Modern Bulgarian political culture has emerged in result of intricately interlaced and inherited beliefs, views, values, and practices, coupled with new and continuously mastered and internalized modes of political com- mitment and conduct. The prevailing political cultural in Bulgaria today is rather strongly marked by community conservatism, national dreams, person-centered- ness, as well as distrust towards the political class as a whole. The activist culture in contemporary Bulgaria is limited, even marginal, divided into two opposing halves: civic activity and nationalist mobilization. The commitment of the trade unions remains superficial and pro- fessionalized. The trade unions themselves are in quite a weak position within the existing system of social dialog. The civic sector in today’s Bulgaria is strongly dependent on external funding; it is lacking sufficient internal support. Activities promoting civic participation are very restricted. Such a civic participation does exist, but only in limited and dispersed sectors of society, whereby its manifestations are more of a sporadic nature.

March 2011 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 1

Contents

1. Introduction...... 2 2. Unique Features of Bulgarian Political Culture...... 3 3. Going into Politics and Political Commitment...... 9 3.1. Typology of Party Membership...... 15 3.2. Participation in Civic Organizations and Movements...... 18 4. Modern Bulgarian Political Culture Facing the Test of Europe...... 22 Bibliography...... 27 2 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

1. Introduction reason-based approaches. The approach to political culture, which is viewed as a politi- Political participation has been subject to nu- cal explanatory theory, often contradicts the merous studies over the past several decades. reason-based approach of rational choices, The issue has been formulated in different which views politics as a market where the ways in the social sciences and initially it has participants make rational decisions based been treated in terms of “civic duty’, i.e. “the on their own judgments about the possible obligation to participate” as an element of costs and benefits from making one or anoth- the mandatory understanding of democracy, er choice. Political culture is looking for the be it ancient or modern democracy. In their sociological explanations of the political be- omnibus comparative study on civic culture, havior of individuals and social groups rather, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba devote a and these are explanations based on shared whole chapter to “the obligation to partici- values and beliefs, including emotions and ir- pate” (Almond, Verba 1963). But in the pro- rational motivations. In the opinion of Todor cess of reasoning on this issue, they actually Tanev, this opposition can be explained with found out that in modern democracies the the “pre-adolescent age” of political science. commitment of citizens is, in fact, far too fee- This is the reason why he offers a synthetic ble, and their participation is too restricted. In approach to the notion in his large-scale re- his study on democracy, Robert Dahl ranked search work entitled “Political Culture”, in “effective participation” as the number one which political culture itself emerges as a re- criterion for the existence of this particular sult of a complicated cultural choice, whereby political regime (Dahl 1999: 44). This, howev- pure rationality is always complemented by er, did not prevent him from finding out that cultural rationality (Tanev 2001: 18-19). modern democracies are actually based on In essence, there are several political cul- precisely such a limited level of participation. tures coexisting in modern Bulgarian society in On the level of individuals, participation the way they have been defined by G. Almond in politics and public life as a whole is based and S. Verba, namely: traditional, restrained on beliefs and notions related to what poli- (i.e. inhibited, suppressed, or controlled), and tics is all about and what is the significance of civic (Almond, Verba 1998). But we are also individual participation therein. These beliefs capable of defining a dominant political cul- and notions are simultaneously an inherited ture, which is made up by the cultural mod- experience from previous generations (politi- els shared by the majority of the population. cal culture), acquired experience and amassed What has been inherited here merges with knowledge making it possible for people the new, as political culture is always in a pro- to get oriented in political life (civic compe- cess of renewal. And yet, the newly emerg- tence), and internalized political values, self- ing cultural models, which nowadays are consciousness about what is important in connected to a large extent with Bulgaria’s public life, and also what is correct and what EU membership, do not necessarily possess is incorrect (value hierarchies). upsides only. In the same way, Europe has al- Political culture has been subject to re- ways been associated with positive values in search for only a relatively short period of the Bulgarian mass consciousness, but Europe time, i.e. this is a new concept, which has is not the only source of positive changes. The now become well established in social sci- gradual sinking-in of the realization that Euro- ences. Political theory makes a distinction be- pean societies are also marked by certain con- tween two approaches to political phenom- tradictory features is part and parcel of the ena, namely: the culture-oriented and the ongoing process of the modernization, which Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 3 is currently taking place in Bulgarian political civic culture. To outline these features would culture. It is connected with overcoming the prove valuable only if they are subsequently belief that over there, “in the white coun- made subject to critical reasoning and consid- tries” (as one can often hear or read), things eration, including the clarification of the so- are certainly better than they seem to be in cial structures that support them. this country, “over there” everything is better in comparison with the situation “over here”. 2. Unique Features of Bulgarian If we assume that there is a dominant Political Culture political culture, which also coexists with more or less marginal and/or minority politi- Bulgarian political culture has been the sub- cal cultures, then the major question should ject matter of numerous analyses and research be: what is the nature of this political culture, works carried out in various academic fields, what are the political values and habits that namely: history, philosophy, historical anthro- are imposed, disseminated, and have survived pology, sociology, and political science. One the test of time in today’s Bulgarian society. segment of the texts devoted to this research As a consequence of the above, here come subject is qualified as “national or people’s some subsequent questions, such as those psychology”. What has always been at stake concerning the specific mechanisms, which in this case is the danger of going into a field maintain the dominant political culture, and of apparent triviality, which claims to recon- the possibility for developing an enduring and struct Bulgarian political culture. prevailing civic political culture in Bulgaria. One of the recognized and respected au- Modern Bulgarian political culture is a mix- thors who have researched “the Bulgarian ture of inherited and newly acquired political national character” is Ivan Hadjiysky, who has values, habits, and practices. We cannot possi- produced reference texts on the “way of life bly explain everything with tradition, although and spiritual nature of the Bulgarian nation”. in our daily discourse we often resort to justi- His approach is sociological and it makes it fications such as “the 500-year long Turkish possible for us to reconstruct to a large ex- domination” or “the 45-year long communist tent an acceptable picture of the major value- dictatorship”. Nowadays, the young people oriented traits of modern society in Bulgaria in Bulgaria who have no personal experience after the Liberation from Turkish domination whatsoever of communism (let alone the in 1878. Having in mind that in all of the “Turkish domination”) make up almost one preceding years national liberation struggles third of the voters in the country. The new ele- had been waged, it is in these first years of ments in Bulgarian political culture have come independent political development precisely in result of the acquisition of a personal, mod- that the principal elements of what we have ern-times experience, which is becoming in- to analyze as Bulgarian national political cul- creasingly more often a European experience, ture today were formed and disseminated. ensuing from our recent EU accession. “Collectivism – individualism – selfishness: If we go back to the question raised above these are the three major periods in the ethi- about the type of the prevailing political cul- cal development of Bulgarians thus far. These ture, which is being established in Bulgarian periods are the offspring of different social society nowadays, and ask ourselves wheth- epochs and their typical bearers are different er this could be civic culture indeed, then it social groups”, is what Ivan Hadjiysky wrote would be interesting to analyze those fea- in the 1930s in his “Moral Philosophy of the tures of the modern political culture in Bulgar- New-time Bulgarians” (Hadjiysky, 1997: 134). ia that contradict the features of the genuine These three major periods are personified 4 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

by the peasantry who happily lived together of a lasting nature, but they are by no means (collectivism), the petty craftsmen (individu- predetermined and fatal in any sense. On the alism), and the then moral bias of his own contrary, they are also subject to change, es- contemporaries (selfishness). The moral trait pecially as far as their structure and composi- of selfishness was the embodied feature of tion are concerned. What can be elicited from merchants and capitalists, both before and R. Daskalov’s study are the following charac- after the Liberation (Hadjiysky, 1997: 175). teristics of Bulgarian political life: A systematic attempt has been made to • Egalitarianism, which is most gener- tell the history of Bulgarian society from the ally connected with the rural roots of the Liberation in 1878 up to the eve of World post-liberation Bulgarian society. War II. It is a large-scale two-volume work en- • The weak civil society, which is mani- titled “Bulgarian Society. 1878-1939” and its fested both in the strong dependence of author is Roumen Daskalov (Daskalov, 2005). the parties in power and the difficulty they At the same time, quite a number of stud- experience to survive in opposition. ies concerning the next epoch of communist • Political personification, which leads rule have now been published and one of the to the identification of parties with their most monumental ones is the research work leaders, to strong party fragmentation, of Ivailo Znepolsky entitled “Bulgarian Com- and to the short durability of party politi- munism. Socio-cultural Traits and Power Tra- cal life. jectory” (Znepolsky, 2008). As far as the pe- • Political violence, which was a phenom- riod after 1989 is concerned, there are several enon frequently resorted to and which large-scale studies, which make it possible has left traumatic imprints in the Bulgar- to reconstruct the elements of Bulgarian po- ian social memory. litical culture. More specifically, those worth • Prevalence of personal regimes as a vari- mentioning are: the book of Plamen Georgiev ety of authoritarianism, whereby the ma- “Bulgarian Political Culture” (Georgiev, 2000), jor decisions in politics always depend on the book of Evgenia Kalinova and Iskra Baeva the supreme leader. “The Bulgarian Transitions. 1939-2002” (Ka- • The special attitude to Russia, be it linova, Baeva, 2001), and also several socio- friendly or hostile, which however is a part logical and culture studies, such as the work of the more general idea about the patron of the team of researchers entitled “The Net- who protects Bulgaria. works of the Transition. What Actually Hap- • The strong emphasis put on the subject of pened in Bulgaria after 1989 (Chalukov et national unification, manifested in the al., 2008), as well as the study published by form of both the various national dreams Andrei Raichev and Kuncho Stoichev entitled (e.g. the yearning for Macedonia, Aegean “What Happened?” (Raichev, Stoichev 2008). Thracia, etc.) and the glorification of lead- The careful examination of Roumen Das- ers connected with the national idea. kalov’s study makes it possible to identify In the conclusion of her comparative study several important characteristics of Bulgarian entitled “Adaptation of Freedom”, which political society in the period between the focuses on the experience of Romania and Bulgarian Liberation and 1939. These charac- Serbia, Diana Mishkova makes the following teristic features seem to have preserved their observation: “The most remarkable feature of significance, carrying it beyond the end of this all post-Ottoman Balkan societies in the 19th period, and so much so that one is even likely century – with the exception of Romania – is to identify them in contemporary society as their relatively non-differentiated social pro- well. These characteristic features seem to be file” (Mishkova, 2001: 221). In the 1930s, Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 5

Ivan Hadjiysky also made a mention of this reasoning implies a second, non-democratic egalitarian culture, as actually did before him dimension of egalitarianism, which generates numerous observers of Bulgarian political life the readiness to accept authoritarian gover- at the end of the 19th century (such as the nance, as long as its embodiment manifests Czech professor Konstantin Jireček or Pavel the features of an uncontestable authority Milyukov, for instance). (such was the situation, for instance, at the To a large extent and for a long period of time of the dictatorship established by Stefan time, Bulgarian society remained rural and Stambolov, but also during the governance of patriarchal, based upon the immediate equal- Alexander Samboliysky, and upon the accep- ity and solidarity typical for the small com- tance of the authoritarian regime of May 19th munity of the clan. The prevailing manners in 1934, or even afterwards, upon the imposi- the national-liberation movement, where the tion of the communist regime). The egalitarian early political habits in the then young mod- attitudes are also connected with the fact that ern political society were formed, stemmed there was no landed aristocracy in Bulgaria from the customs typical for the peasants and – neither even of the “on site” type, which craftsmen who were the dominant part of the emerged in Serbia, nor of the hereditary type, activists of this movement. According to Ivan as the situation observed in Romania. It is for Hadjiysky, these manners and their origins this reason precisely that the “elitist conserva- were also the deep foundations of the demo- tive” party in Bulgaria has always been rather cratic traditions of the Bulgarian nation and feeble, while the “populist conservative” par- this was the thesis he developed in his essay ty has enjoyed a fair amount of support. entitled “The Historical Roots of Our Demo- The feeble civil society in Bulgaria has cratic Traditions (Hadjiysky, 1997: 22-23). Pla- largely resulted from this late modernization, men Georgiev takes a similar stance and goes but it is also due to some of its peculiarities. on to make a detailed analysis of the dynamic For a number of reasons, the entities of the development of Bulgarian national conscious- organized private sector (such as, for instance, ness as an awareness of the interests of the the craftsmen guilds from the 19th century, or entire community, which differ from both the trade unions and cooperatives between private corporate interests and the inter- the two world wars in 20th century) were, on ests of the various professional guilds. In his the whole, among the most vulnerable enti- opinion, egalitarianism in Bulgarian political ties subject to political repressions. They were culture is based on the dominant patriarchal a fertile soil conducive to the emergence of culture, which was replaced in the course of a participation-based political culture. The the preparation for the 1876 April Uprising by defeat of the 1876 April Uprising, as Plamen a “typically Bulgarian culture of participating Georgiev notes, dealt a blow on the culture of subjects”, marked by their subjugation to and participation in Bulgarian society. Much in the admiration for the charismatic leader (Geor- same way, a blow was dealt on the network giev, 2000: 96-103, 125). Quite similar is the of cooperatives strongly dependent on parties, thesis launched by Roumen Avramov in his such as the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union study entitled “The Unrealized Conservative or the Bulgarian Communist Party, by the re- Manifesto of Bulgaria”. Avramov reckons that prisals directed at the left-wing parties in the the deeply rooted egalitarian and commu- period between 1923 and 1925. This overall nal economic traditions in Bulgarian society situation of a poorly organized private sector nourished “the organic refusal to accept the had a bearing upon the autonomy of the po- principles of capitalist rationality” (Avramov, litical parties themselves. In their greater ma- 1998: 744; Avramov 2001: 150). The latter jority and throughout the whole period before 6 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

the establishment of communist rule, these rowings from former parties were only super- parties were devoid of strong roots and were ficial, as the previously amassed experience poorly implanted in the tissue of Bulgarian so- could not have been employed in practice. ciety, hence they did not enjoy the stable sup- What was observed was the same continuing port of certain public sectors. These parties, lack of proper “implantation” of these new to a large extent, were groupings based on parties as well, whereby a certain exception the principle of patron/clientele relations (Das- should be allowed here for the Bulgarian So- kalov, 2005: 178). An exception to this situa- cialist Party (BSP), which was capable of avail- tion are the so-called “ideological parties” (in ing itself from the organizational network of the formulation coined by Roumen Daskalov), its predecessor – the BCP. Even today, the ma- among which the author includes the agrar- jority of the parties strongly depend on their ians, the social democrats, and the radical stay in the corridors of power, they have no democrats, as well as some of the para-fascist reliable public support, and run the risk of dis- parties, which emerged in the 1930s. The un- appearing, if they fail to make it back to Par- derlying problem all these parties shared was liament and remain out of office for a longer that because of the political development, the period of time. This fact is further reinforced coup d‘états, the political reprisals, and – ulti- by a process common to all European democ- mately – the total ban on the functioning of racies, namely the crisis of the “old” parties, the parties in 1934, they all failed to perform which by way of paradox concern the new their proper party building functions from an parties in Central and Eastern Europe as well. organizational point of view. To a large degree, the parties in Bulgaria As soon as the Bulgarian Communist used to be strongly personalized – even the Party (BCP) established its monopoly position traditional party labels, used in journalist pub- around 1947-1948, the multi-party system lications, stem from the names of the respec- was liquidated and, in result, the attempt for tive party leaders, e.g.: Karavelov’s people, involvement with party life vanished for a span Tzankov’s people, Stambolov’s people, and of 45 years. Despite this general framework, later – Radoslavov’s people, Tonchev’s peo- whereby the organized private sector was ple, Dragiev’s people, etc. Roumen Daskalov completely “outlawed”, during the 1960s, points out this personalization in the follow- when a certain degree of liberalization was in- ing way: “From an organizational point of troduced, a sizeable, though strongly restrict- view, for a long time the parties remained a ed, private sector began to develop, mostly in grouping around a single leader, with local the form of subsistence farming, but also in party nuclei formed around prominent local the form of various production cooperatives. enthusiasts” (Daskalov, 2005: 162). This po- Some of these functioned as ancillary or out- litical tradition remained a lasting phenom- sourced food-processing or other manufactur- enon in Bulgaria, and the time of communist ing units and delivered supplies to the exist- rule, when the Party was identified with its ing cooperative farms or even to various other “top leader”, consolidated this model even state-owned enterprises. Historian Vladimir further. The personalization of the parties Miggev sees this development, which further before World War II brought about frequent expanded on a larger scale in the 1980s, as an party splits, which were generated by per- element of the process of “modernization and sonal conflicts. Even parties of the ideological civilization” of society (Miggev, 2006: 143). type, such as the Bulgarian Workers’ Social After 1989, the actual reinstatement of Democratic Party (BWSDP) and the Bulgarian the multi-party set-up took place on a “green Agrarian People’s Union (BAPU) fell apart into field” or a “clean slate” rather, and the bor- factions. After 1989, the personalized parties Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 7 were the prevailing majority, and in most of garian history, such as those of 1887-1894, the cases their political longevity did not ex- 1923-1925, 1941-1944. The manifestations ceed the political life span of their leaders. of this division gained a particular prominence The frequent recourse to political violence at the time of communist rule. These histori- has also exerted a lasting traumatizing impact cal traumas in the collective consciousness of on Bulgarian political culture. The use of po- Bulgarians will prove to be of a lasting nature litical power for dealing with the political op- and despite the change of generations, they ponent or rival, even though such an oppo- will continue to motivate people’s behavior in nent has been an ally quite shortly before, is a terms of hatred or defiance, and the striving frequent occurrence in the country’s political for revenge and retribution. A furious debate history. Taking different forms, such as coup was held in 1990 between the two major po- d‘états, political reprisals and assassinations, litical forces (the Bulgarian Socialist Party and as well as political law-court trials, etc., the the Union of Democratic Forces) about whose abuse of political power has been a constant victims were more numerous and the bones companion to Bulgarian political history. This of the predecessors of which party deserved fact has brought about several lasting conse- more respect and veneration (Kalinova, Baeva quences for Bulgarian political culture. Firstly, 2001: 263). Up to the present day, the trau- it advocates political conformism, suggesting mas in the collective consciousness have not that the strength of those in power is insur- ceased to be a powerful instrument for mobi- mountable. Plamen Georgiev emphasizes that lization, although with the change of genera- the defeat of the 1876 April Uprising dealt an tions the significance of these memories has irreparable blow on the emerging participa- objectively started to decline. tory civic culture in Bulgaria (Georgiev, 2000: Irrespective of the specific form of any giv- 182). Later, at the time of Stambolov’s gov- en political regime, the prevalence of personal ernance, and even on a much larger scale in regimes is another stable feature of Bulgarian the period of 1923-1925, political repression political history, which has had an impact on aimed at destroying any thought or idea of political culture. In the narrow sense, the no- an autonomous and opposition-minded civic tion of a personal regime is interpreted as a participation. As for the time of communist situation, whereby the monarch appoints and rule, repression, which was especially intense dismisses governments on his own, without during the first period of the establishment taking into account the opinion and votes of of this regime (between 1944 and 1950) and the majority at the National Assembly (Das- gradually subsided as far as its most visible kalov, 2005: 167). The direct consequence of and direct forms of its manifestation were this practice, established at the end of the 19th concerned, aimed at suppressing any idea of century, is that it was the newly appointed opposition and resistance against the estab- government that was entrusted with the or- lished order, as Ivailo Znepolsky writes in his ganization of the upcoming elections, so that monumental study entitled “Bulgarian Com- it could come out victorious in the election munism. Socio-cultural Characteristics and contest. In a sense, general elections came to Power Trajectory” (Znepolsky, 2008: 71-72). lose their significance in terms of civic partici- Secondly, political violence creates a trau- pation in the overall political decision-making matic division in Bulgarian society – a division process, as the practice of personal regimes between executioners and victims, between began to transform them into an ordinary the guilty and the not-guilty, and these are popular opinion poll or referendum, the only divisions that have always been part and par- purpose of which was to endorse the decision cel of the numerous dramatic periods in Bul- already made by the monarch. 8 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

The conviction that the most important constant interference in the internal affairs decisions are made by the political leader, and of the country and substantial impact on its that the will of the citizens is of no conse- position on the international scene (Daskalov, quence, turned into a rigid stereotype in the 2005: 184-185). The Bulgarian political forces way of thinking of the rank-and-file Bulgar- were divided mainly along the axis of Russo- ians. This also gave rise to a skeptical attitude philes and Russophobes. During World War with respect to such a democratic procedure II, although Bulgaria was an ally of the Third as elections are for instance, the underlying Reich, its government refused to send even thinking being as follows: elections “are fab- symbolically any military unit to the Eastern ricated or engineered”, they are by no means Front with the justification that the ordinary a fair and level playing ground, but rather a Bulgarians massively shared good feelings for referendum, the outcome of which is known Russia. During the Cold War, Bulgaria was well in advance. Personal regimes continue thought to be the most loyal ally of the Soviet into the 20th century as well. Thus for in- Union and this is an image that is lingering stance, King Boris III inspired two anti-govern- even today among the European elites. Even mental coup d’états (in 1923 and 1934), and after 1989, the relations with Russia have after 1935 he governed through Cabinets ap- been subject to poignant political debates pointed by him. and have invariably been an important part of After the establishment of communist Bulgarian politics. Without going into details rule, the institutional system, despite the of- on the issue about the reasons and substan- ficial rhetoric about collective leadership, was tiation for the Russophile (and Russophobe) based on the personal regime of the “first attitudes in Bulgaria, they are nonetheless a party and state leader”, on the will and will- substantial part of Bulgarian political culture. ingness of whom all the important decisions Last but not least, the dreams of “national depended. The practice of personal regimes unification” are also a major characteristic of encourages political conformism, as well as Bulgarian political culture. Immediately after the conviction that the only way of changing the Liberation and especially after the Berlin anything in politics is when you manage to Congress, the program for a “San-Stefano influence the very center of state power. After Bulgaria” seemed to be the realization of a 1989, the practice of personal regimes was national ideal dating back to the national lib- removed, but political culture has nonetheless eration movement. Subsequently, the subject preserved lasting and persistent residues con- of national unification, which envisages main- nected with it. The most widely spread con- ly Macedonia and Aegean Thracia, turned viction is that the President, and/or the Prime into an important ingredient of Bulgarian Minister, possess all the power in the country politics. Even today, after numerous long and and they are truly capable of changing things stormy historical developments, this idea is in a radical way only by virtue of their person- capable of mobilizing the political passions al willpower. The paradox is that even today, and expectations of some part of Bulgarian 20 years after the beginning of the country’s society. Regardless of the fact that nowadays transition to democracy, the preferred names we cannot register any wide circulation of the for identifying streets and squares are precise- belief that “Macedonia is Bulgarian”, and ly those of the authoritarian political leaders given the conviction of the majority of Bulgar- in Bulgarian history. ians that the independent Republic of Mace- Russia has proved to be an exceedingly donia has the right to exist, “the Macedonian influential factor at the beginning of the exis- topic” continues to be a soft spot for them tence of the modern Bulgarian state with its and has an overall impact on the susceptibili- Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 9 ties of Bulgarian society, at least as far as the grew exponentially and a much larger circle refusal to accept most of the Macedonian in- of clients began to “stick” to the narrow cir- terpretations of Balkan history is concerned. cle of friends…” (Milyukov 1905: 122-123). What should be fleetingly mentioned in this Not less critical about the parties of that time connection is the recently published book of is Dimo Kazassov who calls them “partner- Peter-Emil Mittev, Antonina Zhelyazkova, and ships for the exploitation of power”. Roumen Goran Stoykovsky under the title of “Mace- Daskalov refers to Kazasov’s description and donia at a Crossroad” (Mittev, Zhelyazkova, goes on to qualify the parties as “coteries Stoykovsky 2009), which provoked strong re- or cliques without any essential differences” verberations in the national press. (Daskalov 2005: 159). Roumen Daskalov of- fers an interesting matrix as a tool to qualify 3. Going into Politics and differentiate the political parties existing and Political Commitment by the end of the 19th century. The criteria are four, namely: 1. attitude to the royal court Political culture has different manifestations. (manifested by loyal subjects, i.e. a reserved It also exists in the form of more or less stable attitude); 2. attitude to the great powers mental schemes and convictions, but can be (Russophiles, Germanophiles, or Antanto- manifested, too, in the form of stereotypes philes); 3. priority social circles (conservative, (habits and deeply rooted practices) under- bourgeois-progressive, or radical); and 4. lying the individual civic commitment. The general political conduct (aggressive, hesi- modes of this commitment also differ, but the tant, or passive). attitude to the currently active political parties Roumen Daskalov gives an overall organi- seems to be particularly interesting. Although zations characteristic of the parties throughout the average number of people, previously or the first period of the existence of the mod- currently involved in some form of member- ern Bulgarian state, namely: person-oriented ship in a political organization, hardly exceeds groups formed around a single leader, with lo- more than six or seven percent of the adult cal nuclei set up by prominent local party par- population, the motivation for their doing so tisans. He quotes a text written by the Radical is an undoubted indication of the attitudes, Party activist Stoyan Kosturkov in 1910, which habits, and beliefs concerning politics, which describes the parties in the following way: “… a society shares on a wider scale. several higher-ups in the city, and usually one By the end of the 19th century, no stable in the province, this is the party or – more cor- party organizations whatsoever existed in rectly – its standing membership”. Another Bulgaria. In their essence, parties were pa- activist of the Radical Party, Todor Vlaikov, de- tron/clientele groups, matching the following scribes the process of politicization upon the description made by Pavel Milyukov at the establishment of Stambolov’s dictatorship like beginning of the 20th century: “The strength this: “… the parties increase their membership of party bosses lies exclusively in the fact that by attracting “more sociable, knowledgeable a headquarters of fanatically devoted politi- and brave people” who would subsequently cal activists had to be actually set up around form their village “nuclei”. Upon coming into each such boss in the center, forming at the office, each party seeks to incorporate the same time a group of partisan “friends” in new “discontented or disgruntled people” the province, who more or less had a strong (Daskalov 2005: 162-163). impact on a given locality. Whenever one of During World War I, the party system in these parties happened to “come to power”, Bulgaria underwent a crisis, which – in the the instruments and means of its influence very least – was prompted by the fact that 10 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

almost a million men were mobilized and into elitist parties (the focus of which is on the conscripted, and the martial law introduced educated and well-to-do elite), class-profes- at that time strongly restricted political activi- sional parties (oriented mainly to the working ties. After the war, the parties found it hard to class or the peasantry), and universal people’s recover. The right-wing parties (e.g. the Peo- parties (or catch-all parties, which focus their ple’s Party and the Progressive Liberal Party) appeal on all social strata, appealing to the plunged into a particularly deep crisis after country’s population at large). the Balkan Wars, and so did the liberals (who According to the first criterion, the Peo- governed the country at the time of World ple’s Party or the Radical Democratic Party fall War I). The left-wing parties – agrarians, com- into the first group, communists and -agrar munists (1919), and social democrats, on the ians fall into the second, and the third group other hand, were the first to overcome the encompasses the liberals and the democrats. crisis and rapidly recovered from it. We can assume, of course, that these types The historical parties in Bulgaria vary on are ideal, that parties actually have numerous numerous counts, and literature abounds of distinctions, which this typology fails to take different approaches to the typological sys- into account, and that in different historical tematization of political parties at large. For periods parties can change their appeal. instance, they can be differentiated from the The second criterion is connected with standpoint of their shared values (as well as the principles of internal party organization on the basis of their economic and cultural and the role of the leader, i.e. with the way outlook) according to the generally accepted in which parties describe and present them- left/right scale, although it is not always of an selves to society at large. Parties are small so- overall validity. They can also be differentiated cieties themselves, they are systemic forma- from an ideological point of view and classified tions, which are subject not only to the provi- respectively as socialist, liberal, and conserva- sions of their statutes, but also to a system tive parties. Yet again, they can be regarded of rules and standards, connecting in a single as parties of the status quo and revolutionary whole the requirements for recruiting new parties. In his reference work on political par- members, for loyalty, and for their function- ties, the French political scientist Morris Du- ing. Thus, we can differentiate parties, which verger, who has done seminal work in party base their activity on the public merits and so- politics, introduces a functional classification cial mission of their members (e.g. aristocratic of parties, which has now become truly clas- parties, parties of the “called-upon”), parties, sical, and divides them into mass parties and which consider themselves to be people’s rep- cadre parties. He introduces other classifica- resentatives, and present themselves as enti- tion criteria as well, according to the way in ties expressing the national strivings (populist which parties emerge: either as internal par- and people’s parties), and – finally – parties, liamentary parties (set up in result of members which are clearly oriented towards the loyalty of parliament regroupings), or external parties to their leaders (person-oriented parties). (emerging in result of a social movement out- I am fully aware of the extent to which side Parliament) (Duverger: 1992: 36). the notions, describing party types accord- We can also elaborate a party typology ing to this criterion, are loaded with mean- from the point of view of two other criteria ings that could encumber the understand- connected with the characteristic features of ing of their use in this particular context. In the Bulgarian institutional and cultural com- Bulgaria, there were no aristocratic parties plex. On one hand, according to their public in the generally accepted meaning of the appeal, parties in Bulgaria are differentiated word, because of the lack of hereditary aris- Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 11 tocracy and above all – of landed aristocracy, oriented (leader’s) parties, for their part, are as a result of the Ottoman invasion. Within typical for Bulgarian political life especially af- this context, aristocratic are the parties based ter the 1878 Liberation when public opinion on the idea about the calling of those social identified most of the parties with the names sectors, which either by virtue of legacy, in- of their leaders, e.g. Stambolovists, Radoslav- heritance, and merits have managed to rise ists, Tonchevists, Dragievists, etc. above the masses and this fact entrusts them These two criteria make it possible for us with a special social mission. These parties did to construct a historical typology of Bulgar- not think of themselves as mass parties, but ian parties within a single matrix, and con- rather as relatively small entities, which were sequently – to arrive at the typology of the organizing an enlightened knowledgeable various modes of party commitment. There caste carrying out the mission of a collective are two criteria here and they are: the social leader of the nation (e.g. the Conservative appeal (elitist, class-professional, and nation- Party). As far as the qualification of “popu- wide or catch-all), and the type of internal lar” is concerned, this word today is loaded party organization (missionary, populist, with markedly negative connotations, but ac- and person-oriented). cording to many researchers, this negativity is Obviously, this classification is only pro- product of recent years only. Throughout the visional. It does not take into consideration entire 20th century, especially in its first half, the historical dynamic development of party populism had a different meaning and, in the roles and identities, as well as the variety of majority of cases, it carried positive connota- other features of the parties. Bulgarian history tions, such as an orientation towards the na- seems to lack examples of leader’s parties of tion and the people who were considered to the class-professional profile. To a certain ex- be excluded from politics altogether. At that tent, the BCP could be qualified as such a par- time, “populist” was even considered to be ty at the time of Stalinism (“the personality synonymous with “democratic”. Historically, cult”), but its function during communism is “populism” is a notion connected with spe- highly specific and cannot be compared with cific but also world-wide phenomena, such as party functions in a pluralist or multi-party the populist party in the USA from the end of system. Party typology makes it possible for the 19th and the beginning of the 20th cen- us to classify party commitment into several tury, the populist ideas in Russia of the same historical categories. The mechanism of par- period, and also the folkisch ideology of Ger- ticipation in these six (actually five) ideal party man Romanticism in the 19th century. During types is different. the 20th century, populism also has numerous The major motive for the elitist-aristocratic manifestations, such as agrarianism in Europe parties is the self-consciousness that the very between the two world wars and – according fact of their belonging to the elite (cultural, to some authors – the populist phraseology of intellectual, economic) assigns a certain mis- the Fascists in Italy and the Nazis in Germany, sion to the individual. The party activity com- as well as the Peronist ideology in Argentina mitment here is aristocratic and closely con- after World War II. As for the modern mani- nected with the awareness of both social duty festations of populism, many authors include and mission, which a natural aristocracy feels. here the leftist policy of Hugo Chaves in Ven- The elitist-aristocratic parties have a similar ezuela, the right-wing and far-right populism motivation, but here it is determined by the in Europe (e.g. Jörg Haider in Austria, Jean- consciousness that the political elite is the em- Marie Le Pen in France, or Volen Siderov in anation of the nation, they believe that their Bulgaria) (Todorv 2007: 85-86). The person- roots are in the people, and this is the reason 12 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

why they are the natural leader of these peo- same refers to the nation-wide person-orient- ple. The elitist-leader’s parties motivate their ed parties where the leader is the emanation commitment with the leader in the following of the nation – not only the expression of its way: he/she is the concentration of both the limited and “natural” elite, but of the entire party will and the big project party members nation precisely. The motivation for participa- pursue, where loyalty to the leader is the un- tion here is the self-consciousness of being derlying factor of paramount importance. elected by the leader, as well as the self-iden- For the class-professional parties, partici- tification with this leader namely. pation is motivated by a certain class-related In his study entitled “The Party System in or professional interest, which the individual Bulgaria”, Georgi Karasimeonov has devel- pursues prompted by the meaning he/she oped the argument that unlike some other finds therein. Thus for instance, the Bulgarian communist countries, such as Poland and Hun- Workers’ Social Democratic Party (narrow so- gry, where the monopoly on power practiced cialists) (BWSDP – n.s.) is a party of the intel- by the communist party began to disintegrate ligentsia, which stands for the class interest of as early as the onset of communism, the BCP workers. The populist class-professional par- monopoly on power in Bulgaria started to dis- ties (mostly the communists and the agrarians) integrate as late as the beginning of the post- motivate their participation both with their communist transition, i.e. with the resignation belonging to a certain class or profession and of the party leader Todor Zhivkov on Novem- with the self-consciousness of the elite, which ber 10th 1989 (Karasimeonov 2006: 23-24), makes them believe that they are the emana- despite the existence of illegal by nature dis- tion of the class or the profession and that sident organizations, which cropped up in the they precisely are its most determined part. period between 1988 and 1989. The trans- For nation-wide parties, the appeal is di- formation of the Bulgarian one-party system rected to the entire population, which in pre- inherited from communism (in essence it was cise terms means that it is directed to no one a one-party system, although an official agrar- in particular. To a much greater extent they ian party existed as well) happened within sev- are inclined to embrace the populist ideol- eral months only, which gave birth to the new ogy, and yet we can distinguish here three party pluralism. According to their origins, the sub-categories. The nation-wide aristocratic new entities of this party pluralism can be clas- parties motivate their participation with the sified into four categories as follows: self-consciousness that they are a national • a successor party: an essentially new elite open to all (“honest and progressive”, party, transformed on the basis of the or “concerned for the nation”) people. As for BCP, which is capable of co-existing in a the democratic-populist parties, participation multi-party political environment; and the involvement with their activity is mo- • parties based on the dissident move- tivated with the consciousness of fulfilling a ments and clubs, which have either mission, which, however, is of a nation-wide emerged from the cradle of the BCP, or significance and is open to all categories of have been structured outside it, such as: the people within the nation. The nation-wide Green Party, the Alternative Socialist Party, populist parties present themselves as “par- the Alternative Socialist Movement – inde- ties of the entire population” (e.g. Stephan pendents, the Federation of the Clubs for Stambolov’s “Undivided Bulgaria”), which Openness and Restructuring, the Federation are the emanation of the whole nation. Usu- of Independent Students’ Societies, etc.; ally, these are the parties, which are most • reinstated old parties, such as the frequently qualified as populist parties. The “Nickola Petkov” Bulgarian Agrarian Peo- Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 13

ple’s Union, the Bulgarian Social Demo- As early as the very beginning of the post- cratic Party, the Radical Democratic Party, communist transition, a survey held by the the Democratic Party; Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) in • newly emerged parties, which often August 1991 indicates that nearly 7 percent make recourse to “imported” labels in or- of the respondents self-determined them- der to demonstrate the novel possibilities selves as active participants in the party they for political commitment. They are a mul- chose to be members of, and almost 13 per- ticolored conglomerate of small organiza- cent said that they supported the events and tions bearing a variety of label-names, such activities of their chosen party. The share of as: “liberal”, “democratic”, “national”, passive supporters was 38 percent, and an- “fatherland”, “independent”, “republi- other 43 percent said they were not interested can”, “Christian”, etc., and even a party in participating in political life altogether. The of the paradoxically striking name of “Non- major share (more than 60 percent) among party Affiliated Citizens for Democracy”. the active participants in party life were sup- This new type of political commitment, porters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), actually only a newly-practised type, encom- whereas only a quarter of all the respondents passes a number of varied modes of actual were supporters of the Union of Democratic practices. On one hand, here we see people Forces (UDF). This shows that the BSP was still who used to be members of the Commu- relying on a broad membership inherited from nist Party at the time of communism who the old Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), got committed once again, and on the other whereas the UDF enjoyed a smaller number hand, there are people of no party affiliation of formal members, but a much larger group who also got involved. And on a yet another of supporters. After the year 2000, the “tra- hand, former communists or non-party-affil- ditional” parties of the transition – the BSP iates who nonetheless were involved in dis- and the UDF – seem to be losing members, sident organizations continued their involve- although this concerns the UDF to a larger ment in politics and so did people who had extent, especially having in mind the split of preserved the memory of their pre-1946 po- the Party in 2004, while – on the contrary – litical commitments. Many people, especially another party of the transition, namely the former BCP members, got completely disen- Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) gaged from any party activity whatsoever. has been enlarging its membership.

Party Membership in 2009 and Percentage of Voters

Party 2009 % of the electorate BSP 190 000 2,8 MRF 93 000 1,4 The „LEADER” Party 40 000 0,6 Order, Legality and Justice Party (OLJ) 35 000 0,5 National Movement for Stability and Progress (NMSP) 26 000 0,4 Democrats for Strong Bulgaria 23 000 0,3 GERB – Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 22 000 0,3 IMRO 20 000 0,3 UDF 10 000 0,1 The “Attack” Party 6 000 0,1 Total: 465 000 6,9

Source: the „Troud” Daily, March 26th, 2009, page 17 14 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

The coincidence of the numbers obtained the new parties have no clear role. That is in 1991 and 2009 respectively is amazing, why they need some symbolic identification even if we make an allowance for the fact with universally acknowledged models, such that party headquarters usually mark up the as the identification with the European model data they submit. Around 7 percent of all vot- for Bulgaria. In this way, the newly established ers during the Bulgarian transition have been (transformed or reinstated) political parties in closely involved in the activities of the political Bulgaria managed to legitimize themselves parties. The paradox is that the iridescence of through the European model (they actually the new party palette in Bulgaria and other turn out to be the product of this model), post-communist countries has shaped up in introducing at the same time the European conditions, in connection with which a num- model (they turn out to be its factor) in Bul- ber of researchers in the Western world for- garian political life (Waller 1994). According mulated the thesis about the crisis of the tra- to Georgi Karasimeonov, there are two ma- ditional political parties in the 1980s. jor factors underlying the party differentiation The party differentiation in post-commu- in Bulgaria in the post-1989 period, namely: nist Bulgaria has already been widely ana- historical roots and self-identification. In his lyzed. There are also explanatory paradigms opinion, what is characteristic about the new concerning the process of party formation. parties is their self-identification, these -par Herbert Kitschelt regards this process as a ties are “label parties”, because “they them- successive transition through three stages of selves have determined their ideological and party organization: a) around a charismatic value orientations, as well as their place in the leader; b) through a clientele/patronage or- political environment, having neither any po- ganization; and finally c) the establishment litical experience and practice, nor any clearly of a programmatic party. To a large extent, declared voter preferences behind themselves Kitschelt sees the success of the political tran- (Karasimeonov 2006: 132). sition as a chance for establishing party dif- The reasons for the party differentiation ferentiation between the programmatic par- in Bulgaria at the beginning of the transition ties (in terms of an ideal model, inasmuch as process to democracy are mostly internal. And empirically each party is the symbiosis of char- yet, “the European idea” played an important ismatic traits, clientele relationships, and pro- role in this process. The activity of the political grammatic orientation). This process is also a parties in the first years of the Bulgarian tran- process of transition from a non-stabilized to sition process had a considerable impact on stabilized type of democracy, which – from party differentiation. The newly established the point view of the parties – means a high parties were inclined to accept the ideological degree of party distinctiveness and more or and programmatic messages of those west- less subdued manifestation of their peculiari- ern political parties, which had expressed the ties. On the contrary, at the onset of this pro- willingness to help them. This assistance was cess, the parties lack distinctiveness: they are expressed in terms of material support, and poorly distinguishable and insufficiently dif- – first and foremost – in terms of European le- ferentiated in programmatic terms, but none- gitimacy. It is precisely because of this fact that theless they have well manifested character- the work of those international experts, who istic traits, mainly as far as their genealogy is were frequently sent over to help the political concerned. This is the reason why they badly parties in their preparation for the first free need legitimacy in the political environment at elections in the country, in the elaboration of the onset of their existence. (Kitschelt 1995). their first political programs, and their politi- Michael Waller pays attention to the fact that cal advertising campaigns, can be claimed to Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 15 have been decisive for the image of the in- newly established parties, such as the “At- fluential parties, especially those belonging to tack” Party, the GERB Party, the “Leader” Par- the circle of the then anti-communist opposi- ty, and the Order, Legality, and Justice Party tion. Nonetheless, however, even the BSP, the (OLJ, the Bulgarian abbreviation of which is successor of the communist party, was under RZS). Some of them, of course, might have the strong impact of the messages coming been founders of more than one party. Other from the western parties (mostly the social citizens may have joined the membership of democratic parties). a given party at a later stage. A portion of the party members may have remained in this 3.1. Typology of Party Memberships capacity in the party books and registers only, A total of 130 parties (political labels) are re- while others have been more or less active corded to have run the general elections held members of this party. Some of the found- between 1990 and 2005, out of which 85 ers and the newly accepted members maybe made their presence only once. The remain- continue to be party members to the present ing 45 labels are recorded to have run two day, while other have either dropped out or or more general elections, and out of them have left the party altogether (be it voluntarily 20 parties made their presence at three or or not), and in such a case they now may have more general elections. Out of all contempo- either no party affiliation whatsoever or may rary parties (party labels), only 3 have taken have joined other parties. part in all the 6 general elections, namely: the It is almost impossible to make an estimate BSP, the UDF, and the MRF. Very few labels of the number of citizens who have changed have been preserved over the 20 year-long their parties in their capacity of their official Bulgarian transition, let alone the fact that members throughout the entire period of the their underlying realities have also changed a post-communist transition. The former BCP lot. The newly established parties date back members should be excluded from this cate- to the period between 2003 and 2005 when gory as some of them re-registered in the BSP the GERB Party, the “Attack” Party, and the in 1990, others remained without any party Order, Legality, and Justice Party were set up, affiliation, and yet others joined other political alongside the numerous other parties estab- parties. This movement cannot be qualified as lished on nationalists basis by former military “change of party label”, inasmuch as the BCP personnel, as well as parties set up by several itself was not a party in the classical sense of local business groups. the word, but turned into the basis for the es- This means that nowadays party loyalty or tablishment of an essentially new party – the the durability of party preferences is not the BSP. It is also difficult to make an assessment prevailing element of the dominant political to what an extent the parties themselves – culture. Loyalty does exists, but it seems to be when they change their labels or merge with rather marginal. other political entities – retain their political According to the Political Parties Act of identity and to what an extent their members 2005, the least number of founders of a party uncritically go along with these modifications cannot fall below 500. (The 2008 amend- and changes. ments to this Act require a minimum of 1000 In 2005, in compliance with the Politi- founders.) Even the most superficial calcula- cal Parties Act, the National Audit Office re- tion indicates that what this provision means ceived the reports of 105 parties, while in is that at least 65 000 citizens have partici- 2006 the number of these reports was 106. pated in the establishment of a party. To their In this connection, the website Obshestvo. ranks we should also add the founders of the net (i.e. Society.net) wrote as follows: “Con- 16 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

trary to the widely circulated information members of which manifest a strong self- about the existence of more than 400 par- identification with their organization, such ties in Bulgaria, in 2008 the National Audit as the BSP and the UDF for instance – the Office has received the official reports of two major political formations of the Bul- 165 political organizations (two of which garian transition. There are people among have merged). Subsequently, Obshestvo.net their members who never gave up on them carried out its own investigations about the from the very day of their inception to the number of parties, which have registered an present day. On the other hand, in their es- active presence on the Internet. As it turned sence, these two parties are “civic parties”, out, only 28 out of all the currently regis- where the individual self-identification is tered parties have a web site of their own, with the organization, not with the leader, which has regularly been renewed over the who – as recent history indicates – can be past half a year. Actually, 15 parliamentary replaced quite often, but this by no means parties and 13 parties outside Parliament brings about the disappearance of the or- were present on the Internet on-line. If we ganization itself. The general typology of add to these the two newly established par- these two organizations, however, does not ties in 2009, i.e. the United People’s Party remove the substantial ideological and po- and the Bulgarian New Democracy Party, the litical differences between them. ratio becomes 17 to 13... The majority of Parties marked by a strong self-identifi- citizens believe that the parties receive sub- cation with their organization are also the sidies! It is the parliamentary represented MRF (set up in 1990) and the “Attack” Party parties only that receive government sub- (set up in 2005). What is common between sidies, as well as those, which managed to these two parties from the viewpoint of go over the 1 percent electoral threshold at their functioning is that the self-identifica- the last general election. Currently, govern- tion of their members with the organization ment subsidies are provided to the parties is accompanied by the enormous role of the organized in 6 parliamentary factions plus leader who is inseparable from his party. to another two parties outside Parliament, Similar motivations among the party mem- namely: the New Time and EuroRoma. In bership can be seen in the DSB party, which other words, the number of government by its origin is an essentially civic party, but subsidies currently is 8 altogether.”1 where the self-identification with the lead- By 2009, the number of the active po- er is particularly strong. From a functional litical parties was around 20. Most of these point of view, this type of parties can be parties enjoy a solid history and a certain qualified as civic-leader’s parties, but – again amount of organizational stability. It should - this fact does not remove the considerable be reminded here that there were 5 general ideological and political differences existing elections held between 1990 and 2005; the between them. number of parties, which ran at least 3 out The leader’s parties, where the self-iden- of 5 of them, is also 20. Still, these are differ- tification of their membership is mainly with ent parties not only from the point of view the leader, underwent significant develop- of their ideological and international iden- ment in post-communist Bulgaria. This type tification, but from the standpoint of their of parties have existed for a long time now inception and functioning as well. On one and the mentioning of the Bulgarian Business hand, these are mass political parties, the Bloc, set up in the 1990s and subsequently transformed into George Ganchev’s block, is

1 http://www.obshtestvo.net/content/view/1055/4/ sufficient in this respect. After 2001, howev- Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 17 er, two other parties emerged in this category. or the Social Democrats Political Movement, First came NMSII (National Movement Simeon but other parties, such as the New Time II), which subsequently transformed its name and the United Labor Party are also subject to National Movement for Stability and Prog- to this qualification. With time, parties like ress (NMSP), thus replacing the name of the these acquire the behavior of “addition par- leader, i.e. the former Bulgarian monarch ties”; they are always open to setting up a Simeon II, with “stability and progress”). The coalition and do not insist on possessing a second party to emerge as a leader’s party political profile of their own. The member- was the GERB Party, in which the party leader, ship in such parties is most frequently mo- Boiko Borissov, is the symbol of the party it- tivated by the personal or family history of self. Somewhat similar is the Bulgarian Social their individual members, and as far as the Democracy Party (which has recently changed member self-identification is concerned, it is its name to “Bulgarian Social Democracy – connected with the “carrier” party as well. EuroLeft”), which is strongly identified with There is a sixth group of “label parties”, its leader – Alexander Tomov. the existence of which is maintained pre- A fourth type of parties from those in- cisely because of the symbolic value of their cluded in the list above (i.e. parties enjoying label, while in fact they have ceased for a a certain amount of stability) are small orga- long time now to produce specific causes and nizations of “missionaries”, or in other words consequently to attract specific categories of parties set up by citizens united by a cause, citizens for their implementation. In practice, which remains important for them, even such parties have frozen their activity and are though few people share it. Such small parties ready to enter any coalition, or are even in- have existed from the very onset of Bulgar- clined to “sell” their label directly. According ian transition and they have managed to raise to the “Plovdiv-online” website, “wealthy both membership and voters who remain businessmen connected with the gas and more or less loyal to them. Most frequently, petrol business are showing interest to the these are organizations with a certain “mis- Democratic Party”.2 At the time of local elec- sion”, such as “moderate nationalism” of the tions, however, similar information circulates “Granite” Union of National Dignity” (leader about different other parties, such as the of which is Roumen Leonidov), or the Com- agrarian parties, for instance. In this case, to munist Party of Bulgaria ((leader of which is be a member of such a party is only worth it, Alexander Paunov). if the “label party” gains the prospect of be- In addition, a fifth type of parties can be ing elected either in the local or the central distinguished, including parties, which have authorities in the country. emerged mainly on the basis of splits and The voter self-identification with the par- have existed for a long time in the capacity ties is not especially high. Thus for instance, of “associate” or “rider” parties, i.e. they al- at an opinion poll held in 1999, 60 percent of ways participate in coalitions with a big-size the respondents directly avoided answering party acting in the capacity of their “carri- the question whether they felt close to any er”, as such large parties are eager to en- particular party. This self-identification di- large their coalitions. The self-identification minishes in the younger generations, which of such associate or rider parties is both civic feel reserves with respect to all the parties in and leader-oriented, but it is also marked the country. by the long-standing cooperation with the bigger party. As parties of this type we can 2 http://www.plovdiv-online.com/balgariya/ (Alexander Pra- matarsky is selling the Democratic Party) aleksandar-pramatar- qualify the Movement for Social Humanism ski-prodawa-demokraticheska-partiya.html 18 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

Consolidation of Democracy Survey, 1999 enlightenment and culture). According to a study of this epoch made by R. Gavrilova and How close do you feel % I. Elenkov, the number of Chitalishta at that to any of the parties? time was 130. Together with them, during Very close 7,4 the 1860s and the 1870s, a variety of other Close 24,5 civic societies cropped up, mostly students’ Not very close 8,1 and women’s clubs and societies, but accord- No answer 60,1 ing to the authors of the study, the patriarchal ideology remained dominant in these orga- Source: BBSS “Gallup International” nizations (Gavrilova, Elenkov 1998: 16, 27). Despite the large number of these civic orga- This overall picture of the declining at- nizations, they failed to create a sufficiently tractiveness of parties, especially as far as the dense network of forms of civic commitment young generations are concerned, does not or a sufficiently intensive “social capital”, preclude the opposite phenomenon, namely which could make it possible to establish a the process of party commitment and involve- durable and effective form of democracy. ment mostly with the new political formations. The 1934 coup d‘état marked the onset of The type of this militant attitude to a large a lengthy period, in which the existing civic extent repeats the 1989 models, but – para- organizations were both strongly centralized doxically – inherits the model of the classical and dependent on the state. communist militantism. Obviously, the latter is The communist authorities turned upside on the decline in result of the very process of down the entire civic sector in the country and a post-communist transition (S. Devaux 2005: totally restructured it, especially after 1951 42). This model of communist commitment, (Gavrilova, Elenkov 1988: 91). Although af- which is part and parcel of the political culture ter 1956 in particular, the regime underwent heritage of the post-1989 generations can be some changes, the centralized system of con- utilized in terms of the experience amassed, trol over all civic initiatives remained intact. but now amassed under new conditions and In fact, during the rule of communism there in novel organizations. The new political par- was quite a well developed network of or- ties accept much of the culture typical for ganizations relying on civic participation and the organization of the communist party, al- initiative, but they existed as “official” orga- though in terms of their principles and ideolo- nizations, closely connected with the party in gies they remain quite different. power. Nonetheless, these organizations cre- ated room for individual initiatives and – most 3.2. Participation in Civic importantly – for civic voluntary practices and Organizations and Movements this experience precisely was appropriately The involvement with various public organi- put into practice after 1989 for the recon- zations and political parties (militantism) is struction of civic activities. inherent in each modern society. In Bulgaria, In a collective research on the forms of the first ever such practices developed at the political commitment in the period of post- time of the National Revival, mostly during communist transition, Sandrine Devaux stud- the 19th century. At that time, the most wide- ies the social inertia of the institutions of the spread and popular form of civic organization old regime after 1989, which has a bearing in the country was the Chitalishte (a reading upon the forms of political commitment. Her room, which transcended its literal meaning hypothesis is that socialist societies are dif- and grew into an institution of education, ferentiated rather than monolithic, and that Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 19 coercion did not dominate all public spheres. ed, but different circumstances and situations The individuals accept and go through the (for instance, what is the audience in front of post-communist transformations in a differ- which he/she is performing a given act) lead ent way. Frequently, the newly established to the domination of one or the other aspect associations are in some way a reconversion of this duality. Politics as a profession consists of the old ones. This is the reason why the of this precisely: the maintenance of the deli- development of associated life after 1989 cate balance between these two roles. cannot by itself be an indicator of the social Militatism is the environment, in which change or transformations taking place (Del- the political professionals – i.e. the individuals vaux 2005: 82-83). The experience amassed who have chosen politics as their profession- before 1989 is capitalized now, because it can al field – are normally selected. In his lecture be useful under the new conditions as well. In entitled “The Profession and Vocation of the this way, the year 1989 is a crucial one, but Politician” (1919), Max Weber points out that change is not so radical, at least not in all the there are two ways of making politics: “either dimensions of public life, the practices of mili- to live ‘for’ politics”, or “to live ’on’ politics”. tantism included. But this distinction, according to Weber, is not The political profession in the true sense of absolute, on the contrary, “each serious per- the word emerged with the establishment of son who has devoted himself or herself to a representative government. It was precisely at cause, lives simultaneously for and on it” (We- that time that a category of people emerged ber 1993: 74-75). Max Weber shows how mo- determined to devote themselves to politics dernity is marked by the emergence of profes- as a profession. There are two broad concepts sional politicians, who have separated them- about representative governance from the selves from the civil servants in order to base point of view of the representatives in ques- their activity on „ira et studio”, i.e. on passion tion. According to the first one – the universal and conviction, precisely because they are in a concept – the elected representatives cater state of a constant struggle (Weber 1993: 85). for the common interest only, not for the in- It is Weber again who gives the idea of elabo- terest of the specific public group, which has rating a typology of politicians from the view- elected them to office. According to the other point of the ethos they profess in politics, i.e. one – the pluralist concept – the elected in- politicians who share the ethic of responsibil- dividuals represent society, but they do not ity, and politicians who share the ethic of con- represent each individual part of the public. viction, pointing out that the latter are poor The latter concept refers to John Stuart Mill, politicians in the final account (Weber 1993: but also envisages our times and the modern 110-111). The referral to Machiavelli here is concept of communitarism. Its essence is that a necessary one: politics is not about turning each individual assigned or elected to a gov- one’s back to personal moral beliefs or convic- ernmental office is a representative and in a tions, but rather about subjugating them to a certain sense has a dual function: responsibility, which transcends the individual, • he or she is a trustee (manager) when a responsibility for the others. This does not acting in the capacity of an individual mean that there are no “politicians of convic- and an expert; tion”, whom we often qualify as “fanatics” • he or she is an agent (representative) or “obsessed by the idea”. On the individu- when paying attention to the reactions of al level, however, what we most frequently his/her voters (Lagroye 2003: 201-202). encounter is the legitimation of conviction These two roles are played by the political through responsibility, which is something like actors simultaneously, often they are undivid- being convinced in the legitimacy of duty. 20 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

One can hardly see pure types of pro- for certain collective rights and corporate in- fessional politicians in Bulgarian political terests. On the other hand, this was the expe- life (and the question is whether one could rience of the “Podkrepa” Independent Trade ever find such a phenomenon in other po- Union, which emerged as an illegal organiza- litical communities, for that matter). The tion, but the essence of which was to act as a predominant type of a politician in the first political entity set up to protect human rights. years of independent political existence is “Podkrepa”, however, gradually withdrew the “demagogue”, who relies on a network from any direct involvement with politics in of party “bosses” (in the sense implied by order to go deeper into trade union activities. Weber), which is actually the system of a In both cases, the transformation was pain- small party headquarters around the party ful and difficult at the same time. With the leader, assisted by local notables, who are Confederation of Independent Trade Unions capable of ensuring votes. Often, this struc- in Bulgaria (CITUB) the problem ensued from ture is initially founded on personal loyal- the lack of protest experience within the or- ties, but it is subsequently replaced by a sys- ganization, as well as the lack of experience tem of personal interests in the distribution to represent workers’ interests, especially in of the political spoil in the form of various the emerging private sector where the trade paid governmental posts. This is the time of unions have a feeble presence even to date. the coterie-parties where loyalty to convic- The “Podkrepa” Confederation of Labor ex- tions always comes second. The emergence panded its trade-union presence, but initially of the “ideological parties” in political life this expansion also covered the state-owned introduces the techniques of persuasion enterprises where it could rely on the opposi- and the mass mobilization in the name of tion experience it had gained thus far. In the the lofty goal – a new society, a new state. private sector, however, its presence remained Along with them comes the new politician relatively weak. The major thrust of trade – the convinced missionary, for whom the union activities over the larger part of the tran- goal justifies the means. However, this also sition consisted in upholding the corporate in- creates a periphery of convinced supporters terests of the employed in the large-size state- capable of depriving themselves in the name owned enterprises, which soon slipped into of the chosen cause. This is how militantism a crisis, drastically cut their output, and after emerges – as a conscious commitment to a a succession of rather unsuccessful privatiza- political or civic organization in the name of tion deals were closed down in the majority a certain goal defined in terms of duty and of cases. In this way, the trade union activity conviction simultaneously. was directed mainly at exerting pressure for At the beginning of the transition to de- the preservation of now non-protectable jobs mocracy in Bulgaria, one of the most visible or – at the worst – at lending support to the forms of militantism was the activity carried demands for repaying old and overdue debts out within the trade unions of the hired to the workers. To some degree, these cir- workers and employees. In the new situa- cumstances placed the trade unions in a situ- tion, this activity could only be based on two ation of lagging behinds events, as they were relatively opposite traditions. On one hand, mostly active in the large-scale losing enter- this was the transformation of the Bulgar- prises, while they had little experience in the ian Trade Unions from an essentially official, other – smaller but more active – enterprises. state-directed, and mandatory organization The trade unions remained stronger in into a genuine confederation of free trade the sector of public services, mainly among unions, the objective of which is to stand up the mass categories of civil servants – those Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 21 employed in education and transportation. It membership was increasingly growing into a is there that they were able to mobilize civic mere formality. This is one of the many rea- participation and to uphold their very right sons underlying the relatively low trade-union to existence. On the other hand, however, civic mobilization, especially under the current the strikes organized in these sectors were of conditions of prevailing private ownership in an apparently political nature, because the the industrial and service sectors. other party to the conflict was a certain min- The post-communist situation was marked istry, i.e. the country’s government. In this by the establishment and activity of numerous way, very frequently trade union activities new non-governmental organizations (NGOs) bore a political mark, whereby pubic opinion not only in Bulgaria. They were set up to dif- lost its ability to differentiate between inher- ferent objectives and had different structures, ent trade union activities and party-political but nonetheless public opinion very rapidly activities. Out of sheer habit, during the first began to identify them with civic society. At half of the transition process, public opinion the beginning of the transition period, the was convinced that with its activity the CI- involvement of citizens with the NGOs was TUB continued to be closer to the BSP, while based on enthusiasm and their willingness to “Podkrepa” was thought to be closer to the participate. Gradually, however, not least be- UDF. This is an indication of the hardships cause of the difficulty to fund their activities, the trade unions were experiencing in the the NGOs were restricted within a relatively process of emerging from under the shadow small area of civic society and turned into of the political parties. small businesses rather, which were elabo- After the year 2000, especially with the rating and implementing various, mostly in- advancing process of privatization, the trade ternational, projects. The dependence of the unions made the effort to manifest their great- NGOs in post-communist Bulgaria on foreign er independence from the political class. This funding (public or private) gradually turned act, however, was not necessarily expressed in these organizations into intermediaries be- any increase of their civic activity; on the con- tween foreign donors and internal users, and trary, what actually happened was rather just the activities they were performing turned the opposite. The reason why is that the trade into a specific profession, which consisted in unions themselves seemed to have overcome writing projects and making reports accord- their indifference to the opportunities opened ing to a fixed set of standards. up by privatization and they themselves got The declining amount of foreign funding, involved with it. These two trade-union orga- which began to be felt very clearly after the nizations, which by nature are destined to be country’s accession to the European Union, workers’ and employee’s unions, found them- and has also been connected with the fi- selves in an ambiguous situation when they nancial and economic crisis of late, brought themselves were beginning to turn into own- about the sizeable decline in the number of ers and employers. The overall consequence the actively functioning NGOs. According to observed in result was, in essence, the rise of estimates made over the last several years, civic disengagement from trade union activ- their number has dropped from about 5000 ity, alongside the professionalization of the to 15003. In other words, the active civic sec- trade unions themselves, where there was a tor has little support within the Bulgarian clearly growing distinction between the few society itself, receives insufficient assistance trade union activists (mainly from among the from internal donors, and, on the whole, trade union apparatus) and the rank-and- file trade union members. Even trade-union 3 See http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2011/02/28/ 22 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

encompasses few citizens in various public change of forest zones, which subsequently initiatives. Many of the NGOs act either as are granted permission for real estate devel- think-tanks, consultancies, and PR agencies, opment), or the demand for codifying a new or as mere sub-contractors to foreign proj- statute of the students’ towns in the big cities ects. There was a widespread practice in the in the country (in order to prevent their un- past for ministers and members of parliament controlled real estate development to various to set up a clientele network of NGOs depen- purposes). This new militantism demonstrat- dent on them, the purpose of which was to ed the capability for affecting political deci- appropriate funds from various projects with sions and the capacity for rapid mobilization, the protection of their patrons. This was the despite the lack of sufficient experience. It is reason why the existence of the numerous possible for this new militantism to outline NGOs brought little energy to civic activity. a new model for party commitment as well Consequently, public opinion is inclined to (e.g. in the newly established Green Party). consider them as small private businesses and The problem is that these mobilizations re- finds it difficult to connect them with activi- main without any lasting organizational con- ties serving legitimate public interests. sequences – they disappear together with the Of late, some specific studies have re- solution (or the inability to find a solution) to vealed another, more dangerous tendency. the problem, which initially brought about The “Dnevnik” daily claims the following: such a mobilization. This may prove to be a “… in October 2010, a report of the Center positive phenomenon, because such move- for the Study of Democracy (CSD) warned ments are frequently organized with the as- that representatives of the serious organized sistance of the new social nets on the Inter- crime are entering the civic sector by means net and are capable of being “awakened” on of sports clubs and in the form of lobbyist or- specific occasions. ganizations and pseudo-analytical centers”. It is indicative that many of the public proj- 4. Modern Bulgarian Political Culture ects, which the government assigns to NGOs, Facing the Test of Europe are awarded to various sports organizations, which actually serve as nothing but a cover The inheritance, which the political culture in for a large variety of groupings from the shad- Bulgaria carried from the past, clashed with ow business in the country4. the country’s dramatic transition to democra- These findings about the essential weak- cy. Several are the major elements of the big ness of the civic sector, which has frequently change in Bulgarian political culture. Above been represented by pseudo-civic organiza- all, this is the experience amassed from the tions, does not mean by far that such a sector collapse of the communist system: this event is totally missing in today’s Bulgaria. On the has been incredible and huge in its dimen- contrary, there are sectors in society – rath- sions for several generations now. Many er dispersed and smallish groups at the time Bulgarians have experienced this collapse as being – which are capable of mobilizing and a personal drama, regardless of the feelings organizing themselves around worthy public – triumphant enthusiasm or fear – which it causes. In 2009, movements of the civic type inspires. Among the most essential aspects emerged. They were formed around specific of the collapse of the old system is the total causes, such as: an amendment to the For- shake-up of the governmental institutions as ests Act (with the demand to prevent the ex- a whole. The Bulgarian citizens are now wit- nessing a weak state, disregarded, inefficient,

4 See http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2011/02/28/ feeble, and incapable of imposing its author- Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 23 ity on organized crime and the private “crime In a sense, up to 2000 – 2001, the politi- syndicates”. This reality sharply conflicts with cal process was filled with various causes, and the long established image of an omnipres- even after this period there was at least one ent and strong communist state, imposing big cause, namely the country’s EU member- an order obligatory for all and possessing the ship. But after January 1st 2007, the big politi- strength to guarantee it. These post-1989 cal causes seemed to have disappeared from generations had to adapt to the new market the public debate. From a programmatic point reality and to search, choose, and constantly of view, the different parties looked strikingly calculate (something they had been spared similar, and the broad public opinion no lon- from in the pre-transition times). ger felt enthusiastically attracted to politics. The new generations, which were getting Even on the contrary, the attitude to politics socialized after 1989, do not make compari- became not simply reserved, it also revealed sons like these, for them things are the way certain hostility, and to top it all this attitude they are. These generations are immersed in became instrumental and regarded politics as a different reality where wealth brings power, a kind of lucrative business. The promotion of strength is an instrument for attaining per- market values and the persuasion that every- sonal goals, and it is the market, not the state, thing is a commodity, political programs in- that is omnipresent. The new generations are cluded, were also conducive to the adoption market-oriented, consumer-minded, and ap- of this widespread attitude. preciate highly paid work. They are also the One of the relatively new and rather generations of the new Internet practices, broadly disseminated perceptions of politics which have been penetrating Bulgarian soci- of late, which treats politics as a “political ety increasingly deeper since the mid 1990s. market”, also encourages such an attitude on Internet creates different conditions for com- the part of the public towards political activ- munication, gathering information, and in- ity at large. In this way, Bulgarian culture has teraction, which were totally unknown to the started to acquire new experience and new generations preceding them. values, which conspicuously contradict the All this has altered the attitude to politics prescribed democratic republicanism, which as well. The radical change in the direction of requires from citizens to display an active at- establishing a democratic system has strongly titude, commitment, and participation in the politicized society today, the stakes are truly common deed (res publica). very high and this divides and polarizes opin- An increasing number of characteristic ions. Many people are mastering new prac- features, which in their nature oppose the typ- tices of protest and public pressure, of lob- ical traits of classical civic culture, as defined bying and publicly upholding their personal by Almond and Verba, are being disseminated opinions, of persuading and convincing oth- in modern Bulgarian political culture. The at- ers, and of holding poignant arguments with tempt to define these new characteristic fea- opponents. The practices of making political tures of modern Bulgarian culture comes as a choices are being mastered as well. These result of the observation of both the political practices are preceded by the orientation in debate and the conduct of citizens over the the political environment, the search for and past year or two. sieving through information, the critical read- Ranking first is a strikingly lasting feature ing of the press. Irrespective of the differences of the modern political culture in Bulgaria, in their understanding of politics, everyone such as Manicheism is. What is meant here, shares the lofty national political objective – of course, is by no means a referral to profess- Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union. ing the third century A.D. religion of Mani. 24 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

What the notion of Manicheism refers here same time is virtuous, honest, intelligent, and to is an essential understanding of the world, knowledgeable. Public opinion often hastens society, and politics as fundamentally divided to condemn the lack of “virility” in politicians into two halves: a good one and a bad one. and the manifestation of “women’s traits in This understanding of politics refutes the jus- them”, which are invariably qualified as ac- tifications of any other point of view (qualify- quiescence and an inclination to make con- ing it as “bad”), and thus becomes a denial of cessions. The popular appeal of figures who the very notion of “otherness” (because fre- irradiate such “virility” in modern Bulgarian quently it is the other one precisely that is the politics is very high and is accompanied – if bad guy or the bad thing for that matter). I not nourished – by certain elements of the was able to identify such an understanding of popular folk-pop culture, which places the politics at a debate held among politicians at emphasis on the roles of the active, strong the New Bulgarian University, who had to an- man, and the weak woman in waiting. swer the question whether they could name An essential feature of modern Bulgarian one or two positive things about heir political political culture is the overvaluation of po- rival. It turned out that the majority of these litical power. The popular convictions is that politicians were incapable of formulating any- power gives unlimited possibilities, that when thing favorable about their opponents, appar- you are in office, you can do anything, and ently qualifying them as enemies, who did not vice versa – nothing can be done, if you are deserve any place whatsoever on the political out of office. This is the frequent justification terrain. Such an understanding of politics has heard from parties in opposition, for instance. brought to the extreme one of Carl Schmidt’s But this overvaluation also comes in result of concepts of politics as a differentiation be- the attitude to power seen by many as the tween friends and enemies when one forgets spoils of looting, which must be taken in or- that conflicts occur within a single public or der to be distributed and used in the respec- social whole, the preservation of which is the tive way. The huge value attributed to politi- condition sine qua non for the existence of cal power (which is mostly seen in terms of politics itself (Schmidt 2008: 21-22). control over public institutions) belittles the Modern Bulgarian political culture is independent civic initiative, the opportunity markedly “machist”. It is based on the wide- to attain important public goals outside the spread belief in the ability of a single “strong institutions and even without them. In fact, hand” to punish the “bad guys” and begin this is to a certain extent the manifestation to dispense justice. This is much in line with of the deeply internalized etatism, i.e. a par- the preceding paragraph on the Manichean ticularly strong confidence in the state or the outlook in the modern political culture of Bul- government. This means that even when peo- garia where the thesis about “retribution” ple are critical to the latter and consider that as a motive for political action is employed “it has failed”, they invariably imagine that quite often. Public opinion frequently sees it is the government (or the state) that must effective policy in terms of “punishing the ultimately see to absolutely everything. Even bad guys”, as well as their respective removal when someone gets killed in a drunken row, and replacement by “the good guys”. It is to or a drunken driver hits someone on the road, this purpose that we fairly often imagine the public opinion blames the government and its political leader as “a strong man”, bearer of insufficient concern for the order and secu- “virility”, determination, and willpower, who rity in the country, precisely because people does not step back, but firmly pursues his be- imagine that the state or the government is liefs, who neither bends, nor yields, but at the omnipotent and omnipresent. Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 25

Political culture in modern Bulgaria is also approach prevents us from finding solutions marked by an inferiority complex. It is mani- to concrete problems. This peculiarity, how- fested in the anxious rambling between the ever, goes hand in hand with a deep mistrust megalomania for national grandeur (“the for politicians, a distrust of their willingness Bulgarians are the most intelligent nation”, and capacity to solve common problems. In “we have the best young mathematicians”, the guises of an audience, society watches “we have been the mightiest state in the indifferently what is going on and frequently Balkans”, “we are the successors of the enjoys the failures of the country’s gover- most ancient European culture”, etc.) and nance, as if they do not concern us all. the constant self-pity that we are the worst- Civil irresponsibility goes hand in hand off nation on the European continent. Even with civic cynicism as well. Observations show when we assess our own problems, we lose that citizens are frequently inclined to prac- any sense of proportion, e.g.: our corruption tice what they find reproachable in politicians. is invariably the most rampant, “Bulgaria is a Attitudes here nourish the populist discourse, Third World country”, etc. which opposes “the people” to “those in Today’s political culture in Bulgaria is also power”, no matter who is in office at the par- marked by widespread civil irresponsibility in ticular moment. As though when you are a striking proportions. This is the other name part of “the people”, you are justified to say of civic disengagement and is frequently the whatever you want, and when you land in of- opposite side of the political irresponsibil- fice, you become “just like them”, i.e. corrupt, ity of the elites. This characteristic feature hypocritical, and selfish. Talking about “those is manifested in the systematic demands at the helm” in the public environment as if for resignations – something that was suffi- they were some foreign body separate from ciently well substantiated at the onset of the us, does not belong to our legitimate choice, transition to democracy, because the then it presupposes at the same time an idealized expectations were for a total replacement of image of “the people”, which is composed of the old elite. Today, however, the pressure extremely conscientious, active, responsible, of protests follows the same logic: instead and reasonable individuals. This understand- of demanding that institutions and civil ser- ing makes it possible for almost every citizen vants should properly do their jobs and in- to take the role of a “spokesperson of the sisting that civil society should exert constant people” when he/she talks with a politician, pressure and control over governmental in- regardless of the fact that this same people is stitutions, out of habit, people demand res- an aggregate of individuals sharing different ignations. A resignation may be qualified as ideas and beliefs about the world and politics. taking personal responsibility, but it may also Last but not least, modern Bulgarian po- mean the disengagement from the problem, litical culture is also marked by deep commu- which brought about the demand for such nity conservatism. It has a variety of manifes- a resignation. Another frequent occurrence tations, but one of the most significant ones connected with the previous finding is the is the unwillingness of a large part of today’s habit of bringing specific problems to irre- Bulgarian society to imagine Bulgaria as a solvable conflicts, for instance: a specific modern state. A recent example to this effect traffic accident provoked by a driver’s irre- is the official ceremony devoted to the cele- sponsibility is developed into a global picture bration of the 24th of May – the Day of Slavic about governmental politics in various walks script and culture. The ceremony began with of life. This certainly is not a specific Bulgari- church remembrance singing, followed by a an trait, but what is important is that such an funeral march played by a military orchestra 26 Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation

upon the laying of the wreaths, and this re- defend their own beliefs and interpretations. sembled much more a traditional memorial Moreover, what they defend are actually the service than the joyous modern celebration beliefs of the advertisers, not the understand- of a great day. We think of Bulgaria mainly in ing of the journalists themselves. In such a terms of its “ancient treasures”: the Thracian situation, the audience feels as if it were wit- gold, Khan Asparuch, the orthodox icons, nessing a performance, which has nothing to and the traditional business of extracting rose do with the people in the audience, and today oil. Modern Bulgaria is absent from the im- these people are likely to applaud tempestu- ages we have of our Motherland, the entire ously those who will be usually downtrodden 20th century is practically non-existent. by the same audience four years later. All these sufficiently widespread popular Civic activist culture in Bulgarian soci- aspects of modern Bulgarian political culture ety today remains a relatively marginal phe- have come in result of the historical develop- nomenon. It is shared largely in the better ment, but they have also increasingly been educated circles, but it is also a paradoxical coming as the result of the current interac- manifestation of the passion for engaging tions in society among the elites, the public in civic activity at any cost, which has been opinion, and the mass media. The dominant inherited from the times of communism. On features of modern Bulgarian political culture one hand, the dominant values nourished by do not go beyond the comfort zone of the mass culture and advertising in the mass me- public opinion: what the public sees is that dia environment are strongly individualistic the representatives of the governing majority and market oriented. This overshadows the are the only ones deserving to carry the blame values of solidarity-based civic activities, and and fails to accept that they are currently rep- this is something that is assessed nowadays resentatives of this very public precisely. This as a relic from communism, rather than the is namely the reason why the public opinion foundations of liberal democracy. On the oth- also needs some proper upbringing with re- er hand, political organizations no longer en- spect to civic morality and culture. For their joy any high prestige, and the membership in part, politicians try to outstrip one another such organizations and the militantism within in their contest of radical speak, because their structures is assessed from the viewpoint this is the inevitable condition for their being of the costs and benefits ensuing from them. properly heard by the audience. At the same Few are the citizens who get committed led time, the disqualification of the opponent by by a certain ideal or a cause. Similar is the a “devastating” type of discourse is a game situation with the trade inions as well, which meant to play on the malicious passions of are far from the idea of being the most popu- the audience. In this way, the political debate lar form of manifesting civic commitment. On has been replaced increasingly more by some a yet another hand is the network of non- kind of a show, and the politicians are mani- governmental organizations (NGOs), which festing an increasingly greater preference for public opinion rapidly identified as the major show programs as the venue of their media manifestation of civic society. In its essence, appearances. The mass media often demon- this network is far from numerous. The direct strate a similar conduct: they play the role of participants in this NGO networks are private the “fourth estate”, though not in the meta- businesses, which compete among them- phorical sense – in their capacity of interme- selves for the declining amount of subsidies diaries of public opinion, but in the true sense extended mostly by foreign donors. Their con- of the word, presenting themselves as corpo- tribution to civic activities is almost insignifi- rate participants in the political process who cant now and the public opinion has almost Bulgarian Political Culture and Civic Participation 27 disqualified them, bringing them down to the Bibliography level of ordinary private companies, specializ- ing in writing projects and submitting reports AVRAMOV R. The Unrealized Conservative at the prescribed stages of their implementa- Manifest of Bulgaria. In: Bochev St. Capital- tion. Of late, this sector has been joined by ism in Bulgaria, Sofia, 1998. numerous sports organizations, which very ALMOND G., VERBA S. The Civic Cul- often serve as cover for dubious groupings. ture. Translated by E. Bodourova. Sofia, This more or less pessimistic picture of GalIko, 1998. civic participation in Bulgaria should not make WEBER M. The Scientist and Politi- us disregard the existence of dispersed civic cian. Translated by Vl. Chukov, Sofia, Bul- movements, the members of which are few in vest-2000, 1993. number, but are capable of instantaneous mo- Gavrilova R., Elenkov I. To the History bilization. They attract mainly younger people of the Civic Sector in Bulgaria. Development and bring them together for a given cause. of Civic Society Foundation, Study on the Civ- The political mobilization during the students’ ic Sector, Issue No.2, Spring 1998. rallies in 2009, as well as the subsequent en- georgiev, P. Bulgarian Political Culture. vironmental protests, are a new manifestation Sofia, K&M, 2000. of such a civic culture. These now dispersed DAHL, R. On Democracy, Published in civic movements could become a valuable fac- translation, Sofia, 1999. tor in Bulgarian civic culture as long as they daskalov R. The 1878-1939 Bulgarian So- manage to retain their autonomy and succeed ciety. In two volumes. Sofia, Gutenberg, 2005. in protecting themselves from being turned ZNepolsky, Ivailo. Bulgarian Commu- into instruments of individual political parties, nism. Socio-Cultural Traits and Power Trajec- as these parties are acting today to a large ex- tory. Sofia, Institute for the Study of the Re- tent much like corporate private entities. cent Past, Ciela, 2008. It is obvious that Bulgarian society needs kalinova E., BAEVA I. The Bulgarian Tran- an active network for civic education and sitions of 1939-2001. Sofia, Paradigma, 2001. civic culture. It needs a network precisely, karasimeonov G. The Party System in not a centralized structure or an institution, Bulgaria. Sofia, Gorex Press, 2006. in order to encompass both the public edu- Miggev V. The Private Sector in Bulgar- cational institutions and the political parties, ian Economy in the 1960s. In: Collection of the trade unions, the non-governmental or- Works in Honor of Associate Professor Mincho ganizations, and the various civic initiatives Minchev, PhD. Veliko Tarnovo, St.St. Cyril and and movements, ensuring their broad and Methodius University Publishing House, 2006. effective cooperation. The active citizen does milyukov P. The Bulgarian Constitution. not generate himself or herself, what he/she Thessaloniki, 1905. needs is an educational effort and proper Mittev, peter-emil; zhelyazkova, an- upbringing, as well as good examples and tonina; stoykovsky, goran. Macedonia personal experience. at a Crossroad. Sofia, East-West, 2009. MISHKOVA D. Adaptation of Freedom. 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About the author: Antony Todorov, PhD, is Doctor of Political Science and an associate professor at the “New Bulgarian University” in Sofia. He is the author of numerous publications concerning political theory. He is Chairman of the Bulgar- ian Association for Political Sciences, and Edi- tor-in-Chief of the “Political Studies” Journal. Modern Bulgarian political culture has emerged in result of intricately interlaced and inherited beliefs, views, values, and practices, coupled with new and continuously mastered and internalized modes of political com- mitment and conduct. The prevailing political cultural in Bulgaria today is rather strongly marked by community conservatism, national dreams, person-centered- ness, as well as distrust towards the political class as a whole. The activist culture in contemporary Bulgaria is limited, even marginal, divided into two opposing halves: civic activity and nationalist mobilization. The commitment of the trade unions remains superficial and pro- fessionalized. The trade unions themselves are in quite a weak position within the existing system of social dialog. The civic sector in today’s Bulgaria is strongly dependent on external funding; it is lacking sufficient internal support. Activities promoting civic participation are very restricted. Such a civic participation does exist, but only in limited and dispersed sectors of society, whereby its manifestations are more of a sporadic nature.

March 2011