10 Friday 9th December, 2011 The Island Features A Night time passing out parade by in progress at the Trincomalee Navy base. (Pic courtesy Navy media) BY SHAMINDRA FERDINANDO along the coast on alert to provide gun fire trained sailors accustomed to waiting pas- no effort on the part of the establishment the Trincomalee-Kankesanturai sea line of support in case of an attack on SLN con- sively for instructions. You’ll have to empow- to identify the threat and take counter communications. Since the government n spite of the conclusion of the conflict voy. er your men with the ability to, while active- measures. Both the government and Navy lost control of the overland main supply in May,2009, Sri Lanka will have to Had the war lasted a little longer, LTTE ly assessing the situation, anticipate changes top brass failed to tackle the LTTE procure- route to Jaffna in 1990, the Navy had to Iinvest more on its navy.In fact, the navy underwater fighting craft (submersibles) and adapt accordingly. Hence, as Officers, ment network. Their strategy had meet the challenge of moving supplies to will need additional assets to meet post- would have posed a grave threat to the you are responsible for nurturing the remained the same over a long period of the peninsula. Although supplies meant war challenges. The bottom line is that Trinco-KKS supply route. The LTTE had ‘Thinking sailors’ of tomorrow.” . time. They felt that FACs could intercept for civilians in the peninsula were moved peace shouldn’t prompt a drastic cut in carried out its first suicide attack on an The meticulously carried out opera- arms smuggling trawlers on the northern overland during on and off peace negotia- defence expenditure, though it will please SLN vessel on May 4, 1991, in Jaffna tions, enabled the SLN to destroy ships and eastern waters. Although the cutting tions, the Navy had a daunting task. Since the Opposition and may help the govern- waters. loaded with a range of weapons, mostly of edge of the Navy is its FAC squadrons, the closure of Muhamalai entry/exit point ment to divert additional funds for develop- The LTTE brought in a range of Chinese origin, sometimes re-routed they couldn’t do it on its own. The political in August 2006, the Navy has been forced ment. weapons, including heavy artillery,though through North Korea. Subsequently and military leadership wrongly assumed to keep the sea route intact. The Nordic As Defence Secretary Gotabhaya the SLN made on and off detections. Eretria, too, has been alleged to have been that the FACs alone could effectively block sea monitors quit in May 2006 after the Rajapaksa pointed out at the recently con- Massive LTTE arsenal was evidence of the involved in this operation at the behest of arms replenishment efforts. LTTE targeted a convoy carrying two mon- cluded Galle Dialogue 2011, Sri Lanka navy SLN’s failure to intercept LTTE supply Norway,a charge denied by the Royal The SLN stepped up operations by the itors. can play a vital role in regional maritime ships and the failure on the part of intelli- Norwegian embassy in Colombo. President elite Special Boat Squadron and the Rapid The Navy inflicted heavy losses on the security in the region. The gradual expan- gence services to thwart the likes of ‘KP’, Mahinda Rajapaksa has publicly acknowl- Action Boat Squadron (RABS) in 2007. Sea Tigers in a series of confrontations, sion of operations by pirates operating off who ran arms procurement operations, edged the US support by way of intelli- Their operations forced the LTTE to go on some of which were initiated by them. The Somalia, oil and gas exploration in the sea with impunity. gence, which allowed the SLN to zero-in-on the defensive on the seas. The SBS, which seizure of one of their ‘wave rider’ class bed of Mannar, people smuggling and An overall change in tactics in 2006, four of the LTTE ships in Sept. 2007 and first made its appearance in the Jaffna large attack craft named Indumathi, on poaching remain formidable challenges. aimed at destroying LTTE ships gave the Oct. 2007. Recovery of arms, ammunition lagoon with the setting up of navy unit at June 19, 2007 off Thalaiadi, greatly boosted The navy will have to adopt a result orient- SLN a clear-cut advantage over the Sea and equipment of Chinese origin by the Nagathevanthurai in early 90s had earned the morale of the navy.The vessel had ed strategy to tackle these issues. Tigers. Former Commander Admiral SLN subsequent to confrontations with Sea the appreciation even of foreign special been fitted with Japanese radar. Since the war, the navy has thrown its The Navy’s role on the ground too, has weight behind the government’s efforts to expanded over the past several years. develop the economy,tourism and even The SLN’s role in recovery of arms, clearing waterways in the city and its sub- SLN 61st anniversary today ammunition and explosives, particularly urbs. But its priority should be sustaining the seizure of over 1000 kgs of explosives wherewithal to meet fresh threats. Under laden vehicle at the height of the war and the able leadership given by Vice Admiral a hitherto unknown type of suicide device Somathilake Dissanayake, the navy is pur- during a raid on a kovil at Velani, Kayts suing post-war objectives in line with the emphasized the importance of intelli- government’s overall security and political gence-oriented ‘work.’ The SLN strategy. Intelligence has been credited with a Had Sri Lanka strengthened its navy series of successful operations and one of and adopted a cohesive strategy to deny the most important could be the SLN’s terrorists freedom of movement at sea Focus on post-war contribution to trap the LTTE ring operat- across the Palk Straits in the 80s, Tamil ter- ing in the UK. rorism wouldn’t have survived for over 30 Several projects undertaken by the years. Although successive governments navy during the war, while geared to meet acquired a range of vessels and increased the growing requirements of a rapidly the strength of the SLN over the years, the expanding force saved funds as in the case absence of an overall security strategy of construction projects. The Navy has caused periodic setbacks. The failure on been also involved in an ambitious project the part of the navy to effectively patrol the to upgrade firepower of fighting vessels. It seas had a catastrophic impact on the challenges is no secret that the navy’s failure to entire war effort. upgrade the main armaments onboard its But nothing could be as bad as what the Wasantha Karannagoda did away with Tigers, prompted Sri Lankan government forces. It is widely believed that the LTTE FACs as planned due to negligence and UNP did following the Norwegian- Operation Waruna Kirana launched in to take up the issue with China. assassinated the then Navy Chief Admiral corruption had caused serious problems. arranged CFA in Feb. 2002. Ill advised UNP May 2001to detect/intercept LTTE ships Investigations revealed that shipments Clancy Fernando for Nagathevanthurai The Navy acquired modern sensors. The leadership went to the extent of denying bringing in arms about 100 to 150 nautical were certified with North Korean end user operation, which at one time threatened to effective deployment of radar to cover the SLN spares for fighting craft as it miles from land. Operation Waruna Kirana certificates, a charge denied by Pyongyang. cut off LTTE-held parts of the Jaffna coastal areas has greatly improved the turned a blind eye to LTTE build-up. was basically a waiting game with ships But the recovery of a variety of arma- peninsula. decision making process with real time Several years ago the Jane’s Defence deployed without specific intelligence on ments proved the Chinese connection Another critical drawback had been the data available at various command loca- quoted former President Chandrika LTTE ship movements. Instead, the SLN beyond doubt. The LTTE had bought large absence of right equipment and the waste tions which will facilitate tactical decision Kumaratunga as having said “If we had went after the enemy on the high seas as stocks of armaments from China after the of funds on useless arms, ammunition and making. During the war, the SLN’s upgraded our navy earlier,the problem of far as 2,600 km south of Dondra head dur- Norwegian-arranged Ceasefire Agreement equipment. A case in point is the acquisi- Research and Development Section made Tamil separatist terrorism would not have ing Eelam War IV,while targeting trawlers came into operation in February 2002, but tion of a hovercraft at a staggering cost of significant progress, which facilitated the taken the present form.” bringing in armaments from India. Sri Lanka is uncertain as to when the first Rs. 250 million to the taxpayer. The vessel action against the LTTE. Over two years after the war a total Fighting LTTE trawlers close to Indo- transaction was made. acquired in 1998 had never been used for The Navy is credited with some daring appraisal is necessary to ensure each serv- Lanka maritime boundary had been diffi- The weapons are believed to have gone operational purposes. amphibious landings with the largest ever ice acquired what it really required, while cult due to presence of Indian fishermen to a supply point along the Indian Ocean An LTTE suicide attack on a FAC off conducted in the middle of 1991 to spear- taking measures to sustain existing capa- poaching in Sri Lankan waters.