Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation

(April–June 2001)

Abbreviations APE —British Broadcasting Corporation, Monitoring Global Newsline – Asia-Paciﬁc Economic APP —British Broadcasting Corporation, Monitoring Global Newsline – Asia-Paciﬁc Political XHNA —Xinhua (New China) News Agency CNA —Central News Agency (Taipei) ZTS —Zhongguo tongxun she (China Reporting Agency), Hong Kong ZXS —Zhongguo xinwen she (China News Agency), Beijing RMRB —Renmin ribao (People’s Daily)

1. Internal Developments (a) The 21st Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee. (b) Party and Political Affairs, and Ideological Developments; Human Rights; Public Order; Falun Gong (c) Economic Affairs (d) Education (e) Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)

2. Foreign Relations (a) Diplomatic Tours (b) Countries, Territories and Regions (c) International Organizations (United Nations, Asia-Europe Meet- ing)

1. Internal Developments (a) The 21st Session of the Ninth NPC Standing Committee The 21st Session of the NPC Standing Committee was held in Beijing between 24 and 28 April. Delegates discussed a variety of legislation, including amendments to the PRC Marriage Law, and drafts of three other laws – the Tax Law, Trust Law and Law on National Defence Education (APP,24April). The amendments to the 20-year-old Marriage Law included important new legislation, which sought explicitly to ban bigamy, concubinage and cohabitation, and combat domestic violence in marriage – changes that were urgently needed in the light of “fast-changing social realities and volatile family relations.” Thus, the new law would allow for the innocent party in disputes involving bigamy, concubinage and spouse abuse to claim compensation in divorce settlements. It was revealed that 30 per  The China Quarterly, 2001 Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 807 cent of Chinese families reported occurrences of domestic violence, which was also responsible for 60 per cent of all divorces. Statistics meanwhile showed that in 2000, 8.48 million couples had married (10.8 per cent fewer than ten years earlier), while divorces – some 1.21 million of them – showed an increase of 51.25 per cent over the same period (APP,28April). The amendments were passed by NPC Standing Committee members, as was the Law on National Defence Education (on which, see Chi Haotian, Minister of Defence in APP,10May).

(b) Party and Political Affairs, and Ideological Developments; Human Rights; Public Order; Falun Gong On 14 May, the Head of the CCP Central Committee’s (CCPCC) Organization Department, Zeng Qinghong, addressed a national conference on the education and training of cadres (XHNA, in APP,14May) and called for strict adherence to Deng Xiaoping Theory and Jiang Zemin’s “three representatives” in such training. At the same meeting, Vice President Hu Jintao urged upon cadres the importance of theoretical study, pointing out that the new demands of changing conditions in China demanded “new attainments, know-how, professional competence and leadership abilities.” Ongoing education should be regarded by cadres as a “lifelong endeavour,” said Hu. Later the same month, in the course of a visit to Anhui province, Jiang Zemin echoed such views, calling for improved leadership qualities in order to meet the demands of the expanding market environment, and associated legal and other developments. In his own words, “leadership styles and method is not just a question of work method, but is also a question of ideological method and world view, and a question of stance and attitude towards the masses” (APP,24May). The high priority accorded to training a disciplined and professional cadre contingent was also reﬂected in a circular issued by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the CCPCC Organization Department, entitled “On resolutely preventing and investigating mal- practices, and behaviours [sic]ofviolating discipline and the law, in the work of selecting, promoting and approving cadres” (XHNA in APP,29 May). The document addressed personnel problems among cadres, such as their frequent disregard for relevant procedures and regulations, and practices of buying votes and bribing voters, and “buying and selling ofﬁcial posts.” It was also revealed that some 4 million leading group members from towns and villages, county and city departments had attended training sessions held by above-county Party committees in an effort to improve ideological attitudes and work style among grassroots rural cadres. Reference has also been made to the importance of the “three representations” (the notion that the Chinese Communist Party represented advanced production forces, advanced Chinese culture and the basic interests of the people). Central to inculcating and applying these ideas 808 The China Quarterly

was the urgent need to promote rural development and raise peasant income. To these ends, grassroots cadres were urged to analyse “conspicuous contradictions” that characterized the structure of both the agricultural and rural economies. In particular, action was needed to reduce peasant burdens (not least, through the implementation of pilot projects for rural tax and fee reform) and to promote township and village institutional reforms (APP,20April). A propos the rural sector, in April Vice-President Hu Jintao announced that a campaign would be launched in order to educate rural officials in the interests of protecting farmers’ interests and raising farm efficiency. The main thrust of the campaign would be to improve the cohesion of grassroots CCP organizations and strengthen Party leadership in the countryside. The point was made that despite the high level of grain output achieved in recent years, the situation of Chinese agriculture remained unsatisfactory: farm products were in over-supply, while farmers’ incomes had steadily fallen; the output structure of agriculture was also irrational and production efficiency remained low (XHNA, 1 April). Xinhua reported that at the end of 2000, CCP membership totalled more than 64.5 million people (5.2 per cent of China’s total population). Of these, 11.2 million (17.4 per cent) were women, and 4 million (6.2 per cent) were from ethnic minority backgrounds. Some 30 million CCP members were below the age of 45 and had therefore been born since the foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949. The same source noted that one-third of China’s college students had applied for Party membership. Meanwhile, rural CCP members numbered 29.5 million and belonged to 1.35 million grassroots organizations. Between 1994 and 2000, 3 million CCP members from government departments had been sent to the countryside to assist in Party building (APP,1June). On 9 April, Xinhua published a White Paper on human rights, entitled “Progress in China’s human rights cause in 2000” (full text in APP,9 April). Reflecting the Chinese government’s official definition of human rights, the document spoke of further progress having been achieved in terms of employment provision and wage increases. It noted that all provinces, autonomous regions (except Tibet) and municipalities in China had now established systems enshrining a minimum wage for workers. In addition, China had “basically” put in place a social security system, which embraced the provision of basic pension, medical and unemployment insurance for urban workers. The White Paper drew attention too to improvements in education, with educational funding having risen, on average, by 15.56 per cent p.a. during the previous five years. More than 90 per cent of the total population now had access to radio and television, while the number of Internet surfers had risen from a mere 10,000 (1994) to more than 22.5 million (2000). Finally, the point was made that there had also been further important developments in enhancing grassroots democracy in the countryside. Thus, 23 provinces and autonomous regions had formulated new electoral procedures for the direct election of villagers’ committees. Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 809

The momentum of activities to combat corruption and crime was maintained throughout the quarter. In a speech to a national conference, Jiang Zemin called for a “strike hard” campaign to be launched against specific kinds of criminal behaviour, such as gang crime and violent crime. It was revealed that emergency arrangements were being made by Chinese courts in order to handle cases of criminals detained on charges of endangering public security (APP,4April and APE,11April). Luo Gan himself demanded a major effort to combat “Mafia-style crime and evil forces and their behind-the-scenes backers and protective umbrellas” (XHNA in APP,4April) Meanwhile, severe punishment continued to be handed down to senior officials who had been found guilty of corruption. One example was that of Wang Leyi (former Deputy Director of the General Administration of Customs), who had been dismissed from his post and expelled from the Party after being charged with accepting bribes of 530,000 yuan from a businessman during 1997 and with illegally helping the same businessman to purchase confiscated cars at low prices (APP,26April). The supposed threat posed by the activities of the outlawed Falun gong sect was again a source of continuing concern. There were reports of Falun gong members being detained, beaten and tortured by Chinese police (for example, see Kyodo, 25 April). An article in Renmin ribao attacked what it described as the “heretical teaching” of the sect, accusing it of propagating “fatalism” and “celestial phenomena teachings” (RMRB, 26 April; see also Hong Kong, Ta-kung pao [Dagong bao], 15 June, for further condemnation of the Falun gong “cult”). Meanwhile, a Xinhua commentary took a softer line in its advocacy of policies to educate and “redeem” followers of the sect in order to enhance their “political understanding and…ascientific world outlook” (APP,26June). Finally, the results of a survey highlighted the high degree of public ignorance of AIDS in China, some 20 per cent of those questioned having never heard of the disease. It was reported that at the end of 2000, there existed 22,517 HIV-positive cases in China–arise of 30 per cent over the previous year’s level. Most of these were to be found in rural areas, and 71 per cent of them had been infected as a result of intravenous injection of drugs (APP,9April).

(c) Economic Affairs In April, the National Bureau of Statistics made available selected economic results for the ﬁrst quarter (Q1) of 2001 (APP,17April). They showed GDP growth of 8.1 per cent (a rise of 0.7 per cent above that of the previous quarter; see also APE,25June, which anticipated GDP growth of up to 8 per cent for the ﬁrst half of 2001). Q1 industrial and construction growth was estimated to be 9.5 per cent – higher than that of both services (up 7.4 per cent) and agriculture (up 3 per cent). China’s trade surplus during January–March was US$4.8 billion, with exports valued at US$59.3 billion (a rise of 14.7 per cent), and imports at US$54.5 billion (up by 17.3 per cent). Utilized foreign direct investment 810 The China Quarterly

(FDI) showed quite strong quarterly growth, rising by 11.7 per cent year on year to reach US$7.98 billion. Evidence of qualitative improvements was afforded by a 46 per cent rise in pre-tax industrial enterprise profits to 85.41 billion yuan. Con- cealed within these figures were state-owned enterprise (SOE) profits of 47.8 billion yuan (up 12.8 per cent). The value of total industrial sales was estimated at 1,925.58 billion yuan (a rise of 16 per cent – but 12.8 per cent for SOEs). Less encouraging was a reported rise in the value of industrial stockpiles of 7.7 per cent, to reach 675.57 billion yuan. During the same quarter, GDP in Shanghai’s Pudong New District grew by 15.6 per cent year on year, significantly faster than GDP growth in all Shanghai (9.8 per cent) (APP,23April). Especially notable was the rate of growth of 11 per cent, recorded by Pudong’s information industry. Xinhua reported that by 2005, Pudong’s GDP was expected to reach 200 billion yuan, with services accounting for more than 50 per cent, and with the value of exports reaching US$10 billion. It was revealed that as of the end of March, 40 foreign banks and 110 domestic and overseas financial agencies had offices in Pudong. The continuing development of China’s 43 state-level economic and technological zones (ETZs) was evidenced in the finding that in 2000, their GDP was 186.138 billion yuan (c. US$22.4 billion), or 27.62 per cent more than in 1999. The value of the ETZs’ foreign trade rose by 38.95 per cent to reach US$31.673 billion (of which exports accounted for 30.48 per cent). As of the end of 2000, the cumulative value of overseas investment directed to the ETZs was US$36.885 billion. Further growth of ETZs – especially the 11 in central and western China – was expected in 2001. Meanwhile, China’s 53 New and High Technology Industries Develop- ment Zones (NHTIDZs) – an initiative launched ten years ago – were described as having “cultivated a giant contingent of market-oriented enterprises with high capacity for innovation and competitiveness” (XHNA in APP,21May). In 2000, their aggregate income had totalled 920.9 billion yuan, with a gross value of industrial output (GVIO) of 794.2 billion yuan. The zones had generated 46 billion yuan of state revenue and exports worth US$18.6 billion. By 2005, it was expected that the NHTIDZs would generate an income of 1.7 trillion yuan, GVIO of 1.4 trillion yuan, and exports worth US$30 billion. (See also APE,8 April, for a report that the value of China’s e-commerce was 77.16 billion yuan in 2000.) On 20 June, the Wuhan Export-Oriented Processing Zone – the first of its kind to be set up in China – began operation. Nearly 20 companies and/or projects were reported to have entered or committed themselves to participating in the zone, with associated investment of 3 billion yuan (APE,24June). The Party journal Qiushi (Seeking Truth) noted that efforts were under way to combat “chaos” and restore order in China’s broadening market network. Persistent problems included the manufacture of counterfeit and inferior goods, “rampant credit chaos and business swindling,” poor fiscal Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 811 and economic discipline, and the inadequacy of production safety legislation. In the face of such difficulties, it was essential to take the following steps: to eliminate counterfeit and poor quality goods, especially in food, pharmaceuticals, agricultural material and car assembly industries; to regulate the construction industry, by combating malprac- tices such as sham tendering; to improve tax collection, especially by combating tax fraud and evasion; to fight local protectionism and remove regional blockades; and to deal with illegal “internet bars … [and] game rooms,” and illegal publications (see APP,1May). Xinhua noted that China’s power capacity and consumption were the second largest in the world. The installed capacity of power stations was 319 million kW, while power generating capacity was 1.37 trillion kWh. Plans were already afoot to make most power grids country-wide (except in Tibet and Xinjiang) (XHNA in APE,29April). Xinhua also revealed that China’s oil refining capacity was expected to reach 270 million tons by 2005 – this against the background of a capacity limit of 220 million tons at the end of 1999 – while the output capacity of ethylene would reach over 9 million tons (cf 4.42 million tons in 1999). If the target were fulfilled, by 2005 China would be in a position to supply 46.4 per cent of its ethylene demand (APE,26June). It was reported that natural gas accounted for a mere 2.1 per cent of China’s energy structure and was no more than 10 per cent of the world average level of consumption: hence the need for major efforts to develop natural gas reserves in the Ordos Basin of Inner Mongolia, where reserves estimated at 10.7 trillion cubic metres were located (APE,26 April). An urgent circular issued by the State Council on 13 June demanded the closure of all China’s state-owned small coal mines by 30 June (except for those in Shanxi, Jilin and Heilongjiang, where the deadline was extended to the end of September). Within the same time frame, regulatory measures were to be put in place for all non-state-owned mines. The moves were reportedly prompted by the frequent occurrence of mining accidents (APE,17June). On 3 April, the Ministry of Finance announced a lowering of the business tax throughout the financial and insurance sectors. The reduction would be three percentage points and it would be phased in over the next three years (against the background of a one per cent decline from 8 to 7 per cent (1 January 2001), the tax rate would be further lowered to 6 per cent (1 January 2002) and to 5 per cent (1 January 2003)). The underlying aim of the tax rate cuts was to stimulate business in the financial and insurance sectors (APP,3April). Later the same month, Dai Xianglong (Governor of the People’s Bank of China and Chairman of the Monetary Policy Commission) gave an undertaking that the government would adhere to its stable monetary policy in an effort to stimulate domestic demand and maintain the momentum of economic growth. Central to this policy was the need to keep interest rates and the exchange rate stable. Other priorities included efforts to improve financial services for small and medium-scale enter- 812 The China Quarterly

prises, and to promote better co-ordination between monetary and capital markets (APE,22April). Also in April, the Ministry of Finance was reported to have taken a decision to issue seven-year Treasury Bonds, worth 12 billion yuan,as part of its 2001 account (XHNA, 23 April). The anticipated acceleration of urbanization in China was made clear in a report which suggested that it would rise from the current level of 31 per cent – 15 per cent lower than the world average – to 60 per cent by 2020 (APP, citing XHNA, which also noted a World Bank projection suggesting that China’s average per capita GDP would rise from US$850 (2000) to US$2,800 (2020)). China’s total labour force was estimated to be 711.5 million, of whom 50 per cent were engaged in agriculture, 22.5 per cent in manufacturing and 27.5 per cent in tertiary occupations. Problems of urban unemployment (ofﬁcially, the rate of registered urban unemployment was 3.1 per cent) and rural under-employment continued to be major sources of concern during the quarter. In 2000, SOE lay-offs numbered 6.57 million, 47,000 more than in 1999. Of these, 43.5 per cent were already registered at various re-employment agencies, while 97.3 per cent had secured allowances to cover basic living expenses. Around 3.61 million laid-off workers were said to have found new jobs, indicating a re-employment rate of 35.4 per cent (APE,26April and 8 May). In the countryside, there were calls from the Ministry of Agriculture to increase employment opportunities in township and village enterprises (TVEs) in order to help absorb the huge number of redundant farmers and other unemployed rural labourers (APP,27April). The establishment of an employment training system was seen as a major initiative designed to improve the quality of China’s labour force. As of end-April, 3,790 schools had been set up, with a total enrolment of more than 1.4 million students. In addition, some 8.96 million workers were said to have made use of the 3,750 employment-training centres and 150,000 vocational training agencies that now existed throughout China. In 2000 alone, the national employment training system trained 3.58 million laid-off workers, of whom 2.26 million subsequently found new jobs (XHNA in APP,27April). A Xinhua commentary (APP,6May) described the role of trade unions to China as protecting workers’ rights in the new conditions of the socialist market economy. To this end,

a trade union should discard the old work method of attaching equal importance to its various social functions. Instead, it should take the safeguarding of the rights and interests of workers and staff members as its basic function … [through] consultations on an equal footing and [reaching] collective agreements.

Meanwhile, Wei Jianxing (President of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions) was at pains to emphasise the need to rely on the working class by giving “free rein” to trade union organizations (APP,16May). Elsewhere, there were reports of further progress in the development of Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 813 endowment insurance reform, with 61.72 million people having pur- chased certificates providing for such insurance. Xinhua noted that between 1994 and 2000, the implementation of the State Eight-Seven Anti-Poverty Programme had enabled 80 million people to be lifted from absolute poverty and given sufficient food and clothing to meet their basic needs. A new ten-year programme – the Programme for Poverty Relief Through Development in China’s Rural Areas (2001–10) – was being launched in order finally to resolve the lack of food and clothing for the remaining poverty-stricken population (numbered at just 30 million) (APP,24May). In 2000, average per capita wage income for urban workers was estimated to be 9,371 yuan,arise of 11.4 per cent, in real terms, above the level of the previous year. The corresponding figures for workers in state enterprises and in collectively-owned enterprises were 6,262 and 10,984 yuan (APE,8May). In Shanghai on 7 June, Mike Moore, Director General of the World Trade Organization WTO, argued that the current slow-down of the global economy should serve to encourage more trade and facilitate investment liberalization. He noted that preparations were well under way for a new round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations to be held and, in a reference to China’s impending accession, he added that without China’s involvement, the WTO could not be considered a truly global institution (APP,7June). Elsewhere, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC) suggested that China’s WTO accession would result in annual inflows of foreign capital being raised to US$50 billion (cf the current level of US$42.7 billion) and predicted that the value of Chinese exports would have reached US$700–750 billion by 2005 (APP,19May). In Brussels on 19 June, Shi Guangsheng, Minister of MOFTEC, and Pascal Lamy, the European Union (EU) Trade Commissioner, held discussions on the final stage of China’s entry to WTO. Xinhua noted that the EU was seeking stronger pledges on access to the Chinese insurance market for European companies, as well as looking for clarification on trading rights for foreign firms operating in post-WTO China. Later, Shi spoke of a comprehensive consensus having been reached by the two sides on outstanding problems affecting Chinese entry (APP,19and 20 June). Subsequently, a MOFTEC source stated that China was expected to become a full member of WTO during 2001 – perhaps before or during the WTO trade ministers’ meeting in Doha (Qatar) in November. Committed FDI to China during January–May totalled US$25.97 billion, or 42.29 per cent more than during the same period of 2000. The corresponding figure for utilized FDI was US$15.057 billion–arise of 17.98 per cent (APE,14June). At the end of 2000, China’s registered outstanding foreign debt was reported to be US$145.73 billion (excluding Hong Kong), or 4 per cent less than in 1999 (APE,2April). Of this, medium and long-term debt totalled US$132.65 billion (US$4 billion less than in 1999), while short-term] debt was US$13.08 billion (US$2.1 billion less). It was also 814 The China Quarterly

revealed that in 2000, China had borrowed US$24.92 billion of foreign debt, and repaid principal of US$29.11 billion. The following is an institutional breakdown of China’s foreign debt: sovereign debt of ministries under the State US$48.96 billion (up 3.5 per cent) Council debt of domestic ﬁnancial institutions US$35.56 billion (down 13.1 per cent) debt of foreign-funded enterprises US$46.53 billion (down 1.6 per cent) debt of domestic enterprises US$13.52 billion (down 8.1 per cent) other US$ 1.16 billion (down 28.4 per cent) It was revealed that over the next four to ﬁve years, investment worth 24 billion yuan would be directed to projects designed to solve Beijing’s severe water shortage. Elsewhere, in a reference to the same problem – but on a national basis – the Vice-Minister of Water Resources, Zhang Jiyao, urged the adoption of a more rational system of water charges in order to enhance water conservation (APE,21June).

(d) Education In Beijing on 13 June, Zhu Rongji addressed a national conference devoted to basic education. The Chinese Premier stressed the importance of basic education and urged that it be given a strategic role. Its general standard in China remained too low and regionally uneven. The most serious problem was the lack of guaranteed and stable funding for compulsory education. It was this ﬁnancial constraint that had, in part, led to illegal levies and charges being made on peasants. Zhu was insistent that in rural areas, counties must assume the main responsibility for funding local compulsory education (APP,13June). A State Council decision on reforming basic education acknowledged that the nine-year system of compulsory education had been put into place in most regions, and claimed that illiteracy among the young and middle-aged had now been eliminated. But such achievements notwithstanding, there was still a pressing need for reform – in particular, for improvements in management, for the introduction of more effective teaching methods and personnel arrangements, and for the establishment of better teachers’ training programmes (APP,14June).

(e) Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) On 4 April, the Legislative Council gave a second reading to Donald Tsang’s final budget, approving it by 41 to 18 votes (APE,4April). Towards the end of the quarter, Tsang’s successor, Antony Leung, predicted the emergence of a budget deficit during the next one or two years as a result of the slowdown of other economies and restructuring in Hong Kong itself. He insisted, however, that any deficits that did emerge would not affect Hong Kong’s international credit rating (APP,8June). In a speech to mark Labour Day (1 May), HKSAR Chief Executive, Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 815

Tung Chee-hwa, urged the accelerated promotion of information technology in Hong Kong and further educational reform (especially an expan- sion of higher education opportunities) in order to maintain the region’s competitiveness. Tung spoke of Hong Kong’s successful recovery from the Asian financial crisis. In 2000, GDP growth reached 10.5 per cent and the rate of unemployment had been reduced from 6.3 to 4.6 per cent. He also noted inflows of FDI of HK$23 billion – the second-highest in Asia after China – during January–October 2000 (APP,1May). A cause of concern in Hong Kong and elsewhere was the detention in China of Li Shaomin, a U.S. citizen working as an Associate Professor at Hong Kong’s City University. It subsequently emerged that two other U.S. citizens working in Hong Kong – Gao Zhan and Qing Guangong – had also been separately detained (Radio Television Hong Kong, 30 March and 9 April in APP). On 8 May, Jiang Zemin made his third visit to Hong Kong since the retrocession to China of British sovereignty in order to attend the Fortune Global Forum 2001 (held during 8–10 May). In a speech to the Forum, Jiang spoke of the benefits of economic globalization for Asian countries – benefits that manifested themselves in terms of the encouragement of higher FDI, access to new markets, the further development of trade and economic co-operation, and the promotion of technological transfer. But he also warned of potential disadvantages – not least, the effect of exacerbating inter-regional developmental differentials and widening the North-South gap (XHNA, 8 May). Finally, Anson Chan’s retirement as Chief Secretary of HKSAR took place on 28 April. Her popularity was reflected in local calls encouraging her to maintain her informal involvement in Hong Kong affairs – perhaps in the capacity as a spokesperson for local democratic development. Meanwhile, Mrs Chan’s successor, the former Financial Secretary, Don- ald Tsang, encountered local criticism to the effect that he was “the Chief Executive’s yes-man” (APP,2May).

Foreign Relations (a) Diplomatic Tours On 4 April, President Jiang Zemin left Beijing on a diplomatic tour that would take him to five Latin American countries (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba and Venezuela). Following his arrival in Santiago, Jiang addressed the UN Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean Region. In his speech, he highlighted China’s wish to develop “stable, equal and mutually beneficial” co-operative relations with Latin America. To this end, both sides should seek to strengthen consultations and enhance trade and economic co-operation (in 2000, two-way trade between China and Latin American countries reached a record US$12.6 billion) (APP,6April). Also in Santiago, Jiang Zemin held talks with the Chilean President, Eduardo Frei and other officials, including the President of the Chilean Supreme Court (Hernan Alvarez). On 7 April, the Chinese President arrived in Buenos Aires, where his 816 The China Quarterly

talks with senior Argentinean government officials again focused on ways of further developing bilateral relations, especially in the fields of trade and economic co-operation. In Caracas, Jiang’s discussions with his Venezulean counterpart, Presi- dent Hugo Rafael Chavez, addressed bilateral relations and other international issues of common concern. The talks were described by Xinhua as having been constructive and having achieved “major, positive results.” Jiang spoke of China’s desire to strengthen trade, economic and technological co-operation with Venezuela, especially in the fields of agriculture and energy (APP,16and 18 April). Jiang Zemin travelled next to Brasilia. It was revealed by a local news agency that at the request of President George W. Bush, the Chinese President had held a private meeting with President Fernando Henrique Cardosa of Brazil, during which the two men discussed the recent “Hainan incident” (see below under “United States”). This private meeting followed a more formal encounter, in which Presidents Jiang and Cardosa had addressed issues relating to bilateral relations. Xinhua later described Jiang’s visit to Brazil as a major success that was likely to further enhance bilateral friendship and co-operation (APP,12April). The Chinese President’s final port of call was Havana, where he held talks with President Castro and other Cuban officials. Also in April, the Chinese Foreign Minister (Tang Jiaxuan) visited the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Russia, where he attended the Foreign Ministerial meeting of the “Shanghai Five.” In Prague (23 April), Tang held talks with Premier Milos Zeman. The two sides acknowledged that no political problems existed between them, and Zeman reaffirmed his government’s commitment to “one China.” Tang Jiaxuan also met the Czech Defence Minister, Vladimir Vetchy (APP, 24–25 April). In Kiev, the Chinese Foreign Minister held what were described as friendly and cordial discussions with the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma. Both sides expressed themselves satisfied with the development of bilateral relations (APP,25April). In Moscow, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, noted that relations between China and Russia were continuing to develop well, highlighting the 40 per cent increase in two-way trade during 2000 (to reach US$8 billion). During the same meeting, Putin and Tang also discussed international political and economic trends (“political multi-polarization and economic globalization”) (APP,29April; and see APP,3May for a report from the Press Trust of India (New Delhi), quoting an Indian Foreign Ministry source to the effect that China had virtually ruled out the possibility of joining a “strategic triangle” with India and Russia: Tang Jiaxuan was quoted as having told the Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, that such an idea was “premature”). In May, the Chinese Premier (Zhu Rongji) undertook visits to Pakistan, Nepal, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand. In Kathmandu, Zhu spoke of his government’s wish to strengthen friendship between China and Nepal and to extend bilateral co-operation. Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 817

A broad consensus was reported to have emerged out of his discussions with the Nepalese Prime Minister, Girija Prasad Koirala, including China’s willingness to give preferential treatment for Nepalese products in order to reduce China’s 12 billion rupee trade surplus (APP,14May). Following his visit to Pakistan, where he held talks with Foreign Minister Abdus Sathar, on 16 May Zhu arrived in Male´ for the ﬁrst visit to the Maldives ever to have been made by a Chinese head of government. Both sides acknowledged the favourable development of trade and economic co-operation between their two countries (APP,16May). On 18 May, the Chinese Premier arrived in Colombo, where he met President Mrs Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. Their discussions embraced a familiar range of bilateral and other issues of mutual concern (APP,18May). Finally, on 19 May, Zhu travelled to Bangkok. In his talks with the Thai Defence Minister, Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, he spoke of the Chinese government’s readiness to co-operate in the development of a high-speed railway link between Thailand and China. Zhu Rongji also met King Bhumibol Adulyadej and Premier Thaksin Shinawatra (APP, 19–22 May).

(b) Countries, Territories and Regions Africa (Sudan, Niger, Tanzania) Xinhua reported a meeting in Beijing (30 March) between Jiang Zemin and Vice-President Ali Muhammad Taha of Sudan. The Chinese Presi- dent spoke of China’s wish to strengthen bilateral co-operation (XHNA, 30 March). On 4 June, President Tandja Mamadon arrived in the Chinese capital for a 12-day working visit. His talks with Jiang Zemin focused on bilateral relations and international issues of common concern. Subse- quently, the two leaders witnessed the signing of two bilateral co-operation agreements: one on technological and economic co-operation; the other, a protocol on exempting Niger’s debt to China. President Mama- don also held discussions with Zhu Rongji, who spoke with satisfaction of the favourable momentum of the development of bilateral relations (APP, 4–6 June). Also on 6 June, the Foreign Minister of Tanzania (Jakaya Kikwete) arrived in Beijing for an ofﬁcial visit to China. Following their discussions, Kikwete and Tang Jiaxuan signed an agreement to provide for the establishment of a mechanism for political consultations between the two countries’ foreign ministries. The Tanzanian Foreign Minister also held a meeting with Zhu Rongji (APP, 6–7 June).

Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia, Tajikistan; Sixth Summit Meeting of the Shanghai Five [China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan]) 818 The China Quarterly

ITAR-TASS reported that in the course of talks between the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Losyukov, and his Chinese counterpart, Liu Guchang, it had been agreed that Russia and China would initial a new treaty (Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Co-operation). It was hoped that the Treaty would be formally signed by both sides during Jiang Zemin’s planned visit to Russia in mid-2001. According to Losyukov, the Treaty would “determine our relations for many years ahead … Mention will be made of the border, of each other’s support as regards sovereignty and combating terrorism” (APP,30 March). On 4 April, Xinhua noted that the Chinese and Russian Deputy Foreign Ministers, Zhang Deguang and G. Mamedov, had reached a broad consensus following their discussions of issues of strategic stability (including missile defence, disarmament and arms control). Both sides expressed their opposition to the United States’ planned development of National Missile Defence (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) systems. They also both urged compliance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I, and, at the earliest opportunity, enforce- ment of START II (APP,4April). ITAR-TASS noted the record growth of trade between Russia and China. Thus, in the first quarter of 2001, two-way trade reached US$2.393 billion – a rise of 65.7 per cent, year on year. China’s exports to Russia had risen by over 30 per cent; Russia’s to China were up 80 per cent. It was anticipated that bilateral trade for the entire year would reach US$8 billion (APE,6May). On 8 June, the Foreign Minister of Tajikistan, Talbak Nazarov, held talks in Beijing with Tang Jiaxuan. Tang took the opportunity of the discussions to express the Chinese government’s support for Tajikistan’s efforts to consolidate national independence and reinvigorate its economy (APP,7June). The Sixth Summit Meeting of the Shanghai Five took place in Shang- hai during 14–15 June. Presidents Vladimir Putin (Russia), Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan), Askar Akayev (Kyrgyzstan) and Emomali Pakhmanov (Tajikistan) joined President Jiang Zemin at the meeting. President Islam Karimov of Uzkebkistan was also invited to participate. Subsequently, following the announcement that Uzbekistan had been admitted to the organization, Jiang Zemin noted the decision to change its name to the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) (APP, 14 June). On the second day of the meeting, President Putin called on SCO members to maintain their opposition to international terrorism, national separatism and religious extremism, and illegal trafficking in drugs and weapons. These, he urged, should be the main foci of SCO activities. The six members of SCO later signed a communiqueónarms control, a convention on fighting terrorism, extremism and separatism, and a declar- ation on the establishment of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization. Jiang spoke of the “complete success” of the SCO’s most recent meeting (APP,15June; see also RMRB,16June). Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 819

Eastern Europe (Macedonia) On 12 June, it was announced that the government of Macedonia had decided to restore normal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. The decision followed a period of 18 months, in which diplomatic relations had existed between Macedonia and Taiwan (see separate statements from China and Taiwan in APP,13and 15 June).

Japan A ZXS report quoted Premier Yoshiro Mori as telling a Renmin ribao delegation that the Japanese government’s position on history was one of “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” for the harm caused by Japanese colonial rule and wartime aggression (APP,31March). Be that as it may, on 3 April, the Chinese Ambassador to Japan (Chen Jian) expressed regret that the Japanese government had given approval to a history textbook which allegedly left unchanged the “essence of denial and beautification of Japan’s past aggression” – even to the extent of making no mention of the Nanking Massacre (APP,3April, which also quotes a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman’s critical reference to the “right- wing” textbook). Kyodo meanwhile reported that the Japanese government had no plans to revise the textbook, nor to urge local education authorities in Japan to boycott its use. Foreign Minister Yohei Kono insisted that a panel drawn from the Ministry of Education had impartially vetted the book, which would be used in junior high schools throughout Japan. The seriousness of the developing situation was evidenced by the decision by Tang Jiaxuan to summon the Japanese Ambassador to China (Koreshige Anami) in order to receive the Chinese government’s solemn representations over official Japanese approval of the textbook (APP,4April). An official of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Politi- cal Consultative Conference (CPPCC) also accused Japan of having “undisguisedly propagated an ‘imperial historical perspective,’ distorted history, and prettified aggression” (APP,4April). On 16 May, at the request of the Chinese government, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials called in an official from the Japanese embassy in Beijing in order that he might receive a memorandum on the textbook issue, the content of which echoed the points cited above. Nor was the situation helped by the reported intention of Junichiro Koizumi (President of the Liberal Demo- cratic Party and at this point likely future Japanese Prime Minister) to visit the Yasukuni War Shrine, which honours 2.5 million war dead (Kyodo in APP,24April). In Beijing on 24 May, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Makiko Tanaka, held talks with her Chinese counterpart, Tang Jiaxuan (Kyodo in APP,24 May). Tang raised both the textbook and Yasukuni Shrine issues, in response to which Ms Tanaka spoke of her distress that the incidents had caused such distress and gave an assurance that her government would abide by the 1995 statement given by the (then) Prime Minister, acknowl- 820 The China Quarterly

edging aggression by Japan and pledging a “self examination.” Ms Tanaka also gave a personal assurance that she would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine. At the very end of the previous quarter (30 March), Chinese and Japanese ofﬁcials signed documents on Japanese yen loans, totalling 197.197 billion yen (c. US$1.6 billion), to be extended to China in 2000. The loans were to be used for 23 projects, including infrastructural construction and improving the rural environment. Xinhua noted that as of the end of March 2001, the Japanese government had extended loans worth 2.6677 trillion yen to China, facilitating the implementation of 171 construction projects. On 26 May, Kyodo reported a Japanese decision to withdraw ﬁnancial assistance to China for the purpose of infrastructural development in coastal provinces in favour of concentrating efforts on environmental conservation and the improvement of living standards in the interior of the country (APP,26May).

Latin America (Venezuela, Mexico) On 24 May, the Venezuelan President, Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias, arrived in Beijing for a state visit to China. His talks with Jiang Zemin focused on bilateral relations and international issues of common interest. Noting that trade and economic co-operation were progressing well (trade reached US$351 million in 2000, or 86 per cent more than in 1999), Jiang expressed his country’s readiness to expand bilateral co-operation and revealed that Venezuela was the single most important targeted desti- nation for Chinese investment in Latin America. Subsequently, the two sides signed an oil agreement, whereby Chinese state and privately owned enterprises would participate in oil exploration, exploitation and reﬁning projects in Venezuela. President Chavez also met Zhu Rongji (APP, 24–25 May). The following month saw a four-day state visit to China by the Mexican President, Vincente Fox Quescada. Both he and Jiang Zemin spoke of the positive momentum of the development of relations between their two countries. The Mexican President noted that China and Mexico were good partners, not competitors, and he also expressed his country’s willingness to enhance co-operation with China in the ﬁeld of human rights. The two sides later signed a Co-operation Agreement between their procuratorates (APP,6June).

Middle East (Palestine) In Beijing on 2 April, Zhu Rongji held talks with the Prime Minister of Qatar, Abdullah Bin-Khalifah Al Thani. The Chinese Premier spoke of the importance with which his government viewed the visit. He spoke with satisfaction of the development of bilateral trade and economic relations (APP,2April). Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 821

North-east Asia (North Korea [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]; (South Korea [Republic of Korea]) Xinhua reported that in Beijing on 30 March, Vice-Premier Qian Qichen had held talks with the North Korean Vice-Foreign Minister, Pak Kil-yu. Qian was at pains to stress the determination of the Chinese government and CCP further to consolidate and enhance relations with DPRK. He spoke of progress towards this goal having been enhanced by the visit to China of General Secretary Kim Jong-il in January. He also referred to the forthcoming visit to North Korea by President Jiang Zemin. The two sides were said to have reached a broad consensus on bilateral and international issues (APP,30March). During his visit to South Korea (23–27 May), Li Peng, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, held talks with President Kim Dae-jung on bilateral relations, as well as regional and other issues of mutual concern and interest. He spoke of the rapid development of bilateral relations that had characterized recent years and reafﬁrmed the Chinese government’s determination to establishment a “co-operative partnership oriented towards the twenty-ﬁrst century” (APP,25May). The following month, the South Korean Prime Minister (Lee Han- dong) travelled to Beijing, where he held more talks with Li Peng and also met Jiang Zemin.

The Paciﬁc (Papua New Guinea) On 28 May, the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea (PNG), Mekere Morauta, arrived in Beijing for a one-week visit to China. Zhu told Morauta of his government’s wish to seek closer co-operative relations with PNG. The two men discussed a range of bilateral and international issues and reached a broad consensus. They later witnessed the signing of an agreement on inter-governmental economic and technological co-operation (APP,29May).

South Asia and India Ocean (India, Pakistan, Maldives) On 8 April, the Press Trust of India (PTI) reported the resumption of high-level military-to-military exchanges between India and China in the form of the just concluded visit to China by the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army (Eastern Command). During his visit, Lt-Gen. Kalkar had held discussions with the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Peo- ple’s Liberation Army, Gen. Fu Quanyou (APP,8April). The following month, Zhu Rongji visited Pakistan. He expressed himself encouraged by the development of bilateral trade and economic co-operation, and referred too to the good state of political relations between the two countries. He urged even closer co-operation, especially in the ﬁelds of agriculture and infrastructural construction, and called for the exploration of new areas and forms of co-operation (including the establishment of joint ventures, leasing projects and so on). After his talks 822 The China Quarterly

in Islamabad, Zhu travelled to Lahore, where he praised Pakistan’s consistent support for China in its domestic and international affairs (APP, 12–13 May). On 21 and 22 June, the Foreign Minister of the Maldives, Fathulla Jameel, held talks with senior Chinese ofﬁcials, including Vice-President Hu Jintao and Tang Jiaxuan. Both sides pledged themselves to the development of long-run and stable bilateral relations.

South-East Asia (Malaysia, Brunei) The Malaysian Head of State, Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah, visited China in April, and held talks with Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji. Jiang praised the success of Malaysia’s efforts to overcome the ﬁnancial crisis and endorsed its efforts to secure renewed economic growth (APP, 24 April). The following month, Qian Qichen held talks in Beijing with the Foreign Minister of Brunei, Prince Mohamad [Bolkiah], who had travelled to the Chinese capital in order to attend the Foreign Ministerial Meeting of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Both sides expressed themselves satisﬁed with the development of bilateral relations (APP,23 May).

Taiwan [Republic of China] A XHNA report (29 April) spoke of the new dilemmas and tensions in cross-Strait relations that had emerged since the original talks between Wang Dao-han, Chairman of the Association of Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), and Koo Chen-fu [Zhenfu], Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), in 1992. The Xinhua commentary attributed the deterioration in relations between China and Taiwan to the “separatist activities” of the former President of Taiwan (Lee Teng-hui) and the refusal of his successor, President Chen Shui-bian, to acknowl- edge the “one China” principle. Xinhua quoted from an article in an ARATS-sponsored journal, criticizing Chen Shui-bian for also having refused to recognize the “1992 [Wang-Koo] consensus” and thereby prevented renewed dialogue (see also RMRB,30April). A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman subsequently insisted that acceptance by Taiwan of the “one China” principle would facilitate the discussion of any issue by the two sides – including the removal of missiles deployed in Fujian (APP,8June; and see the response by Taiwan’s Vice President, Annette Lu in ibid.). On 31 March, a CNA report noted that for the first time since 1949, a Chinese Mainland-registered freight ship had travelled directly across the Taiwan Straits to a Taiwanese port (in this case, Liaolo Harbour in Kinmen (Jinmen, or Quemoy)). A little more than a week later, the first reciprocal voyage was undertaken by a private ship from Kinmen to Xiamen (CNA in APP,9April). Both trips reflected the extent of progress towards implementation of the “three mini links” put in place at Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 823 the beginning of 2001. Later in April, a Chinese Mainland ferry sailed directly to another ROC port (Matsu), where it collected 201 illegal immigrants for repatriation (APP,24April). The arrival in Taipei, on 31 March, of the Dalai Lama elicited inevitable condemnation from Chinese sources (see APP,30and 31 March; also Hong Kong, Ta-kung pao,2April and Wenweipo [Wenhui bao], 2 April). But regarded as much more provocative was the Japanese government’s decision to allow former President Lee Teng-hui to visit Japan in order to receive medical treatment. In the wake of the decision, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wang Yi urgently summoned the Japanese Ambassador in Beijing (Koreshige Anami) and described Lee’s proposed visit as a pretext to “peddle his ‘Taiwan independence’ policy.” The visit, said Wang, would be a violation of the principles enshrined in the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement (APP,20April; see also RMRB,21 April and ZXS in APP,21April). In the event, Lee did travel to Japan, where he stayed from 22 to 26 April. On 8 May, the former Taiwanese Prime Minister, Vincent Siew, left Taiwan for China, where he headed a delegation seeking to promote the establishment of a cross-Strait “common market” (APP,8May). Xinhua later reported that Siew had held talks in Shanghai with Huang Ju (a member of the CCPCC Politburo and Secretary of the Shanghai Munici- pal CCP Committee) (APP,13May; on Siew’s notion of a cross-Strait common market, see also APP, April). CNA reported that Taiwan’s China External Trade Development Coun- cil (CETRA) was to set up an office in China in an effort to strengthen bilateral trade. The Chairman of CETRA argued that against the background of deteriorating market conditions in Japan and the United States, it was important to expand Taiwan’s exports to the Mainland. The CNA report acknowledged, however, that discussions between CETRA and its Mainland counterpart (the China Council for the Promotion of Inter- national Trade) had not yet taken place (APE,3April). In April, the fifth Xiamen-Taiwan Trade Fair generated contractual trade deals worth US$420 million – 80 per cent more than in 2000. According to Xinhua, the total value of two-way trade between Xiamen and Taiwan had totalled US$1.2 billion in 2000. Meanwhile, CNA noted that in January and February 2001, the value of trade between Taiwan and the Mainland was US$4.15 billion (down 2.1 per cent, year on year). During this period, Taiwan enjoyed a trade surplus of US$2.467 billion (a fall of 2.9 per cent) (APP,27April).

United States of America From Beijing, Kyodo reported that in the morning of 1 January, a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft had been involved in a collision with a Chinese “Jian-8” ﬁghter plane over international waters in the South China Sea. According to the U.S. Navy Paciﬁc Command, the American 824 The China Quarterly

aircraft later landed at an airport on Hainan Island. None of the 24 crew members was reported to have been injured. A report of the incident on China Central TV acknowledged that two Chinese military planes had been observing the U.S. air patrol, when, at 0907, the American aircraft made a sudden and unexpected turn towards the Chinese planes, so that “its nose and left wing bumped against a Chinese plane, causing it to crash.” The U.S. aircraft was described as having then entered China’s territorial airspace, illegally and without permission, and landed at Lingshui Airport (Hainan) at 0933. The TV report was unequivocal in stating that the direct cause of the accident was the violation of flight regulations by the American aircraft. Subsequently, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that “appropriate arrangements” would be made for the aircraft crew. Later, on 1 April, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong called in the American Ambassador in Beijing, Joseph Prueher, to whom he made solemn representations and protested against the air collision. Zhou insisted that it accorded with normal international practice for Chinese military planes to track the movements of aircraft flying over “China’s sea areas.” He reiterated that the direct cause of the crash was violation of flight rules by the American aircraft. Accordingly, it was the United States that should assume full responsibility for the incident. Zhou added that the U.S. had “seriously violated” China’s sovereignty by subsequently entering Chinese airspace and landing in Hainan without official permission. Similar representations were made to Ambassador Prueher in the course of meetings in Beijing with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, on 3 and 4 April, and in Washington between the Chinese Ambassador, Yang Jiechi, and U.S. State Department officials. On 3 April, Jiang Zemin called on the U.S. to halt all “spy flights” in the airspace of Chinese coastal waters. Jiang also issued an instruction to search for the pilot of the downed Chinese fighter plane “at any cost.” In the event, the search was unsuc- cessful and the pilot, Wang Wei, was eventually considered as missing, presumed dead. At a ceremony to honour his memory, Wang was posthumously given the title of “Guardian of the Sea and Air” by order of the Central Military Commission, signed by Jiang Zemin (APP,24 April). Meanwhile, in Hainan, arrangements were made for U.S. Embassy officials to meet the crew on several occasions. A Foreign Ministry spokesman insisted, however, that the American aircraft did not enjoy diplomatic immunity and added that the Chinese side had the right to inspect it (XHNA, 3 April). Despite further accusations against the United States for having allegedly violated “international law” (for example, see Qin Xiaocheng, Secretary General of the China International Law Society, quoted by Hong Kong, Ta-kung pao,7April, to the effect that the landing in Hainan constituted an “illegal state act in terms of international law”), it was noticeable that public demonstrations in China in the wake of the incident were quite muted, certainly in comparison with those that had occurred Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 825 following the American bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999. As early as 9 April it was being reported that several rounds of diplomatic discussions had already taken place in an effort to resolve the situation arising out of the air incident, and later the same month it was announced that Lu Shumin, head of the U.S. and Atlantic Section of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, had been appointed to head the Chinese side in formal negotiations. The negotiations duly opened on 18 April, when the main items on the agenda were: discussion of the causes of the incident; representations by China to the effect that the United States should halt all reconnaissance activities in Chinese coastal waters; and consideration of how to avoid a repetition of the incident (APP,17April). In the event, American reconnaissance flights over the Chinese coast resumed on 7 May, no challenge being elicited from Chinese aircraft (Kyodo in APP,7May). By this time, the 24 American crew members had returned to the United States. There was strong criticism of American arms sales to Taiwan during the quarter. The Chinese view was that arms purchases were being used by Taiwan to bolster aspirations towards independence, with which President Chen Shui-bian was accused of sympathising, while also encouraging the United States to interfere in cross-Strait affairs. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman urged Washington not to sell advanced weaponry – for example, Kidd-class destroyers, submarines and P-3C submarine-pursuit patrol aircraft – to Taiwan. China, she said, was firmly opposed to such sales on the ground that they violated the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communique´s and would constitute a “serious infringement of China’s sovereignty and wanton interference in China’s internal affairs” (APP,24April, quoting XHNA). A ZTS report from Hong Kong noted that in advance of the annual U.S.–Taiwan arms sales meeting (due to take place in Washington on 24 April), the United States had revealed its exclusion of sales of Aegis destroyers – the most sensitive item on Taiwan’s “wish list.” But most of the other items sought by Taiwan were expected to be made available. Such sales were bound to hurt Sino-U.S. relations. The American argu- ment that such sales were justified by the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act was viewed as no more than a pretext used by Washington in order to “satisfy Taiwan’s defence requirements” (APP,24April). Another ZTS report reaffirmed Chinese opposition to American plans to implement its National Missile Defence (NMD) plan. A Foreign Ministry source described NMD as a threat to international strategic balance and argued that its implementation would merely serve to encourage a new arms race. The same source also expressed the Chinese government’s opposition to U.S. Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) plans, which, it was argued, would threaten the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific Region (APP,18May). A Chinese source interpreted the decision to vote the United States off the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) (3 May), for the first time since UNCHR’s establishment in 1946, as a reflection of widespread 826 The China Quarterly

opposition to efforts by the U.S. to use human rights in order to “pursue its power politics and hegemonism in the world” (XHNA in APP,4May, which also quotes Shen Guofang on alleged interference by the U.S. in the internal affairs of other countries on the pretext of human rights). Finally, it was revealed that in response to the ﬁrst such request by an American Navy vessel since the “Hainan incident,” Beijing had refused to allow USS Inchon to visit Hong Kong (APP,29May).

Western Europe (France, Austria, Denmark, Italy; the European Union [EU]) On 31 March, Tang Jiaxuan arrived in Paris for a three-day visit. His discussions with President Chirac were described as having taken place in a “cordial and friendly” atmosphere and Tang was reported to have spoken of fresh progress in the development of bilateral relations since Chirac’s visit to China (October 2000). The Chinese Foreign Minister added that his government attached great importance to the pursuit of “long-term, stable relations of friendship and co-operation” between China and France. In the course of the discussions, President Chirac noted with satisfaction China’s recent ratiﬁcation of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (APP, 15–16 May). In May, the President of Austria (Thomas Klestil) travelled to China, where he held talks with Chinese leaders, including Jiang Zemin. Jiang noted the positive momentum of the development of bilateral relations, drawing particular attention to the 14 per cent rise (to US$780 million) in two-way trade during 2000. Klestil revealed that the Austrian delegation of businessmen accompanying him had signed contracts with their Chi- nese partners valued at hundreds of millions of dollars (APP, 15–16 June). Later the same month, Vice-Premier Qian Qichen held talks in Beijing with the Danish Foreign Minister, Mogens Lykketoft. He spoke of the Chinese government’s readiness to strengthen bilateral relations. Later during his visit, Lykketoft also met Tang Jiaxuan and Shi Guangsheng (MOFTEC Minister) (APP, 21, 23 and 24 May). (Also in May, the Foreign Minister of Italy, Lamberto Dini, visited Beijing, where he held discussions on bilateral and other international issues with his Chinese counterpart, Tang Jiaxuan.) In Brussels (1 May), Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations, held discussions with Li Tieying, CCPCC Politburo member and President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). On behalf of the EU, Patten expressed the hope that China and the European Union would strengthen exchanges and co-operation in energy, environmental protection and social security. He also noted progress in the development of a bilateral political dialogue (APP,1May).

(c) International Organizations (United Nations [UN], Asia-Europe Meeting [ASEM] In April, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman let it be known that Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 827

China supported the Appointment of Koﬁ Annan to a second term as UN Secretary General (APP,26April). The same month saw a visit to China by Harri Holkein, President of the 55th UN General Assembly. During his visit, Holkein held talks with Tang Jiaxuan. Finally, in May, foreign ministers from 25 ASEM Member States, as well as the EU Commissioner for External Relations, travelled to Beijing in order to attend the Third ASEM Foreign Ministerial Meeting. The main theme of Jiang Zemin’s speech to the meeting (25 May) was the desirability of strengthening the Asia-Europe partnership in the 21st century. Notwithstanding Chinese references to the “fruitful results” of the ASEM meeting, Kyodo noted that the discussions had ended without any “surprising breakthroughs” (APP,25May, which also contains the full text of the formal statement, adopted at the foreign ministers’ meeting). Both Jiang Zemin and Vice-Premier Qian Qichen took advantage of the ASEM meeting to hold their separate meetings with the foreign ministers of many ASEM Member States, including Belgium, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and Vietnam.