Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, I99I
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Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, I99I FIJI November 1991, Sitiveni Rabuka was For Fiji, 1991 was a year of continuing elected to the presidency ofthe party, political turbulence and economic winning 9 ofthe 19 votes cast to Adi uncertainty. The country weathered Lady Lala Mara's 6 and Ratu William several actual and threatened industrial Toganivalu's 4. strikes, and witnessed the emergence of The election of a commoner a number of political parties in antici (although an uncommon one) over two pation ofthe general elections sched high-ranking chiefs to head a chiefs' uled for May 1992. The economy faced party provoked much comment. Some the full onslaught of the interim Fijian observers raised fundamental regime's deregulation measures, which questions about the inevitably corro brought it into confrontation with sive impact on the fijian chiefly system trade unions and other opposition par of chiefs participating in the hurly ties. The year will be remembered as burly of electoral politics as traditional pregnant with many ominous possibili representatives oftheir people. Others ties, and some ofthem will be manifest saw the formation of the SVT as essen m 1992. tially an attempt by the eastern-domi On the political front, several nated chiefly establishment to control important developments took place. the political destiny of the taukei, and The political party backed by the Great to maintain the status quo. Council of Chiefs, the Soqosoqo ni One of these was the ever-mercurial Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), whose Apisai Tora, who at various times in formation was approved by the council his checkered political career has in June 1990, formalized its constitu belonged to the Indo-fijian-backed tion and began the highly divisive pro National Federation Party, the Alli cess of selecting candidates to contest ance, and in 1987 the violence-threat the 37 Fijian communal seats. The SVT, ening, stridently anti-Coalition Taukei says its constitution, will promote the Movement. "Our firm view," he said interests of the taukei, the indigenous "remains that the Bose Levu Vaka Fijians, "in association with other eth turaga [Great Council of Chiefs] nic communities in Fiji," seek to rees should be at the pinnacle of Fijian soci tablish Fiji's links to the British Crown ety, totally removed from the taint of and with the Commonwealth, and pur ordinary politicking" (FT, 10 Oct 1991). sue economic policies that promote In July, he launched his own party, the economic growth and development All National Congress (ANC), a move within an essentially deregulated envi that brought the wrath of the interim ronment to allow "world market forces regime and cost him his cabinet posi to determine prices and production for tion in the interim government. With export and local markets through an its base in western Fiji, a place with a efficient and productive private sector long history of political dissent against enterprise" (SVT constitution, 10). In both the colonial state and the postco- THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1992 lonial Alliance government, the ANC personal political aspirations, mean presented itself as a multiracial party that political fragmentation will be a for all the people ofFiji. To no one's continuing feature of taukei political surprise, Tora presented himself as a life. changed person, "a moderate and a On the Indo-Fijian side, too, there is democrat," saying that Fiji had to find evidence of political fragmentation. In a home for all its people on the basis of 1991 a number ofparties emerged, justice and fairness: "The people of essentially fragments of bodies for Fiji, whether we are Fijians, Indians or merly associated with the now-defunct Europeans, or whatever, are here and Alliance party. Among them were the here to stay. There is no place else for Fiji Indian Congress and the Indian us to go" (FT, 7 Aug 1991). In 1987 Tora Liberal Party. However, these parties was among those calling for the emas are not likely to have any major elec culation ofIndo-Fijians' political toral impact; some may even vanish rights. He hopes to win a number of before election day 1992. Although seats in western Viti Levu as well as a dormant since the coups of1987, the few ANc-aligned General Voter seats to National Federation Party (NFP) hold the balance ofpower in the next remains the dominant, representative parliament. voice ofthe Indo-Fijian community. Several other Fijian splinter parties, The combination of a racially discrimi such as the Fijian Conservative Party natory constitution that gives Indo and Sakiasi Butadroka's Fijian Chris Fijians (nearly half the total popula tian Nationalist Party (formerly the tion) only 27 of the 71 seats, various Fijian Nationalist Party), hope for a pro-Fijian policies of the interim similar outcome. Butadroka's party has regime, and a general sense ofhelpless changed its name but not its platform. ness has given the party (and its con It still demands the political oblitera stituency) a sense of cohesiveness that tion ofthe Indo-Fijians and complete it has rarely enjoyed in the past. Fijian control ofthe economy, includ In September 1991, the NFP decided ing the return of all fee simple and to participate in the forthcoming elec other lands to indigenous hands. In tions under protest. The decision was November, Fijians in western Viti Levu taken to prevent the Indo-Fijian seats launched their own Fijian Landowners from being occupied by "irresponsible Party, with a pro-western Fijian plat people," in Jai Ram Reddy's words (FT, form similar to the policies ofthe West 21 Sept 1991). There was also the reali ern United Front of the 1980s (Lal, zation that, whatever the NFP'S atti 1983). The emergence of splinter Fijian tudes, many Indo-Fijians would con parties is not altogether surprising, test the seats for reasons of their own, though their impact on the Fijian polit including settling old scores. Boycot ical scene is not likely to be significant. ting the elections, the party leaders A diminishing fear of the threat of apprehended, would be disastrous for Indo-Fijian political dominance, a their community's broader interests quiet but strong suspicion ofthe hege and severely detrimental to the party's monic ambition ofeastern Fijians, and future survival. ,I, ! i'1III' ... ~. ••• ';.;h" • l1'l'i"", • i.," "" POLITICAL REVIEWS Although the decision to participate Rabuka backed down when Ganilau, may have pleased many disenchanted who is also Rabuka's paramount chief, Indo-Fijians, it deeply dismayed the said he was "extremely disappointed, NFP'S coalition partner, the Fiji Labour dismayed and shocked" by the general's Party (FLP), which had resolved earlier utterances and demanded an uncondi to boycott the elections. How could the tional apology from him; this was party contest elections under a consti offered to both Ganilau and Mara and tution it had proclaimed to the world his cabinet colleagues. According to to be racist, feudalistic, authoritarian, confidential sources within the interim and unjust? Participation in the elec government, Rabuka had planned to tions, argued the FLP leaders, would sack the government and replace it give legitimacy to the constitution and with a "national front" administration, amount to its acceptance. But princi but the move failed when senior offi pled resolve eventually gave way to cers ofthe army balked. Doing an practical realities. Fearing political incredible about-turn a month later, marginalization and urged by their Rabuka accepted Mara's invitation to supporters, the FLP'S indigenous Fijian join the cabinet as co-deputy prime strategists effectively jettisoned their minister and minister for home affairs previous position and began to explore (which oversees the army, police, and ways offorging a common ground security forces). Mara had outma with other independents and like neuvered the erratic general, or so it minded parties to oppose the SVT seemed for a while. (Daily Post, 29 Oct 1991). As the year While in the administration, how drew to a close, several FLP Fijians ever, Rabuka continued to be an irri were preparing to stand as indepen tant to his cabinet colleagues. He made dents. The difference of opinion no secret of his desire to become prime between the FLP and the NFP, on con minister "to fulfil my objectives and my testing the election, ended the coalition promises of1987" (PIM, Aug 1991). Pro arrangement between them. jecting himself as a populist consensus The fluctuating fortunes of Sitiveni maker, Rabuka helped to resolve the Rabuka frequently made the headlines sugar dispute. He angered many chiefs in 199I. The news that shook Fiji in by insisting, as the Coalition had done June 1991 was Rabuka's stinging criti in 1987, that they should not mix their cism of the interim government, which, traditional political roles. His distinc the general said, had lost touch with tion between "meritorious" chiefs and the people, "got it all wrong," and "traditional" chiefs displeased many, ought to resign. "This government is a especially his remark that the domi reactionary government," Rabuka said, nance of Fijian chiefs would end soon "made up of overpaid people who sit with "replacement of traditional aris on their laurels and wait for something tocracy with meritocracy" (FT, 29 Aug to happen before they react" (FT, 5June 1991). In November, Rabuka was 1991). He even threatened to "repossess elected to the presidency of the SVT, power" he had invested in the presi providing Mara with the opportunity dent. Two days later, however, to force his resignation from Cabinet. 39° THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1992 Rabuka insists that he considers him ning factory, hoping to produce IS mil self the front-runner for prime minis lion pineapples for export in 1994.