Comparison of Java Programming Testing Tools
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Static Analysis the Workhorse of a End-To-End Securitye Testing Strategy
Static Analysis The Workhorse of a End-to-End Securitye Testing Strategy Achim D. Brucker [email protected] http://www.brucker.uk/ Department of Computer Science, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK Winter School SECENTIS 2016 Security and Trust of Next Generation Enterprise Information Systems February 8–12, 2016, Trento, Italy Static Analysis: The Workhorse of a End-to-End Securitye Testing Strategy Abstract Security testing is an important part of any security development lifecycle (SDL) and, thus, should be a part of any software (development) lifecycle. Still, security testing is often understood as an activity done by security testers in the time between “end of development” and “offering the product to customers.” Learning from traditional testing that the fixing of bugs is the more costly the later it is done in development, security testing should be integrated, as early as possible, into the daily development activities. The fact that static analysis can be deployed as soon as the first line of code is written, makes static analysis the right workhorse to start security testing activities. In this lecture, I will present a risk-based security testing strategy that is used at a large European software vendor. While this security testing strategy combines static and dynamic security testing techniques, I will focus on static analysis. This lecture provides a introduction to the foundations of static analysis as well as insights into the challenges and solutions of rolling out static analysis to more than 20000 developers, distributed across the whole world. A.D. Brucker The University of Sheffield Static Analysis February 8–12., 2016 2 Today: Background and how it works ideally Tomorrow: (Ugly) real world problems and challenges (or why static analysis is “undecideable” in practice) Our Plan A.D. -
ON SOFTWARE TESTING and SUBSUMING MUTANTS an Empirical Study
ON SOFTWARE TESTING AND SUBSUMING MUTANTS An empirical study Master Degree Project in Computer Science Advanced level 15 credits Spring term 2014 András Márki Supervisor: Birgitta Lindström Examiner: Gunnar Mathiason Course: DV736A WECOA13: Web Computing Magister Summary Mutation testing is a powerful, but resource intense technique for asserting software quality. This report investigates two claims about one of the mutation operators on procedural logic, the relation operator replacement (ROR). The constrained ROR mutant operator is a type of constrained mutation, which targets to lower the number of mutants as a “do smarter” approach, making mutation testing more suitable for industrial use. The findings in the report shows that the hypothesis on subsumption is rejected if mutants are to be detected on function return values. The second hypothesis stating that a test case can only detect a single top-level mutant in a subsumption graph is also rejected. The report presents a comprehensive overview on the domain of mutation testing, displays examples of the masking behaviour previously not described in the field of mutation testing, and discusses the importance of the granularity where the mutants should be detected under execution. The contribution is based on literature survey and experiment. The empirical findings as well as the implications are discussed in this master dissertation. Keywords: Software Testing, Mutation Testing, Mutant Subsumption, Relation Operator Replacement, ROR, Empirical Study, Strong Mutation, Weak Mutation -
Command Line Interface
Command Line Interface Squore 21.0.2 Last updated 2021-08-19 Table of Contents Preface. 1 Foreword. 1 Licence. 1 Warranty . 1 Responsabilities . 2 Contacting Vector Informatik GmbH Product Support. 2 Getting the Latest Version of this Manual . 2 1. Introduction . 3 2. Installing Squore Agent . 4 Prerequisites . 4 Download . 4 Upgrade . 4 Uninstall . 5 3. Using Squore Agent . 6 Command Line Structure . 6 Command Line Reference . 6 Squore Agent Options. 6 Project Build Parameters . 7 Exit Codes. 13 4. Managing Credentials . 14 Saving Credentials . 14 Encrypting Credentials . 15 Migrating Old Credentials Format . 16 5. Advanced Configuration . 17 Defining Server Dependencies . 17 Adding config.xml File . 17 Using Java System Properties. 18 Setting up HTTPS . 18 Appendix A: Repository Connectors . 19 ClearCase . 19 CVS . 19 Folder Path . 20 Folder (use GNATHub). 21 Git. 21 Perforce . 23 PTC Integrity . 25 SVN . 26 Synergy. 28 TFS . 30 Zip Upload . 32 Using Multiple Nodes . 32 Appendix B: Data Providers . 34 AntiC . 34 Automotive Coverage Import . 34 Automotive Tag Import. 35 Axivion. 35 BullseyeCoverage Code Coverage Analyzer. 36 CANoe. 36 Cantata . 38 CheckStyle. .. -
List of Requirements for Code Reviews
WP2 DIGIT B1 - EP Pilot Project 645 Deliverable 9: List of Requirements for Code Reviews Specific contract n°226 under Framework Contract n° DI/07172 – ABCIII April 2016 DIGIT Fossa WP2 – Governance and Quality of Software Code – Auditing of Free and Open Source Software. Deliverable 9: List of requirements for code reviews Author: Disclaimer The information and views set out in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Commission. The content, conclusions and recommendations set out in this publication are elaborated in the specific context of the EU – FOSSA project. The Commission does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this study. All representations, warranties, undertakings and guarantees relating to the report are excluded, particularly concerning – but not limited to – the qualities of the assessed projects and products. Neither the Commission nor any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may be held responsible for the use that may be made of the information contained herein. © European Union, 2016. Reuse is authorised, without prejudice to the rights of the Commission and of the author(s), provided that the source of the publication is acknowledged. The reuse policy of the European Commission is implemented by a Decision of 12 December 2011. Document elaborated in the specific context of the EU – FOSSA project. Reuse or reproduction authorised without prejudice to the Commission’s or the authors’ rights. Page 2 of 51 DIGIT Fossa WP2 – Governance and Quality of Software Code – Auditing of Free and Open Source Software. Deliverable 9: List of requirements for code reviews Contents CONTENTS............................................................................................................................................ -
Write Your Own Rules and Enforce Them Continuously
Ultimate Architecture Enforcement Write Your Own Rules and Enforce Them Continuously SATURN May 2017 Paulo Merson Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts Agenda Architecture conformance Custom checks lab Sonarqube Custom checks at TCU Lessons learned 2 Exercise 0 – setup Open www.dontpad.com/saturn17 Follow the steps for “Exercise 0” Pre-requisites for all exercises: • JDK 1.7+ • Java IDE of your choice • maven 3 Consequences of lack of conformance Lower maintainability, mainly because of undesired dependencies • Code becomes brittle, hard to understand and change Possible negative effect • on reliability, portability, performance, interoperability, security, and other qualities • caused by deviation from design decisions that addressed these quality requirements 4 Factors that influence architecture conformance How effective the architecture documentation is Turnover among developers Haste to fix bugs or implement features Size of the system Distributed teams (outsourcing, offshoring) Accountability for violating design constraints 5 How to avoid code and architecture disparity? 1) Communicate the architecture to developers • Create multiple views • Structural diagrams + behavior diagrams • Capture rationale Not the focus of this tutorial 6 How to avoid code and architecture disparity? 2) Automate architecture conformance analysis • Often done with static analysis tools 7 Built-in checks and custom checks Static analysis tools come with many built-in checks • They are useful to spot bugs and improve your overall code quality • But they’re -
Thesis Template
Automated Testing: Requirements Propagation via Model Transformation in Embedded Software Nader Kesserwan A Thesis In The Concordia Institute For Information System Engineering Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Information and Systems Engineering) at Concordia University Montreal, Quebec, Canada March 2020 © Nader Kesserwan 2020 ABSTRACT Automated Testing: Requirements Propagation via Model Transformation in Embedded Software Nader Kesserwan, Ph.D. Concordia University, 2020 Testing is the most common activity to validate software systems and plays a key role in the software development process. In general, the software testing phase takes around 40-70% of the effort, time and cost. This area has been well researched over a long period of time. Unfortunately, while many researchers have found methods of reducing time and cost during the testing process, there are still a number of important related issues such as generating test cases from UCM scenarios and validate them need to be researched. As a result, ensuring that an embedded software behaves correctly is non-trivial, especially when testing with limited resources and seeking compliance with safety-critical software standard. It thus becomes imperative to adopt an approach or methodology based on tools and best engineering practices to improve the testing process. This research addresses the problem of testing embedded software with limited resources by the following. First, a reverse-engineering technique is exercised on legacy software tests aims to discover feasible transformation from test layer to test requirement layer. The feasibility of transforming the legacy test cases into an abstract model is shown, along with a forward engineering process to regenerate the test cases in selected test language. -
Empirical Study of Vulnerability Scanning Tools for Javascript Work in Progress
Empirical Study of Vulnerability Scanning Tools for JavaScript Work In Progress Tiago Brito, Nuno Santos, José Fragoso INESC-ID Lisbon 2020 Tiago Brito, GSD Meeting - 30/07/2020 Purpose of this WIP presentation ● Current work is to be submitted this year ● Goal: gather feedback on work so far ● Focus on presenting the approach and preliminary results Tiago Brito, GSD Meeting - 30/07/2020 2 Motivation ● JavaScript is hugely popular for web development ○ For both client and server-side (NodeJS) development ● There are many critical vulnerabilities reported for software developed using NodeJS ○ Remote Code Executions (Staicu NDSS’18) ○ Denial of Service (Staicu Sec’18) ○ Small number of packages, big impact (Zimmermann Sec’19) ● Developers need tools to help them detect problems ○ They are pressured to focus on delivering features Tiago Brito, GSD Meeting - 30/07/2020 3 Problem Previous work focused on: ● Tools for vulnerability analysis in Java or PHP code (e.g. Alhuzali Sec’18) ● Studying very specific vulnerabilities in Server-side JavaScript ○ ReDos, Command Injections (Staicu NDSS’18 and Staicu Sec’18) ● Studying vulnerability reports on the NodeJS ecosystem (Zimmermann Sec’19) So, it is still unknown which, and how many, of these tools can effectively detect vulnerabilities in modern JavaScript. Tiago Brito, GSD Meeting - 30/07/2020 4 Goal Our goal is to assess the effectiveness of state-of-the-art vulnerability detection tools for JavaScript code by performing a comprehensive empirical study. Tiago Brito, GSD Meeting - 30/07/2020 5 Research Questions 1. [Tools] Which tools exist for JavaScript vulnerability detection? 2. [Approach] What’s the approach these tools use and their main challenges for detecting vulnerabilities? 3. -
Testing, Debugging & Verification
Testing, debugging & verification Srinivas Pinisetty This course Introduction to techniques to get (some) certainty that your program does what it’s supposed to. Specification: An unambiguous description of what a function (program) should do. Bug: failure to meet specification. What is a Bug? Basic Terminology ● Defect (aka bug, fault) introduced into code by programmer (not always programmer's fault, if, e.g., requirements changed) ● Defect may cause infection of program state during execution (not all defects cause infection) ● Infected state propagates during execution (infected parts of states may be overwritten or corrected) ● Infection may cause a failure: an externally observable error (including, e.g., non-termination) Terminology ● Testing - Check for bugs ● Debugging – Relating a failure to a defect (systematically find source of failure) ● Specification - Describe what is a bug ● (Formal) Verification - Prove that there are no bugs Cost of certainty Formal Verification Property based testing Unit testing Man hours (*) Graph not based on data, only indication More certainty = more work Contract metaphor Supplier: (callee) Implementer of method Client: (caller) Implementer of calling method or user Contract: Requires (precondition): What the client must ensure Ensures (postcondition): What the supplier must ensure ● Testing ● Formal specification ○ Unit testing ○ Logic ■ Coverage criteria ■ Propositional logic ● Control-Flow based ■ Predicate Logic ● Logic Based ■ SAT ■ Extreme Testing ■ SMT ■ Mutation testing ○ Dafny ○ Input -
Coverity Static Analysis
Coverity Static Analysis Quickly find and fix Overview critical security and Coverity® gives you the speed, ease of use, accuracy, industry standards compliance, and quality issues as you scalability that you need to develop high-quality, secure applications. Coverity identifies code critical software quality defects and security vulnerabilities in code as it’s written, early in the development process when it’s least costly and easiest to fix. Precise actionable remediation advice and context-specific eLearning help your developers understand how to fix their prioritized issues quickly, without having to become security experts. Coverity Benefits seamlessly integrates automated security testing into your CI/CD pipelines and supports your existing development tools and workflows. Choose where and how to do your • Get improved visibility into development: on-premises or in the cloud with the Polaris Software Integrity Platform™ security risk. Cross-product (SaaS), a highly scalable, cloud-based application security platform. Coverity supports 22 reporting provides a holistic, more languages and over 70 frameworks and templates. complete view of a project’s risk using best-in-class AppSec tools. Coverity includes Rapid Scan, a fast, lightweight static analysis engine optimized • Deployment flexibility. You for cloud-native applications and Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC). Rapid Scan runs decide which set of projects to do automatically, without additional configuration, with every Coverity scan and can also AppSec testing for: on-premises be run as part of full CI builds with conventional scan completion times. Rapid Scan can or in the cloud. also be deployed as a standalone scan engine in Code Sight™ or via the command line • Shift security testing left. -
Book of Abstracts
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A Comparison of SPARK with MISRA C and Frama-C
A Comparison of SPARK with MISRA C and Frama-C Johannes Kanig, AdaCore October 2018 Abstract Both SPARK and MISRA C are programming languages intended for high-assurance applications, i.e., systems where reliability is critical and safety and/or security requirements must be met. This document summarizes the two languages, compares them with respect to how they help satisfy high-assurance requirements, and compares the SPARK technology to several static analysis tools available for MISRA C with a focus on Frama-C. 1 Introduction 1.1 SPARK Overview Ada [1] is a general-purpose programming language that has been specifically designed for safe and secure programming. Information on how Ada satisfies the requirements for high-assurance software, including the avoidance of vulnerabilities that are found in other languages, may be found in [2, 3, 4]. SPARK [5, 6] is an Ada subset that is amenable to formal analysis and thus can bring increased confidence to software requiring the highest levels of assurance. SPARK excludes features that are difficult to analyze (such as pointers and exception handling). Its restrictions guarantee the absence of unspecified behavior such as reading the value of an uninitialized variable, or depending on the evaluation order of expressions with side effects. But SPARK does include major Ada features such as generic templates and object-oriented programming, as well as a simple but expressive set of concurrency (tasking) features known as the Ravenscar profile. SPARK has been used in a variety of high-assurance applications, including hypervisor kernels, air traffic management, and aircraft avionics. In fact, SPARK is more than just a subset of Ada. -
Code Review Guide
CODE REVIEW GUIDE 2.0 RELEASE Project leaders: Larry Conklin and Gary Robinson Creative Commons (CC) Attribution Free Version at: https://www.owasp.org 1 F I 1 Forward - Eoin Keary Introduction How to use the Code Review Guide 7 8 10 2 Secure Code Review 11 Framework Specific Configuration: Jetty 16 2.1 Why does code have vulnerabilities? 12 Framework Specific Configuration: JBoss AS 17 2.2 What is secure code review? 13 Framework Specific Configuration: Oracle WebLogic 18 2.3 What is the difference between code review and secure code review? 13 Programmatic Configuration: JEE 18 2.4 Determining the scale of a secure source code review? 14 Microsoft IIS 20 2.5 We can’t hack ourselves secure 15 Framework Specific Configuration: Microsoft IIS 40 2.6 Coupling source code review and penetration testing 19 Programmatic Configuration: Microsoft IIS 43 2.7 Implicit advantages of code review to development practices 20 2.8 Technical aspects of secure code review 21 2.9 Code reviews and regulatory compliance 22 5 A1 3 Injection 51 Injection 52 Blind SQL Injection 53 Methodology 25 Parameterized SQL Queries 53 3.1 Factors to Consider when Developing a Code Review Process 25 Safe String Concatenation? 53 3.2 Integrating Code Reviews in the S-SDLC 26 Using Flexible Parameterized Statements 54 3.3 When to Code Review 27 PHP SQL Injection 55 3.4 Security Code Review for Agile and Waterfall Development 28 JAVA SQL Injection 56 3.5 A Risk Based Approach to Code Review 29 .NET Sql Injection 56 3.6 Code Review Preparation 31 Parameter collections 57 3.7 Code Review Discovery and Gathering the Information 32 3.8 Static Code Analysis 35 3.9 Application Threat Modeling 39 4.3.2.