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Alliance Unity and Intervention in Naples ( –)

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Alliance Unity and Intervention in Naples ( –) Alliance Unity and Intervention in Naples (–) of peace had appeared at the end of , troubling events continued to unfold. Repeatedly, local circumstances G forced the great powers to reexamine the Quadruple and general alliances, including the question of what it meant to act in concert (concerter). Simply put, the perils of war and revolution never receded from what the peace- makers saw before them. In the years and , diplomats faced political uncertainty, the threat of revolutionary upheaval, and the looming prospect of war. Since German politics had caused concern, and in December , the French government again had shown signs of instability. e departure of the Duke of Richelieu, a moderating inuence and trusted interlocutor, fueled nagging suspicions about the viability of the Bourbon restoration. Outright assaults on the Bourbon rulers of Spain and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies heightened the sense that volatility reigned in French politics, and conrmed the fears of radicalism and revolution. e peace settlement would survive, but the longing for tranquility would not be satised. On January , Spanish troops in Las Cabezas, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Riego, disobeyed royal orders to set sail for South America, where colonial insurrections had been underway since –. e disobedience became more than mutiny when Riego proclaimed restoration of the liberal constitution of . e constitution provided for an independent judiciary, civil liberties for the nation, and an elected Cortes to share power with the king. Initially, the great powers responded to the events in Spain with re- straint, making no commitment to concrete action. Indeed, not until March, when King Ferdinand VII accepted the constitution, did it become clear that a revolution had taken place. Even then, the ambiguity continued. Civil strife erupted in multiple localities, yet the king remained on his throne as a constitu- tional monarch. e allies dared to hope that popular loyalty to the monarchy, which had inspired admiration during the French occupation, would overcome the revolutionary spirit and defeat the forces of disorder. During the summer, Alliance Unity and Intervention in Naples (–) however, the situation became more perilous. e constitutional movement spread to Portugal, where on August, liberals proclaimed support for the Spanish constitution. is new political order lasted until May , at which time monarchists emboldened by the French intervention in Spain returned King John VI to absolute power. Disturbing as conditions in Spanish America, Spain, and Portugal appeared, it was rebellion in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies that most frightened the allies and led to military intervention. e Neapolitan mutinies began on July in Nola and quickly spread to Avellino, where General Guglielmo Pepe also declared support for the Spanish constitution. Within a few days, King Ferdinand I and his son Francesco, Duke of Calabria and vicar-general, accepted the Spanish constitution for the kingdom. On July, Ferdinand and Francesco greeted General Pepe as he led royal troops into Naples. Finally, on July, the king swore allegiance to the constitution, while also promising un- specied reforms. As in Spain, where Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies remained a potential successor to the childless Ferdinand VII, the monarchy in Naples survived liberal revolution by accepting the liberal order. Publication of the constitution on July paved the way for parliamentary elections in September. Once assembled, the parliament elected a Permanent Deputation with seven members to monitor the king’s government when the legislative body was not in session. For the ve great powers, developments in Italy transformed abstract con- demnations of revolution and discussions about collective intervention into concrete negotiations to address an alarming sequence of events. In the absence of a clear and present danger such as war with Napoleon, talk of an allied re- sponse produced public disagreement, which threatened the unity assumed to be so essential to European peace. Beginning with the Spanish Revolution in January and continuing through the Congress of Verona, which met at the end of , questions of intervention dominated diplomatic discussions and exposed ssures in the European political system. Conict resulted from di- vergent interpretations of treaty obligations and from the tension between the legal stipulations dening the alliance and the right of sovereign states to reform their domestic political institutions. As in earlier negotiations concerning the nature of the European alliance and Russia’s proposal for a treaty of guarantee, Emperor Alexander I pursued a pragmatic course focused on preserving great power unity. In the end, the overriding commitment to peace held rm, and the allies accepted that an enduring peace required neither complete agreement nor the absence of military action. Russia Responds to the Revolutionary Spirit Prior to the allied meetings in Troppau and Laibach that would sanction Aus- trian intervention in Naples, Russia’s diplomats penned a series of surveys as- sessing political conditions in Europe. e surveys showed that the Russian monarch and his diplomatic agents remained committed to the legal stipulations of , , and , the principles and prescriptions of which they tried to apply to tumultuous events on the ground. Predictably, conditions in France loomed large. roughout and into early , Russian ocials discussed political instability in France both among themselves and with the other great powers. eir analyses revealed concern about the spirit of party and genie of revolution that had revived in France and threatened to drag the kingdom into political crisis. Revolution, Russia’s policymakers believed, easily led to military aggression, which might compel the allies to undertake armed intervention. As early as March , Emperor Alexander had received communications from Austria and Prussia warning of threats to the regime of King Louis XVIII. By September Prince Metternich had proposed convening allied ambassadorial conferences in Paris, where the four powers could monitor developments and coordinate a response. e British position on possible intervention in France was transmitted by Foreign Secretary Castlereagh to Russia’s co-minister of foreign a airs, Ioannis Kapodistrias, and ambassador in London, Christoph Lieven, in a memorandum of September . ­ e British government believed that the political rum- bles in France posed no danger to peace or the European system. Equally signi- cant, the creation of a center for allied communication in Paris would violate the protocols of Aix-la-Chapelle, which had brought France into the alliance of great powers. Based on the protocols, if an imminent threat of revolution or military aggression arose, any of the four allies could call for an extraordinary conference to organize a coordinated response. In light of this provision and the need to consider public opinion, the British government refused to commit to any spe- cic action in advance of actual events. Russia’s diplomats seemed to understand Britain’s constitutional constraints. Moreover, as Castlereagh also pointed out, it was essential that the allies not appear opposed to the current government in France. e French people needed to feel connected to their monarchy, and the perception of foreign opposition could undermine the connection. On the question of French politics, Russia’s monarch and Ministry of Foreign A airs agreed with Austria and Prussia that France had deviated from the path taken in , which had led to the happy results of Aix-la-Chapelle. Russia’s Alliance Unity and Intervention in Naples (–) diplomats saw in the allegedly liberal government headed by Élie Decazes, which was formed aer elections in the fall of , the potential for military aggression. At the end of , however, before the trajectory of the Spanish insurrection became clear and before the outbreak of revolution in Naples, the Russian com- mitment to allied unity remained paramount. Emperor Alexander continued to tout the most intimate union of the great powers. is union, which constituted the core of the general alliance of European states, needed to be preserved, so that France could benet from legitimate and constitutional monarchy. Russia therefore tried to steer a middle course, by which the allies would explain to Louis XVIII the dangers threatening his regime and urge him to change direc- tion. Such action would not alter France’s relationship to the general alliance, as dened by the protocols of Aix-la-Chapelle, but it would fulll an important duty required by both the protocols and the Treaty of / September (the Holy Alliance). is was the duty of veracity that obliged the allies to speak truthfully about potential dangers and in this instance to remind France of its obligation to uphold the conservative principles of the social order. Because the allies remained divided, Alexander avoided proclaiming an opinion on French politics. He did, however, instruct his minister in Paris, General Karl O. Pozzo di Borgo, to point out to the French government its responsibility for Europe’s present and future tranquility. If France at any moment threatened European peace, Russia stood ready, based on existing treaties, to cross into French terri- tory with an allied army. One month later, instructions sent to Russia’s diplomats abroad armed the policy of non-interference in the domestic a airs of France and the German Confederation. If solicited, Russia’s opinion could be shared, assuming that any statement conformed “to the principles of law, the dignity of crowns, and the real well-being of the peoples.” is well-being would be real, moreover, only insofar as it resulted from the moral force of the governments involved. As things turned out, the Duke of Richelieu returned to power in February , following the assassination of the Duke of Berry, Louis XVIII’s nephew. Fears about France had exposed potential ris in the alliance; however, the decision to stand aside seemed prudent. Spain emerged as the more obvious threat to European peace, and some in the Russian government even expressed an overt pro-France position.
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