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Home , Alexander Cockburn, Gary Webb, Michael Moore, Raymond Bonner

Peter Dale Scott, Jonathan Marshall. Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in . Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. xxiii + 279 pp. $15.95, paper, ISBN 978-0-520-21449-1.

Reviewed by Arthur Schmidt

Published on H-LatAm (April, 1999)

For years, historian William O. Walker has to other countries greased the way for illicit drug doggedly and wisely argued that "the history of shipments" (pp. vii-viii). drug control plays an essential part in our under‐ The 1986-88 investigations and public hear‐ standing of -Latin American rela‐ ings conducted by Senator John Kerry (D-Massa‐ tions in much of the twentieth century. To ignore chusetts) and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, that reality is to overlook the reason for one of the Narcotics and International Operations of the now-chronic problems in hemispheric rela‐ Committee on Foreign Relations of the United tions."[1] and Jonathan Marshall States Senate provide the foundation for Scott and would agree with Walker, but add a powerful Marshall's study. (Roughly one-ffth of the cita‐ twist to his view. The new paperback edition of tions in Cocaine Politics list the hearings of the Cocaine Politics. Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Subcommittee and its report).[2] Yet Scott and Central America, originally published in hard‐ Marshall were not happy with what they call the back in 1991 and frst issued in paper in 1992, re‐ "Kerry report." "Unfortunately," they lament, "con‐ iterates their contention that U.S. intelligence straints of time, resources, and politics cut the re‐ agencies have readily and willfully sacrifced port short. Staf and committee disputes, editing drug control eforts in Latin America when they decisions, and stonewalling from the executive conficted with perceived national security inter‐ branch also took their toll. The result was a nearly ests. They go so far as to argue that the single- unassailable, but incomplete account" (p. 15). minded U.S. pursuit of anti- actually Scott and Marshall set out Cocaine Politics to be promoted drug trafcking in the Americas. "In what the Kerry report should have been in their country after country, from Mexico and view, one that provides a more thorough treat‐ to Panama and , the CIA helped set up or con‐ ment of the issues and one that does not shrink solidate intelligence agencies that became forces back from politically sensitive conclusions. of repression, and whose intelligence connections H-Net Reviews

Cocaine Politics consists of Part I, "Right-Wing DEA ofce in that country was closed. Over the Narcoterrorism, the CIA, and the ," about next few years, U.S. intelligence operatives coop‐ two-thirds of the text, and Part II, "Exposure and erated with Hondurans and Cuban Americans Coverup." In all, Scott and Marshall use newspa‐ with active records in drug trafcking and money per and magazine accounts, secondary literature, laundering in order to assure transport, weapons, and Congressional documents from the Kerry sub‐ and supplies for the Honduran-based Contras. committee and the Iran-Contra hearings in rough‐ Further assistance for the Contras on the southern ly equal proportions to lay out what they call the front in Costa Rica was engineered through "lesson of the Contra period"--that "far from con‐ Manuel Noriega and various cohorts of U.S. expa‐ sidering drug networks their enemy, U.S. intelli‐ triates and Cuban Americans. Neither Oliver gence organizations have made them an essential North in the operation of his "Enterprise" nor the ally in the covert expansion of American infu‐ Department of State with its contracts to suppliers ence abroad. The most dramatic increases in drug of "humanitarian aid" to the Contras showed any smuggling since World War II have occurred in reluctance in dealing with individuals and frms the context of, and indeed partly because of, whose involvement in drug trafcking and money covert operations in the same regions. CIA in‐ laundering was well known to various agencies of volvement in Southeast Asia contributed to the US the U.S. government such as the Department of heroin epidemic of the late 1960s, just as CIA in‐ Justice or the Bureau of Customs. volvement in Central America contributed to the Second, Scott and Marshall contend that the cocaine epidemic of the 1980s. Although the CIA Reagan and Bush administrations were willing to did not actually peddle drugs, it did form gray al‐ use the so-called "" as a front for liances with right-wing gangs deemed helpful their anti-Sandinista aims in Central America, against a common enemy" (p. 4). even when it meant weakening drug control ef‐ Scott and Marshall make essentially fve argu‐ forts. As chair of the South Florida Task Force, ments in Cocaine Politics. First, that the adminis‐ they argue, George Bush helped force the trations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush ulti‐ Medellin cartel out of Florida, but took no action mately considered Sandinista more against the drug peddling and money laundering dangerous to U.S. security than narcotics. Accord‐ of anti-Castro Cubans. U.S. ofcials invented the ingly, they were willing to work with well-known image of narcoterrorism, alleging an anti-Ameri‐ drug trafckers in order to support the Contra can conspiracy among Fidelista Cuba, Sandinista cause, particularly given Congressional restric‐ Nicaragua, Colombian guerrilla groups, and the tions (the Boland Amendments of 1982 and 1984) Medellin cartel. In reality, as other analysts have on U.S. governmental support to military and noted, such a grand coalition never existed. In the paramilitary operations against the government words of Rensselaer Lee, "the [Reagan] Adminis‐ of Nicaragua. Scott and Marshall claim that the tration's ideological and security concerns in the CIA's past dealings with drug trafckers and mon‐ Hemisphere led it to ignore a more fundamental ey launderers in Florida, New Orleans, and reality: the increasing penetration by drug traf‐ throughout the Caribbean Basin ofered a ready fckers of noncommunist governments, regimes, network to be applied to the issue of halting in‐ and movements."[3] surgency in Central America. Third, Scott and Marshall argue that the pros‐ Once Argentina withdrew its active assistance ecutions of drug trafckers under the Reagan and to the Contras, the CIA moved in to reorganize the Bush administrations actually complemented Contra leadership in Honduras in 1983 while the their toleration of drug commerce in the name of

2 H-Net Reviews anti-Communism. U.S. eforts against the Sandin‐ tion that in the course of time has been extended istas employed unstable networks of "assets" in from the agencies themselves to their drug traf‐ the Caribbean Basin. Trafckers working with the fcking clients. This must cease" (pp. xi-xii). They U.S. did so for opportunistic, not ideological rea‐ advocate programs of "controlled decriminaliza‐ sons. The management of the various machineries tion" accompanied by a shift of anti-drug expendi‐ of clandestine operations always remained com‐ tures from military and police actions to scientifc plex. Once an individual was no longer useful to and medical measures as the best approach for Washington, he might fnd himself subject to pros‐ coping with the social problems of narcotics. The ecution in the name of the War on Drugs. The two authors are not optimistic about any likely strongest example of this phenomenon was shift in public policy. "For the CIA to target inter‐ Manuel Noriega, no longer needed after the Iran- national drug networks," they write, "it would Contra scandal erupted in 1986. Once Noriega lost have to dismantle prime sources of intelligence, his closest patrons, CIA Director William Casey political leverage, and indirect fnancing for its and Oliver North, his prosecution could serve a Third World operations. If this book shows noth‐ new set of political interests in Washington. ing else, it should indicate the folly of expecting Fourth, integral to the success of Reagan-Bush such a total change of institutional direction" (p. policies was their ability to cover up their unsa‐ 5). vory ties to drug interests. Scott and Marshall de‐ How should one evaluate the republication of vote a third of their text to the eforts employed Cocaine Politics eight years after its original ap‐ by North to intimidate witnesses and otherwise to pearance? It is not a book that can claim to be de‐ obstruct the work of the Kerry subcommittee as fnitive. After all, as Scott and Marshall note, well as to the broader public relations ofensives "even the most reputable sources cannot guaran‐ that both administrations constantly employed. tee accuracy in an area as murky as the narcotics The two authors strongly criticize the unwilling‐ trafc" (p. 7). As in federal racketeering trials, the ness of most of the U.S. Congress to take the drug charges are enormous and the witnesses of unsa‐ links to Central American policy seriously. In ad‐ vory background. It is hard to avoid agreeing with dition, they insist that the electronic news media much of what Cocaine Politics says about the Cen‐ as well as the major newspapers like the Wash‐ tral American wars--that elements of the U.S. gov‐ ington Post and consistently ernment willfully cooperated with known drug ignored or underplayed the issues in ways that trafckers and money launderers against what worked to the favor of the U.S. government. Here Ronald Reagan declared as the "unusual and ex‐ their contentions echo those of media critics like traordinary threat" of Sandinista Nicaragua.[5] It , Edward Herman, and Michael is certainly clear that the U.S. government suc‐ Perenti.[4] cessfully obstructed eforts of the Kerry subcom‐ Fifth, Scott and Marshall argue that the U.S. mittee and the Iran-Contra prosecutors to get to will have to dismantle the national security state the bottom of U.S. foreign policy scandals.[6] In if it is to cope efectively with drug issues. "A root addition, the ability of the Reagan administration cause of the governmental drug problem in this to use the tactic of "the big lie" to obscure the po‐ country (as distinguished from the broader social litical reality of its actions in Central America is drug problem) is the National Security Act of well known.[7] While these weighty allegations 1947, and subsequent orders based on it. These, in from Cocaine Politics are valid, much of sub‐ efect, have exempted intelligence agencies and stance--questions of degree, levels of individual their personnel from the rule of law, an exemp‐

3 H-Net Reviews responsibility, and causal linkages, for example-- held hearings, while ABC's Nightline show aired remains murky. then CIA Director John Deutch's tumultuous meet‐ Cocaine Politics needs higher standards of ing with Congresswoman ' con‐ analysis. Scott and Marshall seem content to see stituents in . In the end, however, little Contra-CIA drug linkages in the Central American happened other than a series of discrediting at‐ wars as simply business as usual, something that tacks on Webb's articles by more powerful news‐ the CIA has always routinely done. By this per‐ papers, particularly and the spective, many of their more hazy connections of .[10] the Central American confict to anti-Castro Webb's experience amply demonstrates the Cubans, Colombian cartels, and Israeli agents are accusations of Scott and Marshall that the main‐ transformed from speculation into evidence. To stream press willfully neglects the issue of drug paraphrase Barry Goldwater, Scott and Marshall involvement in U.S. policy during the Central seem to hold that error in the defense of thesis is American wars. It continues to treat possible CIA no vice; exactitude in the pursuit of historical linkages to drug trafckers lightly, even when the truth is no virtue. "If, despite our best eforts," CIA itself now admits a repeated failure to investi‐ they assert, "history proves a few of our asser‐ gate allegations of Contra drug trafcking or to re‐ tions wrong, it will hardly overthrow the larger port them to other U.S. agencies or to Congress. conclusions of the study" (p. 7). Some readers may [11] In the words of , the San Jose be content with such a stance, but for the broad Mercury News "accomplished something that nei‐ public, the exposure of erroneous claims can dis‐ ther the Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, credit an entire work. (Relatively few audiences nor The New York Times had been willing or able are like those obtained by the labor activist to do--revisit a signifcant story that had been in‐ . On tour, Moore jokingly told one explicably abandoned by the mainstream press, group that ought to go into co‐ report a new dimension to it, and thus put it back caine dealing if really it was interested in nothing on the national agenda where it belongs ... Indeed, more than profts. A member of the audience im‐ if the major media had devoted the same energy mediately shouted back that the CIA had already and ink to investigating the contra drug scandal taken over that activity.)[8] in the 1980s as they did to attacking the Mercury The experience of journalist ofers News in 1996, Gary Webb might never have had a relevant case in point. In August, 1996, Webb his scoop."[12] published a three-part series in the San Jose Mer‐ Yet Webb's series was rife with journalistic cury on drug trafcking in the Contra war and its weaknesses that made it a ready target for its crit‐ linkages with the consumption of crack cocaine in ics and nullifed its potential impact. Kornbluh California.[9] Webb's articles argued that a characterizes it as "an overwritten and problem‐ Nicaraguan drug ring that worked with the CIA in atically sourced piece of reporting. It repeatedly Central America created an inner-city crack co‐ promised evidence that, on close reading, it did caine market in California in order to fnance the not deliver."[13] Cocaine Politics certainly does Contra war. While widely ignored at frst, Webb's not merit such harsh criticism. Nevertheless, the reportage created a sensation in African-Ameri‐ book contains shortcomings that weaken its case, can communities across the United States, eventu‐ faws that were in the power of the authors to ally generating pressure that brought attention have avoided originally or to have corrected in from both Washington and the mainstream me‐ the new edition. Some are simply matters of an‐ dia. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence noyance to the reader, such as the lack of a bibli‐

4 H-Net Reviews ography, a genuine sin of omission in a book that Cocaine Politics thus remains the book that it relies so heavily on secondary works. Others are was eight years ago: an important starting point more serious--for example, the failure to demon‐ for examining the role of narcotics in U.S. policy strate to the reader a critical evaluation of toward Central America and the relationship be‐ sources. Newspaper citations simply contain the tween the CIA and drug trafcking. Unfortunately, name of the newspaper and publication date, a it does not fll the current need for scholarship form of notation that communicates nothing that would bring the drug-Contra story up to date about the authorship of the material to readers. in the context of present U.S. narcotics control ef‐ Readers need to know the identity of journalistic forts in the Western Hemisphere. The United sources since U.S. reporting from Central America States currently supports a complex of supply-side during this period exhibited great variations in programs that involve it deeply in the internal quality. An article by Raymond Bonner or Julia conficts of Bolivia, the Caribbean, Central Ameri‐ Preston, for example, would be likely to ofer su‐ ca, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.[14] These settings perior material to one by Lindsey Gruson, al‐ intertwine U.S. security agencies with local para‐ though all three wrote for the same newspaper, military, police, and military forces. The mixture the New York Times. of human rights and narcotics issues yields a con‐ Scott and Marshall do a better job in their text ripe for abuse.[15] This situation requires notes of commenting on some of their primary that the accusations raised by Scott and Marshall source selections from the Kerry report or from in Cocaine Politics obtain a more defnitive an‐ Iran-Contra congressional documents. Still, a criti‐ swer. cal reader is likely to lack confdence that Cocaine If further studies in this feld are to gain the Politics fully escapes the injudicious use of broad reception that is needed, they must tran‐ sources and argumentation that tripped up Gary scend the scholarly weaknesses of Cocaine Poli‐ Webb. Arguments in Cocaine Politics often sufer tics. At the present time, an unfortunate gap exists from loose construction, while the book's quantity between two diferent approaches to the matter of detail sometimes obscures the forest for the of CIA ties to drug trafcking during the Central trees. Causation rests heavily on conjecture or on American wars. The critical populist school takes coincidences in timing more than it does upon ex‐ the CIA-drug nexus as almost a matter of faith, planations that knit together evidence, source, while the critical institutional approach scarcely and conclusion tightly. Given the covert nature of discusses the question at all. Following the path of the subject matter, many of these defciencies Cocaine Politics, critical populists may lament may be inevitable, but the republication of Co‐ their lack of impact, but they do not seem con‐ caine Politics does not convey the sense that Scott vinced of the need to raise their scholarly stan‐ and Marshall have done all they might to mini‐ dards. The infuence of vested interests and the mize them. While the 1998 title page bears the success of the coverup alone sufce in their view wording "Updated Edition with a New Preface," to account for the impunity enjoyed by crimes of the "Preface to the 1998 Edition" constitutes the power. Even when the powerful admit guilt, their only change from the 1992 paperback. In reality, sins are ignored. "Down the decades the CIA has the 1998 edition has not been "updated" at all. The approached perfection in one particular art, eight pages of the new preface simply state that which we might term the `uncover-up,'" writes several events subsequent to the book's original Alexander and Jefrey St. Clair. "This is publication (including Webb's series and the trial the process whereby, with all due delay, the Agen‐ of Noriega) have validated its contentions. cy frst denies with passion, then concedes in pro‐ foundly mufed tones, charges leveled against

5 H-Net Reviews it."[16] A vicious circle emerges whereby the inherent in U.S. drug control policies in Latin agents of the U.S. national security state commit America; and the abdication of responsibility by hideous deeds that are righteously denounced by the established news media. The critical institu‐ muckracking journalism, whose fndings are then tionalists should make it a priority to seek out ignored by the mainstream news media and the where the "solid proof" lies amid the Contra-CIA political establishment, thus leading to more drug questions while the critical populists should muckracking journalism. raise their analytical standards. The critical institutional literature has gener‐ NOTES: ally stayed away from the Contra-CIA drug ques‐ [1]. William O. Walker III, Drug Control in the tions, not because it has been part of the coverup, Americas, rev. ed. (Albuquerque: University of but because it has not found the standards of New Mexico Press, 1989), xii. Walker has also not‐ proof employed by the critical populists convinc‐ ed that "drug cultures are not at all alien to the ing. William LeoGrande's recent study of U.S. poli‐ Americas; they have been and will likely remain cy during the Central American wars devotes less an integral, though misrepresented, aspect of its than three of its seven hundred seventy-three history ... With equal certainty, the confict over pages to the matter, concluding that while indica‐ drugs in the Americas will persist into its second tions of Contra links to drug trafcking and mon‐ century." William O. Walker III, "Introduction: ey laundering were "highly suggestive, there was Culture, Drugs, and Politics in the Americas," no solid proof implicating senior contra leaders in Drugs in the Western Hemisphere. An Odyssey of the drug trade."[17] Like LeoGrande, the authors Cultures in Confict, ed. William O. Walker III of other works critical of U.S. foreign policy in (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1996), xv and xxiv. Central America and its violation of law and hu‐ [2]. U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforce‐ man rights have also given relatively little atten‐ ment, and Foreign Policy, Report by the Subcom‐ tion to the Contra-CIA drug matter.[18] The same mittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International has been true of prosecutors.[19] Similarly, schol‐ Operations, Committee on Foreign Relations, ars generally not sympathetic to the approach of 100th Cong., 2d sess., December 1988 (Washing‐ U.S. drug-control policies in Latin America have ton: U.S. Government Printing Ofce, 1989). also shrunk back from the issue. Recent work on the drug trade in the region barely mentions pos‐ [3]. Rensselaer W. Lee III, The White sible criminal activity by the CIA and the other Labyrinth. Cocaine and Political Power (New U.S. intelligence arms.[20] Brunswick, N.J. and : Transaction Publish‐ ers, 1989), 184. Lee's book was sponsored by the The gap between the critical populists and the right-leaning Foreign Policy Research Institute in critical institutionalists constitutes an unhealthy Philadelphia. On this same point, Lee went on to prescription for accurately comprehending the say: "In South America, Central America, and the Central American wars, for bringing recent histo‐ Caribbean, the cocaine industry's money and ry to bear on the human costs of contemporary power support established political regimes. U.S. drug control measures in Latin America, and (Funding for the Nicaraguan Contras may be an for incorporating narcotics into the history of U.S.- interesting exception). To pretend otherwise, as Latin American relations in the twentieth century. some Reagan administration ofcials have done, It is time for these two types of literature to em‐ is either to carry on an exercise in self-deception phasize the common elements they often hold-- or to make a deliberate misrepresentation of real‐ recognition of the abuses of power at home and ity." abroad by the national security state; the dangers

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[4]. For example, Edward S. Herman and [15]. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent. The Po‐ War Without Quarter. Colombia and Internation‐ litical Economy of the Mass Media (New York: al Humanitarian Law (New York: Human Rights Pantheon Books, 1988) and Michael Perenti, In‐ Watch, 1998). venting Reality. The Politics of the Mass Media [16]. and Jefrey St. Clair, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986). Whiteout. The CIA, Drugs, and the Press (New [5]. In imposing economic sanctions on York: Verso, 1998), 385. Nicaragua in 1985, the Reagan administration de‐ [17]. William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Back‐ clared Nicaragua "an unusual and extraordinary yard. The United States in Central America, threat to the national security and foreign policy 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill and London: University of of the United States." North Carolina Press, 1998), 464. Cocaine Politics [6]. See Lawrence E. Walsh, Iran-Contra. The is not listed in LeoGrande's bibliography while the Final Report (New York: Times Books, 1994). Kerry report is. [7]. Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh, "Iran- [18]. For example, Theodore Draper, A Very Contra's Untold Story," Foreign Policy (fall 1988), Thin Line. The Iran-Contra Afairs (New York: Hill 3-30. and Wang, 1991) and Peter Kornbluh and Mal‐ [8]. See Moore's most recent video, The Big colm Byrne, eds., The Iran-Contra Scandal: The One (Miramax, 1998). Declassifed History , A National Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: The New Press, [9]. Webb has published an expanded version 1993). of his reportage and experience as Dark Alliance. The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Ex‐ [19]. For example, Walsh, Iran-Contra. plosion (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998). [20]. Recent cases include Peter H. Smith, ed., [10]. The best account of the controversy is of‐ Drug Policy in the Americas (Boulder and Lon‐ fered by Peter Kornbluh, "The Storm over 'Dark don: Westview Press, 1992) and Elizabeth Joyce Alliance,' Columbia Journalism Review, January- and Carlos Malamud, eds., Latin America and the February 1997, 33-39. Multinational Drug Trade , Institute of Latin American Studies Series, University of London [11]. James Risen, "CIA Said to Ignore Charges (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). of Contra Drug Dealing in the '80s," New York Times, 10 October 1998. covered the de‐ Copyright (c)1999 by H-Net, all rights re‐ classifed report by the CIA Inspector General that served. This Work may be copied for non-proft, admitted these agency failings with this one story educational use if Proper credit is given to the au‐ on an interior page. thor and the list. For Other permission, please contact [email protected]. [12]. Kornbluh, "The Storm," 32. [13]. Ibid. [14]. See "Just the Facts: A Civilian's Guide to U.S. Defense and Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean," available at http:// ww.ciponline.org/facts/; Internet; accessed 16 Jan‐ uary 1999; and Mathea Falco, "U.S. Drug Policy: Addicted to Failure," Foreign Policy (spring 1996): 120-133.

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Citation: Arthur Schmidt. Review of Scott, Peter Dale; Marshall, Jonathan. Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America. H-LatAm, H-Net Reviews. April, 1999.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=3016

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