amendment to provide for a single all Island electoral area:~~~~

~~~~Replace Clause 2 (5) with the following:~~~~

~~~~"For the purposes of an election of elected members there shall be one electoral~~~~

~~~~area which shall return eight members."~~~~

~~~~Consequential amendment will then be required to schedule 1.~~~~

~~~~Clause 5 - (see paragraph 3.7 (j) of the Report)~~~~

~~~~After the words "by the Keys'' add ;~~~~

~~~~"or a Private Members Bill"~~~~

~~~~Clause 6 - (see paragraph 3.6 (f), 3.8.2 and 3.8.3 above)~~~~

~~~~1 Clause 6 - (see paragraph 3.6 (f), 3.8.2 and 3.8.3 above)~~~~

~~~~Clause 6 (1) -~~~~

~~~~Replace the word “may” with the word “shall” and the end of Clause 6 (1) add the following words:~~~~

~~~~"in accordance with Schedule 2."~~~~

~~~~Add new Clause 6 (3) -~~~~

~~~~"(3) In this section "public document" means legislation having effect~~~~

~~~~under any enactment."~~~~

~~~~Add new Schedule 2 as follows -~~~~

~~~~SCHEDULE 2~~~~

~~~~PROCEDURE FOR SCRUTINY~~~~

~~~~Section 6(1)~~~~

~~~~1 Save where the Chief Minister certifies to the President of Tynwald that it~~~~

~~~~would be contrary to the public interest, where any public document is to~~~~

~~~~be laid before Tynwald one month's written notice thereof shall be given~~~~

~~~~by the Chief Secretary to the Clerk of Tynwald before it is so laid and the~~~~

~~~~Council shall consider whether any such document raises issues on which~~~~

~~~~a report to Tynwald ought to be made.~~~~

~~~~9 2 A certificate given by the Chief Minister under paragraph 1 above shall be~~~~

~~~~reasoned and shall be laid before Tynwald at the sitting at which the~~~~

~~~~public document in question is laid.~~~~

~~~~3 In the case of a public document on which the Council decide to make a~~~~

~~~~report to Tynwald, the President of Tynwald shall, if possible, so inform~~~~

~~~~the sitting of Tynwald next after that decision has been made and the~~~~

~~~~Council shall make their report to the sitting of Tynwald which follows the~~~~

~~~~expiry of the notice referred to in paragraph 1 above."~~~~

~~~~Existing Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 then to be re-numbered as Schedule 3 and 4 respectively.~~~~

~~~~Clause 7 - (see paragraph 3,8.4 above)~~~~

~~~~Clause 7 (1) (4) ; replace the word "may" with the word "shall"~~~~

~~~~New Clause 8 - (see paragraph 3.7 (g) above)~~~~

~~~~Insert a new Clause 8 -~~~~

~~~~"The Governor in Council may, subject to the approval of Tynwald, by order make provision with respect to the maximum number of Members of the~~~~

~~~~Legislative Council who may be appointed as ministers, and such an order may provide that no Member of the Council shall be so appointed."~~~~

~~~~3 The original Clause 8 then to be re-numbered as Clause 9 and subsequent re-numbering to take place.~~~~

~~~~Parliamentary Copyright available from:~~~~

~~~~The Tynwald Library Buck's Road DOUGLAS Isle of Man IM1 3PW British Isles Tel: 01624 685520 Fax: 01624 685522 e-mail [email protected] Classic 18 m for 15H8S sheets 331 wyw.bindcwatic.cort I~~~~