South Asian Security Dilemma-The Strategic Triangle: India-Pakistan and China

Home , Jamshed Ayaz Khan, Samina Ahmad, Yameen

SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY DILEMMA-THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE: INDIA-PAKISTAN AND CHINA

PhD DISSERTATION

This Dissertation is submitted to National Defence University, Islamabad in partial fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in STRATEGIC& NUCLEAR STUDIES BY MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ UR RAHMAN NDU-SNS/PhD-11/F-007

SUPERVISOR DR. RIZWANA KAREEM ABBASI

DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC& NUCLEAR STUDIES FACULTY OF CONTEMPORARY STUDIES NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD-PAKISTAN 2018

CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Theoretical Perspective 5 The Review of Literature 7 Plan of the Research 15 Methodology 19 Chapter 1

IR Theories and Strategic Triangle in South Asia

Introduction 21

1.1 Theory of Strategic Triangle 21 1.2 Realism 25 1.3 Security Dilemma 34 1.3.1 Stability-Instability Paradox 37 1.3.2 Theory of Deterrence 40 1.4 Strategic Culture 44 Conclusion 47 Chapter 2

Trilateral Strategic Relationship: India-Pakistan and China (1947-74)

Introduction 49 Part I Strategic Cultures of India, Pakistan and China 50 2.1 India’s Strategic Culture 51 2. 2 Pakistan’s Strategic Culture 54 2.3 Chinese Strategic Culture 57 Part II

Impact of Strategic Culture on States Relations (1947-1974)

2.4 India-China Relations 62 2.4.1 The Disputes on Water 66 2.4.2 Impact of China’s Nuclearization on Indian Policy 67 2.5 Pakistan-India Relations and China’s Response to Pakistan 71 2.5.1 Kashmir Issue 74 2.5.2 Emergence of Pak-China Nexus against India 77 2.5.3 1965 Indo-Pak War and China’s Response 80 2.5.4 India’s Suspicions about Karakoram Highway (KKH) 82 2.5.5 China’s Response during Indo-Pak War 1971 83 2.5.6 Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and Policy Motivation in Response to India’s Nuclear Program 88 Conclusion 92

Chapter 3

Trilateral Strategic Relationship: 1975-98

Introduction 94 3.1 Identifying India’s Strategic Behavior: A Three S’s Approach 95 3.2 India’s Nuclear Weapons Program and China’s Concerns 97 3.2.1 The India’s Nuclear Policy during 1975-1980 98 3.2.2 India’s Nuclear Policy during Second Tenure of Indira's Government (1980-1984) 100 3.2.3 India’s Nuclear Policy under Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989) 101 3.2.4 India’s Nuclear Policy in the Post- Gandhi Era (1989-1998) 103 3.2.5 China’s Response on Pokhran II 106 3.3 Identifying Pakistan’s Strategic Behavior: A Realist Three S Approach 108 3.4 Pakistan’s Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons and China’s Assistance (1975-1998) 112 3.4.1 The Impact of Nuclearization during Brasstacks Crises (1986-87) 120 3.4.2 Pakistan’s Strategy towards Nuclear Test and China’s Arms Assistance to Pakistan 122 Conclusion 129

Chapter 4

Indo-Pak Relations and China’s Response Since 1999

Introduction 131 4.1 Relevance of Theory of Deterrence 132 4.1.1 Kargil Crisis 1999 136 4.1.2 2001-2002 Military Standoff 149 4.1.3 Mumbai Terrorist Attack 156 4.1.4 Deterrence for South Asian Region 163 Conclusion 165

Chapter 5

Trilateral Strategic Initiatives for Credible Minimum Deterrence

Introduction 166 5.1 Conception of Minimum Deterrence 167 5.1.1 Prerequisites of CMD 172 5.2 CMD and Nuclear Doctrine 172 5.2.1 China’s Nuclear Doctrine 174 5.3 CMD and Command and Control 177 5.3.1 China’s Command and Control System 179 5.4 China’s Military Modernization and Force Building 184

5.5 India’s Nuclear Doctrine 191

5.5.1 India’s Command and Control System 196

5.6 India’s Nuclear Force-Building 200

5.6.1 India’s Nuclear Delivery Vehicles 203

5.6.2 India’s Missile Program 204

5.7 Pakistan’s Initiatives on Nuclear Doctrine 207 5.7.1 Pakistan’s C2 Systems 209 5.8 Pakistan’s Nuclear Force Building 215 5.8.1 Pakistan’s Missile Program 218 5.9 Comparative Analysis of Trilateral CMD 220 5.9.1 India’s ‘Cold Start’ Doctrine and Pakistan’s Response 223 5.9.2 India’s Ballistic Missile Defense and Pakistan’s Response 227 Conclusion 231

Chapter 6

Trilateral Strategic Rivalries and Security Dilemma of Pakistan

Introduction 233 6.1 Identifying China’s Strategic Behavior 234 6.2 Sino-US Counter containment strategies 238

6.3 Identifying India’s Containment Strategies towards China 243 6.3.1 India’s ‘Look East’ Policy and China’s Response 245 6.4 The Emergence of a Triangular Construct 255 6.4.1 South Asian Security Dilemma-The Strategic Triangle: India-Pakistan and China 257 Conclusion 260

Chapter 7

Regional Security Dilemma, Strategic Stability-Instability: Options and Solutions

Introduction 262 7.1 Understanding South Asia’s Deterrence Stability 263 7.1.1 South Asian Stability under Polarity 268 7.2 Initiatives for Arms Control 272 7.2.1 Bilateral Mechanism: Indo-Pak Arms Control Measures 273 7.2.2 Sino-Indian Arms Control Measures 275 7.2.3 Trilateral Arms Control Measures (India, Pakistan and China) 276 7.2.4 Multilateral Arms Control Measures 280 7.2.5 Regional Institutional Arms Control Measures (SCO) 285 7.3 Initiatives for CBMs 288 7.3.1 CBMs between India and Pakistan 289 7.3.2 CBMs between China and India 295 7.4 Sino-Pak Economic Engagement: A Way Forward to Regional Stability 296 7.5 Additional Solutions for Regional Strategic Stability 300 Conclusion 305 Bibliography 316 Tables

Table 2.1: Rules on Kashmir Issue 77 Table 4.1: The Kargil Operation’s Implications for Nuclear Deterrence Theory 147 Table 5.1: China’s Nuclear Armed Ballistic Missiles 188 Table 5.2: India’s Missile Development 206 Table 5.3: Pakistan’s Missile Development 220 Table 7.1: Prospects and Perceptions for Assuring South Asian Strategic Stability 267 Table 7.2: China-Pak Economic Corridor, Road and Railway network 298 Figures

Figure 1: China’s Command and Control System 183 Figure 2: India’s NCA 198 Figure 3: Pakistan’s NCA 212 Figure 4: Pakistan’s SPD 213 Figure 5: A Triangular Model for an Actor’s Behavior 244 Figure 6: India’s Membership in Multilateral Institutions of South Asia and ASEAN 249 Figure 7: Strategic Complexity of Triangle India-Pakistan and China 258 Map 1

Disputed Areas between China and India 65

DEDICAION

To my late parents without their prayers and love, I could not have become what I am now. May Almighty Allah bless their souls in heaven.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All praises to Allah Almighty for the continued and uncounted blessings. He has without any calculation and endowed me with determination, time & health to accomplish one of my major dreams in life. Let me begin with the heartiest gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Rizwana Karim Abbasi; who remained generous in sparing time, rendered instructions besides extending highly invaluable guidance since the last five years. She is an unforgettable mentor and beacon of knowledge for me. Her review of several drafts of this research has been tireless and appreciable.

I am also grateful to Prof Dr. Zulfiqar Khan, Head of Department, for providing essential assistance while handling procedural intricacies to meet multiple prerequisites prior to submission of this dissertation. He indeed has bailed me out in complicated conditions and rendered best advices when I needed the most. He has opened his students’ mind for a different perspective in the academic world. My sincere thanks for the members of Departmental Thesis Review Committee, Dr. Zafar Khan and Dr. Shaheen Akhtar. Their insightful comments and valuable critical enquiry on certain aspects of study that helped widen the research scope in different perspectives. Also availing opportunity to pay homage to my worthy teachers Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema and Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal for enlightening me on the subject matter during the coursework that enabled me to complete this research. My special gratitude to Ms. Shamsa Nawaz, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, for doing the laborious & tedious job of proof reading and editing.

I am also appreciative of my spouse and children Khansa, Ubaid, Junaid and Hifsa, by ungrudgingly letting me devote my time and energies towards my research work. Last but not the least, I am indebted to my elder brother Brig Dr. Muhammad Saif ur Rahman, TI( M), who has been a constant source of inspiration, encouragement and guided like my father throughout the pursuance of doctoral level studies.

ABSTRACT

The Post-Cold war scenario has induced diverse strategic implications on the South Asian security architecture that envisioned competition between India, Pakistan and China. China’s enduring military modernization and economic rise strengthened its intent to get super power status in future that shaped mistrust for the US as the US assumes China as its potential competitor. To restrain China’s rise, the US planned a ring of encirclement with the collaboration of various regional players including India. The emerging Sino-US animosity and China’s ongoing power progression distresses India’s security framework. The spectrum of India’s security widened and it devised multiple counter containment strategies vis a vis China. On the other hand, Pakistan’s threat perceptions are mainly Indo-centric and Sino-Indian strategic resentment generated serious strategic repercussions for Pakistan and provoked security dilemma between India, Pakistan and China. In order to dilate upon the subject matter, Realist Paradigm and its key drivers (through qualitative approach) provide theoretical understanding to ascertain trilateral security dilemma that ultimately leads toward regional instability. Contours of South Asian strategic puzzle are mainly based on India-Pakistan relations and after becoming overt nuclear powers, both the states commanded restraint. They only faced limited armed conflict in 1999. Likewise, Sino-Indian aversion diversified regional strategic environment vulnerable and for avoiding any upcoming Indo-Pak and Sino-Indian nuclear conflict, the three states adopted ‘Minimum Credible Deterrence’ postures on similar footings. Nonetheless, their persisting ambiguities and deep- rooted multidimensional conflicts disrupted South Asian stability. For sustaining strategic stability, various formal and informal arms control measures have been proposed on bilateral, trilateral, multilateral and regional institutional level. Informal measures are comparatively more convincing since they address the root causes of trilateral trust deficit through Confidence Building Measures. It offers that China’s gambit through trade with India and Pakistan particularly in the backdrop of ‘One Belt One Road’, will have spillover impact on Indo-Pak relations that have a potential to ultimately uphold South Asian strategic stability in future.

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ABBREVIATIONS

APC All Parties Conference APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASBM Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation BJP Bhartia Janta Party BMD Ballistic Missile Defense BSF Border Security Force C2 Command and Control C4I2 Command, Control, Communication, Computerization, Intelligence and Information CBMs Confidence Building Measures COSC Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee CENTO Central Treaty Organization CIA Central Intelligence Agency CJCS Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff CNA Computer Network Attack COAS Chief of Army Staff CPEC China-Pakistan Economic Corridor CSD Cold Start Doctrine CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CWC Chemical Weapons Convention DAE Department of Atomic Energy DRDO Defense Research and Development Organization DCC Development Control Committee DGMOs Director General Military Operations

DND Draft Nuclear Doctrine ECC Employment Control Committee FAS Federation of American Scientists FDO Physical Dynamics Research Laboratories FTA Free Trade Agreement G.8 Group of Eight industrialized nations GOI Government of India GoM Group of Ministers HEU Highly Enriched Uranium HST Hegemonic Stability Theory IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IBT Indus Basin Treaty ICA International Court of Arbitration ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles IOR-ARC Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile ISI Inter-Services Intelligence JeM Jash-e-Muhammad JuD Jamat-ud-Dawa KANUPP Karachi Nuclear Power Plant KKH Karakorum Highway KRL Khan Research Laboratory LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba LoC Line of Control LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eleam MAD Mutual Assured Destruction MCD Minimum Credible Deterrence MFN Most Favored Nations MGC Mekong-Ganga Cooperation MW Mega Watt NAM Non-Aligned Movement

NSAB National Security Advisory Board NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCA National Command Authority NDU National Defence University NESCOM National Engineering and Scientific Commission NFU No First Use NLI Northern Light Infantry NPT Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty NSC National Security Council NWFZ Nuclear Weapons-Free-Zone NWS Nuclear Weapon States OBOR One Belt One Road PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission PAL Permissive Action Link PAROS Prevention of Arm Race in Outer Space PINSTECH Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology PLA People’s Liberation Army PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosion PRC Peoples Republic of China PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty RAW Research and Analysis Wing RCCS Regional Center for Strategic Studies RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SALT Strategic Arms Limitations Talks SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile SPD Strategic Plans Division

SRBM Short-Range Ballistic Missile SSTL Surrey Satellite Technology Limited START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission TNW Tactical Nuclear Weapon UAE United Arab Emirates UF6 Uranium Hexafluoride UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNSC United Nations Security Council USA United States of America USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WB World Bank

Introduction

This research examines trilateral relationship between India, Pakistan and China, in the light of their diverse strategic environments through the prism of theories of International Relations. Asia is experiencing major geopolitical, economic, strategic, military and security developments. Consequently, defining the contours of South Asian security and future of its nuclear order. The rise of China is the most important development in the Asian and global context. China is rising economically, politically and militarily,1 and is relying on its growing economic power. It is intensifying its military budget and has the world’s second largest military budget after the US.2 The China’s rapid economic growth strengthened its ambitions of military modernization program as well.3

China is aspirant for attaining super power status by 2020.4 Its threat perceptions are more in reaction to the US strategies, who had tried to contain China with the collaboration of its allies in the region in the post-Cold War era, such as, India.5 China’s growing power potential has unnerved its neighbors, particularly India. China’s ongoing military preparations may have had a domino effect in foreseeable future. Conversily, Indian military modernization would however, undermine South Asian peace and stability. This paradoxical situation creates security dilemma6 between India and Pakistan due to their deep rooted historical multidimensional conflicts, which are highlighted in the succeeding paragraphs.

Under these circumstances, it is a compulsive study for the strategic analysts to address the strategic issues of the three states (India- Pakistan and China). Their diverse strategic cultures, religions, geostrategic locations, military preparations and arms race are clouded with ambitions,

1Robert J. Art, ‘The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Hawl’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.125, No.3 (2010), pp.359-360. 2 P. Kamennov, ‘China: Principles of Proactive Defense’. International Affairs, Vol.56, No.3 (2010), p.64 3 Subrata K. Mitra, ‘The Reluctant Hegemon: India’s Self-Perception and the South Asian Strategic Environment in Contemporary South Asia’ p.407, downloaded from www.09584930320001759{1}.pdf on June 18, 2012. 4 Ibid. 5 Judith F. Kornberg and John R. Faust, China in World Politics: Policies, Processes, Prospects (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2007), p.177 6 Security Dilemma is a condition due to which states try to enhance their military capabilities for the sake of their security and sovereignty. Security Dilemma is extensively discussed in Chapter 1.

2 perceptions and aspirations, which require an in-depth investigation. The division of the Sub- continent provide a watershed in the geo-political study of the region.

The history of both India and Pakistan is full of mistrust, animosity and conflicts and the two states have territorial disputes (Kashmir) coupled with other issues like Siachin, Sir Creek, Wullar Barrage and Tulbural Navigation project, etc.7

Whereas, the Sino-India relations were initiated in a reputable way after the Chinese revolution of 1949. Both China and India had established diplomatic relations in 1950 and sustained friendly relations during the 1950s.8 The honeymoon period of Sino-India relations ended in 1962 and the two states were involved in full scale war on the issue of Tibet which had adversarial impact on their relations thereafter.9

On the contrary, Pakistan was the first country among the Muslim world in recognizing China. China and Pakistan started their firm relations by signing a boundary agreement in 1963 and became all weather friends.10 China provided economic and military assistance to Pakistan on regular basis.11 China successfully tested the nuclear device on October 16, 1964, mainly for security reasons, driven by its deteriorating relations with both the United States and the former Soviet Union.12 India started its nuclear program soon after its inception,13 however, accelerated

7 Kanti Bajpai, ‘Southern Asia as a Flashpoint, p.2. Downloaded from www.flashpoint.pdr. On June 3, 2012. Siachin is the highest battleground on earth, where India and Pakistan are engaged in conflict since 1984. According to 1949 Karachi agreement and the 1972 Shimla agreement presumed that it was not feasible for human habitation to survive north of NJ9842. Prior to 1984, neither India nor Pakistan had any permanent presence in the area. (All About Siachen Glacier: the conflict, perspectives of India and Pakistan, geography, history and the possible resolutions. About Mozilla Firefox downloaded on September 4, 2012). Demarcation of boundary along Sir Creek and the construction of Wuller Barrage/Tulbural Navigation project in Jammu and Kashmir which Pakistan claims is in violation of the Indus Basin treaty of 1960. (Downloaded from www.garethprice.pdf.adobereader on September 4, 2012). 8 Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, p.66 ‘China’s Peaceful Rise and South Asia’ IPRI Paper 13, Published by Asia Printers Islamabad. (August 2008), p.66, downloaded from www.paper13.pdf on July 22, 2013. 9 Judith F. Kornberg and John R.Faust, p.174 10Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Relations’ in Devin T. Hagerty (ed) ‘South Asia in World Politics’ (London, Oxford University Press, 2005), p.57. 11 Mohammad Ahsan Chaudhary, ‘Strategic and Military Dimensions in Pakistan-China Relations’ in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed), Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.317 12P.R.Chari and VyjayantiRaghavan, Comparative Security Dynamics in Northeast Asia and South Asia (New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2010), p.87 13George Perkocich, India’s Nuclear Bomb (Berkely: University of California Press, 1999), p.14

3 its pace after the Chinese nuclear test, in order to attain global status and to preserve its security by containing China.14

During the Pak-India war of 1965, China exclusively supported Pakistan and delivered ultimatum to India.15 It criticized India for its aggressive role in 1971 as well.16 She however, was reluctant in providing military assistance to Pakistan due to the Soviet factor.17 Nonetheless, China continued economic assistance to Pakistan even before and after 1971 war.18

India detonated its first nuclear test in May 1974 and called it a ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ (PNE). The test exacerbated the vulnerability of the South Asian strategic environment and generated acute security dilemma for Pakistan.19 For contending India’s nuclear superiority and for sustaining the intensity of its security dilemma, Pakistan started nuclear program in 1974 after the India’s PNE and achieved deterrent capability during 1980s.20 India conducted its nuclear tests for the second time in May 1998 on two separate days (May 11 and 13). In response to Indian nuclear tests, on 28th and 30th May 1998, Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices in a tunnel under the Ras Koh mountain range near Chagi in Baluchistan.

In the wake of nuclear tests of May 1998, the existence of nuclear weapons have obtained center stage in maintaining South Asian strategic stability. India and Pakistan were involved in a limited conflict in 1999, but nuclear factor could not permit them to proceed towards full scale war. Currently, both the states are busy not only in enhancing their nuclear capabilities but expanding their nuclear delivery mechanism also.21 On the other side, India and China are involved in containment and counter containment strategies against each other for achieving great-power

14 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.114. 15 P.R.Chari, Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff (New Delhi, Manohar Publications, 1995).pp.27-30. 16Hennry Tanner, ‘Russian Chinese Clash Steals Council Limelight’, The New York Times (6 December 1971). 17Muhammad Ahsan Chaudhari, p.323. India signed a defense pact with USSR in 1971 which could not permit China to intrude in Indo-Pak war 1971. For details, see references 186-188 of Chapter two. 18 Nilofar Mahdi, ‘Sino-Pak Relations: Historical Background’, Pakistan Horizonvol.39, No.4, Fourth Quarter (1986), pp60-68. 19Before 1974, India and Pakistan fought three conventional wars but the induction of nuclear weapons created serious security repercussions for the South Asian region in general and for Pakistan in particular due to weaker one between the two. 20 Shahid-ur-Rahman, Long Road to Chaghi (Islamabad: Print Wise, 1999), p.105. 21 Nuclear force posture and its delivery mechanism of both the states is elaborated in chapter 5.

4 status, that lead towards Sino-Indian arms competition.22 Thus, the existing Sino-Indian strategic competition provoked vulnerability of regional strategic environment, where in a regional triangle (India-Pakistan and China), India presumes China and Pakistan as its (India’s) main security threats. For sustaining their nuclear deterrence credible, the three states adopted nuclear doctrines but their persisting misperceptions could not enable them to acknowledge the nuclear doctrines of one another and their enduring strategic completion intensified security dilemma between them.23

Nonetheless, there are explicit imbalances on the arena of power potential as China is bigger and stronger than India, while India is bigger and stronger than Pakistan that generate asymmetry due to Sino-Indian increasing material power-mainly armament. This asymmetry leads to generate security dilemma among China-India and India-Pakistan, which elucidates the central argument/hypothesis of the present research as, ‘Sino-Indian competition and security dilemma affects the Indo-Pak security framework’.

This study is based upon four key questions as appended below.

1. What are the presumable consequences of security dilemma between India-Pakistan and China? 2. How Sino-Indian competition and security dilemma affects the Indo-Pak security framework? 3. Will China’s peaceful and economic rise stabilize or destabilize the South Asian region? 4. How can fragile nuclear environment in South Asia be stabilized to secure peace to prevent future wars?

Within the parameters of these four questions, the research proceeds to analyze the following supplementary questions.

 How far would it be possible for Pakistan to maintain its status of minimum deterrent in future while considering its minimum defense posture?  Will it be possible for Pakistan to maintain affinity with China in the long run?  What would be the implication of Sino-Indian economic ties on Indo-Pak relations?

22 India has adopted ‘Look East’ policy for containing China while China has followed ‘String of Pearls’ policy for contending India. Sino-Indian counter containment strategies are elaborated in chapter 6. 23 Trilateral nuclear doctrines are examined in chapter 5.

 What will be the contours of deterrence between the three states in foreseeable future?  What will be the options for Pakistan to compete with the rapidly growing Sino-Indian ties?

Theoretical Perspective

Realism is the most appropriate school of thought which provides understanding during assessing the present research. The attainment of power is a striking principle of realism. During the World War II, international politics was a struggle for power between the states.24 States seek to maximize their power potential for their security and survival. This leads to security dilemma between them.25 Power exacerbates the importance of weapons when a country anticipates to acquire nuclear weapons if conventional weapons remain insufficient as in the case of Pakistan. After obtaining the nuclear posture in reply to Indian nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan is sustaining the international pressure against its nuclear program and unwilling to withdraw from its nuclear option that indicates its realist assumption for enhancing power.

Realism provides four models to ascertain the security dilemma of the strategic triangle of India- Pakistan and China. The first model that is ‘theory of strategic triangle’ provides understanding about the multiple dynamics of triangular relationship.26 The trilateral relations between, USA, USSR and China during 1960s and 1970s formulated a test model which can easily be applied on the strategic triangle of India-Pakistan and China. According to this model, weaker one among the three states has the options to establish strategic relations with anyone of the remaining two states for overcoming its security dilemma.

Second model is based upon the key approaches of realism (classical, defensive, offensive and theory of balance of power). Classical realism explains that the desire for more power is rooted in the flawed nature of humanity which compels the states in enhancing their capabilities continuously.27 In South Asia, elite mindsets of India and Pakistan provide the ground to the classical realists to investigate human nature because the political and military leadership of both the states frequently blame each other for starting the four wars fought between them. In South

24Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, Theories of International Relations (New York: St Martin Press, 1996), p.76 25 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle of Power and Peace (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973), p.5 26 Lowell Dittmer, ‘The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game- Theoretical Analysis’ World Politics, Vol.33, No.4 (July 1981), pp.485-515. 27 Hans J. Morgenthau, p.26.

Asia, elite mindsets and political cultures of China, India and Pakistan provide the ground to the classical realists to investigate human nature. Likewise, defensive structural realism elaborates that states seek to enhance their power potential according to the availability of their economic resources.28 The three states (India, Pakistan and China) are busy in augmenting their power potential by adopting defensive structural realism and the present research analyzes the multiple strategies of the above-mentioned states for their power maximization. Similarly, offensive structural realism provides understanding due to which the states adopt the best possible strategies for assuring their survival and security.29 In the existing South Asian strategic environment, both India and Pakistan are continuously enhancing their nuclear arsenals despite proclaiming minimum nuclear deterrence against each other, and even they do not pay attention to the consequences of nuclear arms race in the region. Offensive structural realism offers the arguments for evaluating the persisting South Asia’s strategic environment.

Third model ‘the security dilemma’ provides the exponents due to which security dilemma persists among the states. In an anarchic system, security dilemma exists, ‘when the military preparations of one state creates an irresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another state as to whether those preparations are for ‘defensive purposes’ (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or ‘offensive purposes’ (to change the status quo to its advantage)’.30 Security dilemma exists due to the incapability of the states in establishing the mechanism for containing the unavoidable circumstances. The supporting approaches of security dilemma (stability-instability paradox and deterrence theory) explicate that states intend to intensify their power potential as stability- instability paradox provides understanding in analyzing nuclear arms competition among the states because it is presumed that nuclear weapons provide safeguard to the states for sustaining their security and survival. Likewise, deterrence theory explicates that states intensify their nuclear arsenals for sustaining their nuclear deterrence in pursuit of their survival and security. The states of strategic triangle (India, Pakistan and China) proclaim that they have maintained minimum

28 Colin Elman in Martin Griffth, (ed), IR Theory for 21st Century (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp.11-18. Kenneth Waltz also holds that under anarchy, the states are sensitive during establishing cooperation due to the effects of their existing and future relative capabilities and intend to ensure their survival by adopting self-help system according to their accessible economic potential. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p.105. 29 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: WWW Norton, 2001), pp.35-37. 30 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemmas: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmilan.2008), pp 2-5

7 nuclear deterrence posture and the present research seeks to examine the above-mentioned assertions.

Fourth model ‘trilateral strategic culture’ elucidates the impact of cultural behavior of India, Pakistan and China during decision making. The strategic response of any state can be predicted by analyzing its strategic culture as Sun Tzu’s dictum as ‘one should aware about himself and his adversary’.31 In the context of India and Pakistan, some parallel features of cultural response against each other are observed (elite mindset, Hindu-Muslim hatred, glorification of militant culture and extremism), which have significant impact on the process of their decision making. Chinese strategic culture is mostly influenced by Confucianism which could not permit the use of force against the adversary even during severe security threats and advocated diplomatic means and dialogues in resolving the disputes.32

Thus, Realism provides conceptual understanding in describing the security environment of strategic triangle India-Pakistan and China. There is a marked asymmetry in the dyads that comprising this triangle, India vis-à-vis China and India vis-à-vis Pakistan, both in conventional and nuclear weaponry. This framework also delivers conceptual basis due to which India confronts China and Pakistan, which it deems for more than fifty years its main national security threat. The aforesaid four models of realism illuminate trilateral security dilemma which ultimately lead towards regional instability.

The Review of Literature

The review of literature of the present research delivers in-depth understanding in analyzing trilateral security dilemma. The review of theoretical framework reveals to explore the exponents of central argument/hypothesis of this research. Ashok Kapur introduced the notion of strategic triangle while elaborating the conflict in the case of Nazi Germany versus US, UK and USSR during World War II.33 Nevertheless, the triangle was short-lived but presented the idea of strategic triangle as the aforesaid triadic relationship was planned to restrain the rise of Nazism that was a

31 Sun Tzu quoted in, ‘The Art of War’ downloaded from www.goodreaders.com/auther/quotes/1771.sun_tzu on March 25, 2014. 32 Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.25. 33 Ashok Kapur, India and the South Asian Strategic Triangle (New York: Routledge, 2011), p.52.

8 strategic threat for the West and USSR. Armesh Chandra described the basic concept of strategic triangle by elaborating the triangular relationship between the USA, the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China during 1960s and 1970s.34 The two decades sustained relationship between three major powers attracted the academic arena in assuming the triangular relationship as a strategic tool. To evaluate triangular relationship between USA, USSR and PRC, Theodore Caplaw has evolved multiple explanations relating to the tendency of coalition or collusion between the three poles of triangle.35 In aforesaid triangle, China was comparatively weaker one between the three and its coalition with either of the two superpowers provided leverage to uplift its strategic importance through manipulation. Caplaw’s postulations are appropriate to analyze the dynamics of strategic triangle India, Pakistan and China, where Pakistan is weaker one between the three and Indo-Pak permanent rivalry could not permit Pak-India amity and Sino-Pak coherence would be strategically advantageous for Pakistan.

Realism and the key approaches of realism provide understanding to evaluate security dilemma of the strategic triangle India, Pakistan and China. The lust of power is the guiding principle in realism and Morgenthau derived this from the egoistic nature of human beings for power maximization.36 Nevertheless, many of the realists i.e. Jack Domely37, Reinhold Niebuhr38 and Kenneth Thompson39 showed disagreements about the egoistic human nature for uplifting power. Besides disagreements, the human nature has incredible impact on the states during conflicts and the states intend to intensify their power potential for assuring their safety and survival. K.J. Hostly explicates that by maximizing their power, the states would become capable to restrain the behavior of belligerent states.40 John Baylis and Steve Smith proclaim that power is a prime source for the sates to sustain their sovereignty because the stronger states do whatever they aspire and the weak states accept whatever they have to accept.41 Therefore, the states have to ensure their

34 Armesh Chandra, ‘Strategic Triangle Among Russia, China and India; Challenges and Prospects’ Journal of peace studies, Vol.17, Issue 2&3 (April-September 2010), p.41 35 Theodore, Caplow,’Future Developments of a Coalitions in Triad’, American Journal of Society, Vol.64, No. 3 (March 1959), pp.490-491. 36 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle of Power and Peace (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1955), p.61. 37 Jack Domely, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.9. 38 Reinhold Neibuhr, The Children of Light and Children of Darkness (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944), p.123. 39 Kenneth W. Thompson, The Moral Issue in Statecraft (Benton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), p.75. 40 K.J. Hostli, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: N.J.Prentice Hall, 1967), p.193. 41 John Baylis and Steve Smith (ed) The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.145.

9 own security by engrossing all available resources that leads towards security dilemma among them.

Security dilemma is a condition due to which states intend to augment their military capabilities for assuring their security and survival. Kaufman defined security dilemma as, ‘the condition due to which the states have a credible fear of ethnic extinction’.42 Robert Jervis elucidates security dilemma, ‘the states may be convinced to cease their military rise if their security is guaranteed but some remaining factors i.e. technology, their subjective security requirements, events outside their control and the fear of the increase of competitor’s relative power might generate a condition out of control that enforced them towards security dilemma’.43 According to Kenneth Waltz, ‘the states are not aspire to exist with their security dilemma but their circumstances aggravate them to implicate’.44 For comprising security dilemma and for sustaining their survival, states generally adopt theory of balance of power. Sidney B. Fay contends that balance of power is an equilibrium in power among the states to prevent them in becoming sufficiently strong to intrude upon others.45 George Schwarzenberger describes balance of power as, ‘equilibrium’ or ‘a certain amount of stability in international relations’ that favorable environment engenders by an alliance of states for maintaining ‘equilibrium’.46 In the absence of central power at the systematic level, hostile happenings can occur among the states that fail to care for themselves. For sustaining their security and sovereignty, the states seek to get assistance from great powers for amassing so much power that they can threaten the others. For augmenting their power, the states adopt internal balancing (by enhancing their military and economic capabilities) or by external balancing (entering into alliances with others).47 Norman D. Palmer and Gurina Palmer specified two kinds of alliances, offensive and defensive.48 Offensive alliances strive to intrude the balance into its ally’s favor and defensive alliances intend to maintain the balance.

42 Kaufman. S. J. ’Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War’, International Security, (1996), pp.38-108. 43 Robert Jervis, ‘Was the Cold war a Security Dilemma?’ Journal of Cold-war Studies, Vol.3, No.1 (2001), p.41. 44 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International politics (New York: MC Graw-Hill, 1979), p.187. 45 Sidney B. Fay stated in, Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), p.395. 46 Georg Schwarzenberger, Power Politics (New York: Friederick A. Pareger, 1951), p.178. 47 Annette Freyberg- Inan, Ewan Harrison and Patrick James. (eds) Rethinking Realism in International Relations Between Tradition and Innovation (Baltimore: The John Hopkin University Press, 2009), p.107. 48 Norman D. Palmer and Gurina Palmer, International Relations (New Delhi: A.I.T.B.S Publishers, 2010), p.224.

Furthermore, the logic of strategic culture also has a considerable impact in identifying state’s response during conflicts. Carnes Lord expressed six distinct areas during classifying strategic culture as, ideology, military history, political culture, international relationship, geopolitical setting and military modernization.49 According to Peter Lovoy, ‘strategic culture is based upon the shared beliefs and assumptions of a nation’.50 Dorryl Howlett identifies three distinct areas of strategic culture i.e. nature of threats, cultural norms and their negotiating techniques for inducing peace.51

Ian Johnston emerged a new debate for assessing strategic culture by elucidating three generations of strategic culture.52 Besides evaluating aforesaid explanations of strategic culture, Lawrence Sondhaus is still uncertain and states that no definition comprehensively illustrates the characteristics of strategic culture.53 Notwithstanding disagreement, strategic culture is considered a tool to formulate behavioral calculation of the adversary to estimate the level of unacceptable damage during wars. J. Mohan Malik argues that India’s elite intends to get regional and global preeminence due to its (India’s) size, strategic location and population.54 Likewise, Jawahar Lal Nehru wrought the philosophy of ‘Greater India’ and elucidated that India would grasp prominent status in international politics due to its size and power potential.55 As for Pakistan’s strategic culture is concerned, Pakistan’s security perceptions are ‘Indo Centric’,56 and religion is the main factor of Hindu-Muslim hatred even before the partition of Sub-continent. Pakistan is declared as

49 Carnes Lord, ‘American Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy, Vol.5, No.3 (1985), pp.272-274. 50 Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture’, published by Defense Threat Reduction Agency USA on 31 October 2006, p.7. 51 Dorryl Howlett, ‘The Future of Strategic Culture’, Published by Defense Threat Reduction Agency USA on 31 October 2006, pp.3-4, downloaded from www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/pakistan.pdf on December 2015. 52 The first generation emerged in early 1980s, and explained various behavioral aspects of Soviet Union and USA relating to nuclear issues. The second generation appeared in mid 1980s and elaborated the duplicity of the political leadership. The third generation occurred during 1990s and focused more on historical military, experiences as compared to political and social history. The comparison of three generations confirm some common characteristics of strategic culture i.e. norms, geography, political mindsets and the ability to inflict the adversary. Alastair Ian Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture International Security’, Vol. 19, No.4 (Spring 1995), pp.36-43. 53 Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of war, (London: Routledge, 2006), p.6. 54 J.Mohan Malik, ‘South Asia in China’s Foreign Relations’ Pacific Review, Vol.13, No.1 (February 2001), p.74 55 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (London: Meridian Books, 1945), pp.35-40. Also quoted Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.498 56Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘An Interpretive Analysis of India-Pakistan Strategic Culture and Its Impact on South Asian Peace and Security’ Regional Studies, Vol.xxvi, No.3 (Summer 2008), p.17

11 an ‘Islamic State’.57 Hasan Askari Rizvi explicates that defense of Pakistan is presumed as defense of Islamic state and Islamic principles i.e. shaheed (martyr), ghazi (victorious) and Jihad-e-fi- sibillah (holy war in the name of Almighty Allah) are prime sources of motivation for armed personnel during war and peace.58 Thus, under the existence of prolonged Hindu-Muslim hatred and India’s intent for regional preeminence, both India and Pakistan involved in wars and in a limited conflict that engendered upcoming South Asian strategic environment vulnerable.

Currently, both India and Pakistan are declared nuclear weapon states. It is generally presumed that the chances of nuclear war are less likely in the presence of nuclear weapons. They are believed to be weapons of peace. However, the strategic analysts are suspicious and have predicted the vulnerabilities of nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. Rebert M.Gates showed grave repercussions to Seymour Hersh, ‘the likelihoods of nuclear exchange persist in case of upcoming conflict between India and Pakistan’.59 Z.S. Davis explores the dynamics of South Asian strategic stability by examining the consequences of nuclear tests of May 1998 and expresses that India’s military mobilization raised the specter of full scale war and possibility that Pakistan’s conventional military defeat of its army would resort to nuclear weapons.60

George Perkovich elaborates two interrelated factors that have favored nuclear weapons. The primary driving impulse among many Indian elites have been to take actions aimed at transcending the country’s colonial past. Jaswant Singh considers the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as ‘nuclear apartheid’61. Perkovich shows that it is a ‘political narrative’ and not a security first narrative that has dominated India’s discourse with itself and the world on nuclear issues. The study abundantly documents the contrary view that elite hunger for status and recognition have counted for much more.62

57 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, Islamic Provisions, Part IX, (articles 227-231). 58 Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture’, p.320, downloaded from www.kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/101068/ichaptersection_singledocument/50a on December 23, 2015. 59Seymour M. Hersh, ‘On the Nuclear Edge’, The New Yorker (29 March 1993). 60 Z.S. Davis, (ed) The India-Pakistan Military Standof’ (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p.2 61Jaswant Singh (an Indian politician) elaborated nuclear apartheid as, ‘The division among the nuclear and nonnuclear states within an unfair and defective nonproliferation regime that formulates the dual standards of national security is a kind of international nuclear apartheid’. Jaswant Singh, ‘Against Nuclear Apartheid’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, No.5 (1998), p.48 62George Perkovich, p.108. For understanding main proponents due to which states intend to become nuclear, see reference 90 of chapter two.

Z. I. Cheema elucidates nuclear command and control systems of India and Pakistan63 and shows the suspicions that it is hardly possible for both the states to avoid any nuclear mishap due to lack of technological resources and poor culture of conflict management.64 The persisting South Asian strategic environment intensified Pakistan’s security dilemma and Pakistan presume India as an aggressive state which is the prime threat to its security.

While examining China’s strategic culture, Fan Ning and Liu Hauquing proclaim that the Chinese are peace-loving and China has not invaded any country, not even occupied an inch of other’s territory except to teach a lesson that the state prefers to impose political means rather than military for resolving the disputes.65 Andrew Scobell elucidates that China was not involved in a destructive war during its long history.66 Liu Hauquing expresses that Chinese people are peace loving and always promote peace according to UN charter and asserts that the remaining UN member states must indorse peace and settle their disputes through dialogues.67 China’s national defense policy is defensive in nature and P. Kamennov describes ongoing China’s military preparations based on science and advanced technology, in line with the requirements of modern high tech warfare.68 For reassuring its defense, China followed Waltz argument that ‘a country without nuclear ally intends to become nuclear for containing its adversaries have them’,69 and tested its nuclear device on 16 October 1964.

After the Chinese nuclear test, George Perkovich argues, the international community was expecting that India would try to contain Chinese nuclear test and tried to keep India away from nuclear test’.70 Smith Ganguly evaluated that the primary motivation behind India’s nuclear

63Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, pp.347-361 64 Ibid, pp473-478 65 Fang Ning, Defense Policy in the New Era’, in Michael Pillsbury (ed), The Chinese View of Future Warfare (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), p.48. Liu Hauquing, ‘Defense Modernization in Historical Perspective’, in Michael Pillsbury (ed), The Chinese View of Future Warfare (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), p.115. 66 Andrew Scobell, ‘China’s Strategic Culture’, p.7, downloaded from www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/ssi_scobell.pdf on December 27, 2015. 67 ‘Liu Huaqing on the Stand of the Military towards Taiwan’, Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), (4 September 1995). 68 P.Kamennov, ‘Principles of Proactive Defense’ International Affairs, Vol 56, No.3 (2010), pp.54-57. 69 Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; More May be Better’ Adelphi Paper.No.171. (London, International Institute of Strategic Studies. 1981). 70George Perkovich, p.35. Additionally, George Perkovich explains that India argues, its nuclear program was to contain China and Pakistan but Nehru’s statements in 1957 shows that India had the capability to make nuclear weapon while China became nuclear in 1964. In 1958, Mr. Bhaba (the father of Indian nuclear program) showed his intentions more than one time for making nuclear bomb.

13 program was the security concerns in the form of alleged threats from China and Pakistan. George Fernandus proclaims China as ‘the number one potential threat’.71 Indian leaders believed that nuclear weapons could be employed for protecting the state against these dangers.72 Menon is of the view that India and Pakistan are living in a relatively similar strategic environment vis-a-vis India and China, and the possible nuclear use between India-China and India-Pakistan will be due to some prolonged conventional armed conflict.73 Arpit Rajain argues that the nuclear tests of May 1998 by India and Pakistan have intensely changed the strategic scenario of South Asia. The overt nuclearisation has shaped a new strategic triangle, comprising India, Pakistan and China.74 Arpit Rajain follows the theory of nuclear deterrence as a tool to analyze and predict the future of this newly emerged strategic triangular relationship among these states. He highlights the complex interaction and role of variables like strategic culture, nuclear weaponization and deployment, command and control, arms control, non-state actors and foreign policy choices, which are likely to govern the relationships among three nuclear armed states of Southern Asia.75

Presently, the three states possess enough nuclear arsenals to deter each other. It is critical to estimate trilateral nuclear force postures because they are clandestine in nature and it is complicated to analyze their nuclear calculus and delivery mechanisms along with their missile programs. After evaluating the existing potential of nuclear and missile production from multiple resources, the three states have the potential to target all important military and civilian installations of one another. According to Federation of American Scientists report, China possessed 250 nuclear warheads.76 Dinshaw Mistry predicted that by 2020, Pakistan and India could each have the capability to produce 200 to 250 nuclear weapons.77

71 George Fernandus,’China is Enemy No.1’, Indian Express (3 May 1998). 72 Sumit Ganguly, ‘India’s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s Nuclear Weapons Program’, International Security, Vol. 23, No.4 (Spring 1999), p. 173 73Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for Indi (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 200), pp.240-244 74Arpit Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia; China, India and Pakistan, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p.15. 75Ibid, p.23 76 FAS Report on Status of World Nuclear Forces, downloaded from www.fas.org/assues/nuclear-weapons/status- world-nuclear-forces on February 11, 2015. 77 Dinshaw Mistry, ‘Missile Proliferation and Deterrence Stability in South Asia’ in Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (eds), Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Washtington D.C: Stimson, 2013), pp.127- 128

Nayar and Paul argued, ‘India’s leadership assumes that its nuclear weapons program the most significant for assuring its security’.78 Besides nuclearization, both India and China have the aspirations to get the status of regional and global superpowers respectively as Nayar and Paul argued that India has the desire to seek great power status and the great powers have the capability to defend themselves against any aggression.79 Likewise, Arpit Rajain evaluates that China’s emerging economic rise and military modernization provide the opportunity for obtaining the status of super power in future.80

The aforesaid literature review provides ground to comprehend trilateral security dilemma. For eliminating security dilemma, arms control measures were initiated at bilateral level i.e. Indo-Pak and Sino-Indian arms control measures. Zamlay Khalilzad reveals that Pakistan instigated the idea before UN General Assembly for asserting the South Asian region as Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ), but India rejected it.81 According to Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan offered No-War pact to India but India denied Pakistan’s offer’.82 For avoiding nuclear exchange, India announced its Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) in 1999 and proclaimed ‘No First Use’ (NFU) policy and Muhammad B. Alam articulated that the intent behind India’s NFU was to establish a Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD).83 Pakistan was reluctant to admit India’s NFU stance and Jamshed Ayaz Khan disclosed that the flaws in India’s NFU policy generate provision to India for employ first use of nuclear weapons.84 Riffat Hussain expressed that in response of India’s NFU, Pakistan decided to keep “First Use’ option.85 Despite initiating Indo-Pak arms control measures, both the states failed to establish arms control mechanism as Rodney Jones elucidates that the two states undertake that they are well aware about each other’s strategic aspirations and have counter containment potential during crises.86

78 Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V.Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.171-175 79Ibid. 80 Arpit Rajain, p.415. 81 Zamlay Khalilzed, ‘Pakistan: The Making of a Nuclear Power, Asian Survey Vol.XVI, No.6 (June 1976), pp.580-592. 82 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Story of Pakistan Army (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1976), pp.122-123. 83 Mohammad B. Alam, ‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Context and Constraints’. Heidberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics. Working Paper No. 11(October 2002). p.3. 84 Jamshed Ayaz Khan,’India’s Nuclear Doctrine’ The Nation (31 January 2003). 85 Riffat Hussain, ‘Nuclear Doctrine in South Asia’. SASSU Research Report No. 4 (December 2005). p.25. 86 Rodney W. Jones, ‘Prospects for arms control and strategic stability in South Asia’, Contemporary South Asia, Vol.14, No.2 (June 2005), p.200.

So far Sino-Indian arms control measures are concerned, Hua Han stated that India was intended to manipulate the new strategic architecture in post-Cold-War scenario without joining international non-proliferation regime.87 In response, China was committed in support of CTBT as Hua Han described China’s stance on CTBT while, India’s reluctance in signing CTBT created Sino-Indian disagreements on arms control.88 Thus, a gap persists in the existing literature to eliminate the security dilemma of the strategic triangle India-Pakistan and China. For eradicating trilateral security dilemma, the present research contributes trilateral informal arms control measures i.e. Confidence Building Measures between India-Pakistan and China, regional institutional arms control measures and the influence Sino-Pak economic engagement on regional strategic architecture. The aforesaid analyses would eventually lead to address the impact of Sino- Indian competition and security dilemma on the Indo-Pak security framework that is the main hunch of this study.

Plan of the Research

This research comprises of seven chapters. The introduction encompasses the review of literature which is the major source for conducting the present research. The research tools provide guidelines and roadmap during conducting the present research for the in-depth understanding of the research problem. Chapter 1 is based upon the introduction of the supporting theories which are applied during the research. Realism provides basic understanding to examine the factors due to which states are compelled to raise their power potentials. The intention to enhance the power potential induces the states to start arms race which ultimately creates security dilemmas. This chapter is divided in four sections for assessing the security dilemma of the strategic triangle: India-Pakistan and China. In section one, the theory of strategic triangle is elucidated by analyzing multiple dynamics of triangular relationships and appropriate position is identified for the said strategic triangle. In section two, the supporting approaches of realism i.e. classical, defensive, offensive and the theory of balance of power are elaborated in understanding the root causes of the afore-mentioned trilateral strategic relationships. Section three explicates the main proponents due to which security dilemma persists among the states and its key approaches (stability-instability

87 Hua Han, ‘Sino-Indian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control’, in Eric Arnett (ed) Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban, SIPRI Research Report No. 14 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.50. 88 Ibid.

16 paradox and deterrence theory) illuminate the strategic retorts of the states for containing their security dilemmas. This section provides base for the present research in investigating the main strategies of the three states for intensifying their power potentials which are addressed in the coming chapters. Section four evaluates the significance of strategic culture in determining the state’s response during crisis. All these four sections provide base in examining the major research questions of the present research.

Chapter 2 evaluates the aspects due to which the security dilemma between three states occurred during 1947-1974. This chapter contains two sections, one deals with the strategic culture of India, Pakistan and China within the context of their nature of threats, cultural norms and negotiating techniques. In section two, the impact of their strategic culture on their strategic relations are elaborated. Initially, both China and India had established pleasant relations but due to territorial conflicts and after Sino-Indian war of 1962, they reassessed their strategic relations. Whereas, both India and Pakistan are traditional rivals since the time of the partition of the Sub-continent. They have fought three wars and a limited conflict. The Kashmir issue is the main bone of contention between them. After 1962 Indo-China war, both China and Pakistan found a common enemy in India and established strategic relations. China supported Pakistan during 1965 war and was intended to promote Pakistan in war1971 but due to Indo-Soviet defense pact, could not provide assistance during war 1971. After 1971, China provided economic and military assistance to Pakistan. The chapter conveys on the basis of Sino-Pak relations, Indo-Pak relations and the impact of China on Indo-Pak relations.

Chapter 3 deals with trilateral relations during 1975-98. After India’s nuclear test of 1974, Pakistan followed three S’s (State of war, Self-help and Survival) approach of realism and decided to become nuclear in order to contain India’s nuclear supremacy. Though, Pakistan offered no-war pact and floated the idea of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia, however, India’s denial diverted Pakistan’s attention towards its nuclear weapon program. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto played pivotal role in establishing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Despite facing numerous hindrances, i.e. India’s media propaganda, US warning to Pakistan’s political elite, India’s plan to target Pakistan’s nuclear installations and US embargo, Pakistan clandestinely continued its nuclear program and unveiled its nuclear capability in 1983. Both India and Pakistan came close to conflicts during 1986-87 and in 1990 but nuclear factor kept them away from confrontation.

Despite creating ambiguity after the nuclear test of 1974, India continued to enhance its nuclear program. The realist three S’s assumptions provide understanding of India’s nuclear intentions during 1975-1998. Likewise, the study examines China’s participation in assisting Pakistan’s military modernization, establishing missiles programs and the peaceful usage of nuclear energy. China’s assistance to Pakistan was based upon the realist theory of balance of power. In order to maintain balance of power and to contain the security dilemma, Pakistan exploded nuclear devices in reply to India’s nuclear tests in May 1998.

Chapter 4 deals with the strategic environment between India and Pakistan after the nuclear tests of 1998. After becoming overt nuclear powers, it was anticipated that both the states would not be involved in conflicts. Their prevalent strategic atmosphere refutes this assumption. The likelihoods of nuclear conflicts during Kargil, 2001-2002 military standoff and Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008 brought them close to full-fledged armed conflict. International community is continuously showing apprehensions on Indo-Pak animosity including China, since its (Chna’s) neutral stance during various crises could not have any significant help for conflict management.

The mediating role of the US was apparent during these crises which indicates that the US involvement in upcoming South Asian strategic environment would persist. A review on the classification of deterrence theories provides understanding about deterrence behavior of both the states and ‘Decision Theoretic Deterrence Theory’ is found comparatively appropriate for the South Asian region.

Chapter 5 discusses about the reliability of CMD of China, India and Pakistan by applying the prerequisites of CMD. The three states have established their command and control systems for assuring safety and security. It is meant to avoid nuclear accidents and miscalculations. Their nuclear programs are clandestine in nature and it is critical to analyze their nuclear calculus, force postures and delivery mechanisms along with their missile programs. After evaluating the existing potential of nuclear and missile production from multiple resources, the three states have the potential to target all important military and civilian installations of one another. China’s military preparations are mainly to deter the US, and China has the potential to target US important civil and military installations. However, it is critical for China to contain the US in near future due to the persistence of a huge disparity between them. The persisting uncertainties related to trilateral initiatives for the prerequisites of CMD, aggravated strategic competition and created security

18 dilemma between China, India and Pakistan. In the South Asian context, India has generated serious security repercussions for Pakistan by adopting an ambiguous nuclear doctrine, CSD posture and by aspiring for BMD, which aggravated Pakistan’s security dilemma. In response, Pakistan introduced ‘Nasar’ missile that exacerbates the chances of nuclear exchange in the South Asian region.

Chapter 6 provides understanding about the main proponents of rivalries between China and India. The present research seeks to evaluate US response towards China under Unipolarity. China’s initial strategic behavior was to follow ‘non-violent’ strategy. Due to US initiatives to contain China, particularly on Taiwan issue, China reformulated its strategic behavior. In response, China planned to adopt ‘active defense’ strategy and focused upon its military modernization by initiating economic rise. At the regional level, India adopted ‘Look East ‘policy to contain China. In response, China has adopted ‘String of Pearls’ policy. India’s ‘Look East’ policy is evaluated according to triangular model in determining actor’s external behavior in the content of economic interdependence, institutional identification and power structure. Theory of balance of power and power transition theory provides understanding about the strategic behavior of China and India. Indo-China regional strategic rivalries have generated serious complications for the strategic stability of the South Asian region. Indo-China competition has intensified Pakistan’s security dilemma since it is weaker amongst the three.

Chapter 7 identifies options, solutions and findings for preserving the stability of the South Asian region and offers most appropriate solutions to strengthen it. This chapter not only provides understanding about the stability under polarity but also evaluates deterrence stability within the debate of optimists and pessimists. This chapter assesses multiple arms control measures in the context of South Asian strategic environment and explores various options and solutions for maintaining regional strategic stability. Furthermore, China’s latest OBOR strategy to intensify strategic stability and reduction of arms competition in the South Asian region is examined.

The conclusion takes up the issues relating to trilateral relationship between India-Pakistan and China from the prism of realism. South Asian security dilemma is mainly based on Indo-Pak enduring rivalries and the factors which engender the likelihoods of conflicts between the two states are identified. Likewise, their overt nuclear postures have not only strengthened security dilemma but the probabilities of nuclear exchange in South Asian region are aggravated. Both

China and India have the pretentions of becoming superpowers at the Global and regional levels respectively. The Sino-Indian rivalries and arms race in the South Asian region have diverted Pakistan’s attention to reassess its strategy which generated trilateral security dilemma. This study also analyzes the consequences of China’s trade pacts with India and Pakistan on the South Asian strategic environment. The study elaborates enduring South Asian strategic instability which is largely based on trilateral security dilemma and the ultimate objective of this research is to determine the main proponents for promoting regional strategic stability by initiating various formal and informal measures on bilateral, multilateral and regional institutional level. This research undertakes that informal arms control measures are comparatively more convincing to address South Asian strategic stability.

Methodology

This research undertakes along tri interconnected tracks.

1. Theoretical and Conceptual Innovation; The theme is taken from realism and its key approaches (classical, defensive, offensive, theory of balance of power, stability-instability paradox and deterrence theory) provide provisions in analyzing trilateral security dilemma. 2. Comparative Analysis; For examining security dilemma between India-Pakistan and China, the main proponents due to which these states intend to become nuclear are analyzed within the context of their historical and cultural background. The three states are not only determine to maintain their nuclear postures but are gradually enhancing their nuclear potential and are committed to maintain their deterrence credible. The three states are reluctant to admit the credibility of deterrence of one another and comparative analysis of trilateral nuclear force build up provides understanding for investigating arms and nuclear competition that ultimately leads towards security dilemma between them. 3. Regional Strategic Analysis; Trilateral security dilemma engenders South Asian strategic instability. For endorsing regional strategic stability, various measures are analyzed on bilateral, multilateral and regional institutional level that may proceed to maintain regional strategic stability.

The present research evaluates a contemporary case study methodology. Inter disciplinary literature from international relations, comparative politics, political science and history provides

20 acumens for the case study method by employing qualitative research through deductive approach. The descriptive and historical research designs are used to craft and explore the research questions. To understand the basic strategic, diplomatic, political, and security interpretations of the South Asian region, both primary and secondary sources have been consulted. The present research is covered by basic components of research i.e. analytical description, prescriptive and explanatory.

The collection of data relating to the nuclear programs of the three states is a daunting task because their nuclear programs are covert in nature. The declassified data relating to nuclear stockpiles of the three states is insufficient for scholarly investigation. Thus, the estimation of the exact number of their nuclear force buildup is anticipated by evaluating the available evidences relating to the capacity of producing the nuclear arsenals and their allocated financial resources during the past two decades. The authenticity of the sources is verified by examining multiple methods as archival records, governmental documents and the statements of the senior officials. All the possible measures (i.e. primary sources, secondary sources, data collection technique and data analysis through the use of ‘NVivo’ software) have been adopted during research to obtain the true picture of the research problem which leads to predict the viable solutions. This remains the basic target of the whole research.

Chapter 1

IR Theories and Strategic Triangle in South Asia

Introduction

This chapter provides the understanding between realism and relevant theories, to elaborate the motives which compel the states to maximize their power potentials for their survival and power projection. This chapter consists of four sections, first section covers the theory of strategic triangle and its relevance with India-Pakistan and China's security dilemma. Second section deals with realism and its relevant theories while explaining the strategic behavior of the three states in order to sustain their survival in the anarchic system. Third section explains security dilemma by evaluating the relevant theories (stability-instability paradox and theory of deterrence) in the context of China-India and India-Pakistan relations. The significance of strategic culture in understanding the states response during conflicts is analyzed in the fourth section.

To comprehend the main argument of this research, this chapter seeks to answer the following questions.

 What are the motives of the states for maximization their power?  How states ensure their survival and sovereignty?  What measures states adopt to overcome their security dilemma?  What is the nature of strategic triangle of India-Pakistan and China?  What is strategic culture and how it impacts on state’s behavior?

1.1 Theory of Strategic Triangle

The strategic triangle is a tridimensional relationship between rivalries and conflicts of interests between three centers of comparable caliber.1 A triangular relationship between countries is strategic, when polarities are deeply ingrained and the issues in conflict are either settled by war as in the case of Nazi Germany versus US, UK and USSR triangle during World War II, or there is an extended conflict that engages military preparations, ideological and state’s disputes and diplomatic controversies, as in case of India, Pakistan and China.2

1 Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), pp.174-179. 2 Ashok Kapur, India and the South Asian Strategic Triangle (New York: Routledge, 2011), p.52.

In the former case, shelf life of triangle was short, ending in victory for the allies, their military and diplomatic interests and their opposition to Nazi values. This triangle was strategic because it had a strategic aim to defeat the rise of Nazism and the threat it posed to the West and the USSR interests. In the latter case, an endgame is not in sight, the contention between three countries is prolonged and dangerous. It has a potential to escalate. The division of economic and military power of the three prevent dominance by one or the other. Three different systems of patterns of exchange of relationships are conceivable as:3 I. The ‘ménage a trios’ (household of three) consisting of symmetrical amities between all three players. II. The romantic triangle consisting of amity between one ‘pivot’ player and two ‘wing’ players but enmity between each of the latter. III. The ‘stable marriage’ consisting of amity between two of the players and enmity between each and the third.

The strategic triangle between India-Pakistan and China fulfills the last system where China and Pakistan have established long-lasting affable relations but both have the conflicts with India. The basic concept of a strategic triangle was associated with the triadic relationship between the USA, the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China (PRP) during the 1960s and in 1970s. ‘For a long period, the three major powers of the World; China, the United States and the Former Soviet Union have found themselves involved in such a relationship’.4 Whatever was the importance of such a tirade at the international level, it attracted debate, discussion in the academic and political arena. Triangular relationship as a strategic tool assumed significance in various countries at the global level. To understand the dynamics of triangular relationship, T. Caplow has evolved several propositions and his first proposition says that the tendency towards a coalition or collusion between two of the three poles and the fear of this tendency in each pole constitute the main dynamics of the triangle.5 The strategic triangle among USA, Soviet Union and China during

3 Lowell Dittmer, ‘The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game Theoretical Analysis’ World Politics, Vol.33, No.4 (July 1981), pp.485-515 4 Armesh Chandra, ‘Strategic Triangle Among Russia, China and India; Challenges and Prospects’ Journal of peace studies, Vol.17, Issue 2&3 (April-September 2010), p.41, Downloaded from www.1291712546.pdf on January 29, 2013 5 Theodore, Caplow,’Future Developments of a Coalitions in Triad’, American Journal of Society, Vol.64, No. 3 (March 1959), pp.490-491.

1960s and 1970s provided enough raison d’être to formulate the test model of triangularity of power. In a given triangle A, B and C, B and C stand for superpowers (USA and former Soviet Union) and A stands for China. A is much weaker and vulnerable but its coalition with either of the two super powers can benefit to its real status. This advantage will be comparatively vis-à-vis more two great powers are in connection to each other.6 This proves that the weak pole’s position in a triangular situation can be improved greatly through manipulation. This was applicable in the case of China’s position during 1960’s and 1970’s, when Soviet Union and the United States were considered to be two dominant world’s powers.

A (China)

(USA) B C (Former USSR)

The probabilities for weak pole in a triangle can further be analyzed by the following five models.

Model 1: Any coalition allowed in a given triangle ABC,

B C

End result: Equal frequency of AB, BC and AC.

6 Armesh Chandra, p.42

Model 2: The coalition AB is prohibited,

B C

End result: Coalition of AC and BC

Model 3: The Coalition of BC is prohibited,

B C

End result: coalition of AB and AC. Model 4: The coalition of AB and BC are prohibited, A

B C

End result: coalition of AC only.7

7 Ibid, p.44

When these probabilities are applied to the triad India, Pakistan and China as, A stands for Pakistan, B stands for India and C stands for China as:

Model1 is least applicable due to permanent Indo-Pak rivalry. In Model 2, probability of AC strongly exists and is strategically enhancing A. Model 3 might be conceivable because BC has direct impact on A’s strategic position. The occurrence of Model 4 was observed in the past but the enduring China’s revised policy of peaceful rise in post-Cold War era and especially under emerging Sino-Indian economic entanglement may have exacerbated Pakistan’s security dilemma.8 Model 5: The coalition of AB is prohibited and BC is concurrently under engagement and competition, A (Pakistan)

Engagement + Competition (India)B C (China) Thus, Model 5 is relatively more applicable on strategic triangle India-Pakistan and China because both China and India are simultaneously involved in counter containment strategies and are establishing trade relations at the same time. The research seeks to address the impact of existing Sino-Indian relations on Pak-India relations. 1.2 Realism

Realism provides basic understanding due to which states seek to compete one another militarily. This may lead to the existence of security dilemma between them. Many thinkers since ancient times have enunciated a lot about realism. First of all, Kutilya focused on the position of the potential conqueror who always aimed to enhance his power at the expense of the rest9, but his primary assumptions had been expressed by different ways starting from a deeply pessimistic view

8 China’s Grand Strategy of peaceful rise is extensively discussed in Chapter 6. 9 Kautilya was quoted by Colin Elman in Martin Griffth, ‘International Relations Theory for the Twenty-first Century’, p.11.

26 of human nature. Machiavelli argues for strong and efficient rulers for whom power and security are the major concern.10 Thomas Hobbes stated that the state of nature was prone to a ‘war of all against all’.11 Carr stressed that power is a necessary ingredient of every political order.12 Hostli maintains that power is the general capacity of a state to control the behavior of others.13 Power can be defined as the ability to control outcomes.14 Morgenthau stated that power is rooted in the nature of humankind.15 J.C.Garnett elaborates realism as the theory of political behavior which remains pervasive in contemporary strategic writings.16

The basic realist ideas are based upon permissive view of human nature and on the conviction that international relations are conflictual which are ultimately resolved by wars. Wars can be managed but not eliminated and the impediments to global cooperation are impossible to overcome owing to the problem of trust in a condition of anarchy. Therefore, the policies should enhance power.17

The concept of power (elucidates the term power in the introductory chapter as well) is strikingly central to realism, as it is a necessary requirement for any group to attain objectives, no matter what is the nature of the objective. Power has become the focal point for the sovereignty of the states and realists iron law explains it as, ‘the stronger do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept’.18 For example, in the cases of Nazi Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1939, the Soviet Union and Hungry in 1956, Indonesia and East Timor in 1975, the weaker states had to submit to the will of the stronger.

Realism is distinguished between two main variants, classical realism and neorealism with its three contemporary characteristics, neoclassical, defensive structural and offensive structural realism.

10 Ibid.p.12. 11 Thomas Hobbes was quoted by Martin Griffith, p.12. 12 E.H Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London: Perennial, 1939), p.297. Also quoted Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, "Theories of International Relations "(New York: St Martin Press, 1996), p.72. 13 K.J. Hostli, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: N.J.Prentice Hall, 1967), p.193 14 Ibid. For example, state A is able to get state B to act in a way which maximizes the interests of A. 15 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle of Power and Peace (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1955), p.26. Morgenthau offers the definition of power: man’s control over the minds and actions of other men, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (ed) The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.150. 16 John C. Garnett, ‘Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions’, Contemporary Strategy, Vol.1 (1987), p.6. 17 Richard W.Mansbach and Kristen L. Rafferty, Introduction to Global Politics (London: Routledge, 2008), p.41. Also quoted Zafar Nawaz Jaspal in Moonis Ahmar, p.114 18 John Baylis and Steve Smith, p.145

Classical realism is popularly renamed as human realism as Machiavelli condemned human nature as:19

It must be needed be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers.

It is the human nature which motivates the states towards the conflicts because conflicts and wars are rooted in human nature.20 Thomas Hobbes criticized human nature as:21

The disposition of men is naturally such that expect they be restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man will distrust and dread each other, and as by natural right he may, so by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength he hath, towards the preservation of himself. Morgenthau argues that the power pursuit propensity of states is derived on the basis of human beings as power maximizes.22 This perspective holds that ideological, as well as material factors may constitute power.23 The absence of the international equivalent of a state’s government is a permissive condition that gives human appetites free region.24

Many of the realists never accepted the human egoistic nature and mentioned some other aspects that men are motivated by other desires than the urge for power.25 Niebuhr denied the egoistic nature of humans that individuals are not consistently egoistic.26 Kenneth Thompson praised that man is at heart a moral being and emphasizes the instable quest of man for justice.27 Morgenthau argues that ‘to do justice and receive it is an elemental aspiration of men’.28

19 Machiavelli was quoted by Jack Donnely, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.9. 20 Scott Burchill. Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Domely, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus Smit and Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.31 21 Thomas Hobbes was quoted Dr. Muller in Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia, An Assessment of Deterrence Stability in the India-Pakistan Conflict (Deutschland: GMBH and Co, 2011), p.14. 22 Hans J. Morgenthau, p.61. 23 The IR Theory Knowledge Base windows, internet explorer downloaded on Jan 22, 2012. 24 Martin Griffth, International Relations Theory for the Twenty-first Century’, p.12 25 Jack Domely, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.9. 26 Reinhold Neibuhr, The Children of Light and Children of Darkness (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944), p.123. Also quoted Jack Domely, Realism and International Relations, p.9. 27 Kenneth W. Thompson, The Moral Issue in Statecraft (Benton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), p.75. Also quoted Jack Domely, Realism and International relations, p.10. 28 Hans J. Morgenthau, p.61. Also quoted Jack Domely, Realism and International relations, p.9.

Besides disagreements, realists are confident to declare that human nature contains an ineffaceable core of egoistic passion which has the significant impact on the conflicts among the states. Various religious groups in India and Pakistan frequently express aggressive sentiments against each other that is assessed during the present research.

While explaining noerealism, Arnold Wolfer linked states in the international system to billiard balls, which collide with each other when their trajectories cross.29 Realists consider states as ‘hard-shelled’ entities with clearly define national interests that will frequently lead them to go to war to define or promote those interests.30 Therefore, states go to war due to number of reasons, from concern to defend or extend their borders. The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 on the issue of Tibet is the best example in understanding the reasons due to which states adopt warlike posture. One difference between classical realism and neorealism is their distinct view on the source and content of state preferences. Morgenthau’s seminal statement of classical realism relied on the assumption that leaders of the states are motivated by their lust of power while Waltz by contrast, omits leader’s inspirations and state characteristics as casual variables for international outcomes, except for minimal assumption that states seek to survival.31

For evaluating the causes of war, Waltz concentrates on three images: the individual, the state and the international system and privileged the third image and declared the international system as the primary casual variable responsible for wars in international relations.32 Waltz referred to the fact that the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image, it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.33 In international system, the most important casual variable in determining war is anarchy and the absence of a central monopoly of legitimate force.34

29 Arnold Wolfer was quoted by Blair and Steven Curtis, International Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p.133. 30 Ibid. 31 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Boston: Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), pp.91-96. 32 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p.238. 33 Ibid. 34 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory’ Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol 18, No.4, (Spring 1988), p.615.

International relations persist to be frequent effort for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy. Internal and international developments lead to states rising at different rates, and as states rise and fall relative one another, conflict arises. States choose to keep in conflict as they analyze that the benefits of doing so exceed its costs. In particular, as the international system is created by and for the leading power in system, changes in power lead to conflict over system leadership. Gilpin recommends that these dynamics have applied to relations between states, and hence, his framework is applicable to a wide swath of human history.35

Thus, in the absence of central power at the systemic level, states have to ensure their own security (self-help) which leads to conditions of their security dilemma.36 For containing security dilemma, the states ensure their preservation through balance of power. Balance of power is defined as the theory that the strength of one group of powers should be equal to the strength of the other group, thus preventing any hegemony and ensuring peace.37 Sidney B. Fay argues that balance of power is equilibrium in power among the nations to prevent any one of them to become sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon others.38 The balance of power is analyzed in more than one ways. George Schwarzenberger spoke of it as ‘equilibrium’ or ‘a certain amount of stability in international relations’ that under favorable conditions is produced by an alliance of states or by other devices.39

Morgenthau stated in terms of four different senses, ‘as policy aimed at a certain state of affairs, as an actual state of affairs, as an approximately equal distribution of power and any distribution of power,’ but he added that ‘whenever the term is used without qualification, it refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality’.40 Balance of power is technically defined as the absence of preponderant dominant military power in the international system, stated as the process where smaller powers would form temporary

35 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.7. 36 Security dilemma simply arises when security for one state leads to insecurity for the other. 37 Florence Elliott and Michael Summerskill, A Dictionary of Politics (London: Penguin Books, 1964), p.33 38 Sidney B. Fay stated in, Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), p.395. Also quoted Norman D. Palmer and Gurina Palmer, International Relations (New Delhi: A.I.T.B.S Publishers, 2010), p.213. 39 Georg Schwarzenberger, Power Politics (New York: Friederick A. Pareger, 1951), p.178. Also quoted Norman D. Palmer and Gurina Palmer, International Relations, p.212 40 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle of Power and Peace, p.167. Also quoted Norman D. Palmer and Gurina Palme, International Relations, p.213

30 alliances of convenience which would act as a countervailing power to the dominant military state in the region.41

Tim Dunne and Brain C. Schwidt define balance of power as, ‘if the survival of a state or a number of weaker states is threatened by a hegemonic state or coalition of stronger states, they should join forces, establish a formal alliance, and seek to preserve their own independence by checking the power of the opposite side’.42 For realists, peaceful change comes with adjustments to new relations of power: that is shifting strategic alliances among states.43 Balance of power is a complex puzzle for international law and international organizations to address the threats to international peace and order and states form alliances for their powerful rivals.

There is a contradiction between the classical and structural realists about how balance of power is formed. Classical realists suggest that balance is something to be created or brought about by skillful statesmen and as such Wight described the balance of power as ‘the masterpiece of international politics’.44 By contrast, structural realists intimate that balance of power has an almost automatic quality similar to a law of nature, much as a level surface always forms on still water.45

In international politics, unpleasant happenings can occur among the states that fail to care for themselves. For assuring their security and survival, great powers are always on ground to prevent a single state from amassing so much power that it can threaten the others. That is, by engaging in power balancing behavior, great powers seek to prevent a single state from gaining a preponderant hegemonic position in international relations.46 They do so by enhancing their economic and military capabilities (internal balancing) or by entering into alliances with other (external balancing) states.47

41 Scott Burchill. Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Domely, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus Smit and Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations, p.40 42 Tim Dunne and Brain C. Schmidt Realism in John Baylis and Steve Smith, p.144 43 Scott Burchill. Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Domely, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus Smit and Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations, p.71 44 Alasdair and Steven Curtis, International Politics, p.135 45 Ibid. 46 Annette Freyberg- Inan, Ewan Harrison and Patrick James. (eds) Rethinking Realism in International Relations Between Tradition and Innovation (Baltimore: The John Hopkin University Press, 2009), p.107 47 Ibid.

Alliances are divided in two kinds, offensive and defensive. Offensive alliances seek to disturb the balance of favor of its members and defensive alliances aim at restoring the balance.48 International politics is a competitive realm; systemic pressures propel great powers to intimate each other, particularly in military strategies and technology. The balance of power may be the world balance or regional balance. It is often assumed whether the balance of power is regional, hemispheric or worldwide. Usually, two or more states form an alliance to discourage aggression when they could not hope to defeat it; such a move would probably be regarded as the first step towards a really effective alignment.49

Balance of power can be analyzed in the context of bipolar or multipolar systems. Realists have contradictions about the bipolar or multi-polar balance of power. Structural realists declare the bipolar systems preferable as compared to the multi-polar systems. Waltz declared the bipolar system the best for the stability. According to him, ‘in bipolar system, both can be expected to act to maintain the system’.50 Waltz gives three reasons for why bipolar balance of power is the best structure for enhancing stability:51

 The probabilities of conflicts are lesser in bipolar than in a multi-polar structure.  Deterrence will be easier to maintain.  When there are two power regions, there are less chances of miscalculation in a system.

While, classical realists prefer a multi-polar system in which alliances are more resilient and fluid than the bipolar system. Classical realists criticize bipolar system as each great power keenly observes the activities of the other and shows over reaction while there are chances of misjudgment and lack of freedom for action of a well-oiled multi-polar balance of power.52

Realists claim that they are not pro-war but on the other side, they argue that war is a permanent feature of international politics. Some prominent realists condemned particular wars which they assumed as unnecessary. Morgenthau criticized the American involvement in Vietnam War because he assumed that during war, the tendency to over-react was demonstrated in a bipolar

48 Norman D. Palmer and Gurina Palmer, International Relations, p.224 49 Ibid. 50 K. Waltz, Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, p.204 51 Ibid. Also quoted R. Jackson and G. Sorenson, Introduction of International Relations, Theories and Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.76. 52 Alasdair Blair and Steven Curtis, International Politics, p.135

32 system rather than the rational defense of the national interests.53 Similarly, John Mearshemier and Stephen Walt came out against the US invasion in Iraq in 2003 and argued that American interests were not threatened by Iraq.54

During the state of security dilemma, great powers are always under threat particularly in the absence of any central government to turn for their protection.55 In the case of the relations between India and Pakistan, Pakistan’s “Indo-centric” security concerns accelerated its nuclear program after the Indian nuclear test of 1974, according to the neorealist’s assumption of self-help, for its survival and security. Wandt criticized neorealism and argued that self-help and anarchy are not fundamental conditions of the system which exist independent of the actions of states. Rather anarchy and self-help are courses of action and not structure which states establishes through their own practice. Thus, anarchy and self-help are constructed processes and anarchy is what states make of it.56

Defensive structural realism shares neo-realism’s minimal statement about state motivation. Like neo-realism, defensive structural realism implies as states seek security in an anarchic world. The main threat to their well-being comes from other states.57 There are three main differences between neo-realism and defensive structural realism:58

1. Neo-realism permits various micro foundations to explain state behavior, defensive structural realism relies only on rational choice. 2. Defensive structural realism includes the offense-defense balance as a variable. This is a complex variable combining a variety of different aspects that make invasion harder or easier. Defensive structural realists argue that existing technologies or geographical positions often support the defense, detained resources do not cumulate simply with those previously possessed by the metropolis, dominoes do not fall, and power is complex to project at a distance. Consequently, in a world in which invasion is hard, it may not to take too much balancing to offset revisionist behavior.

53 Hans J. Morgenthau, Truth and Power (New York: Pareger, 1970), pp.87-108. 54 John Mearshemier and Stephen Walt, ‘The Israel Lobby and U. S Foreign Policy’, Middle East Policy, Vol.XIII, No.3 (Fall 2006), pp.54-59. 55 Scott Burchill, Theories of International Relations, 3rd ed, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp.35-36. 56 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ “International Organization” Vol. 46, No, 2, (Spring 1992), p.395. 57 Colin Elman “Realism” in Martin Griffiths, International Relations Theory for the Twenty-first Century, p.17. 58 Ibid.

3. Combining rationality and an offense-defense balance that favors the defensive structural realists calculate that states should sustain the status quo. Expansion is rarely structurally mandated, and balancing is the suitable response to intimidating concentration of power.

In contrast to neo-realism, this is dyadic, not involuntary; balance of power theory is linear not systemic. Causation operates rationalism and an offence-defense balance that favors the defense means that states balance, and balances have results. Defensive structural realism has a problem that the research program is better suited to exploring structurally controlled reaction. In explaining the factors due to which conflict arises, defensive structural realists suggest to appeal either at domestic level factors or argue that security dilemma dynamics make states behave as if they were revisionist.59

Defensive structural realism proposes that states should seek an appropriate amount of power and almost all the states seek to maximize their power potential which is based upon the availability of their concerned resources. Thus, despite the remaining factors, the three states (India, Pakistan and China) have the aspirations to maximize their powers by adopting defensive structural realism, and the projections of the three states are elaborated in the succeeding chapters of the present research.

Likewise, offensive structural realists differ with the defensive structural realist prescription that states look for only an ‘appropriate’ amount of power. Mearsheimer argues that states face an uncertain international environment in which any state might use its power to harm the other. In support of his argument, Mearsheimer gives five assumptions:60

The international system is anarchic; great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, and accordingly can damage each other; states can never be certain about other states intentions; survival is the primary goal of great powers; and great powers are rational actors.

From these assumptions, Mearsheimer presumes that great powers fear each other that they can rely themselves for their security, and the best possible strategy from them for ensuring their survival is to maximize their relative power. Mearsheimmer argues that security requires acquiring

59 Ibid.Colin Elman, p.18 60 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: WWW Norton, 2001), pp.35-37.

34 as much power relative to other states as possible and further explained that increasing capabilities can improve a state’s security without triggering a countervailing response.61

The outcome of this is a tendency towards insecurity and ultimately starts arms races among the states, even if the states are not anticipated.62 For example, during World War II, Britain and Germany were busy in very costly ‘boat race’ as each had the intention to build more battleships then the other. During the war, Winston Churchill discovered the insanity in making more battleships which were required to defend Britain, yet he also accepted that Britain had no option to maintain its credibility in that arms race.63 Similarly, during 1950s and 1970s, the superpowers accumulated enough nuclear arsenals to destroy life on the globe many times, nonetheless, each side wanted to get still more warheads for attaining the security which always seemed to be beyond their grasp. In the South Asian region, despite their pathetic economic conditions, both India and Pakistan are busy in enhancing their nuclear arsenals and do not bother about the consequences of such nuclear arms race in the region. Offensive structural realism provides the understanding due to which apart from attaining minimum nuclear deterrence against one another, the three states of strategic triangle are busy in enhancing their nuclear arsenals.

1.3 Security Dilemma

The security dilemma refers to the consequences due to which states maximize their arms strength for their protection under condition of international anarchy.64 Kaufman defined the security dilemma as a situation in which both sides have a credible fear of ethnic extinction.65 Robert Jervis argues, ‘security dilemma exists when both sides may be willing to give up the chance of expansion if they can be made secure but a number of other factors, such as, the fear that the other’s relative power is dangerously increasing, technology, events outside their control and their subjective security requirements, put such a solution out of reach’.66

61 Ibid. 62 Alasdair Dlair and Steven Curtis, International Politics, p.134. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Kaufman. S. J. ’Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War’, International Security, (1996), pp.38-108 66 Robert Jervis, ‘Was the Cold war a Security Dilemma?’ Journal of Cold-war Studies, Vol.3, No.1 (2001), p.41.

For Kenneth Waltz, ‘states have to survive with their security dilemma which is not due to their intentions but by their situations. A dilemma cannot be absolutely resolved but; it can be dealt with up to some extent’.67 During the Cold War, the initiatives of peaceful coexistence of the Soviet Union during mid-1950s with an attempt to use nuclear deterrence as the “answer” to its security dilemma with the West.68 Robert Jervis favors the similar belief as ‘the central theme of international relations is not evil but tragedy’.69 The security dilemma for him is primarily explained as ‘the inability of the states to admit that the actions of a state could be seen as threatening for other states and the concomitant belief that the other’s hostility can be explained by their aggressiveness’.70

Thus, security dilemma sustains because states are unable to develop the real mechanism and are forced to adopt undesirable conditions due to anarchy. If the danger of escalating hostility is evident for ameliorating the security dilemma, little can be done as states operate anarchy.71 The situation due to which security dilemma is driven for great power struggle, no one is consciously intended to adopt a deliberate tragic.72 Jervis holds more complex views than Mearsheimer on state’s behavior and proposes that the security dilemma can be relied when status-quo oriented states become confident in defensive measure according to the nature of each other’s security potentials and their own ability to neutralize potential military threats.73

Charles Glaser introduces two variables, ‘greed and unit level knowledge of state’s motive’, and argues that the acuteness of security dilemma is determined by the state’s motivational structures and trust in each other’s intentions.74 These analytical variables emphasize complicated key security dynamic in international relations but practically, it is hardly possible to differentiate in defense and offence. In an environment when states are not willing to constitute each other’s legitimate security due to mistrust and uncertainty, the separation of offense-defense hardly

67 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International politics (New York: MC Graw-Hill, 1979), p.187 68 Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status, The Realignment of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.99 69 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: N.J. Princeton University Press, 1976), p.66 70 Ibid, p.75 71John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). pp.3-36 72 Ibid. 73 Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status, The Realignment of International Relations, p.100 74 Charles Glaser, ‘Security Dilemma Revisited’, World Politics, Vol.50, No.1 (October 1997), p.174

36 matters. The mutual confidence building measures and threat perceptions among the states provide matter of judgment.

If according to Jonathan Mercer, ‘a reputation is a judgment of someone’s character or disposition that is used to guess future behavior’.75 Then one can predict that state A draws inferences from state B’s aspirations, predicted on its reputation and would respond accordingly. Threat reputation will lead to hostile reactions and aggravate the security dilemma. According to Stephen Walt, ‘states that are viewed as aggressive are likely provide others to balance against them’.76

In determining the sources of threat perceptions and material factors as specified by Waltz, states will have to base their prior experience under the condition of international uncertainties and mutual a priori assumptions about their future. It also depends upon the interaction among the states involved.

During the post-Cold War era, the strategic architecture of Southern Asia is complicated due to patron client linkage to extra regional power. The sine qua non in any patron-client relationship is that the patron be viewed as superior to the client and in this case, it can be measured by relative technological advancement and economic strategic power. This qualifies the patron as a source for weapons sales, technology transfer and possibly military support.77 In a regional triangle (India-Pakistan and China), India intends to confront China and Pakistan which it has, for many decades, deemed to be its main national security threat. But, it quite an unequal one as India is bigger and stronger than Pakistan. Similarly, China is bigger and stronger than India which creates asymmetry due to a race of military modernization between them.78 This asymmetry is the main factor of security dilemma among the three states and the present research seeks to analyze the aspects which intensify the state of security dilemma among them.

75 Jonathan Mercer, Reputation in International Relations (Cornel: Cornel University Press, 2010). P.6 76 Stephen Walt, The Origin of Alliances, (New York: Cornel University Press, 1986), p.25 77 Lowel Dittmer (ed) South Asia’s National Security Dilemma; India, Pakistan and China, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), p.204 78 Ibid. Michal Krepon (Co-founder of Stimson Center) also expressed similar views during a Lecture on ‘Strategic Stability and Escalation Control’ in ‘The Monterey Institute of International Studies, The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ in Monterey on November 19, 2013. The Lecture is also available on www.youtube.com/watch?=u7YLIAHVSA

1.3.1 Stability-Instability Paradox

Stability is defined in various ways as constancy of character or purpose, resistance to sudden change, tenacity, dislodgment or overthrow, dependability or reliability.79 The stability has been academically argued within the frame of multiple disciplines, i.e. biology, physics, sociology, economics and political science.80 The interstate strategic relations might be stable when each state has sufficient information about the policies and strategies of the other state for avoiding the abrupt change in the existing status.81 Stability may be referred to the nature of state’s system i.e. in a condition due to which a state possesses equilibrium or the ability to acquire equilibrium. There is a difference between equilibrium and stability as M. A. Kaplan argues, ‘stability in a system is prerequisite while becomes irrelevant for the existence of a stable equilibrium. Similarly, a stable equilibrium is not essential for establishing the stability’.82 Stable equilibrium varies within certain limits as political equilibrium may be vibrant due to the alignments relating to its internal changes for retaining the stability.83

Likewise, Bernard Loo interlinks geography with strategic stability in creating more nuanced concept of strategic stability.84 According to Bernard Loo:85 Strategic stability is understood here as a condition where policy-makers do not feel free pressured into making reactive changes from existing non-violent to violent strategies involving the large-scale use of military force in the pursuit of particular state interests. The concept of strategic stability does not rule out the use of military force. What it does rule out is accidental or inadvertent war, as well as the knee-jerk reactions of policy-makers who feel that they are being pushed or pulled, almost against their will, towards decisions about the use of military force without prior consideration of other non-violent policy options.

79 Tughral Yameen, ‘A Study on Weapon of Mass Destruction and Their Impact on Strategic Stability in South Asia’ (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies PhD, 2011), p.56. 80 Hans. J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, pp. 167-168. 81 Robert L. Pflatzgraff jr, ‘China-US Strategic Stability, The Nuclear Order-Build or Break’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C, April 6-7 2009, p.1, downloaded from www.ifpa.org/pdf/Pflatzgraff-China- US.Strategic.Stability-Carneigie.Seminar-6April2009 on June 19, 2015. 82 M.A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (Boston: Brown and Little, 1957), pp.6-7 83 Riffat Hussain, ‘Analyzing strategic stability in South Asia with pathways and prescriptions for avoiding nuclear war’, Contemporary South Asia, Vol.14, No.2 (June 2005), p.142 84 Bernard Loo, ‘Geography and Strategic Stability’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.26, No.1 (2003), p.157 85 Ibid. p.156

The concept of stability is however, more complex despite seeking sufficient information of the adversary and for maintaining state of balance as Patrik A. Mc Carthy stated, ‘it is critical to analyze a changing system insecure or stable system towards uncertainty’.86 On the contrary, Jaswant Singh correlates stability with a state of balance as, ‘stability assumes a state of balance between the two adversaries even though there may not be a parity between them’.87 All the states especially the nuclear capable states strive to ensure strategic stability against their alleged rivals by sustaining a balance in their employment strategies and weaponry.88 The stability- instability paradox provides reasonable ground of stability and the conventional balance within nuclear dyad. One of the soundest versions of stability-instability paradox as it applied during Cold War as:89 The essence of this paradox was that nuclear weapons were supposed to stabilize relations between adversaries, and to foreclose a major war between them. At the same time, offsetting nuclear capabilities might well prompt provocations, instability, and even conflict at lower levels, precisely because nuclear weapons would presumably provide protection against escalation.

The idea of Stability-Instability was evolved during Cold War when the Super Powers were busy in proxy wars against each other without compromising the stability at the strategic level. Michael Krepon suggests that stability-instability paradox is rooted in the enormity of the stakes involved in crossing the nuclear threshold.90 It is argued that the stability-instability paradox will hold for the near future because ‘neither side has the requisite capability to pursue a decapitating first strike against the other.91

86 P.A Mc Carthy, Hierarchy and Flexibility in World Politics: Adaptation to Shifting Power Distribution in the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund (Aldershot: Ashygate, 1996), p.11 87 Jaswant Singh was cited by Feroz Hasan Khan, ‘Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia’, Nonproliferation Review, Vol.10, No.1 (Spring 2003), p.62 88 Adil Sultan, ‘South Asian Stability-Instability Paradox: Another Perspective’, IPRI Journal, Vol. XIV, No.1 (Winter 2014), p.24. 89 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.452 90 Michael Krepon, The Stability-Instability Paradox: Misperception and Escalation Control in South Asia, (Washington D.C: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), p.2. Also quoted Varun Sahni, The Stability Instability Paradox, A Less Than Perfect Explanation, in E. Sridhran (ed) The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship (New Delhi: Routledge, 2007), pp.186-187. 91 Summit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p.108. Also Quoted Zafar Iqbal Cheema, in Indian Nuclear Deterrence, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.456

Snyder describes the reason behind the stability-instability paradox as:92

If neither side has a ‘full first-strike capability’ and both know it, they will be less inhibited about initiating conventional war, and about the limited use of nuclear weapons, than if the strategic nuclear balance were unstable. Thus firm stability in the strategic nuclear balance tends to destabilize the conventional balance.

The focal points of security-insecurity paradox are to counterbalance the capabilities of nuclear weapons and maintain peace during conflict and minimize the tension at the lower end. Such particular formulation appeared in the wake of the Cuban missile crises of 1962.93 There are certain preconditions for maintaining stable deterrence and strategic requirements of nuclear strategy.94 Basrur indicates three main schools of thoughts in the US; two of them, the punitive retaliation and denial believe that assured destruction capability is a prerequisite for crisis stability and the third, the damage limitation, stresses on nuclear superiority.95 On the other side, Snyder points out another dimension of stability-instability paradox as:96

A potential aggressor is ‘balanced’ at each level of violence if his objectives can be denied to him at that level, if his costs of fighting at that level would be higher than his expectation of gain, or if by attacking at that level, he would exceed a certain critical threshold of risk that the defender would ‘up the ante’ to a higher level at which either the aggressor’s aims would be frustrated or he would suffer unacceptable costs.

Snyder points out another dimension in traditional balance of power. The lack of tendency towards an arms race, the tendencies either to stimulate or annihilate war, and the tendency of the process to preserve the independence of major actors, traditional balance of power is focused on the third tendency because the major factor in the system would continue to exist. Indeed, armament and warfare often are treated not only as the type of instability but as method of preserving stability

92 Glen H. Snyder, The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror in Paul Seabury (ed), The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), p.199.Quoted E. Sridhran, p. 187 93 Varun Sahni, The Stability Instability Paradox, A Less Than Perfect Explanation in E. Sridhran (ed) The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship (New Delhi: Routledge, 2007), p.187 94 Desmond Ball, Hans Bethe, Bruce Blair and others compiled shorter list of key measures: do not use deadly force against an adversary, do not use military forces to undermine an adversary in geographic areas he deems vital; do not use force against an adversary’s ally; do not use force to dramatically alter the status quo in a sensitive region; and do not initiate horizontal escalation, in Crisis Stability and Nuclear War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1987), p.62 95 Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security, (California: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 26-31. Quoted Zafar Iqbal Cheema, p.452 96 Glen H. Snyder, Deterrence and defense: Towards a Theory of National Security, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p.48

40 according to the third tendency.97 Stability itself can be defined as, ‘the degree of economic, technological, or politico military “shock” which system can sustain without creating one side or the other a capability and willingness to strike first.98

Additionally, the entire system is in an overall balance under one or two conditions:99

1. When both conventional and nuclear balance are in equilibrium separately. 2. When both the balances are out of balance but one side predominates in one component and the other side in the other.

A clear strategy prescription emerges from the stability-instability paradox, which is essential for status quo powers to prepare their forces for containing low-intensity conflicts and insurgencies. The stability-instability suggests that the stability encouraged by nuclear weapons through mutual deterrence at the strategic level open up the possibility of more frequent resort to force, and hence, increased instability at lower levels of violence. Thus, in the South Asian region, both India and Pakistan are continuously striving towards the counter containment strategies against each other for avoiding conflicts at lower level and the present research seeks to analyze mutual deterrence between them after the nuclear tests of May 1998.

1.3.2 Theory of Deterrence

Deterrence means any strategy, force position or policy which intended to persuade a potential enemy not to attack. It is assumed that a weak country can deter attack by a strong one as long as it can impose a damage outweighing in proportion to the expected gains of the aggressor. Deterrence is a function of credibility, capability and will.100 Deterrence is defined as: ‘to discourage or turn aside or restrain by fear; to frighten from anything, to restrain or keep back from acting or proceeding by any consideration of danger or trouble’.101 The logic of deterrence derives from realist paradigm and it lies within the sub-paradigms of realism in a world of anarchy, conflict and warfare, power and balance of power.

97 Varun Sahni, The Stability Instability Paradox, A Less Than Perfect Explanation in E. Sridhran (ed) The India- Pakistan Nuclear Relationship, (New Delhi: Routledge, 2007), p.189 98 Ibid. p.190 99 Ibid. pp.189-190 100 David Robertson, Dictionary of Modern Defense and strategy, (London: Rutledge, 2000), p.39 101 Lawrence Freedman quoted Oxford English Dictionary in ‘Deterrence’, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) p.27

The basic assumption of deterrence theory is that: state (A), fears an attack from state (B) seeks to change B’s plans by threatening of retaliation which abrogates B’s potential gains.102 There are pre conditions for its function: indeed, B has to be aware of the A’s intention and capability to retaliate. If B is not aware A’s threat or its intentions to retaliate, deterrence has failed.

The concept of nuclear deterrence is based upon neorealist assumption for assuring the survival and stability for the states. Kenneth Waltz describes following three preconditions which are essential for nuclear deterrence to be in effect:103

1. States must pose the ability to inflict the unacceptable damage to the aggressor and has the capability of “second-strike”, so that, its nuclear forces must have the potential to strike back if attacked. If a state has not the ability to survive a nuclear attack and has not the potential to retaliate, then the state has no deterrence and the state is unable to prevent itself from the punitive retaliation of its rival states. 2. Waltz states that, ‘survival of forces must require early firing in response to what may be false alarm’. It means, the states must pose the mechanism to avoid any conflict due to the wrong signaling which might lead to unintended nuclear war. 3. There should be a reliable command and control system for preventing the nuclear arsenals from the accidents and unauthorized use. Efficient command and control provide safeguards against risks of theft and misuse of nuclear weapons.

During World War II, the USA was relying upon its nuclear weapons and assumed as a mere extension of its nuclear capabilities. After becoming former USSR, the nuclear, the USA was no longer relied upon the nuclear weapons and reconsidered the purpose of its nuclear weapons.104 Initially, both USA and Former USSR had the potential to strike civilian targets with nuclear weapons and had the awareness of the horrible consequences and assumed the nuclear weapons sufficient for maintaining peace.105

102 Brown. A and Arnold.L International Relations, Vol.24, Issue 3, (2010), p.298 103 Kenneth Waltz, More May be Better, (New York: Notron and Company, 2003), pp. 19-20 104 Brown. A and Arnold.L, International Relations, p.298 105 Ibid.

This perception was criticized by Thomas Schelling who provoked the significance of second- strike capability:106

There is a difference between a balance of terror in which either side has the capability to obliterate the other, and one in which both sides have the capability no matter who strikes first. It is not the ‘balance’, the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation- that constitutes ‘mutual deterrence’ it is the stability of balance.

The debate between optimists and pessimists concerning the proliferation of nuclear weapons, depends upon the different perceptions and consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons. Kennth Waltz argues that the possession of nuclear weapons by two powers can reduce the likelihood of war.107 The presence of nuclear weapons raises the cost of war extremely high due to which states are conscious about starting any war that might lead to the nuclear war.108

While discussing the impacts of nuclear weapons as a mean of defensive deterrence, Waltz proposes the following points:109

I. If war is inevitable, the dangers of no-victory in a nuclear scenario resist its incidence. II. The states become more conscious in the presence of nuclear weapons. III. Deterrent strategy does not believe in conventional strategy which relies upon extent of territory, for avoiding a major cause of war. IV. Effective deterrence is based upon one’s capabilities and the will to utilize them.

These arguments support prevailing deterrent stability among new nuclear states. So, Waltz is generally labeled as a modern deterrence optimist.110 In contrast, Scott Sagan presents a pessimistic

106 Thomas Schelling, Surprise Attack and Disarmament, RAND P-1574 (1958), quoted in Robert Ayson, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age, (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 60, 36. Brown. A and Arnold.L, p.298. 107 Kennth Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, (New York and London: W W Norton and Company, 1995). p.48 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid, pp.5-6. 110 Kennth Waltz takes an optimistic view of deterrence stability among new nuclear nations, their weapons capabilities and C2 problems, and opines that overtime, they would be able to resolve these problems, as did the existing nuclear weapons states.(Waltz, pp.20-24) while discussing the difference between actions and reactions of new nuclear states as compared to the old nuclear states, he highlights the following points:(i) new nuclear states may emerge in hostile pairs and shares common borders; (ii) some new nuclear states may not have well rooted societies and governments; (iii) new nuclear states which are radical at home, may not be necessarily radical abroad; (iv) he underplays the fears of regional bipolarity due to the emergence of neighboring nuclear states; (v)he also declines to accept the worries regarding falling of nuclear weapons into the hands of trigger happy military officers of new nuclear states (pp.10-12). Waltz further maintains that lesser [nuclear] states would not be able to disrupt

43 view and argues that the presence of nuclear weapons become dangerous between the states.111 Sagan explains that most of the new states have not the capability to fulfill the operational requirements for stable nuclear deterrence.112 Sagan points out three major assumptions for stable nuclear deterrence:113

1. When one state has acquired the nuclear capability and other has not yet developed it, there should be the absence of preventive war until the other will become the nuclear. 2. Both the states must have the potential to inflict unacceptable damage to each other and have the reliable second strike capability. 3. Their nuclear arsenals must be preserved from accidental or unauthorized use.

Waltz-Sagan debate is comprehensive: the practical evidences do not support the legitimacy of their arguments because only few states have acquired nuclear capabilities and even fewer have the operational doctrines for utilizing them and there is a single evidence for utilizing the nuclear weapon is observed during war. The Waltz-Sagan debate does not mention the role of the leaders and organizations for managing the nuclear forces of new nuclear states.

During the Cold War, enormous efforts were made for assuring the survivability of the nuclear arsenals in first strike and be ready for a second strike according to Sagan’s assumptions for nuclear weapons but his assumption of ‘unacceptable damage’ creates ambiguity and Mac George Bundy114 rejected this idea and stated as:115

Think-tank analysts can set levels of ‘acceptable’ damage well up in the tens of millions of lives. They can assume that the loss of dozens of great cities is somehow a real choice for sane man. They are in an unreal world. In the real world of real political leaders […] a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one’s country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable.

the nuclear equilibrium, as nuclear weapons make miscalculation difficult, they can be used both for defense and deterrence, and if employed responsibility, nuclear weapons make wars hard to start (p.30). 111 Scott D. Sagan in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), downloaded from www.people.fas.harvard.edu.pdf on June 2013. Also quoted Riffat Hussain, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia’, South Asian Strategic Stability Unit, (December 2005), p.3 112 Scott Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation,’ International Security, Vol.18, No.4 (1994), p.71 113 Ibid. 114 Mac George Bundy was National Security adviser during President J.F. Kennedy and President L.B.Johnson. 115 Mc George Bundy, ‘To Cap the Volcano', Foreign Affairs, Vol.48, No.1 (1969), pp.1-20.

Following this, he therefore advocated “minimum deterrence” whereby states attain enough nuclear weapons to strike few cities which will be sufficient for deterring. Since the Cold War, nuclear weapons states have shifted towards minimum deterrence.116

For sustaining minimum nuclear deterrence, India, Pakistan and China adopted Waltz’s preconditions about nuclear deterrence,117 and the present research evaluates the credibility of their Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). While, China’s existing military modernization due to its economic rise has implications on South Asian security architecture and the present research seeks to elaborate it in the context of maintaining strategic stability in the South Asian region and assesses the relevance of CMD and the policies of these states in the present century.

1.4 Strategic Culture

In the post-Cold War era, culture has become prominent while elaborating international relations because it has significant impacts on the grand strategy of a state’s behavior. Johnston explicates culture as the shared notions and judgments that implement on both individual and groups in maintaining their social and political relationships within organizational environment.118 There are assorted conceptions related to culture in the security concerns while arguing about strategic culture. Strategic culture is a new concept which was introduced in late 1970s during Cold War, when the analysts tried to explore the main proponents due to which the superpowers had different approaches in formulating the policy about their nuclear weapons.119 In 1977, Snyder developed the theory of strategic culture for explaining the Soviet military strategy which was elaborated as ‘the sum of ideas, patterns of habitual behavior and the conditioned emotional responses that members of a national strategic community have assimilated through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy’.120 The logic of strategic culture revolves

116 Mac Leon.I and Mc Millan.A, Concise Dictionary of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.148 117 See Reference No.26 of Chapter 5. 118 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, Vol.19, No.4 (Spring 1995), p.45. 119 Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War, (London: Routledge, 2006), pp.5. Zafar Iqbal Cheema in ‘An Interpretive Analysis of India-Pakistan Strategic Culture and Its Impact on South Asian Peace and Security’, Regional Studies, Vol.xxxvi, No.3 (Summer 2008), pp.4-5 120 Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, September 1977), pp.8, downloaded from www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/2005/R2154.pdf on March 15, 2016. Snyder was also quoted by Jaffery S. Lantis in ‘Strategic Culture and National Security Policy’ International Studies Review, Vol.4, No.3 (Autumn 2002), p.93

45 around the argument that the values and ideas are the main aspects in formulating the security policies of the states about the use of force. As Johnston argues:121

Different states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the states and its elites.

According to Carnes Lord, ‘strategy in culture is based upon the habits and traditional practices of a military force which are employed by a society for obtaining its political goals'.122 Furthermore, Lord correlated military strategies with political culture and expressed that, generally, the military behavior of a state is the reflection of a high degree of its political culture.123 On the contrary, David R. Jones did not intend to restrict the strategic culture with military behavior and attributed three levels in determining the strategic culture of a state:124

1. At the micro-environmental level: that is based upon the geography, history and the ethno- cultural appearances. 2. At the societal level: that is based upon economic, social and political aspects of a society. 3. At the micro level: that is based upon the features of civil military relations and the military establishments.

Multiple factors have significant impact during elaborating the strategic culture of a particular region or a state as Dorryl Howlett explores three distinct areas of strategic culture i.e. nature of threats, cultural norms and their negotiating techniques for inducing peace.125 Likewise, Carnes Lord identified six dynamics that frame the strategic culture, military history, political culture,

121 Alastiar Lain Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’ International Security, Vol.19, No.4 (Spring 1995), pp.33-64. 122 Carnes Lord, ‘American Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy, Vol.5, No.3 (1985), p.271. 123 Ibid, pp.270-272. Political culture is a ‘shorthand appearance for a mindset’ which has the outcome for minimizing attention to reduce the full range of alternative problems, behaviors and solutions which are rationally achievable, defined Elkin and Simon, ‘A Cause in Search of its Effects’, Comparative Politics, Vol.11, No. 2 (January 1979), p.128. 124 David R. Jones, Soviet Strategic Culture’ in Carl Jacobson (ed) Strategic Power: USA/USSR, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 35. 125 All of these areas have a series of multiple dynamics connected with it but these are incorporated in determining the strategic cultural dimension. For example, during analyzing the nature of threats, strategic culture can promote traditional strategies by elaborating the circumstances which might not assist changes in the security environment. A strategic cultural analysis can support changes by adopting multiple plans and develop a series of intervening strategies for containing the emerging threats. Though, it will not be a hard and fast submission, but, it can be pronounced in developing long-term strategic cultural identities of any particular state by obtaining considerable knowledge, explained Dorryl Howlett, ‘The Future of Strategic Culture’, published by Defense Threat Reduction Agency USA on 31 October 2006, pp.3-4.

46 geographical proximity, military technology and the nature of civil-military relations.126 According to Peter R. Lavoy, ‘strategic culture has something to do with the ‘shared beliefs and assumptions’ of a nation’.127 Such beliefs and assumptions facilitate the elite during decision making. The impact of strategic culture on strategic behavior will be meaningless and contracted if analysts will not scrutinize the cultural behavior during decision making.128 By employing such conceptions of strategic culture, the analysts sought to describe the framework for obtaining certain policy options which are pursued by states. Despite elaborating aforementioned definitions, the concept of strategic culture is still debatable as no definition extensively illustrates the features of strategic culture.129 After evaluating Soviet deterrence policy, Snyder resulted that the US analysts failed to foresee Soviet response because they unnoticed the main factors due to which a state has its own way to interpret, analyze and respond on strategic concerns.130 So, a new debate appeared which addressed to a new tool for assessing strategic culture. Ian Johnston elucidated three generations of strategic culture.131 Colin Gray was considered in first generation, defined strategic culture as, ‘the socially constructed and transmitted assumptions, traditions, preferred methods of operations, habits of mind and that are relatively specific to a geographical based security community’.132 This definition was the upshot of his analysis about USA and USSR that both the states possessed different strategic cultures and the Americans were unable in planning to fight and win a nuclear war strategically.133 According to second generation, the strategic culture was used as a tool for political supremacy during strategic decision making as Bradley S. Klein stated, ‘state can legitimize the use of violence

126 Carnes Lord, ‘American Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy, Vol.5, No.3 (1985), pp.272-274. 127 Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture’, published by Defense Threat Reduction Agency USA on 31 October 2006, p.7. 128 Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War, (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp.33-34. 129 Lawrence Sondhaus, p.6. 130 Jack L. Snyder, p.40. 131 The first generation emerged in early 1980s, and explained various behavioral aspects of Soviet Union and USA relating to nuclear issues. The second generation appeared in mid 1980s and elaborated the duplicity of the political leadership. The third generation occurred during 1990s and focused more on historical military? Experiences as compared to political and social history. Alastair Ian Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture International Security’, Vol. 19, No.4 (Spring 1995), pp.36-43 132 Collin S. Gray, ‘Nuclear Strategy’, in Carl G. Jacobson (ed) Strategic Power: USA/USSR, (London: St. Martin Press, 1990), pp.35-49 133 Ibid.

47 against punitive adversaries by adopting all available sources’.134 By employing multiple ways for the use of violence, it would be hardly predictable whether the violence would be in self-regard of the decision makers rather than strategic culture which would restrict the strategic choices. Johnston placed himself in third generation, defined strategic culture as:135 It is a system of symbols incorporated in two parts: first contains the basic norms related to the strategic environment, i.e. nature of opponent and the threat it poses (zero-sum or variable sum). The second part comprises the ability to use the force (the potential to control the outcomes, to eradicate threats and the circumstances due to which the use of force is unavoidable).

The comparison of three generation’s verdicts indicates that the concept of strategic culture is still exists though at a formatting phase, while Johnston’s definition is relatively more appealing out of the three. The existing debate confirms some common characteristics of strategic culture i.e. geography, norms, political mind sets, nature of threats and the ability to inflict the adversary. Strategic culture plays momentous role in determining state’s response during crisis. However, it is hardly probable to estimate the reaction of a state because the rational for one state could be irrational for another.136 Strategic culture assists in assessing aggressor’s response in nuclear environment. According to Colin S. Gray:137 One must have in-depth understanding about the strategic culture of the adversary because inadequate awareness may disturb global peace and security.

By analyzing the strategic cultures of India, Pakistan and China, it would be feasible for the present research to analyze the proponents due to which security dilemmas persists between them and to envisage their strategic response in addressing their main issues for stabilizing regional strategic stability.

Conclusion

This chapter is based upon the introduction of the supporting theories which are applied throughout the study. Theory of strategic triangle gives historical background of the strategic triangle and

134 Bradley S. Klein, ‘Hegemony and Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defense Politics’, Review of International; Studies, Vol.14, No.2 (April 1988), p.136 135 Alastair Ian Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’ International Security, Vol. 19, No.4 (Spring 1995), pp.41-43 136 Ibid. pp.63-64 137 Colin S. Gray, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture’ p.14, downloaded from www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/startcult-out.pdf on March 26, 2015.

48 provides ground in understanding the South Asian security dilemma of the strategic triangle: India- Pakistan and China by evaluating multiple dynamics of triangular relationship between USA, Soviet Union and China during 1960s and 1970s.

Realism and key approaches in international relations provide important conceptual tool to help us in understanding the motives due to which states are intended for maximizing their power potentials. All the relevant approaches of realism (classical, neo classical, defensive, offensive structural realism and theory of balance of power) argue that all the states have the intentions in maximizing their power and they might adopt various strategies for assuring their survival and sovereignty in an anarchic world.

Theory of security dilemma provides exponents in determining the complexities of trilateral relationship and concludes that asymmetry is the prime factor of security dilemma between India, Pakistan and China. The debate between optimists and pessimists about the spread of nuclear weapons also contributes in understanding the security dilemma between India, Pakistan and China. The supporting approaches of security dilemma (stability-instability paradox, and theory of deterrence) elucidate various strategies of the three states for containing security dilemma.

Strategic culture has a significant impact in describing the strategic response of a state during crisis. The three states of strategic triangle (India-Pakistan and China) possess diversity in their strategic cultures due to their diverse cultural backgrounds. After assessing their strategic cultures, the present research seeks to predict their strategic responses during crisis in future. With the support of stated theoretical framework, the present research becomes capable in addressing all the research questions which will lead to adequate response.

Chapter 2 Trilateral Strategic Relationship: India-Pakistan and China (1947-74)

Introduction

In the strategic triangle (India-Pakistan and China), the three states are declared nuclear powers. They have involved in limited conflicts and conventional wars such as China-India and India- Pakistan in past. This triangle provides uniqueness due to the different strategic cultures, political systems, varying approaches in formulating foreign policy preferences, power struggle, competition, territorial issues, and military strategies of the three states. The complexity of this trilateral standoff cannot be underestimated and thereby, gives importance to this study.

The question about risk of war and the issues of strategic stability among the three states are complicated by the fact that these states share borders, have a history of hostile political rhetoric and have not just hotly debated limited war but at some point in their recent history, two of them (India and Pakistan) were also involved in a limited conflict.1 All the three states of triangle have different strategic perceptions for containing one another. This provides room for this study in order to address the complexities of their mutual relations by the deep understanding of their conflicts. This is an unprecedented situation in history where a triangular nuclear competition has been constructed.

This chapter seeks to analyze the impact of the strategic cultures of India, Pakistan and China in establishing their mutual relations. This chapter comprises on two sections; first deals with the strategic cultures of the three states and section two focuses on the impact of strategic cultures on their decision making.

Within the context of aforementioned discussion, this chapter contributes the answers of succeeding questions.

 What is the role of the strategic culture in construction of Sino-Indian and India-Pakistan relations?  What is the impact of China on Indo-Pak deep rooted security concerns?

1 India and Pakistan were involved in a limited conflict in 1999 which is elaborated in Chapter 4.

 What were the main exponents which compelled India, Pakistan and China to acquire nuclear weapons?  What were the major issues emerged between Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak relations during 1947-1974?

Part I

Strategic Cultures of India, Pakistan and China

The concept of strategic culture has occupied an important status during the study of strategic studies.2 Beside the persisting debate, security is a main objective in shaping the strategic culture. Strategic culture is an outcome of a range of conditions. History, geography and narratives that formulate collective identity which enables the decision makers to pronounce about security, are all elements of strategic culture.3 States frequently plan various strategies especially the military strategies for assuring their security as Rosen elaborated strategic culture about military preparations as, ‘beliefs and norms that frame … preferences about international military behavior, especially those relating to the decisions to go to war, inclinations for offensive, interventionist or defensive modes of conflict, and levels to decide the acceptable level of wartime casualties’.4 Likewise, Klein stated two definitions of strategic culture in the context of military provisions as, ‘the behaviors to thought and action’ and ‘the set of approaches and principles held within a military formation about the political objective of war and the most effective plan and operative way of achieving it’.5

Likewise, Johnson, Kratchner and Larson proclaim ‘security objectives’ the main notion during defining strategic culture as:6

A set of assumptions, shared beliefs and modes of behavior derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both written and oral) that shape relationships of other

2 For the concept of strategic culture, see Reference Nos 118--137 of Chapter 1. 3 Dorryl Howlett, ‘The Future of Strategic Culture’, published by Defense Threat Reduction Agency USA on 31 October 2006, p.3, downloaded from www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/pakistan.pdf on 18 December 2015. 4 Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996), p.12. 5 Yitzhak Klein. ‘A Theory of Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 10, No.1 (1991), pp. 3-23. 6 Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffry A. Larson (eds) Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p.9.

groups and collective identity which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.

Thus, the study of strategic culture of any particular state or region provides understanding about the strategies for assuring its security and survival. A strategic cultural analysis can support changes by adopting multiple plans and develop a series of intervening strategies for obtaining security objectives. Though, it will not be a hard and fast submission, but, it can be pronounced in developing long-term strategic cultural identities of any particular state by obtaining considerable knowledge.7 Therefore, by evaluating the strategic cultures of India, Pakistan and China, the present research examines the trilateral strategic relations. It anticipates the main proponents of their mutual rivalries which are the main characteristics in generating security dilemmas between them. The subsequent section deals with the strategic cultures of these states along with the impact on their policies distinctively.

2.1 India’s Strategic Culture

India’s strategic culture was formed and influenced by its history. Among the ancient rulers, while Samudragupta used military force, Ashoka had a change of heart after using the brute military force in the battle of Kaling in 269 B.C and adopted ‘dharma’ (peaceful methods) to win over enemies.8 According to Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘the book of Hindu political philosopher Kutilya, ‘Arthshastra’ is the major source for the Indian strategic thinkers in shaping India’s behavior even in the present era’.9 Arvind Gupta admired Kutilya and delegated the same status as Sun Tzu in China’s strategic thinking.10

Kutilya’s theory of security is known as ‘mandala’. ‘Mandala’ is based upon the postulation derived from a circle of states. The ‘mandala’ comprises on immediate neighbors is considered as enemies, while, the ‘mandala’ next to immediate neighbors is likely to be friend.11 For assuring

7 Dorryl Howlett, ‘The Future of Strategic Culture’, pp.3-4 8 L.N. Rangarajan (tr), Arthshastra by Kutilya (New Delhi: Penjuine, 1987), p.548. Also quoted Arpit Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p.198 9 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘An Interpretive Analysis of India-Pakistan Strategic Culture and its Impacts on South Asian Peace and Security, p.13. 10 Arvind Gupta (Former Deputy NSA &DG IDSA) argued during a seminar on ‘Exploring the Roots of India’s Strategic Culture’ in Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, New Delhi on October 5, 2017, also available on www.youtube.com/watch?v=uFjnwODOrA 11Kutilya’s ‘Mandla’ was elaborated by George Tanham, ‘Indian Strategic Thought’ in Kanti Bajpai and Amitbh Matto (eds) Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), p.47. Amrita Narlikar, ‘Peculiar

52 the security of the state, Kutilya elaborated six policy measures for endorsing mandala as, Harmony, Warfare, Impartiality, March, Pursuing for cooperation and Dual strategy.12 Kutilya described these policy measures as follows:13

1) Harmony: Whoever is lower to another will seek harmony. 2) Warfare: Whoever is greater in power will seek warfare. 3) Impartiality: Whoever presumes, I have the ability to disrupt my adversary will seek impartiality. 4) March: Whoever aspires to retain essential needs will march against the adversary. 5) Pursuing for Cooperation: Whoever is unable to defend himself will pursue for cooperation. 6) Dual strategy: Whoever estimates that assistance is inevitable to work out an end, will seek peace with one while wage war with other.

Likewise, for analyzing India’s strategic response in formulating its foreign policy, Kutilya described ‘dharma’ (peaceful methods) to assure the security of the state to win over enemies and outlined various forms of diplomacy historically. The most comprehensive are;14

 Samadhi or entering into an agreement with specific conditions, that is, concluding a treaty.  Vigratha or three kinds of war; open war, a battle in the normal sense, secret war, attacking the enemy in a variety of ways, and undeclared war.  Asana or staying quiet.  Yana or preparing for war.  Samsraya or seeking the protection, when threatened, of a stronger king or taking refuge in a fort.  Dvaidhibhava or the policy of making peace with neighboring king in order to pursue, with his help, the policy of the hostility towards another.

Kutilya’s philosophy does not only ascribe India’s medieval politico-military behavior but became model during establishing relations with the local states, while having devastating consequences.15 Ashok Kapoor revealed that even Nehru followed Kutilya’s mandala soon after partition in 1947.16 India established friendly relations with Afghanistan, former Soviet Union and Vietnam, but was hostile towards China and Pakistan, which indicates that Nehru recognized the efficacy of

Chauvinism: Explaining the Negotiating Strategy of a Rising India’ International Affairs, Vol. 82, No.1 (January 2006), pp.77-94. 12 The description of Mandala is taken from Usha Mehta and Usha Thakkar, Kutilya and His Arthshastra (New Delhi: S. Chand and Company LTD, 1980), p.1. 13 Ibid. 14 L.N. Rangarajan (tr), Arthshastra by Kautilya, p.548 15 Joe Larus, Culture and Political-Military Behavior: The Hindus in Pre-Modern India (Calcutta: Minerva Press, 1979), pp.101-102. 16 Ashok Kapoor, India’s Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Prager Publishers, 1976), p.77.

Kutilya’s mandala.17 Indian strategists believe that Kutilya’s teachings are based upon realism and are advantageous to India’s idealism in global politics.18 Amrita Narlikar indicates that under the existing India’s economic strength and in a diverse strategic environment after the end of Cold War, its diplomatic dealings in various international forums on numerous global issues has incredible resemblance that were articulated by Kutilyan teachings.19

Additionally, the glorification of militant culture is also a considerable element of India’s strategic culture. The Rajputs, Jats, Marhatas, Dogras, the Sikh Khalsas, Gurkhas and various tribes are popular in history precisely because they took up arms for the cause of the state.20 These castes have their names in history for adopting militant cultures. Rajputs refused to support Akbar (Mughal Emperor) and took arms against him, Jats started revolt against Mughal rulers and refused to pay high taxes. Dogras faced the similar problem in Kashmir. Gurkhas took up arms when they were forced for mobilization and Khalsas adopted martial posture in response to nine Sikh gurus who preached for peace. Two of them had to bear heavy losses.21 These castes had become a matter of pride for adopting the postures as martial races. Even Britishers acknowledged them and established the regiments of British Indian army with Jat regiment, Marhata regiment, Rajputana regiment and Gorkha rifles.22

Moreover, the cumulative Nehruvian and Gandhian ‘Greater India’ philosophy is also based upon Kutilya’s philosophy of Mahabharata.23 The ‘Greater India’ vision can be construed within the prism of classical realism, which elucidated that India ‘would play a greater role in world affairs corresponding to its size and power potential’.24 India’s size, population and strategic location have

17 Rashid uz Zaman, ‘Kutilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy, Vol.25, No.3 (July 2006), p.241. 18 Ashok Kapoor, p.77. 19 Amrita Narlikar, ‘Peculiar Chauvinism: Explaining the Negotiating Strategy of a rising India’ International Affairs, Vol. 82, No.1 (January 2006), pp.77-94. 20 Arpit Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: China, India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p.201 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. p.202 23 L.N. Rangarajan (tr), Arthshastra by Kutilya (New Delhi: Penjuine, 1987). Kutilya’s Arthshastra and War, Essays, UK. (November 2013), downloaded from www.ukessays.com/dieeertation/esemples/miliyary-arthshastara-and- war.pdf on March 24, 2016. 24 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (London: Meridian Books, 1945), pp.35-40. Also quoted Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.498

54 inspired India’s elite for obtaining its preeminence at both regional and global level.25 After the disintegration of the Subcontinent in 1947, India assumes Pakistan the main obstacle on its desire of becoming regional superpower and in obtaining prestigious status in international community.26 Similarly, China is also intended not only to exercise regional dominance but to become a superpower in near future.27 Comparable aspirations of both India and China have forced India to believe that China is the main impediment on its way to becoming Asia’s sole superpower.28 Thus India’s threat perceptions are China and Pakistan specific and its military preparations in the context of its strategic culture are mainly to contain both China and Pakistan.29 India’s military modernization against China and Pakistan has generated serious security repercussions for the South Asian region which are examined in the following research.

2.2 Pakistan’s Strategic Culture

Pakistan’s threat perceptions are Indo-centric since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has the apprehensions about its survival due to India. Its strategic architecture is mainly conditioned due to its discernment of insecurity from India.30 India is portrayed as a hostile nation in Pakistan due to which Pakistan assumes India as prime threat to its security. Over the past 69 years, the political elite in Pakistan believes that Indians are unhappy with an independent state for the Muslims and they are intended to avail the chance to destroy or invade it.31 Three major developments instigated grave security repercussions for Pakistan that were contributed by India.32

25 J.Mohan Malik, ‘South Asia in China’s Foreign Relations’ Pacific Review, Vol.13, No.1 (February 2001), p.74 26 Zafar Iqbal Cheema ‘An Interpretive Analysis of India-Pakistan Strategic Culture and its Impacts on South Asian Peace and Security,’p. 18 27 See Reference 4 of Introduction. 28 J.Mohan Malik, p.74. Both India and Pakistan are traditional rivals since their inception. 29 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2010). 30 Zafar Iqbal Cheema ‘An Interpretive Analysis of India-Pakistan Strategic Culture and its Impacts on South Asian Peace and Security,’ p.15 31 Ibid, p.16 32 The British Government announced partition plan of India on June 3, 1947 and according to this plan, it was decided about the future of more than 580 princely states that they were free either to join any state (Pakistan or India) or maintain independent status. The ruler of Junagadh acceded to Pakistan but in November 1947, India occupied by military action. Kashmir was Muslim majority state and majority of the Kashmiri people intended to accede Pakistan but the Hindu Maharaja Kashmir did not want to accede to Pakistan. He initially decided to adopt independent status but signed an agreement of accession with India in October 1947. See M. Ikram Rabbani, Comprehensive Pakistan Studies (Lahore: Carvan Book House, 2010), pp.123-155

1. Soon after partition, communal riots triggered the massive inflow of migrants. It was difficult for Pakistan to overcome the adverse impact of refugees and their killings. 2. The disputes due to the distribution of civil and military assets of the government of British India created bitterness. It was difficult for a newly established state (Pakistan) to establish civil and military structure but Pakistan was not provided with its due share of military equipment. 3. Disagreements over the concurrence over states of Junagarh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir.

The above-mentioned challenges along with the non-acceptance of an ideologically independent state for the Muslims and the Minorities for the Sub-continent to equip itself with military power. Since then, Pakistan planned the upgradation of its military capabilities for containing India’s hegemonic design and its strategies about military modernization is evaluated by the existing research.

Pakistan’s cultural norms are traced in two nation theory.33 It is based upon the Islamic ideology which contributed a lot in developing societal disposition and coordination among the policymakers of Pakistan. Islamic norms are glorified among social, political and military discourse. The historical analyses highlight the beginning of Islam in India, admire Muslim rule and describe two nation theory in the context of Hinduism and Islam. These narratives also highlighted Muslim rights and interests that were threatened due to hard-hearted Hindu majority under the British dominance. It forced the Muslims to seek legitimate safeguards first and then demanded a separate state. After obtaining the state, these norms became the cultural part of Pakistani society. Islam has become the prime factor during constitution making as it designated the state as ‘Islamic State’. No law is constituted that intrude the basic ideologies and teachings of Islam.34 The defense forces of Pakistan emphasize Islam in conjunction with discipline, hierarchy and professionalism as the basic principles of defense organizations. Islamic norms, history and teachings especially the bearings of Muslim soldiers during wars are the part of training of military personnel. Islamic principles i.e. shaheed (martyr), ghazi (victorious) and Jihad-e-fi-sibillah (holy war in the name of Almighty Allah) are highlighted as the main sources of motivation for the

33 The partition of India in 1947 was based upon two nation theory, because the Muslims of Subcontinent proclaimed that they were quite disparate nation as compared to Hindus. Thus, they demanded a separate state. Rizwana Abbasi, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo: Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control Regime (Bern: Peter Lang AG, International Publishers, 2012), p.83. 34 See Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, Islamic Provisions, Part IX, (articles 227-231).

Pakistani military personnel during war and peace.35 Defense of Pakistan vis-à-vis India is anticipated by military leaders and civilians as the defense of Islam.36 These Islamic symbols and notions were continually invoked during Pak-India conflicts to bolster the military personnel and for obtaining popular support against the adversary.

As for Pakistan’s negotiating techniques are concerned, soon after its inception, Pakistan decided to promote peace both at the regional and global level and formulated its foreign policy in support of peace. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (the founder of Pakistan) designed the limits of the Pakistan’s foreign policy and proclaimed that Pakistan would maintain peace and non- aggression. During a press conference in Delhi, Quaid-i-Azam pointed out main tenets of foreign policy as:37

We will be most friendly to all the nations; we stand for the peace of the world. We will make our contribution whatever we can.

Quaid-i-Azam recalled Pakistan’s commitment with peace for the second time during inaugurating the Pakistan Broadcasting Service and stated:38

Our object should be peace within and peace without. We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial and friendly relations with our immediate neighbors and with the world at large. We have no aggressive designs against anyone. We stand by the United Nation’s Charter and will gladly make our full contribution to peace and prosperity of the world.

During addressing the people of the US, Quaid elaborated Pakistan’s foreign policy as:39

Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill to all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed people of the world in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.

35 Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture’, p.320, downloaded from www.kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/101068/ichaptersection_singledocument/50a on December 23, 2015. 36 Ibid. 37 Quaid-i-Azam’s statement during a press conference in Delhi held on July 14, 1947. 38 Quaid’s speech after inaugurating the Pakistan Broadcasting Service on August 15, 1947. 39 Quaid’s address to the people of the United States on February 26, 1948.

Obviously, the aforementioned speeches of Quaid-i-Azam expressed his desire for goodwill and understanding between India and Pakistan. Certain principles, which are fundamental for establishing goodwill among the states, i.e. territorial integrity of the states, independence, non- interference in the internal affairs and the recognition of their equal status as sovereign nations.40 India is reluctant to undertake such principles and has always considered the division of the Sub- continent as artificial and declared it as a result of British machinations.41 India strives to acquire pre-eminence in the South Asian region and presumes Pakistan the main barrier on its way.42 Due to this mistrust, the political elite of both the states have portrayed detestable postures against each other. They frequently blamed each other for their internal turmoil and violence.43 There is a continuous reiteration in the assertion of Pakistani elite that India has till to date not complied with the idea of a separate identity of the Muslims of the Sub-continent. The political and religious groups of both the states express their desires to overcome each other. They are unaware about the consequences of such belligerent endeavor or may be they are ready to face the distresses.

Pakistan’s security concerns are ‘India specific’, and despite other outstanding issues, Kashmir dispute is the main bone of contention between Indo-Pak relations. For overcoming such threat perception, Pakistan followed neo-realist model which posits that the states generally plan to contain security threats by two ways, one by enhancing their military might and second by forming alliances.44 Thus for assuring its security, Pakistan adopted various strategies according to abovementioned realist model and developed long-lasting friendly relations with China. The present research examines the impact of China on Indo-Pak enduring rivalries in the succeeding chapters.

2.3 Chinese Strategic Culture

In order to maintain internal stability and preserve the state from external violence, the use of force has been endemic according to Chinese history and its cultural norms. China remained engaged in a total of 3,790 recorded internal and external historical wars from 1100 BC to 1911, including the

40 Rashid Ahmad Khan, ‘Pakistan, India, and Regional Cooperation in South Asia’, in Maehrunnisa Ali (ed) Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 1971-1998 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.243. 41 Buddhudasa R. Kirtisinghe, ‘An Economic Community for South Asia’, The Economic Times (2 November 1978). 42 See Reference Nos. 23-25. 43 Dr. Inayatullah, ‘Nuclearisation of India and Pakistan: Security or Holocaust?’, The News (December 17, 2000) 44 Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture’, published by Defense Threat Reduction Agency USA on 31 October 2006, p.18.

58 conflicts with non-Chinese powers.45 Sun Tzu laid the foundation of Chinese strategic thinking in his book ‘Art of War’ (514-496 BC).46 He developed seven guiding principles for assuring the victory during wars as, faithful army, suitable weather, favorable geographical environment, capable leadership, strict discipline and rewards and punishment with subject to performance.47 Sun Tzu introduced the concept of deception as, all warfare is based on deception (bingz be guidao ye).48 The war doctrines in China put an excessive emphasis on deception. According to Sun Tzu, ‘attack where they are unprepared, go forth where they will not accept’ have been guiding principles, not just for military, but for the citizens as well.49 ‘Art of War’ has influenced China’s contemporary discourse. Mao Tse-Tung’s two essays, ‘on Protected War and Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War’ have references to Sun Tzu’s Art of War.50 Mao modified Sun Tzu’s work to suit his needs and meet the requirements of the time.

After evaluating China’s historical strategic discourse, Chinese analysts proclaimed that the Chinese are peace-loving and China has not invaded any country, not even occupied an inch of other’s territory except to teach a lesson that the state prefers to impose political means rather than military for resolving the disputes.51 Likewise, Gerald Segal explained China’s nine cases about the use of force during 1949-1985, and concluded that China demonstrated strategic and tactical flexibility during crisis and remained willing to employ political inputs for obtaining political goals.52

In addition, Sun Tzu was not in favor of prolonged warfare and China followed Tzu’s idea of short war.53 To meet the challenges of short war, China followed Waltz argument that ‘a country without

45 Michael D.Swaine, Ashley J.Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy, Present and Future (Santa Monica, Rand, 2000), p.46 46 Samuel B. Griffith (tr), Sun Zi: The Art of war (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). 47 Lionel Giles (tr) Sun Tzu’s Art of war, downloaded from www.fas.org/man/artofwar.htmon March 28, 2016. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp.134-136 and 219- 232. Mao Tse-tung was also quoted by Arpit Rajain, p.104. 51 Fang Ning, Defense Policy in the New Era’, in Michael Pillsbury (ed), The Chinese View of Future Warfare (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), p.48. Liu Hauquing, ‘Defense Modernization in Historical Perspective’, in Michael Pillsbury (ed), The Chinese View of Future Warfare (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), p.115. 52 Gerals Segal, Defending China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp.211-227. 53Lionel Giles (tr) Sun Tzu’s Art of war, downloaded from www.fas.org/man/artofwar.htmon March 28, 2016. Also quoted Arpit Rajain, p.114. During Mao’s era, China’s civil war campaign at Pingjin lasted for 56 days, the Sino- India war 1962 ended in 20 days, Huaihao for 65 days and Vietnam War in1979 for 29 days.

59 nuclear ally intends to become nuclear for containing its adversaries have them’, and became nuclear by testing its nuclear device on 16 October 1964.54 China’s new leadership formally adopted limited war as a war fighting doctrine during post-Cold War scenario.55 Moreover, China is pursuing a course towards upgrading the qualitative parameters of its defense capability based on science and advanced technology and bringing the combat training of its army and navy, in line with the requirements of modern high tech warfare.56

Likewise, China’s negotiating techniques are based on a belief that China is not an aggressive or expansionist state,57 and according to Andrew Scobell, ‘China is not fought a destructive war during its long history’.58 According to Xin Shizhong:59

The Chinese people have always loved peace… This national psychology and historical tradition have an insightful inspiration on the objectives of national defense and strategic policies of China.

Liu Huaqing (former Admiral and Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission) expresses in a Hong Kong newspaper:60

China is continuously pursuing a foreign policy for promoting peace and asserts that all the UN member states must follow the UN charter, promote peaceful environment among them and settle their disputes through negotiations.

Similarly, China’s peace-loving intents were articulated in its Defense White Paper in 1998:61

China’s national defense policy is defensive in nature…. Which is traced in its cultural and historical traditions. China is sustaining its peace-loving intents during 5000 years of its

54 See Reference 91. 55 Arpit Rajain, p.107. 56 P.Kamennov, ‘Principles of Proactive Defense’ International Affairs, Vol 56, No.3 (2010), pp.54-57. For assuring its military security and for preventing its political, diplomatic, economic and military measures, China designed a program in 2006, to modernize national defense and the armed forces, which includes three stages: by 2010, the foundation of a fundamental basis for the transformation; by 2020, making general advancement along the main lines of modernization; by 2050, attaining the strategic goal of creating armed forces capable of successfully operating the use of information technology during wars. 57 Arpit Rajain, p.106. 58 Andrew Scobell, ‘China’s Strategic Culture’, p.7, downloaded from www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/ssi_scobell.pdf on December 27, 2015. 59 Xing Shizhong, ‘China threat Theory May Be Forgotten’, Quishi [Seeking truth], February 1996 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports-China, (1 February 1996). 60 ‘Liu Huaqing on the Stand of the Military towards Taiwan’, Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), (4 September 1995). 61 ‘White Paper on China’s National Defense’, Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, (27, 1998), in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports-China, (29 July 1998).

civilization. Ancient Chinese analysts reinforced ‘associating with benign noblemen and befriending good neighbors’, which indicates that Chinese people are peace-loving throughout their history and promoted friendship with the people of the remaining states.

In order to resolve the disputes and uphold peace between the states, China endorsed dialogue process but the previous Chinese history62 compelled it to redefine its security objectives as,63

 To build itself into a country that is economically prosperous, politically stable and militarily sufficient in its own defense.  To lay particular stress on a good neighbor policy, with the purpose of establishing friendly and cooperative relations with the neighboring countries.64  To have interdependence between security and development, striving for international economic security as a whole, and thus to create a lasting and peaceful environment for China’s people.

The Chinese military modernization due to its economic prosperity is based on the theory of deterrence which derives from the realist paradigm. The main goal that China follows in the present era is that of economic prosperity to raise productivity, a policy of active defense, independence, peace and a foreign policy based on five principles.65

62 In the subsequent period, for over 100 years, the Chinese were exploited and there was no concept of security as China was open to invaders, aggressors and economic exploiters. Given this, the Chinese speak of issues like national security and sovereignty as being influenced by history. 63 Arpit Rajain, pp.112-113 64 China is striving good relations with its neighboring states. According to P.Kamennov, pp 55-56,’Russia and China signed a number of documents during 1991-2008 in resolving Russia-China border disputes. As for Sino-Indian relations, despite the disagreements over disputed territories in Ladakh in Northern India and McMohan Line in the state of Arunachal Pardesh, a trend toward the development of strategic partnership emerged. According to a joint Sino-Indian overview prospects in 2008, both the sides pledged to continuously facilitate confidence building measures by maintaining stable contacts in the defense sphere and reiterated their commitment to a course towards resolving sensitive Sino-Indian disagreements, including the border issue, through peaceful negotiations, seeking to ensure that the intensive development of bilateral ties is not affected by these disagreements. China’s relations with its southern Neighbor-Vietnam- are at present being built in line with the 16 ‘golden’ hieroglyphs formula: Good Neighborliness, Friendship, Comprehensive Cooperation, Long Term Stability and Future Orientation, which was adopted in 2000. After long and rather difficult negotiations, important agreements were signed on the land border and delimitation of the Gulf of Tonkin. China’s relations with Japan are still complex. Beijing is opposed to Japan’s UN Security Council membership as a permanent member and at the same time it objects to Japan’s participation in the US Plans to deploy a theater missile defense system, seeing it’s a threat to its ‘military containment’ policy with regard to the independence of Taiwan. At the same time, as Sino-Japanese trade and economic ties have intensified in the past few years, the two sides are implementing measures to improve their relations in political sphere. An important landmark in this direction was the visit to Japan by Chinese President Hu Jintao in May 2008, the first in the past 10 years, leading to the signing of a joint statement on the sides’ intent to build strategic, mutually beneficial cooperation. Pak-China friendship is popularly being acknowledged as “the all-weather friendship” among the international community and is the high watermark at the global level’. 65 These five principles are :1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 2) mutual non-aggression, 3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, 4) peaceful coexistence in developing

Currently, the US is prevailing as the sole global super power under unipolarity.66 Chinese believe that the US has the aspirations to maintain its (US) hegemony under unipolarity which forced China to adopt a ‘highly offensive oriented (fuyu jingonxing)’ posture.67 China believes that the US has adopted multiple strategies against China with the collaboration of several countries especially with India.68 In response, China also planned counter containment strategies against the US and its allies including India to overwhelm its threat perceptions which exacerbated South Asian security dilemma. The following study investigates the trilateral security dilemmas in order to understand the possibilities in creating strategic stability in the South Asian region.

diplomatic relations and 5) economic and cultural exchange with other countries. These are the same as the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 between India and China. These principles were further endorsed in the 1955 of Bandung conference of non-aligned nations, where China played an active role. 66 Unipolarity is discussed in detail in chapter 7. 67 For maintaining its hegemony, the US was involved in several conflicts during and after Cold war and enforced the remaining states to accept its supremacy through economic and political measures, explained Andrew Scobell, ‘China’s Strategic Culture’, p.17, downloaded from www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/ssi_scobell.pdf on December 27, 2015. 68 For containing existing China’s rise, the US has planned a ring of encirclement extending from South Korea, Mongolia and Japan in the north through the South China Sea to India in the South, expressed John W. Garver and Fei-Ling Wang, ‘China’s Anti-Encirclement Struggle’, Asian Security, Vol.6, No.3 (2010), p.2. Additionally, Chinese anticipated that the US was already aware about India’s nuclear test of May 1998 but kept blind eye and had devious plot to throw China off balance, analyzed Andrew Scobell, ‘China’s Strategic Culture’, p.19, downloaded from www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/ssi_scobell.pdf on December 27, 2015.

Part II

Impact of Strategic Culture on States Relations (1947-1974)

2.4 India-China Relations

Both China and India are recognized as the cradle of ancient civilizations. They have common mountains bordering approximately 3500 kilometers and comprise more than one third of the world population. Their border region was mostly populated by ‘barbarian’ or semi-civilized tribe of Mongoloid stock. Tibetan region was considered as the relatively developed region in respect of its culture. Tibet is popularly being acknowledged as the birthplace of Buddhism which rapidly attained popularity in China and became the official religion from 1368 to 1217 AD.69 Tibet had relied upon China in all its affairs till it declared its independence in 1912.70

Before the division of Sub-Continent, British demarcated the present border between India and China and forced China to accept it but had not taken concrete steps during the demarcation of the border that created ambiguities between the two states soon after the partition in 1947.71 India assumed that the McMahon line was the demarcated line between India and China while China had already showed her disagreement and expressed her claim on Tibet.72 China could not respond to Indian encroachment in Tibet due to her engagement in civil war and became attentive after the revolution of 1949.73 Nonetheless, both the states established diplomatic relations in 1950. China occupied Tibet in October 1950. India did not show any intention to exploit the issue and expressed its desire through diplomatic channel that ‘matter would be resolved peacefully by China and

69 Maqsudul Hassan Nori, ‘China and South Asia in 21st Century’ Regional Studies, Vol.xvii, No.4 (Autumn 1999), p.8. Under the Mongolian Yuan dynasty during 1368 to 1217 AD, the religious authority of Dalai Lama was accepted and in return China was delegated the security interests of Tibet. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. During Shimla conference in 1914, the Britishers exerted undue pressure on China to accept their proposed border but there were no proper arrangements taken in demarcating the border between India and China. 72 During Shimla Conference (1913-1914), a line was proposed from the eastern border of Bhutan along the Himalayas up to Brahmaputra River where the river emerges from the Tibetan course into Assam valley and was declared McMahon line on the name of British Negotiator Sir Hennery McMahon. China participated in Shimla Conference but refused to accept the McMahon line and claimed that Tibet was the part of Chinese territory. See Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol.7, 15th ed (New York: Peter B Norton, 1994), p.643. 73 Maqsudul Hassan Nori, p.9. Initially. China was involved in resolving internal issues and not in a position to negotiate till October 1949. There was no effective government in China during 1947-1949 and Mao’s communist forces were engaged in conflict with Chiang Kai-Shek government for the control of Mainland and at last, Mao’s forces succeeded to win over Chiang government and established The People’s Republic of China in October 1949, explained R.C.Hingorani, Nehru’s Foreign Policy(New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing Co, 1989), p.48

Tibet’.74 India adopted Kutilya’s ‘dharma’ (peaceful means) and ‘Dvaidhibhava’ (making peace with neighbors). Jawahar Lal Nehru (a famous Indian politician) did not assume China as a threat for India and believed in peace that precludes war with China,75 and intended to develop friendly relations as he stated in 1950.76

If India and China can develop mutual friendship and cooperation, it will strengthen peace in Asia; the future of peace in Asia, indeed of the world will depend to a large extent on the kind of relations that develop between India and China.

The two states signed an agreement in 1954 which was based upon China’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and were enunciated “Paunchsheel” in Bandung Conference in 1955.77 China appreciated Indian support in attaining rightful status in UN.78 Both India and China had established friendly relations during 1950’s, characterized by a popular Hindi saying ‘Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai’ (Indians and Chinese are brothers).79

The brotherly relations were disturbed abruptly by the arrival of Dalai Lama (Tibet’s spiritual leader) in Dharmshala which provoked Chinese reservations on Indian involvement.80 In 1960, China showed severe concerns and conveyed distresses to India about Dalai Lama’s arrival in Tibet but India could not respond accordingly.81 The two states got involved in blame game of

74 R.C.Hingorani, pp.48-49 75 Rollie Lal, ‘Understanding China and India: Security Implications for the United States and the World’ (London: Praeger Security International, 2006), p.39 76 Jawahlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi: Government of India Publication Division, 1961), p.369. 77 Maqsudul Hassan Nori, p.9. Paunchsheel was elaborated by five principles as ‘mutual respect, mutual sovereignty, mutual non-interference, mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence’. During the period from 1953 to1954, the leaders of both the states frequently exchanged visits and signed agreements on different issues, i.e. Agreement on Trade and Communications was signed in1954, explained Xia Liping during his Speech ‘China-India Security Relationship: retrospect and Prospects’ presented in Conference on ‘India in 21st Century: External Relations’ in Shanghai Institute for International Studies on June 24-25, 2002. 78 Ibid, p.9. 79 Shekar Gupta, ‘Stop Fighting the 1962 War’, Indian Express (19 September 2009). Also mentioned David M. Mlone and Rohan Mukherjee, ‘India and China: Conflict and Cooperation’, Survival, Vol.52, No.1 (February-March 2010), p.138. 80 Carole Mc Granahan, ‘Kashmir and Tibet: Comparing Conflicts, States, and Solutions’ downloaded from www.dx.doi.org/10.1080/14736480412331307112 on November 3, 2012, p157. China assumed that Dlai Lama was involved in anti-China campaign and had the intentions to turn Tibet as a buffer zone between China and India and Indian support to Dlai Lama aggravated China against India, Khalid Mahmood quoted Ma Jiali (a Chinese analyst) in ‘Sino-Indian Relations: Future Prospects, Friendship, Rivalry or Contention?’ Regional Studies, Vol.XXV, No.2 (Spring 2007), p.14. Chinese mistrust aggravated due to Indian support to Dalai Lama when he fled Tibet in 1959, analyzed Judith F. Kornberg and John R.Faust, ‘China in World Politics’ (New Delhi, Viva Books Private Limited, 2007), p.174 81 David M. Mlone and Rohan Mukherjee, p.140.

64 encroachments on each other’s territories. China claimed 90,000 sq kms along the Himalayan sector which was occupied by India, while, India objected China on 38,000 sq kms in Aksai Chin.82 In 1961, India planned a more overtly aggressive ‘forward policy’ by establishing military posts in the disputed areas to cutoff China’s supply lines.83

The disputed territories are revealed in Map 1:

82 Maqsood ul Hassan Noori, p.9. 83 David M. Mlone and Rohan Mukherjee, p.140.

Map 1

Source: David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, ‘India and China: Conflict and Cooperation’ Survival, Vol.52, No.1 (February-March 2010), p.141.

The territorial disputes led to a full scale war in October-November 1962 which affected Sino- Indian relations adversely.84 China adopted Sun Tzu’s limited warfare and the war ended within

84 J.Mohan Malik, ‘South Asia in China’s Foreign Relations, Pacific review: Peace, Security and Global Change: Formerly Pacific Review: Peace, Security and Global Change’ (2001), downloaded from www.dx.doi.org/10.1080/13239100120036054 on November 3, 2012, p.77. On 20 October 1992, China attacked

20 days. The disaffections of war between the two states were observed for a long time on the issue of Tibet and a number of border skirmishes particularly in 1960s.85 After the war, India realigned its relations with the Soviet Union more closely, to relegate China within the international Communist movement. In the meanwhile, China and Pakistan established closer ties.86

2.4.1 The Disputes on Water

China and India have aspirations of preeminence at global and regional arena respectively and economic prosperity is prerequisite for both the states for materializing their endeavors. Therefore, the two states seek to obtain economic affluence. The river systems play vital role for boosting up their economies because they share Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin in the Tibetian Autonomous region. The three river systems are the main source of the lifeline of millions of people and have enduring sources of hydral power and storage potential. A branch of Brahamaputras (Yarlung Tsango) is the lengthiest tributary in its long journey of about 2,880 km from Mount Kailash to Southern Tibet. It makes u-bend during crossing between Gyala Peri (7,150 m) and Nauche Barwa (7,756 m) as it cascades from Tibetian plateau to lower heights. During loosing height, it flows with an altitude of 1,050 m. The u-bend contains the immense hydro power potential as river drops with the elevation by approximately 3,000 m within the journey of 300 km with the average degrading of 10 m per km and has the capacity to generate 48000 to 54000 MW.87 Both the states have the intentions to harness the hydroelectric potential at the u-bend but China is in position to construct dam on Yarlung Zangpo or Tsangpo.88

India has reservations due to China’s plan to build dam at Yarlung Tsangpo section of Brahmaputra. The dam will badly affect the flow of water to north eastern India. Additionally, the outcomes of dam exacerbate the fears of adverse climate change which may ultimately lead to

India from two sectors, eastern and western simultaneously as mentioned in Map 1, (David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, pp.140-141). China’s forces penetrated inside India and occupied the territories which it claimed in the western border and there were the chances of China’s occupation to the Punjab, Himachal Pardesh and Utter Pardesh but China unilaterally declares a ceasefire in November 1962. Explained R.C.Hingorani, Nehru’s Foreign Policy(New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing Co, 1989), p.57 85 Judith F. Kornberg and John R.Faust, p.174 86David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, pp.141-142. 87 P.K.Gautam, ‘Sino-Indian Water Issues’, Strategic Analysis, vol.32, No.6 (November 2008), p.970. 88 Ibid, p.970. Presently, China has an easy excess to Yarlung Zangpo or Tsangpo due to better road network and railway track as compared to India.

67 unusual melting of Himalayan glaciers, thereby disturb the flows.89 The two states are the beneficiaries of the three river systems which has a significant impact on their economies. Their desire for economic development give them the chance for military modernization which is based on the theory of deterrence which derives from the realist paradigm and according to China’s revised security objectives.90

2.4.2 Impact of China’s Nuclearization on Indian Policy.

To understand the aspects due to which the states aspire to nuclear, Kenneth Waltz describes the following reasons due to which states acquire nuclear weapons:91

 To counter the weapons of the other power, usually by initiating it. Acquisition of the nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union falls in this category.  Distress persists on nuclear ally when an adversary attacks. French nuclear capability drew its motivation from this factor.  In the absence of nuclear allies, a country intends to become nuclear due to its adversaries. China’s intent to become nuclear falls under such category.  To encompass the conventional superiority of an adversary. Pakistan’s quest to become nuclear for comprehending India’s conventional supremacy.  To pursue resilient substitute for uplifting conventional military might.  For offensive purposes.  To intensify global standing and to acquire more influence among the international community.

After analyzing Waltz’s arguments, last argument is applicable to India’s ambition of becoming nuclear on the assumptions as:92

Due to proclaiming the largest democracy, and population wise second biggest country, and is the custodian of ancient civilization, projecting thousands of kilometer into the Indian Ocean, its political elite aspires to become major world power.

89 Ibid. 90 See Reference No.62. 91 Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; More May be Better’ Adelphi Paper.No.171. (London, International Institute of Strategic Studies. 1981). Cited by Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Nuclear Defence; Shaping the Arsenals’ (New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2001) pp. 9-10. Also cited by Jasjit Singh, ‘Threat of Nuclear Weapons’, in K. Subramanyam (ed), India and the Nuclear Challenge (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986), pp.86-88. 92K.M. Desilva. Problems of Governance in Sri Lanka (New Delhi; Konark Publishers. 1993). p-392.

To justify Indian nuclear ambition, Raja Rammana quotes:93

There was never a discussion among us over whether we should not make the bomb. How to do it was more important? For us it was a matter of prestige that would justify our ancient past. The question of deterrence came much later. Also as Indian scientists were keen to show our Western counterparts, who thought little of us those days that we too could do it.

The Indian leaders contributed a lot in shaping India’s self-image. Nehru explicated India as:94

Long years ago, we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially. At the stroke of midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom.

India intends to get regional prominence due to its size and military capability.95 During Cold War era, India intended to play a significant role in South Asian region similar to the United States at the global level.96 Initially, India alleged to acquire nuclear weapons for obtaining the status of regional superpower, and for accomplishing prestige in the international community, initiated its nuclear program soon after partition. It however, expressed dubious proclamations about its nuclear program.97 After the defeat in 1962, India accelerated the momentum of its nuclear program to contain China.98 The China’s nuclear test of 1964 generated a new source of instability into India’s security architecture. India expressed serious apprehensions and on October 19, 1964, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri stated:99

That the Chinese were trying to build a mighty war machine and thus create fear in the minds of all. China had gone a step further and had recently exploded an atom bomb.

93 Raja Ramana was quoted Muhammad Mushtaq and Muhammad Jawad Hashmi, ‘Regional Hegemonic Aspirations of India; A Review of Indian Nuclear Program’ Pakistan Journal of Social Science, Vol.32, No.1 (2012), p.253 94 Speech by Jawaharlal Nehru on the eve of India’s Independence Day, 15 August 1947. 95 Aysha Siddiqa Agha. ‘Pakistan’s Security Problems of Linearity’ South Asian Journal, (January-March 2004). P.45 96 Shirikant Paranjpe, and Thomas, Raju G.C. “India and South Asia; Resolving the Problems of Regional Dominance and Diversity” in David J. Mayers (ed) Regional Hegemons; Threat Perception and Strategic Response (Boulder: Westview Press 1991). p.165 97 India started its nuclear program soon after independence in 1948 on the pattern of British Atomic Energy. India expressed dual intentions regarding its nuclear program in 1957, Mr. Nehru declared that the nuclear program would be for peaceful purposes but just after six months, he declared that India would not hesitate to make nuclear bomb and argued that its nuclear program was to contain China and Pakistan. George Perkovish, India’s Nuclear Bomb (London: University of California Press, 1999), p.34 98 George Perkovish, ‘India’s Nuclear Bomb,’ p.39 99 Lal Bahadur Shastri was quoted by Bidanda M. Chengapa, India-China Relations: Post Conflict Phase to Post-Cold War Period (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 2004), p.196.

India anticipated China’s nuclear test of 1964 as a threat to its prestige in the international community. It aspired to obtain the status of regional superpower and decided to adopt a comprehensive plan to uplift its nuclear program.100 Despite accelerating its nuclear program, India’s government was reluctant to fabricate nuclear weapons but public opinion and the political elite raised a campaign in favor of manufacturing the nuclear weapons101. Gerald Braunthal conducted a survey in 1966 based on general public opinion and concluded that seven out of ten were in favor of making the atomic bomb. He added:102

Those who answered positively argued that atomic weapons needed for defense against China and Pakistan to withstand any blackmail and to maintain a balance of power, that national prestige would be enhanced, and that India no longer would need to rely militarily on American and Russian nuclear umbrella.

Shastri denied public demand and announced that ‘India’s nuclear program would be carried on for the peaceful nuclear explosives.103 However, Shastri had the intention to explore the option of an external security guarantee from super powers in the backdrop of China’s nuclear test, according to Kutilya’s samadhi (entering into an agreement). Nehru took over the Government after Shastri and he did not intend to seek any external security guarantee. Soon after the Chinese nuclear test, the US President Lyndon Johnson offered the assurances to India against any nuclear threats104 but India refused the offer.105

100For containing China’s nuclear test and to match the global nuclear environment in future, India planned a comprehensive five years plan with a large budget of $2 billion for accelerating the nuclear program, the agreement was signed with former USSR for the supply of advanced aircrafts and to construct a factory for manufacturing the aircrafts. See George Perkovish, pp 61-65 101 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p.61. Soon after the China’s nuclear test, The Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastary regretted the nuclear test and declared it as shock of danger in maintaining peace not only for the Southern Asian region but for the rest of whole world. During an address to the nation, Shastari pointed out that China’s nuclear test would not amend India’s nuclear stance and we would continue our nuclear program for peaceful purposes. But Shastri’s ‘no change policy’ was condemned among the media and political elite and demanded to revise the nuclear policy. Explained Bhumitra Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: A Historical Analysis (Bern: European Academics Publisher, 2004), p.60. Indian Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis conducted a study and concluded that ‘only an Indian nuclear arsenal could elevate India to a position of equality with China; quoted Indrajeet Singh and Pardeep Kumar Singh, ‘India’s Nuclear Weapon Program’, Scholars Voice: A New Way of Thinking, Vol, 1, No.1 (January 2009), p.86 102 Gerard Braunthal, ‘An Attitude Survey in India,’ Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring 1969), p. 81. 103 Elaborated Shyam Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb (Sahibabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 112. 104 ‘Radio-Television Address by President Johnson,’ 18 October 1964, printed in A.C.D.A., Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 465–9. 105 Glenn T. Seaborg and Benjamin S. Loeb, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 118.

Additionally, Pak-China ‘all weather friendship’ prompted India to launch nuclear weapon program. Especially China’s support during Pak-India war in 1965 deflected India to become nuclear in order to prevent China’s nuclear blackmail in future. During 1965 Indo-Pak war, Indian politicians demanded the Government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons. According to them:106

India’s survival both as a nation and as a democracy, in a face of the collusion between China and Pakistan, casts a clear and imperative duty of the government to take an immediate decision to develop our nuclear weapons.

Indira Gandhi came in power in 1966 and decided to implement the strategy of developing nuclear explosive technology.107 During Pak-India war 1971, the presence of USSR Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal reignited India’s affection of nuclear coercion and shaped the feelings that even superpower could become the nuclear risk to India.108 To overcome the predicament, India followed theory of realism as an analytical tool by adopting Kutilya’s Yana (preparing for war) and Samsraya (seeking protection) and emphasized more on its nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, theory of deterrence and the concept of power under realism also provides understanding about India’s nuclear weapons program.109

In May 1972, India started measures for underground nuclear tests,110 and detonated its first nuclear test on May 18, 1974 and described it as a ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)’.111 India aspired to acquire dual rewards in the context of its strategic culture through PNE;

106 Bhumitra Chakma, p.73 107 Indrajeet Singh and Pardeep Kumar Singh, ‘India’s Nuclear Weapon Program’, Scholars Voice: A New Way of Thinking, Vol, 1, No.1 (January 2009), p.88. Initially, Indira Ghandhi was convinced that India would not make nuclear weapons but soon she modified her intentions after the developments of China’s thermo-nuclear weapons in May 1966. 108 Ibid. 109 See references 9-18 and 103 of chapter 1. 110 Bhumitra Chakma, p.74. During a debate of Annual Budget in the parliament, Jagjivan Ram (the then defence minister) informed that ‘the Atomic Energy Commission is studying the technology for conducting underground explosion for peaceful purposes’. 111 Volha Charnysh,’India’s Nuclear Program’ downloaded from www.nuclearfiles.org on September 18, 2013. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, Its Implications’ for South Asia, p.126.

(a) To pursue preeminence at the regional and global level according to Nehruvian and Ghandian philosophy of ‘Greater India’112.

(b) To contain its threat perceptions which are mainly China and Pakistan specific.

India’s nuclear test of 1974 had generated severe security repercussions in the South Asian region in general and for Pakistan in particular and China also expressed disappointment and warned India that the nuclear tests of May 1974 would harm peace and stability of South Asia.113 The present research elaborates the consequences of 1974 nuclear test on the security architecture of the South Asian region in the succeeding chapters.

2.5 Pakistan-India Relations and China’s Response to Pakistan

The root causes of Pakistan-India relations can be traced back before partition. Apart from some common characteristics between Hindus and Muslims in the Subcontinent (common language, social and cultural background), religion is the prime factor in developing hatred due to the mutually antithetical nature of Hinduism and Islam.114 The Hindu masses and their leadership did not reconcile with the presence of the Muslims in India. Since this creed caters well for the carnal side of the individual, its adherents have been clinging on to it for a long time. With the advent of Muslim rule in the Sub-continent, a more powerful ideology was introduced in the region which had never been acceptable to the Hindus. Muslims ruled India for around one thousand years, employing sometimes, the orthodox blend of Islam and sometimes to win sympathies of the Hindus. But the basic conflict of the two never subsided.

Under the powerful hold of Mughal emperors, Hindus followed Kutilya’s asana (staying quite) and kept a low profile that had not permitted them to adopt an aggressive attitude. But in British colonial rule, Hindus encompassed belligerent posture against the Muslims which formulated two nation theory for them and resulted in the ultimate division of the Sub-continent into two separate states. Since, Pakistan is the legacy of about 1000 years Muslim rule, its continuation makes them feel like bear with a sore head. Small wonder even more than 68 years of post-independence, the

112 Rizwana Abbasi, ‘Enduring India-Pakistan Rivalry: Prospects for Conflict Resolution’, Regional Studies, Vil.xxxiii, No.3 (Summer 2015), p.101. 113 Bharat: An Untold Story, downloaded from www.bharatuntoldstory.tumblr.com on September 18, 2013 114 Syed Imran Sardar, ‘Conflict Transformation Approach and the Kashmir Issue: A New Perspective’ Regional Studies, Vol. xxvi, No.4 (Autumn 2008), p.12. See references 114-118.

Hindus ignore the ideological aspect and consider the conflict as a mere territorial dispute hoping to win Pakistan back by the passing time.

Due to religious differences, they had not reached an understanding between them; Burke elaborates these religious differences as:115

Among the universal religions, there are two incompatible than Islam and Hinduism. Islam is the youngest of the great religions of the world. It is also the simplest and the most explicit. The sole requirement is belief in one all-powerful God, in Muhammad (PBUH) as the messenger and the Quran as the message. On the other hand, Hinduism is rooted in the ancient past and is not a religion in the usual sense of a faith having a prescribed dogma and scripture. Jawaharlal Nehru commented on religion as:116

India is supposed to be a religious country above everything else. Hindu, Muslim and Sikh take pride in their faiths and testify to the truth by breaking their heads. The spectacle of what is called religion in India and elsewhere, has filled me with horror, and I have frequently condemned it and wished to sweep clean of it. Almost always it seemed to stand for blind reaction, dogma and bigotry, superstition and exploitation and the preservation of vested interests. Whereas, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah explained the two communities as:117

The Hindus and Muslims belong to different philosophies, social customs and literatures. They neither intermarry nor intertwine together and indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based on conflicting ideas and conceptions. This religious animosity compelled Muslims of the Sub-continent to demand a separate state on religious base.118 The deep rooted hatred erupted due to religion in the Sub-continent as is argued by Huntington as:119

115 S.M.Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), pp. 10-11 116 Jawaharlal Nehru commented on religion in September 1932 in an essay entitled, ‘What is Religion?’ quoted Sumith Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistan Conflicts Sine 1947 (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, 1988), p.25 117 As quoted by Sumith Ganguly, p.26. In support of his argument, Quaid-i-Azam explained as “you must remember that Islam is not merely a religious doctrine but a realistic and practical code of conduct. I am thinking in terms of history, our heroes, our art, our architecture, our music, our laws, our jurisprudence… In all these things our outlook is not only fundamentally different but often radically antagonistic to the Hindus. We are different beings. There is nothing in life, which links us together…. our economic life, our treatment of women, and our attitude to animals…. We challenge each other at every point of the compass”. Quaid-i-Azam was quoted by Abdur Rashid, From Makkah to Nuclear Pakistan (Lahore: Ferozsons (Pvt) Ltd, 2001), pp.256-257 118 The creation of Pakistan was unique in the sense that it was based on an ideology which sought its roots from the religion of Islam. The famous slogan ’Pakistan ka mutlab kiya laillaha illallah’ (Pakistan will be an Islamic state), became the core of freedom and the base of Pakistan. 119 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p.42

Of all the objective elements which define civilizations, however, the most important usually is religion, as the Athenians emphasized. To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world’s great religions, as people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other as happened in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia and the Sub-continent. Apart from the religion, there were some additional aspects which had significant impact on formulating the relations between the two states in future.

 On the eve of partition, the two political parties (All India Congress and All India Muslim League) shaped images which were the major rudiments of entire conflict. The Congress was not in favor of partition and maintained that old India continues to exist as an entity while Muslim league stressed that the Muslim majority areas in the northwest and east India, constituted into a separate state. The contradiction between the two parties resulted in the images and perceptions.120  The ideologies of both the states reject the validity of the other; secularism denies the legitimacy of religious identity. On the other hand, religion is essential for Pakistan’s identity as a nation state. The process of identity construction based on the dichotomy necessitates the existence of a sense of historical differences between the two communities. It plays a fundamental role in familiarizing the perception of ‘self’ as different from the ‘others’.121  The relationship between the two is largely influenced by emotions and sentiments and feelings of the past have solidified each other’s perceptions to such an extent that any change in the status quo would be politically suicidal for the governing elite.122 Such an irrational enemy passion has locked both India and Pakistan in a zero-sum conflict.123  The deep rooted hatred erupted in the tragic incidents following the partition. The Sub- continent plunged into a bloodbath as trainloads of migrating Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs were cruelly killed like penned cattle. Women were killed and their babies thrown on spear tips. Such was the frenzy at the dawn of the two nations.124

120 Syed Imran Sardar, p.11 121 Sisir Gupta, A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966), pp.13-15 122 Smruti S Pattanaik, Elite Perceptions in Foreign Policy (New Delhi; Manohar, 2004), p.17 123 Amit Dholakia, The Role of Mediation in Resolving India-Pakistan: Parameters and Possibilities (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), p.97 124 Mohammad Ali Durani, India and Pakistan: The Cost of Conflict and The Benefits of Peace (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.5. Soon after partition, 3.5 million Hindus and Sikhs migrated from Pakistan to India while

 Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan’s strategic perceptions are Indo-centric because India seeks to enforce its preeminence on Pakistan. India elucidates that ‘Pakistan has already obtained enough concessions since its inception and now it has to accept India’s prominence’.125

The mistrust due to which the leaders view the actions of one another is embedded in their divergent conceptions and perceptions on a number of issues. Thus, since 1947 both states have been continuing discrepancies over a number of issues. The ‘perception’ and ‘image’ have a consistent critical role in determining overall policies.

The study intends to discuss all such perceptions especially, the Kashmir issue, which is the main case of conflict between the two states.

2.5.1 Kashmir Issue

Pakistan claims that the accession of Kashmir to India in 1947 was illogical and constitute unresolved agenda of partition.126 The accession of Kashmir to India just after the two months of partition erupted the sentiments of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir and they refused to accept accession and started a disobedience movement against Maharaja of Kashmir.127 In support of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir, the tribal frontier pathans entered into Kashmir which caused the first Indo-Pak war.128 India alleged Pakistan in interfering the internal affairs of Jammu and Kashmir and referred the dispute to the UN Security Council.129 The UN Security Council initiated

5 million Muslims migrated from India to Pakistan and almost 1million people were killed due to partition related sectarian violence, quoted Frances Stewart and Taimur Hayat, ‘Conflicts in South Asia: Prevalence, Costs, and Politics’ in Khadija Haq (ed), The South Asian Challenges (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.113 125 Syed Ali Mujtaba, Soundings on South Asia (New Delhi: New Dawn Press, 2005), p.27 126 According to partition plan in June 3, 1947, it was decided that the princely states were free to join either domination. Pakistan pretended that Kashmir would be the part of Pakistan because of the entire road communication networks of Srinagar and Jammu were connected with Pakistan. About eighty percent population of Jammu and Kashmir was based on Muslims and according to Pakistan’s first Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, ‘geographically, economically, culturally and religiously, Kashmir is the part of Pakistan’. The Maharaja Kashmir who himself a Hindu had not the intention to join Pakistan and ‘announced the accession of Kashmir to India on October 26, 1947’. Syed Imran Safdar, p.14. 127 Stanley Wolpert, Pakistan and India, Continued Conflict or Cooperation (London: University of California Press, 2010), p.22 128 Ibid, p.17 129 Florence Elliot and Michiel Summerskill, ‘A Dictionary of Politics (London: Penguin, 1964), p.200

75 a ceasefire line and decided that the plebiscite was to be held to decide the fate of Kashmir.130 The UN passed five resolutions within ten years, urging that a plebiscite should be taken in Kashmir.131 Pakistan welcomed UN resolutions for the peaceful resolution of Kashmir issue according to the negotiating techniques of its strategic culture. By realizing the dangerous outcomes of the expected plebiscite, India started creating hurdles and by adopting delaying tactics, tried to convince the international community to avoid plebiscite due to unfavorable circumstances.132

Both the states have firm stances on Kashmir Issue. India declared Kashmir as ‘an atoot ang’ (integral part) of India.133 During a speech to the Constituent Assembly on November 25, 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru stated:134

We were of course vitally interested in the decision that the state would take Kashmir, because of the geographical position with her frontiers marching with three countries, namely the Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan, is intimately concerned with the security and international contacts of India. Economically also Kashmir is intimately related to India. India had the aspirations to show Kashmir as symbol for the negation of the religious factor during partition in 1947. Apart from the religious factor, India contended that Maharaja Hari Singh (the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir) himself opted for India by signing the agreement of accession.135 Due to his Kashmiri origin and personnel association, Prime Minister Nehru did not intend to favor the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.136 Till to date, the Indian political leadership is reluctant to accept Kashmir as an issue of plebiscite and describes it as an issue of autonomy.137 On the other hand, Pakistan describes Kashmir as it’s ‘the Jugular vein’.138 Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali

130 Javaid Ahmad Sheikh, ‘Security Perceptions of Weak Nations: A Case study of Pakistan’ in Syed Farooq Hasnat and Anton Pelinka (eds), Security for the Weak Nations (Lahore: Azhar Sons, 1987), p.93 131 Florence Elliot and Michiel Summerskill, p.200. UN Resolutions were passed on April 2, 1948, January 3, 1949, March 14, 1950, March 30, 1951 and January 24, 1957, quoted Stanley Wolpert, pp.22-27 and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, p.89 132 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, p.89. India assumed that the Muslims of Kashmir would not favor India those were in majority and would opts for Pakistan. Thus India did not support to conduct the plebiscite in Kashmir. 133 Syed Imran Safdar, p.15 134 Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, ‘Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp.388-389 135 Syed Imran Safdar, p.16 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 Pakistan proclaims that Kashmir is an unfinished agenda of the division of Subcontinent and strategically, Pakistan can assure its water resources and territorial security by undertaking Kashmir. Elaborated in www.kashmirlibrary.org downloaded on June 18, 2013.

Jannah pleaded that Kashmir would become the part of Pakistan.139 The former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then foreign minister of Pakistan expressed his sentiments as;140

The people of Kashmir are our blood and we will struggle for their right because it is a right which cannot be denied. We are duty-bound to deliver this right to the people of Kashmir. On another occasion, Bhutto again said;141

Remember that …. we shall fight, and we shall fight for 1000 years as we have fought for 1000 years in the past…. we can continue. Thus, both the states have firm stances and opposite rules about Kashmir issue as shown in table 2.1

139 Sisir Gupta, p.46 140 Agha Amir Hussain, Speeches delivered by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto before the UNO (1957-1965), (Lahore: Classic Publishers, 1995), p.145 141 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto at the UN, downloaded from www.sixhour.com/understanding%20zulfiqar%20ali%20bhutto.html on April 12, 2015.

Table 2.1 Rules on Kashmir Issue

Pakistan India 1. Kashmir is a disputed territory. 1. Kashmir is not a territorial dispute. 2. India is an unlawful occupant of 2. Kashmir legally belongs to India since Jammu and Kashmir. its accession in 1947. 3. Pakistan would keep on pursuing the 3. Plebiscite is not feasible. matter for free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir. 4. Kashmir is a question of ‘identity’ of 4. Kashmir is neither religious nor an Muslims in a country with a ethnic problem. predominantly Hindu population. 5. Pakistan also supports third party 5. Bilateral negotiation is the only way to involvement to resolve the issue. resolve the issue. 6. The Kashmir issue is due to the 6. Kashmir issue is more exogenous than indigenous freedom movement. indigenous. 7. Apart from all other outstanding issues, 7. Less contentious issues should be taken Pakistan intends to resolve the Kashmir first. issue first. Source: Syed Imran Sardar, ‘Conflict Transformation Approach and the Kashmir Issue: A New Perspective’ Regional Studies, Vol. xxvi, No.4 (Autumn 2008), pp.18-19

2.5.2 Emergence of Pak-China Nexus against India

Ever since the communist revolution of 1949, Pakistan intended to establish friendly relations with China. Pakistan was the first country in the Muslim world which recognized China in January 1950, and established diplomatic relations in May 1951. Initially, Pakistan had reservations due to China’s domestic politics, however, its response soon convinced Pakistan to persuade neighborly relations.142 During Korean War, Pakistan supported China by refraining from voting in UNGA

142 Chinese strategic culture is primarily defensive since Sun Zi’s time. China’s defensive strategy can be observed from the world-famous Great Wall constructed during waring states regime (403-221 BC) and Ming Dynasty (1368-

78 and provided assistance to overcome economic crisis.143 Pakistan joined regional alliances, SEATO and CENTO, sponsored by the Unites States in 1950s. This created skepticism about Pakistan's alignment with the western alliances and Pakistan assured China that the alliances were joined to contain the dangers of war with India.144 Pak-China relations entered into a new phase of friendship during Bandung Conference in 1955 and Pakistan was the first non-communist country that was declared a trustworthy friend by China.145 Pakistan assisted China in attaining the UN seat.146 After the Sino-Indian war in 1962, China decided to align Pakistan militarily and economically against India and Sino-Pak relations entered in a warmest phase of friendship and Z. A. Bhutto (the former foreign minister of Pakistan) appreciated as:147

1644). The Great Wall is a symbol of China’s defensive security strategy and the evolution of Chinese civilization culminated defensive strategic culture. According to Chinese proverb ‘youde buke youdi’ (if one has virtue, one cannot be matched) and ‘guan de bu yaobing’ (display virtue and do not flaunt the military). Chinese believe that the main aim of war is to retaliate against those who initiated the war or to stop the strong for victimization the weak. Explained Johnston by Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.26. Additionally, Johnston explained, ‘when war is unavoidable, the Chinese strategic culture still leads to adopt defensive posture. Offensive stance can only be adopted for punitive, deterrence and to avoid annihilation’ (p.26). Johnston elaborated the Chinese strategic culture as: When violence is used by the state to deal with external security threats, it is generally applied defensively and is limited in nature. This reflects a view that violence is not particularly efficacious in eliminating threats or producing security. Rather, the more reliable basis for state security is the moral and administrative quality of internal ruler-ship, (p.26). The Chinese foreign policy decision makers followed the China’s traditional defensive posture during 1950s. China signed treaties of friendship rather than confronting or balancing the states and followed the ‘lean to one side’ policy. In 1950s, Soviet Union was the emerging power dominating the communist world; China opted to sign agreement of friendship rather than balancing Soviets in 1951, (p.28). During Korean War (1950-53), China was not intended to wage war but the direct involvement of US-led United Nations troops forced to get involved (p.36). Similarly, in post-Cold War scenario, China maintained her balancing behavior against the hegemon- The US and tried to develop partnership with all the major powers, (p.29). By analyzing China’s response in formulating foreign policy during 1950s, Pakistan envisaged to establish warm relations with China. 143 China faced a big slump in world trade during Korean War and for averting economic deficits, Pakistan exported raw cotton and jute in a bulk and China appreciated Pakistan’s support in UNGA, elaborated Mohammad Ahsan Choudhari, Strategic Military Dimensions in Pakistan-China Relations’ in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed), Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 1971-1998 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.318-319. 144 Mohammad Ahsan Choudhari, Strategic Military Dimensions in Pakistan-China Relations’ in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed), Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 1971-1998 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.319. The Prime Ministers of both the states met during Bandung Conference in 1955 and Pakistan succeeded to assure China that the alliances were joined to contain India. 145 Khaild Mahmood, ‘Sino-Pakistan Relations: An ‘All Weather’ Friendship’, Regional Studies, Vol. xix, No.3 (Summer 2001), p.3 146 Savita Panday, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy’ (Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1991), p.69 147 Address to National Assembly by Z.A. Bhutto on December 4, 1962, downloaded from www.bhutto.org/1957- 1965_speech14.php on April 12, 2015.

The motive force in the alliance was to counteract India’s assiduous and planned tactics to isolate Pakistan in order to finally strangle her.

Both China and Pakistan have a common enemy (India) which then compelled both the states to establish good relations as ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. Pak-China relations were based upon the realist assumption of defensive structural realism due to which states seek security in an anarchic world by adopting all available resources.

The main adjunct of China’s support to Pakistan was to align regional balance to contain India that was according to the realist theory of balance of power. After the Sino-Indian war in 1962, a boundary agreement between Pakistan and China was signed in March 1963. Pakistan secured 1350 square miles while China attained 2000 square miles and 750 square miles were ceded under the actual control to Pakistan.148 India protested against the agreement and declared that Pak-China agreement heightened the hostility between China and India.149 Pak-China agreement was observed skeptically by the US. The US undersecretary of state, George Ball visited Pakistan and expressed US suspicions about Pak-China agreement but Pakistan rejected the US pressure and preferred to uphold the honor of the agreement.150 The border agreement of 1963 became a breakthrough between the two states. It was followed by an air transit agreement in August 1963.151 Pakistan adopted balance of power strategy. It established its relations with China to contain both India's threat and counter any external pressure.

In 1964, China supported Pakistan’s stance on the state of Jammu and Kashmir.152 The heads of the two states exchanged visits during 1964-1965.153 India was very much concerned about Sino- Pak friendship and expressed her serious reservations. Prime Minister Shastri declared China and Pakistan as the common enemies against India.154 The development of Pak-China relations had a

148 Khalid Mahmood, ‘Sino-Pak Relations: An ‘All Weather ‘Friendship’ Regional Studies, Vol.xix, no.3 (Summer 2001), p.8. Savita Panday, p.70. Bidanda M. Chengapa, India-China Relations: Post Conflict Phase to Post-Cold War Period (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 2004), p.106. The agreement was highly appreciated by Pakistan and the president Ayub Khan declared a significant landmark in the history of friendly relations between the two states. 149 Bidanda M. Chengapa, p.106 150 Khalid Mahmood, p.9 151 Ibid. The Sino-Pak air link was materialized on April 29, 1964, when PIA plan landed at Shanghai airport and the Chinese declared as a ‘milestone in the history of friendly relations between the two countries’. 152 Savita Pande, p.70 153 Premier Zhu Enlai visited Pakistan for the second time in February 1964 and in return, the president Ayub visited China in March 1965. 154 Bidanda M. Chengapa, p.107

80 deteriorating impact on Sino-Indian relations and India perceived it as a threat for her security in future.155

2.5.3 1965 Indo-Pak War and China’s Response

Both India and Pakistan were persuaded to use force for the resolution of Kashmir issue due to their cultural norms and firm stances on Kashmir issue. Initially, India blamed Pakistan for starting the war by sending paramilitary forces in Chamb Jurian sector of Indian held Kashmir but the war was the outcome of the series of Indian actions.156 Initially, border skirmishes began take place in January 1965 onwards that reflected the deteriorating condition between India and Pakistan.157 In April 1965, both the states blamed each other for provoking the clash and Lal Bahadur Shastri (the then Indian Prime Minister) stated, ‘the Army will decide its own strategy and deploy its manpower and equipment in the way it deems best’.158 Pakistan assumed that India would not cross the international borders but the growing tension between the two states forced them to start three weeks war in September 1965.159 According to S.M.Burke;160

The Kutch war was but a symptom of deep-seated canker of Kashmir, which continued to foster and poison Indo-Pak relations. The 17 day war in September 1965 between India and Pakistan was the test case for Pak-China friendship and China openly supported Pakistan and declared India as an aggressor on September 8, 1965.161 China passed an ultimatum to India and charged with a succession of series violations of China’s territory and demanded to withdraw from all aggressive armed forces on China-Sikkim

155 Ibid. Mr. Bhuto expressed on Pak-China relations during a speech in Pakistan’s National Assembly as: ‘We entered into negotiations with China in December 1960. Our negotiations were proceeding in an unsatisfactory manner. Then at the same time of Sino-Indian conflict, an impetus was given to those negotiations’, Debates in National Assembly of Pakistan, Vol.2, (Part II), July 17, 1963. 156 S.M.Burk, p.318. Tension escalated between the two states during the years preceding the war 1965 due to the unrest in Kashmir by the stealing a scared hair of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) from the Hazratbal mosque near Srinagar in 1963. The outcome of this incidence led to communal riots in East Pakistan and West Bengal which resulted the mobilization of the Muslims and Hindus on massive level in East Pakistan and West Bengal. Quoted Rashid Ahmad Khan, ‘Pakistan-India Peace Process: An Assessment’ IPRI Journal, Vol. ix, No.1 (Winter 2009), p.92 157 S.M.Burk, p.324. 158 Shastri, ‘India Plans to Strike Back’, Hindu Weekly (3 May 1965). 159 Inayatullah, ‘Nuclearisation of India and Pakistan: Security or Holocaust,’ The News (17 December 2000). The disturbance in Kashmir compelled both the states to take measures in resolving the Kashmir issue but the abrupt death of Jawaharlal Nehru in May 27, 1964 sabotage the whole process of normalization. See Rashid Ahmad Khan, p.92 160 S.M.Burk, p.326 161 Savita Pande, p.70. Bidanda M Chengapa, p.107

81 border and to stop the acts of aggression and provocations against Pakistan.162 China condemned India’s provocative violations along the line of control in Kashmir just two days before the Indian attack on Lahore and repeatedly asked to resolve the Kashmir issue according to the wishes of Kashmiris.163 Just one day after the Indian attack on Pakistan, China officially declared Indian attack as an ‘act of naked aggression’ and announced firm support to Pakistan and warned India that she (India) would be responsible for all the consequences of criminal and extended aggression.164 China charged US and former Soviet Union for supporting Indian aggression in Kashmir. It blamed UN as a ‘tool of US imperialism and its allies which they did not object Indian infiltration in Kashmir and provoked military conflict between India and Pakistan’.165 India associated Chinese support to Pakistan with the Sino-Indian conflict and the Indian foreign minister stated:166

The demonstration of aggressive partnership between the Chinese and Pakistani Governments against India. This is nothing but open incitement to persist in its aggressive occupation of Indian Territory under the umbrella of Chinese military threat against India and is further evidence of Chinese collusion with Pakistan against India.

The Chinese diplomacy during war succeeded in winning the immense popular goodwill of the people of Pakistan. The foundations of ‘all weather’ friendship were laid in September 1965.167 China’s proactive diplomatic assistance to Pakistan during war 1965 proved herself as a trustworthy friend of Pakistan. China was concerned about the Indo-Pak Tashkent dialogue. After the war and during negotiations, China assured military presence along the Indian border to provide favorable bargaining position to Pakistan.168 Both India and Pakistan followed ceasefire on September 23, 1965 and signed Tashkent declaration.169 China was disappointed due to the terms of Tashkent accord but did not openly criticize and interfere in the Pakistan’s domestic

162 K.M.Arif (ed) China-Pakistan 1947-1980(Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984), p.9. Bidanda M Chengapa, p.109 163 Ibid, pp.71-72 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid, pp.73-85. 166Foreign Affairs (5 May 1965), p.99. Also quoted Bidanda M Chengapa, p.108 167 Khalid Mahmood, pp.10-11. The notion of ‘all weather’ friendship was observed during the visit of Chinese President to Pakistan. Approximately a million people welcomed their guest from China in Lahore. 168 Anwar Hussain, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an entente cordiale (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.130 169 Tashkent declaration was signed in January 1966. Rashid Ahmad Khan, p.93.

82 political controversy.170 Tashkent declaration was not appreciated within Pakistan. Z. A. Bhutto, the then foreign minister, expressed disagreement and decided to leave his office.171

Nonetheless, China continued its support on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, even after 1965. China’s assistance to Pakistan during 1965 war and on Kashmir issue is according to Sun Tzu’s principle about obtaining favorable geographical environment. It was to encircle India in the South Asian region. A joint statement was issued during Chinese President’s visit to Pakistan after 1965 war stating:172

Kashmiri people’s right of self-determination must be respected and that the Kashmir dispute should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people as pledged to them by both India and Pakistan.

2.5.4 India’s Suspicions about Karakoram Highway (KKH)

Pakistan and China signed an agreement in 1966 for the construction of KKH to establish a road link through Khunjerab pass.173 Some of its parts run through the territory of Kashmir. This creates anxiety for India as India assumed KKH a security threat for her.174 Elaborating the Indian implications, Mahnaz Isphahani wrote:175

The KKH has interfered in the political and military relationship between Central and South Asia. No single highway has run through such sensitive territory through an area, where the borders of Pakistan, India, China, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan come close together. By travelling these lands, the Karakorum Highway and its associated routes have posed threats and presented opportunities to all states of the region.

170 Khalid Mahmood, p.11. 171 Lubna Abid Ali, ‘Towards Tashkent Declaration’ downloaded from www.pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/pdf/LubnaAbidAli on February 11, 2014 172 K.M.Arif, p.103 173 KKH project was the envisaged for the revival of the historic silk route which had existed as a trading link between Xinjiang and Gilgit. It was constructed by the collaboration of Chinese engineers with Pakistan Army’s Frontier Works Organisation (FWO). The 800kilometer long road linked with Rawalpindi via national highway, runs besides Indus river and then enters in Hunza valley in the shadow of Karakoram, Himalaya and Hindukush ranges, crosses along the world’s largest glacier ranges and passes over mountains as high as 16,000 feet above the sea level. It was constructed during 1966-78, and now it is an all-weather communication link between the two states. 174 Bidanda M Chengapa, p.113 175 Ispahani feels: Although objectivity the KKH may not be an ideal logistic route, it has been important to foreign and security policy makers. Its presence has put India on the psychological defensive in Kashmir; brought China into the Kashmir quarrel on Pakistan side; and enhanced Sino-Pakistani military cooperation. The decision to construct these northern routes and the energy responses of the Soviet Union and India, suggest the regional political significance of the KKH. Mahnaz Z. Isaphani, Roads and Rivals (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), p.201. also Quoted Bidanda M Chengapa, p.113

Additionally, India perceives that China would be in position to encircle India during any military confrontation and would undermine India’s intent of becoming Asia’s sole superpower.176 In view of the strategic concern over KKH, the then Indian foreign minister Danish Singh passed a statement in Lok Saba in 1969:177

This road will help extend the Chinese road network in the Tibet Sinkiang area into northern Kashmir. It will give easier access to Chinese troops from the areas under the legal occupation of China in north east Kashmir and from Tibet into the Gilgit area in Pakistan. Occupied Kashmir which lies to the north of the ceasefire line. The military significance of this road is therefore self-evident.

Apart from the Indian reservations, KKH became the main trade source between China and Pakistan. Both China and Pakistan agreed to sign to establish trade organization to handle overland in 1969.178 KKH is a milestone in endorsing the relationship and communication between the communities of Northern Areas of Pakistan and the Western region of China. It becomes a blessing for the residents of these regions to carry out their trade supplies rather than approaching the far- off main trade centers of Pakistan and China.

2.5.5 China’s Response during Indo-Pak War 1971

During 1969-1971, Pakistan was passing through a political turmoil. It ended up with military action in East Pakistan and resulted in a defeat in its war with India. It eventually dismembered Pakistan by the creation of Bangladesh. Pakistan once again anticipated China’s support in the war of 1971. China supported Pakistan and criticized India as an aggressor and USSR as a collaborator. The Chinese delegate Huang Hua said during UN Security Council debate:179

The present armed aggression by the Indian government against Pakistan is being carried out with the convenient, support and protection of the Soviet Union.

Pakistani leadership was confident in attaining China’s support.180 The Chinese factual position was not in favor of Pakistan and China’s officials had passed clear indication that China was not

176 Bidanda M Chengapa, p.114. The expansion of Morhun-Khunjeral pass connects with Lhasa Sinkiang highway and it encircles the North Western part of Jammu and Kashmir. So Srinagar becomes vulnerable if China precedes her forces from Tibet to Northern Kashmir during conflict with India. 177 Danesh Singh was quoted Bidanda M. Chengapa, p.114 178 Khalid Mahmood, p.12 179 ‘China Condemned Indian Aggression against Pakistan’ The New York Times (6,7 December 1971) 180Khalid Mahmood, p.14,

84 in a position to intervene in the war or even offer sufficient military assistance to deter Soviet backed Indian offensive.181

Sultan Muhammad Khan (the then foreign secretary during war) elaborated the China’s stance as:182

China never … held out any possibility of coming to Pakistan’s aid with her armed forces, and it is out of question of active Chinese military involvement and such an eventuality was never discussed.

Additionally, China assumed the Indo-Pak war 1971 a struggle between division and anti- division and aggression and anti-aggression and the subversion and anti-subversion.183 During the war of 1971, the US discontinued military aid to Pakistan from March 1971, and on November 1971 and the export of military equipment worth of $3.6 million was revoked. While arms supply from the USSR to India was continued as per the agreement between them. This eventually developed the existing military disparity between India and Pakistan.184

India followed Kutilya’s argument Samadhi (agreement with specific circumstances) and signed a treaty with the USSR in August 1971 about the supply of arm to India.185 In case of China’s entry into war, USSR was equipped to intrude for Indian support. The USSR

181 Anwar Hussain, p.152. China expressed official position on 1971 war by a letter which was public in April 12, 1971, which explains the Chinese stance on Indo-Pak war 1971:  China assumed the ‘happenings in Pakistan’ is an internal affair, should be settled by Pakistan in the absence of foreign interference.  China condemned the separatists as was reflected in the expression ‘the unity of the people of East and West Pakistan is the essential pre requisite for the prosperity and stability of Pakistan’.  China considered the separatists to be in a minority, ‘limited no of persons who have the intentions to sabotage the unification of Pakistan’.  As for suggesting the solution, China’s preference was to settle the issue through negotiations.  China accused USSR and US guilty of collusion with India. Additionally, China blamed India of flagrantly interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan.  China assured her firm assistance to Pakistan if, ‘the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan. The text letter was published in Pakistan Horizon, Karachi, second quarter, 1971. Also quoted Mehrunnisa Ali, ’China’s Diplomacy During the Indo-Pak War, 1971’ in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed), Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 1971-1998 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.34-35 182 Sultan Muhammad Khan, Memories and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat (London: London Centre for Pakistan Studies, 1999), pp308, 347 183 Ibid. Mehrunnisa Ali, p.41, the given intentions did not match with the basic principles of Sino-Pak relations. 184 Ibid. Mehrunnisa Ali, p.35 185 Disclosed The Times, London (6 November 1971)

85 pledged with India to start divisionary action in Sinkiang against China in case of latter’s intervention in Ladakh.186

China now faced two adversaries; the USSR on its north and India on its south. The USSR had the aspirations to encircle China with the collaboration of India.187 In such vulnerable environment, China planned to implement Sun Tzu’s deception188 and remained irrelevant during 1971 war. However, China continued military and economic assistance to Pakistan even after 1971 war.

Pakistan faced a critical phase during the war of 1971 when most of the military hardware was lost. China proved out to be a trustworthy friend and provided nine Shanghai-class motorboats of which could be converted for firing missiles.189 The most significant contribution to Pakistan’s defense was to establish Heavy Rebuild Factory to assemble T- 59 Tanks at Taxila in 1971.190 China provided almost 1000 tanks, more than 30 naval vessels, batteries, gun boats, surface to air missiles, light weapons, and ammunition.191 Although, China had limited resources to export tanks but Pakistan was provided with a considerable quantity of Type-59 tanks with a provision of mounting a 12.7 mm anti- aircraft gun.192

After the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, India could have asserted its hegemony in the region.193 In response, to uplift Pakistan after the war of 1971, China assisted Pakistan as much as to overcome the prevailing strategic environment. With the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, the balance of power in the South Asian region was imbalanced. In order to sustain balance of power and to contain India’s desires to become a regional superpower, China remained a time tested helpful friend.

186The Daily Telegraph, London, (10 January 1972) 187 Mehrunnisa Ali, p.45 188 See Reference 48. 189 Anne Gelks and Gerald Segal, China and Arms Trade (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985), p.70 190 Muhammad Ahsan Choudhari, p.323 191 Anne Gelks and Gerald Segal, p.64. The Chinese tanks are improved versions of Soviet battle tanks of the 1950s. 192 Ibid. Anne Gelks and Gerald Segal, p.64. 193 Mehrunnisa Ali, p.317. Savita Pande, p.71

China provided economic assistance to Pakistan. China started giving economic assistance even before and after 1971 by providing an interest free loans to Pakistan’s Five Years Plans194 After 1971 war, China converted four past loans of $ 170 million into grants and postponed the preceding loans of $ 200 million for twenty years.195 Likewise, China reaffirmed Pakistan’s support on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir after 1971 war,196 and Pakistani political leadership considered Chinese friendship as a strategic imperative for Pakistan’s security in future.197

Although, the 1971 war was not directly related to the Kashmir issue but its consequences had the impact on the future of Kashmir.198 A part from Kashmir issue, some other issues i.e. dispute on

194 China provided $ 60 million for Pakistan’s Third Five Year Plan (1965-70) and $200 million for Fourth Five Years Plan (1971-75). Pakistan Finance Division, Economic Advisor’s Wing, ‘Pakistan Economic Survey, 1966-67’ (Rawalpindi: 1967), p.215 and Pakistan Finance Division, Economic Advisor’s Wing, ‘Economy of Pakistan, 1948-68 (1968), pp. 330-1. Also quoted K.M.Arif, p. 274. Half of the loan was reserved for import of commodities and the other half for projects to be selected subsequently. Anwar Hussain, p.142. From 1970 to date, the Chinese economic support was mainly based on loans and credits. 195 Nilofar Mahdi, ‘Sino-Pak Relations: Historical Background’, Pakistan Horizo, vol.39, No.4, Fourth Quarter (1986), pp. 60-68. Also quoted Savita Pande, p.71 196 K.M.Arif, pp.133-134. 197 K.M.Arif, p.144, In April 1973, Mr Bhutto declared Pak-China friendship as the cornerstone of the foreign policy of Pakistan and in May 1974,expressed the views of the people of Pakistan in Beijing and paid tribute to the people and the leadership of China for providing unwavering solidarity with Pakistan during the darkest days of its history. 198Ibid. Rashid Ahmad Khan, p.93. After the war 1971, Shimla agreement was signed in July 1972 provided that both the states would resolve their disputes through bilateral talks, but India did not show seriousness in holding talks on Kashmir issue. See Rashid Ahmad Khan, p.93

87 water,199 Sir Creek and Siachin,200 engendered trust between India and Pakistan, but, Kashmir issue is the heart of hostilities between them. The present research gives possible solutions for

199At the time of partition, the distribution of water resources between the two states were not seriously addressed. At the time of partition, the engineers of both the states decided to opt ‘Standstill agreement’ until March 31, 1948 and permitted India to carry on the control on the headworks but India continued its control on the headworks after the expiry of the ‘Standstill Agreement’ and disconnected the supply of water to Pakistan. (Available at ‘Case Studies/Water Conflict Management and Transformation’ downloaded from www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu on July 1, 2013). With the collaboration of World Bank (WB), the two states signed ‘Indus Basin Treaty’ (IBT) at Karachi on September 19, 1960.The main points of the Treaty include;  An agreement that Pakistan would receive unrestricted use of the western rivers, which India would allow to flow unimpeded, with minor expectations.  Provisions for three dams, eight link canals, three barrages, and 2500 tube wells to be built in Pakistan.  A ten-year transit period, from April 1, 1960 to March 31, 1970 during which water would continue to be supplied to Pakistan according to detailed schedule.  A schedule for India to provide its fixed financial contribution of $ 62 million, in ten annual installments during the transition period.  Additional provisions for data exchange which gives the control of three rivers, (Indus, Chenab and Jhelum) to Pakistan and the remaining three (Beas, Ravi and Sutlej) to India. (Ibid). In addition, an international financial agreement was signed by the representatives of the governments of Australia, Canada, West Germany, New Zealand, Pakistan, The United Kingdom and the United States of America, for generating Indus Basin development fund of almost 900 million dollars to finance the construction of irrigation and other works in Pakistan. (Quoted from Ch. Muhammad Ali, p.330). Both the states strictly followed the treaty during 60’s but India developed first controversy in 1970 by constructing Salal dam on Chenab River (Shaheen Akhtar, ‘Emerging Challenges to Indus Water Treaty: Issues of Compliance and Trans boundary Impacts of Indian hydro projects on the Western Rivers’ p.30 downloaded from www.irs.org.pk at July 8, 2013). Pakistan showed serious reservations on Salal dam and both the states settled the issue without third party mediation and Pakistan succeeded to convince India to restructure its design (Ibid).In 1984, India created the controversy for the second time by constructing Wuller barrage/Tulbural hydropower on river Jhelum (Ibid).Pakistan believes that the project will generate stoppage while filling Mangla dam and India is utilizing the project as a political tool to coerce Pakistan (Shaheen Akhtar, p.33). Arjimand Hussain Talib analyzed the issue as: It is now well known among the water resources management experts that the basic idea behind the Wullar barrage project is not navigation but its use as a geostrategic tool to achieve geopolitical goals with Islamabad. (Arjimand Hussain Talib, ‘Soz’s Jhelum fantasy’, The Kashmir Times, Srinagar, (25 September 2007)). Apart from the bilateral talks of the two states, the issue is still live and no breakthrough is observed which force the two states in resolving the issue. Additionally, Kishanganga is another controversial project between the two states. Kishanganga is a hydroelectric plant and is designed to construct in Jahlum river basin by diverting Kishanganga River. Its construction was started in 2007 and was planned to complete in 2016. Pakistan has serious reservations because Pakistan is proceeding to construct Neelam-Jahlum hydropower project and assumes that Kishanganga project will reduce the power generating potential of Neelam-Jahlum project. On the other side, India stated that Kishanganga project will affect the 10 percent of the river flow. Pakistan refused to accept Indian stance and declares Kishanganga project as the violation of IWT and Pakistan approached International Court of Arbitration (ICA) on May 17, 2010 and succeeded to inspire ICA to issue the order to stop further development on Kishanganga project. Quoted from ‘Kishanganga Project: Decoded’ downloaded from www.simplydecoded.com/2013/23/Kishangagaproject at July 9, 2013). The two states are reluctant to accept the stances of each other. India denies Pakistan’s perception to Wullar (Tulbal) Baghlihar and Kishanganga and declares that Pakistan’s objections are basically political and not technical (Ramsawami R.Iyer, ‘South Asian Water Concerns,’ Current Affairs Digest (August 2005), p.103). Strategically, India is in advantageous position due to the upstream riparian of the main Indus tributaries while Pakistan is in vulnerable position due to lower riparian and Pakistani political elite has emphasized that the claim on Kashmir has the impact in resolving water disputes. Kashmir is the origin of the main tributaries of Indus including

88 resolving the issues between them including Kashmir issue, for the peace and stability of the South Asian region.

2.5.6 Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and Policy Motivation in Response to India’s Nuclear Program

In the beginning, Pakistan was not interested in making nuclear weapons and according to General Ayub Khan, ‘if Pakistan needed nuclear weapons capability, it could buy it’.201 The disparity of conventional weapons between India and Pakistan diverted Pakistan’s attention towards possessing nuclear weapons program to counter India’s conventional weapons superiority.

Jahlum and Chenab and Indian attempts to construct the hyderal projects in Kashmir always create ambiguities between the two states. Thus, the resolution of Kashmir issue has the direct impact on water issues which is addressed in next chapters. 200 Sir Creek is an old issue which was addressed before partition in 1914 by the Government of India concerning with the demarcation of boundary of the Creek which was the matter of concern between Sindh province and Kutch state (Khalid Mahmood, ‘Improving Indo-Pak Relations’ South Asian Journal (April-June 2011), p.34). At the time of partition, Pakistan’s position on Creek’s boundary was demarcated according to 1914 agreement (Ibid). Presently, this issue has become alive due to the changing course of River Indus and needs to determine the boundary (Ibid). Both the states have opposite stances relating to boundary as the Indian intention is to consider on the western side of the river on Sir Creek while Pakistan wants to draw on the eastern side (Ibid). Demarcation has the significance for the fishing communities of both the states because they face the danger of transgressing on the territorial waters of the other. Additionally, being the part of continental shelf, Sir Creek could become exclusive economic zone for the two states. Continental shelf is considered as the source of oil reserves and due to boundary dispute, the two states are unable to exploit the oil reserves (Quoted from Gareth Price, ‘India-Pakistan: Changing the Narratives’ downloaded from www.garethprice.com on September 4, 2012). The two states have the intentions to come to an agreement and they executed a joint survey and were close to resolve the issue (Ibid), but the whole practice became fruitless due to Mumbai attacks in 2008. Siachin is the world’s highest battleground and is not feasible for human habitation. Siachin is a 72 km long and 2/3 km wide glacier at a height more than 7000 meters and was uninhabited prior to 1984(Quoted Khalid Mahmood, ‘Improving Indo-Pak Relations’ South Asian Journal (April-June 2011), p.34). (Siachin is located in the disputed Kashmir region and is claimed by the two states. ‘The Siachin Glacier’ downloaded from www.siachinglacier.com on July 24, 2013). The main source of conflict over Siachin lies due to non-demarcation of the ceasefire line on the map known as NJ 9842 (Ibid). According to Karachi Agreement in 1949 and Shimla Agreement in 1972, it was presumed that NJ9842 is not feasible for human habilitation to survive and prior to 1984, the permanent presence of the two states is not observed (Ibid). However, India sent expeditions to this area in 1970s and moved its troops there in 1984 (Khalid Mahmood, p.34), while, Pakistan initiated expeditions during 1980s and the two states were involved in direct conflict in 1984 (‘The Siachin Glacier’ downloaded from www.siachinglacier.com on July 24, 2013). During 1989-1992, both the states planned to withdraw from the use of force and came to a comprehensive settlement and in 2004-2006, they agreed to work out on the schedule of disengagement but their attempts could not come to any conclusion (Khalid Mahmood, p.34). India was not intended to vacate the two positions while Pakistan stressed to vacate and declare them disputed and stressed to include them in an unsigned annexure to the agreement (Ibid). The two states are bearing heavy human and financial losses due to harsh weather conditions and they again initiated to resolve the issue during 2007 and 2012 but failed to sign the agreement (Gareth Price, ‘India-Pakistan: Changing the Narratives’ downloaded from www.garethprice.com on September 4, 2012). 201 Ayub Khan was quoted bt Samina Ahmad.’Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program, Turning Points and Nuclear Choices’. International Security, Vol.23. No.4 (Spring 1999). P.182.

Pakistan’s response was based upon its perception of insecurity from India. Z. A. Bhutto passed his famous statement: ‘if India acquired a nuclear bomb, we will make the bomb even if we eat grass’.202 The 1971 war reinforced Pakistan’s hostility towards India and its perspective of insecurity and forced to redefine Pakistan’s defense policy.203

The motivating factors for Pakistan to build nuclear weapons were based upon three critical factors:204

1. The decision was an immediate and direct outcome of the dismemberment of Pakistan in the war of 1971. 2. Pakistan assumed that India planned to manufacture nuclear weapons. 3. Pakistani political leadership especially Bhutto, presumed that the nuclear arsenals could assure the survival of Pakistan against Indian nuclear and conventional threats.

After the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, Z. A. Bhutto became the head of the state.205 Bhutto had robust aspirations for Pakistan to become a nuclear state since the times of Ayub regime.206 After assessing the India’s development in attaining nuclear weapon capability in 1972, Bhutto adopted nuclear weapons program and later recalled:207

On 20 January 1972, he (Bhutto) called a meeting of the scientists in Multan and asked them how they could contribute towards the security of the country to meet not only a major conventional threat but also a looming nuclear challenge from India. At this

202 Cited in Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and Postures’ in P.R.Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Iftikharuzzaman (eds), Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), p.10. Also quoted Samina Ahmad, p.183. 203 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, ‘Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence; Pakistan’s Posture’ in E.Sridhran (ed), India Pakistan Nuclear Relationship (New Delhi: Routledge, 2007), p.53. In early 1970s, despite relying upon the super powers, Pakistan pronounced to opt nuclear capability for counterbalancing India. 204 Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Past and Future’ in Olav Njolstad (ed), Nuclear Proliferation and International Order (New York: Routledge, 2011), p.28 205 Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party had won a majority of seats in West Pakistan during 1970 general elections. Initially, he became the civilian chief martial law administrator and the President and then became the Prime Minister of Pakistan. 206 Bhutto in 1958, as minister for fuel and power and in charge of atomic energy, had argued Ayub to initiate actively exploring the nuclear option, cited Samina Ahmad, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapon Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Option,’ International Security, Vol.23, No.4 (Spring 1999), p.182. In 1966, as Foreign Minister, Bhutto again expressed that if India acquired nuclear bomb, ‘even if Pakistanis have to eat grass, we will make the bomb,’ cited Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Politics; Attitudes and Postures’ in P.R.Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Iftikharuzzaman (eds), Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996),p.10 207 Munir Ahmad Khan, Nuclearization of South Asia and Its Regional and Global Implications: Focus on Regional Issues (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1998), p.11

gathering, Bhutto endorsed the idea of seeking nuclear capability for Pakistan and decided to completely reorganize the atomic energy in the country.

Following the 1972 decision, Bhutto himself was determined to supervise the nuclear program. He took the charge of the division of Nuclear Energy Affairs and made the chairperson of PAEC answerable only to him.208 In 1973, Bhutto initiated negotiations with France in order to procure nuclear reprocessing plant for the enrichment of plutonium. It was apparently for Pakistan’s civilian energy program.209 In March 1974, a research center for the development of nuclear weapons was developed in Wah having code-named ‘Research’.210

The Indian nuclear test of 1974 aggravated the politico-strategic disparity in South Asia and inserted immensely acute and complex security dilemma for Pakistan. Although, India claimed it to be a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) but Pakistan abandoned it and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (the than Prime Minister) expressed:211

A more grave and serious event has not taken place in the history of Pakistan.

To allay Pakistan’s apprehension, Indira Gandhi (the then Indian Prime Minister) wrote a letter to her Pakistani counterpart to assure that the explosion had no military, political or foreign policy implications.212 Bhutto remained highly unconvinced of Gandhi’s assurance and replied that ‘it is a question not only of intentions but of capabilities’ and added:213

It is well be established that the testing of a nuclear device is no different from the detonation of a nuclear weapon. Given this indisputable fact, how is it possible for our fears to be assuaged by mere assurances which may in any case be ignored in subsequent years? Governments change, as do national attitudes. But the acquisition of a capability, which has direct and immediate military consequences, becomes a permanent factor to be reckoned with. I need hardly recall that no non-nuclear-weapon state, including India, considered mere declarations of intent as sufficient to ensure their security in the nuclear age.

208Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program’ in Olav Njolstad (ed) Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, p.28 209 Samina Ahmad, p.184. 210 Bhumita Chakma, p.28 211 The former Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s statement in the National Assembly of Pakistan on June7, 1974, quoted by Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Case Study for a Nuclear Security Guarantee’ in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed) Readings in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: 1971-1998 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.267 212 Bhumitra Chakma, p.29 213 ‘The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Z.A.Bhutto’s Reply,’ Pakistan Horizon, Vol.XXVII, No.3, (Third Quarter 1974), pp.197-198. Quoted Bhumitra Chakma, p.29

The Indian nuclear test of May 1974 revived Bhutto’s promise to acquire the capability to formulate the nuclear weapons as he expressed, ‘Pakistan is intensively committed to become nuclear’.214 Agha Shahi (the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan) emphasized on the outcome of India’s PNE in Geneva: ‘now the road is open for the states to become sixth, seventh and eighth nuclear power’.215 To forewarn the international community about the hazards that Pakistan might be embedded due to India’s nuclearisation, Aziz Ahmad (former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs) stated in June 1974, that India has acquired enough material to make seventeen plutonium bombs. 216

Initially, Pakistan declared that its nuclear program was for peaceful purposes and to meet the energy requirements in future.217 In addition, Bhutto started mounting public opinion in favor of initiating the nuclear program with the financial support of the Islamic world.218 India’s PNE intensified Pakistan’s threat perception and security concern which are India’s centric according to its (Pakistan’s) strategic culture. Furthermore, PNE provoked security dilemma between India and Pakistan. Thus, PNE exacerbated Pakistan’s ‘Indo centric’ threat perception and disturbed South Asian strategic balance that compelled Pakistan to adopt realist assumption of balance of power. It initiated its nuclear weapons program to counter such strategic environment. It had to assure its security and survival. The proceedings relating to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program are elaborated in the succeeding chapter.

214 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy under Z.A. Bhutto and Zia ul Haq’ Strategic Studies, Vol.xiv, No.4, (Summer 1992), p.7 215 Agha Shahi was quoted by Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 84 216 Aziz Ahmad was quoted by Kamal Matinuddin, pp. 87-88. 217 Explained Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.159. During 1970s, when Pakistan planned to speed up its nuclear program, Pakistan was ranked the poorest region of the world in terms of energy production. The annual per capita electricity utilization in Pakistan was just 150 KWH which was the one tenth of the world average, explained in ‘Nuclear Power for Pakistan’ (Islamabad: Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, GOP, 1976), p.1. According to IAEC and PAEC estimation in 1975, and ‘Market Survey for Nuclear Power in the Developing Countries’ (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1975), pp. 6-7, a minimum per capita electricity requirement would be 800 KWH by the year 2000 and suggested to plan for generating the electricity up to 23000 MW. The study concluded that Pakistan had limited options for the electricity generation and declared the nuclear power production the most suitable option. 218 Ashok Kapoor, Pakisan’s Nuclear Development (London: Croom Helm Publishers, 1987), p.150

Conclusion

The strategic triangle (India-Pakistan and China) is a unique example in world’s history where the three neighboring countries have nuclear arsenals accompanied with the diversity of strategic cultures. The Indian strategic culture revolves around the philosophy of Kutilya (an ancient Hindu philosopher) and even in the present era, her hostility with China and Pakistan is also based on realism guided by Kutilya’s theory of security ‘Mandla’, and the Martial culture is the most prestigious fascination in Hindu society through which Indians aspire to attain regional supremacy. India argues that both China and Pakistan are main hindrance in its way of preeminence. India is involved in conflicts with China and Pakistan.

Pakistan’s strategic culture is derived from Islamic ideology and the legacies of the past extending to the pre-partition times of the Sub-continent. Pakistan’s security perceptions are Indo-centric, and both (India and Pakistan) are involved in conflicts. Kashmir issue is the main source of contention. Chinese Philosopher Sun Tzu explained Chinese strategic culture in his book ‘The Art of War’, and recommended guiding principles during war. Sun Tzu was in favor of limited war. The current Chinese war doctrine is also based on limited conflicts. China’s strategic culture is defensive in nature which compelled her to plan a strategy of active defense by enhancing its military modernization through economic prosperity.

The study in this chapter discussed the motives, due to which three states, China and India and Pakistan had fallen into conflicts during 1947-74. Initially, the Sino-Indian relations were based upon five principles of peaceful coexistence and remained brotherly till 1959 but both got involved in a territorial dispute which led to a full scale war in 1962. Indian aspiration of regional domination motivated her to seek a nuclear posture. Moreover, India presumed China’s 1964 nuclear experiment as an intimidation against its survival and its prestigious standing in the international community. Thus, India planned to accelerate its nuclear program and detonated nuclear test in May 1974. India’s nuclear determinations were according to Waltz’s argument about enhancing its international prestige and Kutilya’s arguments about Yana (preparing for war) and Samsaraya (seeking protection).

Both China and Pakistan have common security perceptions against India which inspired them to establish warm relations against a common enemy. So, Sino-Pak relations are mainly India

93 specific. China assisted Pakistan during Pak-India war 1965 and favored on Kashmir issue but could not openly support during the war of 1971 due to Indo-Soviet pact. However, China continued economic and arms assistance to Pakistan even after the war of 1971 which aggravated India’s security perceptions. In response, India’s conventional security preparations, including its nuclear test of 1974, generated security dilemma between India, Pakistan and China. Being smaller one among the three, Pakistan had serious apprehensions about security dilemma that invigorated its aspirations in establishing nuclear weapons program. This particular aspect is discussed in the coming chapters.

Chapter 3 Trilateral Strategic Relationship: 1975-98

Introduction

The Indian nuclear test in 1974 exacerbated the politico-strategic imbalance in South Asia and the disparities between the three states engaged them in an arms race. Being the smaller one, Pakistan’s predicament crafted its security dilemma more complex and acute. For overcoming the discrepancy, Pakistan accelerated its nuclear program while India persisted in intensifying its nuclear program. India’s nuclear intention compelled Pakistan to seek external backing and attained economic assistance from China and in civilian nuclear technology.1 During 1975-1998, India intended to wage war against Pakistan2 and nuclear factor provided the rationale due to which both the states avoided to inflict each other.

This debate generates following questions and this chapter seeks to answer them:

 How far does the three ‘S’ approach of realism elucidate the strategic behavior of the two states (India and Pakistan) during the pursuit of their nuclear programs?  How far did China espouse Pakistan during 1975-1998?  What was the impact of China on Indo-Pak deep rooted security concerns?  What was China’s response to India’s nuclear test of May 1998?  What was the role of nuclear deterrence during crisis between India and Pakistan?

To answer the questions stated above, the state’s response for the advancement of nuclear programs of India and Pakistan are analyzed by examining the three ‘S’ arguments of realists. China’s impact on Indo-Pak rivalries is evaluated by applying realist theory of balance of power. The disparities and the conflicts between the three states engaged them in an arms race and the realist theory of balance of power provides the arguments to comprehend South Asian strategic

1 For China’s assistance to Pakistan for military modernization, see references 189-192 of Chapter 2. For assistance in civilian nuclear technology, see reference 200. 2 India intended to wage a war during 1986-87 and in 1990, for details see references 170 and 202.

95 framework. It elucidates the main argument due to which the three states planned to become nuclear.

3.1 Identifying India’s Strategic Behavior: A Realist Three S Approach

India continued enhancing its nuclear arsenals after PNE, and the realist three S (State of War, Self-help and Survival) arguments provides an understanding of India’s strategic behavior during 1975-1998. For evaluating India’s ‘State of war’, there were multiple factors due to which India decided to enhance its nuclear program i.e. domestic politics, traditional threat perceptions, national security and its elite mindset. George Perkovich stated that domestic politics was the leading aspect in driving India’s nuclear program.3 Scott Sagan suggested a multidimensional justification of nuclear program, assimilating not only the domestic politics and national security but included norms and state identity also.4 Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V Paul emphasized the significance of geo-strategic aspects in determining India’s nuclear program. According to them, the main aspect of India’s nuclear program was its threat perceptions from China and Pakistan.5 Likewise, India’s leadership undertakes its nuclear program as the most central factor for assuring its security.6 As for as India’s political and religious mindset is concerned, they are staunch to eliminate Pakistan. According to Rashtriya Sevek Sangh (RSS), ‘Pakistan’s long-lasting aggression against India is restrained by dropping of nuclear bomb over Pakistan’.7 Thus, domestic politics, threat perceptions, national security and elite mindset generated diverse strategic environment about ‘State of war’ for India that diverted its attention towards uplifting its nuclear program which is evaluated by the present research.

Another imperative argument which cannot be disregarded relating to great powers response is especially the US proceedings for preventing India and Pakistan for procuring nuclear weapons.8

3 George Perkovish, India’s Nuclear Bomb (London: University of California Press, 1999), pp.6-7 4 Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb’ International Security, Vol. 21, No.3 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 65-66. Apart from adopting multidimensional approach, Sagan considered domestic politics the most important while explaining India’s quest of nuclear weapons. 5 Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V.Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.6-7 6 Ibid, pp.171-175 7 ‘The Punchajanya’ New Delhi (20 June 1999). 8 After the India’s nuclear test 1974, the US initiated its non-proliferation efforts particularly towards South Asia. Legislations of Nuclear Non –proliferation Act 1978, the Pressler and Symengton amendments were designed specially to keep India and Pakistan away for acquiring nuclear weapons.

Indian leaders denied in accepting non-proliferation regime by arguing that it was based upon gross disparity, in which the existing nuclear states availed the strategic and political advantages due to the possession of nuclear weapons, and relegated the remaining world to second-class status. As Jaswant Singh (the former Indian Advisor on Defense and Foreign Affairs) argued:9

The first 50 years of Indian independence reveal that the country’s moralistic nuclear policy and restraint paid no measureable dividends, except resentment that India was being discriminated against… Why admonish India… for not falling in line behind a new international agenda of discriminatory non-proliferation… Nuclear weapons powers continue to have, but preach to the have-nots to have even less.

Likewise, the post-Cold-War scenario aggravated India’s intent of obtaining nuclear weapons. With the collapse of Soviet Union, India was reluctant in relying upon former Soviet Union.10 So, the post-Cold-war development motivated India to follow second realist assumption ‘Self-help’ for augmenting its nuclear weapons program.

As for third realist assumption ‘Survival’ is concerned, there are various justifications of India’s nuclear program within this context. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program might be included in them that had another significant impact on India’s nuclear policy planning as C. Subramanian (former Indian Defense Minister) stated, ‘the concept of national defense must be reconsidered if countries like South Africa, Israel and Pakistan had become capable in developing nuclear weapons, India would have the option to instigate challenging decision about acquiring nuclear weapons’.11 Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 abruptly interrupted the South Asian strategic environment especially intensified India’s nuclear aspirations and generated more advantageous position for Pakistan vis-à-vis India. The US seemed Pakistan’s assistance against Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and suspended Symington Amendment that had applied economic restrictions against Pakistan.12 Reagan administration provided $ 3.2 billion military and economic assistance to Pakistan as a reward for its participation in the war against Soviet invasion in

9 Jaswant Singh, ‘Against Nuclear Aparthied’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, No.5 (September/October 1998), p. 43 10 Before disintegration, Soviet Union was India’s traditional ally and reliable arms supplier. Additionally, Soviet Union was India’s staunch supporter on Kashmir issue before the UN, and implied security guarantee to India for counterweight China according to Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty 1971. India presumed that this security guarantee is rendered invalid in post-Cold-war scenario. See Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Towards Pokhran II: Explaining India’s Nuclearisation Process’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol.39, No.1 (2005), p.227. 11 ‘India Cannot Foreclose Nuclear Options- Subramanian’, The Hindu (30 October 1979). 12 Bhumitra Chakma, pp. 220-221.

Afghanistan.13 Pakistan was also provided forty F-16 aircrafts and India raised serious reservations and expressed that Pakistan’s acquisition of F-16 would disturb the conventional balance of power between India and Pakistan.14 Similarly, India’s anxiety about nuclearisation remained exacerbated due to the statement of Zia ul Haq that Pakistan has possessed atomic weapon.15 China factor also intensified Indian determination about nuclear weapons because China conducted a series of nuclear tests during 1993-1995, and displayed nuclear arsenals in Tibet to target India.16 The aforesaid explanations were used by India to continue its nuclear program during post PNE strategic environment for reassuring its survival and security. Thus, India’s aspirations for promoting its nuclear program is based upon realist three S’s assumptions (State of war, Self-help and Survival) and its proceedings towards nuclear program after PNE are evaluated under the succeeding subsections.

3.2 India’s Nuclear Weapons Development Program and China’s Concerns

After the nuclear test of May 1974, India embraced a policy of ‘nuclear ambiguity’, neither denying nor confirming the pursuance of its nuclear weapons program.17 According to the annual report of Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the personal interpretation of Indira Gandhi relating to nuclear test 1974 is worth mentioning. During NBC’s Meet the Press Program in Washington D.C, Indira responded:18

Actually, the word I use is experiment, because that is what it was. We wanted to see whether by such an explosion or implosion, I don’t know what the scientific term is, whether this can be used for purposes like making dams up in the mountains or roads or something which otherwise is a very long and difficult process.

13 Ibid, p.221. 14 To pacify the India, US argued that arms assistance to Pakistan would reduce Pakistan’s template for obtaining nuclear weapons but India was not convinced. See Denis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies (Washington D.C: National Defense University Press, 1992), p.383. 15 See Reference 168. 16 Chandran. R, ‘New Chinese Missiles Target India’, The Times of India (11 July 1997). 17 Bhumitra Chakma, p.191. 18 Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: Statements on Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs [GOI], 1982), p.67. Also quoted Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, Its Implications for South Asia. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010). P.127

Furthermore, the discrepancies related to the PNE were also observed in the official arguments.19 The credibility of PNE was undermined not only at the domestic level but at the global level as well especially the United States and Canada condemned and the US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger in his official statement said:20

We deplored it strongly and made it clear to India that we do not see the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in India that would justify the doubts and insecurities that have been raised by the explosion.

3.2.1 The India’s Nuclear Policy during 1975-1980

Indira's Government lost its popularity due to the emergency imposed during the period of 1975- 77, and was defeated in the elections of 1977.21 Morarji Desai of Bhartia Janta Party (BJP) succeeded Indira Gandhi in 1977. He was not in favor of further advancement of India’s nuclear program and decided not to pursue the development of nuclear weapons.22 Although, his plan for suspending further advancement of nuclear weapon program was based upon his disagreement that PNE would not serve any economic or peaceful technological objective, but he was criticized that his initiative to deferment was due to US pressure.23 Desai's government was determined to maintain what had already been attained due to PNE. The US exerted pressure on India to sign NPT and accept the full-scope safeguards.24 Desai renounced US demand unless all the nuclear states signed a comprehensive test ban treaty.25 Surprisingly, Desai had strong viewpoint against

19 Dr. Sethna (the in-charge of explosion) was doubtful about the peaceful application of the nuclear test and he expressed, ‘it is too early to give an indication, I would like to impress upon you that we are looking into it’. Likewise, Raja Ramanna was straightforward in replying about peaceful application of test as, ‘Personally, I believe that it will not be useful for the next twenty years. But in the next century, if one wanted to make a hole in ten minutes or so, then there might be a case for one’. The above mentioned statements of Dr. Sethna and Raja Ramana were analyzed by Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, and Its Implications for South Asia, p.127 20 The response by Dr. Kissinger is contained in a Department of State letter written on his behalf by Robert J. McCloskey, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, to Senator Abraham Ribicoff, chairman, committee on Government Operations, United States, 2 June 1976 (Washington D.C.: National Security Archives, 1989). 21 Arpit Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: China, India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p.212 22‘Statement of the Prime Minister Morarji Desai on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions’ in Rajya Sabha, published by Press Information Bureau New Delhi on 31 July 1987. Also expressed in ‘The India’s Nuclear Weapon Program, The Long Pause: 1974-89’ downloaded from www.nuclearweaponarchieve.org/india/indiapause.hml on April 6, 2014. 23 Paul F. Power, ‘The Indo-American Nuclear Controversy’, Asian Survey, Vol.19, No. 6 (June 1979), pp.582-583 24 During a visit by US President Jimmy Carter to India in January 1978, it was demanded to sign NPT and to accept application of full-scope safeguards on the Indian nuclear program. 25 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, and Its Implications’ for South Asia, p.211

99 the development of nuclear weapons before taking the charge of the government but supported the preservation of nuclear option until and unless all the nuclear weapons states accepted subsequent limits on their respective nuclear programs.26 Desai’s restraint related to India’s nuclear weapons program and inclination towards exploring a solution about nuclear proliferation enhanced India’s impression of a moderate stance as compared to Indira’s government.

During Desai's regime, India did not perceive any conventional or nuclear threat from Pakistan and China. In spite of existing boundary disputes between India and China, the Sino-Indian relations became stronger.27 Moreover, Pakistan’s acquisition of sophisticated arms did not create any misperception between the two states and both were involved in the process of normalizing their relations.28 Desai's government did not exploit Pakistan’s involvement in Afghan crisis during 1979.29

Domestic conflicts led to the collapse of Desai's government in early mid-1979 and Desai was replaced by Charan Singh. He modified India’s traditional nuclear policy developed by Nehru and decided to pursue the policy intended by Shastri and Indira Gandhi. Singh was the first to express officially from India related to Pakistan’s nuclear program. In fact, Pakistan’s nuclear potential was given a center stage in India’s nuclear policy in 1979. The annual report of India’s Ministry of Defense 1979-80 highlighted the hazardous allegations of the expected transfer of Western military technology to Pakistan and China and Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapon technology compelled India of close surveillance.30 At that time, Pakistan had not achieved any significant success in attaining nuclear weapons technology and even no threat was perceived by the Indians. During the short tenure of the government of Janata Party, India’s nuclear weapons program was put on hold.31

26 Gurmeet Kanwal quoted Morarji Desai, ‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Policy’ downloaded from www.idsa-india.org on April 6, 2014 27 Annual Report 1978-79, Ministry of Defense, Government of India (New Delhi: GOI, 1979), p.1 28 Annual Report 1977-78, Ministry of Defense, Government of India (New Delhi: GOI, 1978), p.2 29 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, Its Implications’ for South Asia, p.214

30 Report 1979-80, Ministry of Defense, Government of India (New Delhi: GOI, 1980). P.2 31 Volha Charnysh, ‘India’s Nuclear program’ downloaded from www.charnysh_india_analysis.pdf on April 5, 2014

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3.2.2 India’s Nuclear Policy during Second Tenure of Indira's Government (1980-1984)

Indira Gandhi returned to power for the second time in January 1980 and announced the resumption of India’s nuclear weapons programs. In March 1980, she reaffirmed government’s plan in Rajyia Sabha that ‘India is interested in the peaceful usage of nuclear energy but will not be reluctant to undertake nuclear explosion in its national interest’.32 She again expressed anxiety within a month about acquisition of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and the enlargement of China’s nuclear weapons program.33 She emphasized; ‘India must formulate an in-depth awareness about the nuclear programs of neighboring countries. In addition, it was essential that India must proceed for latest nuclear developments’.34 It was a typical clarification of the preceding policy of ambiguity due to which her government had taken during post PNE.35

At that time, India adopted dubious posture and apparently pronounced to carry out more PNEs but on the other side, provided assurances to the US authorities for not conducting PNE during a particular time frame.36 India’s assurance was conditional subject to the US efforts to keep Pakistan away from acquiring nuclear weapons capability.37 Reports of Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons potential further augmented India’s nuclear threat perception from Pakistan.38 In late 1982, Washington Post reported that:39

India’s military commanders had prepared a contingency plan for launching an air strike on Pakistan’s uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta and the small reprocessing facility at PINSTECH in Rawalpindi.

Indira's government articulated the urgency to watch ‘utmost vigilance’ related to the reports about Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons.40 Due to its perception of a worsening security

32 ‘Gandhi Says National Interest May Require Nuclear Blasts’ Washington Post (14 March 1980) 33 Worldwide Report: Nuclear Development and Proliferation, No.37, 3 April 1980, p.21 34 Ibid 35 Worldwide Report: Nuclear Development and Proliferation, No.40, 25 April 1980, p.41 36 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, Its Implications for South Asia, p.215. The existence of such understanding was verified when Eric Gonsalves (the then Indian Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs) presented a classified assurance to James L. Malone (the then State Department Official In-charge of Proliferation) that India would not execute a ‘PNE in a current timeframe’, expressed in ‘US was Given Assurance against Nuclear Blast’, The Hindu (22 February 1982). 37 Ibid. ‘US was Given Assurance against Nuclear Blast’, The Hindu (22 February 1982). 38 Annual Report 1981-82, Ministry of Defense, Government of India (New Delhi: GOI, 1982). P.2 39 Milton R. Benjamin, ‘India Said to Eye Raid on Pakistani Plant’ Washington Post (20 December 1982) 40 Annual Report 1982-83, Ministry of Defense, Government of India (New Delhi: GOI, 1983). P.2

101 condition, India’s government decided to respond properly by maintaining full defense surveillance.41

The Indo-US deal came under strain in 1983 when it was reported that India was planning for another nuclear test at Pokhran.42 In 1984, Indira's government decided to accelerate work on the expansion of its nuclear program.43 Her government was involved in the expansion of nuclear weapons capability until her assassination in October 1984. In response to India’s nuclear preparations, Pakistani resources assumed a severe nuclear threat in any conflict in future and planned to focus on this development as a fundamental assumption for their strategic estimations.44

India’s security environment during 1980s was described by a perception of Pakistan due to the supply of armed equipment ‘as a frontline state’ by the West. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan provided the opportunity for Pakistan to become a ‘part of the so called strategic consensuses’.45 The supply of sophisticated arms to Pakistan was considered overrated about its ‘legitimate defense requirement’. India had the apprehension that the massive supply of military weapons to Pakistan would distress the balance in the South Asian region.46 The US financial and military assistance package of $3.2 billion to Pakistan was assumed as an expression of Pakistan’s renewed strategic significance for the US.47 The continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan provided the opportunity for Pakistan to have taken full advantage by projecting its role as a frontline state and obtained latest and sophisticated weapons.48

3.2.3 India’s Nuclear Policy under Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989)

Rajiv Gandhi came to power after her mother’s assassination in October 1984. During his first six months in office, he was preoccupied by the news of Pakistan’s nuclear potential and repeatedly accentuated India’s nuclear policy in order to contain Pakistan’s nuclear danger. In April 1985, he expressed that India’s nuclear policy of not attaining nuclear arsenals is being reviewed due to

41 Annual Report 1983-84, Ministry of Defense, Government of India (New Delhi: GOI, 1984), p.2 42 Washington Post (23 June 1983) 43 ‘Shadow of an Indian H-Bomb’, Foreign Report, (13 December 1984), pp. 1-2 44 Stephen P. Cohen, Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.153 45 Annual Report 1981-82, Ministry of Defense, Government of India (New Delhi: GOI, 1982), p.1 46 Ibid. 47 Annual Report 1982-83, Ministry of Defense, Government of India (New Delhi: GOI, 1983), p.1 48 Annual Report 1984-85, Ministry of Defense, Government of India (New Delhi: GOI, 1985), p.1

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Pakistan’s nuclear threat.49 He further explained; ‘if we are determined in becoming nuclear power, we would make it in a few weeks or few months’.50 Rajiv’s claim could not be detached from India’s announcement related to its long term project Dhurva (the world’s largest safeguards-free research rector) with the capacity of producing 25kg plutonium annually, which was expanded lately.51 During 1985-86, Pakistan’s pursuit for nuclear weapons capability endured to dominate India’s threat perceptions.52 India considered Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability as a severe threat for its security,53 and started producing nuclear arsenals in late 1986.54 In 1987, India’s perceptions further heightened due to Pakistan’s proclamation related to acquiring nuclear weapons capability.55 This perception aggravated India to reconsider its options due to Pakistan’s acquisition of sophisticated weapons which India declared ‘beyond its need’ and presumed ‘the most serious outcomes for its security’.56

Under the wrath of Pakistan’s nuclear threat, India accomplished significant advancements in its nuclear weapons capability. Leonard Spector illustrated a change of ‘historic proportions’ in India’s security environment during Rajiv's regime due to the reports about Pakistan’s attainment of the ‘essentials of a rudimentary nuclear deterrent of about three to six nuclear devices’.57 In early 1987, India accelerated its nuclear development program especially the production of weapons-grade plutonium.58 Rajiv's government was determined to counter Pakistan’s nuclear threat and reiterated its commitment to maintain technological supremacy over Pakistan. In March 1988, it was reported that India had fabricated several low-yield nuclear weapons.59 In May 1989,

49 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, Its Implications’ for South Asia, p.218. Rajiv again stated within month that India would reconsider its nuclear policy to counter Pakistan’s quest of nuclear weapons capability. ‘India to Review Nuclear Policy, Says Rajiv,’ The Washington Post (5 May 1985) 50 Ibid. 51 Research Reactors at Trombay (Bombay: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre [GOI], 1987), pp.1-2 52 Annual Report 1985-86, Ministry of Defense, Government of India (New Delhi: GOI, 1986). p.3 53 Ibid. 54 Richard Sale, ‘India Said to Upgrade Nuclear Arsenal’, United Press International, 25 April 1988, cited Leonard S.Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Ma: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), p.100 55 Dr. A.Q.Khan disclosed Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapon capability during an interview with an Indian Journalist, (Ref.79). 56 Annual Report 1986-87, Ministry of Defense, Government of India, p.2 57 Leonard S.Spector, p.88 58 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, Its Implications for South Asia, p.219. 59 ‘India has a Nuclear Arsenals’ The Independent (22 March 1988).

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William Webster (the former CIA Director) stated that ‘there were several indications related to India’s involvement in nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.60

During his regime, Rajiv developed a formidable conventional military infrastructure. India sustained the world’s 3rd largest military, 4th largest air force and 5th largest navy and its overall conventional armed forces ranked as the 4th largest armed power after the US, the former Soviet Union and China.61 The huge power set up exhibited India’s perception to attain a global rank in the international political system. India’s conventional power build-up support advocated by nuclear weapons capability was not only for boosting its security and foreign policy objectives to counterbalance China and Pakistan, but also contemplated to establish India’s role as a regional great power. Giri Deshingkar (former Director of the Center for the Study of developing Areas) noted:62

It is an aggression of things that can happen…. (Emphasis added). There are shifting perceptions of who a potential opponent might be. Sometimes its Pakistan, sometimes its China, alternatively may be the (US) 7th fleet…. having acquired a solution, you look for the problem.

Western ambassadors in New Delhi assumed that India has a serious intention to be viewed as a world power.63 Thus, Rajiv initiatives to intensify various elements of nuclear weapons capability according to realist assumption of Self-help indicate that India has the aspiration to get a great power status.

3.2.4 India’s Nuclear Policy in the Post- Gandhi Era (1989-1998)

After Rajiv’s regime, India came into an era of coalition governments and many of whom did not complete their tenures except Narsima Rao. V.P Singh of Janata Party became the Prime Minister in November 1989 and continued with the earlier India’s nuclear policy without making any major change. However, he had to tolerate the political pressure in dealing with his coalition allies like BJP, a conservative Hindu Party, which pronounced an open support to India’s nuclear weapons

60 William Webster was quoted by Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, Its Implications for South Asia, p.220 61 This conclusion is based upon a comparative assessment from Military Balance 1989-1990 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990). 62 Giri Deshingkar, ‘India Building up Military Power beyond Regional Needs’, the daily Jang London (19 June 1989). 63 ‘Super power Rising’, Weekly Time Magazine (3 April 1989), p.13

104 program in its election manifesto.64 V.P.Singh was willing to initiate dialogue with Pakistan on the issue of nuclear weapons but warned that India would not compromise on its nuclear policy of not manufacturing the nuclear weapons if Pakistan produced such weapons.65 However, V.P.Singh secretly continued further development of nuclear weapons program.66 The world community also noticed India’s advancement in its nuclear program. In late 1989, the West German authorities revealed the illegal export of 250 metric tons of heavy water to India.67 In April 1990, Romania’s president disclosed that the former communist government had supplied 12.5 tons of Norwegian heavy water to India.68 India’s intention in relying on clandestine nuclear purchase for the expansion of its nuclear capability disclosed its factual aspirations for the development of nuclear weapons.69 In early 1990, Indo-Pak peace process reached imminent collapse due to the rise of freedom movement in Indian-held Kashmir, which precipitated the prospect of another war on the Kashmir issue.70 It was predicted that if a war broke out, both the states would not hesitate to employ nuclear weapons.71After evaluating the Kashmir crisis1990, K.Snuderji (the then Indian Army Chief) expressed India’s standpoint:72

The Indian citizen has every right to expect that India, having mastered the technology in 1974, is in the year of grace, 1990, and he would expect India, very short order, to have usable nuclear weapons also, if required.

Chandar Shaker replaced V.P.Singh in late 1990 and he became the Prime Minister for a short tenure (seven months). The Shaker government was unable to take any significant decision about nuclear weapons program due to short lived and political instability. New elections were held in June 1991 and during election campaign, the Congress Party had suffered heavy loss of Rajiv Gandhi’s tragic death in a terrorist’s suicidal bomb blast. Narasimha Rao became the Prime Minister in June 1991 and he completed his full tenure of four years. Narasimha Rao had close association with Indira and Rajiv Gandhi. It was predicted that he would carry on the nuclear

64 ‘India Should Produce Nuclear Weapons’, Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly (2-8 October 1989), pp.2-3 65 Quoted by Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.225 66 Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder: Westview Press for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1990), p.78 67 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, Its Implications for South Asia, p.226 68 Michael Gordon, ‘Romania is Reported in Nuclear Deal with India’ New York Times (30 April 1990). 69 Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, p.78 70 ‘Growing Fears of Clash over Kashmir’, Financial Times (30 January 1990). 71 Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, p.79 72 General K Sunderji, ‘The Nuclear Threat’ India Today (30 November 1990), p.94

105 policy of expanding the nuclear weapons capability.73 Before taking the charge as Prime Minister, he had repeatedly supported India’s right to continue more PNEs if required for national interest and rejected the suggestions of the submission of full-scope safeguards on its nuclear weapons program.74 Narasimha Rao was appreciated due to his serious attention of uplifting nuclear weapons program I.K.Gujral expressed about nuclear program that ‘the nuclear tests were both foreseeable and unavoidable’.75

The endorsement of US backed Brown Amendment in 1995 augmented additional strategic pressure against India followed by the NPT which was preceded towards CTBT in1996.76 India concluded that once CTBT is implemented, it would be politically problematic to conduct nuclear tests.77 Thus, for overcoming such critical situation, Narasimha Rao’s government decided to follow France and China, who conducted nuclear tests before joining CTBT, and permitted the preparation of nuclear test in late 1995.78 The US had reportedly noticed India’s arrangements at its nuclear test-site at Pokhran in December 1995 for executing a nuclear test but it was not materialized due to US pressure.79 Narasimha Roa’s government ended in March 1996, and H.V. Deve Goda and I.K.Gujral came into power for less than two years from May 1996-March 1998. However, their governments were not politically confident to initiate any significant pronouncement related to nuclear weapons program. The BJP came back to power after the general elections of Feb-March 1998. During election campaign, BJP promised that it would reassess India’s nuclear policy. After becoming the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee decided to appoint a strategic review committee.80 Based on the submissions of the committee, India’s government carried out five nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 named as Pokhran II. India’s aspirations behind nuclear tests of May 1998 were according to realist three S’s approaches, and for obtaining various advantages, i.e. accomplishing the status of regional superpower, for acquiring greater leverage in the world community and especially for containing both China and

73 Narasima Rao was initially the Minister of External Affairs but then became the Minister for Home Affairs under Rajiv Gandhi. 74 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, Its Implications for South Asia, p.227 75 I.K.Gujral, Continuity and Change: India’s Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2003), p.xxi 76 Indrajeet Singh and Perdeep Kumar Singh, ‘India’s Nuclear Weapon Program: An Analysis’, Scholars View: A New Way of Thinking, Vol.1, No.1 (January 2009), p.91, downloaded from www.cdsrs.org on March 30, 2014. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, Its Implications’ for South Asia, p.227 80 Indrajeet Singh and Perdeep Kumar Singh, p.92

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Pakistan. The present research seeks to evaluate the consequences of nuclear tests of May 1998 on the security dilemma between India-Pakistan and China in the following chapters.

3.2.5 China’s Response on Pokhran II

Pokhran II resulted in a downturn in its relations with China. Prior to tests, India accused China as ‘the number one potential threat’.81 China was charged for nuclear proliferation in South Asia by “aiding and abetting Pakistan’s nuclear program”,82 The Indian Prime Minister wrote a letter to US President thus:83

I have been concerned at the deteriorating security environment, especially the nuclear environment, faced by Indian for some years past. We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although, our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust, that country has mainly helped another neighbor of ours to become covert nuclear weapon state. At the hands of this bitter neighbor, we have suffered three aggressions in the past 50 years.

In response to India’s letter to the US President, the Chinese officials perceived it an India’s attempt to drive a wedge between the US and China and ‘to align itself as a potential ally with the US against China and to encounter her in the region’,84 and responded:85

The Chinese side pointed out that the Indian leaders have recently made speeches slandering China, severely hurting the feelings of the Chinese people and destroying the good atmosphere of steady improvement in relations between the two countries. We strongly demand that India immediately stop all the gratuitous attacks against China and take concrete steps to steer the bilateral relation onto the track of normalcy as early as possible. The two sides made no progress on the border issue.

China responded with a strong rhetoric and decided to follow its policy of ruthless opposition against India’s nuclear program. While, the major powers intended to accept India’s nuclear

81 T.V. Paul quoted George Fernendus (Former Indian Foreign Minister) in ‘Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/ Missile Ties and Balance of Power Politics’ p.26 downloaded from www.dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700308436928 on March 3, 2012 82 Ibid. 83 Quoted Bidanda M Chengappa, ‘India-China Relations: Post Conflict Phase to Post-Cold War Period’ (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 2004), p.191 84 T. V. Paul, ‘Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear Missile Ties and Balance of Power Politics’, Non-Proliferation Review, Vol.10, No.2, (Summer 2003), p. 27 85 Bidanda M. Chengapa quoted, p. 193

107 capability, China adopted firm stance and demanded India to rollback its nuclear program and follow UN Security Council resolution 1172.86 China adopted the policy of restraining India by increasing military buildup and by providing arms assistance to its ally Pakistan. This was noted by Western analysts as well and according to Ian Johnston, ‘the dominant motivation in arming Pakistan has been to ‘help divert Indian military resources away from China’.87 According to Robert Ross:88

China continues its support for Pakistan by supplying nuclear and missile technologies because China views as a credible Pakistani deterrent as the most effective way to guarantee the security of its sole ally in Southern Asia against Indian power. China views its relationship with Pakistan as somewhat similar to the US relationship with Israel.

China has the intentions to behave like superpower not only on regional but on global level. Both India and China have the aspirations to exercise regional dominance.89 The two states are behaving as an old Chinese’s proverb, “one mountain cannot accommodate two tigers”.90 India’s current security and military threat perception is China specific while China assumes itself as the Asia- Pacific’s sole ‘Middle Kingdom’ and pretends India as the peer competitor on the way of becoming Asia’s sole super power.91 After the nuclear tests of 1998, China surmised that India had the intentions of becoming global military power and contained China by taking control over Indian Ocean.92 For containing India, China followed the India’s Kutilya’s concept of ‘mandala’ or encirclement which has the resemblance with Chinese proverb, (yuan jiao jin gong), develop friendly relationships with more distant neighbors and be prepared for war against adjacent neighbors.93

86 J.Mohan Malik, ‘South Asia in China’s Foreign Relations’ Pacific Review, Vol.13, No.1 (February 2001), p.79. Quoted Bidanda M. Chengapa, p, 192. The UN Security Council Resolution 1172 demanded that India and Pakistan should restrain from further tests, terminate development of ballistic missiles with capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons and additional production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. 87 Ian Johnston, ‘International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy’ in Kim Samuel (ed), China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (Oxford: West view Press, 1998), p.63. 88 Robert S. Ross, ‘Engagement in US-China Policy’ in Alastair Ian Johnston and Robert S.Ross (eds), Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p.193. Aslo quoted T. V. Paul, p. 24. 89 Arpit Rajain, p.404 90 Quoted J. Mohan Malik, p.74. 91 J. Mohan Malik, p.74. 92Ibid, p.78. 93 For the details about Kutilya’s concept of ‘mandala’, see References 10-11 of Chapter 2. China has established friendly relations with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka for deploring India’s big brother and hegemonic stance by

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For India’s containment, China is busy in arms sale to the states around India and approximately 90 % of its arms sale to the bordering states of India.94

3.3 Identifying Pakistan’s Strategic Behavior: A Realist Three S Approach

Since its inception in 1947, India is a main threat for Pakistan. The track record of Indo-Pak rivalries indicated that the two states are the hostages of past due to India’s military superiority and hegemonic size, India has intended to acquire dominant role in the South Asian region and Pakistan has assumed a potential threat for its sovereignty.95 To comprehend Indo-centric threat perception, Pakistan glorified the martial qualities and martyrdom that cause greatest damage to the enemy and realist three ‘S’ thought provides base in understanding the Pakistan’s response in the aftermath of India’s PNE. State of war is a condition where there is no actual conflict, but a permanent Cold War that could become a ‘hot’ war at any time.96 Pakistan has a strong aversion to Indian domination and intends to contain it by enhancing military modernization which creates a ‘state of war’ between the two states. India’s PNE extended severe security concerns for Pakistan especially for its political and territorial sovereignty. Both India and Pakistan share 1600 km long common border which is occasionally violated and their troops are deployed and both the states are occasionally involved in exchange of fire along LoC. Any miscalculation and internal turbulence may drift towards conflicts between the two states.97 Such frenzy strategic environment compelled Pakistan to restructure its defense policy and for overcoming the ‘state of war,’ Pakistan decided to adopt nuclear posture.

Self-help explicates the state of affairs in the presence of an anarchical environment, when states cannot assume that other states will come to their defense even if they are allies.98 For assuring its

emphasizing to treat all the states equally irrespective of their size and population, elaborated J. Mohan Malik, pp.75- 78. 94 J. Mohan Malik, p.74. China’s biggest client is Pakistan that receives 35%, Bangladesh procures 20%, and Mayanmar acquires 16%. While, Sri Lanka and Nepal also trade arms with China. During 2011-2015, China’s arms sale to Pakistan was $2988 million, Bangladesh $1650 million and Myanmar $ 1338, downloaded from www.gz.com/621884/china-is-the-world-fastest-trowing-arms-exporter-thanks-to-the-nations-surrounding-india on December 14, 2016. 95 Aysha Siddiqa Agha, ‘Pakistan’s Security; Problems of Linearity’ South Asian Journal, Lahore, p.36, downloaded from www.southasianmedia.net/journals/journal/03-South-Asian-Security-Dilemmas on March1, 2014 96 Tim Dunne and Brain C. Schmidt, ‘Realism’ in John Baylis and Steve Smith (ed) ‘The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations’ (New York, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.150. 97 Kamal Matinuddin, ‘Nuclearization of South Asia’, Regional Studies, Vol.xvi, No.3 (1998), p.35. 98 Tim Dunne and Brain C. Schmidt, p.158

109 security and survival, Pakistan joined regional alliances, SEATO and CENTO during 1950s. Apart from signing defense pacts with Pakistan, the US and its allies provided substantial military assistance to India after the Sino-India conflict 1962.99 During this era, India succeeded to obtain military assistance from the Soviet Union.100 Although, the military assistance to India was provided for containing China but Pakistan had fears that India would use its newly acquired military power against Pakistan.101 During 1965 war, the aforementioned alliances became irrelevant and despite providing the assistance, the US imposed arms embargo on Pakistan which seriously undermined Pakistan’s combat effectiveness.102 A Pakistani writer Khurshid Hyder commented on US embargo as:103

The embargo had serious repercussions on Pakistan’s defense capability and was one of the factors which contributed to its dismemberment in 1971.

Pakistan had lots of expectations from China’s support during war of 1971 but China was unable to assist militarily and simply provided a diplomatic support.104 Pakistan determined to acquire self-sufficiency in arms and ammunition after 1971 war. A Defense Production Division was established by the Ministry of Defense in 1973 to endorse the indigenous production of arms and ammunition.105 Pakistan’s acquisition of self-sufficiency and her aspiration for nuclear technology after the Indian nuclear tests of 1974 provides a comprehensive understanding in explaining the realist concept of ‘self-help’. Likewise, Survival is the main objective of all the states and according to Henry Kissinger:106

99 Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Defense Policy’ in Syed Farooq Hasnat and Anton Pelinka (eds), Security for the Weak Nations (Lahore: Azhar Sons, 1987), p.110. The US, UK, Canada and Australia supplied military assistance to India included arms and ammunition aircraft and communication equipments. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. The political leadership of Pakistan was convinced that India had no intention of fighting against China but was simply using bogey to amess sophisticated weapons from the West. 102 Ibid, p.111. 103 Khurshid Hyder, ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in the Early Seventies’ in Masuma Hassan (ed), Pakistan in a Changing World (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Relations, 1978), p.106 104 The main arguments due to which China did not provide arms support to Pakistan is already be explained in Chapter No. 2 105 Hasan Askari Rizvi, p.111. Under the management of Defense Production Division, Wah Ordinance Factory was extended and restructured and three more ordinance factories were established near Wah.By mid-seventies, Pakistan attained self-sufficiency in several types of small weapons. Technical and financial assistance was sought from China and Soviet Union to set up a heavy mechanical complex and a steel mill respectively. A Mirage rebuild and overhaul factory was established with the collaboration of France and China cooperated to set up F-6 rebuild complex and a Tank rebuild factory. 106 Hinery Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 3rd edn (New York: WW Norton, 1977), p.204

110

A nation’s survival is the first and ultimate responsibility. It cannot be compromised or put to risk.

The historical realists such as Machiavelli, Meinecke and Weber emphasized the survival as the first priority of the state.107 Soon after the inception, survival was a key challenge that Pakistan had to face due to Indian hostilities. Pakistan intensified a number of security handicaps due to Indian hegemony. Pakistan has lack of territorial depth and the main communication line exists parallel to the Indo-Pak border. The major cities of Pakistan are located in the vicinity of the border which makes convenient for Indian troops to confront during conflict. Initially, Pakistan was required a well-equipped and highly professional army to keep India away from any aggression but inherited a small, weak, ill-equipped and disorganized military. India repudiated to transfer the Pakistan’s due share of armament and equipment of the former Indian Army. Pakistan was not even given a single ordnance factory at the time of partition.108 For the sake of its survival, Pakistan planned to modernize Pak Army.109

Additionally, after India’s PNE, Pakistan determined to adjust with new realities in a rational way by adopting a viable policy options to neutralize India’s nuclear intimidation. Initially, Pakistan intended to promote peace in the region according to the negotiating techniques of its strategic culture and insisted before the UN General Assembly to declare the South Asian region as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ), but India abandoned it.110 The Indian denial was based upon

107 Quoted Tim Dunne and Brain C. Schmidt, p.158 108 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Story of Pakistan Army (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1976), pp.36-37 109For overcoming the deficiencies and providing the rapid technological advancement to Pak Army, Three Major aspects were adopted: 1. Pakistan was on its way to reorganization of its armed forces when got involved in first Pak-India war 1948. This made it essential for Pakistan to accelerate the process of military modernization and to take concrete steps to meet with the urgent needs of latest weapons. 2. For the training of newly selected army officers, a military academy at Kakul was established in 1948 and selected officers were sent to Commonwealth countries for specialized and technical training. 3. For the regular supply of arms to Pak Army, Pakistan planned to erect an ordinance factory which was inaugurated in 1951 at Wah. Explained Hasan Askari Rizvi, pp.107-108 110 Zamlay Khalilzed, ‘Pakistan: The Making of a Nuclear Power, Asian Survey Vol.XVI, No.6 (June 1976), pp.580-592. Akhter Ali, ‘Indian Nuclear Alibi’ Pakistan and Gulf Economist (April 10-16, 1982), pp.8-17. Hasan Askari Rizvi, p.114. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Case Study for a Nuclear Security Guarantee’ in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed) Readings in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: 1971-1998 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.267-268. Michael Hamel-Green, ‘Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Initiatives: Challenges and Opportunities for Regional Cooperation on Non- Proliferation,’ Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 21, No.3 (October 2009), p.363. Savita Pande, ‘Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia’ downloaded from www.idsa.india.org on March 4, 2014. Savita Pande argued about Indian disagreement by quoting the then Defense Minister Subramanian as “once the nuclear weapon-free

111 the fear that by the approval of NWFZ, India might have to forego its nuclear option.111 India had a concerns that, ‘if the UN become unable to implement general nuclear disarmament, then the states would intend to acquire nuclear arsenals like India’.112 Despite applying NWFZ in the South Asian region, India intended to enforce it in the remaining regions.113 Pakistan sought the assurances through UN for the non-nuclear weapons states from any potential nuclear threats from the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), but was not responded consequently.114

Likewise, Pakistan offered No-War pact to India to remove mistrust, Pakistan recommended that both the states surrender the use of force in resolving their disputes and minimize their armed forces up to jointly acceptable limits. India was unwilling in accepting Pakistan’s offer and opted to sign a Treaty of Friendship with Russia for general coordination of their foreign policies.115

Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts, i.e. the perception of a nuclear weapons free zone and Treaty of Friendship, contained the conviction that if the international community did not persuade against India from pursuing its so called PNE program and, if sufficient safeguards were not offered to the non-nuclear states, these states might be convinced to follow India’s example. The atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity could encourage the small and weak states to seek nuclear weapons program. The Indian nuclear test of 1974 had inevitable impact on the survival and security of Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan followed three realist assumptions (State of war, Self-help and Survival) and anticipated that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor of a country’s territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty. Due to Indo-centric security perceptions, Pakistan’s main aim is to deter any Indian aggression by accomplishing nuclear capability.

zone is accepted, it will legitimize nuclear weapons in the hands of nuclear weapon powers and will bring an end to the struggle to achieve nuclear disarmament. 111 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Indian Nuclear Deterrence’, p.88. 112 George Perkovich, ‘Indian Nuclear Bomb’, p.68. 113 Savita Pande, ‘Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in South Asia’ 114 Pakistan raised the resolution for the safeguards to the non-nuclear states from nuclear threats before the UN during different sessions but did not receive positive response. In 1980, the resolution was abandoned because it attained the support of two among the five NWS (Former Soviet Union and China was in support of resolution while USA, UK and France abstained), explained Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Case Study for a Nuclear Security Guarantee’ in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed) Readings in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: 1971-1998 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.274-2276. 115 Hasan Askari Rizvi, pp.122-123

112

3.4 Pakistan’s Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons and China’s Assistance (1975-1998)

After India’s PNE in 1974, China condemned India for harboring its desire to become regional super power and decided to assist Pakistan against ‘India’s nuclear threat and blackmail’.116 In 1975, China’s Vice Premier visited Pakistan and announced China’s support to Pakistan’s proposal for a ‘nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia’.117 In May 1976, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited Beijing along with the famous Pakistani nuclear physicist and Nobel laureate (Dr. Abdul Salam), and signed two agreements relating to scientific and military cooperation between them.118 The significance of the subsequent year is disclosed by Bhutto in his death cell where he had expressed:119

In the light of recent developments which have taken place, my single most important achievement which I believe will dominate the portrait of my public life is an agreement which I arrived at after an assiduous and tenacious endeavor spanning over eleven years of negotiations. In the present context, the agreement of mine, concluded in June 1976, will perhaps be my greatest achievement and contribution to the survival of our people and our nation.

Pakistan had firm expectations from China even after the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, and Bhutto expressed his anticipations that ‘Mao’s death would not affect China’s recognition with the Third World Countries and its support for the just causes of exploited’.120

Pakistan signed an agreement with France in 1976 for acquiring plutonium reprocessing plant.121 Internationally, the agreement was condemned with the argument that Pakistan would achieve the nuclear capability and it was cancelled due to US pressure.122 The world’s response against Franco- Pakistan agreement invigorated Pakistan to adopt the alternative route for acquiring nuclear

116 Savita Pande, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1991), p.71 117 Ibid. Also quoted Badinda M Chengapa, India-China Relations:Post Conflict Phase to Post-Cold War Period (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 2004), p.127 118 Savita Pande, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy, p.72 119 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, If I am Assassinated (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), p.44 120 Bhotto’s interview with George Hutchenson in The Spector London (11 September 1976) 121 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.159 122 Although, the agreement was signed with the approval of IAEA and US also approved it as a member of IAEA, US exerted the pressure on both France and Pakistan to abrogate the agreement in 1978. France could not sustain the pressure and suggested some modifications in the project but Pakistan rejected them and demanded the completion according to the agreement and finally it was cancelled, elaborated Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, pp.159-161.

113 capability.123 The cancellation of Franco-Pakistan deal became the blessing in disguise for Pakistan because in the presence of agreement, both the plants would have been under international safeguards. It was the indication that the intensity of a threat perception compelled the states to seek a credible response and in the absence of nuclear security guarantee, it was difficult to keep a state away from pursuing nuclear weapons capability.

Bhutto government planned to focus on uranium enrichment route and clandestinely undertook to acquire uranium enrichment plant.124 For assuring the secrecy, Bhutto launched media campaign for diverting Western attention converging on the issue of reprocessing plant while the acquisition of enrichment plant was in progress.125 The analysts outside Pakistan were reluctant to accept Bhutto’s attention from reprocessing plant to Uranium enrichment as Leonard Spector explained:126

Bhutto followed both the routes to produce nuclear weapons, though he initially relied on the plutonium reprocessing method until difficulties forced to shift to the Uranium enrichment technique.

Ashok Kapoor considered that initially, Bhutto followed both the routes and later preferred the method of plutonium reprocessing.127 The track record provided evidence that Bhutto followed both the routes but mostly stressed on uranium enrichment.128 Dr. A. Q. Khan was assigned the task for the enrichment of Uranium and he established Engineering Research Laboratories in 1976

123 For acquiring nuclear capability, two routes (plutonium reprocessing and enrichment of Uranium) are obtained. Plutonium route can be taken for preparing the fuel for nuclear reactors and for developing nuclear weapons. Plutonium route is required for a reprocessing plant, nuclear reactor and the amenities on a huge scale while, the enrichment of Uranium is more complex as compared to plutonium route. There are several ways for Uranium enrichment i.e. gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, laser separation, electromagnetic and aerodynamic nozzle. Uranium is naturally found in two isotopes: U_238 (99.3 percent) and U-235 (0.7 percent) while Highly Enriched Uranium (93 percent U-235) is prerequisite during bomb making. The enrichment process dissects the two isotopes up to the concentration of U-235. Raw Uranium is transformed into gas by gaseous diffusion method and separates the two isotopes through a semi-porous membrane. For acquiring a high concentration of U-235, ultra-high speed centrifuges are required to process gaseous Uranium (Uranium Hexafluoride or UF6). Explained David Wang, ‘Plutonium vs. Uranium: The Road Less Travelled’ down loaded from www.mit.edu/ans7870/sts/sts.069/f02/sts069new/dwang/plutonium.pdf on March 10, 2014. Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, pp. 101-102 124 Maulana Kausar Niazi, Aur Line Cut Gaee [ And Line was Disconnected] (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1987), pp.84-88 125 Ibid. 126 Leonard S. Spector, Going Nuclear (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp.101-105 127 Ashok Kapur, p.15. Also quoted Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.162 128 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.163

114 in Kahuta in the outskirts of Islamabad.129 The plant was started with a series of secret acquisitions of equipment and material from Western countries i.e. stainless steel vessels from Italy, electrical inverters from Canada and Britain, aluminum rods and vacuum pumps from West Germany and vacuum valves and evaporation and condensation system from Switzerland.130 Bhutto had planned to keep secrecy relating to the outcome of Kahuta uranium enrichment plant. Dr. Khan clarified the imperative of the mystery of Kahuta during its formative phase:131

When towards the end of 1976, the foundation for the project was laid, it was decided that the project would be kept secret until such time when we had produced the necessary equipment for the project.

Bhutto’s government provided resources for its attainment and at last succeeded in operating a gas centrifuge enrichment plant at Kahuta and Dr. Khan dedicated the successful operating of plant to Bhutto that ‘without Bhutto, there would have been no Kahuta’.132 The US showed its concerns about Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Pakistan in 1976 in an effort to dissuade Bhutto from attaining nuclear weapon program and threatening him that ‘if he did not restrain nuclear weapon program, he would be severely punished’.133 In July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq ousted Prime Minister Bhutto and imposed martial law,134 but the change of government did not inhibit the continuation of Bhuttos nuclear policy. China continued its business as usual with Zia’s military regime in Pakistan. After coming in power, Zia sent a letter to Deng Xiaoping that ‘the traditionally close and friendly relations between the two states would continue to grow and increase strength with the passage of time’.135 During a visit to China in December 1977, Zia was assured that China’s Pakistan policy as persuaded by Mao would continue unaffected, and Deng Xiaoping guaranteed China’s ‘unswerving support’ in its efforts to safeguard its ‘national independence and state sovereignty’

129 George Perkovich, India Nuclear Bomb, pp. 308-309 130 Discussed Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.164 131 Dr. A. Q. Khan’s interview with a Pakistani Weekly in the Urdu Language, Hurmat, (14 March 1985). 132 Zahid Malik, Dr. Abdul Qader Khan and Islamic Bomb (Islamabad: Hurmat Publications, 1989), p.24 133 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, pp.137-138. Also quoted Samina Ahmad, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapon Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Option,’ International Security, Vol.23, No.4 (Spring 1999), p.185. Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, p.89 134 After the general elections in March 1977, the opposition refused to accept the results and started anti-Bhutto agitation and General Zia took over the government and complied the breakdown of law and order in the country. 135 Savita Pande, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy, p.73

115 and its stance on the struggle of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir would also continue.136

Bhutto was imprisoned, prosecuted and hanged, and Kamal Matinuddin correlated Bhutto’s downfall with anti-American campaign against him due to his attempt in developing nuclear program.137 Bhutto later claimed that ‘Pakistan was on the threshold of full nuclear capability and all we needed was the nuclear reprocessing plant’.138 Bhutto asserted from his prison cell that he uplifted the PAEC and argued, ‘I am faithfully determine to acquire nuclear capability for my country’.139 In the nuclear history of Pakistan, Bhutto is acknowledged for his central role in the advancement of Pakistan’s nuclear program.

After becoming Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Zia ul Haq continued further advancement in Pakistan’s nuclear program. US was attentive regarding Pakistan’s modest efforts in attaining nuclear capability and the US ambassador warned Zia to stop nuclear program.140 He also renounced the US pressure and played a tremendous role by implementing a strategic posture of nuclear ambiguity. For uplifting Pakistan’s capability to enrich uranium to weapon-grade stages through centrifuge technology, Zia launched an extensive concealed network in Western Europe by exploiting the loopholes of Western Union legislation for acquiring the uranium enrichment technology and equipment from Netherlands and Germany.141 On the contrary, as for as China’s assistance is concerned, both China and Pakistan were not involved in any significant development particularly in nuclear relations prior to 1979.142

136 Speech delivered by Den Xiaoping at the return banquet by Zia-ul-Haq in December 18, 1977. Also quoted K.M.Arif (ed), China-Pakistan Relations: 1947-1980 (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984), p.176 137 Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, p.89 138 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, pp.137-138. 139 Ibid. 140 K. Subrahmanyam, Times of India (26 May 1998), quoting General K.M.Arif, the former Chief of Saff to General Zia. The US ambassador approached Zia and informed, ‘you will make a wonderful task by restraining nuclear program’. Zia responded that ‘he does not know if this program persists, I would categorically cease it’, quoted Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, p.91. 141 Samina Ahmad, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapon Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Option,’ International Security, Vol.23, No.4 (Spring 1999), p.186. 142 Savita Pande, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy, p.73

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The Carter administration laid serious obligations on Pakistan’s nuclear program and imposed military and economic sanctions in April 1979.143 To assuage US pressure and for strengthening Pakistan’s stance about nuclear program that it was for peaceful purposes, Zia’s administration suggested measures for regional nonproliferation including the accession to the NPT for India and Pakistan simultaneously and the recognition of IAEA full scope safeguards.144

The Soviet military intrusion in Afghanistan in December 1979 provided a turning point for the nuclear weapons program of Pakistan. To contain Soviet intervention, US amended its policy and lifted military and economic sanctions against Pakistan.145 Additionally, US provided justification for the extension of military and economic aid to Pakistan by arguing that the supply of conventional weapons would effectively contain its nuclear weapons program. James Buckley (the then US undersecretary of state for security assistance, science and technology) elaborated as:146

In place of ineffective sanctions on Pakistan’s nuclear program imposed by the past administration, we hope to address, through conventional means, the sources of insecurity that prompt a nation like Pakistan to seek a nuclear capability in the first place.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, China enhanced Pakistan’s assistance to overcome the consequences due to Soviet presence in Afghanistan.147 In January 1980, China accused USSR in search of stepping stone for a southward plunge towards China and the whole sub-continent.148 The two states (China and Pakistan) agreed on the threat that the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan posed to the security of the entire region and planned to coordinate their strategies to meet the challenge. During his visit to Beijing in May 1980, Zia-ul-Haq declared

143 Ibid. Samina Ahmad, p.186. Zafar Iqbal Cheema quoted Ashok Kapur, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, pp.166-167. The sanctions were imposed on the basis of the Symington amendment to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978. 144 Samina Ahmad, p.186. These offers might be incompatible for Pakistan’s nuclear program, but India refused to acknowledge them and linked its nuclear policy to global disarmament and rejected any regional nonproliferation regime. 145 The Soviet intervention emphasized the strategic significance of Pakistan and for the sake of US interests in the region, US waived sanctions against Pakistan and started providing massive military and economic assistance, explained Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, pp.166-167 146 Quoted Akhter Ali, Pakistan’s Nuclear Dilemma: Energy and Security Dimensions (Karachi: Economic Research Unit, 1984), p.10. Mitchell Reiss, ‘Safeguarding the Nuclear Peace in South Asia’, Asian Survey, Vol.33, No.12 (December 1993), pp.1110-1111. Also quoted Samina Ahmad, p.187. 147 M.A Chaudhari, ‘Strategic and Military Dimension in Pakistan-China Relations’, Pakistan Horizon, Vol.39, No.4 (Fourth Quarter 1986), p.27. Also mentioned Savita Pande, , p.73 148 Nilofar Mahdi, ‘Sino-Pak Relations: Historical Background’ Pakistan Horizon, Vol.39, No.4 (Fourth Quarter 1986), p.69

117 that the two states had ‘perfect understanding in all fields’.149 In August 1980, China decided to provide ground to air missiles, TU-16 and TY-4 medium-range bombers, M1-4 Hound helicopters, T-59, T-60 and T-92 medium, anti-aircraft guns, amphibious and light tanks, while another consignment of military hardware including Mig-21, T-16 bombers and F-9 fighter aircraft were provided to Pakistan in November 1980.150

During 1980s, the geopolitical rivalry of Superpowers in Afghanistan supported Pakistan’s nuclear program in two ways:151

1. During Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the US and remaining Western countries were more restrained in exerting stress on Pakistan to stop its nuclear program. It was due to the strategic stakes to prevent further extension of former Soviet Union in Asia. It can be argued that USSR provided geopolitical catalyst in accelerating Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. 2. Substantial Western economic and military support during Soviet-Afghan crisis indirectly contributed in sustaining Pakistan’s nuclear program. The strict US implications relating to non-proliferation legislation could have enacted as a horrific restraint on Pakistan’s nuclear development.

Pakistan continued its nuclear program and succeeded to get a small-scale reprocessing laboratory from Belgium in 1980.152 When the US involved in a coercion with the Soviets and tried to push them out of Afghanistan in 1981, the construction of Kahuta enrichment plant was completed and thousands of centrifuges were installed in a huge hall.153 Dr. A.Q. Khan succeeded to enrich a tiny sample of uranium to weapon grade which was sufficient in manufacturing a nuclear bomb. Zia admired Dr. Khan and renamed Engineering Research laboratories as A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and delegated inclusive authorities to Dr. Khan in pursuing for conducting cold test.154

149 Khalid Mehmood, ‘Sino-Pak Relations: All-weather Friendship’, Regional Studies, Vol.xix, No.3 (Summer 2001), p.17. 150 Intelligence reports quoted by Nilofar Mahdi, pp.211-212. 151 Bhumita Chakma, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program’ in Olav Njolstad (ed) Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York: Routledge, 2011), p.30 152 Shahid-ur-Rahman, Long Road to Chaghi (Islamabad: Print Wise, 1999), p.13 153 Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the World’s Most Dangerous Nuclear Smuggler (New York: Twelve, 2007), p.111 154 Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, The United States and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons (New York: Walker and Co, 2008), p.84, and explicated Zia’s unscheduled visit to KRL on p.85 as: “He was expecting a school of chemistry lab and there was a plant filled with fully functioning Western-style laboratories, cascades of gleaming centrifuges humming away in glass chambers all being monitored by scientists in

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Apart from enrichment of uranium in KRL, the plutonium reprocessing route was followed by PAEC in early 1980s, and Pakistan started the construction of a ‘New Lab’ in PENSTIC complex near Rawalpindi. The ‘New Lab’ was took several years in separating sufficient plutonium for manufacturing nuclear device and was inadequate for generating the massive amount of plutonium.155 Thus, Zia planned for further expansion of centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.156

In 1981, China modified its policy about South Asia and planned to maintain friendly relations with Pakistan and India. China’s Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang arrived in Islamabad in June 1981 for four days visit and restated China’s friendship for Pakistan.157 During his visit, he intentionally avoided passing the statements related to Kashmir issue because he wanted to develop pleasant environment for his foreign minister Huang Hua who planned to reopen talks for normalizing Sino- India relations.158 Huang Hua during his India’s visit said, ‘we must live in peace because it is in the favor of not only of the two states but for the peace of Asia and the rest of the World also’.159 Despite China’s submission to strengthen Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir dispute, a qualitative change has taken place in China’s policy. According to Maqbool Ahmed Bhatti:160

Factually, a visible improvement in the tone and context of Sino-Indian relations has been achieved with China stressing the need to settle the Kashmir dispute through bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan, without formally abandoning its stance that the state was a disputed territory, in deciding whose future both the UN resolutions and the Shimla agreement remained relevant.

The main source behind China’s initiative of peace was its five principles of peaceful coexistence and the expression of new approach which was manifested by the post Mao era. Thus, despite boundary disputes with India, China followed its revised policy of active defense and focused on

pristine white coats. Nothing like this had even been done in Pakistan before. I remember the look on his face. He was like, ‘This is an empire’. He was overwhelmed.” 155 David Albright and Mark Hibbs, ‘Pakistan’s Bomb: Out of the Closet,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.48, No.6 (July-August 1992), p.42 156 Akhtar Ali, p.61 157 Khalid Mehmood, p.18. 158 Ibid. 159 Ibid. 160 Maqbool Ahmed Bhatty, ‘Pakistan-China Relations in the 21st Century.’ Regional Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, (Winter1999-2000), pp.83-84

119 economic development and modernization and set about rebuilding fences for the quest of peace and stability in the region.161

However, the US was reluctant to admit China’s aspirations of peace and stability and postponed the dialogues on the transfer of nuclear technology to China in September 1982 because US assumed that China was busy in assisting Pakistan to acquire nuclear capability.162 During 1983, there was a difference of opinion among the US officials relating to the China’s assistance to Pakistan about the nuclear weapons design but China denied that it had facilitated Pakistan in designing nuclear weapons.163 Additionally, US Senator Carston expressed in the context of Sino- Pak relations before the Senate:164

Pakistan had already acquired nuclear capability and Pakistan can make at least a dozen of nuclear weapons. The presence of nuclear weapons augmented the dangers of war between India and Pakistan.

Pakistani nuclear scientists claimed that they had attained the capability to conduct the cold tests by adopting both the ways (plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment) in 1983-84.165 Dr. A.Q. Khan stated in 1984:166

In nuclear technology, India was ahead with Pakistan but soon Pakistan superseded India and planned not to exceed 5 percent enrichment level.

During 1985, the US kept blind eye on Pakistan’s nuclear development and bypassed Solarz and Pressler amendments against Pakistan and continued Pakistan’s economic and military aid.167 Zia released the statement that Pakistan has the capability to manufacture atomic bomb whenever it desired.168 Whereas, Pakistan and China decided to sign an accord on the peaceful uses of nuclear

161 Khalid Mehmood, p.18 162 Savita Pande, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy, p.75 163 Ibid. 164 Senator Carston was quoted in The Time of India (22 June 1984). Also expressed Rizwana Abbassi, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo: Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control Regime (Bern: Peter Lang AG, International Academic Publishers, 2012), p. 130 165 Shahid-ur-Rahman, Long Road to Chaghi (Islamabad: Print Wise, 1999), p.105. 166 Dr. A.Q.Khn was quoted by Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.102 167 Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Road to Chaghi: Pakistan’s Nuclear Program, Its Sources and Motivations,’ Modern Asian Studies Vol. 36, No. 4 (October 2002), p.878 168 Ibid, p.901

120 energy on 15 September 1986.169 At the time of agreement, both the states expressed their aspirations for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

3.4.1 The Impact of Nuclearization during Brasstacks Crises (1986-87)

The concept of nuclear deterrence was introduced for the first time between India and Pakistan during Brasstacks. In December 1986, India launched a military exercise ‘Brasstacks’ to test new operational ideas especially testing the new communication system and to give the opportunity to the senior commanders in coordinating operations at multi-crop formation level. Behind the exercise, India had a secret plan to aggravate Pakistan into war.170 The declared plan was to attack at Khaplu in Pakistan’s occupied Kashmir but the real plan was to disconnect Punjab and Sindh provinces of Pakistan.171 India mobilized a quarter of a million troops just twenty miles away from the border during winter in 1986-87, opposite Pakistan’s province of Sind.172 The scale of mobilization was too huge to precedent during peacetime compared to some exercises conducted by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe. India mobilized nine divisions and around a thousand armored vehicles deployed along the border.173 Indian troops carried live ammunition, engendering a perception in Pakistan that India was likely to attack Pakistan.174 For defusing the Brasstacks crisis, Pakistan relied upon the nuclear weapons for the first time.

During an interview with an Indian Journalist, Dr. A. Q. Khan disclosed that ‘nobody can undo Pakistan or to take us for granted. We are here to say and let me be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened’.175 Additionally, Munir Ahmad Khan announced in 1987, ‘Pakistan had successfully conducted cold test of its nuclear weapons’.176 Indian leaders perceived an official hand behind the interview. They believed that Pakistan sought to publicize its possession of nuclear

169 ‘Pakistan, China Sign Cooperation Agreement’, Pakistan Times (21 September 1986). Also quoted Rizwana Abbassi, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo: Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control Regime, p. 130. 170 Iram Khalid, ‘Brasstacks Crisis in 1986-87’, South Asian Studies Vol. 27, No.1 (January-June 2012), p.40 171 Ibid, p.37 172 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence.p.402 173 Iram Khalid, p.37 174 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence.p.402 175 Ibid, p.403 176 Unpublished manuscript by Munir Ahmad, quoted by Farhatullah Babar, The News (23 April 1999)

121 weapons under the cover of Indian’s Brasstacks exercises. Indians felt themselves under pressure to neutralize the impact of Pakistan’s projection of its nuclear deterrent capability.177

India assumed that Pakistan was assisting the struggle in Kashmir by arming, training and infiltrating Kashmiri freedom fighters and deployed its strike crops along the border near Rajasthan in the south while taking up defensive positions in the north, as it has done during the Brasstacks exercises.178 The Brasstacks exercises induced Pakistan to augment the transparency of its nuclear capability to initiate a nuclear deterrence factor in India-Pakistan strategic relations.179

The two states were near to the brink of full scale war and Pakistan initiated consultations with India. The Prime Ministers of both the states had a telephonic conversation which was followed by hotline between the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO’s) of both the states.180 A diplomatic concern was also solemnized in the US and the former Soviet Union and the President Reagan got in touch with Rajeev Gandhi and General Zia to prevent the crisis from escalating into a war.181 The crisis was resolved when Zia adopted ‘cricket diplomacy’ and visited India to watch cricket match. He also held talks with the Indian leadership.182 During Zia’s visit, no agreement was signed but his visit played a significant role in reducing tension between the two states. In March 1987, the leadership of the two states agreed to a phased withdrawal to peacetime locations.183

During the Brasstacks crisis, the logic of rational theory is elaborated as, ‘the possession of nuclear weapons by two powers can reduce the likelihood of war precisely because it makes the cost of war so great’.184 After the withdrawal of forces, a number of confidence building measures were

177 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence.p.402. 178 Ibid, p.405. 179 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: Debates in Decision Making’ downloaded from www.drznjaspal.blogstop.com on March 22, 2014. 180 Iram Khalid, p.40 181 Ibid. 182 Rizwan Zeb, ‘Deterrence Stability, N-Redlines and India-Pakistan Conventional Imbalance,’ Regional studies, Vol.xxvii, No.2 (Spring 2009), p.21. On February 21, 1987, General Zia ul Haq visited Swami Man Singh Stadium in Jaipur to watch World Cup cricket match between India and Pakistan along with Rajiv Gandhi. It was termed ‘cricket diplomacy’ and ‘cricket for peace’. 183 Rizwan Zeb, p.21. 184 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘More May Be Better’ in Scot D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds), The Spread of Nuclear weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). P.48.

122 taken including an agreement was signed in December 1988 on the prohibition of attack on the nuclear installations and facilities of each other.185

3.4.2 Pakistan’s Strategy towards Nuclear Test and China’s Arms Assistance to Pakistan

General Zia died in 1988 in a plan accident and Ghulam Ishaq Khan became the president.186 The troika of leaders, (The President, The Prime Minister, and Chief of Army Staff) formed the armed forces of Pakistan inescapable in nuclear decision making as Joseph Crincione stated: ‘three sets of actors play the dominant roles in nuclear decisions: the scientists, the soldiers and the state leaders’.187 After the elections of 1988, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Army chief General Mirza Aslam Baig appeared as the patron of continuity of the Zia’s regime policies.

Pakistan’s nuclear program is indigenous and China provided assistance in transferring the technology of nuclear reactors and all these nuclear reactors are under IAEA safeguards.188 Whereas, for uplifting Pakistan’s conventional force posture, in 1980s, China was the main source of elevating Pakistan’s conventional weaponry and approximately 75% of tanks used by Pak Army and 65% of aircraft in the Pak Air Force are of China’s origin.189 Pakistan’s desire to seek China’s assistance for its military modernization is based upon the assumption of defensive structural realism due to which states utilize all the accessible resources to intensify their power potential.

Despite obtaining military assistance from China, Pakistan had firm commitment to become nuclear and there was a controversy related to the process of nuclear decision making. Benazir Bhutto had limited control in the decision making process.190 She was bypassed by the civil military establishment in the sphere of nuclear decision making.191 President Ishaq Khan had

185 Rizwan Zeb, p.21. 186 Ghulam Ishaq Khan was a long-time civil servant and finance minister during Zia’s regime and then became the Chairman Senate. After Zia’s death, he became the caretaker President and was elected the President of Pakistan after the general elections of 1988. 187 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Colombia University Press, 2008), p.64 188 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Chairman, School of Politics and International Relation, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad. Interview (Islamabad, 14 April 2018). 189 Jian Yang and Rashid Ahmad Siddiqui, ‘About an “All-Weather” Relationship: security foundations of Sino-Pak relations since 9/11’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.20, No. 71 (September 2011), pp. 565-566. 190 She was restricted due to eighth amendment in the 1973 constitution and she had insufficient majority in the parliament to undo the eighth amendment. 191 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: Debates in Decision Making’ downloaded from www.drznjaspal.blogstop.com on March 22, 2014.

123 absolute control over nuclear program and Benazir Bhutto was reportedly admitted that she had not been informed whether Pakistan had the capability to possess nuclear weapons or not.192 On the contrary, General Aslam Baig (the then COAS) asserted that Benazir Bhutto had been given detailed information related to the nuclear program soon after taking her oath for the office of the Prime Minister.193 During her US visit in June 1989, William H.Webster (the then CIA director) had delivered detailed updates on Pakistan’s nuclear program.194 She had adopted dubious policy and apparently showed cooperation with the army generals while advocated restraint on the nuclear program during her public meetings and according to Spector:195

There was evidence to believe that Benazir Bhutto might have slowed down ‘certain narrow aspects’ of Pakistan’s nuclear program in 1989 when the US President issued the certificate that it did not ‘possess a nuclear explosive device’.

In 1989, Pakistan lost its strategic worth due to Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the US imposed Pressler Amendment against Pakistan.196 When the US authorities estimated that Pakistan had crossed the threshold, the President George Bush denied issuing the required certificate in 1989 and the sanctions were imposed on all the economic and military assistance to Pakistan in 1990.197

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the end of Cold War with the disintegration of Soviet Union severely disturbed Sino-Pak relations. China followed its policy of active defense and planned to strengthen its economy according to its revised security objectives.198 During Kashmir crisis in 1990, both India and Pakistan deployed their forces for a viable war and China advised both the states to resolve their issues through negotiations.199 However, China continued its cooperation with Pakistan in the sphere of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and US

192 ‘Bhutto in the Dark,’ The Independent, (3 January 1989) 193 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: Debates in Decision Making,’ After taking office in December 1988, Benazir Bhutto was given a comprehensive briefing on the nuclear program by Dr. A.Q.Khan and Munir Ahmad Khan. 194 William H. Webster was quoted by Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: Debates in Decision Making’. 195 Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, p.89 196 Kamal Matinuddin, Nuclearization of South Asia, p.95. 197 Ibid. 198 See Reference 63 of Chapter 2. 199 Jian Yang and Rashid Ahmad Siddiqui, p.566. China assumed that the UN resolution on Kashmir issue had lost its validity.

124 repeatedly accused China in support of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, which was frequently denied by both Pakistan and China.200

There were multiple factors which engendered the restraints on the way to China’s nuclear support to Pakistan, i.e. the impact of Mao’s death on China’s foreign policy, the global initiatives of arms control and nuclear disarmament in the post-Cold War era, China’s revised policy of its active defense and its five principles of peaceful coexistence. At the end of Cold War, China was steadily enunciated into the international non-proliferation regime, which created restraints on its way to nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.201 Security is the prime factor between the Sino-Pak bilateral relations and their affable civil nuclear cooperation enhance mutual confidence and stabilize strategic cooperation between them. Although, the post-Cold-War era has a significant impact on Sino-Pak relations relating to transfer of nuclear reactors technology when compared to Cold-War era, but the distrusts on the Sino-Pak nuclear relations have not been stopped.

In spring 1990, India and Pakistan were again near to the brink of war due to growing tensions over Kashmir. India blamed Pakistan on supporting the militants in Indian held Kashmir and deployed the troops to avert the insurgency from Pakistan. In response of Indian mobilization, Pakistan counter-mobilized its elite troops in the center and north and deployed them along the Indian border where they could target Punjab and Kashmir.202 In the presence of conventional military asymmetry, Pakistan maneuvered its incipient nuclear weapons capability. According to Seymour Hersh (an American journalist), ‘Pakistan prepositioned F-16 on full alert and ready to Launch on command, which sent a message to New Delhi that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if a war took place203. On the contrary, P.R.Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen

200 In December 1991, China signed an agreement for the construction of Chashma 300 MW nuclear power reactor in Pakistan. China assured that the materials were provided with safeguarded facilities, while Pakistan signed an IAEA safeguard agreement for Chashma nuclear reactor. In 1993, China signed an agreement with IAEA for the implementation of IAEA safeguards to China’s nuclear power station (INFCIRC/418), which was supplied to Pakistan. China provided technological assistance to Pakistan for establishing 40 MW reactor at Khushab. Again China was objected on the supply of 5000 ring magnets to Pakistan in 1995 without given any firm evidence. In 1996, China was again blamed in supporting Pakistan in the construction of Khushab reactor. According to the annual reports 1997-1998, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), China was accused in developing longstanding nuclear ties with Pakistan. Elaborated by Malikman, ’Sino-Pak Nuclear Cooperation’ downloaded from www.pakistanidefence.com on April 23, 2014 201 Zhang Jiegen, ‘China-Pakistan Relations after the Cold War and Its International Implications’, p.7, downloaded from www.posse.gatech.edu on April 23, 2014. 202 Iram Khalid, p.37 203 Zafar Iqbal Cheema. Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.405

125 produced a thoroughly researched monograph on the 1990 crisis and concluded that, ‘our assessment, after consultation with a large number of American, Pakistani, and Indian civilian officials, diplomats, military and intelligent officers, is that Hersh’s report is largely inaccurate. It reflects the more alarmist spectrum of American view during the crisis, and in few cases, it may even go beyond that’204. There is disagreement over whether nuclear weapons played a significant role in diffusing the 1990 crisis, but the real issue is to focus on the fact that both the countries had possessed nuclear weapons capabilities which compelled both the states not to involve in crisis according to the logic of rational deterrence theory. It can be argued that the logic of nuclear deterrence was existential deterrence under condition of opaque nuclear proliferation.205 Existential deterrence can be said to have worked in 1990 because war between India and Pakistan did not break out. It is generally believed that in an opaque nuclear competition, there is simply no way that Indian or Pakistani planners could have the confidence to launch an entirely successful nuclear first strike.

In August 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan exercised constitutional authority drawn from the eighth amendment and sacked Benazir Bhutto’s government under the allegation of corruption. Nawaz Sharif became the next Prime Minister in November 1990, and was popularly known as a protégé of the army in that era. During his first speech in the National Assembly on November 7, 1990, he replicated the establishment’s view on the nuclear strategy.206 During his election campaign, Nawaz Sharif condemned Benazir Bhutto’s nuclear stance as ‘pliable’ due to US pressure. During his first speech in national assembly on November 7, 1990, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declared that ‘Pakistan’s nuclear program was intended for peaceful purposes, but had a built in security option’.207 President Ghulam Ishaq Khan also highlighted Pakistan’s nuclear stance during presidential address to the parliament on November 8, 1990 that ‘Pakistan would not compromise its nuclear policy as a quid pro quo for the renewal of US aid’.208 However, Nawaz

204 Ibid, pp.405-406 205 Devin T. Hegrety, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), p.3. Devin T. Hegrety declares nuclear deterrence under opacity as existential deterrence. In a condition that the states are involved in nuclear arms competition and they have limited information about the nuclear stockpiles of the other states, any deterrence relating to their deterrence will be existential. 206 Zafar Iqbal Cheema. Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.171 207 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: Debates in Decision Making’. 208 ‘No Compromise on Nuclear Policy, Says Ghulam Ishaq Khan’, The Dawn (8 November 1990). Also quoted Zafar Iqbal Cheema. Indian Nuclear Deterrence. P.171.

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Sharif had the aspiration for the restoration of US military and financial aid because Pakistan was facing severe economic crisis due to financial allegations of Gulf war. The armed forces of Pakistan were sought to obtain US military equipments to meet the security challenges in future. The US authorities imposed their demands for the restoration of aid.209 To overcome the economic and security challenges, Nawaz Sharif initiated a plan of a five-nation conference related to nuclear weapons in South Asia in which the US, the Soviet Union, China, India and Pakistan would contribute to settle the issue.210 India denied Pakistan’s plan, expressing it a propaganda strategy in which there was ‘nothing new’.211 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was aware about public sentiments about the possession of nuclear weapon. Shaharyar Khan (former Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary) disclosed in 1992 that, ‘Pakistan had the capability to possess nuclear weapons’.212 Nawaz Sharif government was dismissed in 1993 and Benazir succeeded him and became the Prime Minister for the second time. Now Benazir Bhutto was in favor of proceeding Pakistan’s nuclear program and Zafar Nawaz Jaspal quoted her, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear program was intended for peaceful purposes, but could be converted to military use if the country’s national security was threatened’.213 Benazir Bhutto disclosed during an interview in 1994 that, ‘we have neither possessing nuclear weapons and nor intended to explode it, but we have the ability to fabricate it’.214 Benazir Bhutto’s government was dismissed for the second time due to corruption charges in November 1996 and Nawaz Sharif succeeded her for the second time and became the Prime Minister in 1997.

Bhartia Janta Party (BJP) succeeded to make the government in India after the elections of 1998 in India. It was the BJP’s policy of utilizing the nuclear weapons against Pakistan,215 and planned to conduct nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. Soon after the nuclear experiments, Lal Karishan Advani (the then Indian Home Minister) expressed:216

209 Zafar Iqbal Cheema. Indian Nuclear Deterrence. P.171 210 ‘Pakistan Seeks Talks on Nuclear Curbs,’ International Herald Tribune (7 June 1991). 211 ‘Pakistan’s atom plan rejected’, The Independent (8 June 1991). 212 Shaharyar Kahn was quoted by Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, p.99. 213 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: Debates in Decision Making’. 214 Quoted Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, pp.98-99. 215 Farzana Shakoor, ‘Nuclearization of South Asia and the Kashmir Dispute’ in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed), Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 1971-1998 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.454. During election campaign, BJP promised not only to conduct nuclear test but to utilize it against Pakistan. 216 FaIrzana Shakoor quoted L K Advani in ‘Nuclearization of South Asia and the Kashmir Dispute’ in Mehrunnisa Ali p.454

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Pakistan should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region and the world and roll back its anti-India policy, especially with regard to Kashmir, India’s bold and decisive step to become a nuclear weapon state has brought about a qualitatively new stage in Indo-Pak relations, especially in finding a solution to the Kashmir problem. It signifies India’s resolve to deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan’s hostile design and activities in Kashmir.

Additionally, Advani spoke of ‘proactive measures against Kashmiri militancy’ and suggested that India might be conceded a military strike into Pakistan’s held Kashmir.217 Madan Lal Khurana (the then Indian minister for parliamentary affairs) demanded Pakistan to accept India a nuclear power and declared that ‘if Pakistan wanted to fight another war with us, they should tell us the place and time, as we are ready for that’.218 BJP spokesman K.L.Sharma expressed an equally ruthless statement and warned that ‘Pakistan would have to face “India’s wrath” if Pakistan continued with its anti-India policy’.219 These aggressive statements were coupled with the strengthening of conflicts between India and Pakistan along the Line of Control (LoC), and created a strong reaction in Pakistan to pronounce itself as a nuclear power in the mid of May 1998. Additionally, India’s pro-active stance on Kashmir demanded Pakistan to evacuate (Pakistan’s held Kashmir) was the key factor for Pakistan’s decision to become nuclear.220

Strict international sanctions against India could keep Pakistan to dissuade from becoming nuclear. The international community was reluctant to impose sanctions against India soon after her nuclear explosion. Deplorable world response against India provided compulsion for Pakistan to initiate nuclear tests.221

217 Stephen Kinzer, ‘Restraint by Pakistan is Eroding, Leader Says’ New York Times (24 May 1998). Also quoted Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing’ in Lowell Dittmer (ed) South Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan and China (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), p. 101 218 ‘Khurana Demanded Pakistan to Accept India a Nuclear Power’, The Nation (22 May 1998). Also quoted Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing’, p. 101. 219‘Sharma Warned Pakistan on Anti India Policy’, The Nation (23 May 1998). Also quoted Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing’ in Lowell Dittmer (ed) South Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan and China (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), p. 101. 220 Farzana Shakoor, p.454 221 Hilary Synnott, The Causes and Consequences of South Asia’s Nuclear Tests, Adelphi Papers 332 by IISS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.27-37. Though, the US could impose sanctions against India within a day after the nuclear test according to Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, yet the remaining major powers were not willing to take similar action. During G-8 summit conference in Birmingham, UK did not shy away from condemning India’s nuclear experiments and Pakistan expressed ‘deep disappointment at the muted response’ elaborated in The Nation (19 May 1998). Also explained Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing’, p. 102.

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Instead of condemning India’s nuclear tests, numerous attempts were made to discourage Pakistan from testing nuclear tests by offering inducements.222 Pakistan denied and expressed serious reservations against the US offers.223 However, Pakistan was seeking tangible security assurances from major powers vis-à-vis India’s nuclear weapon capability but the US was unwilling to assure such commitment due to political and logistic problems in its materialization.224 Nawaz Sharif also accused US for adapting discriminating posture against Pakistan on religious grounds and expressed that the US has unnoticed India’s nuclear program but imposed sanctions against Pakistan due to its Islamic posture.225 The public opinion played pivotal role in making a decision in Pakistan for conducting nuclear experiments.226 Nawaz Sharif government could not endure the constraint on nuclear tests when army chief reported after the visit of LoC, that ‘the troop’s morale would be compromised by the further postponement of nuclear tests.227 The main argument of Pakistan for obtaining nuclear posture is apparent as Mushahid Hussain expressed, ‘initially, Pakistan was not in favor for possessing nuclear weapons but India’s nuclear intent forced Pakistan to become nuclear’.228

222 During May 12-27, 1998, US President Clinton contacted Nawaz Sharif four times on telephone to advice restraint. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair also suggested abstinence while Japanese Prime Minister visited Pakistan to compel her to avoid nuclear tests. Senior US officials including Strobe Talbott (deputy secretary of state); General Anthony Zinni (Commander in chief of US Central Command); and Karl Inderfurth (Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia), visited Pakistan within four days of Indian nuclear explosions and offered military and economic assistance and according to Thomas Simons (US ambassador to Pakistan), ‘something never offered by the US to a non-ally like Pakistan’. Likewise, Pakistan was offered to initiate for the release of F-16 aircrafts already ordered and paid by Pakistan. It was promised to revoke Pressler amendment and efforts were taken for bilateral economic support and the supply of military equipment. The concessions for granting the loans through international financial institutions were also given, elaborated Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing’, pp. 102-103 223 Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing’, p.103 224 Robert C. McFarlane, ‘Pakistan’s Catch-22’ New York Times (30 May 1998). 225 Farah Zarah, ‘Pakistan’s Elusive Search for Nuclear Parity with India’ in Raju G, C. Thomas and Anit Gupta (eds), India’s Nuclear Security (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), pp.146-148 226 The peoples from all walks of life in Pakistan showed firm intentions in favor of nuclear experiments. During a meeting with the editors of major newspapers with the Prime Minister, it was demanded to conduct a nuclear test to amend the strategic asymmetry in South Asia. Two All Parties Conferences (APCs) were held before the nuclear tests and it was announced to conduct nuclear tests without any further delay. Articles and the statements of the journalists and scholars in the newspapers also tilted heavily in favor of nuclear tests. Gallup Pakistan conducted a survey which indicated the consent of about 70 percent of the people were in favor of nuclear tests. Explained Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing’, pp.106-107. 227 Ibid, p107. 228 Mushahid Hussain Sayed (Senator and Chairman Senate Defense Committee) states during expressing keynote in seminar, ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Arms Control and Disarmament Contemporary Challenges and Prospects’ in Islamabad on May 7, 2014.

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Thus, Pakistan decided to resist the external pressures and planned to follow the Public consent and detonated what it claimed, the five nuclear devices on May 28, and 30, 1998, matching India’s five nuclear tests. According to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, ‘we have settled a score and have carried out five successful nuclear tests’.229 In a press conference in May 29, 1998, Nawaz Sharif said:230

Our security, peace and stability of the entire region, was gravely threatened. As any self- respecting nation, we had no choice left for us. Our hand was forced by the present Indian leadership’s reckless actions. We could not ignore the magnitude of the threat …. Under no circumstances would the Pakistani nation compromise on matters pertaining to its life and existence. Our decision to exercise the nuclear action has been taken in the interest of national self-defense. These weapons are to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional.

Pakistan had become world’s 7th nuclear power and the first nuclear power among the Islamic world and by adopting realists three S approaches, attained the capability to deter any Indian aggression in future. Further progresses in Pakistan’s nuclear program after the nuclear tests of May 1998 are evaluated in next chapter.

Conclusion

India assumes Sino-Pak ‘all-weather friendship’ as a potential threat for its survival. To contain both China and Pakistan, India continued enhancing its nuclear arsenals even after PNE by adopting realist three S assumptions. To evaluate Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear potential, India launched a military exercise ‘Brasstacks’ in 1986-87, but the fear of nuclear escalation kept the two rivals away from conflict. Both India and Pakistan were again near to conflict during Kashmir crises in 1990 but their nuclear capabilities could not permit them to proceed in combat. India exploded nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 and provoked aggressive statements against Pakistan. In response, Pakistan detonated nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May 1998.

Since its inception, Pakistan’s threat perceptions are Indo-centric and India’s nuclear test 1974 aggravated its security predicaments. To contain India’s nuclear supremacy and maintain its sovereignty, Pakistan decided to follow the three S of realism which motivated her to adopt nuclear

229 Address of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the nation on television on 28 May, 1998. 230 Carey Sublette, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Program 1998: The Year of Testing’ downloaded from www.nuclearweaponarchive.org on March 25, 2014

130 posture. Before acquiring nuclear weapons, Pakistan demanded assurances against the nuclear aggression i.e. No-war pact with India and the declaration of NWFZ for the South Asian region but India’s reluctance compelled Pakistan to opt for nuclearization. Pakistan had already initiated its nuclear program for peaceful purposes before 1974 but after India’s PNE, Pakistan planned to initiate nuclear weapons program. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto played a pivotal role in accelerating Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pakistan had to overcome the hindrances to sustain its objective of continuing with the nuclear program, i.e. US embargo, India’s plan to target Pakistan’s nuclear installations, US warnings to Pakistan’s political elite to keep them away from nuclear program, international pressure for the cancellation of France-Pakistan deal related to reprocessing plant and malicious India’s propaganda against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Soviet aggression against Afghanistan had become blessing in disguise for the nuclear program of Pakistan because US lifted its economic and military sanctions against Pakistan in order to use Pakistan to contain Soviet aggression from Pakistan's western borders. Pakistan steadily carried on the proceedings in its nuclear program even the changes in governments did not create any distress on the way to nuclearization and in 1983-84, Pakistan disclosed that it had attained the nuclear weapons capability.

After India’s PNE of 1974, South Asia’s conventional military balance became upset and was distracted in India’s favor. China’s role in maintaining balance of power is prominent by assisting Pakistan in military modernization. China is a major source of conventional weaponry for Pakistan and realist theory of balance of power provides theoretical understanding about China’s support. In spite of the obligations related to nuclear disarmament and arms control, China continued Pakistan’s assistance for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. At the end of Cold War, China amended its foreign policy and planned to follow the strategy of peaceful rise and its stance after the nuclear tests of 1998 is examined in the forthcoming chapter.

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Chapter 4 Indo-Pak Relations and China’s Response Since 1999

Introduction

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War, many significant developments were observed in the global strategic architecture as the world became bipolar to unipolar. However, in South Asian region, the importance of nuclear weapons has not diminished. Prior to the nuclear tests of May 1998, both India and Pakistan had the experience of wars during 1948, 1965 and 1971. The fear of nuclear exchange was non-existent. The presence of nuclear weapons after the nuclear tests of 1998 have compulsively increased the chances of nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. This has drawn extensive international attention towards the South Asian region. Nuclear factor has become focal point in the South Asian strategic architecture. The likelihoods of nuclear exchange is obvious due to aggressive postures of elite mindsets of India and Pakistan.The Indian elite perceives threat of further fragmentation of India from Pakistani elite in order to reduce India's significance in the world.1 The mistrust is unending. Both the states were involved in three wars and a limited conflict in past. They constantly blame each other for their internal violence.2 Hence, the acrimony thus reinforced and the culture of persistent strain amongst them provides a viable fodder for a possible nuclear war. Any intense emotional frenzy of the elites could easily result into a use of nuclear weapons.

The strategic environment of South Asia has emerged as a unique example of its kind particularly after the mutual nuclear blasts of India and Pakistan. They share disputed borders vulnerable to conflicts. Any miscalculation or misinformation can drift towards a nuclear war in the backdrop of deep rooted misunderstandings.

The period since 1998 has been marked by a fragile nuclear deterrence and the deterrence theory provides an in depth understanding in the historical analytical accounts of India-Pakistan’s nuclear programs and their strategic behavior. The present research is mainly focused to examine the Indo- Pak response during the crisis after 1998. China’s stance due to India’s hostile rhetoric after May 1998 is also evaluated by the present research, primarily during Indo-Pak crises since 1999.

1 Dr. Inayatullah, ‘Nuclearisation of India and Pakistan: Security or Holocaust?’, The News (December 17, 2000) 2 Ibid.

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Within the context of this debate, this chapter seeks to answer the following questions.

 Have nuclear weapons stabilized or destabilized the South Asian region?  What was the strategic response of the two states during Kargil incidence, Twin Peak crisis and Mumbai terrorist attacks?  What was China’s rejoinder during crises between India and Pakistan since 1999?  Does deterrence theory explain the nuclear behavior of India and Pakistan?

To answer the above questions, the state’s response in crisis of both India and Pakistan are evaluated by implementing realist theories of deterrence and stability-instability paradox.

4.1 Relevance of Theory of Deterrence

Theories of deterrence were framed within the context of US-Soviet confrontation.3 Hiroshima trauma engrossed world’s attention towards nuclearization. Robert Oppenheimer proclaimed that the massive destructive potential of nuclear weapons fascinated the aggressors to acquire nuclear weapons.4. Bernard Brodie denied Oppenheimer’s argument as, ‘if the defender has the ability to retaliate in kind, the aggressor would not initiate aggression’.5 Likewise, Waltz maintained that ‘the danger of major war among the states possessing nuclear weapons approaches zero’.6 Additionally, John Mearsheimer7, Stephen Van Evera8, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker9 endorsed Bernard Brodie’s argument. Such optimistic opinions related to nuclear proliferation have not escaped disrespect, and were argued by some pessimists that nuclear

3 Scott D. Sagan, ‘History, Analogy and Deterrence Theory’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol.22, No.1 (Summer 1991), p.79. 4 J. Robert Oppenheimer, ‘Complete History of Scientific Biography’ downloaded from www.encyclopedia.com/topic/j_robbert_oppenheimer.aspx on April 20, 2015. 5 Bernard Brodie, ‘The Development of Nuclear Strategy’, International Security, Vol.2, No.4 (Spring 1978), p.75. Also quoted Arvind Kumar in “Theories of deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence in the Sub Continent”, in E. Sridharan (ed), The India Pakistan Nuclear Relationship. (Delhi: Routledge. 2007) p.240. 6 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Origins of war in Neorealist Theory’, in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds), The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 50-51. Also see 7 John Mearsheimer undertakes that ‘nuclear weapons are a superb deterrent’ and elaborates that the world would become safer if Ukraine, Japan and Germany became nuclear power in the coming era. See John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol.15, No.1 (Summer 1990), p.20. 8 Stephen Van Evera advocated that Germany possess nuclear weapons to deter Russia. See Stephan Van Evera, ‘Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold war,’ International Security, Vol.15, No.3 (Winter 1990/91), p.54. 9 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, ‘An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.26, No.2 (June 1982), p.283.

133 deterrence may not be stable in specific regional settings.10 In the South Asian region, the conflicting strategic environment between India-Pakistan relations provided laboratory in assessing appropriate theory related to regional nuclear deterrence. A review of deterrence literature suggests several aspects of deterrence theories.

McGeorge Bundy developed Existential Deterrence Theory in 1984 and the salient features of the theory are:11

The retaliation can be anticipated under the condition of opacity. The states always seek to maximize their nuclear capabilities due to lack of trust and the insufficient information about the nuclear arsenals of their adversaries. Existential deterrence become viable in a condition when both the sides possess sufficient thermo nuclear arsenals which could be utilized against each other with neither having disarming first strike capability.

Jonathan Schell employed the existential theory in support of disarmament and stated it as, ‘the ability for retaliation is based upon the possession of minimum weapons with maximum capability for rebuilding them unless the capability would achieve at the zero level’.12

The Classical Deterrence theory was introduced by Bernard Brodie and matured in 1950s and early 1960s by the contribution of Hans J. Morgenstern, John J. Mearshemer and Kenneth N. Waltz.13 The main argument of this theory is based upon power politics.14 The theory was evolved in the context of bipolar international system and despite winning, avert war was declared as the prime objective of Classical Deterrence theory.15

10 Lewis A. Dune, ‘Containing Nuclear Proliferation’, Adelphi Paper 263 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991) pp.3-5. Steven E. Miller, ‘The Case against a Ukranian Nuclear Deterrent’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.3 (Summer 1993), p.80. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold war’, International Security, Vol.15, No.1 (Summer 1991), p.37. Paul Bracken, ‘Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea’, Survival, Vol.35, No.3 (Autum 1993), p.137. Quoted Scott D. Sagan, ‘More Will be Worse’ in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds), The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renued (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), p.47. Also quoted, “Theories of deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence in the Sub Continent”, in E. Sridharan (ed), The India Pakistan Nuclear Relationship. (Dehli: Routledge. 2007) p.240. 11McGeorge Bundy, ‘Existential Deterrence and its Consequences’, in D. MacLean (ed), The Security Gamble, (Totowa, N.J: Rowman and Allanhead, 1984), pp. 8-9. 12 Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (London: Picador, 1984), p. 153. 13 Explained Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.4. 14 Ibid, p.7. 15 Bernard Brodie (ed), The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p.76.

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According to this theory, ‘balance of power is a key in maintaining peace, status quo and stability among the states’.16

The main initiators of Structural Deterrence Theory are Measheimer, Gaddis and Waltz and they offered several clarifications for the conciliatory effect of bipolar structures.17 According to Gaddies, ‘the stability during post-war can be described by a simple structure which revealed the realities of power by maintaining more stable alliance system that have the potential to absorb alliance patterns’.18 Waltz argues that the remarkable stability is attained when great powers maintain their relationships and the costs of war are very high.19 Mearsheimer elaborated the interpretations because of which the Bipolar system was more peaceful than Multipolar as, ‘firstly, there were limited probabilities of war due to fewer conflicts between the superpowers. Secondly, deterrence was manageable because there were rarer likelihoods of imbalance of power. Thirdly, the existence of deterrence occurred due to fewer likelihoods of miscalculations in Bipolarity’.20 Snyder and Diesing described as the chances of conflicts exist among the states in the presence of their asymmetric relationship.21 Thus, distribution of power in Bipolar system is the guiding principle of structural deterrence theory.

The main author of Decision Theoretic Deterrence Theory is Daniel Ellsberg.22 The key tenets of the theory are:23

 It is critical for the decision makers to decide during war due to ambiguous strategic response of the adversary.

16 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 19480, pp.125-126. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to Future’, International Security, Vol. 15, No.1 (Summer 1990), p.18. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 123-128. Also quoted Arvind Kumar in “Theories of deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence in the Sub Continent”, in E. Sridharan (ed), The India Pakistan Nuclear Relationship. (New Delhi: Routledge. 2007) p.241. 17 Frank C. Zagar and D. Marc Kilgour, p.8. 18 John Lewis Gaddies, ‘The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Post-War International System’, International Security, Vol. 10, Mo.4 (Spring 1986), pp.105-110. 19 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Stability of Bipolar World’, Daedalus, Vol.93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp.882-886. 20 John J. Mearsheimer, p.14. 21 Glen H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining and Decision Making in Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 450-453. 22 Daniel Ellsberg illustrates Decision Theoretic Deterrence Theory by elaborating the chicken game in the light of expected utility model of Blackmail in, ‘Theory and Practice of Blackmail’ downloaded from www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/p3883.pdf on April 27, 2015. 23 Ibid. Also quoted Frank C. Zagare, ‘Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment’, International Interactions, Vol.21, No.4 (1996), p.375.

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 Despite ambiguity related to the opponent’s strategic response, the decision makers initiate probabilistic estimates on behalf of intelligence reports.  During decision making, each player adopts the strategy for attaining maximum expected utility and evading minimum losses in a nuclear exchange.

The Organization Deterrence theory is developed by Sagan. This theory is based upon two arguments. First, the proposition of the theory is based upon the behavior pattern of military organizations for assured deterrence. It is highly improbable for the military organizations to accomplish the operational provisions in establishing nuclear deterrence due to their uncompromising routines and parochial interests which are prerequisites of their professional training. Second, the strict civilian control on military organizations can contribute in balancing their behavior pattern.24

Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour developed Perfect Deterrence Theory. This theory is based upon the working of mutual deterrence and is associated with non-cooperative game theory which resulted in a new approach of deterrence. It is effective for extended deterrence relationships and is applied on both unilateral and shared deterrence relationships. The strategies of deployment are organized by the theoretical construct of massive retaliation and flexible response and parity is not essential for stable deterrence.25

The aforementioned theories were designed within the context of US-Soviet confrontation. Both the states possessed highly sophisticated nuclear arsenals along with their delivery mechanisms. Both the states established hotlines, signed treaties, developed advanced command and control systems and means of verification by satellites. Missile flight times between them provided enough reaction time. When this scenario is compared with Pakistan-India confrontation, these features are missing. Both the states share long border and they have limited time to decide whether or not to use nuclear weapons during crises.26 Hence, it is problematic to shape deterrence means for the

24 Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, International Security, Vol.18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), p.68. 25 Frank C. Zagare and D. Mark Kilgour, ‘Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment’, pp.285-297 26 Arvind Kumar quoted Jacob Viner and Bernard Boridie in “Theories of deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence in the Sub Continent”, in E. Sridharan (ed), The India Pakistan Nuclear Relationship, p.247

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South Asian region. The following case studies examine the relevant theory for establishing stable nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan.

4.1.1 Kargil Crisis 1999

Kargil conflict took place just one year after nuclear tests of May 1998. Kargil was the first military conflict in nearly 30 years between any two nuclearized rivals in the world and the largest-scale conventional military engagement ever between any two nuclear states.27

Kargil was history’s most powerful negation of the conception about the states having nuclear weapons that they never involve even in conventional conflicts. Kargil heights have a significant impact on the supply lines of Indian army towards Siachin Glacier.28 Usually, Indian troops vacate the Kargil heights during winter and return in early summer. In early summer of 1999, Pakistani troops occupied the Kargil heights before the return of the Indian troops. Both started a war for the occupation of the Kargil heights. Pakistan had multiple objectives in its occupation. Pakistan anticipated to secure a better negotiating position with India on the issue of Siachin Glacier, at a strategic level.29 Pakistan sought to persuade international support for resolving Kashmir dispute through third party mediation.30 Pakistan planned to resolve Kashmir dispute under the cover of

27‘The Usuri River conflict of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s between China and USSR never involved air strikes nor had the same escalation potential’, expressed Praful Bidwai. “Chasing the Mirage of Nuclear Stabilization, in ‘Security and Nuclear Stabilization in South Asia” in ImtiazAlam. (ed) SPANA South Asian Studies, Vol, VII. Free Media Foundation Lahore, (2006). p.52. 28Kargil comprises of arduous mountains with the height ranging from 2500 to 5600 meters. Kargil is bounded by Shyok river in the east, Zojila pass in the west, LoC on the north and the scattered villages like Mulbek, Sanko, Khalsi, Patrapur and Zojilaon the south. Usually, heavy snow fall on the mountains with the temperature between minus 20-400c is observed during September to May next year. Two major road links lead to Kargil during fair weather (May-August) and for the transportation of Indian held Kashmir. The main road links Srinagar to Kargil and ends up at Leh and usually remains closed in winter (September to May). This road is the main supply route for Indian troops positioned along LoC. The second road starts from Himachal Perdesh to Upshi in Ladakh via Pathankot and crosses the valley of Jammu and Kashmir. It is a difficult track which runs at the height of approximately 4500 meters and is not convenient for the Indian army in assessing LoC. In Pakistan, road link network towards Kargil is comparatively poor. Two mountain tracks lead towards Kargil, one Sakardu-Kargil track via Dewasi and the second is Burzil to Kargil through Gultari-Piyal-Shaqma. Both the tracks unmattled which are used during summer for lighter traffic only. Burzil-Shaqma track is normally used as major supply route both for Pakistani troops and for the civilian population. See Mussarat Javaid Cheema, ‘International community on Kargil Conflict’, South Asian Studies, Vol.28, No.1 (January –June 2013), p.86. 29Altaf Gauhar, ‘Four Wars, One Assumption’, The Nation (5 September 1999). 30 Nawaz Sharif’s address to the nation on 12 July 1999. Also cited Shamshad Ahmad Khan (former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan) in The News (31 May 1999).

137 continued doubtful nature of present dispensation.31 At the tactical level, Pakistan sought to interpret the Srinagar-Leh road by disrupting the supplies and reinforcements of Indian army stationed at Siachin Glacier.32 According to S. Paul Kapur, ‘the main proponent for designing Kargil operation was to threaten India’s position at Siachin’.33

During Kargil crisis, Pakistan army intended to obtain some local advantages also, i.e. for uplifting the army’s moral, for seeking military’s position in domestic politics.34 Pakistan assessed a number of critical assumptions. First, during Kargil incidence, Indian army would be unable to retaliate with required massive operation to dislodge Pakistani troops because of its engagements of counterinsurgency in Kashmir.35 Second, Pakistani officials assumed that Indian army would not be able to timely discover the infiltration which will provide leverage to Pakistani troops to offset whatever feeble India’s counterattacks would be.36 Third, Pakistan perceived that the probability of general war was minimal due to the presence of nuclear weapons. Even it was anticipated that India will not be in a position to wage general war against Pakistan due to the fear of incursions along LoC.37

31 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘The Strategic Context of the Kargil Conflict’ in Peter R. Lovay (ed), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.61 32 General (retd) Mirza Aslam Beg, ‘Kargil Conflict and Beyond’, The Nation (30 May 1999). Also cited Lt Gen (retd) Javed Nasir, ‘Kargil: A Flashpoint’, The News (26 June 1999). 33 In support of his argument, Kapur quoted his interviews with Gen (retd) Musharaf and Jalil Abbas Jilani (former ambassador and Pakistan’s foreign secretary). Gen (retd) Musharaf stated during interview as, ‘Kargil incidence was happened due to Kashmir, where Pakistan proclaims Kashmir as it territory. Whereas, Siachin is a barren Westland but Pakistan is very much concerned about it’. Likewise, Jalil Abbas Jilani stated, ‘Siachin was the main motive due to which Kargil operation has taken place and without Siachin factor, Kargil incidence would not have not taken place,’ See S. Paul Kapur, ‘Ten Years of Instability in Nuclear South Asia’, International Security, Vol.33, No.2 (Fall 2008), p.76 34Feroz Hassan Khan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Christopher Clay, ‘Pakistan’s Motivations and Calculation for the Kargil Conflict’ in Peter R. Lovay (ed), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 86 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid, pp.86-87 Lt Gen (ret) Mahmud Ahmad also discussed contingency plan during an interview with Peter R. Lovay on 10 May 2003, and according to Gen Mahmud, ‘we expected the posts to be held at least through the summer…. We started out with prevention. What would happen after would be determined by what happened over the summer’. Additionally, the monsoon rains during July-September, would hamper Indian troops from enlarging their operations but monsoons do not approach the Kargil heights. If Pakistani troops could sustain the momentum of Indian counter offensive until October, Pakistan would be in a position to further consolidate and restock its defenses. 37 Ibid, p. 87.

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The above mentioned assumptions were miscalculated by Pakistani planners.38 Additionally, Pakistan adopted an inexcusable political position by publically disclosing that the fighting forces were self-determining mujahedeen rather than Pakistani troops.39 It was assumed by the Kargil planners that India would not initiate a general war due to nuclear weapons, but the nuclear weapons could not prevent Indian response in the local area and Pakistan’s initiative about Kargil was not appreciated by the international community.40 Initially, Indian intelligence failed to identify the invaders and named them as Mujahedeen or Ghusbaitiyan.41 The two states started with conventional weapons but soon, this conflict appeared as a serious nuclear threat for India and Pakistan.

Kargil conflict was a limited conflict with the involvement of around 40,000 troops from India42 and 34,000 troops from Pakistan initially equipped with small arms.43 The conflict was

38 Following assumptions were misjudged, 1. Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops were identified one month before and India availed an additional month to organize a response without provoking insurgency in Indian held Kashmir. 2. Untimely weather provided leverage to India to bring in heavy weapons especially the Bofers artillery which played a significant role in combating Pakistan in the Kargil-Dras sector. 3. Pakistani planners misinterpreted India’s relentless counterattack. 4. Pakistani planners did not expect such a planned India’s relentless counterattack including Indian artilary and air force attacks. See Feroz Hassan Khan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Christopher Clay, pp. 87-88. 39 Pakistan engaged Northern Light Infantry (NLI) in operation with the collaboration of regular troops. Most of the soldiers from NLI were from the villages along LoC, and they were not given the equal legal status as compared to the residents of the remaining areas of Pakistan. It was convenient for the government officials to declare them as freedom fighters despite declaring them as a regular army. Thus, Pakistan refused to admit that the army was involved in conflict even Pakistan’s Foreign Offices was not aware about the initial plan of infiltration. India renamed mujahedeen as ghusbathiay (illegal intruders). 40Feroz Hassan Khan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Christopher Clay, p.88. 41 Indian intelligence networks misjudged the identification of NLI troops by intercepting their (NLI troops) transmitted military communications. The NLI troops usually communicated in local dialects i.e. Balti, Pashtu and Shina rather than in Urdu or Punjabi and Indians assumed that the invaders were civilian militants. Despite this, the Pakistan army projected that the real identity of the invaders was exposed during summer, but Indians believed in the deception. See C. Christine Fair, ‘Militants in the Kargil Conflict: Myth, Realities and Impacts’, in Peter R. Lovay (ed), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.232. Pak army also promoted Indian stance and Gen (retd) Chaudhary Iftikhar Ali Khan stated during a briefing to the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC) in May 19, 1999 that, ‘the information given to the international community that Pak army is not involved in operation but the mujahedeen are running the operation. 42PrafulBidwai. “Chasing the Mirage of Nuclear Stabilization, in ‘Security and Nuclear Stabilization in South Asia’, p.52. 43 C. Christine Fair, ‘Militants in the Kargil Conflict: Myth, Realities and Impacts’, in Peter R. Lovay (ed), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.231

139 geographically restricted to the northern region along LoC, but India used larger troops along with a great deal of air power during the two month long conflict.44 India planned number of options for ‘horizontal escalation’, i.e. to expand the conflict to a strategically adjacent areas along LoC, to block Pakistan’s access to the Arabian Sea and to attack along international border.45 During conflict, both the states employed conventional weapons system but India had the superiority with Bofor guns and Mirage 2000, but Pakistan relied upon mountain equipment and light infantry.46 To contain India’s ‘horizontal escalation’, Pakistan planned to employ nuclear weapons whenever required.47 Likewise, India also intended in deploying nuclear weapons in dealing with the conflict if it intensified beyond its expectations.48

During the two-month conflict, both the states were reluctant to disclose their nuclear deployment officially but their political leaderships exchanged their intention about the use of nuclear weapons through press statements. According to Raja Zafar-ul-Haq (former minister for religious affairs), ‘Pakistan might opt for nuclear option if its sovereignty, territory and security is at stake’.49 Shamshad Ahmad (former secretary for foreign affairs) stated, ‘for protecting its territorial integrity, Pakistan has the option to use any weapon’.50 According to Vajpayee (the then India’s Prime Minister), ‘India is ready for all the probabilities including nuclear war’.51 George Fernandes (former defense minister) stated that any nuclear threat from Pakistan will be dealt seriously by India.52 According to Peter Hain (former British Foreign Minister), ‘during Kargil conflict, both the states were very close to exchange of nuclear weapons’.53 During Kargil incidence, the two states exchanged nuclear threats 13 times within five weeks.54

44 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.410. 45 John Gill, ‘Military Operation in the Kargil Conflict’, in Peter R. Lovay (ed), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, pp.105-110. 46 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.410 47 Adrian Levy and Sumit Das, ‘Nuclear Alert Sounded in Pakistan’, Sunday Times (30 May 1999). 48 India was ready to deploy nuclear warheads with their delivery systems i.e. Mirage 2000 aircraft, short and medium ranges Prithvi and Agni missiles and kept them at Readiness State 3 which showed that the delivery vehicles along with nuclear weapons were ready to be mated within short notice. See Rag Chengapa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2000), p.437. 49 ‘Nuke option open says Minister’ Gulf News (1 July 1999). 50 ‘Pakistan warns it may use any weapon in defense’, Financial Times, Global News Wire (31 May 1999). 51 ‘India not daunted by Pak nuke threat: PM’, Times of India (1 July 1999). 52 ‘India Ready for any Eventuality’, The Hindu (1 July 1999). 53 The News, December 17, 2000. 54 Seven threats came from India and six from Pakistan, stated Rag Chingapa, p.437. Also stated Praful Bidwai, p.52.

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On the contrary, despite exchanging nuclear threats through political leaderships, both the states were not prepared for nuclear escalation, and Pakistan intended to wage low intensity conflict under nuclear umbrella.55 According to Gen (retd) V.P. Malik, ‘it was considered that Pakistan’s nuclear experiment of May 1998, will provide nuclear shield and leverage to Pakistan in instigating a full-scale conventional war’.56 Likewise, Pakistan authorities denied about employing nuclear weapons for use.57 According to India’s Kargil review committee report, ‘Pakistan sent only ‘covert’ indications to India during operation’.58 The statements exchanged during operation were ad hoc individual ingenuities and these were not the policy statements.59 Both the states adopted rational behavior and they were away from nuclear exchange during operation but Kargil incidence was recognized as the world’s most dangerous nuclear flash point whose consequences would have exceeded in the South Asian region. It also emphasized on the hazards of military confrontation, no matter how limited, between the two nuclear rivals which could spillover. The conflict strained the vulnerabilities of nuclear exchange due to underestimation, miscalculation or an accident, any of which could have led to action-reaction spiral.

International community was worried about the strategic behavior of India and Pakistan during Kargil incidence. World response could not support Pakistan for not giving regard to the peace process according to Lahore Accord,60 and the Kargil operation occurred side by side which jolted

55 Peter R. Lavoy, p.11. 56V.P.Malik, Kargil from Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2006), p.272. 57 Gen (retd) PervaizMusharaf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p.98. 58The Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), p.243. 59 Peter R. Lavoy, p.12. 60 Lahore Accord was signed between foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan K. Raghunath and Shamshad Ahmad Khan on February 21, 1999. The main clauses of Accord are given as:  Both the states undertook the commitment to provide information in advance related to their nuclear ballistic missiles tests.  The two states are fully committed to taking all possible measures to avoid an unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and reducing the chances of nuclear accidents. Both the states are bound to share the information related to any nuclear accident, unexplained or unauthorized use that can drift towards the nuclear exchange between them.  The two states will sign an agreement for assuring the safety of navigation by naval vessels and for preventing from accident in the ocean.  The two states will take measures in developing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).  The two states will establish communication links between the respective Director Generals Military Operations (DGMO) for restraining any miscalculations related to their military mobilization.  Both the states will employ mutual consultation on non-proliferation, disarmament and security. Lahore Accord was downloaded from www.bits.de/public/pdf/rr99-2.pdf on May 25, 2015.

141 the whole peace process, and provided a favorable environment for India in attaining international support.61 Russia supported India and pressurized Pakistan through its embassy in Islamabad and demanded to withdrawal of forces immediately.62 Group of Eight industrialized nations (G-8) released a statement for India and Pakistan to work on ceasefire immediately, respect the LoC and return to dialogue according to Lahore Accord.63

Pakistan was anticipating its all-weather friend China’s assistance during crisis but China showed balanced response due to its revised post-Cold war global strategy of peaceful rise through economic development.64 Within this context, China has sought to address the contentious issues including territorial disputes with neighboring countries by pursuing ‘good neighborly policy’, including rapprochement with India.65 The legacy of Sino-India’s hostility soon after Pokhran II gradually subsided because both China and India aspired for reconciliation.66 Additionally, China has professed the consequences of Indo-Pak rivalries under the nuclear environment which would have adverse impact on its own security architecture.67 According to China’s calculations, Pakistan was involved in extremely dangerous military behavior during Kargil crisis and by supporting Pakistan, it will weaken its position during its competition with India.68 So, China decided to follow a neutral stance on Kargil issue as Chinese foreign ministry spokesman stated in a press conference on 30 June 1999:69

We sincerely hope that stemming from a desire to safeguard peace and stability in the South Asian region. India and Pakistan earnestly respect the Line of Control in Kashmir according to the spirit of the Lahore Declaration. A just and reasonable solution on this issue and other disputes.

61Feroz Hassan Khan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Christopher Clay, p.88. 62 ‘Russia Rejects Pakistan version of Kargil Crisis’, The Hindu (2 July 1999). 63 ‘G-8 Condemns Violation of the LoC’ The Hindu (21 June 1999). 64Jingdong Yuan, ‘Beijing’s Balancing Act: Courting New Delhi, Reassuring Islamabad’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.64, No.2 (Spring/Summer 2011), p.42. 65 Ibid. See Reference 64 of Chapter 2. 66 John W. Garver, ‘The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity Following India’s Nuclear Tests’, The China Quarterly 168 (December 2001), pp.865-889. 67 Jingdong Yuan, ‘China and the Kashmir Problem’, (paper presented at the Association of Asian Studies annual meeting, Chicago, 31 March-1 April 2005). 68 Zhang Guihong, US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and Its Implication for China: A Chinese Perspective, Occasional Paper No. 50 (Washington D.C: The Henry Stimson Center, 2003), p.17. 69 Chinese spokesman was quoted by Mira Sinha Bhattachariea, China the World and India (New Delhi: Sanskriti, 2001), p.457.

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China’s decision to become neutral was presumed as its polite decline of Pakistan’s plea for assistance.70 On the other hand, the Indian policymakers decided to pursue an elusive policy towards China. China assured its neutrality. Jaswant Singh (India’s Foreign Minister) proclaimed during his visit to China in June 1999 that ‘both China and India reiterated that they would not become threat to each other’.71 Another significant reason which compelled China to maintain a neutral stance during Kargil conflict was that China did not want India to have an alliance with the US which could instigate complications for Tibet and Xingjiang.72

China’s reluctance in support of Pakistan on Kargil issue under new South Asian security environment downgraded Pakistan’s trustworthiness on Sino-Pak all-weather friendship.73 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited China along with his Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz to seek assistance; but their entries were not validated. Chinese authorities advised Pakistan to adopt a peaceful settlement with India.74 Chinese premier Zhu Rongji also advised Pakistan during his visit to Pakistan in 2001 that, ‘both India and Pakistan must maintain utmost limitation and preserve peace and stability of South Asia’.75 Pakistan was aware about China’s changing pattern as Sultan Muhammad Khan (former Pakistan’s ambassador to China) commented on ‘new’ Sino- Pak relationship:76

Regionally, China will continue Pakistan’s assistance, but will mainly focus upon how Pakistan itself deals to overcome its existing problems. The old promise of ‘all weather friendship’ remains part of history…. China has some valid arguments for being cautious about Pakistan’s policy about Kashmir and Afghanistan. It is up to Pakistan to eliminate these impediments.

Despite obtaining cautious response on Kargil issue, China’s stance was not tantamount to unrestraint it’s venerable ally. Essentially, the international community including the US publically

70 Swaran Singh, ‘The Kargil Conflict: Why and How of China’s Neutrality’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 23, No.7 (October 1999), p.1083. 71 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p.32. ‘India-China Bilateral Relations’, downloaded from www.mea.gov/portal/foreigntrlation/China-January- 2012.pdf on April 23, 2016. 72 M.S. N. Menon, ‘Why was China Neutral during Kargil Action’, The Tribune (5 November 1999). 73 Robert G. Wirsing, “Pakistan’s Security in ‘New World Order’: Going from Bad to Worse?” Asian Affairs, Vol.23, No.2 (Summer 1996), pp.101-126. 74Jingdong Yuan, p.43. 75 ‘China Warned over India ‘Threat’, downloaded from www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/1326504.stm on April 24, 2016. 76 Sultan Muhammad Khan, ‘The Warmth Cools’, The Dawn (10 January 2003).

143 condemned Pakistan during crisis and demanded Islamabad to withdraw unilaterally, and China’s assistance to Pakistan might be considered as the bone of contention between China and India.

Besides China’s proclamation of neutral stance during Kargil issue, India was suspicious about Sino-Pak defense cooperation and alleged it as an enabling factor for Pakistan to counterweight against India, as Swaran Singh stated:77

China’s military assistance to Pakistan in various projects, i.e. establishing Heavy Rebuild factory to overhaul Type 59 tanks, F.6 Rebuild factory. Likewise, the remaining projects like Al-Khalid Tank, Mbt 2000, Super 7 fighter jet, Karakoram 8 (K8) Trainer etc, were projected as a potent threat to India.

India’s provocations were mainly due to China’s assertions about Pakistan’s military cooperation as General Fu Quanyou (PLA chief of general staff) stated, ‘military cooperation between China and Pakistan was “vital” and would continue “no matter how the world …. situation might change”, i.e. even war broke out between India and Pakistan’.78 China’s assertion in support of Pakistan’s military assistance indicated that despite having a neutral stance during Kargil crisis, China was sought to conserve its all-weather friendship with Pakistan in post Kargil scenario.

The US officials were keenly observing the strategic scenario and planned to enforce Pakistan for the withdrawal of forces.79 In the first week of June, President Clinton contacted to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan and stated to diffuse the crises, respect the LoC, and declared the removal of Pakistani troops as a precondition in resolving the conflict.80 It was surprising for the Indian officials that since Cold-War to Post-Cold-War period, the US rarely supported India during Indo-Pak disputes.81 In the mid of June, President Clinton again contacted the premiers of both the states and suggested to start dialogue, but India’s Prime Minister Vajpayee rejected the proposal and demanded the evacuation of infiltrators from Kargil heights.82 The US continuously persuaded Pakistan for the removal of forces as Gen Zinni argued, ‘if you are reluctant to withdraw, you are

77 Swaran Singh, pp.10-11. 78 Fu Quanyou was quoted by John W. Garver, ‘The Future of the Sino-Pakistani Entrant Cordiale’, p.411, downloaded from www.mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/101065/ichaptersection-sim on April 24, 2016. 79 After analyzing the situation in late May 1999, the US officials calculated that war could be avoided with subject to the withdrawal of Pakistani troops behind LoC. Expressed Peter R. Lovay, p.197. 80 ‘Clinton Asks Nawaz, Vajpaee to Diffuse Volatile Situation’, News International (5 June 1999). 81 Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.98. 82 Peter R. Lovay, p.200.

144 waging a war and nuclear annihilation towards your country and it will be very distressing news for everyone.83 Additionally, Zinni offered a safe passage to Pakistan’s troops during retreat by suppressing India,84 and ultimately Gen Musharraf convinced that the removal was the single option.85 Pakistan decided to accept Zinni’s offer during a meeting of Defense Committee of Cabinet (DCC), and according to Mirza Aslam Beg (the former army chief of Pak army), ‘it was decided to reinstate the peace process according to Lahore declaration and LoC would be regarded and these were come into effect during Washington Declaration’.86 After the discussion with Gen Musharraf, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Washington and signed Washington Declaration on 5 July 1999.87

The withdrawal from Kargil heights generated queries due to which Pakistan could not achieve its desired targets. Pakistan failed to anticipate the US reaction during crisis. The US was discontented due to Pakistan’s Afghan and Kashmir policies and alleged that such policies were inequitable to the credibility of a nuclear weapon state.88 Prime Minister Sharif’s visit to Washington remained ineffective because he had already agreed with whatever he signed one week before, during his meeting with Gen Zinni in Islamabad.89 However, Sharif’s visit to Washington highlighted the fragility between the civil-military relations which resulted in the dismissal of Sharif’s government in October 1999.90 The Pak army was involved in Pakistan’s Kashmir and Afghan strategies which

83 Tom Clancy, Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, Battle Ready (New York: G.P. Puntnam’s Sons, 2004), p.347. 84Nasim Zehra,’Zinni’s Islamabad Mission’, News International (25 June 1999). 85 Gen Musharraf recognized that it was hardly feasible for NLI troops and Pak army to sustain on the mountaintop with the scarcity of water, food, ammunition and face Indian ground and air force attacks. Zinni confirmed Musharraf’s withdrawal acceptance during an interview with Joseph Mcmillan and Rodney Jones. See Rodney W. Jones and Joseph McMillan, ‘The Kargil Crisis: Lesson Learned by the United States’ in Peter R. Lovay, p.369. 86 Gen (retd) Aslam Beg, ‘The Kargil Denouement’, Frontier Post (14 July 1999). 87The draft of Washington Accord is given as: ‘President Clinton and Prime Minister Sharif agreed that the current scenario of Kargil incidence may precipitate to wider conflict. They convinced that for the peace of South Asia, LoC is regarded by both the states according to their Silma Accord 1972. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that measures should be taken for the resumption of LoC according to Simla Agreement. The President insisted for the speedy cessation of hostilities along LoC. They agreed that Lahore Accord was the best option in resolving the issues between India and Pakistan, including the Kashmir issue. The President assured that he will get personnel attention in boosting the continuation and amplification of bilateral efforts, and for the restoration of LoC. The President confirmed his intentions to an early visit to India and Pakistan.’ Downloaded from www.presidency.ucsd.edu/ws/?pid=57835 on 26 May 2015. 88 Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘The Lessons of Kargil as Learned by Pakistan’ in Peter R. Lovay, p.349. 89 Ibid. 90 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington D.C: Brookings Institute, 2004), p.166.

145 were collapsed during Kargil crisis.91 Kargil incidence unveiled the operational weaknesses of Pakistani planners as Maleha Lodhi stated:92

The Kargil operation disclosed systemic flaws in a process of decision making that is chaotic, impulsive, overly secretive and erratic. The exclusion of internal checks and balances … generated personalized system of authority which delivered hurried decisions, whose concerns were not alleged through, and projected the deficiency of consultation even within the planners, much less placed on public support.

On the India’s side, Kargil incidence displayed serious allegations related to its ability to manage the unpredicted distresses in a security environment. For analyzing India’s ability of conflict management and accumulating the recommendations for assuring its national security, the Government appointed Kargil Review Committee.93 The committee produced its report, ‘Reforming the National Security System’, which described the snags in multiple areas and gave recommendations for the betterment of India’s defense preparations.94 Kargil Review Committee observed that the occurrence of incidence was the incompetency of Indian Intelligence which could not envisage the existence of Kargil incidence.95 The Committee highlighted the deficiencies about border management and pointed out the lack of coordination between the departments concerned, i.e. Ministry of Defense (regular army and some paramilitary forces) and Ministry of Finance, and recommended a comprehensive border management policy.96 During the issue, lack of

91 Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘The Lessons of Kargil as Learned by Pakistan’ in Peter R. Lovay, pp.349-350. 92MaleehaLodhi, ‘The Kargil Crisis: Anatomy of a Debacle’, News line (July 1999). 93Kargil Review Committee comprised on L.K. Advani (Minister for Home Affairs), George Fernandez (Minister of Defense), JaswantSingh (Minister of External Affairs), Yashwant Sinha (Minister of Finance) and the representatives of specialized task forces related to border management, internal security and management of defense. See Rajesh M. Basrur, ‘The Lessons of Kargil as learned by India’ in in Peter R. Lovay, p.313. 94 Government of India, Reforming the National Security System: Recommendations of the Group of Ministers, February 2001, downloaded from www.vifindia.org/sites/derault/files/GoM%20report%20on%20national%20security.pdf on May 27, 2015. 95 The task was assigned to certain India’s civilian and military organizations for analyzing Pakistan’s military preparations along LoC, i.e. Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), The Border Security Force (BSF). These intelligence organizations have numerous sub-networks for gathering the intelligence reports and these reports are submitted to the Joint Intelligence Committee. These organizations failed to recognize Pakistan’s employment on the Kargil heights in the beginning of summer 1999. For information, see James J. Wirtz and Surinder Rana, ‘India’s Systenic and Intelligence Failure’ in, in Peter R. Lovay, p.220. 96 Coordination among different departments was problematic due to their vested interests, i.e. smuggling, narcotics control and rivalries. See Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), pp.246-257. Government of India, Reforming the National Security System: Recommendations of the Group of Ministers, February 2001, pp.58-96, downloaded from www.vifindia.org/sites/derault/files/GoM%20report%20on%20national%20security.pdf on May 27, 2015.

146 coordination between Civil Government and the forces was observed,97 and Group of Ministers (GoM) emphasized to reestablish the policymaking structure of the government.98

Many of the political and military analysts of both the states promulgated about the invulnerability of their nuclear postures. Their assertions about nuclearization indicate their conviction to raise conventional danger threshold, to see how for each can aggravate the opponent at the sub-war level. The Kargil conflict provided clear caveat to the states that in future, the South Asia would be the most dangerous region due to the presence of nuclear weapons. If the conditions of confrontation prevail, the likelihoods of nuclear escalation exist because their dynamic military might may got out of control due to unrestrained suspicions and hostile sentiments.

Indian and Pakistani strategic behavior during Kargil incidence provided ground in finding relevant deterrence theory. Table 4.1 summarizes six key findings about the deterrence theory.

97 See Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning, p.259. 98 Government of India, Reforming the National Security System: Recommendations of the Group of Ministers, February 2001, pp.97-104, downloaded from www.vifindia.org/sites/derault/files/GoM%20report%20on%20national%20security.pdf on May 27, 2015.

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Table 4.1

The Kargil Operation’s Implications for Nuclear Deterrence Theory

Expectations Outcome Comment No conflict between the states Armed conflict occurred, but possessing nuclear weapons Mixed sustained limitations For attaining the territory, no Both sides only threatened nuclear threats Positive the use of nuclear weapons No initiation was taken to Crisis occurred but remained intensify the crisis Mixed limited Steadiness of status quo The territorial status quo was Positive maintained Insignificance of balance of Pakistan’s withdrawal was power Mixed not due to conventional military imbalance Instigation of arms control Real arms control remains Negative unclear, even long after Kargil incidence Source: Peter R. Lovay (ed), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.36.

Two deterrence theories (structural deterrence and decision-theoretic) have partial insight about state’s behavior during Kargil crisis. The relevance and significance of structural deterrence theory is ascribed due to asymmetry between India and Pakistan at the conventional and the nuclear level and the estimated cost of the use of nuclear weapons would be beyond their expectations. The asymmetrical relationship between India and Pakistan is always observed during crisis and especially during Kargil incidence. However, mutual nuclear restraint prevailed regardless of asymmetries due to inconceivable cost of the use of nuclear weapons. Theory provides the understanding that in the presence of growing asymmetric relation between India and Pakistan, one or both can initiate the recurrence of crisis in future but both will hardly involve in nuclear exchange. Likewise, the relevance of decision-theoretic theory is observed during Kargil crisis when India did not expand the crisis beyond a limit and avoided to open any other section for

148 escalation except Kargil. Rationally, India’s choice was a risk-averse and kept the crisis at certain level of limited conflict. India’s assertion not to be the first to initiate nuclear weapons during Kargil crisis was also a stabilizing aspect.99 It is estimated that before expanding the crisis, India calculated the gains and losses and then exercised maximum restraint.

During Cold War, the US and former Soviet Union avoided nuclear and conventional warfare by adopting various strategies including proxy wars and exploiting sub conventional military opportunities. Deterrence theorists described this tense standoff as the stability-instability paradox as it was applied in the Cold War scenario as:100

The spirit of stability-instability paradox was based upon the stabilized relations between the opponents. At the same time, their counterbalancing nuclear potential might raise instability, and might drift to conflict at lower level because nuclear weapons would provide them protection against nuclear escalation.

Kargil conflict can also be addressed within the framework of Glen Snyder’s model of ‘stability instability paradox’ and according to this model, ‘the two competing states possessing nuclear weapons and second strike capability will not be completely deterred from action towards the other, and the reason for the conflict remains unsolved despite the question of nuclear weapons’.101 The nuclear programs of the two states are clandestine in nature and Krepon argues that it is hardly predictable to engage a second-strike capability in the initial stages of nuclear rivalry.102

The Kargil war held a serious potential for escalation at the nuclear level. This indicates that both the states will not hesitate to employ nuclear weapons against each other in future. The Kargil incident shows that in-spite of the existence of nuclear deterrence, states may pursue the gains perceived to be within reach.

99 Arvind Kumar quoted Jacob Viner and Bernard Boridie in “Theories of deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence in the Sub Continent”, p.253 100 Michel Krepon, Rodeny Jones and Zaid Haider (eds) Limited War, Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), p.10. 101 Glen Snyder, ‘The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror’, in Paul Seabury (ed), The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler Books, 1956), p.199. Glen Snyder was also quoted by Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Challenges of Nuclear Stability in South Asia’. The Non-Proliferation Review, (Spring 2003). P.64. 102 Michael Krepon, The Stability-Instability Paradox: Misperception and Escalation Control in South Asia (Washington D.C: The Henery Stimson Center, 2003), p.7.

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4.1.2 2001-2002 Military Standoff

Soon after the Kargil incidence, an equally strong refutation came when a small group of militants attacked the Indian parliament on 13th December 2001, and targeted Indian legislation.103 They were intercepted and killed during the exchange of firing with the security forces104. The attack was alleged as an attempt to target the Indian parliamentarians and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared it as a violence against Indian nation.105 India blamed Pakistan for supporting the militants and aggravated a pre-emptive military strategy against Pakistan in 2002.106 India warned Pakistan to stop cross border terrorism and demanded twenty most wanted terrorists and claiming the two Pakistani militant groups, Jash-e-Mohammad (JeM), and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) were involved in terrorist attack.107 India banned its communications links by removing its high commissioner from Islamabad, blocked train and bus services and imposed restrictions on Pakistan’s airlines over India’s zone.108 India planned to initiate operation ‘Parakaram’ against Pakistan on 18 December 2001 with the deployment of heavy artillery and tanks deployed close to the border.109 It was an extremely dangerous situation because any unintended miscalculation, accidental ignition or misperception by either side could have triggered violence which may escalate towards nuclear escalation. After Kargil conflict, both the states were again came close to nuclear exchange. During 2001-2002 military standoff, a massive military mobilization with the engagement of a million troops was observed.110 During standoff, both India and Pakistan came

103 Dinshaw Mistry, ‘Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia’, Security Studies, Vol.18, No.1 (2009), p.163. 104 Fortunately, an electricity black out resulted in a meeting being postponed and there were thus few ministers in the vicinity. Furthermore, the terrorists crashed their car, and their cover was therefore blown leading to a gunflight which caused twelve deaths. See Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence (Karachi: Oxford University Press 2010), p.415. 105 ‘All Options Are Open’, The Hindu (20 December 2001). 106 India retained a highly aggressive stance which resulted Indo-Pak bilateral relations to a minimum level since Kargil conflict 1999. See Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.415. 107 P.R Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crisis and a Peace Process (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p.149. 108Ibid. 109 Ibid, p.151. Approximately 800,000 troops along with ammunition and equipment were placed on the border while air force and Navy was activated. For the blockade of Pakistan’s seaports, Eastern fleet from Bay of Bengal was moved to the Arabian Sea. Additional troops were deployed along LoC and the working boundary in a state of red alert. 110 Kamal Matinuddin, ‘India-Pakistan Standoff, ‘Regional Studies. Quarterly Journal of the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, Vol. XXI, NO.3, (Summer 2003), p. 23.

150 close to armed conflict in January 2001 and in May 2002.111 Prime Minister Vajpayee stated on May 2002, that India was well prepared for sacrifices to combat for victory and the time had come for a decisive fight.112

Pakistan denied India’s assertions and demanded the proofs of its involvement and terminated the Indian intimidation.113 In reply of India’s deployment, Pakistan responded with full counter- mobilization by placing around 300,000 troops on the international border which were near to three-fourth of its army while air force and navy were kept on alert.114 Abdul Sattar (Pakistan’s former minister for foreign affairs) stated on 30 January 2002, ‘the deployment of troops by India along the border with Pakistan was ‘threatening and coercive’, and suggested the de-escalation of troops through negotiation as was done in Brasstacks.115 For the resumption of dialogue process, Vajpayee government set demands with Pakistan. The demands were to arrest and extricate twenty-five most wanted terrorist, stop facilitating their training, arms supply, funding and including any sort of assistance relating to their terrorist activities.116 Consequently, Pakistan prohibited five Pakistani based militant organizations, closed their offices, seized assets, arrested their leaders and declared that no organization would be allowed to indulge in terrorist activities in the name of Kashmir, and banned to use the title of Jaish (army), Lashkar (volunteer force) and Sipah (soldier).117 Gen (retd) Musharraf repetitively implored Pakistan’s non-interference and warned India that Pakistan will retaliate with full potential if is attacked.118 Musharraf gave the assurances to the international community that Pakistan will not allow the promotion of terrorism within Pakistan and anywhere at the global level.119

111 Ibid. 112 2002 Kashmir Crisis, downloaded from www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/kashmir-2002.htm on May 31, 2015. 113 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.415. 114 2002 Kashmir Crisis, downloaded from www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/kashmir-2002.htm on May 31, 2015. 115 Ibid. 116 Peter Lavoy and Surinder Rana, ‘Standoff between India and Pakistan’, Strategic Insight, Vol.1, Issue.1 (March 2002), downloaded from www.nnn.ups.navy.mil/si/mar02/Southasia.asp on January 12, 2014. 117 P.R Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, p.157. 118 While addressing the nation on PTV on 27 May 2002, Musharraf disapproved the charges raised by the Indian leadership and considered highly irresponsible behavior. He declared that such war hysteria will provoke war which will not be acceptable, and stated that Pakistan will not be the first to initiate war, but it should not be considered as weakness. If war is waged against Pakistan, we will retaliate with full force and give an appropriate response. See 2002 Kashmir Crisis, downloaded from www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/kashmir-2002.htm on May 31, 2015. 119 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.416.

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During standoff, signals for the use of nuclear weapons were exchanged against each other through press statements. Gen Padmanabhan (former Andin army chief) warned Pakistan in a press conference on January 2002 as:120

I want to assure one thing that any nuclear escalation against India, its forces, assets at sea, human, economic or other targets, the offenders of that violence will be dealt severely and their perseverance will become uncertain.

In reply of Padmanabhan’s statement, Gen Musharraf stated during an address to the nation on 23 March 2002:121

By the Grace of Allah, Pakistan has a powerful army with the capability to a crushing response in reply of all sorts of aggression. Anybody who has intended to challenge to our security and integrity, will be given an unforgettable lesson.

This was a clear indication for India that any aggression against Pakistan would result in disastrous concerns for her. Musharraf endorsed this policy by stating, ‘any incursion from the Indian side about Kashmir divide, will precipitate a storm that would result in the ruins of the aggressor… the people of Pakistan are confident about the capability of Pak army’s potential to inflict intolerable loss to the enemy’.122 Confrontational rhetoric from both the sides reached at its peak during standoff. Revengeful statements of the two states demonstrated dubious impression that both were frightened about the use of nuclear weapon from the other, and assumed that their conventional conflict might escalate into a nuclear war.123

Berjesh Mishra (former India’s national security advisor) stated on June 4, 2002, ‘India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and India undertakes that Pakistan will realize the enormity about the use of nuclear weapons’.124 Gen Musharraf restated the same day and emphasized upon Pakistan’s stance about the use of nuclear weapons and stated, ‘the possession of nuclear weapons is apparently implying by any state for its use under certain conditions …. Pakistan has not

120 Padmanabhan was quoted by P.R Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, p.157. 121 Musharraf address is downloaded from www.infopak.gov.pk/President_Addresses/Pres_23Marc.htm on March 15, 2012. 122 ‘Musharraf Vows to ‘Unleash Storm’ if India Attacks’, The News (30 May 2002). 123 ‘That Terrible Pinnacle: Efforts to move beyond Nuclear Crisis Management in South Asia’, Disarmament Policy, Issue No.66 (September 2002), downloaded from www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd66/66nr02.htm on June 2, 2015. 124 ‘That Terrible Pinnacle: Efforts to move beyond Nuclear Crisis Management in South Asia’, Disarmament Policy, Issue No.66 (September 2002), downloaded from www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd66/66nr02.htm on June 2, 2015.

152 deployed nuclear weapons in its history, never even employed its missiles’.125 During an interview with BBC on 22 June 2002, Gen Musharraf stated, ‘we are fully willing, if they come across LoC, we will teach them a lesson’.126 Gen Musharraf again expressed that ‘if Indian army took a step across LoC or the international border, we will not only push them back, we will surround them and the conflict will not remain a conventional war’.127 In reply of Musharraf’s statement, George Fernandes (former Indian defense minister) showed dangerous hyperbolic response and warned that:128

We have been very much concerned about a person who is not only the President of Pakistan but who is the army chief of that country also, and is showing his intentions of the use of nuclear weapons. If he has decided to destroy his country, then he may take this act of madness, but if he wants to persist his state than he must withdraw to do so.

India and Pakistan undertook deterrent measure, i.e. testing and placing ballistic missiles during standoff. George Fernandes confirmed that India placed its Prithvi missiles along international border in the beginning of standoff.129 Likewise, Pakistan also positioned its short-range missiles Hataf I and Hataf II along the border but it was dubious whether the missiles were equipped with nuclear or conventional arsenals.130 Deployment of missiles and the exchange of threatening statements from political leadership might be due to their aspirations to indulge in brinkmanship and handling the dominance of escalation.

During 2001-2002 standoff, China expressed dissimilar response as was revealed during Kargil crisis and got actively involved to defuse the regional tension. A spokesman of Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed while condemning terrorism as, ‘Kashmir is an issue enduring by history that must be resolved through peaceful means.131 Wang Baofu (a South Asian specialist from China’s

125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. 127 ‘Warning forces India to pullback troops, says President’, Dawn (31 December 2002). 128 ‘Pak Will be erased if it nukes India: Fernandez’, The Hindu (28 January 2003). 129 P.R Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, p.173 130 Ibid. Despite exchanging Musharraf’s such distressing statements, Pakistan did not intend to deploy nuclear weapons. During 2001-2002 standoff, Pakistan entirely relied upon its conventional forces and its entire national security mechanism remained red alert and there was no indication related to the mobilization of nuclear weapon’s delivery system during standoff. See Peter R. Lovay, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implication’, p.147, downloaded from http://mercury.ehz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/47509/ichaptersection_singledocument/4e3c on June 1, 2015. 131 Chinese spokesman was quoted by Mohan Malik, ‘The China Factor in the India-Pakistan Conflict’, Occasional Paper Series, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii (November 2002), p.2.

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National Defense University) criticized India for ‘correlating the resistance movement in Kashmir with terrorism for undermining Pakistan’s contribution in war against terrorism and employing US pressure on Pakistan, and appreciated President Musharraf for his commitment against the war on international terrorism’.132 China also relegated India’s proposal for the issuance of joint declaration against terrorism that was anticipated as criticism on Pakistan.133 Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji advised President Musharraf during his visit to China during December 2001-January 2002 that, ‘it is in the fundamental interest of India and Pakistan and according to the anticipations of the international community that both the states to maintain utmost limitation and safeguard for the peace and stability of South Asia’.134

During standoff, China remained actively involved in contact with key international players as Jiang Zhuquing (Chinese Foreign Minister) held telephonic conversation with US Secretary Powell and expressed deep concerns on South Asian troubled strategic environment.135 China also activated SCO for encompassing the worsening environment of the South Asian region. A joint statement was issued after the meeting of Foreign Ministers of SCO held in Beijing on January 7, 2002, which expressed, ‘grave concerns over Indo-Pak standoff 2001-2002’.136 Likewise, Jiang told his US counterpart for the second time soon after the attacks in Srinagar as, ‘China will contribute a constructive role in promoting appeasement between India and Pakistan’.137

China’s proactive contribution for resolving Indo-Pak standoff and its denial in response to India’s declaration against Pakistan exacerbated India’s security concerns. On India’s protest, China

132 Wang Baofu, ‘No Winner in India-Pakistan Conflicts’, Beijing Review (28 February 2002). 133 “China using Pak against India, says Farooq’, Indian Express (27 May 2002). 134 ‘Chinese Premier, Pakistani President on Pakistan-India Tension’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Switzerland, downloaded from www.chinaembassy.ch/eng/xwss/t137990.htm on February 13, 2015. 135 Jiang Zhuquing, ‘Tensions in South Asia of Common Concern’, China Daily (4 January 2002). According to Jiang, ‘if India-Pakistan got involved in large scale conflict, it would not be constrained between the two states and would disturb the peace process of Afghanistan and jeopardize the strategic stability of the South Asian region and even all of Asia. 136 ‘Joint statement by Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of SCO on January 7, 2002’, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Geneva, downloaded from www.missions.itu.int/kazaks/eng/sco/sco6.htm on July 18, 2014. During conference, the Chinese and Russian Foreign Ministers issued a separate statement and demanded India and Pakistan to take diplomatic initiatives for resolving the crisis, reported, ‘Hua, Statement Calls for Restraint’, China daily (January 9, 2002). 137 ‘Chinese, US Ministers Discuss India-Pakistan Situation on May 28, 2002’, Consulate General of People’s Republic of China in Houston, downloaded from www.chinahouston.org/news/2002528074426.html on July 16, 2014. In Jammu, 34 people were killed including women and children in a terrorist attack on military base on May 14, 2002, which aggravated Indo-Pak hostility.

154 maintained that it has exercised and will remain its influence over Pakistan with regard to security.138 For elaborating China’s response during standoff, Jingdong identified five key features about Sino-Pak partnership as:139

1) Despite different political, social, religious and ethnic backgrounds and dramatic changes during the past six decades, both the states maintained unchanged friendship and strong ties between them. 2) The mutual understanding and respect of both the states is based upon the Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence. 3) Consultation on close ties through exchange of visits of the leadership of both the states on regular basis. 4) Mutual cooperation, assistance and support in the international arena. 5) In-depth cooperation in culture, defense, economy and science and technology with jointly satisfying results.

Furthermore, China’s security association with Pakistan in post Pokhran II security architecture has become more delicate. According to realpolitik perspective, China’s support to Pakistan constitutes a key element in China’s South Asian policy. Pakistan’s position in regional geostrategic setting remains, and the enduring problem of ethnic separatism and terrorism in Xingjian also incorporated a stable relationship with Pakistan.140 The most significant aspect of Sino-Pakistan all weather friendship is the extensive defense ties, and China’s assistance has proven vital in uplifting Pakistan’s conventional capabilities.

For averting the standoff, the US got involved for the second time after Kargil incidence.141 Colin Powell (the US Secretary of State) compelled both the states to resume negotiations and forced India to conduct free and fair elections in Indian held Kashmir, which he observed as an essential

138 Jingdong Yuan, ‘Beijing’s Balancing Act: Courting New Delhi, Reassuring Islamabad’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.64, No.2 (Spring/Summer 2011), p.49. 139 Ibid, p.39. Jingdong explicated these features by interviewing various Chinese analysts in Beijing and Shanghai during March 2010-October 2010. 140 Lowell Dittmer (ed) South Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan and China (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), p.161. 141 On 6 June 2002, the US secretary of state Richard Armitage visited Pakistan and demanded the assurances to stop cross-border infiltration from Pakistan to Indian held Kashmir on permanent basis and General Musharraf replied positively. India confirmed the decrease in cross-border infiltration by taking a series of diplomatic and military steps. On 12 June 2002, Donald Rumsfield (the US Secretary of Defense) visited India and showed his desires that initial initiatives for reducing tension will create the situation due to which the political leadership of both the states will come to the negotiating table. See Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.416.

155 precursor for reopening of negotiations.142 Finally, Indian and Pakistani governments adopted conciliatory behavior due to US pressure and decided to re-establish their formal and diplomatic relations in October 2002. Official post-mortems predictability of both the states indicated advantageous spin on the crisis.143 Some Indians were not happy about India’s withdrawal and considered it due to US stress.144 Musharraf stated, ‘we have overwhelmed an adversary without fighting a war’.145 Gen Padmanabhan professed that mobilization during standoff provided the opportunity to the armed forces to update their equipment and training, and the penetration across LoC had considerably declined.146 By expressing such statements, both the states desired to attract their public sentiments in favor of their respective governments. However, it was worst crisis of its kind in the context of historical and logical explanations. Regardless of standoff, any miscalculation, or accident during crisis might drift towards nuclear escalation.

It is generally believed that nuclear is a key factor for conflict management in the South Asian region. It can be evaluated that war was averted during crisis 2002 due to the logic of rational nuclear deterrence. Despite issuing threats against Pakistan, India was deterred to even launch a conventional attack, the main fear was of nuclear retaliation. Two fundamental problems attracted deterrence theorists towards Pakistan’s confrontation.

(a) First was how to deter a nuclear attack on Pakistan by India. The apparent answer would be to uphold the nuclear capability for containing nuclear attack by India.

(b) The second problem is a much more critical that: would it be possible for Pakistan to make its nuclear deterrence efficient in case of expected conventional attack? For determining the solution of the problem, the deterrence theorists predict two probabilities, either to respond with nuclear weapons or to avoid in order to adopt countermeasures.

142 Surinder Rana, ‘Emerging Reconciliation Amidst Continuing Military Impasse’, Strategic Insight, Vol.1, Issue.6, (August 2002), downloaded from www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug02/southAisa3.asp on 15 December 2014. 143 See for example, ‘Troop withdrawal vindicates our stance, says Musharraf’, Daily Times (26 October 2002). ‘Objectives of Army deployment achieved, says Fernandes’, The Hindu (28 October 2002). 144 Raja Menon, ‘That Terrible Pinnacle: Efforts to move beyond Nuclear Crisis Management in South Asia’, Disarmament Policy, Issue No.66 (September 2002), downloaded from www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd66/66nr02.htm on June 2, 2015. 145 ‘Warning forced India to pull back troops, says President’ Dawn (31 December 2002). 146 ‘Gen shoots mouth off, backfires’, The Indian Express (31 December 2002).

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Existential deterrence theory provides assistance in understanding Pakistan’s second problem. The nuclear weapons programs of both the states are clandestine in nature and both are declared nuclear states. Both realize that nuclear weapons are disastrously destructive in nature and it would be irrational to utilize them during crisis. The crisis 2001-2002 verified that there is hardly the probability of total war with nuclear weapons. Both India and Pakistan seem capable of inflicting unacceptable damage upon each other in future due to their existing nuclear stockpiles. The present research is an attempt to find out a methodology due to which the two states can come close to resolve their issues.

4.1.3 Mumbai Terrorist Attack

The relations between India and Pakistan once again got on the brink due to Mumbai attacks in the year 2008. Mumbai faced a series of terrorist attacks on November 26, 2008. A number of well-armed groups targeted two luxury hotels, a restaurant, a railway station and a hospital and killed 183 persons, 293 left injured and took hundred were made hostage, including American and British guests who were residents in the hotels.147 Initially, the terrorists were not identified but the witnesses claimed that they were 25. After the investigation, it was disclosed that they were only 10. Panic was created mainly to inflict maximum damage by killing the people.148 It was the first time that India did not accuse the civilian government of Pakistan and blamed Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) for committing Mumbai attacks,149. LeT rejected its connection with Mumbai attacks.150

Soon after the incident, India stopped a dialogue process with Pakistan. They demanded the handing over of 20 people to Pakistan supposedly involved in Mumbai attack.151 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh cautioned in an address televised on November 27, 2008 as, ‘if our neighbors would not take appropriate measures against militant groups based in India’s

147 Jeremy R. Hammond, ‘The Mumbai Attacks: More Than Meets the Eye’, downloaded from www.countercurrents.org/mumbai.htm on June 4, 2015. 148 Ibid. The terrorists were killed at the spot except one ‘Muhammad Ajmal Amir Kasab’. He was captured alive, and he was identified as the resident of Distt Okara of Punjab Province in Pakistan. 149 After the investigation, Maharashtra police disclosed that ‘LeT trained a fidayeen-squad’ for Mumbai incident, India claimed that live captured terrorist Muhammad Ajmal Amir Kasab confessed his association with LeT, reported by Adam Ellick, The New York Times (30 December 2008). 150 Shaheen Akhtar, ‘India-Pakistan Peace Process’, IRS Regional Brief, No.9 (August-December 2008), p.2. 151 India suspended talks on secretary-level relating to Sir Creek, Siachin, water resources, culture and commerce. See Jeremy R. Hammond, ‘The Mumbai Attacks: More Than Meets the Eye’.

157 neighborhood, India will not be tolerated at any cost’.152 Indian foreign minister Pernab Mukerjee accused some elements in Pakistan.153 India revised its visa policy for Pakistanis and announced strict conditions with extended processing time from 15 to 30 days. It also banned cross border trade along LoC.154

India transferred two demarches to Pakistan, one was issued to Pakistan’s High Commissioner in New Delhi. It blamed certain elements in Pakistan had executed the terrorist attack in Mumbai. India anticipated that Pakistan will take stern actions against the terrorists involved in the attack.155 Second demarche was delivered by Indian High Commissioner Islamabad. It demanded the extradition of three persons, Tiger Memon. Dawood Ibrahim, Moulana Masood Azhar and insisted to take action against Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD).156 In fact, India tried to proclaim the attacks as a part of global war on terror to captivate global response in its favor. India formally requested to the UNSC to pursue the prohibition of Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD).157 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared Pakistan as the ‘epicenter of terrorism’ during a speech in the parliament on 12 December 2008, and demanded from the international community to intervene in resolving the matter. It stated:158

We have provoked the world community against the epicenter of terrorism which operated from Pakistan. We have observed the reported steps of Pakistan against the center but we are not satisfied and Pakistan has to take further actions and must dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism and declared that India has an opted an utmost restraint so for it should not be treated as its weakness.

Likewise, Pernab Mukerjee demanded assurances from Pakistan to curtail terrorist activities against India. Mukarjee stated that India wanted guarantees from Pakistan for dismantling the existing terrorist infrastructure, follow UNSC resolution, enforce sanctions on JuD and pronounce

152 Address of PM Manmohan to the nation on 27 November 2008, downloaded from www.edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/11/27/mumbai.worldreaction/index.html?iref=newssearch on June 4, 2015. 153 K. Alan Kronstadt, ‘Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for US’, p.9, downloaded from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R40087.pdf on June 4, 2015. 154 Shaheen Akhtar, p.2. 155 Bryson Hull, ‘India demands Pakistan act decisively on Mumbai attack’, downloaded from www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/01/us-india-mumbai-idUSTRE4B00LI20081201 on June 5, 2015. 156 Ibid. 157 Shaheen Akhtar, p.2. 158 ‘More needs to be done: Singh’ The News (13 December 2008).

158 its leadership as terrorists.159 At the same time India intensified its war preparedness by emphasizing that, ‘India was keeping all options open’.160 Despite promoting the Mumbai attack at the global level and propagating the malicious charges of terrorism on Pakistan, Indian officials failed to uncover any tangible evidence against Pakistan.161 Apart from receiving signals about a major attack from their own sources and from the US as well, Indian intelligence agencies failed in preventing specific response which indicated their incapability and lack of coordination among them.162

Pakistan condemned Mumbai attack in the strongest possible term. President Asif Ali Zardari pronounced it as a ‘detestable act’ and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani called it a ‘dreadful act of terrorism’ Both sent condolence messages to their counterparts separately and expressed shock and sorrow over the loss of the lives of innocent people in attack.163 Shah Mahmood Qureshi (Pakistan’s minister for foreign affairs) was in New Delhi during attack and he described the attack as a ‘horrendous tragedy’.164 Qureshi advised India to avoid ‘knee-jerk’ pronouncements and haphazard conclusion while rejecting Indian's allegations, he cited the example of Smjhota Express. The investigations later confirmed that a serving Indian army officer was involved in the massacre.165

Pakistan decided to fully cooperate with India in identifying the terrorists and Qureshi proposed to establish joint commission for the investigation of the incident.166 President Zardari assured that ‘if there is any indication of any group from Pakistan, we will take severe action against them’.167 The Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) repeated Pakistan’s determination not to permit its soil for any terrorist exercises both at the regional and the global level. It offered full cooperation

159 ‘Pernab Mukerjee tells Pakistan: Fulfil assurances on terror’ The Tribune Chandigarh (17 December 2008). Ashok Tuteja, ‘Pernab to Pak: Implement UNSC resolution’, The Tribune Chandigarh (18 December 2008). 160 ‘India to consider all options, warns Pernab’, The News (20 December 2008). 161 ‘In Wake of Attacks, India-Pakistan Tensions Grow’, New York Times (2 December 2008). 162 Ibid. Angel Rabasa, RobertD. Blackwill, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, C.Christine Fair, Brain A. Jackson, Brain Michael Jenkin, Seth G. Jones, Nathaneil Sestak, Ashley J. Tellis, ‘The Lessons of Mumbai’, p.9, downloaded from www.rand.org/content/dam/eand/pubs/occasionalpapers/2009/RAND_OP249.pdf on June 4, 2015. Also mentioned K. Alan Kronstadt, ‘Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for US’, p.9, downloaded from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R40087.pdf on June 4, 2015. 163 ‘Zardari, Gilani condemn’, The News (28 November 2008). 164 Shaheen Akhtar, p.4. 165 Ibid. ‘Let’s stop blaming each other, suggests Pak FM’ The Kashmir Times, Jammu (28 November 2008). 166 ‘Pakistan Offers to Aid India in Terror Investigation’, Washington Post (2 December 2008). 167 ‘Zardari: If evidence points to any group in my country, I shall take strict action’ The Hindu (30 November 2008).

159 to India including assistance in investigation, intelligence sharing and to establish a joint investigation commission.168 Pakistan denied its involvement in Mumbai attacks. It reiterated that the terrorists were non-state actors. President Zardari once again assured of his government's cooperation and will take grave action against non-state actors.169 Pakistan planned to launch investigations about India’s claim of Pakistan’s involvement in Mumbai attack. It repeated its demand of any credible evidence with a suggestion to establish high level delegation for joint investigation.170 In the wake of UNSC resolution 1267, Pakistan initiated a countrywide crackdown against JuD, al-Akhtar Trust and al-Rashid Trust and banned their operational networks, froze their assets and arrested their top leadership including Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, Haji Muhammad Ashraf and an Indian born Mahmud Muhammad Bahaziq.171

India could not provide any hard evidence about Pakistan’s link to Mumbai incident and reiterated that the suspects would not be given to India. They were to be treated according to Pakistan’s law.172 Pakistan cautioned that peace process should not be seized due to Mumbai attack. According to Gilani, ‘the terrorists are intended to cut off peace process between India and Pakistan and we should not permit them to sabotage peace process between the two states’.173

However, Pakistan sent a clear message to India that Pakistan has the right to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty and will respond against any Indian aggression accordingly.174 In response to Indian threats, Pakistan’s political and military leadership assured that they were aware about India’s threats and had the potential to maintain its (Pakistan’s) territorial integrity.175 PM Gilani rejected war and stated that Indian government was covering up its intelligence failure to

168 ‘DCC pledges not to allow use of Pakistan’s soil for terror attack, review border situation’ The News (9 December 2008). 169 ‘Zardari: If evidence points to any group in my country, I shall take strict action’ The Hindu (30 November 2008). 170 ‘Pakistan hands demarche to Indian envoy’, Daily Times (9 December 2008). 171 The UN banned Jud, al-Akhtar Trust and al-Rashid Trust according to UNSC resolution 1267 and Pakistan regarded the UN Resolution. For details, see ‘Govt goes after Daawa for UN’, The News (12 December 2008). 172 ‘Gilani sees India ties normalizing over time’, The News (14 December 2008). 173 ‘Gilani: Peace process must not be derailed’, Dawn (6 December 2008). 174 A joint resolution was passed during all parties’ conference in support of defence forces of Pakistan and paid tribute due to their services for assuring Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and expressed that Pakistan condemned ‘unsubstantiated ‘allegations from India and seek to settle all outstanding disputes. See ‘Defend Pakistan’s honor: all party meet’, The HIndu (3 December 2008). 175 ‘Pakistan capable of thwarting aggression’, The Nation (22 December 2008).

160 find a ‘scapegoat’ behind the Mumbai attack.176 Qureshi stressed upon the ineptness of war and suggested for diffusing the tension despite promoting aggression. He expressed that:177

The exchange of emotional statements is easy but regional strategic environment demands wisdom and India’s wise people believe that India-Pakistan war will be unjustifiable due to few unwise elements. The outcome of war did not offer any solution in future and the two states must avoid confrontation due to such elements.

In response of India’s statement, while ‘keeping all options open’, Gen Pervaiz Kiani (the then Chief of Army Staff) reacted:178

The defense forces are fully prepared to give a similar response within few minutes if India planned any surgical strikes inside Pakistan and to meet any eventuality, they become ready to sacrifice their lives for their country.

President Zardari pledged that ‘the country’s ideology is based upon freedom and the inhabitants of Pakistan will not compromise on their sovereignty and freedom and will be ready for war till the last drop of their blood’.179

Belligerent statements of the leaderships of two nuclear armed rivals diverted the attention of international community for taking interest in resolving the disorder between India and Pakistan for sustaining peace and stability of the South Asian region. The world players including US, UK and China remained in touch with both the states to avert any expected conflict between two nuclear neighbors.180

As far as China’s response is concerned, China anticipated that for sustaining regional stability, both India and Pakistan must resume dialogue process.181 According to a spokesman of Chinese Foreign Ministry, ‘continuation of dialogue process between India and Pakistan is obvious for

176 ‘Gilani: Mumbai Heat: India wants to make as a scapegoat to cover its security failure’, The Tribune Chandigarh (25 December 2008). 177 ‘Qureshi: Mumbai Heat; Pak fully prepared to defend itself’, The Tribune (22 December 2008). 178 ‘Kiyani pledges matching response in no time’, The News (23 December 2008). 179 ‘Zardari: We’ll defend Pakistan till the last drop of our blood’ The Hindu (25 December 2008). 180 Britain Prime Minister Gorden Brown visited India and Pakistan soon after the Mumbai attacks and asked Pakistan to take strict action against the perpetrators. He proposed the measures for investigation and resumption of dialogue process and offered assistance in investigating the suspects of Mumbai attack. See ‘Brown tells Pakistan it’s time to take action’, Daily Times Islamabad (15 December 2008). China urged both the states to work together in investigating the main cause of terror attack and identify the mastermind and maintain peace. See ‘Singh tons down rhetoric: Mastermind of Mumbai attacks remains to be identified: China’, Dawn (24 December 2008). 181 Jian Yang and Rashid Ahmad Siddiqui, ‘About All-Weather Relationship: Security Foundations of Sin-Pakistan Relations’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.20, No.71 (September 2011), p.571.

161 sustaining regional peace and stability that is the common observation of the international community’.182 Indo-Pak tension further intensified when Indian aircraft violated Pakistan’s air space. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jeichi contacted his counterparts of India and Pakistan and compelled them to start a dialogue process.183 As rhetoric heated up, China refused to admit India’s blame that Kashmiri militants were involved in Mumbai attacks. It hinted at the other fault lines in Indian society where various sects of Hindus and Muslims have hostile bearings due to their different religious beliefs and interests.184

China’s response during and after Mumbai attack was the outcome of its national interests that were expressed by President Hu Jinto during his address at a meeting of diplomats in July 2009 in Beijing, and stressed that, ‘China will stick to the independent policy of peace, follow the way of peaceful development and established friendly relations with all the countries according to its five principles of Peaceful Co-existence’.185 In the post-Cold war scenario, the main objective of China’s domestic and foreign policy is to promote peace and development.186 China seeks to widen and deepen its global search for energy and other resources for sustaining the continual growth of its economy by expanding its political clout.187 So, China is actively projecting its ‘Soft Power’ and peaceful image by promoting educational, culture, tourism and other exchanges at the societal level.188 Such assertions explicate that China’s reemergence for obtaining great power status will continue to be peaceful because they promote China’s fundamental interests.

On the contrary, the US President Obama enunciated solidarity with India by stating that, ‘India has the right to protect itself against the external threats’.189 While, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted Pakistan’s attempts in investigations and emphasized on both India and Pakistan to cooperate at the highest level for maintaining total transparency.190 US rejected

182 ‘China Calls for India-Pakistan Dialogue after Mumbai Attack’, Xinhua (4 December 2008). 183 ‘Chinese FM Talks with Indian, Pakistani Counterparts over Phone’, Peoples Daily (27 December 2008). 184 ‘Mumbai Attacks Reveal Deep-Rooted Conflicts in India’, People’s Daily (1 December 2008). 185 ‘Chinese President Urges Diplomats to Serve National Interests’, Xinhua (20 July 2009). 186 Zhiqun Zhu, China’s New Diplomacy: Rational, Strategies and significance (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011), p.231. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 ‘Obama: India Has Right to Protect Itself’ Times of India (1 December 2008). 190 ‘Remarks by the Secretary Rice in Pakistan’ downloaded from www.2001- 2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/12/112752.htm on June 9, 2015.

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India’s charges against Pakistan and criticized India’s plans of surgical strikes.191 In spite of declaring JuD a terrorist outfit by UNSC, both the US and UNSC had not even considered Pakistan a terror state.192 US rejected any probability of India-Pakistan war due to Mumbai attacks and both India and Pakistan avoided the deployment of major troops along the international border.193

Pakistan stared its efforts to once again restart the dialogue process.194 It succeeded to sign an agreement with India to de-link the action on terrorism and resumed the composite dialogue process.195 The agreement was appreciated in Pakistan while it was rigorously criticized in India. Soon after his arrival from Sharm-el-Sheikh, Manmohan had to face harsh criticism from nearly all political parties including his coalition partners.196 Prime Minister Manmohan did not sustain the political pressure against the agreement and denied to accept the agreement.197

Both the states are busy in blame game which reveals lack of trust between them. This is mainly according to their strategic cultures where the elite mindsets of both the states are reluctant to trust in each other. Exchange of harsh statements between the political leadership of both the states is a common practice and exchange of fire on Line of Control (LoC) has usually been observed. Decision theoretic deterrence theory addresses the Mumbai incidence as; any outbreak of clash may lead to nuclear exchange due to the ambiguous strategic response of the adversary. Thus, for avoiding any nuclear conflict, the two states did not initiate even conventional strike against each other during Mumbai crisis.

191 During his visit to Pakistan, the US Senator McCain rejected India’s military strikes against Pakistan and declared that there was no firm evidence against the Pakistan’s government’s involvement in Mumbai incidence. Quoted Wilson John, Paul Soren, Anjali Sharma, Jayeeta Bhattacharjee, Kaustav Dhar Chakarabarti, Aashti Salman and Nish Verma ‘The Mumbai Terror Attacks: A Case Study of Response and Reactions’ downloaded from www.mumbaiattack-1230552332507.pdf on May 5, 2014. See ‘White House opposes punitive strikes: Engagement advocated’, Dawn (3 December 2008). 192 ‘No move to declare Pakistan a terrorist state: US’, Dawn (14 December 2008). 193 ‘White House counsel’s caution’, Dawn (27 December 2008). 194 During Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in the Russian city Yekaterinburg on June 16, 2009, the President Zardari assured Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that Pakistani territory would not be used for terrorism against India. 195 An agreement was signed on July 2009, by Manmohan Singh and Yousaf Raza Gillani in Egyptian city of Sharm-el- Sheikh during Non-Align Movement (NAM) summit. Both the Prime Ministers accepted that the composite dialogue process is the only way forward and it should not be bracketed with the action of terrorism. See ‘India, Pakistan issue joint statement on bilateral relations’, Indian Express (16 July 2009). 196 ‘We will not accept delinking: BJP’, The Hindu (18 July 2009). 197 ‘No dilution of our stand: Manmohan’, The Hindu (18 July 2009).

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4.1.4 Deterrence for South Asian Region

The theories which have been discussed in three case studies were formed within the context of US-Soviet engagement during Cold War. The South Asian socio-cultural and geostrategic architecture is substantially differs from the US-Soviet confrontation during Cold War. The Communist and the Western world differed in their ideologies. Both were engaged against each other in several parts of the globe. Nevertheless, their rational response during crisis could not permit them in direct conflict. It was observed during Berlin Blockade in 1948-49, the Taiwan Straits in 1954 and China-Soviet conflict in 1969. During crises, the states responded rationally and were not intended to wage wars for obtaining temporary gains.198

Both the US and former Soviet Union are placed thousands of kilometers away from each other and mighty oceans separate them. The forces of both the states were not involved in direct conflict during Cold War. They maintained a distance from each other and were busy in proxy wars for acquiring their political objectives. Whereas, the aforementioned aspects are not observed in the context of Pakistan-India relations. Both the states share a common border and no natural features separate them. The troops of both the states are positioned in red alert along LoC and frequently engaged in exchange of fire. Prior to obtaining overt nuclear status, the two states were involved in conflicts.199

The behavior of the political leadership of India and Pakistan is based on emotions rather than on rationality during decision making because it is generally assumed that the leaders of two nuclear giants (USA and Former Soviet Union) took strategic decisions after extensive deliberations and with calculated risks. Political instability persists in India and Pakistan while, United States and Soviet Union both have stable governments. During Cold War, the Kremlin chiefs were accountable and Nikata Khrushchev was replaced because he failed to act in a responsible way.200 However, one cannot deny that the political elite of the two overt nuclear states (India and Pakistan) behaved in a rational way during crisis after Pokhran II, but it is critical to evaluate that such rational response would be perceived in coming future as well.

198 Kamal Matinuddin, ‘Nuclearization of South Asia’, Regional Studies, Vol.16, No.3. (Summer 1998), p.35. 199 Before 1998, both the states were involved in conflicts in 1948, 1965 and in 1971. 200 Kamal Matinuddin, ‘Nuclearization of South Asia’, Regional Studies, p.35.

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The enduring Hindu-Muslim hatred became unabated especially among the religious groups of India and Pakistan. The demolition of historical Babri Mosque in 1992 is the indication of latent hatred of Hindus against the Muslims. In the reaction of demolition of Babari Mosque, the religious groups in Pakistan started attacks on Hindu Temples which indicated ‘tit for tat’ response against each other. Such response was also observed in three case studies when the political leaderships of the two states exchanged belligerent statements during crises.

Both India and Pakistan are not capable to have a look on each other’s activities during peace. Their intelligence agencies, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), intend to collect the details relating to troops mobilization on various sectors but they are incapable to validate the data that generate faulty conclusions. The decision taken on untrustworthy information may hazardous for the South Asian strategic stability.

Due to political instability, the likelihoods of change of governments occur in India and Pakistan. The governmental policies might be reverted with the change of governments due to unstable state structures. Pakistan has experienced three military coups while India is also striving for political stability after the assassination of Mrs Indra Gandhi in 1984. The political instability of both the states may harm their nuclear deterrence.201

Additionally, the role of external powers during crisis between the two states is obvious especially US played prominent role as mediator for maintaining peace and keeping the South Asian region away from nuclear exchange. While, China’s neutral stance during Indo-Pak crisis could not reveal significant impact for diffusing tension between India and Pakistan. On the contrary, the theories of deterrence are silent in elaborating the role of external powers. Hence, it is a challenging and difficult task to explore the relevant theory for the South Asian Region. After evaluating the theories of deterrence, ‘Decision Theoretic Deterrence theory’ is relatively applicable because ambiguity is perceived related to the strategic response between India and Pakistan. The nuclear doctrines of India, Pakistan and China provide in-depth understanding for evaluating the ambiguities related to the South Asian strategic environment that is discussed in the coming chapter.

201 Ibid, p.38

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Conclusion

It is generally believed that the states possessing nuclear weapons hardly involve in conflicts with one another. After the nuclear tests of 1998, it was anticipated that the two states would come towards the peaceful resolution of their disputes but Kargil incidence in 1999 refuted the postulation and both the states were near to the brink of nuclear escalation during crisis. Once again the two states were near to nuclear exchange during 2001-2002 military standoff and after the Mumbai incidence in 2008. The Indo-Pak crisis after 1998 provided a unique notion that limited conflicts might occur under nuclear umbrella. Rational response of India and Pakistan kept them away from nuclear exchange but it is unpredictable that both the states will respond rationally in future. Thus, it can be predicted that the chances of nuclear conflict exist in the upcoming South Asian strategic environment. During crises in the post 1998 scenario, the suspicious role of domestic actors precipitated the vulnerability of regional strategic environment. It is assumed that their existence might disrupt the proceedings of peace initiatives between India and Pakistan. Additionally, the elite mindsets and Hindu-Muslim hatred can flare up extremism between the two states. Originally, China’s neutral stance could not provide leverage to Pakistan during crises management and Indo-Pak crises were resolved by US intervention. It is surprising that relevant deterrence theories did not support external intervention during conflict management which indicates that both India and Pakistan must initiate the mechanism of conflict management with mutual consent which is elaborated in chapter seven.

The main proponent due to which the two states were away from nuclear exchange and were bound to keep the conflict at the limited level was due to the existence of nuclear deterrence and the realist theory of decision theoretic deterrence provides the understanding about their nuclear stances during crisis. The three states (India, Pakistan and China) are suspicious about the nuclear stockpiles and military preparations of one another which generates security dilemma among them. The present research examines trilateral strategies and force postures in coming chapter.

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Chapter 5

Trilateral Strategic Initiatives for Credible Minimum Deterrence

Introduction

After the nuclear tests of May 1998, India and Pakistan were involved in a limited conflict during crises, but the existence of their nuclear deterrence kept them away from nuclear exchange. Likewise, the existing Sino-Indian strategic competition also exacerbated the implication of nuclear deterrence between China and India. For sustaining the credibility of their nuclear deterrence, the three states (India, Pakistan and China) adopted nuclear doctrines but their persisting misperceptions could not permit them to acknowledge the nuclear doctrines of one another. For reassuring their nuclear deterrence credible, the three states initiated ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ (CMD), and planned to fulfil the prerequisites of CMD. The three states are not only enhancing their nuclear capabilities but expanding the means of their nuclear delivery mechanisms also. Their missile programs are endorsed by their potential to target all-important military and civilian installations of one another. For promising safety, security and reliable use of nuclear weapons during conflicts, they have also developed command and control systems.

Within the context of this debate, this chapter seeks to answer the following questions.

 Why China, India and Pakistan remain committed in escalating their nuclear weapons programs?  What are the force postures, delivery systems of nuclear weapons and command and control systems of China, India and Pakistan?  What are the main proponents due to which the three states are suspicious related to their CMD?  How Sino-Indian strategic competition disrupts Pakistan’s strategic architecture?  What is the credibility of existing CMD of India and Pakistan for avoiding nuclear escalation in the South Asian region in future?  How can the realist assumption of Stability-Instability Paradox elucidate the CMD of India and Pakistan?

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To answer the above questions, the CMD of India, China and Pakistan are evaluated within the three preconditions of mechanics of CMD. It is critical to estimate trilateral force postures because their nuclear programs are clandestine in nature and multiple resources within and outside of the South Asian region are adopted for the evaluation.

5.1 Concept of Minimum Deterrence

The idea of minimum deterrence is traced in an arms race between USA and former Soviet Union during Cold War when both the states were striving in enhancing their deterrent forces for encompassing the military preparations of each other, which provoked the idea of minimum deterrence for the survival of their nuclear forces.1 The minimum deterrence provided the notion that fewest nuclear weapons are sufficient to deter the adversary’s attack. A numeric parity of nuclear weapons as compared to conventional military balance is not as essential and detrimental because an adversary having large collection of nuclear arsenals can be successfully deterred with small reliable nuclear weapons.2 The supporters of minimum deterrence argue that it leads to evade arms race, saves awesome resources required for otherwise social services and development. Minimum deterrence has also been illustrated in the context of its strategic objectives, which may themselves be limited.3 It facilitates comparatively less industrially developed states to collect the resources for minimum deterrent ability in the absence of alternative options for assuring its security and survival. According to Waltz:4

Unlike conventional strategy, a deterrent (nuclear) strategy does not rely upon extent of territory, thus removing major cause of war, and deterrence effectiveness a dependent upon one’s capabilities and the will to use these capabilities.

Additionally, the minimum is based upon ‘the lowermost level of destruction … due to employing a limited number of nuclear weapons,5 which allows various justifications about the specific

1 P.M.S. Blackett, ‘A Critique of Defense Thinking’, Survival, Vol.3, No.3 (1961), pp.126-134. 2 William T.R.Fox, ‘International Control of Atomic Weapons’ in Bernard Brodie (ed), The Absolute Weapons (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p.181 3 Herbert F. Yark contended: the minimum deterrence is lemmatized in two ways; one in terms of its objectives and the remaining in terms of its means. In terms of objectives, it intends to deter the use of nuclear arsenals by someone else and not more than that. In term of means, minimum deterrence involves a limited number. Herbert F. Yark, Arms and the Physicist (New York: American Physical Society, 1994), p.373 4 Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), pp. 5-6 5 Peter Gizewski, Minimum Deterrence in a New World Order, Aurora Papers, 24, (Ottawa: Canadian Center for Global Security, 1994), p.2.

168 magnitude of a particular damage. A misconceived concept about minimum deterrence occurred in the US during the initial phase of Cold War, when the US Navy proclaimed to destroy ‘the entire Russia’ with 720 warheads and 45 submarines,6 which may still be anticipated as minimum with the production of hundreds and thousands of warheads in the later phases of Cold War.

It is critical to quantify ‘minimum’ due to the persisting opacity related to the amount of fissile material the states possess, their numbers of nuclear weapons along with their future plans for force development. In a condition, when the numbers and locations of a state is unidentified, its opponent will not have confidence to target and destroy its deterrent. Therefore, British, Chinese and French perceptions about minimum deterrence remain undefined.7 An opaque minimum deterrence is considered as a relatively small nuclear force but the Chinese and Indian analysts argue that the reliability of minimum deterrence may not be restricted to a simple calculation of numbers.8 The international community has sought to initiate the steps for reducing the number of nuclear weapons and to maintain deterrence up to a minimum number of weapons, and both China and India provide a test case for realists for evaluating such dynamics. China remains ahead of India both at the strategic and conventional levels, but the magnitude of China’s advantage in respect of its qualitative and quantitative deficit it faces is relative to the US.9 China’s proclamation about its deterrence is explained in two ways as ‘minimum deterrence’ and ‘limited deterrence’, that creates suspicion on India because India is reluctant to admit this due to China’s ongoing production of fissile material for weapons.10 India undertakes that China’s Second Artillery retains a two-level doctrine that employs ‘credible minimum deterrence’ vis-à-vis Russia and the US and ‘limited deterrence’ against India which enforces the evidence of mistrust.11

As far as the South Asian strategic environment is concerned, it is hardly feasible for India and Pakistan to sustain the limited number of force built-up due to various factors and both the states

6 Ibid, pp.2-3. 7 Avery Goldestine, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution, (CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp.279-291. 8 Pan Zhequang and P.K.Singh, ‘Thinking Beyond Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy’, in Lora Saalman (ed and tr) The China-India Nuclear Crossroads (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), pp.25-34. 9 Lora Saalman (ed and tr) The China-India Nuclear Crossroads (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), p.175. 10 Pan Zhequang and P.K.Singh, ‘pp.25-34. 11 SriKanth Kondapalli, ‘Revisiting No First Use and Minimum Deterrence’ in Lora Saalman (ed and tr) The China-India Nuclear Crossroads (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), pp.47-64.

169 decided to redefine minimum in the context of their regional strategic environment. Rodney Jones explains that, it is critical to find out the ‘minimum’ in the South Asian context, as he states:12

Does ‘minimum’ imply the sufficiency of small number of nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons held in reserve? Low readiness or alert rates of nuclear force? Renunciation of nuclear war fighting? Mainly counter-value targeting? Alternatively, does the term minimum merely make virtue today’s facts of life in the Subcontinent’s limited resources, scare weapons materials, unproved delivery systems, and still undeveloped technical military capabilities?

Former Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Abdul Satter stated about Pakistan’s notion of minimum deterrence:13

Minimum nuclear deterrence will remain the guiding principle of our nuclear strategy. The minimum cannot be quantified in static numbers. The India build-up will necessitate review and reassessment. In order to ensure the survivability and credibility of our deterrence, Pakistan will have to maintain, preserve and upgrade its capabilities.

Likewise, the former India’s Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh stated related to minimum deterrence in 1998:14

The minimum is not a fixed physical quantification. It is a policy approach dictated by, and determined in the context of our security environment. There is no fixity. Therefore, as our security environment changes and alters, and as new demands begin to be placed on it, our requirements too are bound to be evaluated.

Additionally, minimum nuclear forces have their own fallacies as Lawrence Freedman explains:15

Minimum deterrent forces are vulnerable to first strike, compelling premature use and hair-trigger responses and restricted to counter-city attack.

Thus, minimum is an unclear concept in articulating the fixed number of weapons for sustaining minimum deterrence. The estimation about minimum deterrence is inversely proportionate to the

12 R.W. Jones, ‘ Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview’ downloaded from www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/minimum-se.pdf on May 9, 2014 13 ‘Pakistan’s Response to Indian Nuclear Doctrine’, Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar’s inaugural address to the seminar organized by the Islamabad council of World Affairs and the Institute of Strategic Studies, 25 November 1999. 14 India’s foreign minister’s speech in Parliament on December 16, 1998. Also quoted Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence: Current Challenges and Future Efficacy’ Margalla Papers, Special Edition, (2008), pp. 46-47 15 Lawrence Freedman, ‘The Rational for Medium Sized Deterrence Forces’ in Christopher Bertram (ed), The Future of Nuclear Deterrence (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1981), p.49. Also quoted Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence: Current Challenges and Future Efficacy’ Margalla Papers, Special Edition, (2008), p.47

170 aspects related to the survivability of force, as survivability of force might be assured by its smaller size and vice versa.16 It is interrelated with the force configuration of the opponent. If the aggressor has comparatively more sophisticated weapons along with their delivery mechanism, the prospect of survivability of force would be severely affected by the same proportion. The second aspect is the credibility of the delivery mechanism to hit the intended targets is conditional with subject to the adversary’s potential to intercept by employing missile defense systems. If the survivability is relegated due to the deployment of opponent’s missile defense system, then apparently the magnitude of minimum deterrence would be in favor of higher side.17

Minimum must be dynamic and credible and for overcoming the deficiencies of minimum deterrence to a feasible extent, some nuclear states including China, India and Pakistan renamed it as ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD)’.18 Under the persisting South Asian strategic architecture, it is anticipated that both India and Pakistan intended to adopt CMD after becoming overt nuclear powers in 1998 as highlighted by Strobe Talbot (former US Deputy Secretary of State) in an interview with India Today as:19

The phrase “credible minimum deterrence’ was expressed by the Indian Prime Minister on several occasions that demanded to reconcile the two adjectives, credible and minimum. It

16 Naeem Salik, ‘Minimum Deterrence and India-Pakistan Nuclear Dialogue; A Case Study of Pakistan’ downloaded from www.centrovolta.it/landau/content/binary/minimumdeterrenceIndia- Pakistandailogue.Casestudy.pakistan.pdf on January 27, 2016. 17 Ibid. 18 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence: Current Challenges and Future Efficacy’, p.47. The CMD stance is derived from two elements, credibility and minimalism. Both the elements can be illuminated separately but their combination explicates nuclear deterrence policy. Credibility is the consolidation of capability, political will, intelligence, effective and assured retaliation, and survivability while minimum is explained in terms of cost, size, posture and eventuality of use, Explained Tanvi Kulkarni and Alankrita Sinha, ‘India’s Credible Minimum Deterrence’, IPCS Issue Brief, No.179, (Dec 2011). While, minimum exists in both Minimum Deterrence and in CMD, but the term CMD is comparatively uncertain while elaborating it according to regional strategic environment. Yet it is uncertain to determine the number of deterrent forces in both the cases because it varies from state to state. Thus, it can be assessed that ambiguity exists in both the cases but its intensity becomes more ambiguous in the case of CMD. James C. Melvenon, Murray Scot Tanner, Michael S. Chase, David Frelinger, David C. Gompert, Martin C. Lilicki and Kelvin L. Pollpeter, China’s Response to US Military Transformation and Implication for the Department for Defense (Sant Monica, C A: RAND Corporation, 2006), p.97.Also mentioned Lora Saalman (ed and tr) The China-India Nuclear Crossroads (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), p. 174. Zadar Khan, ‘Pakistan’s Minimum Deterrence and its Policy Approach towards Fissile Materials: Security Concerns and the Region’s Changed Strategic Environment’ The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis’, Vol.26, No.1 (March 2014), p.52 19 Quoted by Peter R. Lavoy, ‘South Asia’ in Jeffery A. Larsen (ed), Arms Control Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment (Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002), p.25.

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requires to endorse ‘credible’ to deter and to provoke ‘minimum’ for preventing an overwhelming and expensive arms race.

After nuclear tests of 1998, India asserted to follow CMD,20 but revealed it ambiguous as K.Subramanyam stated:21

Minimum deterrence is not mathematical implication, but a tactical approach. If it is feasible for a country to possess enough arsenals to survive and has the potential to retaliate with unacceptable penalty, then it is obvious to maintain ‘open-ended’ minimum deterrence for matching opponent’s arsenals in statistical terms.

In India’s response, Pakistan announced its deterrence policy and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declared that ‘the state’s nuclear policy would be based upon CMD which would lead to avoidance of arms race in the South Asian region’.22 Pakistan’s policy of CMD is elaborated under four objectives:23

1. Deterrence of all kinds of external hostility. 2. Building to this effect on affective combination of conventional and strategic response. 3. Evading a pre-emptive attack through protection and the threat of nuclear reprisal. 4. Alleviating strategic deterrence in South Asia.

To obtain the said objectives, preservation of CMD is the key concern for Pakistan’s security policy.24 It is critical to validate CMD without quantifying the exact number of nuclear weapons and Pakistan’s CMD posture is also unclear about elaborating ‘minimum’ and remains undefined, open ended and on the similar spiraling as India’s CMD.25 This research seeks to examine the consequences of existing CMD postures of the three states in the context of the security dilemma of the strategic triangle India-Pakistan and China by analyzing the prerequisites of CMD.

20 Despite proclaiming CMD posture, India could not interpret about ‘minimum’ and failed to clarify, how many nuclear weapons would be sufficient to deter Pakistan or what would be its posture credible towards China which indicates that India deliberately engendered ‘calculated ambiguity’ about its nuclear policy. Explained Zafar Khan, ‘Emerging Shafts in India’s Nuclear Policy: Implications for Minimum Deterrence in South Asia’, Strategic Studies, Vol.34, No.1 (Spring 2014), PP.98-99. 21 K. Subramanyam, ‘Not a Numbers Game: Minimum Cost of N-Deterrence’, Times of India (7 December 1998). 22 Remarks of the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Nuclear policy and the CTBT during speech in National Defense College on 20 May 1999. 23 Mahmud Ali Durani, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons’ Cooperative and Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 37, Sandia National Laboratories, (July 2004), p.23. 24 Ibid. 25 Farh Zahra, ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence in South Asia’, IPRI Journal, Vol. xii, No.2 (Summer 2012), p.10.

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5.1.1 Prerequisites of CMD

For examining the efficacy of CMD among the states, Kenneth Waltz describes three preconditions for CMD:26

1. States must be capable to acquire nuclear capability and have the potential not only to bear nuclear attack but to strike back also. 2. The threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons for a nuclear attack must be credible. 3. States must ensure their nuclear programs fool proof.

It is generally assumed that a country bearing the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons against the aggressor, the adversary would be reluctant for further escalation. However, the probabilities of war among the nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states exist and the chances of limited conflicts might occur among the nuclear powers as well. Additionally, for successful deterrence, the country must have reliable communication capability for communicating the threats of retaliations with nuclear weapons against the aggressors by employing effective command and control. The threats of the use of nuclear weapons must be credible that the adversary would believe that the threat is authentic and not a bluff. All the above- mentioned prerequisites are evaluated under Waltz’s preconditions of CMD by comparing the doctrines, and command and control systems and force postures, among China, India and Pakistan.

5.2 CMD and Nuclear Doctrine

The idea of doctrine is based upon ‘a set of principles or rules governing the employment of capability, which may be technological, ideological, political, military or strategic.27 Usually three aspects, political, military and strategic, are considered in doctrine. Political ideological doctrines broadly constitute practice, promulgation and propagation of a political philosophy and an

26 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘More May Be Better’ in Scot D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds), The Spread of Nuclear weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). P.48. Quoted Arvind Kumar ‘Theories of deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence in the Sub Continent’, in E. Sridharan (ed), The India Pakistan Nuclear Relationship. (Delhi: Routledge. 2007) p.257. Also downloaded from www.olivialau.org/ir/archive/sag5.pdf on May 10, 2014. Suresh Dhanda, ‘An Assessment of ‘Second-Strike’ Capability’, ’World Affairs, Vol.13, No.4 (Winter 2009), pp.94-96. See the reference 94 of Chapter No. 1. Suresh Dhanda quoted Institute for Science and International Security, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: An Assessment of Second-Strike Capability, ‘World Affairs’, Vol.13, No.4 (Winter 2009), p.98. 27 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Doctrine: Its Evaluation, Development and Implications for South Asian Security, p.316.

173 ideology on the national, regional or global level Politics and ideology being generally thought to be based upon integrated assumptions, theories and comprehensive patterns of cognitive and moral beliefs constituting a socio-political system28. A military doctrine is defined as a body of theory, which describes the environment within which the armed forces operate, and prescribes the methods and circumstances of their employment.29

The strategic doctrines are characteristically different from the classical doctrines because a fundamentally altered strategic environment in the post 1945 international political system.30 After the World War II, the new structure of strategic power was developed by ideological, political, and military aspects of Cold War and by the latest development in the military technology and operational dimensions of strategic doctrines. The addition of nuclear weapons has a great impact in developing the new dimensions of strategic doctrine like, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), massive retaliation and flexible response. The destructiveness of the nuclear weapons shifted the prime focus of military doctrine from defense or war fighting to deterrence.31 Nuclear doctrine is different from posture.32

Force posture is initially relying on the structural capabilities and the states nuclear doctrine has less significance. Normally, nuclear doctrine is related with the conceptual, institutional and infrastructural mechanisms for the deployment of nuclear weapons, the nature of nuclear capability has a great impact in adopting nuclear doctrine. In the post-World War II era, the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have resulted in a paradigm shift in doctrinal emphasis from war fighting to deterrence capabilities.33

The nuclear doctrine provides the broad concept, principles and policies regarding the development, the employment of nuclear forces, nuclear strategy related to the number of nuclear arsenals to deploy and delivery systems to put them on, and how they would be used, whether in

28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid, p.317 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33Bernard Brodie observed, “thus for the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose” Bernard Brodie, ed, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, (New York Harcourt, Brass and Co, 1946), p.76.

174 counter force or counter value modes.34 At the global level, the states adopt doctrines which are according to their political, military and strategic intentions, and the analysis of China’s nuclear doctrines provide understanding about its projected strategic response during crises, for examining its CMD postures according to Waltz’s prerequisites about CMD.

5.2.1 China’s Nuclear Doctrine

The elaboration of a country’s nuclear and military doctrine is critical as it seeks to clarify its strategic posture and a strategy that it deems to follow, and the force posture that it may seek especially in case of China due to non-accessibility of the information concerned.35 However, in the beginning of 1999, China published military textbooks for understanding the evolution of its latest doctrine and anticipated it essential to disclose the details of speedy military developments and deploy a series of latest strategic missiles to deter foreign involvement on Taiwan dispute.36 Consequently, China decided to follow a strategy of minimum deterrence as mentioned in white paper on national defense in October 2000:37

Since the possession of nuclear weapons, China solemnly pronounced to follow the strategy not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any condition and later proclaimed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon states.

Similarly, China again reaffirmed its posture of no first use, adopted moral stance in white paper on national defense 2002, and ‘demanded the countries having biggest nuclear stockpile to accept the leading concern towards nuclear disarmament’.38 In 2004, China considered ‘active defense’ as a theoretical base for the advancement of its nuclear weapons. According to Chinese Defense

34 Zafar Iqbal Cheema. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Doctrine, Its Evaluation, Development and Implications for South Asian Security, p.318. 35 While many of the states including the US make the basic information of their doctrines (through Department of Defense) accessible for public, but in case of China, no such information is available. The information is clandestine in nature and cannot be revealed to the foreigners. The evolution of China’s doctrine is based upon the partial information available through the official and military statements. See Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009), p.68. 36 Mark Schneider, ‘The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People’s Republic of China’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28, No.3 (2009), p.245. 37 ‘White Paper: China’s National Defense’ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Beijing (2000), downloaded from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine on February 11, 2015. Also quoted Arpit Rajain, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: China, India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p.138. 38 ‘White Paper: China’s National Defense’ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Beijing (2002), downloaded from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine on February 11, 2015.

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Ministry, ‘the configuration and scale of China’s advancement for enhancing its nuclear capability is arranged with the collaboration of its military strategy of ‘active defense’ (emphasis added).39

US is suspicious of China’s ‘active defense ‘and its no-first-use (NFU) posture and anticipated that China is endorsing the ambiguity about its nuclear doctrine to establish limited nuclear force to deter US involvement on Taiwan issue.40 US is concerned about China’s NFU due to General Zhu Chenghu’s statement in 2005, ‘if the US intervenes within the target zone on China’s region by employing missiles and precision-guided ammunition, China will have the option to respond with nuclear weapons’.41 However, Chinese Foreign Minister denied Zhu’s statement in July 21, 2005 and asserted NFU policy about the nuclear weapons.42 China is constantly following its nuclear doctrine and revived its promises again in National Defense White Paper at the end of 2006:43

The primary objective of China is to deter the countries having the intentions of the use of nuclear weapons against it. China still committed to NFU under any conditions at any time. China sustains the fundamentals of self-defense in retaliation and the advancement of nuclear weapons for reassuring its national security. Central Military Commission directly controls the progression of China’s nuclear force. China exerts various constraints during acquiring its nuclear forces. China is not willing to enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.

Despite proclaiming NFU stance, the ambiguity about China’s nuclear doctrine remained persisted due to the statements of Cai Yuqui (the former Major General in the Chinese army and Vice

39 China’s military preparations are anticipated for defensive operations and becoming offensive in case of enemy’s attack. Such preparations are required to deter war by adopting self-defense posture during peace and tactical offensive operations during war. China’s military modernization fulfills the prerequisites of both the operations by adopting latest high-tech conditions (emphasis added). See Mark Schneider, p.251. 40 Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009), p.77. 41 General Zhu Chenghu stated in reply to the question related to the probabilities of China’s tactics about a conventional war on Taiwan Conflict during an interview with Danny Gitting, editor,’ Asian Wall Street Journal’ in July 2005. 42 Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, p.77. 43 White Paper: China’s National Defense’ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Beijing (2006). Additionally, China again confirmed its pledge on NFU in ‘White Paper: China’s National Defense 2010’ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Beijing (2011), Downloaded from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine on February 11, 2015.

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Principal of Nanjing Army Command College) in an interview in August 2007, appreciated Chairman Mao’s four fighting principals:44

We will not attack unless we are attacked, if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack, as to whether we will use nuclear weapons first, the above principal can also be followed. If we have been repeatedly ‘attacked’, then there should not be a limit for our counterattack.

Whereas, China’s military preparations and doctrine are primarily aimed to deter the US, but have impact on India’s security dynamics. China’s growing nuclear strategy is influenced by US superior targeting capabilities, conventional strike and missile defense that intensifies China’s fear to destroy its nuclear forces in a non-nuclear first strike. In response, China’s deployment strategies for comprising the US system, i.e. multiple warheads could disturb India due to their potential uses in an anticipated Chinese first strike.45 Additionally, debate over force posture projected for inactivating US conventional strikes might create ambiguity about the strategic calculations related to ‘first use’, initiated during Chinese retaliation, as Chinese strategists anticipated that even conventional attack on Chinese forces would be considered as a nuclear attack.46

Similarly, another ambiguity related to China’s nuclear doctrine is whether China’s NFU stance is applicable in India’s case or not? According to China’s Defense White Paper 2010:47

According to the strategy of NFU of nuclear weapons at any time and in any instance, and made an explicit promise that under no circumstances will it use or threaten to use nuclear arsenals against nuclear-weapon-free-zones or non-nuclear weapons states.

India’s apprehension in this regard is whether this promise is applicable in India’s case because according to China’s revised declaratory policy, the NFU stance would be applicable to NPT signatories and nuclear-weapon-free-zones.48 China’s NFU stance is not applicable within

44 ‘Military Scholar on Tactics Views Defense Issue’, Hong Kong Tu Kung Pao (1 August 2007). Also mentioned M. Schneider, p.248. 45 M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure’, International Security, Vol.35, No.2 (2001), pp.83-84. 46 Ibid. p.80. 47 White paper: ‘China’s National Defense 2010’ information office of the state Council of the People’s Republic of China Beijing in 2011. 48 China revised its declaratory policy that was released in 1995 and stated that, ‘China is not intended to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons and naturally applies to non-nuclear-weapon states and the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on nuclear states that have undertaken any comparable internationally binding commitment not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons’. This shift is left out only India, Israel and Pakistan. While elaborating South Asian strategic environment, both Pakistan and China are time-tested

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‘Chinese Territory’, which apparently includes disputed territory.49 Such ambiguities about China’s NFU pledge disrupted its stance on CMD according to Waltz’s second prerequisite about CMD and assimilated India’s insecurities for its (India’s) survival. For contending such uncertainties, India announced its nuclear doctrine that is discussed in the succeeding portion of this chapter.

5.3 CMD and Command and Control

Command and Control (C2) is a distribution of amenities among the personnel for adopting the procedures in controlling and directing military operations.50 C2 is described as, ‘the ability to send order requires for one-way communication between higher authority and the forces, this is command. While, the capability to receive feedback through information channel is essential for control’.51 Likewise, according to The US Department of Defense, C2 is defined as:52

The exercise of authority and direction by a purposely-designated commander over assigned forces for the completion of the task. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of equipment, personnel, processes and communication facilities employed by a commander in directing, planning, controlling forces, coordinating and operations in the completion of task.

Any C2 system must be capable to communicate the orders of command hierarchy to armed forces in any condition across the spectrum of warfare, without addressing the complexities of the orders.53 Nuclear C2 have assumed exceptional significance in the existing era of ‘information warfare’ and ‘information revolution’. Electronic and cyber warfare has introduced an inclusive paradigm in war fighting, especially in the context of C2, rendering the classical military deterrence superseded. C2 of nuclear weapons is a complicated mechanism and a difficult job for national

ally and India presumed that China’s revised declaratory policy is mainly against India. See Bhrahma Chellaney, ‘The India-Pakistan-China Strategic Triangle and the Role of Nuclear Weapons’, IFRI Proliferation Papers, (winter 2002), p.22. 49 George Perkovich, ‘The Nuclear Security Balance’, in Francine R. Frankle and Harry Harding (eds) The China-India Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp.211-212. China claims that Tibet and Arunachala Pradesh are incorporated as China’s territory and in certain circumstances, China will initiate nuclear strike against these territories under the assumption that its NFU pledge will remain. 50 Shaun Gregory, Nuclear Command and Control in NATO (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp.3-4 51 A. Carter, J. Steinberger and C. Zraket, Managing Nuclear Options (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, 1987), p.117. 52 Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for War and Peace (Washington D.C: National Defense University, 1992), p.17. 53 Shaun Gregory, Nuclear Command and Control in NATO, pp.3-4

178 decision makers.54 Apparently, two contradictory objectives of C2 systems are observed, either assertive or delegative. For addressing assertive systems, highly centralized C2 systems are planned in which the leadership at the highest level is delegated the authority to permit the use of nuclear weapons for avoiding accidental use.55 While, in delegative C2 systems, it is planned to place the weapons in ready state of alert under the command of regional military commanders with the provision of their decision to use under different contingencies.56 When delegative command systems confirm the capability of ready-response, then there would be the probabilities of accidental or unauthorized use. It poses the serious dilemma for the decision makers that the systems they are relying in exercising for command and control on nuclear arsenals and the related operational, infrastructural and organizational set up for the employment, deployment of nuclear weapons, the threat of nuclear weapons exists.57

54 The states developed C2 for assuring the legitimacy of the decision-makers about the use of nuclear weapons and for avoiding the mishaps of unauthorized or accidental use. These two objectives are achieved up to some degree. Peter Fever points out that the main challenge in establishing the ‘fail-safe’ system a forever/never dilemma’: ‘leaders want a high assurance that weapons will always work when directed and seek the assurances for avoiding the unauthorized use’. Explained Peter D. Fever, ‘Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear States’, International Security, Vol. 17, No.3 (Winter 1992-93), and p.163. 55 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.347 56 Ibid. 57 The US nuclear history permits organizational theories to predict and according to Scott Sagon, those have the authority and capability to use weapons of mass destruction, seek to maximize their autonomy and dislike any procedural or technical innovations, which create the situation for the operational decision-making power away from their hands. Expressed Scot D. Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrines and Command and Control Systems’, in Peter R. Lovy, Scot D. Sagan, and James J. Wirts (eds), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), p.37. It could lead to exacerbate the rivalry among the armed forces for attaining the control over nuclear weapons. The realists argue that the main motive for establishing delegative or assertive C2 systems is due to the threats as realized in the military doctrine of the state. The state leadership would select highly C2 systems in a condition that their opponents would either lack of sufficient number of nuclear weapons or conventionally armed and unable to carry out attack against their C2 system due to acute delivery system. The realists also asserted that a state seeks delegative system due to perceived threats to its nuclear installations and against it. C2 intends to maintain the quick response capabilities. The fears of first strike or preemptive attack from an opponent would generate strong intentions for acquiring delegative C2system. Thus, different strategic doctrines would lead towards different command and control systems. According to the strategic culture theory, ‘a state’s command and control system may be inspired due to decision making traditions and domestic politics. Neo-culturists expressed that internal political struggle and state’s political hierarchy have direct impact on its command and control system. A state leader might have to address that pre- delegation to another civilian leader or military commander would need to point out a successor. As Sagan expressed: ‘if control over a state’s nuclear weapons arsenal symbolizes the highest political authority in that state, then pre-delegation of weapons release authority would signal who was next in the line of succession’. (Ibid. pp.42- 43).

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Another dilemma related to C2 systems of nuclear arsenals is the optimization of two inconsistent requirements:58

1. In case of nuclear attack, the military must have the capability to root out the attack and to retaliate rapidly and effectively. 2. There must be a credible C2 system, which prevents the utmost probability of accidental or unauthorized use.

The dilemma is obvious during the Cold War when various narrow escapes of nuclear standoff took place even in the presence of unlimited technical and financial resources of USA and former USSR. According to Peter D. Fever:59

This is the nuclear surety problem: making sure nuclear weapons are always ready for use when needed, but never detonated accidentally or by unauthorized persons.

Thus, the study of Command and Control system provides understanding for examining the safety and security, avoiding unauthorized and accidental use and for assuring the nuclear programs fool proof according to Waltz third prerequisite of CMD.

5.3.1 China’s Command and Control System

It is challenging to estimate China’s Command and Control System as lack of information remains a fundamental hurdle. Unlike India and Pakistan, China’s C2 has not evolved on any National Command Authority (NCA) and the Central Military Commission (CMC) is the final authority for employing nuclear weapons.60 China’s Command and Control system is elaborated in Figure 1. Despite the remaining subsections of CMC, the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) is the most relevant subsection in explaining China’s C2. SAC was established for implementing secure and reliable command and control on both conventional and nuclear missile forces.61 SAC was established in June 1966 and Premier Zhu Enlai named it the Second Artillery (Di Erpao Bing) by separating it

58 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.347. 59 Peter D. Fever, ‘Concern is Nuclear Surety Not Deliberate Use of Bomb’ Christian Science Monitor, 8 June 1998, downloaded from www.csmonitor.com/1998/0608/060898.opin.2.html on June 3, 2014. Zafar Iqbal Cheema also quoted Peter D. Fever, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.348 60 China’s civil-military relations have unique profile because China’s armed forces are not considered as state’s forces but the forces of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), explained Swaran Singh, ‘China-India-Pakistan: Nuclear Command and Control of Southern Asia’, Research Paper No.33 (March 2010), p.25 61 Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1999), pp.96-97

180 from existing PLA’s Artillery Corps.62 In 1968, SAC was divided into short range, intermediate- range, long-range and intercontinental range.63 Since its inception, the SAC comprises around 90,000 personnel and 6 missile bases,64 and upholds over 100 nuclear warheads.65

China seemingly upholds a crisis command center in the mountain range of Xishan (Western hills) in western Beijing, which comprises on early-warning equipment and command and control.66 China has set up command bunkers at Yuquan Mountain range Hohhot, and in Inner Mongolia, where they could retreat, if they will under nuclear attack.67 The SAC works with the collaboration of sprawling research networks under the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Academies. The First Academy deals with carriers rocket development and surface-to-surface missiles, the Second Academy for surface-to-air missiles, the Third Academy for coastal defense missiles, the Fourth Academy for solid-propellant rockets, the Fifth Academy for satellites, and Ninth Academy for carrier rockets and tactical air defense.68

China is enlarging its submarine fleet for comprising various challenges that its C2 faces and for sustaining strategic stability in South China Sea. The development of ballistic-missile submarines and the second-generation nuclear-powered attack generate multiple challenges to the existing China’s C2. The traditional China’s command culture relies on caution and dejects the initiatives that are instigated without the approval of the high command. Such impediment might force China to evolve advance C2 and terminate several channels that resulted in greater centralization.69

62 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (London: University of California Press, 2002), p.166. Swaran Singh, ‘China-India-Pakistan: Nuclear Command and Control of Southern Asia’, Research Paper No.33 (March 2010), p.28 63 After the division, SAC was not given the full status as compared to air force or navy have acquired and was directly linked under CMC. Swaran Singh, ‘China-India-Pakistan: Nuclear Command and Control of Southern Asia’, p.28 64 Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1999), p.93. Each of all six missile bases are declared as corps level (junji) size and these are Shengyang (Liaoning), Huangshan (Anhui), Huaihua (Hunan) and Xining (Qinghai province). Swaran Singh, ‘China-India-Pakistan: Nuclear Command and Control of Southern Asia’, p.29. Arpit Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p.143. 65 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington D.C: Department of Defense, 2001), p.14. 66 Swaran Singh, ‘China-India-Pakistan: Nuclear Command and Control of Southern Asia’, p.29. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Garth Hekler, Ed Francis, and James Mulvenon, ‘C3 in the Chinese Submarine Fleet’, in Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murry and Andrew R. Wilson (eds), China’s Submarine Force (Annapolis, Maryland: Navan Institute Press, 2007), p.216.

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China planned to evolve its nuclear deterrence from minimum to limited deterrence (youxianweishe).70 Nevertheless, the analysts remain divided about the efficacy of China’s C2, as Bernard D. Cole and Paul H. B. Godwin illustrate, ‘the utilization of China’s commercial satellites for both communications and reconnaissance elucidates the weakness of China’s military capabilities.71 While, Avery Goldstein has diverse view about China’s C2 as, ‘China’s existing satellite systems provide warheads the improved accuracy with terminal guidance packages.72 Such divergent estimations create suspicions about China’s C2 and the imposition of US Ballistic Missile Defense further undermine China’s nuclear deterrence.73 After analyzing China’s CMD in the context of Waltz’s three prerequisites about CMD, China worsened doubts under the following submissions,

 China’s economic and military modernization of the last two decades, China has placed a predominant position in Asia. Chinese analysts are optimistic about China’s rise in future and predict its tremendous economic and military modernizations during the first two decades of the 21st century.74 In 2015, China’s power status has reached at the level of a semi super power and is placed second in the world.75  Despite the additional China’s instigations against the US,76 China’s growing economic and military strength does not permit challenge to the US hegemony in near future.77 Many

70 Alasair I. Johnston, ‘Prospects of Chinese Nuclear Forces Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control’, in Davis-d Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang (eds), China’s Military in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.162-167. 71 Bernard D. Cole and Paul H. B. Godwin, ‘Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the 21st Century’, in Larry M. Wortzel (ed), The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Washington D. C: US Department of Defense, 1999), p.181. 72 Avery Goldstein, ‘Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival’, International Security Vol.22, No.3 (Winter 1997/98), p.49. 73 Swaran Singh, ‘China-India-Pakistan: Nuclear Command and Control of Southern Asia’, p.49. 74 Yan Xuetong, ‘The Rise of China and Its Power Status’ , Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.1 (2006), p.32, downloaded from www.oxfordjournals.org on February 5, 2015. 75 Ibid. 76 It is estimated that China has planned to deploy 20 IGBMs,24 SLBMs and 100 IRBMs to reach the US mainland which are insufficient in deterring the US, explained Lanxin Xiang, ‘The Chinese Military: Problems of Modernization’, PSIS Occasional Paper Number 3, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva (1999), pp.29-30. 77 It is critical to estimate China’s force posture due to its current economic growth especially the impact of Taiwan independence movement may create hindrance for sustaining its emerging military buildup. Additionally, there is a huge disparity between the China’s and the US military buildup and European Union may seek the status of semi superpower during 2020s that undermine China’s aspiration of becoming semi superpower and containing the US in near future. See Yan Xuetong, ‘The Rise of China and Its Power Status’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.1 (2006), pp.30-32, downloaded from www.oxfordjournals.org on February 5, 2015.

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states within and outside Asia are keenly monitoring China’s rise in the context of their national securities. China’s emerging economic and military rise has engaged the states to readjust their policies and redesign the terms and conditions according to China’s newly acquired status.78  China’s emerging force posture has created grave security concerns for the South Asian region also and especially for India. India anticipates China’s force posture and military modernization as a main obstacle on its way for exercising regional dominance.79 To contain China’s regional dominance, India planned to augment its deterrence as CMD in the light of Waltz’s prerequisites of CMD that is evaluated in the following section.

78 Arvind Gupta and K.D.Kapur, Emerging Asian Nuclear Environment (New Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society, 2012), p.150 79 See Reference No.89 of chapter 3.

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Figure 1: China’s Command and Control System

Acronyms: AMS Academy of Military Sciences CACDA China Arms Control and Disarmament Association CAE China Academy of Engineering Physics CAEP China Academy of Engineering Physics CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences CDSTIC China Defense Science and Technology Information Center CFISS China Foundation of International Strategic Studies CICIR China Institute of Contemporary International Relations CIIS China Institute of International Studies CIISS China Institute of International Strategic Studies CMC Central Military Commission DACD Department of Arms Control and Disarmament GSD General Staff Department IAPCM Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs NDU National Defense University PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy SAC Second Artillery Corps Source: Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter (eds), ‘Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament,’ Occasional Paper No.15 (April 2009), p.20

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5.4 China’s Military Modernization and Force Building

China has an obsession of becoming a ‘great power’ (do guo) since Sun’s time by virtue of its civilization, history, population and especially due to its growing economy.80 China’s high rate of economic development during the past two decades has shifted it to a major power in the global economy.81 In the beginning of 21st century, China introduced the term ‘Peaceful Rise’ that was implied as its intention for attaining superpower status.82 China’s incredible economic development provided capitals for its military modernization as the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DAI) estimated that China’s military spending in the beginning of 21st century intensify China as the second largest military spender after the US.83 China is tremendously preceding its economic growth and is likely to equal the US economy in size by mid of 21st century.84

80 Zhang Yualing and Tang Shiping, ‘China’s Regional Strategy’ in David Shambaugh (ed), Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (London: University of California Press, 2005), p.49 81 China’s GDP growth rate during the past twenty years was observed very high and it id predicted that it will expand up to 2015, explained Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh, ‘Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development’, p.19, downloaded from www.120727_Chinese_Military_Modernization_Force_Development.pdf on February 7, 2015. According to World Bank’s Purchasing Parity (PPP) report, ‘China’s GDP was $6.4 Trillian in 2003 that was 1.7 times Japan’s GDP of $3.6 Trillian and 58.7 % of the US GDP’, downloaded from www.worldbank.org/datatopic/GDP_PPP.pdf on February 7, 2015. Likewise, World Bank released the record about China’s economic growth as ‘China’s economic growth is approximately 80 % of the regional GDP as 10.4% in 2010, 9.5% in 2011 and 8.4 % in 2012 and it is declared as the “overly fast” growth among the economic sectors. See World Bank, ‘Global Economic Prospects: Uncertainties and Vulnerabilities’ downloaded from www.siteresources.worldbank.org/introspects/resources/334934_1322593305595/8287139_1326374900917/EAP RegionalSummaryGEP.Jan2012.Enh.pdf on February 7, 2015. 82 The emerging China’s economic growth is mainly being assumed to get the status of a superpower and to contain the US hegemony. If China sustains the existing economic growth, it is predicted that China would get the status of a superpower within coming two to three decades, see Yan Xuetong, ‘The Rise of China and Its Power Status’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1 (2006), pp.13-22, downloaded from www.oxfordjournals.org on February 7, 2015. 83 Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, p.25. Also quoted Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009), p.16. 84 Dr. Noor-ul-Haq. ‘Sino-Indian Relations (2004-2005), p.1. Available at www.ff.67.pdf downloaded on June 10, 2012

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China expanded its military growth with the collaboration of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Communist Party.85 PLA described goals for army modernization in an apparently innocuous way in Defense White Paper 2006 as:86

The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized war by the mid-21st century.

China organized its military modernization in two phases. The first phase was anticipated during Deng Xiaoping’s era in early 2010s for encompassing large regional contingencies, i.e. Taiwan and Korea, and to get control over South China Sea.87 The second phase was designed after the completion of the first for pursuing global military influence.88 Additionally, China intends to acquire the status of pre-eminent Asian power by producing sufficient strength because it assumes to assure its security and survivability without the intervention of any external power and pretends itself as the status of medium-sized great power till the mid of 21st century.89

Thus, for obtaining the ‘great power’ status and maintaining its self-defense posture, China is busy in extending its nuclear stockpiles both on quantitative and qualitative levels,90 and its stance on CMD91 according to Waltz first prerequisite is evaluated by estimating its nuclear force posture. It is ambiguous to estimate the exact number of China’s nuclear arsenals due to state secret. However, after evaluating the information related to the capacity of producing the nuclear stockpiles and available financial resources during the past two decades, it might be feasible for estimation. It was assessed in 2009 that China had possessed nuclear warheads from 121-160.92 In

85 Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, p.66. 86 China’s National Defense in 2006, downloaded from www.news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006- 12/29/content_5547029_28.htm on February 7, 2015. P.Kawennov, ‘China: Principles of Proactive Defense’, International Affairs, Vol.56, No.3(2010), p.57 87 Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, p.67. Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 Arpit Rajain, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: China, India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p.415. 90 Mark Schneider, ‘The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People’s Republic of China’, p.244 91 See references 10-11 and 18. 92 Norris and Kristensen, Military power of People’s Republic of China (Washington D.C: US Department of Defense, 2009), p.66. Also mentioned M.Taylor and Evan S. Mediros, ‘China Search for Assured Retaliation’, International Security, Vol.35, No.2 (Fall 2010), p.34.

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2011, the nuclear arsenals were estimated around 240,93 and according to FAS (Federation of American Scientists) report 2014, China possess 250 nuclear warheads.94 Despite increasing nuclear stockpiles, China’s main priority would be ‘to win without fighting’ and nuclear weapons could be employed in case to win due to China’s defensive nuclear policy according to its strategic culture.95

China is also swiftly building its conventional missile forces and the main motive of these preparations is to counter the US.96 China has planned to modernize its nuclear capable silo-based Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), i.e. DF.4, DF.5A, DF.31 and DF.31A.97 DF31A with the range of more than 11000 km has the capacity to target most of the localities within the continent of the USA.98 China is also manufacturing medium range, conventionally armed anti- ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), i.e. DF.21, with the range of more than 1500km by carrying maneuverable warhead.99

China places a top priority of remodeling its submarine force. China is equipping its forces with JL.1 and JL.2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).100 Additionally, China has assumed

93 SPIRI Yearbook (Stockholm: International Peace Research Institute with the collaboration of Oxford University Press, 2011), p.342. 94 Han M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces 2013’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.69, No.6 (2013), p.79. See FAS Report on Status of World Nuclear Forces, downloaded from www.fas.org/assues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces on February 11, 2015. 95 Mark Schneider, ‘The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People’s Republic of China’, p.244. Ibid. Lt Gen Li Jijun, Vice President of the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences stated during an address at the US War College in 1997: ‘China’s nuclear policy is defensive in nature. China’s decision of making nuclear weapons was due to the existing nuclear threats. A limited stockpile is possessed for preserving the self-defense. China has individually decided itself to follow no first use of nuclear weapons or not even threaten to use against non-nuclear states. China’s nuclear policy is purely defensive in nature and concentrates to deter the expected nuclear blackmailing from the remaining nuclear powers’, downloaded from www.cns.miis.edu on February 9. 2015. Also quoted Arpit Rajain, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: China, India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p.122. 96 Mark Schneider, ‘The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People’s Republic of China’, p.244. US Intelligence community assumes that China will succeed to make long range missiles having the range to target US by the 2020s, see Han M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces 2013’, p.79. 97 Annual Report to Congress: Military Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, downloaded from www.2014_DoD_China_Report.pde on February 12, 2015. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid.

187 to develop a three stage solid missile DF.41 (CSS.X.10) with a range of more than 12000km.101 Overall latest China’s missile development is shown in Table 5.1

101 Missiles of the World, CDD.X.10, downloaded from www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld.35/missile_deatil.asp on February 12, 2015.

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Table 5.1

China’s Nuclear Armed Ballistic Missiles

US Deployment No of Missile Designation Propellant Mode Range (km) Launc- -hers DF.3 CSS.2 Liquid Transportable 3000 + 5-10 Rollout-to- DF.4 CSS.3 Liquid launch 5500 + 10-15 CSS.4 Mode DF.5A 2 Liquid Silo 12000 + 20 CSS.5 Mode DF.21/21Aa 1 and 2 Solid Road Mobile 1750 + Fewer than 50 Css.10 Mode DF.31 1 Solid Road Mobile 7000 + 5-10 Css.10 Mode DF.31A 2 Solid Road Mobile 11,000 + More than 15 Submarine JL.1b CSS.NX.3 Solid Launched 1700 + 12

Submarine JL.2c CSS.NX.14 Solid Launched 7,000 + 36

a. This table considers only the nuclear capable DF.21 (CSS.5 Mode 1) and DF.21A (CSS.5 Model 2), each of which has lesser than 50 launchers deployed. The conventional DF.21C and DF.21D are not considered. b/c. Both JL.1 and JL.2 are not operational but their warheads are available. The test of JL.2 is expected within two years. Source: Jeffery Lewis, ‘China’s Missile Forces’ Adelphi Series, downloaded from www.19445571.2014.pdf on February 12, 2015. Annual Report to Congress: Military Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, downloaded from www.2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf on February 12, 2015. Han M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces 2013’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.69, No.6 (2013), p.79. ‘The Military Balance’, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Vol.114, Issue.1, (2014), p.231.

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China is investing heavily on its Air Force. People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is considered the World’s 3rd largest and Asia’s largest force including 1900 aircrafts (comprising bombers, attack aircraft, fighter attack), 600 which are equipped with latest technology.102 PLAAF is transmuting into a capability to compete offshore defensive and offensive operations. China’s aeronautical complexes are manufacturing numerous types of airborne early warning and control system aircrafts which encompass KJ.2000 and Y.8 MOTH (the modified version of Russian IL.76 airframe).103 PLAAF has become the largest force possessing World’s advanced Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system comprising Russian based SA.20 (S.300 PMU1/2) with locally manufactured CSA.9 (HQ.9).104 China is dynamically pursuing fifth generation capabilities i.e. J.20 stealth fighter and is uplifting its B.6 bomber fleet (the latest version of Russian Tu.16 BADGER) including a long range variant which carries long range cruise missiles.105

Likewise, China anticipated the attainment of the military space technologies vital for conducting successful military operations in future. The space warfare, cyber and counter space programs enable China in pursuing its asymmetric capabilities vis-à-vis the US.106 China is interested in developing macro, micro and Nano satellites with the collaboration of Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL) and has become the first country outside the European Union as the

102 Annual Report to Congress: Military Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, downloaded from www.2014_DoD_China_Report.pde on February 12, 2015. 103 Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh, ‘Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: A Western Perspective’, p.131, downloaded from www.120727_Chinese_Military_Modernization_Force_Development.pdf on February 12, 2015. 104 Annual Report to Congress: Military Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, downloaded from www.2014_DoD_China_Report.pde on February 12, 2015. Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh, ‘Chinese Military Modernizatio and Force Development: A Western Perspective’, p.131, downloaded from www.120727_Chinese_Military_Modernization_Force_Development.pdf on February 12, 2015. SAM system was developed in support of ground base air defense forces in 2011. 105 Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh, ‘Chinese Military Modernizatio and Force Development: A Western Perstective’, p.131, downloaded from www.120727_Chinese_Military_Modernization_Force_Development.pdf on February 12, 2015. Arvind Gupta and K.D.Kapur, Emerging Asian Nuclear Environment (New Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society, 2012), p.169. B.6 has the capability of aerial refueling and China has modified it in H.6K variant with newly designed engine for extended range. It is believed that B.6 has given the PLAAF the leverage for a long range standoff offensive ability with precision-guided weaponries, explained Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh, ‘ Chinese Military Modernizatio and Force Development: A Western Perspective’, p.131, downloaded from www.120727_Chinese_Military_Modernization_Force_Development.pdf on February 12, 2015. 106 . Arvind Gupta and K.D.Kapur, Emerging Asian Nuclear Environment (New Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society, 2012), p.170.

190 member of European Galileo space-based navigation system in 2003.107 China launched its first space mission in 2003 and is enduring it for obtaining its goal of referring a manned lunar mission by 2020.108 China demonstrated its ability of direct-ascent kinetic kill against satellites low Earth orbit by demolishing its weather satellite (defunct FY.1C) during a test in 2007.109 On 2010, China launched second-generation Beidou navigation satellite in a geosynchronous orbit.110 China’s objective is to get the similar Global position as the US and Russia by launching Beidou satellites into orbit.111 China is building its own space station, following Russia and the US. Towards this, China propelled an investigational module Tiangong.1 in 2011, and this project will probably complete in 2020-2022.112 Additionally, China anticipates counter space capabilities for eliminating the adversaries in accessing its space based systems and is acquiring a series of technologies for enhancing its counter space abilities i.e. destroying the opponent’s precision guided weapons and satellite jammers.113 Presently, the cyber warfare is a severe intimidation for the security of the states and China has developed a comprehensive plan for containing this via Computer Network Attacks (CNA). According to Major General (R) Wang Pufeng:114

In coming future, wars will be controlled by information warfare. We are aware and consider it as a driving force for China’s military modernization and combat readiness.

It assessed that China has the capability of using ‘advanced data weapons’. These include electronic circuitry destruction capabilities, self-morphing malicious code applications; self- encrypting/self-decrypting of malicious code; exploitation of unreported vulnerabilities in common commercial software and external disruption capacity of wireless networks.115 China has

107 Ibid, p.171. 108 Ibid. 109 Annual Report to Congress: Military Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, downloaded from www.2014_DoD_China_Report.pde on February 12, 2015. 110 Stephen Clark, ‘China Launches a New Navigation Satellite into Orbit’, downloaded from www.space.com/9442- china-launches-navigation-satellite-orbit.html on February 12, 2015. 111 Arvind Gupta and K.D.Kapur, p.172. 112 ‘China Launches Module for Space Station’, USA Today (29 September 2011). 113 Annual Report to Congress: Military Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, downloaded from www.2014_DoD_China_Report.pde on February 12, 2015. 114 Major General (R) Wang Pufeng, ‘The Challenge of Information Warfare’ in Michael Pilsbury (ed), Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington D.C: National Defense University, 1997), p.318. Also quoted Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, p.119. 115 Kevin Coleman, ‘Cyber Threat Matrix’ downloaded from www.defensetech.org/archives/2007_12.html on February 13, 2015. Also quoted Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, p.119.

191 emphasized the significance of cyber warfare in support of its military operations in three ways. First, it will permit data collection for information and computer network attack. Second, it restrains an opponent’s action or reduces their reaction. Third, it acts as a source of force multiplier during kinetic attacks.116

The primary concern of China’s military preparations is US specific and the US is vulnerable to information attack due to having highly information-intensive society. In case of future US- China conflict, China would employ sophisticated computer viruses or ‘computer bombs’ to emergency control, water, sanitation, financial sector, traffic and energy. The main concern of China’s cyber-attack will sow chaos among US civilians and similar attack would be expected on all the aspects of U.S. military power.117 It is illustrated that well planned cyber-attacks might be distressing to a state’s economy as hazardous by inflicting an intercontinental missile.118 Aforementioned China’s nuclear force posture, delivery mechanism and military modernization indicate that China has contented Waltz first prerequisite of CMD. China worsened doubts in its nuclear neighbor (India) and especially Sino-Pak nexus exacerbated India’s fears, and for encompassing both China and Pakistan, India established its nuclear doctrine.

5.5 India’s Nuclear Doctrine

After becoming overt nuclear power, India announced its Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) in August 1999, for pursuing its strategic objectives, enunciating CMD and to deter both China and Pakistan simultaneously.119 According to DND, India expressed her intentions for not conducting more tests, join the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with certain amendments, started negotiations to

116 ‘White Paper: China’s National Defense’ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Beijing (2010), downloaded from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine on February 11, 2015. 117 Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, p.119. 118 Ibid. 119 Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘The Logic of Assured Retaliation’, in Muthiah Algapa (ed) The Long Shadow (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), p.188. India intends to develop its nuclear deterrent capabilities to sustain security and power equilibrium vis-à-vis China, obtain regional supremacy and seek international status equivalent to the states possessing nuclear weapons, i.e. UNSC seat and the key concern of India’s DND is to address CMD, explicated Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence: Current Challenges and Future Efficacy’, Margalla Papers, (Special Edition 2008), p.48. For more details, please see Indian Draft Doctrine available at http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html. accessed on March 19, 2012.

192 stop fissile material production without conditions. Indian authorities proclaimed, ‘No First Use,’ policy vis-à-vis non-nuclear weapon states and establish a Credible Minimum Deterrence. 120

According to Draft Doctrine 2.4:121

The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.

India’s offer of nuclear ‘NFU’ does not address the security issues of smaller states like Pakistan that may affect due to the Indian military superiority. Lawrence Prabhakar stated:122

Indian stance on NFU cannot prevent Pakistan’s nuclear installations from conventional military strikes. Pakistan might be assumed the attack against its nuclear deterrence in which India’s NFU stance can be misinterpreted.

In a specific condition, if the two nuclear states are engaged in a conflict, it will be meaningless about the usage of nuclear weapons either first or last resort.123

Ambiguities exist on the similar spiraling as China’s nuclear doctrine as India has decided not to use nuclear weapons even against the states, which will not, aligned with the nuclear states124, but P.R Chari does not agree with this clause and argues:125

India could conceivably use its nuclear weapons against countries such as Japan and Germany, who are aligned or receive security cover from the United States either through bilateral treaty or through NATO.

120 Mohammad B. Alam, ‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Context and Constraints’. Heidberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics. Working Paper No. 11(October 2002). p.3. 121 For more details, please see Indian Draft Doctrine available at: http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html. accessed on March 19, 2012. 122 Quoted Riffat Hussain, ‘Nuclear Doctrine in South Asia’. SASSU Research Report No. 4 (December 2005). p.24. 123 Ibid. 124 Article 2.5 of Indian Draft Doctrine that states that: India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers. 125 P.R.Chari: The BJP’s Nuclear Doctrine, the Deccan Herlad, Hyderabad, India, August 27, 1999, p.6. Coated Mohammad B. Alam. p.7

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Likewise, In the context of Draft Doctrine 2.7126, whether India will be ready to bear the frequent nuclear attacks before its retaliation to unacceptable losses by the aggressor in a faith that the threat of massive retaliation will deter the attacker or not? How is it possible for India to defend after first nuclear attack?

In the light of Draft Doctrine 4.1 and 4.3127, it will be difficult for an adversary to judge the credibility. If the opponent does not believe in rational thinking and is confident that after tolerating the massive destruction of more than one cities, it will have the potential to target at least one major Indian city by a first strike or in a retaliatory strike that will not be acceptable for Indian political leadership.

It is challenging to access India’s deterrence because it wants to deter two countries having different nuclear potentials. If it compares with Pakistan, it will be tragic. If India wants to bluff, it would invite a pre-emptive strike by Pakistan.128 Mr. K. Subramanian (the author of India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine) argues that there are one hundred and fifty nuclear weapons for an effective Indian deterrence against Pakistan and China.129 Moreover, K. Sunderji has opined that India needed a minimum of 20 nuclear weapons of 20 kilotons each to deter a small country like Pakistan and about 50 such weapons to provide a credible nuclear deterrence against a large country such as China.130

126 Draft Doctrine 2.7 is states: ‘Highly effective conventional military capabilities shall be maintained to raise the threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons’. 127 Draft Doctrine 4.1 states: Credibility: Any adversary must know that India can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against India and its forces. And Draft Doctrine 4.3 states: Survivability: a. India’s nuclear forces and their command and control shall be organized for very high survivability against surprise attacks and for rapid punitive response. They shall be designed and deployed to ensure survival against a first strike and to endure repetitive attrition attempts with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a punishing strike, which would be unacceptable to the aggressor. b. Procedures for the continuity of nuclear command and control shall ensure a continuing capability to effectively employ nuclear weapons. 128 Mohammad B. Alam, p.11 129 Proliferation News and Resources, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, downloaded from http://www.ceip.org/files/nonproliferation/templates/articles.html. On February 2, 2012. 130 Ibid.

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It will be difficult for India to meet minimum deterrence in the presence of its triad of aircraft, mobile based missiles and sea based assets (3.1 Draft Doctrine)131. In spite of dispersion and deception of the weapons, the Indian nuclear facilities are not accident-prone. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is comparatively protected than India’s and the track record of Pakistan is free from nuclear accidents. Shamshad Ahmad Khan (former Pakistan’s ambassador in the UN) expressed:132

Pakistan has a flawless record in terms of nuclear safety and safeguards. India has had several nuclear accidents. The Narora fire, the Kalpakam water leak, the Kagla dome collapse have occurred though, none of them were very serious in nature.

Likewise, according to the calculation of NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index 2014 that evaluates the security of nuclear materials at the Global level, Pakistan is relatively ranked above India while India is ranked only above Iran and North Korea.133

According to doctrine 6.1 Draft Doctrine,134 extra ordinary precautions should be taken against the unauthorized access or use of nuclear arsenals. Prime Minister is the final authority to decide the use of nuclear weapons. What will happen, when the entire communication system of the Prime Minister’s office is wiped out during first strike? Who will be the second one to control the nuclear button? Will it be the second one to control the nuclear button? Will it be possible for a lower ranked officer to launch a weapon in the atmosphere of mixed or wrong signals?

In case of first strike, will it be possible for India to retaliate with rapid, punitive response because submarine based missiles are required to secure communication lines for launching? India will be

131 Draft Doctrine 3.1 states: India’s nuclear forces will be effective, enduring, diverse, flexible, and responsive to the requirements in accordance with the concept of credible minimum deterrence. These forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets in keeping with the objectives outlined above. Survivability of the forces will be enhanced by a combination of multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and deception. 132 Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p-254. 133 NTI Nuclear Material Security Index: Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability and Action, pp.120- 129, downloaded from www.nti.org/media/pdfs/2014-NTI-Index-Report-pdf?-=138392382 dated February 26, 2016. 134 Draft Doctrine 6.1 states: Security: Extraordinary precautions shall be taken to ensure that nuclear weapons, their manufacturing, transportation and storage are fully guarded against possible theft, loss, sabotage, damage or unauthorized access or use.

195 required ‘a massive investment in surveillance and target acquisition infrastructure by way of satellite, aerial reconnaissance and human intelligence’.135

In January 4, 2003, India revised its DND and rearticulated its ‘NFU’ stance in two ways. First, the word, ‘anywhere’ was added to the provision on ‘NFU’, and revealed as, ‘a posture of ‘NFU’ of nuclear weapons will only be adopted in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere’,136 which indicates that Indian armed forces would have the option of ‘first use’ on another states territory as an occupation territory or even in a hostile mood. Second, article VI of the revised DND renders the NFU stance invalid by stating: ‘However, in the event of major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, with biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option to retaliate with nuclear weapons’.137 This is in contradiction with the original draft where the use of biological and chemical weapons against Indian forces even outside India could trigger nuclear retaliation, which indicates that NFU stance was no more relevant but the threshold for the threat or the use of nuclear weapons had been dropped significantly.

By adopting ambiguous stance on ‘NFU’, India wants to behave like USA in the South Asian region. According to George Fernandes (former Indian defense minister), ‘a much better case to go for preemptive action against Pakistan than the USA has in Iraq.’138

Pakistan showed reservations about Indian ‘NFU’ stance as Jamshad Ayaz Khan argued:139

India has revised its policy on NFU, and wants to keep its option open by creating confusion on the issue of the use of nuclear weapons. If India will have the intentions of the use of nuclear weapons against any state, it will propagate against the desired state to launch a biological or chemical attack on India and by applying the theory of unilateral preemption strike, India would retaliate with nuclear weapons. The utilization of the theory of unilateral preemptive strike has the right of the super power, the United States, to preserve the states with chemical and biological weapons by assuming that the use of these weapons of mass destruction will not encourage nuclear response. India has taken out this from USA’s doctrine.

135 Gurmeet Kanwal; “India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Policy” available at http://www.idsa.india.org/an-feb1-01.html1 136 The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews India’s Nuclear Doctrine (New Delhi: Government of India Press Release, 4 January 2003). 137 Ibid. 138 Quoated Riffat Hussain, p.25. 139 Ibid. Major General (Retd) Jamshed Ayaz Khan,’India’s Nuclear Doctrine’ The Nation (31 January 2003).

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Indian ambition to respond in the region as the USA at the international forum shows that India wants to get the status of regional super power and its nuclear doctrine is supporting the status quo in the South Asian region.

5.5.1 India’s Command and Control System

The India’s C2 is established according to the provisions of India’s DND as article 2.6 (b) states that deterrence demands India to sustain, ‘a robust command and control system’.140 Likewise, section 5 titled ‘Command and Control’ confers the provisions about command and control. According to article 5.1 of the DND:141

Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level. The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor (s).

After the nuclear tests of May 1998, India formally announced nuclear command structure. It is based upon National Command Authority (NCA) that comprises on political and executive council while Prime Minister represents the political council and the Chairman Chief of Staff Committee (CCOSC) chairs executive council.142 Additionally, the remaining members of political council include minister of defense, home minister, and minister for external affairs, minister of finance and the national security advisor.143 The executive council is assigned to ensure necessary inputs to the political council while taking decisions.144 Despite CCOSC, the remaining members of executive council are the three service chiefs, heads of intelligence agencies and the scientific community involved in nuclear program.145 During decision-making, political council plays prominent role and as the head of political council, the Prime Minister is the final authority to decide.146 The India’s DND illuminates specific conditions for targeting policy. According to article 5.2 of the DND:147

140 Article 2.6 of the text of the Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on India’s Nuclear Doctrine. 141 Article 5.1 of the text of the Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on India’s Nuclear Doctrine. 142 India gradually developed multi-institutional C2 under the NCA. In January 2003, India pronounced political and administrative relating to C2 systems of nuclear weapons. Explained Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.351 143 Ibid, p.352 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Gurmeet Kanwal, Nuclear Defense: Shaping the Arsenals (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2001), p. 155. 147 Article 5.2 of the text of the Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on India’s Nuclear Doctrine.

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An effective and survivable command and control system with requisite flexibility and responsiveness shall be in place. An integrated operational plan, or a series of sequential plans, predicted on strategic objectives and a targeting policy shall form part of that system.

This is axiomatic with authentic employment of nuclear weapons against anticipated targets. Responsiveness proceeds from ready-response abilities, which would hardly become practicable until there will be a pre-delegation of authority. The prerequisite of an incorporated operational plan as part of the C2 system provides another ground for the Prime Minister to authorize pre- delegate to military personnel for the use of nuclear weapons. CCOSC is the premier advisory on armed issues. However, CCOSC advocates the recommendations only without having the real executive powers and has not the authority to exercise ‘command’ over any services except his own.148 The Figure No.2 illustrates the India’s NCA in detail.

148 Ibid, p. 156

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Figure 2

India’s NCA

Legend: PMO- Prime Minister’s Office DRDO Defense Research and Development Organization DAE- Department of Atomic Energy Source: Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Strategy (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2010), p. 166

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India’s C2 systems of nuclear weapons are firmly under civilian control and the armed forces have not been involved in the process of nuclear planning and decision making which the Western scholars condemn.149 Serious doubts are raised related to the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrence due to lack of coordination between the civil and military bureaucracy during the process of decision-making. Pravin K. Sawhney explains that armed forces are not fully aware and they have numerous queries especially in launching the Agni missiles during war.150

Additionally, India’s political management and atomic bureaucracy have not the intentions to integrate armed forces during decision-making and the development of nuclear weapons.151 In the initial phase of India’s C2, it was recommended that the possession of nuclear weapons would be under DRDO and if the decision makers were finally convinced to issue the order for the release of nuclear weapons, the order would be passed on with a series of codes through several communication channels outside New Delhi for assuring the authenticity.152 The senior officials disapproved it and V.S. Arunachalam (the former head of DRDO and the advisor to ministry of defense under Indira Gandhi) ascribed it with an interesting but incredible statement:153

If New Delhi goes up in a mushroom cloud, a certain theater commander will go to the safe, open his book, and begin reading at page one, paragraph one, and will act step by step on the basis of what he reads.

According to some reports, the possession of nuclear warheads/radioactive core is delegated to Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The detonation of assemblies is the task of DRDO while

149 Neil Joeck, ‘Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia’, Adelphi Paper, Vol. 37, No. 312 (1997), p.53. 150 Pravin K. Sawhney, ‘Pakistan Scores over India in Ballistic Missile Race’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol.12, No. 11 (November 2000), pp. 31-35. Pravin K. Sawhney raised certain questions about the credibility of India’s C2system:  What is the strategy of C2 for assuring premature activity?  Who will integrate the re-entry/warhead and will give the assurances relating to the complete system for reliable launching?  Who will retain Agni Missiles?  What will be the target acquisition surveillance facilities?  Who will maintain the inventory of target priority?  What will be the indication for the induction, deployment of Agni missiles and made ready for firing? 151 W.P.S. Sidhu, ‘India’s Nuclear Use Doctrine’ in Peter R. Levy, Scot D. Sagan and James J.Wirtz (eds), Planning the Unthinkable (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), p.154. 152 Ibid, p.155. 153 Ibid.

200 armed forces are responsible for the control of delivery vehicles.154 This alienated arrangement is not livable in the post 1998 era. Armed forces would inevitably be demanded the allocation of authority for the utilization of nuclear arsenals.155 Sidhu assumes that India’s political leadership had sought the ability of the use of nuclear arsenals in support of their political motives to play a prominent role not only at the regional but at the global level also. Such political motives are irrelevant to elaborate army preparations and intricate C2 due to declared nuclear arsenals and their deployment.156

These political ambitions are no more required the arrangements, the advancement in India’s nuclear weapons program and its deterrence capability has crossed the threshold in which an elementary C2 has been considered sufficient and now India is hard-pressed to establish a sophisticated multilayered C2 system.

5.6 India’s Nuclear Force-Building

States intend to acquire nuclear arsenals when they assume that they have severe threat perceptions about their security and survival. Possession of nuclear weapons against an opponent with reliable conventional force provide measures of dissuasion, national assurance and deterrence. For reassuring their retaliatory capabilities, states frequently intensify their nuclear arsenals. After becoming overt nuclear power, India is continuously enhancing its nuclear postures, and the realist assumption of Stability-Instability Paradox provides theoretical understanding related to its counterbalance measures against China and Pakistan by augmenting its nuclear stockpiles.157

To estimate India’s nuclear force posture, it is imperative to consider the size of its nuclear stockpiles, capabilities related to delivery and geographical locations in the context of its adversarial relations with China and Pakistan. The volume of India’s nuclear stockpiles is classified but it can be anticipated by evaluating the capacity of its nuclear installations. The adequacy of India’s nuclear reactors is obvious. The Indian designed Dhurva 100 MW heavy-

154 Rajat Pandit, ‘India All Set to Set up Nuclear Forces Command’ The Times of India (30 December 2002). Also quoted Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.350. 155 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p.350. 156 W.P.S. Sidhu, p.129. 157 See References 79-84 of Chapter 1.

201 water reactor and the Canadian designed CIRUS 40 MW heavy-water reactor have the potential to produce up to 35 kg of plutonium yearly.158

The extended scope of India’s civilian nuclear program is made problematic for estimating the accurate stockpiles of fissile material. In 1992, it was estimated that India had accumulated approximately 300kg weapons-grade plutonium, which was enough for 40-50 nuclear devices that indicates that the stockpile could be more than 1,200 kg by 2009.159 It indicates that India has produced several tones of weapon-grade plutonium and is capable to enhance its stockpiles in future. It was anticipated that India had about 70 nuclear weapons by 1998.160 By 2010, it was estimated that India has produced enough weapon-grade plutonium to make 100 nuclear weapons and its Dhurva reactor has the capacity to produce sufficient weapon-grade plutonium to make five nuclear weapons per year.161 Additionally, India is building a breeder reactor that will make additional plutonium enough for 25 weapons annually.162 According to Rodney W. Jones judgment, India would formulate 200 nuclear devices by 2010.163 According to a report of International Institute for Science and Security, India has 60-105 nuclear weapons with a medium estimate of 80.164 Robert Wall165 and the Federation of American Scientists166 claim that India holds 90-110 nuclear devices until 2013. Additionally, India is covertly busy in establishing a nuclear city for manufacturing thermonuclear weapons in Southern Karnataka and it is estimated that it would be the largest atomic research laboratories, complex of nuclear centrifuges and

158 Christoph Bluth, ‘India and Pakistan: a case of asymmetric nuclear deterrence’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.22, No.3 (September 2010), p. 393 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid, pp. 393-394 161 ‘Global Fissile Material Report 2011: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production’ downloaded from www.fissilesmaterials.org/library/gfmr11.pdf on May 20, 2014. 162 Dinshaw Mistry, ‘Missile Proliferation and Deterrence Stability in South Asia’ in Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (eds), Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Washtington D.C: Stimson, 2013), pp.127- 128 163 Rodney W. Jones, Minimum Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: An Overview (Reston: Policy Architects International, October 1, 2001), p.12 164 Suresh Dhanda quoted Institute for Science and International Security, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: An Assessment of Second-Strike Capability, ’World Affairs, Vol.13, No.4 (Winter 2009), p.98. 165 Robert Wall, ‘China Nuclear Stockpile Grows as India Matches Pakistan Rise’ downloaded from www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/china-nuclear-weapon-stock-grows-as-india-matches-pakistan-rise.html on May 13, 2014. 166 ‘Federation of American Scientists: Status of World Nuclear Forces’ downloaded from www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclear-weapons/nuke-status.html on May 13, 2014.

202 weapons testing facilities in the Sub-continent and is anticipated to be completed in 2017.167 Dinshaw Mistry predicted that by 2020, India could have the capability to produce weapon-grade fissile material to make 200 to 250 nuclear weapons.168

Thus, India possesses sufficient nuclear stockpile and is consistently updating its nuclear capabilities.169 Despite the presence of the given stockpiles of fissile material, there is lack of consensus between the analysts of India and Pakistan in assessing the size of arsenals to deter each other. Vijay Nair estimated that India would be required varying size of 132 nuclear weapons to deter both Pakistan and China.170 According to Jasjit Singh:171

It is challenging to foresee the arsenals with more than a double-digit in numbers or it may be practical to assess according to a lower end figure as 2-3 dozen nuclear weapons at the end of 10-15 years… the aspects about deterrence decay might lead towards possessing minimum beside a larger one.

Bharat Karnad has assessed that ‘India’s demand would be around 300 nuclear weapons at the end of 2030, and many of which would be high-yield thermonuclear weapons’.172 George Percovich undertakes that India is ahead of Pakistan in possessing nuclear weapons in numbers and is not assuming any serious intimidation from China in the near future, and is not interested in accelerating its nuclear weapons production and will seek to maintain around 150 weapons for the time being.173 Besides assessing India’s nuclear stockpiles, it is uncertain about the number of nuclear weapons for minimum deterrence and its existing developments in nuclear weapon program174 exacerbated Pakistan’s security dilemma that instigates the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan.

167 Adrian Levy, ‘India is Building a Top-Secret Nuclear City to Produce Thermonuclear Weapons’, Foreign Policy (16 December 2015). 168 Dinshaw Mistry, p.128 169 India is constructing two more reprocessing plants at Tarapur and Kalpakam and their production is expected in 2014 which will contribute in boosting 100% increase in their production of Weapon-Grade Plutonium. Additionally, India is establishing nuclear enrichment plant at Rattahalli for fulfilling the requirements of nuclear submarines which are planned to launch in 2015. Expressed R. Rajaraman, ‘Estimates of India’s Fissile Material Stocks,’ pp.81- 83, downloaded from www.scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archieve/sgs16rajaraman.pdf on May 13, 2014. 170 Vijai Nair, Nuclear India (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1992), p.181. 171 Jasjit Singh, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), p.315. 172 Bharat Karnad, ‘A Thermonuclear Deterrent’ in Amitabh Matto (ed), India’s Nuclear Deterrent Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: Harnand Publications Pvt. Ltd, 1999), p.143. 173 George Percovich, ‘South Asia: A Bomb is Born’, Newsweek (24 January 2000). 174India is constructing two more reprocessing plants at Tarapur and Kalpakam and their production is expected in 2014 which will contribute in boosting 100% increase in their production of Weapon-Grade Plutonium. Additionally,

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5.6.1 India’s Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

India has attempted to maintain its nuclear threshold by developing and employing ‘a first generation of nuclear capable delivery vehicles’.175 India has a fleet of nuclear-capable ground- attack aircraft that include highly sophisticated Russian aircraft, as the 64MiG-29 (Fulcrum) and the 40 Su-30MK (Flanker).176 India possesses European 4 TU-22M Backfire aircrafts that were designed for long-range nuclear missions.177 India also possesses 88 Jaguar S (1) and 147 MiG-27 (Flogger) strike aircraft.178 Besides Pakistan, India is planning to counter China’s deep strike capability and the Sukhoi-30 MKI aircraft has the potential with a normal range of 3200 km with 800 kg payload and can be extended to about 7000 km by providing air-to-air refueling.179

However, several deficiencies have been observed during the operation of the aircrafts as delivery vehicles. They might be damaged on ground in a conventional or nuclear attack or their runways may be destroyed for preventing takeoff. For assuring their protection against conventional attack, they are placed undercover, by hardening shelters and by dispersing them on different airbases. Additionally, aircrafts have various flaws for assured ‘second-strike’ delivery vehicles. The assurance of two-way radio communication is a prerequisite during their flights that can be intercepted in the presence of highly sensitive communication network. Besides aircrafts, India has acquired ballistic missiles as nuclear delivery vehicles. Since 1990s, India has gradually shifted its nuclear deterrence from aircrafts to ballistic missiles.

India is establishing nuclear enrichment plant at Rattahalli for fulfilling the requirements of nuclear submarines that are planned to be launched in 2015. Expressed R. Raja Ramana, ‘Estimates of India’s Fissile Material Stocks,’ pp.81- 83, downloaded from www.scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archieve/sgs16rajaraman.pdf on May 13, 2014. 175 Francois Heisbourg, ‘The Prospects for Nuclear Stability between India and Pakistan’ Survival, Vol.40, No.4 (1998- 1999), p.78 176 Christoph Bluth, p.394 177 Ibid. 178 Ibid. Suresh Dhanda, p.99, downloaded from www.indianjournals.com on May 13, 2014. Anglo French Jaguar aircraft has the capacity to carry nuclear warheads up to a range of 1600 km and Flogger has the range of 800 km. 179 Srinjoy Choudhary, ‘Sukhois Capable of Hitting Chinese Targets’ The Statesman (28 September 2002). Suresh Dhanda also quoted, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: An Assessment of Second-Strike Capability,’ p.98.

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5.6.2 India’s Missile Program

India has acquired a series of ‘nuclear capable strategic’ and tactical conventional missiles during 1980s.180 The existing India’s missile program is based upon Prithvi and Agni series. Prithvi is Soviet based SA-2, single stage, liquid fueled and road-mobile missile having a short range of surface to air that was initiated in 1983 and tested in 1988.181 Prithvi consists of three types of missiles. The Prithvi-I has the capability to carry 1000kg and target within a range of 150 km and it was handed over to Indian Army in late 1994.182 A long range Prithvi-II (SS.250) has a range of 250 km to 350 km with a payload of 500kg its lightweight is considered sufficient for nuclear- weapon delivery.183 Prithvi III (SS-350) which is renamed as Dhanush is designed for naval purposes possessing the range of 350 km with the payload of 500 kg.184 The experts expressed distrusts related to the potential of Prithvi series; some argue that only Prithvi I and II can carry nuclear warheads while the American Intelligence Agency evaluated that only Prithvi I is capable to carry nuclear warheads.185

The second India’s missile range Agni has been designed to expand the India’s nuclear capabilities especially for containing China, except Agni I, which is designed to restrain Pakistan. Agni I has been tested upon to the range of 1200 km and Agni II to range between 1200 to 2000 km with a payload of 1000kg in each case.186 A particular variant of Agni I is Pakistan specific with a range of 700 km.187 Agni II+/IV was tested in 2010 having the range of 3000km with payload of 2000kg.188 Agni III projected up to the range of 3500-5000 km with 2000-2500 kg payload containing three solid fuel stages, and was tested in 2011.189 Agni V was tested in 2012 up to a range of 5000 km with a payload of 5000 kg.190 Submarine launched K.15 having the range of 700

180 W.P.S.Sidhu, ‘India’s Security and Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures, in W.P.S.Sidhu, Brain Cloughly, John Hawes and Trista C. Schaffer (eds) Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures in Southern Asia (Washington: Henry Stimson Center, 1998), pp.1-48 181 Suresh Dhanda, p.101. 182 Francois Heisbourg, p.80 183 Ibid, p.81 184 Suresh Dhanda, p.101 185 The report of Central Intelligence Agency was quoted by Suresh Dhanda, pp.101-102 186 Suresh Dhanda,’ p.102 187 Ibid. This missile weighs 12 tones with solid fuel and is viable to mount by road mobile transport carrier or by railroad launch cars. 188 Dinshaw Mistry, p.124 189 ‘India Defence Consultants’ downloaded from www.indiadefence.com/AGNIMISSILE.htm on May 18, 2014. 190 Dinshaw Mistry, p.124

205 km with 6000 kg payload was tested in 2008.191 Parhar tactical ballistic missile with a range of 150 km was tested in 2011, while Nirbhay cruise missile was tested in 2013.192 Multipurpose Brahmos cruise missile with a range of 700 km was tested in 2013.193 Overall India’s missile development is shown in Table 5.2. Additionally, India is developing a sea borne missile Sagarika that would be dual in character (as ballistic and as air breathing) and projecting a long-range missile Suraya for containing the whole China in future.194

191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 Francois Heisbourg, ‘The Prospects for Nuclear Stability between India and Pakistan’ Survival, Vol.40, No.4 (1998-1999), p.81

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Table 5.2

India’s Missile Development

First test, No of Missile Range (km) Weight (kg) tests Until Notes March 2013 Liquid-fuel, conventional and nuclear versions; Prithvi I 150 1000 1988 land-based and ship launched versions Prithvi II 250 1000 1997 Prithvi III/ 350 500 2004 Dhanosh 40 tests Agni I 700-1200 1000 2002, 9 tests Agni II 1200-2000 1000 1999, 9 tests Agni II+/IV 3000 2000 2010, 3 tests Agni III 3500-5000 2000-2500 2011 Agni V 5000 5000 2012, 2 tests Submarine- Launched Missile 13 tests include 4 tests of an underwater- launched missile K-15 700 6000 2008, 13 tests in its full configuration, and additional tests of one or two missile stages or from land Brahmos Cruise Conventional missile 290 3000 2001, 35 tests payload; land, sea and air-launched versions Prahaar 150 1000-2000 2011, 1 test Nirbhay Cruise 700 3000 2013, 1 test missile Source: Researcher’s calculations.

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5.7 Pakistan’s Initiatives on Nuclear Doctrine

Pakistan drafted its nuclear doctrine after the nuclear tests of May 1998 and even before the declaration of India’s DND in 1999 but could not officially revealed due to variety of interpretations.195 Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is Indo-centric and Pakistan intends to maintain sufficient nuclear arsenals for sustaining its nuclear deterrence credible to deter India as three retired Pakistani officials elaborated in their article in 1999 as:196

Deterrence was the sole aim and small arsenal was considered adequate. At no time did Pakistan contemplate use of nuclear weapons for war fighting or seek to develop capability for a pre-emptive attack. Apart from the obvious constrained resources, it was not so unrealistic as to entertain such thoughts. India is too large and too well arms to be vulnerable to a disabling strike. Besides, any such attempt would provide retaliation with disastrous consequences.

The main argument of these analysts indicates the irrelevance of nuclear arms competition between India and Pakistan for the perseverance credible nuclear deterrence. However, they believe that ‘minimum deterrence’ is not a static notion that may align according to changing circumstances, but they refrained to quantify Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile to meet the upcoming strategic coincidences. Z. N. Jaspal believes that: 197

In the present strategic scenario, Pakistan possesses enough strategic weaponry … to provide it with a minimum nuclear deterrence. The basis of this perceptions that in nuclear deterrence, parity between opponents is not based on numerical equality of the number of nuclear delivery systems, or of the number of warheads or in the yield of megatons available to each opponent. Parity requires assured destruction capability.

Correspondingly, Abdul Sattar (Former Pakistan’s Foreign Minister) again elaborated Pakistan’s stance about ‘minimum deterrence’ in November 1999.198 Agha Shahi (Former Pakistan’s Foreign

195 Pakistan planed ‘tit for tat’ reaction in response to India’s DND, but military takeover in October 1999 shaped divergent dynamics that could not permit Pakistan to declare its nuclear doctrine. Similarly, the enduring Pak-India conventional and nuclear disparity compelled Pakistan to create ambiguity by initiating undeclared nuclear doctrine. Likewise, the aftermaths of 9/11 in 2001 and the disclosure of A.Q.Khan network in 2004 kept Pakistan under stressed that compelled Pakistan to generate ambiguity despite declaring nuclear doctrine. Naeem Ahmad Salik, ‘The Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine’, in Feroz Hassan Khan, Ryan Jacobs and Emily Burk (eds), Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade (Monterey: Naval Post Graduate School, 2014), p.74. 196 Agha Shahi, Zulfiqar Khan and Abdul Sattar, ‘Securing Nuclear Peace’, The News International (5 October 1999). 197 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Reassessing Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy’ down loaded from www.defencejourcal/2001/july/reassessing.htm on June 13, 2015. Also quoted Arpit Rajain. Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia, China, India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005). p.319 198 See Reference No 13.

208

Minister) raised the traditional ‘action-reaction syndrome’ that has subjugated the strategic relations between India and Pakistan since their inception, as India intends to maintain its minimum deterrence flexible according to changed circumstances, and in response, Pakistan will indeed uphold its deterrence on the similar footings.199 According to General Kidwai, ‘whenever Pakistan’s survival will be at stake.200 Pakistan will not compromise to use nuclear arsenals and will never hesitate to use nuclear weapons when:201

 Any part of Pakistan is captured by India.  The military installations are demolished or attempt to demolish.  For destabilizing Pakistan, interfere or plan to interfere in its internal affairs.

According to General F.S.Lodhi, ‘our nuclear strategy about nuclear weapons is to strike first’.202 It can be estimated that Pakistan’s defense forces have placed nuclear weapons in a state of red alert to target India’s military installations. The people in power in India and Pakistan were exchanged threatening statements in past. General F.S.Lodhi explained that Pakistan has planned the parameters about the use of nuclear weapons on following grounds:203

 Nuclear weapons will be employed with the approval of highest executive.  The nuclear weapons would be used only when the enemy would get success to break our defense line.  Once it is confirmed that the enemy is ready to demolish our nuclear installations, then Pakistan must use nuclear weapons without any delay.

Brig S.J.Saeed Ismat also explained the outlines for the use of nuclear weapons:204

 If the enemy succeed to break our nuclear deterrence, then Pakistan must have the potential to retaliate.

199 Agha Shahi, ‘Pakistan Responds to India’s Nuclear Doctrine’, Disarmament Diplomacy 41 (November 1999), downloaded from www.acronym.org.uk/41pakistan.htm on December 15, 2016. 200 Paolo Cotta, Ramusino and Maurizo Murtellini,’Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan’, Landau Network-Centero Volta Report 21 June 2002, downloaded from www.centrovoltra.it/landau/content/binary/pakistan/2520january/25202002.pdf on December 16, 2016. General Kidwai was quoted by Major General (Retd) Jamshed Ayaz Khan,’India’s Nuclear Doctrine’ The Nation (31 January 2003). Also quoted Riffat Hussain, ‘Nuclear Doctrine in South Asia’. SASSU Research Report No. 4 (December 2005). p.25. 201 Ibid. 202 F.S.Lodhi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine’ downloaded from www.defencejournal.com/apr99/pak-nuclear- doctrine.htm on December 17, 2016. 203 Ibid. 204 Brig (ret) S.J.Saeed Ismat, ‘Strategy of Total Defence: A Conceptual Nuclear Doctrine’, downloaded from www.defencejournal.com/2000/ma/doctrine.htm on December 16, 2016.

209

 The forces must be capable to retaliate in case of the failure of deterrence.  When it is confirmed that enemy does not want to spare us. Then nuclear weapons must be ready against the enemy.  Our response must be balance according to aggressor’s action.

Pakistan acknowledges the significance of nuclear weapons especially in the existence of India’s vast conventional forces. So, Pakistan decided not to sign the agreement of NFU. This indicates Pakistan’s policy of ‘weapons of last resort but first use’ especially in a condition when Pakistan has limited warheads as compared to India. Therefore, in reply to India’s DND, that Pakistan has the potential to deter India by adopting “First Use Posture”. Moreover, Zafar Iqbal Cheema suggested: 205

Pakistan’s deterrence can be further augmented by its decision to assemble a small nuclear force rapidly, to diversify weapons by using designs that rely on both uranium and plutonium, to develop comprehensive missile programs, and to take steps to miniaturize.

In the existing conventional disparity between the two states forced Pakistan in depending upon nuclear weapons to offset India’s conventional superiority. Pakistan’s ‘first use’ option and undefined nuclear threshold policy reveals its upcoming nuclear policy. Pakistan’s nuclear policy is based upon five main elements: an adequate stockpile of nuclear weapons and their delivery mechanisms; an effective conventional fighting force; survivable strategic forces; a minimum nuclear doctrine and robust strategic command and control.206

5.7.1 Pakistan’s C2 Systems

Pakistan decided to follow a difficult option in regulating the operational aspects of its C2 system: besides to opt a centralized or delegative C2 system as Peter Fever illustrates as, an ‘always/never dilemma’.207 To sustain the dilemma of C2 related to nuclear weapons in the context of the two inconsistent requirements,208 military officials in Pakistan have a firm control over the nuclear

205 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control’, in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz (eds), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (London: Coenell University Press, 2000), p.169. Also quoted by Arpit Rajain, p.319 206 Peter Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its premises and Implication’, in Henery Sokolski (ed), Pakistan’s Nuclear Future Worries beyond War (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 2008), p.131, 207 Peter D. Fever, ‘Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear States’ International Security, Vol.17, No.3 (winter 1992-1993), p.163. Peter D. Fever expressed as: ‘Leaders want a high assurance that weapons will always work when directed and a similar assurance that they will never be used in the absence of authorized direction’ which are apparently conflicting objectives. 208 See Reference No.174

210 weapons.209 For assuring the safety and security of nuclear arsenals, Pakistan has taken foolproof measures that provide a safety valve against illegal employment of nuclear weapons and according to US Congressional report:210

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not fully assembled. Warheads, detonators and missiles are stored separately, but there are contingency plans for quick assembly in the event of a national crisis.

Due to lack of strategic depth and concomitant less early warning time and geographical proximity, the imperatives of retaining quick response capability with a small nuclear force, Pakistan may have decided a delegative C2. Pakistan’s nuclear assets and C2 might become vulnerable in case of India’s surprise or pre-emptive air strike due to lack of Pakistan’s strategic depth.211 The complexity of preserving communications with dispersed silos and mobile launchers in hard areas for the sustainability of nuclear arsenals also demands a delegative control system. Pakistan’s defense forces have however, retained the legacy of centralized control. The delegative system is also concerned to the accidental use of nuclear weapons, which is directly concerned with the nuclear environment of India and Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan has adopted an assertive or centralized command and control.

In February 2000, Pakistan announced its command and control structure for its nuclear weapons. It was announced that a National Command Authority (NCA) related to the development of nuclear weapons and the employment of Command, Control, Communications, Computerization, Intelligence and Information (C4I2)212 was established. The NCA is chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and includes the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCS), three services

209 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence: Current Challenges and Future Efficacy’ Margallla Papers, Special Edition (2008), p.62. Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, p.240. Gurmeet Kanwal, Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal, p.154. Also quoted Sawaran, ‘China-India-Pakistan: Nuclear Command and Control in Southern Asia’ p.38, downloaded from www.RP-33-Sawaran-Singh-China-India-Pakistan- Nuclear-Command-Control-March-2012.pdf on June 5, 2014. 210 ‘US Special Forces on Standby to Safeguard Pakistan Nuclear Arsenal’ downloaded from www.us-special-forces- on-standby-to-safeguard-pakistan-nuclear-arsenal on June 3, 2014. Also quoted Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence: Current Challenges and Future Efficacy’ Margallla Papers, Special Edition (2008), p.62 211 E. Arnett, Nuclear Stability and Arms Sale to India: Implications for U.S. Policy,’ Arms Control today, Vol. 27, No.5, (August 1997), pp.7-11 212 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence: Current Challenges and Future Efficacy’, p.62

211 chiefs, the Director General Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and the heads of concerned strategic- scientific organizations. Two special committees are announced in dealing with nuclear weapons issue: Development Control Committee (DCC) and an Employment Control Committee (ECC). The DCC’s deputy chair is CJCSC including more or less membership, and the atomic bureaucracy, i.e. Chairman KRL (Khan Research Labs), Chairman PAEC (Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission) and Head of NESCOM (National Engineering and Scientific Commission) and Director General SPD. All the administrative policies related to the development of nuclear weapons, missile systems are the prime functions of DCC, and it is framed to assure Pakistan’s credible nuclear deterrence.213 The ECC’s deputy chair is Foreign Minister including ministers for defense and interior, the CJCSC, three services chiefs and Director General SPD. The main function of ECC is to formulate organization related to the employment of nuclear weapons and to identify them in various contingencies.214 The Figure No.3 illustrates the Pakistan’s NCA in detail.

213 Ibid, pp.62-63. 214Ibid.

212

Figure 3

Pakistan’s NCA

Prime Minister (Chairman)

Strategic Plans Division

Employment Control Committee Development Control Committee

 Deputy Chair: Foreign Minister Deputy Chair: Chairman of the Joint  Minister of Defense Chiefs of Staff Committee  Minister of Interior Chief of Army Staff/vice Chief of  Minister of Finance Army Staff  Chairman Joint Chiefs of Chief of Naval Staff Staff Committee Chief of Air Staff  Chief of Army Staff/ Heads of concerned strategic orgs Chief of Army Staff Secretary: Director General of the  Chief of Naval Staff Strategic Plans Division  Chief of Air Staff  Secretary: Director General of the strategic Plan Division  Others: as required

Services Strategic Forces (Operational Control-NCA)

Army Navy PAF

Source: Peter R. Lovey, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability’ downloaded from www.Pakistan- nuclear-posture-Security-Survivability.pdf on June 01, 2014

Likewise, the focus of SPD is to assure the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear installations and coordinates among all intelligence agencies to contain any external threat.215 The SPD works under the Joint Services Headquarters and overall responsibility of nuclear security and safety is delegated to CJCSC. The Figure No.4 demonstrates the SPD in detail.

215 Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability’ p.14, downloaded from www.Pakistan- nuclear-posture-Security-Survivability.pdf on June 01, 2014.

213

Figure 4

Source: Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability’ p.15, downloaded from www.Pakistan-nuclear-posture-Security-Survivability.pdf on June 01, 2014

Despite the civilian government took over political power in 2008, the military and SPD continuously remained in operational control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.216 However, the security concerns compelled Pakistan to acquire nuclear arsenals and adopted a first-use asymmetric escalation stance. Pakistan Army has its own inclinations related to the safety and security of nuclear weapons. As Barry Posen and Scott Sagan argued:217

216 Ibid, p.12 217 Barry R. Posen, The Source of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1984), p.18, Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.177. Also quoted Vipin Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace?

214

‘Military organizations tend to favor offensive strategies and procedures that allow independence and retention of the initiative, attempt to minimize civilian interference, and underestimate the probability of accidents or unauthorized use’.

The Pakistan Army is admired due to its professionalism, has adopted methods to carry out and enhance an already offensively oriented stance to assure the use of nuclear weapons during crisis and will survive any preemptive strike.218 As Timothy, D. Hoyt writes:219

It is apparent that Pakistan’s C2 procedures are delegative, learn heavily towards the always side of the ‘always/never’ divide, and probably include both devolution and possibly pre- delegation in order to ensure the use of weapons.

Despite obtaining such measures, Pakistan’s C2 still persists reservations about its CMD. Currently, Pakistan is not sustaining an operational nuclear arsenal nor continuing nuclear force on a hair-trigger alert and to ensure security and survivability of nuclear weapons, the components are stored at several military locations.220 General Kidwai stated that nuclear weapons could be accumulated, moved and mated with delivery vehicles within a very short notice.221 Additionally, Pakistan Military officials stated that ‘in emergency circumstances… the weapon is relocated to permit the quick assembly’.222 The current de-mating of assets is based upon technical features of Pakistan’s weapons design, and the technicians might decide not to store the warheads in assembled form for their safety and security.223 Nevertheless, it would become critical due to sophistication of the technology of nuclear weapons design.224 To avoid the complications,

Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability’, International Security, Vol.34, No.3 (Winter 2009/2010), pp.65-66. 218 Vipin Narang, p.66. 219 Timothy D. Hoyt, ‘Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine and the Dangers of Strategic Myopia’ Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No.6 (November/December 2001), p.966. Also quoted Vipin Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability’, International Security, Vol.34, No.3 (Winter 2009/2010), p. 66. 220 Kenneth N. Luongo and Brig Gen Naeem Salik (ret), ‘Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security’, Arms Control Today, Vol. 37, No. 10 (December 2007), downloaded from www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Lungo on June 1, 2014. 221 General Kidwai quoted in Vipin Narang, p. 66. 222 Ibid. 223 David Albright and Mark Hibbs, ‘Pakistan’s Bomb: Out of the Closet’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 48, No.6 (July/August 1992), pp.38-43. 224 David Albright and Paul Brannan, ‘Pakistan expanding Plutonium Separation Facility near Rawalpindi’ ISIS Imagery Brief (Washington D.C: Institute for Science and International Security, May 19, 2009), p.1, downloaded from www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/PakistanExpandingNewLabs.pdf on June 3, 2014.

215

Pakistan may possess a well-equipped deterrent to enhance the reliability of its asymmetric stance of escalation, which may intensify the likelihoods of nuclear accident or inadvertence.

Furthermore, Pakistan Army has the authority to deploy nuclear weapons rapidly during crisis with India whenever required. This may involve pre-delegating a range of authority to end users in its chain of command for the release of nuclear weapons. There will be two or three persons involved for the split of code at the lower level of military command; warheads and codes are also considered to be collocated. Maj Gen (retd.) Mahmud Durani declares:225

For example, at an air force base the code may be divided between the base commander and the unit commander, in the army, the code may be divided between group commander and the unit commander. This rule also applies to a launch site.

It appears that officers at lower level may be ceded with the authority, especially the assembly and release of nuclear weapons during crisis that may generate the South Asian strategic environment susceptible.226

5.8 Pakistan’s Nuclear Force Building

Pakistan disclosed its capability to fabricate nuclear weapons in the 1980s. Pakistan’s nuclear devices are fission weapons with a core of Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU). It is estimated that 10-15 kg of HEU are required for a single nuclear warhead.227 Congress state reports that Pakistan has developed enough HEU for 60 nuclear weapons.228 Christoph Bluth expressed that Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile vary between 20-60.229 The Pakistan’s potential for producing HEU is predicted at 100 kg per year.230 According to Rodney W. Jones judgment, ‘Pakistan would make 110 nuclear

225 Maj Gen (ret) Mahmud Durrani, p.33. 226 The NCA would be under stress mainly due to the deployment of nuclear weapons on silo-based missile launchers and on submarines. The nuclear weapons would be launched on hair-trigger alert to contain an ambiguous event that would provide a very limited time to the decision makers to respond and the decision powers could be delegated to the local commanders. Explained Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for India-Pakistan Strategic Environment’, NDU Journal, Vol No.xxv, (2011), p.17. 227 Christoph Bluth, ‘India and Pakistan: a case of asymmetric nuclear deterrence’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.22, No.3 (September 2010), p.394 228 Quoted Christoph Bluth, p.394 229 Ibid. 230 Ibid.

216 devices by 2010’.231 According to a report of International Institute for Science and Security, ‘Pakistan has 55-90 nuclear weapons with a medium estimate of 70’.232 Andrew Bast presumed that Pakistan possesses sufficient HEU for making more than 100 nuclear devices.233 Robert Wall envisaged that Pakistan would assemble 110-120 warheads in early 2013,234 while, the Federation of American Scientists235 claims that Pakistan holds 100-120 nuclear devices till 2013.

There is a divergence of opinions of the analysts related to the exact estimation of nuclear weapons of India and Pakistan. Dinshaw Mistry estimated that Pakistan has sufficient HEU for 80 nuclear weapons, its Khushab reactor has produced plutonium sufficient to prepare 20 weapons, and its enrichment facilities and Khushab reactor are expected to produce enough material to make seven to fourteen nuclear weapons annually.236 Additionally, Pakistan is developing three more reactors in Khushab that are estimated to produce enough plutonium to make 12 to 15 more nuclear weapon per year, by around 2015.237 Dinshaw Mistry predicted that by 2020, Pakistan and India could each have the capability to produce weapon-grade fissile material to make 200 to 250 nuclear weapons.238 The previously mentioned estimation indicates that Pakistan possesses sufficient nuclear stockpile and is consistently updating its nuclear capabilities.239 Similarly, to calculate Pakistan’s nuclear requirements, Gregory S. Jones evaluated that even Pakistan will plan to target

231 Rodney W. Jones, p.12 232 Suresh Dhanda quoted Institute for Science and International Security, p.98. 233 Andrew Bast, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Calculus,’ p. 75, downloaded from www.dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2011.609063 on June 18, 2012 234 Robert Wall, ‘China Nuclear Stockpile Grows as India Matches Pakistan Rise’ downloaded from www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/china-nuclear-weapon-stock-grows-as-india-matches-pakistan-rise.html on May 13, 2014. 235 ‘Federation of American Scientists: Status of World Nuclear Forces’ downloaded from www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclear-weapons/nuke-status.html on May 13, 2014. 236 Dinshaw Mistry, p.127 237 Ibid. 238 Ibid, p.128 239 Pakistan is developing its fourth Khushab nuclear reactor which will enable Pakistan in producing lighter and smart nuclear arsenals with higher yield. Stated Zafar Khan, ‘Pakistan’s Minimum Deterrence and is Policy Approach toward Fissile Materials: Security Concerns and the Region’s Changed Strategic Environment’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.26, No.1 (March 2014), p.55. India has the capability of producing hydrogen bombs, stated Francois Heisbourg, p.79

217 cities, which will undermine the state’s survival as India may opt a counterattack.240 The estimation compiled by Jones is given:241

For killing 50 percent of India’s population, the 100 time of number of nuclear weapons will be required as it has now… seven-fold difference in population …seven times number of nuclear weapons that India could be readily delivered… and its current seven-time increase in nuclear stockpiles. Such increase in stockpiles is not justified as India would require to compete Pakistan’s ability of producing fissile material and as well as its increase in missile production.

Jones furtherly evaluated that ‘if Pakistan is intended to eliminate six Indian ground force divisions (nine weapons per division) and the aircraft on 10 airbases (three weapons per airbase), it would be required 84 nuclear weapons and its existing stockpile is reserved to threaten Indian cities. Thus, Pakistan will require at least twice of its current stockpiles which will generate serious repercussions on its prevailing nuclear posture that would be sufficient for its existence and survival’.242

Additionally, Pakistan also attempted to maintain its nuclear threshold on the similar spiraling as India’s by developing and employing ‘a first generation of nuclear capable delivery vehicles’.243 Pakistan has acquired a range of combat aircrafts from different countries but US based 46F-16A/B are suitable for delivering nuclear weapons. Christoph Bluth expressed that they have the potential to carry nuclear weapons with a radius of 850 km.244 Its Mirage 11/5 and A-5 aircraft can also be utilized to carry nuclear weapons but they have not the access to reach India’s capital due to a short range.245 In 2010, Pakistan has obtained China’s JF-17 Thunder that comprises on highly advanced machinery and has the ability to carry 3000 kg load with a range of 3000 km.246 The vulnerabilities

240 Gregory S. Jone, Pakistan’s ‘Minimum Deterrence’ Nuclear Force Requirements (Carlisle, USA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), p.96. 241 Ibid, p.98. 242 Ibid, p.97. 243 Francois Heisbourg, p.78 244 Christoph Bluth, p.394 245 Ibid. 246 ‘CAC/PAC JF Thunder’ downloaded from www.allmilitaryweapons.com/2011/11/cacpac-jf-17-thunder.html on May 15, 2014. JF Thunder is highly sophisticated, all weather, lightweight, day/night multi role aircraft developed by a joint venture of Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra and Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation of China.

218 of delivery vehicles247 forced Pakistan to gradually shift its nuclear deterrence towards ballistic missiles.

5.8.1 Pakistan’s Missile Program

Pakistan obtained missile technology and acquired its missile in four phases. First, during 1960s and 1970s, Pakistan’s Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) developed US and French based rockets and a plant for solid fuel stage.248 Second, since early 1989, Pakistan revealed the existence of its missile program and tested four variants of surface-to- surface short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) known as Hataf. The Hataf I has a range of 80-100 km with payload of 500 kg and Hataf II or Abdali with a range of 300 km including payload of 500 kg.249

Third, during mid and late 1990s, Pakistan assembled and developed the indigenous variants of Hataf III, Hataf IV and Hataf V. Hataf III or Ghaznavi, is derived from Chinese M.11 missiles, with a range of 300 km with possibly a 500kg payload.250 Hataf IV or Shaheen, was tested in April 1999 and was drawn from China’s M-9. Hataf IV has the capacity to carry a payload of 1000 kg up to the range of 750 km.251 Pakistan successfully tested surface-to-surface, liquid fueled Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), Hataf V or Ghauri missile in April 1998 which expanded Pakistan’s capability to target up to a range of 1500 km with a nuclear or conventional payload of 700 kg.252 Hataf V or Ghauri is based on the North Korea’s No-dong and Taepo-Dong missiles, which is based on Russian technology.253

Fourth, during 2000s and early 2010s, Pakistan tested new short and medium-range missiles. Some of the missile tests were in response to India’s missile tests especially during 2001-2002 military standoff or due to the regional and domestic political events after 2002.254 This phase

247 The vulnerabilities of delivery vehicles have been discussed under the caption of ‘India’s Nuclear Delivery Vehicles’. 248 Tariq Mutsafa, ‘SUPARCO-the formative years, 1961-67,’Friday Times (30 March 2012). 249 Francois Heisbourg, p.81 250 Samina Yasmeen, ‘South Asia after the Nuclear Tests: Prospects for Arms Control’, Pacific Review, Vol.11, No.3, (October 1999), p.241 251 Ibid. 252 Ibid, pp. 241-242 253 Suresh Dhanda, p.103. 254 Dinshaw Mistry, p.125

219 comprises on the series of Hataf missile from VI to IX. Hataf VI or Shaheen-2 was tested in 2004 with a range of 2000 km and a payload of 500-700 kg.255 After the successful tests of Hataf VI, Pakistan diverted its attention in making cruise missiles and Hataf VII or Babur CM ground- launched cruise missile was tested in 2005 that has the range of 700 km with payload of 450 kg.256 Hataf VIII or Babur CM cruise missile enhanced air-launch missile capacity of Pakistan Air Force.257 In 2011, Pakistan tested a short range nuclear capable missile Hataf IX or Nasar and it is presumed that the test of Hataf IX or Nasar is the indication of Pakistan’s potential in developing tactical nuclear weapons to contain India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.258 Overall, Pakistan’s missile development is shown in Table 5.3.

255‘ Shaheen-II or Hataf-6’ downloaded from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakisan/missile/shaheen2.htm on May 21, 2014. 256 Muhammad Daheem, ‘Pakistan’s missile capability’ downloaded from www.pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=178539 on May 21, 2014. 257 Dinshaw Mistry, p.126 258 ‘Missile’ downloaded from www.nti.org on May 21, 2014.

220

Table 5.3

Pakistan’s Missile Development

First test, No of Missile Range (km) Weight (kg) tests Until Notes March 2013 Hataf II was Hataf II/Abdali 300 500 1989,8 tests modified and retested in 2002

Hataf Derived from III/Ghaznavi 300 500 1997, 7 tests Chinese M.11 Hataf 750 1000 1999, 11 tests Derived from IV/Shaheen Chinese M.9 Derived from Hataf V/Ghauri 1500 700 1998, 9 tests North Korian Nodong; liquid fuel Hataf VI/Shaheen-2 2000 500-700 2004, 5 tests Hataf VII/Babur Land-based and CM 700 450 2005, 11 tests ship-launched Hataf VIII/Raad CM 350 1100 2007,4 tests Air-Launched Hataf IX/Nasar 60 Unknown 2011,3 tests Source: Researcher’s calculations

5.9 Comparative Analysis of Trilateral CMD

After analyzing nuclear doctrines, command and control systems and the force postures, the means of nuclear delivery vehicles and Missile programs of China, India and Pakistan according to Waltz’s preconditions for CMD, the three states proclaim that they have assured CMD. However, their flaws among above-mentioned segments diverted the attention that there would be the tenacity of nuclear arms race with conventional and nuclear confrontation among them.

China’s nuclear doctrine, command and control system, force postures, missile development and enduring military preparations are mainly focused to deter the US, which generated severe security

221 repercussions on India’s security dynamics at the regional level. Comprised on China’s strategic superiority and to sustain CMD, India’s enduring deterrent force buildup exacerbated an unending arms race in the region that complicated deterrent signaling postures towards Pakistan. Force building completion among China, India and Pakistan as China-India vis-à-vis India-Pakistan generated asymmetry both at the conventional and nuclear level,259 that made South Asian strategic environment critical. South Asian strategic stability is mainly based upon Pak-India strategic relations. To understand existing Indo-Pak strategic environment, the Stability-Instability Paradox260 provides theoretical support to evaluate the main aspects of South Asian strategic instability, which is elucidated by evaluating the dynamics of stability and instability in the region. Zafar Iqbal Cheema explains the dynamics of stability between India and Pakistan as:261

 Existence of tested / declared nuclear weapons abilities.  Dedicated ballistic missiles and aircraft delivery mechanism.  Formation of Command and Control systems.  Establishment of nuclear doctrine/contingencies of employment of nuclear weapons.  Development of second-strike capabilities.  Limited institution of S& CBMs.

Besides proclaiming to adopt CMD, both India and Pakistan are suspicious about the regional strategic stability due to the persisting uncertainties about the dynamics of stability between them. Ambiguity about the quantification of nuclear stockpiles to sustain CMD exacerbated nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. Therefore, both the states are continuously busy in enhancing their nuclear weapons program. According to Niel Joeck, ‘it is indispensable for the political elite of India and Pakistan to address the main concerns of their current arms race developments forthrightly and logic of minimum deterrence could not ensure peace between the two states’.262

259 Christopher Clary,’Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia’ in Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (eds), Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Washtington D.C: Stimson, 2013), pp.141-152. Suresh Dhanda, p.106. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Growing Conventional and Strategic Asymmetry and its Implications for South Asian Stability,’ in Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Muneer Mahmud (eds), Ballistic Missiles and South Asian Security (Islamabas: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2007), p.96. Rodney W. Jones, pp.9-14. 260 See Chapter 1, pp.37-40. 261 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security, p.454. 262 Neil Joeck, ‘Nuclear Relations in South Asia’, in Joseph Cirincione (ed), Repairing the Regime: Preventing Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), p.144.

222

Likewise, the induction of nuclear ballistic missiles has augmented the chances of nuclear war in South Asia. A large number of these aircrafts of the two states are deployed close to their border, in the suburbs of Lahore (Sargodha) and New Delhi (Ambala and Hindan).263 The capitals of both the states are within the range of their aircrafts. The largest industrial and economic centers of both the states, Karachi and Mumbai are also within the range of each other. The short distances among the prime military, economic and political centers of the two states have made the environment vulnerable to the peace and stability of India and Pakistan. Mumbai and Karachi are some 900 km and New Delhi and Islamabad are around 700 km.

The major cities of both the states are within the range of their missiles and the two states have very limited time to decide for retaliation. Ballistic missile flight time between Sargodha and New Delhi is hardly five minutes and it would be very critical for the decision makers to decide in such a timeframe.264 Thus, despite all efforts, the two states have done a lot to maintain the ‘second- strike’ capability but doubts exist during analyzing the capabilities and strategies of both the states against each other.

Moreover, mobile ballistic missiles overcome the detriments of aircrafts crucial for launching the ‘second-strike’ capability, i.e. runways and easy mobilization from their manufacturing bases to launching pads. Strategic depth also has a significant impact during ground and air operations. It could be vulnerable for the endurance of strategic arsenals and cause unintended escalation. Comparatively, India has the advantages due to its strategic depth which permits it to scatter strategic forces in several places while Pakistan’s strategic assets are located nearer to India due to lack of strategic depth. To offset the shortcomings of strategic depth, Pakistan is vigorously relying upon missiles Hataf III and Hataf IV, as these are its reliable delivery options.265 The disadvantageous aspect for India is due to its liquid fueled Prithvi and the stage II of Agni because these missiles are required to have an intense logistic support to operate and they can be detected due to their heavy sizes.266 The deployment procedure of India’s weapon system is also a source

263 Francois Heisbourg, p.80 264 Moeed Yusaf, ‘Preserving towards Nuclear Stability’ in Imtiaz Alam, p.28. 265 Both Hataf III and Hataf IV are solid fueled and are manufactured by latest military technology and are easy to carry due to their smaller size as compared to liquid fueled missiles and these missiles have a significant role in the survivability of Pakistan, explained Suresh Dhanda ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: An Assessment of Second- Strike Capability,’ ’World Affairs, Vol.13, No.4 (Winter 2009), pp.104-105. 266 Suresh Dhanda, p.105.

223 of instability. India has maintained calculated ambiguities related to its nuclear arsenals i.e. Prithvi missiles. Here is no official clarification from India’s government about Prithvi, whether it is nuclear or conventional weapon delivery system while Pakistan’s ballistic system is designed to carry both conventional and nuclear weapons.267

The C2 of both India and Pakistan are setup on similar pattern but India’s strategic force command may persist to follow ‘launch after hit’ tactics to acquire ‘launch on warning or launch under attack’ posture, which offers India to depart from NFU to FU posture, that would not be acceptable for both Pakistan and China.268 Similarly, India generated a deliberate ambiguity for replacing its ‘NFU’ posture to ‘FU’ that was condemned by Pakistan.269

5.9.1 India’s ‘Cold Start’ Doctrine and Pakistan’s Response

The Indian army had some reservations related to DND and offered the idea of ‘Cold Start’ Doctrine (CSD) in April 2004. The plan of this limited-war doctrine was to instigate a conventional move against Pakistan, which would have an extensive damage on the defense line of Pakistan before the intrusion of world community in resolving the issue.270 CSD is the outcome of disagreements between civil-military relations. Indian military officials believe that India’s political culture decisively influences upon state’s decision process and according to Padmanabhan (the former Indian army chief):271

The political culture in the country has deteriorated over the years. Communalism, sectarianism, regional parochialism, and sub-nationalism are on the rise. There is growing

267 Ibid, p.106. 268 Zafar Khan,’Emerging Shift in India’s Nuclear Policy: Implications for Minimum Deterrence in South Asia’, Strategic Studies, Vol.34, No.1 (Spring 2014), p.107 269 See reference 139. 270 Rizwan Zeb, ‘Deterrence Stability; N-Redlines and India-Pakistan Conventional Imbalance’ Regional Studies, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (Spring 2009), p.36. According to ‘Cold Start’ Doctrine, the Indian Army will establish Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) which will consist of eight small-sized divisions. During operation, extensive air support from IAF and Naval aviation will provide to IBGs. The main objective of the Doctrine is to get victory by rapid mobilization of forces before the intervention of external powers i.e. US and China on behalf of Pakistan. During aggression, maximum firepower will use without any delay until the attainment of military objectives. In the coming conflict, the Indian army will not intend to dismember Pakistan as it was taken during 1971 war and according to Walter Ladwig, ‘the main aim of India’s army is to make shallow territorial gains, 50-80-kilometer-deep, that could be used in post- conflict negotiations to extract concessions from Pakistan. Explained Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’ International Security, Vol. 32, No.3 (Winter 2007/2008), pp.6-9 271 General S.Padmanabham (Retd), ‘ The Indian Army in 2020’, Security Research Review, the Journal of Bharat- Rakshak.com, Vol.2, No.2 (June 21, 2006), downloaded from www.bharat-rakshak.com/SRR/2006/02/58.html on June 10, 2014.

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criminalization of politics and a culture of ‘vote banks’ has taken root. Politicization of the bureaucracy and the police, are well established.

The Indian army assumes that their political leadership was not interested in retaliation against Pakistan during 2001-2001 military standoff due to the US and Western pressure.272 The Cold Start doctrine will enable Indian army to initiate the military operation within shortest time interval that will create the adverse environment for the political leadership to interfere due to global pressure.273 By adopting this doctrine, India has the plan to get the advantages.274 The Indian political leadership is not in favor of CSD as Stephen Cohen examines that by adopting such doctrine, military would be in a position to play excessive role during decision-making.275

The CSD would provide India an option not to exceed the military operation beyond the limited war. The limited war is evaluated by four parameters: geography, objectives sought, time and weaponry used as P.R.Chari mentioned:276

The Cold Start strategy, which seeks to call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff with limited offensives, provides all corps with offensive capability and upgrades the role of Special Forces. The tactical objectives may include a rapid shallow invasion, destroying terrorist infrastructure or Pakistani military assets, or hot pursuit of militants- all limited objectives. The strategic objective would be to get India out of its post-1998 ‘strategic box’ of being deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from acting against Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir.

272 Rizwan Zeb, p.36 273 Ibid. 274 The limited size of battle plan and the shortest possible time of mobilization will minimize the financial constraints. Additionally, it is presumed that Cold start doctrine will provide the nuclear threshold and Pakistan will not a position to employ nuclear weapons. Explained Rizwan Zeb, pp.36-37 275 Stephen Cohen is quoted by Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’ International Security, Vol. 32, No.3 (Winter 2007/2008), pp.6-9. 276 PR Chari, ‘Limited War under the Nuclear Shadow in South Asia’, in Arzan Tarapore, Report of the seminar presenting key findings of the USIP report held on January 19, 2005 at the IPCS conference room, Military – Articles, No. 1623, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, January 29, 2005, Downloaded from www.ipcs.prg/article/military/limited-war-under-the-nuclear-shadow-in-south-asia-1623.html on June 13, 2014. Also quoted Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Cold Start Assumptions: Critical Analysis’ presented the paper in Three day Workshop on Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia. July 20- 22, 2010, Islamabad.

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Pakistan condemned CSD and warned India about any misadventure. In a meeting of NCA chaired by Yousaf Raza Gilani (the then Prime Minister), a statement was issued on 13th January 2009:277

It had taken serious note of recent Indian statements about conducting conventional military strikes under a nuclear umbrella. Such irresponsible statements reflected a hegemonic mindset, oblivious of dangerous implications of adventurism in a nuclearized context…. Massive inductions of advanced weapons systems, including installation of ABMs (Anti-Ballistic Missiles), build-up of nuclear arsenal and delivery systems through ongoing and new programs, assisted by some external quarters, offensive doctrines like ‘Cold Start’ and similar accumulations in the conventional realm, tend to destabilize the regional balance.

Gen Pervaiz Kayani (the then Chief of Army staff) confidently stated that the outcomes of any mishap due to a ‘nuclear overhang’ would be suicidal for India and Pakistan would respond with full potential by utilizing all available resources.278 This statement was endorsed by Air Marshal (Ret) Rao Qamar and stated that:279

Pakistan has put all the required preparations in place to meet any eventuality. The aggressor could not even think of what the reply would be from Pakistan.

These statements reveal the response of Pakistan’s defense forces against ‘Cold Start’ doctrine. The exponents of Cold Start doctrine are under flawed impression that the exceptional formations in Indian Armed Forces would transform the theater of South Asia’s strategic situation in India’s favor. But Kenneth Waltz rejected this assumption and argued that the structure of international system would not affect due to major changes in military technology unless the induction of new weapons during wars that change the number of great powers.280 Thus, Pakistan adopted Waltz argument and besides refining its conventional defense strategy, introduced Hataf-IX (Nasar).281 Prior to discussion of ‘Cold Start’, Pakistan has already adopted a ‘first-use’ doctrine, but the discussion appears related to the technological development in designing delivery vehicles to

277 ‘NCA takes serious note of Indian statements’, The News (14 January 2010). 278 Gen (Ret) Pervaiz Kayani quoted by Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Cold Start Assumptions: Critical Analysis’. July 20-22, 2010, Islamabad. 279 Air Marshal (Ret) Rao Qamar quoted by Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Cold Start Assumptions: Critical Analysis’. 280 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), pp.180- 181. 281 See Reference 258.

226 offset shallow thrust. The military officials released a statement in February 2013, soon after Nasar test that:282

The test fire was conducted with successive launchers of two missiles from a state of the art multi tube launcher. Nasar, with a range of 60 km, and in-flight maneuver capacity can carry nuclear warheads of appropriate yield, with high accuracy. This quick response system, which can fire a four missile Salvo, ensures deterrence against threats in view of evolving scenarios. Additionally, Nasar has been especially designed to defeat all known Anti Tactical Missile Defense Systems.

The Nasar missile has three considerable presumptions in the context of South Asian nuclear stability:283

First, canisterized system is followed in manufacturing Nasar missile due to which warheads can be mated prior to the mobilization of missile. The constraints related to unauthorized or accidental use are ambiguous during the management both on procedural or physical level because it is uncertain to judge the legitimacy of the authority in the context of command and control during conflict. Second, technically, Nasar is developed for dual use, for conventional and for nuclear warfare at the same time. It would be confusing for any external observer or for India to distinguish between conventional versus nuclear Nasars. If Pakistan relies on Nasar during conventional conflict against India, it can be misinterpreted which may cause a nuclear confrontation in the South Asian region. Third, due to having a shortest target range, it can be assumed that Nasar missile would be deployed in the vicinity of India-Pakistan border. The chances exist if India might target Nasar would battery during conventional crisis which would result in the emission of radiations which could fatally distress the border area of both the states. It would be critical to presume that whether the two states would be ready to bear the consequences of such a situation.

Pakistan’s response for containing Cold Start aggravated the dangers of nuclear escalation between the two states. In Nasar’s response, India introduced its short-range nuclear capable missile Parhar284 as P. R. Chari believes that Parhar will accomplish the ‘inadequacy of India’s

282 Inter-Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR18/2013-ISPR, Feb 11, 2013 downloaded from www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.aspo=t-press-release&id=2240 on June 12, 2014. Also quoted Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, ‘Doctrine, Capabilities, and Instability in South Asia’, p.100. 283 Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, ‘Doctrine, Capabilities, and Instability in South Asia’, pp.100-101. 284 See Reference 192.

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NFU policy to deter Pakistan’s destabilizing strategy’.285 In a region where unpredictability persists due to extremism and terrorism, the employment of nuclear weapons might become a major threat. Chari emphasized on a new range of threats between the two states as ‘extending from border intrusion to sub-conventional warfare, militancy and cross border terrorism, and nuclear weapons would become incapable against these dangers’.286

To sustain regional peace and stability, the two states are required to adopt rational behavior even during peacetime,287 as Rodney Jones expressed:288

There is a strong need for international as well as local efforts to resolve the primary issues of contention between India and Pakistan, bilateral measures to reduce the risks of both conventional and nuclear military risk-taking, and arms control arrangements to draw down or at least offset the increasing gaps in conventional military capability.

Furthermore, India is intensifying its deterrent forces by US-India nuclear deal and aspires to join NSG that can disturb Indo-Pak strategic balance and undermined Pakistan’s posture of CMD and aggravates its (Pakistan’s) security dilemma vis-à-vis India. Indo-Pak bilateral measures for contending their security dilemmas and sustaining regional strategic stability are evaluated in chapter seven.

5.9.2 India’s Ballistic Missile Defense and Pakistan’s Response

In the existing South Asian strategic environment where all-important military and civilian installations of India and Pakistan are within the range of their missiles and both have a limited time to decide, India planned to initiate Ballistic Missile Development (BMD) program. It was presumed that credible deterrence would be no longer irrelevant due to relying upon the prospect of punishment through massive reprisal.289 The US strategists claimed that the states like Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and North Korea posed serious security threat for the US due to their modest

285 P.R. Chari, ‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Stirring of Change’, downloaded from www.carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/04/india-snuclear-doctrine-stirrings-of-change-pub-55789 on September 10, 2016. 286 Ibid. 287 Zulfiqar Khan and Rizwana Abbasi, ‘Regional-centric Deterrence: Reassessing its Efficacy for South Asia’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.25, No.4 (Winter 2013), p.496. 288 Rodney Jones, ‘conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia’, SASSI Research Paper No.1 (March 2005), pp.8-9. 289 ‘Executive summary of the Report of the Commission to assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States’ downloaded from www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm on February 7, 2016.

228 ballistic missile potential against the US and its allies.290 Therefore, the US interest in the BMD compelled the other states including India to instigate for missile-shield for sustaining their particular security objectives. According to Anand Sharma, ‘for obtaining and maintaining a status of regional superpower, it is necessary for India to outdo the opponent’s capabilities’.291 This strategic mindset inspired India in institutionalizing BMD system to disrupt the current strategic balance between India and Pakistan as Vinod Kumar indicated, ‘there is a consensus within India for procuring interruption abilities through multiple available routs of technology assimilation’.292

Therefore, India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) instigated two missile defense systems namely Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) Missile Interceptor for high altitude interception and the Advanced Air Defense (AAD) Missile Interceptor for lower altitude.293 India proclaimed that both the systems were successfully tested as PAD was tested in November 2006 and AAD was in December 2007.294 India again pronounced for the second time that its two- layered defensive system was capable to accomplish its objectives.295 The Indian scientists claimed that the two-tiered shield would have the capability to intercept the missiles within the radius of 400 km.296

By employing BMD, India intended to accomplish various objectives as Nathan Cohan pointed out:297

 To protect India from nuclear attack.

290 Dean A. Wilkening, ‘Ballistan Missile Defense and Strategic Stability’, Adelphi Paper 334 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.9. 291 Wg Cdr Anand Sharma, ‘Ballistic Missile Defense for India: Necessity, Imperatives and Implications’, National Defence and Aerospace Power, Issue Brief, Center for Air Power Studies, April 15, 2009, p.2. 292 A. Venod Kumar, ‘A Phased Approach to India’s Missile Defense Planning ‘, Strategic Analysis, Vol.32, No.2, (March 2008), p.177. 293 Ibid, p.172. 294 After testing PAD, India claimed that it had acquired the capability to intercept incoming missiles in space, and AAD was tested from Wheeler Island to target Prithvi missile that was launched Chandipur on December 6, 2007. The main objective of AAD was to ensure the attempt if engagement in space fails. AAD would attempt the target even up to 20 km height, explained Air Marshal AK Trikha, ‘India’s quest for Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence’, Indian Defence Review, Vol.23, No.1, dpwnloaded from www.indiandefencereview.com/news/indias-quest-for-anti- ballistic-missile-defence/ on February 6, 2016. 295 Wg Cdr Anand Sharma, p.1. 296 Suresh Dhanda, p.108. 297 Nathan Cohan, ‘India’s Ballistic Missile Defense Options’, downloaded from www.stimson.org/spotlight/indias- ballistic-missile-defense-options-/ on February 7, 2016.

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 To protect two most iconic cities, New Delhi, the capital and Mumbai, the commercial capital.  To provide shield to the troops in carrying out Cold Start Doctrine.

Besides, Indian proclamations, the analysts are skeptical in accepting about the efficacy of BMD.298 It would be hardly viable for India’s BMD in intercepting Nasar due to its speed and low apogee. Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang claim that India’s BMD has not the potential to intercept Nasar.299 Similarly, Ghazala Yasmin asserts that Pakistan’s Babur Cruise Missile can easily override BMD300 and are capable to target both New Delhi and Mumbai.301 Zafar Iqbal Cheema expressed reservations about the credibility of BMD and argued that it has limited capability to intercept cruise and ultra-supersonic ballistic missiles but declared that it could undermine the deterrence capability.302

Regardless of the disagreements, it is anticipated that the BMD system would further aggravate the asymmetry between India and Pakistan and the discrepancy of power between the rival states, and have always been disadvantageous for strategic stability.303 Classical deterrence theory predicts that India’s commencement of BMD may perhaps compel Pakistan to pursuit operational nuclear weapons to sustain strategic parity and stability. In this context, Pakistan could initiate the following counter measures against India’s BMD:

 Pakistan would enhance its nuclear program and enlarge its strategic abilities qualitatively and quantitatively because it would be feasible to overwhelm India’s BMD by developing massive number of delivery vehicles and warheads. It would be critical for India’s BMD to contain several warheads within a limited time. For reassuring such tactic, it would be

298 ‘The history of U.S. BMD programs, India must reconsider technical challenges before propagating the efficacy of BMD. Moreover, India’s defense research establishment has faced severe difficulties during developing other weapons systems and it is obvious to experience challenges in developing BMD. Nathan Cohan, ‘‘India’s Ballistic Missile Defense Options’, downloaded from www.stimson.org/spotlight/indias-ballistic-missile-defense-options-/ on February 7, 2016. 299 Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, ‘Doctrine, Capabilities, and Instability in South Asia’, p.100. Shortest flight time would make complicated for any missile defense system to interrupt especially in the case of Nasar missile. 300 Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, ‘Indian Missile Defense Development: Implications for Deterrence Stability in South Asia’, Strategic Studies, Vol.35, No.2 (Summer 2015), p.37 301 Babur Cruise Missile is capable to target up to the range of 700 km. The distance between Lahore and New Delhi is 400km and from Tharparkar (Sindh) to Mumbai is 700 km. 302 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence: Current Challenges and Future Efficacy,’ p.48 303 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for India-Pakistan Strategic Environment’, NDU Journal, Vol No.xxv, (2011), p.2

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indispensable for Pakistan to replace the missiles possessing single warhead with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MRIVs), with up to 10 reentry vehicles (RVs) per missile.304  For maintaining its credible nuclear force posture, Pakistan would wage conflict and a distressing deterrence /management trade-off as Scott D. Sagon describes as vulnerability/invulnerability paradox.305  The operationalization and deployment of nuclear weapons capability engenders a new conflict dynamic that creates a new strategic atmosphere having elements of discriminating instability.306

Thus, India’s BMD would generate massive spiral aggressive nuclear arms a condition in which the two states would be under strain due to less stability and limited security. By acquiring BMD, India would be in advantageous position to initiate its Cold Start Doctrine or impose limited conflict due to the absence of fear of nuclear retaliation. Pakistan’s quest for enhancing its nuclear and missile capabilities especially for obtaining MIRVs according to classical deterrence theory would undermine CMD postures of the two states.

Aforementioned discussion has been elaborated comprehensively according to Cheema’s dynamics of stability between India and Pakistan307 except the last one that is extensively evaluated in chapter seven. The uncertainties about the dynamics of stability undermine the strategic stability between India and Pakistan.

On the contrary, Cheema illuminated the dynamics of instability also as:308

 Divergent political discernments.  Existence of unsettled disputes, especially Kashmir.  Existence of low-intensity conflict.  Occasional eruption of crisis and conflict-situations.  Geographical vicinity and less early warning time.

304 Ibid, pp.16-17. 305 Scott. D. Sagon, ‘The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia’ Asian Survey, Vol.41, No.6 (November/December 2001), pp. 1064-1086. Scott Sagon elaborated this term that for assuring the invulnerability, nuclear weapons are dispersed during crisis but it might become vulnerable for terror attack. 306 Vipin Narang, pp.38-41 307 See References 261-269. 308 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security, p.454.

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 Conflicting insights about nuclear and security doctrines.  Ideological / Religious Assortment and Historical Resentment.  Lack of dedicated hotlines between the top leadership and risk reduction mechanism.

These are also evaluated in the present research,309 except the last argument, which is explained in chapter seven. The dynamics of instability also indicate that the existing strategic environment between India and Pakistan remains vulnerable which may compel both the states to intensify their military preparations including uplift of their nuclear programs. Such preparations would endorse security dilemma between India and Pakistan that is the central point of the present research. The amplification of security dilemma due to Sino-Indian confrontation is evaluated in the coming chapter.

Conclusion

To assuring their nuclear deterrence according to Waltz prerequisites for CMD, the three states (China, India and Pakistan) initiated to adopt CMD postures, and they are not only striving to enhance their nuclear stockpiles but have established their delivery mechanisms also. Moreover, the three states possess sufficient nuclear arsenals to deter each other and their credible delivery mechanisms made them capable to target important military and civilian installations of one another. To meet the challenges during crisis, the three states have developed their nuclear doctrines but due to lack of trust, they could not permit to concede the nuclear doctrines of one another. China’s persisting force posture, doctrine and C2 are mainly focused to encompass the US, which engenders suspicions and fears for India’s security and survival. Sino-Pak nexus also worsened India’s apprehensions that compelled India to initiate countermeasures against China and Pakistan. The ambiguities due to the trilateral initiatives to obtain the prerequisites of CMD exacerbated strategic competition and intensified security dilemma between China, India and Pakistan.

309 ‘Divergent political discernments’ see references 103-113 of chapter 2. ‘Existence of unsettled disputes, especially Kashmir’, see references 126-140 of chapter 2. ‘Existence of low intensity conflict’, see Kargil Conflict in chapter 4. ‘Occasional eruption of crisis and conflict situation’, see 2001-2002 Military Standoff and Mumbai Terrorist Attack 2008 in chapter 4. ‘Geographical vicinity and less early warning time’, see reference 263. ‘Conflicting insights about nuclear and security doctrines’ see references 270-280. ‘Ideological / Religious Assortment and Historical Resentment’, see references 114-118 of chapter 2.

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Likewise, in the South Asian strategic environment, India planned ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ to contain nuclear threats during crises. While, Pakistan developed ‘Nasar’ missile to encompass India’s Cold Start Doctrine. Moreover, India’s initiative to obtain BMD shaped the regional strategic environment with diversion. Due to the persistence of asymmetry, Pakistan is mainly relying upon nuclear weapons and is continuously enhancing its nuclear stockpiles. Both India and Pakistan have developed a credible command and control systems on the similar strategies for the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals and to avoid any nuclear accidents and miscalculations. The two states avoided nuclear exchange since 1998 but a limited conflict during Kargil crisis in 1999, due to the existence of nuclear deterrence and the realist postulation of Stability-Instability Paradox explains the susceptibility of the existing strategic environment between India and Pakistan. The prevalent regional strategic environment not only strengthens security dilemma but also aggravates the chances of nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. The initiatives to reduce the likelihoods of nuclear escalation in the region are discussed in chapter seven.

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Chapter 6 Contemporary Trilateral Strategic Rivalries and Pakistan’s Security Dilemma

Introduction

South Asian region is experiencing a diverse strategic competition among the regional actors. The US interest in the region has also increased multi-fold in the post-Cold-War era with the rise of China. The international political system which plunged into a unipolar system ever since the end of the Cold War, is now under pressure. To sustain its unipolarity, the US is vigilant about its upcoming competitors both at global and regional levels, despite having acquired sophisticated military modernization. The US presumes China as its potential upcoming competitor in the South Asian region due to its (China’s) growing economy and military modernization and has initiated relevant countermeasures. Similarly, India has the apprehensions about China’s military modernizations and its inclination towards the region. It has planned multiple strategies to compete with the rise of China. To compete such strategies, China has also planned counter containment strategies.

The conflicting strategies of above mentioned states engender the South Asian strategic architecture and exacerbate security dilemma between India, Pakistan and China. Realist theory of balance of power and the power transition theory provides an in-depth understanding related to the strategies of above mentioned states. This chapter examines the aspects due to which states seek to compete with each other by intensifying their military modernization.

Within the context of this debate, this chapter seeks to answer the following questions.

 What are the main aspects due to which China articulates its strategic behavior?  What are the China’s balancing strategies in contention with the United States?  What are the main aspects due to which India adopted containment strategies towards China?  What are the outcomes of India’s ‘Look East’ and China’s ‘String of Pearls’ policies?  Will it be practicable for India to contain China by new warheads and missile testing?  How is the security dilemma critical for Pakistan as compared to India and China?

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To answer the above-mentioned questions, the response of the US, China and India are analyzed in order to achieve their desired results. The balancing strategies under the theory of balance of power and state’s external behavior in the context of economic interdependence, institutional identification and power structure are also elaborated.

6.1 Identifying China’s Strategic Behavior

China remains aware about its security both in regional and global politics. Traditionally, it is presumed that in spite of behaving as an oppressor, the state performs as the protector of the people. The Chinese phrase guojia (country) consists of two characters- guo (state) and Jia (family). It is anticipated that both will be protected by the state as Wu Xinbo narrates it as:1

This notion finds expression in such idioms as guo jia wang (the country is defeated and home lost), bao jia wei guo (to protect our homes and defend our country), wang guo mie zhong (national subjugation and genocide), and bao guo bao jia (to defend our country and protect our religion).

The Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu elaborated that ‘Chinese are peace loving and are not in favor of fighting and subduing the adversary and if war is inevitable, attack the enemy’s strategic power, the worst being the attack on civilian installation of the adversary’.2 Chinese followed Sun Tzu’s philosophy even in the modern era during Korean War.3 Likewise, Confucian strategic culture has a direct impact on China’s strategic thinking. Generally, it is presumed that Confucian is reluctant to use of force even during severe security threats and preferred to adopt negotiations and diplomatic means in resolving the disputes.4 But this perception does not support the Chinese

1 Wu Xinbo, ‘China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power’ in Matiah Algapa (ed), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Standford: Standford University Press, 1998), p.123 2Ibid. The impact of different strategies and tactics from Sun Tzu is vividly shown in the wisdom of strategists such as Zhuge Liang, Zhu Yu, and others. One episode is ‘Zhuge Liang Qi Qin Meng Huo’ (Seven Catches of Meng Huo). Meng Huo was a minority's General who fought against Liu Bei’s troops led by Zhuge Liang in Southern China. Zhuge Liang managed to catch Meng seven times using different strategies and tactics, but Meng would not admit failure. So, Zhuge Liang let Meng go seven times until Meng was totally persuaded by the superiority of Zhuge Liang in both strategic thinking and morality. Therefore, Meng surrendered his troops without further fighting. This example not only shows the superiority of fighting stratagems but also emphasizes significance of morality in fighting wars. Explained Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.22 3 Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision Making: Confucianism, Leadership and WarNew York: Routledge, 2007), p.22. During Korean War, The American soldiers noted the strange strategy of Chinese army. In spite of confronting the adversary directly, they deployed two units forward and one back for engaging and one unit attacked later for flanking the enemy to divide into two parts, therefore creating chaos. 4 Ibid, p.25.

235 warfare strategies during anti-Japanese war because they did not hesitate to retaliate aggressively for the sake of their national pride.5 Due to the influence of Confucian strategic culture, Chinese adopted three proponents, non-violence (feigong), defensiveness (fanhyu), and righteous war (yizhan),6 China’s strategic culture has been declared as peace-loving and non-violent by many the analysts. A famous Chinese scholar, Jin Dexiang, has given an explanation of the philosophical thinking related to the notion of China as a peace-loving nation. He elaborates that Chinese culture is based on agriculture and is static due to self- sufficient economy which compels China to adopt defensive and peaceful national psychology.7 Buzan Ersheng argues that the highest plan to defeat the enemy is to adopt non-violent or non-military tactic.8 In the traditional philosophy of Confucianism, he wei gui (peace is the most precious) was the main assumption while maintaining national unanimity and solidity.9 Likewise, according to Fairbank, ‘in the standard formulation of the Chinese classics, ‘war and weaponry is an inauspicious tool, and should only be used in unavoidable circumstances’ … in Chinese strategic thinking, war should not be the ‘last resort’.10 The Chinese defensive posture can also be analyzed from the world-famous Great Wall which was constructed during the Warring States Period (403-221 BC) and until the Ming Dynasty (1368- 1644).11 The Great Wall was the defensive forefront against foreign aggression and a symbol of China’s defensive security strategy. The Great Wall provided a huge shield for the preservation of the integrity of China. China’s peace-loving and defensive strategic culture is the cultivation of the evolution of thousands of years. Johnston summarizes the three basic elements of the Chinese culture which are influenced by Confucian culture as ‘war is unpromising and to be sidestepped;

5 Ibid. As Deng Xiaoping said during his visit to the US in 1979, ‘The Chinese people suffered amply from the miseries of war. We do not wish to fight a war unless it is forced upon us. We are firmly against a new world order…. we want peace____ a genuine peace in which the people of each country may develop and progress as they wish, free from aggression, interference, and bulling’. 6 Ibid, p.26. Among the three proponents, the righteous war will only happen if the first two cannot work. So, the righteous war is not instrumental, as structural realists will argue, war would become due to two arguments, if all other resorts are exhausted and as the old Chinese saying, ‘we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack’ (ren bu fan wo, wo, bu fan ren, ren ruo fan wo, wo bi fan ren). This is the traditional maxim reflecting the sprit in Chinese material art as a defensive practice, which is only for self-defense. But if attacked, you will not be bullied. 7 Jin Dexiang, ‘Zhongguo de Heping Waijao Chuantong yu Xifang de Huanghuolun (China’s Peaceful Diplomacy Tradition and Western ‘Yellow Peril)’. Shijie Jingi yu Zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics), No.11 (1997), p.13. Also quoted Huiyun Feng, p.26 8 Huiyun Feng quoted Buzhan Ersheng, p.26 9 Ibid. 10 Huiyun Feng quoted Fairbank, p.26 11 Ibid. The Ming Dynasty raised the Great Wall to defend from its archival in the north, explained Yuan-Kang Wang, ‘Offensive Realism and the Rise of China’. Issues and Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 2004), p. 187

236 the adversary is not inevitably demonized and coercion is the last resort’.12 Likewise, Mohan Malik describes China’s non- expansionist approach during ancient eras and agues:13

China’s real cultural achievements historically had little to do with militarism and imperialism and that Chinese civilization reached its qualitative peaks during the relatively peaceful and culture oriented Song and Qing Chinas. China was the world’s greatest power during Song (960-1267) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties.

Since the founding of Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China was involved in skirmishes till 1979, but China followed the policy for improving relations with the major powers.14 In 1979, China adopted the policy of ‘no enemy’ for the first time in history during establishing her relations with major powers.15 China continued her policy to sustain stable relations with the major powers after the Cold War.16

Despite assuming ‘no enemy’ policy, China was forcefully involved in conflicts by the major powers. After 1949, the first conflict that China faced during Korean War (1950-53) by the US.17

12 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p.66 13 Mohan Malik, China and India: Great Power Rivals (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2012), p.14-19 14 Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing (eds) China’s New Diplomacy Tactical or Fundamental Change? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.43. United States was China’s main adversary during 1950s and 1960s, and the two states involved in conflicts on the issues of Korean and Vietnam wars. During 1960s and 1970s, Soviet Union replaced The US and in 1969, Sino-Soviet vicious border clashes occurred. China signed an agreement with India in 1954 about the five principles of peaceful existence (See Reference No.63 of Chapter 2). 15 Ibid, p.43. 16 China developed constructive strategic partnership with US even after the bombing on Chinese embassy in former Yugoslavia by US in 1999. Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing (eds) China’s New Diplomacy Tactical or Fundamental Change? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.43. In March 2001, Chinese fighter jet intercepted by US EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft and forced to make an emergency lending in China. China claimed that it was the violation of China’s sovereign space. Despite showing severe reaction, China showed flexible response and returned the crewmen and the surveillance to the US. China expressed its condolence on 9/11 incidence and pronounced to support the US against war on terror. China ratified the UN Security Council resolution against terrorism which permitted the US to take military action against Afghanistan (Kai-Hi, ‘Dynamic Balancing: China’s Balancing Strategies towards the United States, 1949-2005’. Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.18, No.58 (January 2009), p.133). 17 After the success of Chinese Communist Party in 1949, Kim II Sung had the desire to unite Korea but Stalin convinced him with the consent of the US. Mao Zedong did not intend to wage war especially against US led United Nations troops, but due to ideological and security concerns permitted him to get involved (Huiyun Feng, p.36). Whereas, it was a conventional war but due to US involvement, there were the chances of the use of nuclear weapons (Michael H. Hunt, ‘Beijing and the Korean Crisis June 1950-June 1951’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.107, No.3 (1992), pp.453-478). Both US and China were prepared for a full-scale war but the developments during war did not permit the two parties to proceed for a complete victory and war ended in July 1953 while the skirmishes on divided Korea still exist. Huiyun Feng declared the Korean War as the wrong war started at the wrong time at a wrong place with a wrong enemy (Huiyun Feng, pp.36-37).

237

China has grave concerns about Taiwan. Since 1949, China proclaimed Taiwan as her ‘integral part’ and declared the reunification with Taiwan as a ‘sacred mission’ for the Chinese people.18 Chiang Kia-Shek professed Taiwan’s independence from China while China presumed it as ‘the cause of war.’19 US had the intentions to restrain the Sino-Soviet communism in Asia and planned to engage Taiwan as forward base. It decided to sign Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1954 which caused warfare between Taiwan and China for three decades.20 Taiwan has become the center stage for China for its survival and spiraling in future as Ross Munro stated:21

In the eyes of China, Taiwan is first and foremost a strategic target that must be subjugated if China is to realize its goal of becoming Asia’s dominant and unchallenged power.

Taiwan is still enduring the leading issue of potential conflict between the US-China relationships.22 China intensified its military capabilities nearby Taiwan Strait to deter both Taiwan’s independence move and US military entanglement in a cross-strait clash.23

18 ‘Vice Premier Highlights Sacred Mission for All Chinese’, People’s Daily (August 22, 2004). Downloaded from www.english.peopledaily.com.cn/200208/22/eng20020822-101876.shtml on January 17, 2015. 19 Huiyun Feng, p.42. The main proponent of China’s anxiety is the consequences due to Taiwan’s independence, because it would be critical for China to stop Tibet and Xinjiang from following Taiwan’s example. Likewise, according to PLA (People Liberation Army) National Defense University (NDU) text book, (Peng Guanfqian and Yao Youzhi,The Science of Military Strategy, English Edition (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005), pp.442-443. “The reunification of China mainland and Taiwan not only is something that concerns China’s national sovereignty and integrity…. but also will exert impact upon the survival and development of the Chinese nation and the rejuvenation of the great nation of China in this century…. If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, not only our maritime defense system would lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to the outside forces, but also a large water area and rich reserves of ocean resources will fall into the hands of others. What’s more, our line of foreign trade and transportation, which is vital to China’s opening up and economic development will be exposed to the surveillance threats to separatists and enemy forces, and China will be forever locked on the west side of the first chain of islands of the West Pacific…. the independence of Taiwan means the start of war…. Although this is undesirable for China, we have to face it. The Taiwan issue is the largest and the last obstacle which we must conquer in the Chinese people’s path to rejuvenation in the 21st century.” 20 Kerry Dumbaugh, ‘Taiwan’s Political Status: Historical Background and Its Implications for U.S. Policy’ downloaded from www.crs.gov/RS22388.pdf on January 18, 2015. The US provided assistance to Taiwan for sustaining sufficient defense capability against China. 21 Ross Munro, ‘Taiwan: What China Really Wants’, National Review (11 October 1999). 22 Pauline Kerr, p.19. 23 Ibid. China’s force postures and military capabilities are evaluated in Chapter 5.

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6.2 Sino-US Counter Containment Strategies

China’s main operational strategy is ‘Active Defense’ which specifies as ‘China does not war or fight wars of aggression’.24 Likewise, General Zhang Qinsheng states:25

Strategically we adhere to defense, self-defense and would win by striking only after the enemy has struck. China shall never fire the first shot. Such an approach is consistent with the ancient Chinese thought to use caution before getting into a war--- use force only for a just cause, put people first, and cherish life.

The US is unwilling to accept China’s argument of self-defense due to China’s enduring economic rise, military modernization and desire to acquire superpower status,26 and noted the PLA National Defense University (NDU) textbook, ‘the essence of [active defense] is to take the advantage and to destroy the adversary’.27 Likewise, according to another PLA, NDU textbook, ‘under high-tech disorders, for the distrustful condition, the plan for achieving mastery by striking only if the opponent has struck does not explain waiting the aggressor’s strike submissively.28

Although, China was involved in skirmishes with India, Soviet Union and Vietnam during 1960s and 1970s,29 Taiwan issue induced China to revise its ‘no enemy’ policy as Joseph Nye elaborated, ‘if you behave China as an adversary, China will also become an adversary’.30

24 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, p.12, hereafter called ‘DoD PLA Report 2007’. Also elaborated Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009), p.68. 25 Lt Gen. Zhang Qinsheng, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff, People’s Republic of China, stated during Sixth IISS Asian Security Summit Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 2, 2007, downloaded from www.iiss.org.uk/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/plenary-session-speechs-2007/second-plenary-session-it- gen-zhang-qinshen on February 7, 2015. 26 See References 1-4 of Introduction. Kai He, ‘Dynamic Balancing: China’s balancing strategies towards the United States, 1949-2005’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 18, No.58 (2009), p.118. 27 Cited Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009), p.69. 28Ibid. 29 For Sino-India’s conflicts, see references 80-81 of Chapter 2. In March 1969, Sino-Russian clashes occurred on the issue of Ussuri River along the border of Central Asia. Sino-Russian clash occurred for the second time in May 1978, when Soviet troops in a helicopter and in boats penetrated into Chinese territory. Expressed in ‘Sino-Soviet Border Clashes’, downloaded from www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/prc-soviet.htm on May 14, 2016. Likewise, Sino-Vietnam skirmishes started in the mid of 1970s because Vietnam signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Soviet Union, and both China and Vietnam involved in a conflict in February 1979. Expressed in, ‘Chinese Invasion of Vietnam February 1979’, downloaded from www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/wae/prc- vietnam.htm on May 14, 2016. 30 Joseph Nye was quoted in ‘Containing China’, The Economist (29 July 1995), p.11. Also quoted Kai He, p.136.

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Taiwan issue is a main source of contention on the way of Sino-US relations.31 China assumes the US as a single major power capable of intimidating China’s security.32 To contain the US threat perception, China followed realist theory of balance of power to sustain its security and sovereignty. Stephen Walt argues that states retain balance to contain the most threatening states rather than the utmost powerful states.33 Waltz describes two kinds of balancing, internal and external.34 To contain the security and survival, states have the options to adopt either internal balancing or external balancing according to the nature of threat perceptions and the polarity of the international system.35 Polarity is elaborated in three kinds, Unipolarity, Bipolarity and Multipolarity.36 Under Unipolarity, the rising states may implicate military threats either from hegemon or non-hegemon states. To contain the hegemons, the states have the only option of relying on their own capabilities.37 In Unipolarity, the rising powers are unable to challenge the hegemon militarily due to a huge disparity between them. To sustain the threats from non-hegemon states, the states seek hegemon’s assistance while hegemon’s support will be near to bandwagoning rather than restraining the threats.38 In Bipolarity, the states are inclined to external balancing. Kenneth Waltz elaborates conflicting argument and according to him, ‘under Bipolarity, the two superpowers encompass with each other according to their force potentials’.39 It elucidates that the superpowers have not persuaded the remaining states. The formation of two blocks during Cold War disproves Waltz’s argument and affirms the implication of both internal and external balancing. It however, proclaims external balancing as the prime strategy during Bipolarity. Under Bipolarity, the non-pole states have the option of external balancing in case of traditional security threats. Nonetheless, in the presence of military threats from both the

31 Pauline Kerr, p.19. 32 Mel Gurtov and Hwang Byong-Moo, China’s Security (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1998), p.70. Aslo quoted Huiyun Feng, p.83. 33 Kai He quoted Stephen Walt, p.116. 34 Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p.118. Also explained in Reference No.47 of Chapter 1. 35 Kai He, p.117. Threat perceptions can be classified into two types, traditional security threats which refer to the dangers of military conflicts, endangering to the autonomy and the survival of the states while non-traditional threats refer to the outcome of the well-being of the states i.e. social, economic, environmental and human issues. In Sino-US context, China is facing traditional security threats. 36 Kai He, p.118. 37 William Wolfforth, ‘The Stability of Unipolar World’, International Security, Vol.24, No.1 (1999), pp.9-22. 38 According to Kai He, ‘despite attaining hegemon’s backing, the states could become the bandwagon of the hegemons and insecure due to the disparity among them. See Kai He, p.117. In Post-Cold-War era, the Asian states are still striving to aggravate their military potentials even few of them are under US safeguards. 39 Kanneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1979), p.171

240 superpowers, the non-pole states have no option except to rely on their own capabilities. While, such scenario was not observed during Cold War but empirically and theoretically, it might occur.40 In Multipolarity, the states suffer elusive uncertainties due to the inappropriate power configuration of Multipolarity. The non-pole states have immaculate threat perceptions during Unipolarity and Bipolarity while they become confused to identify the adversaries in Multipolarity. This generates dilemma of options while seeking alliances during crisis. The balancing preferences for the states during Multipolarity are uncertain in pursuing either external or internal balancing.41 Thus, Polarity plays dominant role in illustrating the dynamics of balancing strategy for the rising states to sustain their security and survival.

In the Post-Cold War scenario, the international system is declared as Unipolar and the US is the sole hegemon.42 Under Unipolarity, the hegemon has the options of internal balancing (enhancing internal economic and military capabilities) and external balancing (forging alliances) but internal balancing is preferred to contain the rising powers and to meet the challenges against its hegemony.43 To uphold its hegemony, the US is sustaining both the strategies of internal and external balancing. The US is not only spending a heavy budget to uplift its military power but has boosted its military ties with the collaboration of NATO and by signing US-Japan bilateral alliance treaty.44 The US reconfirmed itself as the sole super power during Kosovo war in 1999. However, China’s economic growth and military modernization is a potential threat to the Unipolarity of the US. Although, Michael Mastandundo believed that the international scenario since 1990 has been Unipolar but they disagree with respect to its sustainability. Advocates of the multipolar model anticipate the imminent collapse of Unipolarity; others believe that unipolar moments have the potential to last longer, say for a total of twenty to thirty years.45 But USA is tempted to act

40 The non-aligned movement is a unique example of external balancing of the Third World countries during Cold War against the two superpowers concurrently. 41 Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, ‘Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Pattern in Multipolarity’, International Organization, Vol.44, No.2 (1990), pp.138-168 42 Kai He, pp.117-118. 43Ibid. External balancing is not mandatory but it may slowdown the pace of the rising powers against the hegemon. 44 The US military budget is approximately half of the world’s total and more than the combined military expenditures of 14 nations in 2002, stated Josee Joffe, ‘Bismarck’s Lessons for Bush’, The New York Times (29 May 2002). In 2000, the US had the GDP equivalent to the total GDP of Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and more than eight time the China’s, downloaded from www.worldbank.org/data/datatopic/GDP.pdf on February 4, 2015. 45 Michael Mastanduno, ‘A Realist View: Three Images of the Coming International Order’ in T.V. Paul and John A. Hall (eds) International Order and the Future of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.31

241 unilaterally and is vigilant on preceding the emergence of any future global competitor.46 USA has the apprehensions about China’s growing power47 and is exerting the pressure for assuring its Unipolarity in future. US President Obama visited Asia’s leading democracies - India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea during his 10-day Asian tour in late 2010. These democracies have significance in containing China’s rise.48 China pretends that the US is raising a ring of encirclement extending from Japan, South Korea and Mongolia in the north through the South China Sea to India in the South as steps toward the final carving up and destruction of China.49

To contain Unipolarity and encompass US hegemony in future, China has three options in polarity as:50

1. Under Unipolarity, as a non-polar state, China may prefer internal balancing even if it faces security threats from the hegemon. 2. Under Bipolarity, China will opt for external balancing to deter the hegemon. 3. Under Multipolarity, China will assume both internal and external balancing to dissuade security threats.

Despite admitting US as the sole superpower at the end of Cold War, Chinese leaders enthusiastically assumed that the US would soon downturn due to the rise of the other poles i.e. Germany, Japan and China.51 The Chinese leadership was reluctant to admit Unipolarity and anticipated that the world would become multipolar due to the ambiguities in the distribution of power. China would behave as a polar state as Deng Xiaoping stated:52

The situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union dominated all international affairs is changing. Nevertheless, in future when the world becomes three polar, four polar or five polar, the Soviet Union, no matter how weakened it may be and

46 Ibid, pp.32-33 47 Ibid, p.29 48 Brahma Chellancy, ‘The China-India-Pakistan Triangle: Scenarios for the 21st Century’,Ceri Strategy Papers, No,8 (September 17, 2010), p.4. available at www.n8-17092010.pdf downloaded on September 24,2012 49 Quoted John W. Garver and Fei-Ling Wang, ‘China’s Anti-Encirclement Struggle’ Asian Security, Vol.6, No.3 (2010), p.2. Available at www.1479985.2010.pdf downloaded on February 2, 2013 50 Kai He, pp. 121-122. 51 Wang Jisi, ‘The Role of United States as a Global and Pacific Power: A View from China’ The Pacific Review, Vol.10, No.1 (1997), pp.1-18 52 Deng Xioping, ‘The International Situation and Economic Problems’, The Selected Works of Deng Xioping, Vol.3 (online version) downloaded from www.english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol13/text/d1130.html on January 31, 2015.

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even if some of its republics withdraw from it, will still be one pole. In the so-called multipolar world, China will too be a pole. We should not be little our own importance: one way or another, China will be counted as pole.

Additionally, there are three main proponents of China’s persuasion about Multipolarity. First, Chinese leadership is very much enthusiastic about China’s rise as a super power which will be advantageous for world peace.53 Second, it is presumed that the US military and economic decline in early 1990s has reduced its hegemony.54 Third, it is anticipated that Multipolarity is comparatively more appealing than Unipolarity and Bipolarity for world peace.55

Primarily, China adopted third option of internal and external balancing under Multipolarity. China focused on improving its bilateral relations with all major powers particularly, with Russia by establishing close military and political cooperation to countervail the US hegemony in the 1990s.56 Sino-Russian cooperation remained limited due to their historical mistrust, strategic competition and mutual suspicion. US threat perceptions against them did not allow the two states to develop military alliance against the USSR.57 Additionally, China employed multiple diplomacy in the 1990s and joined ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), Shanghai Five or later Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and informal summit meeting (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea).58 China’s multiple diplomacy and its military cooperation with Russia were considered as its future military preparations against the US but failed to launch a real military alliance.59 Therefore, China’s plan for overemphasized Multipolarity did not occur in the reality of Unipolarity that compelled her to opt first option of internal balancing, and decided to focus on its military modernization, and ongoing China’s military modernization is evaluated in Chapter 5.

53 Yan Xuetong, ‘The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.10, No.26 (2001), pp.33-39 54 Wang Jisi, ‘The Role of United States as a Global and Pacific Power: A View from China’ The Pacific Review, Vol.10, No.1 (1997), p.4 55 Jiag Zemin, ‘President Jiang Zemin’s Keynote Speech at the 1994 Informal APEC Leadership Meeting’ downloaded from www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjz/gjzzhy/2604/2606/t15273.htm on February 4, 2015. 56 Kai He, p.127. 57 China had threat perceptions due to viable military intervention on Taiwan issue while Russia had the reservations about NATO’s expansion and radicalism in Chechnya. 58 ‘Shanghai Five’ was established in 1996 but Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and China for consolidating confidence on disarmament on the borders. ‘Shanghai Five’ was renamed as the ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization’ by the addition of Uzbekistan in 2001. 59 Kai He, p.128.

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6.3 Identifying India’s Containment Strategies towards China China’s economic and military rise has distressed India’s security architecture as India intends to become regional superpower,60 and undertakes China a main obstacle that generates Sino-Indian competition. To evaluate India’s behavior in containing and preventing China’s regional hegemony, power transition theory provides understanding in formulating the state’s response. Organski, AFK and Jacek Kugler envisaged the idea of power transition theory and according to them, ‘despite seeking the equilibrium of power, the preponderance of power among the rising states is a prerequisite for maintaining peace’.61 Additionally, Organski justified the theory by stating:62

The similarity among the economic, political and military capabilities between the rival states may escalate the prospects of conflicts, and peace is assured during the existence of disparity in national capabilities between the advantaged and disadvantaged states and the initiator would be from small group of disadvantaged rising states.

Power transition theory is narrated as a hierarchy in international politics comprising a single dominant state, middle powers, small powers and the remaining powers.63 In the existence of power parity between the challenger and the dominant power, the probability of conflict exists due to the impatience of the challenger to redress its issues and undertakes its ‘rightful’ role at the global level. The dominating state is reluctant to despair its preponderance.64 Thus, Organski’s power transition theory provides perception in understanding South Asian strategic environment where China might be declared as a dominant power and India as a challenger. To prevent and contain China’s hegemony, India adopted ‘Look East’ policy.65 The figure 5 reveals a triangular

60 Rizwana Abbasi, Pakistan and the Nuclear Taboo, Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control Regime (Bern: International Academic Publishers, 2012), p.271 61Organski, AFK and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), p.19 62Ibid. 63 Jan Hornat, ‘The Power triangle in the Indian Ocean: China, India and United States’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2014), downloaded from www.09557571.2014.pdf on February 25, 2015. Thus, it is illustrated that power transition theory falls in the category of hegemonic stability theory which proclaims that a single dominant power is prerequisite in the international system for implementing the rules among the rising states. 64 The period of parity is identified by calculating the power potential of the challenger. Parity exists when challenger attains 80% to 120% of the power against the aggressor, explained Ronald L. Tanmmen, ‘The Organski Legacy: A Fifty-Year Research Program’, International Interactions, Vol.34, No.4 (2008), p.326. 65 The Post-Cold War scenario brought economic, political and strategic repercussions for India. India not only lost its strategic partner against China due to collapse of the Soviet Union but had to withdraw its leading role among non-aligned world. Likewise, India had to bear a severe economic and political crisis since independence. Such developments motivated India to reassess its external behavior. In 1992, India announced its ‘Look East’ policy and

244 model in understanding an actor’s external behavior which provides in-depth understanding about India’s ‘Look East’ policy.

Figure 5

A Triangular Model of an Actor’s Behavior

Power Structure

Actor’s External Behavior

Economic interdependence Institutional identification

Source: Qin Yaqing, ‘International Factors and China’s External Behavior’ in Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing (eds), China’s “New” Diplomacy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.36

The state’s behavior is based upon three hypotheses according to figure 5. First, economic interdependence has the impact on state’s behavior in retaining peace, friendly and peaceful relations among the states are directly proportional to the higher degree of interdependence.66 Second, institutional identification has the impact on states in recognizing their participation for the efficacy of international institutions in promoting peace.67 Third, the global power structure has direct impact on state’s external behavior as Mearshimer argues, ‘every state must enhance its power potential until it has to achieve the status of hegemon during unipolarity’.68 The model undertakes that three international variables explained state’s behavior as the changes in variables

initially, it was focused on establishing relations with East Asian countries but soon succeeded to develop multilateral political nexuses with the region. 66Qin Yaqing, ‘International Factors and China’s External Behavior’ in Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing (eds), China’s “New” Diplomacy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.36 67Ibid. 68 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: WW Norton, 2001), p.3.

245 have the impression on actor’s inclination towards violence and peace i.e. institutional identification and economic interdependence may enhance or reduce state’s power structure which shapes its external response towards peace or conflict.

6.3.1 India’s‘Look East’ Policy and China’s Response The main proponent of India’s ‘Look East’ policy was to develop economic and military relations including a collection of partners for assuring its trade and military modernization to counter China’s exclusive power on Asia.69 Infer explain economic relations related to India’s ‘Look East’ policy, Keohane, Nye and Gilpin provide clarifications about economic interdependence. Keohane and Nye elaborate that the states involved in economic interdependence, hardly resort to arms race.70 Economic interdependence has direct impact on cost of war as high economic interdependence intensifies the cost of war and vice versa, which diminishes military as a foreign policy tool.71 If economic interdependence among the states attain a certain frequency and velocity, the prospect of war is less likely while the likelihoods of interstate cooperation rather than conflict is enhanced.72

By adopting the policy of economic interdependence, India succeeded in attaining amazing economic benefits during 1990’s by establishing trade relations with ASEAN countries with three times increase from $3.5 billion to $10 billion.73 India succeeded to implement Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN countries in 2011 in order to reduce tariffs among the less developed ASEAN states.74 India-ASEAN bilateral trade touched around $80 billion, while the

69 Jermy Moore, ‘The Pursuit of Asian Hegemony: A Comparison of Chinese and Indian Strategic Objectives and Containment Policies’ downloaded from www.epublications.bond.edu.au/gdc/23 on March 10, 2015. India decided to establish ministerial level ‘joint committees’ with Malaysia (1992) and Japan (1992), South Korea and Thailand (1993), Singapore (1994), Malaysia (1995) and Indonesia (1996). By developing bilateral relations with these countries, India ‘s attempt to make a link with Asia-Pacific for its economic growth, see Eiichi Katahara (ed), ‘India’s Foreign and Security Policy: Expanding Roles and Influence in the Region and Beyond’, East Asian Strategic Review (May 2013), p.33 70 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Toronto: Brown and Company, 1977), p.40. 71 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.11 72Ibid, p.187 73 Kripa Sridharan, India and ASEAN: The ASEAN Region in India’s ‘Look East’ Policy (New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2005), p.125. 74 Anindya Batabyal, ‘Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India’s ‘Look East’ Strategy’ China Report, Vol.42, No.2 (2006), p.191.

246 flow of two way investment reached $43 billion by 2012 and likely to touch $100 billion in 2015.75 The strategic and economic imperatives are the outcomes of India’s ‘Look East’ policy. To obtain closer economic relations with the region, India adopted sub-regional arrangements by joining Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). BIMSTEC provided the opportunity of close coordination among the countries around Bay of Bengal namely Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, India, Nepal and Bhutan. BIMSTEC has the significance for bridging a gap between South Asia and Southeast Asia but despite addressing political and security issues, India eventually intends to focus on trade relations.76 BIMSTEC members seek to sign a free trade pact among them till 2017.77 India has the desire to strengthen its ties with BIMSTEC members in order to undermine China’s interests in the region.

Likewise, India is instrumental in initiating another six countries forum Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) in 2000, to overwhelm China’s influence in Southeast Asia.78 Despite enforcing culture, tourism and education, the MGC states are more substantive about cooperative agreements related to trade and infrastructure.79 The most prominent agreement is the construction of 1,360 km Trilateral Highway running from northeast India to Thailand through Mayanmar.80 India signed a bilateral trade agreement with Japan in 2011 which compelled Japan in investing several mega projects i.e. Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, Chennai-Banglore Corridor, the Rail

75 G.V.C.Naidu, ‘India and East Asia: The Look East Policy’, Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs, vol.18, No.1 (Spring 2013), p.66. India’s export to ASEAN countries consist of gems and jewelry, oil meals cotton yarn, meat and meat preparations, machinery, rice, drugs, fabrics, pharmaceuticals and chemicals etc. India’s imports consist of plastic material, artificial resins, wood and wood products, natural rubber, electronic goods, edible oils, organic chemicals and fertilizers etc. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand are interested in India in sectors i.e. fuels, telecommunications, hotel and tourism services, chemicals. Industry, fertilizers, paper and pulp, textile and food processing. Singapore and Malaysia have become India’s active trading partners as they have more than 70% share in trade. See D.Gopal and Sailaja Gullapalli, ‘India’s Diplomacy of Regional Trading Groups: A Case of India-ASEAN Free Trede Area and Sub-Regional Agreements’ in Y. Yagama Reddy (ed), Emerging India in Asia-Pacific (New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2007), p.75. 76 Jermy Moore, ‘The Pursuit of Asian Hegemony: A Comparison of Chinese and Indian Strategic Objectives and Containment Policies’ downloaded from www.epublications.bond.edu.au/gdc/23 on March 10, 2015. 77 Ibid. 78 India. MGC comprises India, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam, and was named on two famous rivers Mekong and Ganga which are the symbol of civilizations. The main aim of MGC is to facilitate the mutual relations of the people inhabiting around the two river basins, down loaded from www.aseanindia.com/about/mgc on March 10, 2015. 79 Anindya Batabyal, p.188. 80 The cost of highway is around $700 million including complimentary projects for connecting the highway with railways and Dawei sea port of Myanmar. India is also interested in connecting trade routes between New Delhi and Hannai. See Anindya Batabyal, pp.4-5.

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Freight Corridor from Delhi to Kolkata via Mumbai, and the investment of billions of dollars in technology transfer.81

Both BIMSTEC and MGC provided the opportunity for India to flourish trade relations in the region as it raised from $1.7 billion in 2002 to $3.7 billion in 2006, but both the forums failed to establish a comprehensive foreign policy for the member states.82 Thus, economic interdependence provided financial advantages to India which provided the opportunity for allocating substantial finances for military modernization to encompass China at the regional level. On the contrary, India’s plan of encirclement and containment of China in the region became unproductive because despite signing trade pacts, ASEAN states remained non-compliant with any joint strategy to compete China at the regional level.

To evaluate actor’s external behavior in the context of institutional identification according to triangular model, it is imperative to elucidate international institutions which are based on the formal and informal rules on regimes for commanding and regulating the behavior of the states.83 According to John J. Mearsheimer, ‘a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other’.84 The states intend to cooperate by adopting the rules for assuring their offence-defense which endorses the world in a state of endless security competition, in the presence of probabilities of war among them.85 India preferred institutional identification due to China’s existing security concerns and focused on East Asian states and joined ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996.86 ARF is distinct in comparison to BIMSTEC and MGC in their address to security issues. India’s active involvement in ARF reverted its foreign policy as India contributed in the economic forums before joining ARF. India’s appearance in ARF inspired the remaining Southeast Asian countries i.e. Singapore in participating proactively into the forum to

81 G.V.C.Naidu, pp.65-66. 82 Julian Levesque, ‘Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Initiatives: India’s Underused Soft Power Tool’ downloaded from www.ipcs.org/article/india-the-world/mekong-ganga-cooperation-initiative-indias-underused on March 11, 2015. 83 Stephen Krasner (ed) International Regime (New York” Cornel University Press, 1983), p.1 84 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, Vol. 19, No.3 (Winter 1994/95), p.8. 85 Ibid, p.12. 86 Anindya Batabyal, p.191. ARF was formulated in 1994 with the membership of 27 multilateral states including all ASEAN states and the remaining major power i.e. USA, China and EU. Initially, India was given the status of dialogue partner in 1995 and became the member in 1996. Before joining ARF, India joined South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 and SAARC’s stagnant output is one of the enduring factors due to which India diverted its attention towards Southeast Asia, See Eiichi Katahara, p.41

248 counterbalance China in the region.87 The Southeast Asian security environment entered in an era of tenuous insecurity due to the cessation of conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam at the end of the Cold war.88 The smaller states in the region i.e. Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam anticipated insecurity due to China’s influence in the region and for offsetting China’s dominance, they emanated fervent support for India’s integration into multilateral forums.89

Despite concentrating on Southeast Asia, India joined Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) in 1995. Initially, IOR-ARC comprised seven on countries (India, South Africa, Australia, Mauritius, Kenya, Singapore and Oman) with the objective of establishing an Indian version of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).90 In 1997, seven countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Mozambique, Madagascar, Tanzania and Yemen), its total member became fourteen, and Bangladesh, Thailand, Iran and United Arab Emirates (UAE) also became members in 2000.91 Additionally, five more states (China, Egypt, Japan, United Kingdom and France) joined as a dialogue partner.92 India reinvigorated the organization in 2011, and identified six priorities including maritime security.93 With the addition of two more members (Comoros and Seychelles), its total members were twenty in 2012, while United States joined it as dialogue partner.94 Figure 6 elaborates India’s membership of multilateral institutions of South Asia and ASEAN.

87 Jermy Moore, ‘The Pursuit of Asian Hegemony: A Comparison of Chinese and Indian Strategic Objectives and Containment Policies’ downloaded from www.epublications.bond.edu.au/gdc/23 on March 10, 2015. 88 Anindya Batabyal, p.190. 89 Ibid, p.189. 90 Eiichi Katahara p.42. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 Declaration of IOR-ARC fourteenth conference chaired by India held in Delhi in November 2011. 94 Eiichi Katahara, p.43.

249

Figure 6

India’s Membership in Multilateral Institutions of South Asia and ASEAN

SAARC MGC Laos ASEAN

Afghanistan Cambodia Pakistan Vietnam Maldives BIMSET Myanmar Nepal Bhutan India Thailand

Sri Lanka Bangladesh Philippines

Brunei

Kenya Seychelles Iran Malaysia Tanzania Comoros UAE Singapore Mozambique Madagascar Oman Indonesia South Africa Mauritius Yemen IOR-ARC Australia

Source: Eiichi Katahara (ed), ‘India’s Foreign and Security Policy: Expanding Roles and Influence in the Region and Beyond’, East Asian Strategic Review (May 2013), p.43

Despite enforcing economic relations, India employed IOR-ARC forum to sustain regional preeminence and to obtain parity with Indian Navy and regional maritime forces especially China.95 India’s attempt to develop confidence building among the regional navies was named Milan (meeting of minds of coming together in Hindi). The biennially exercises of Milan series were held during 1995-99.96 In 2003, a large scale multilateral exercise was held including friendly visits of the fleets of all the participating states from Myanmar to Australia.97 In 2008, total twelve countries participated in exercise with the new induction of New Zealand, Brunei and Vietnam.98 In 2012, Maldives, Philippines, Seychelles and Mauritius also joined Milan In 2012, Maldives, Philippines, Seychelles and Mauritius also joined Milan exercise and their induction extended the

95 Shyam Saran, ‘India’s Maritime Strategy’ downloaded from www.irgamag.com/analysis/terms-of- engagement/item/7567-india’s-maritime-strategy on March 15, 2015. 96 Eiichi Katahara, p.35. First Milan exercise was held in 1995 on the strategic post of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Indian Ocean with the collaboration of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Singapore and Thailand, while second Milan was held in 1997 with the participation of nearly all navies based on Bay of Bengal. The Milan exercise 1999 was given a code name SIMBEX. 97 Eiichi Katahara, p.42 98 Ibid.

250 concerned area of Indian Navy from the countries along the Bay of Bengal to the western half of the Indian Ocean.99 India’s naval preparations in the Indian Ocean are a serious matter of concern for China as General Zhau Nauqi (Director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences) stated, ‘China is not willing to accept Indian Ocean as Indian Ocean’.100 China undertakes that a ‘Great Game’ will occur between India and China in the Indian Ocean in near future as Alfred Mahan predicted, ‘whoever regulates the Indian Ocean controls Asia’.101 So, China planned a long term implication for the Indian Ocean despite concentrating on Taiwan Strait and elsewhere in East Asia. China’s strategy towards Indian Ocean was named as the ‘String of Pearls’ by the Indian analysts while China denied it.102 Over the last decade, several Chinese companies were involved in the construction and the progression of various ports in the Indian Ocean. China proclaims that its assistance is simply for commercial purposes only and rejects its military presence.103 India is reluctant to accept China’s proclamation and assumes it as the China’s plan of encirclement to keep India off from the region.104 Sino-Indian distrust about Indian Ocean may provoke the regional strategic environment highly volatile as Mohan Malik describes, ‘the South Asian region has the potential

99 Ibid. 100 General Zhao Nauqi was quoted by David Brewster, ‘Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’: is there really a Sino-Indian Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean?’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, vol.10, No.2 (2014), p.143, downloaded from www.dx.doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2014.922350 on February 28, 2015. 101 Alfred Mohan was quoted by Sibapada Rath, ‘ Maritime Strategy of India and China: Influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan’, p.77, downloaded from www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/nwc14/article_7.pdf on March 14, 2015. Also quoted David Brewster, ‘Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’: is there really a Sino-Indian Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean?’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, vol.10, No.2 (2014), p.143, downloaded from www.dx.doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2014.922350 on February 28, 2015. 102 The term was first used by the US Secretary of Defense in a report 2005 entitled ‘Energy Future in Asia’ and was swiftly adopted by Indian strategists despite China’s denial relating in establishing any military bases in the Indian Ocean, see David Brewster, ‘Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’ is there really a Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean?’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.10, No.2 (2014), p.139 103 China assisted Myanmar in establishing several ports on the Bay of Bengal and facilitated Sri Lanka for promoting the ports at Hambantota and Colombo. Similarly, China is actively involved in the port of Gawadar in Pakistan, locating around 600 km east of the Strait of Hormuz. China declares that her assistance to abovementioned ports is for the trade purpose only. See David Brewster, ‘Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’ is there really a Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean?’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.10, No.2 (2014), pp.139-140 104 India showed reservations about China’s interest in ports around Indian Ocean and claimed that China would monitor its commercial traffic through Malacca Strait. India has severe objection on the port of Hambantota due to its location around the southern tips of India and Sri Lanka and declared it as a pearl in China’s string. Pak-China collaboration on Gawadar is another matter of grave concern for India because Gawadar would provide strategic depth to Pakistan during conflict and China’s presence in Gawadar could captivate its significant role in combating the conflict. See David Brewster, ‘Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’ is there really a Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean?’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.10, No.2 (2014), pp.139-140

251 to frequently rub and push against the Eurasian Tectonic plate, instigating resistance and instability in the entire Himalayan mountain range, India’s mutual correlation with China also remain instable, resistance and tension provoking’.105 India employed institutional identification for accomplishing control over Indian Ocean to compete China’s influence in the region. India’s external behavior in the context of institutional identification according to triangular model compelled China to initiate the strategy to uphold its regional dominance which resulted in maritime arms competition between the two states. To elucidate actor’s external behavior in the light of power structure within the framework of triangular model, power is a striking principle in the international system which shapes state’s behavior in an anarchical system.106 Likewise, Qin Yaqing highlighted the implication of power structure as, ‘the likelihood of violence occurs when the rising power is dissatisfied with the existing international arrangements and has the intention and potential to challenge the prevailing hegemon’.107 India assumed China’s military modernizations a hedge on its way of becoming regional hegemon and planned to modernize its power structure for comprehending China’s dominance in the region. India followed balance of power theory after declaring China as the number one potential threat especially prior to the nuclear tests of May 1998108, and adopted both the strategies of internal and external balancing. By employing internal balancing, India is not only constantly expanding its nuclear stockpiles109, but is also establishing its nuclear delivery vehicles.110 Similarly, India has developed a series of ‘nuclear capable strategic’ and conventional missile system.111 Additionally, India decided to develop a strategic partnership with the US by adopting external balancing. The US had the intentions in encouraging India for the containment of China’s growing influence in the South and Southeast Asian region. The US had already acknowledged India as a defacto

105 Mohan Malik, China and India: Great Power Rivals (Boulder: First Forum Press, 2011), p.9 106 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp.40, 50. 107 Qin Yaqing, pp.37-38 108 See Reference 81 of Chapter No.3 109 See References 159-162 of Chapter No. 5 110 See References 175-179 of Chapter No.5 111 See Table 5.2 of Chapter No. 5

252 nuclear weapon state prior to the nuclear tests of May 1998.112 The US assistance to India in balancing China was elaborated by Condoleezza Rice’s statement as:113 China’s desire in exercising balance of power is conditional in large part on US response to challenge…. it (the US) should encourage India in sustaining regional balance. There are chances of conflicts between India and Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir or on nuclear competition between them. But India has the potential to confront China in the region and it should be in America’s too. India is a growing power and has the tendency to become a great power.

Both India and the US developed a partnership with great speed during 2000s to initiate a mechanism to deal with rising China. The Bush administration lifted sanctions on military and arm sales enforced by Clinton administration after the nuclear tests of 1998.114 After 9/11, the two states embarked on cooperation on a variety of issues especially on security.115 In late 2001, the two states planned to cooperate on missile defense.116 By 2002, both the states coordinated in relegating China’s role in Central and South Asia and the Persian Gulf.117 US started arms sale to India and encouraged Israel in arms sale to India. It exerted pressure to stop arms sale to China.118 In 2004, Indo-US cooperation entered in an era of strategic partnership especially in the area of missile defense.119 India and the US signed an agreement on nuclear cooperation during the visit of President Bush to New Delhi in 2006. The agreement permitted India to augment its civilian nuclear capabilities that will provide leverage for building a credible nuclear deterrence against China.120 The US speculated that the agreement will augment the two states towards a formalized alliance and Leaon Panetta (former defense secretary) characterized India as a ‘linchpin’ for the US new defense policy of ‘rebalancing’ towards Asia-Pacific. Barack Obama identified the

112 Zhao Gancheng, ‘US-India Civillian Nuclear Deal and Its Impact on Regional Stability: A Chinese Perspective’, Regional Studies, Vol.27, No.2 (Spring 2009), p.5 113 Condoleezza Rice (US Secretary of State), ‘Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interests’, Foreign Affairs, (January/ February 2000). 114 John W Garver and Fei-Ling Wang, ‘China’s Anti-Encirclement Struggle’ Asian Security, Vol. 6, No.3 (2010), p.243 115 Don Berlin, ‘The Rise of India and the Indian Ocean’, Journal of Indian Ocean Region, Vol.7, No.1 (January 2011), p.8. 116 John W Garver and Fei-Ling Wang, p.243 117 Smith Ganguly, ‘India’s Foreign Policy Grows up’, World Policy Journal, Vol.20, No.4 (Winter 2003/2004), downloaded from www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03-4/ganguly.html on March 15, 2015. 118 SIPRI Arms Transfer Database; downloaded from www.armstrade.sipri.org on March 16, 2015. Israel was the second largest arms supplier to India during 2001-2007. 119 John W Garver and Fei-Ling Wang, p.243 120 Ibid.

253 agreement as ‘one of the defining association for the twenty first century’.121 Despite establishing strategic partnership with the US, India was pursuing another regional strategic partner and engrossed Japan due to its (Japan’s) concerns about China’s rise. India and Japan established their strategic partnership in 2006 and besides improving mutual economic and political ties; they focused on the issues about regional security due to China’s rise.122 Both the states (India and Japan) signed an agreement in 2007 to promulgate a road map for the strategic Global partnership according to new dimensions.123 Despite intensifying cooperation with India, Japan remained constantly involved in military modernization due to increased apprehension of conflict with China on the issues of Korea, Taiwan and the regional disputes in the East China Sea.124 India conducted missile interception tests in 2007 and in 2008 with the US collaboration and declared an integrated missile defense system by 2011.125 China showed severe reaction and condemned missile defense. It considered it as eroding its nuclear deterrence which make China more susceptible to US attack, threat or intervention.126 Both the US and India were involved in joint military exercises and they carried out fifty exercises during 2008-2010.127 India signed arms deals with the US worth $8.2 billion.128 The US-India strategic development over the past decade is an enormous achievement for both US and Indian diplomacy which was appreciated by President Barack Obama during his visit to India in 2010. He advised India to reinforce its ties with East Asia and explained:129 Like your neighbors in Southeast Asia, the US intends India not only to ‘Look East’ but to engage with East because it will rise the prosperity and security of all our nations.

121 Francine R. Frankel, ‘The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.64, No.2 (2011), p.14. 122 Sujit Dutt, ‘Managing and Engaging Rising China: India’s Evolving Posture’, Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.2 (Spring 2011), p.136. 123 John W Garver and Fei-Ling Wang, p.254. 124 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan (New York: Cornel University Press, 2008), pp.166-171. 125 Animesh Raul, ‘India: Missile Defense Dreams’, Intelli Briefs (27 March 2008), downloaded from www.intellibriefs.blg.com/search?q=india%3a+Missile+Defense+Dreams on March 20, 2015. 126 John W Garver and Fei-Ling Wang, p.243 127 Francine R. Frankel, ‘The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.64, No.2 (2011), p.2 128 Ibid. 129 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President to the joint session of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on November 8, 2010, downloaded from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/remarks-president-joint-session- indian-parliament-new-delhi-india on March 21, 2015.

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Similarly, the US admitted the repercussion of US-India coordination for comprising China as Pentagon commission report elaborated in 2012:130 There is a general unanimity within India and the US that their mutual interdependence generates a favorable strategic equilibrium as Chinese power increases…. developed Indian abilities…. especially for uplifting the Indian Navy’s capabilities in providing security in the Indian Ocean, which are in US interests.

Similarly, India and Japan not only conducted bilateral naval exercises but also have taken part in multilateral naval exercises including Singapore, Australia and the US during 2012-2014.131 Despite increasing power structure by adopting internal and external balancing, India hardly needs to compete with China as Pentagon has the desire to replace the Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean.132 To reinforcing its navy, India planned to make two groups of airstrike by 2015, three by 2022 and anticipates to acquire thirty-one new warships with six new submarines.133 Nevertheless, the existing naval balance according to available published sources indicates advantageous in China’s favor. China is planning six air craft carriers and its submarine fleet comprises sixty-two with six nuclear capable marines and three nuclear capable ballistic missile submarines including fifty-three electric-diesel submarines.134 China’s frigates and destroyers are thirty-five and many are equipped with anti-air warfare potential comparable to US made aegis combat system while India has total thirty-three and fifteen out of which are under preparation or trial stages.135 Similarly, the growing economies of China and India ensure financial resources for their defense expenditures. During 2009-2010, India was spending 2.3 percent of its GDP on defense and assessments of 2014-1015 indicate the decline in defense share of GDP below 2 percent.136 China’s defense share of its GDP is 2 to 3 percent and according to the estimates of expenditures by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) during 2008-2009, China was declared as second largest defense spending country with the expenditures of $ 100 billion while India

130 US Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), p.38 131 Geoff Hiscock, ‘India, Japan Snuggle Closes as China Power Grows’, downloaded from www.edition.cnn.com/2014/01/25/world/asia/india-japan-relations-hiscock on March 27, 2015. 132 Francine R. Frankel, p.7. 133 Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon, The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House, 2010), p.127. 134 Francine R. Frankel, p.7. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid, p.6.

255 placed ninth with the expenditures of $36 billion.137 The estimates indicate that China’s defense expenditures about three times as compared to India’s. While evaluating India’s ‘Look East’ policy within the framework of a triangular model of an actor’s behavior, it was observed that India became capable in allocating substantial economic resources for its military modernization through economic interdependence but remained incapable in shaping collective counter containment strategy against China. Institutional identification provided leverage to India in achieving control over Indian Ocean and China’s counter containment measures compelled the two states towards maritime arms race. India’s initiatives of reinforcing its power structure through external balancing by the US and Japan again diverted China’s attention towards military modernization. The strategies of the two states against each other are according to Organski’s power transition theory where China is striving to obtain the dominant power status and India is executing the role of a challenger. Sino-Indian rivalry and arms race generated strained strategic environment which fulfill the elements of security dilemma138 not only between the two states but for their neighboring state ‘Pakistan ‘as well. 6.4 The Emergence of a Triangular Construct The South Asian region is mainly comprised on India and Pakistan, but there is a debate among the analysts whether South Asian security dynamics are analyzed by eliminating the China factor. According to a study done by Henry Stimson Center, ‘China is assimilated as a part of regional equation and it would be critical for one or more parties in establishing treaty based trilateral restraint arrangement because neither equality nor formalized equality would be acceptable to them’.139 Conventional and nuclear asymmetry would intensify insecurity in the relationship of India-Pakistan and China. The existing Sino-Indian arms competition has created ‘China Threat’140

137 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2010). 138 See reference 74-77 of Chapter 1. 139 Michael Krepon, ‘Nuclear Risk Reduction: Is Cold War Experience Applicable to South Asia?’ in Idem and Chris Ganjane (eds) The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia, The Henry Stimson Center, Report No.38 (June 2001), p.10. 140 Feroz Hasan Khan, ‘Navigating the Crossroads’, The Monitor, Center for International Trade and Security, Vol.7, No.3 (Fall 2001), pp.10-14. John Graver, Protracted Contest: Sino-India Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), pp.336-337. Dang Jianjun, ‘How to Respond to India’s ‘China Threat’? China Org (3 June 2009), downloaded from www.china.org.cn/international/2009-06/03/content-17883584.htm on May 15, 2015.

256 for India. To overwhelm various threat perceptions including ‘China’s Threat’, India formulated security objectives in order to:141 1. Protect the country’s borders as defined by law and protected in the constitution. 2. Defending the properties and the lives of its citizens against war, terrorism, nuclear threats and militant actions. 3. Protecting the country from insecurity, religious and other forms of radicalism, originating from neighboring states. 4. Securing the country against the use of threats and the use of weapons of mass destruction. 5. Development of equipment, material, and development of technologies that have a bearing on India’s security, especially its defense preparation through indigenous research, production and development, inter-alia to overcome restrictions on the transfer of such items. 6. Upholding further collaboration and understanding the neighboring countries and employing mutually agreed confidence building measures. 7. Pursuing security and strategic dialogues with the major powers and key partners.

The second, fourth and fifth points are discussed in chapter 5 in detail, while sixth and seventh points are evaluated in chapter 7. According to first four points, India intends to protect its citizens and the country against the conventional attack and the use of nuclear weapons. According to fifth point, India aims to overcome all limitations related to equipment, technologies and transfer of material which are essential for India’s defense because India proclaims that all of its preparations about nuclear weapons are defensive in nature.142. Therefore, India’s security perception nonetheless revolve around the ‘twin threat’ from China and Pakistan.143 Despite the presence of Sino-Indian détente at one level, the ‘China threat’ rhetoric is a constant Indian stance.144 India has the aspirations to get the prestigious status in the international community and to emerge as a global power, and propagates China’s threat in order to gain arms support from the West.145 Similarly, Pakistan considers ‘China’s role key to South Asian peace’,146 and its (Pakistan’s)

141 Ministry of Defense, Indian Armed Forces, downloaded from www.mod.nic.in/aforces/body.htm on April 15, 2016. 142 Grilal Jain, ‘On the Defensive’, in V. Groved (ed) Introduction to International Relations and India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Deep and Deep, 1992), p.491. 143 John Graver, Protracted Contest: Sino-India Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), pp.336-337. 144 Ibid 145 Feroz Hasan Khan, pp.10-14. 146 Talat Hussain cited General Musharraf’s speech at a seminar at the Institute of strategic Studies, Islamabad, The News (16 May 2001).

257 reliance on China to counterbalance India has an impact on the larger Asian power balance.147 Thus, China factor in South Asian strategic architecture cannot be disregarded, and its emergence in the regional paradigm has a significant impact in intensifying nuclear and conventional arms competition in the region. The India-Pakistan and China is a triangle where 2.5 billion people are residing under many types of uncertainties.148 The legacy of mistrust and conflict, the unsettled border issues, and the plurality of discernment and options compelled the analysts to address the density of the regional situation. According to Anil Joseph Chandy:149

India-Pakistan and China, the three powers which determine the strategic profile of this region, constitute a security triangle. The triangle is described by the geo-strategic and geo-political intertwining of the security policies of all three powers. The nature of one country’s politics and policy preferences has an immediate impact on, and response from, the other two. The dynamics of the three-power relationship in South Asia has predominantly been one of enduring antagonism between India and Pakistan, ambivalent friendship and discords between India and China, and close cooperation and strong friendship between China and Pakistan.

6.4.1 South Asian Security Dilemma-The Strategic Triangle India-Pakistan and China In the strategic triangle (India-Pakistan and China), India confronts China and Pakistan which it has for many decades deemed to be its main national security threat. But they are quite unequal ones; as India is bigger and stronger than Pakistan, while China is bigger and stronger than India which creates asymmetry due to a race of military modernization between them.150 The rivalries among the three countries are based on conflicting territorial claims, conflicting world views, diplomatic ambitions and asymmetrical distribution of economic and military power.151 The asymmetric paradigm supports China over India and India over Pakistan and offers certainly a clue to the triangular configuration, particularly to its strategic dimension.

147 Zbigniew Brezezinski, ‘A Geostrategic for Asia’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.5 (September/October 1997), p.58. 148 Jean Luc Racine, ‘The Uncertain Triangle: India, China and Pakistan, The Regional and International Dimension,’ p.1 downloaded from www.racine.pdf on June 9, 2012 149 Anil Joseph Chandy, ’India, China and Pakistan’in Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Matto (eds) Peacock and the Dragon (New Delhi: Har-Anaad Publicatins.2000), p.298. Also quoted Monis Ahmar in Pakistn, ‘India China Triangle: The Changing Geo-Strategic Relations and Indo-Pak Conflicts’. Margalla Papers, (2004), p.38. 150 Lowel Dittmer (ed) South Asia’s National Security Dilemma; India, Pakistan and China (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), pp.204-205. 151 Ashok Kapur, India and South Asian Strategic Triangle (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp.5-6

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This asymmetry is the main factor which leads towards trilateral security dilemma and the complexity of the stable deterrence among the three states. The figure 7 reveals the strategic complexity and asymmetrical power structure of the three states.

Figure 7

Strategic Complexity of Triangle India-Pakistan and China

China

India Pakistan

Source: Arpit Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: China, India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p.81

Both China and Pakistan have rivalries against India which compel them to develop strategic relations to contain their common enemy and the theory of strategic triangle explains the main impediments of the strategic Triangle India-Pakistan and China.152

The strategic complexity exacerbated security dilemma between the three states but Pakistan’s security dilemma remained acute under the following assessments:

152 Theory of Strategic Triangle is explained in Chapter 1.

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 China has the aspirations to contain United States on global level and India follows China on regional level while Pakistan as a result matches its position with India.153 Sino-India counter containment strategies have harmful impact on Pakistan’s security dilemma.  Pakistan’s security dilemma is India specific because they have inherited their negative relations from past colonialism. In the prevailing South Asian strategic architecture, both India and Pakistan are not only augmenting their military muscle but enhancing their nuclear arsenals and the key approaches of realism (classical, defensive, offensive and the theory of balance of power) provide understanding about their military modernization.154  India’s military preparations are China and Pakistan specific which generate asymmetry between India and Pakistan which engender serious security repercussions for Pakistan due to smaller one among the three.  To sustain the credibility of their nuclear deterrence, the three states initiated CMD by adopting Waltz’s three prerequisites for CMD, but the ambiguities related to their CMD engendered grave security ramifications between them. It aggravated Pakistan’s security dilemma. Pakistan’s posture of CMD provided nuclear umbrella against India’s nuclear black mailing in the past but the existing Sino-Indian arms race has made Pakistan’s security dilemma distressing for its future. The legacy of mistrust and threat perceptions are the prime factors of Indo-Pak rivalry since their inception. Their strategic cultures155 also promoted hatred between them which generated diverse environment not only for the two states but for the strategic stability of the South Asian region also. Likewise, Pakistan suffers three handicaps related to its security. 1. Pakistan’s main railway and road network, one of its provincial capital which is its second largest populated city, lie very close to Pak-India border. Lack of strategic depth and no natural barriers generate security concerns for Pakistan. 2. India is approximately five times larger with respect to its population and area that provide superiority in manpower, industrialization, weapons and defense industry which ultimately generates threat perception for Pakistan’s security.

153 Rizwana Abbasi, p.271 154 For details see Chapter 1. 155 The strategic cultures of India and Pakistan are elaborated in Chapter 2.

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3. Third, due to its size and population, India’s insistence for obtaining the status of regional superpower exacerbates Pakistan’s security distresses. Additionally, any miscalculation may drift towards confrontation between India and Pakistan. Under such frenzy strategic environment when the state of security dilemma and likelihoods of conflict between India and Pakistan persist, it might disrupt the South Asian strategic stability. The main aspects of minimizing their security dilemmas and to sustain the regional strategic stability are addressed in the succeeding chapter. Conclusion The Post-Cold war scenario has induced numerous strategic implications at the global and the regional levels. The restructuring of power balance provided the opportunity to the US in proclaiming a sole superpower status. China’s emerging economic rise permits her to augment its military modernization which is a matter of concern for the US. China’s strategic culture is defensive in nature but the US military entanglement on Taiwan issue compelled her to adopt ‘Active Defense’ by following the options of external and internal balancing. China’s force posture indicates its potential to target US civilian and military installations but it is hardly feasible for China in encompassing US hegemony due to a huge disparity between the military buildups of the two states.

In the Southeast Asian region, both China and India have the aspirations of becoming regional superpowers and both the states desire to capture control over Indian Ocean. It is presumed that whoever regulates the Indian Ocean would rule Asia. Both the states adopted containment and counter containment strategies towards each other and power transition theory provided theoretical understanding related to their strategic behavior. India adopted ‘Look East’ policy by applying triangular model in shaping actor’s external behavior in the context of economic interdependence, institutional identification and power structure. The US and Japan also reinforced India in restraining China’s growing influence in the region. In response, China also planned counter containment strategies in matching India. Sino-Indian competition resulted in an arms race which generates the regional strategic environment critical.

Sino-Indian arms race has desperate implication on South Asian strategic environment. Where as in a regional triangle (China, India and Pakistan), India confronts China and Pakistan, which it has for many decades deemed to be its main security threats. But they are quite unequal one: as China

261 is bigger and stronger than India, while India is bigger and stronger than Pakistan which generate asymmetry due to Sino-Indian arms race. The existing Sino-Indian rivalries and arms race diverted Pakistan’s attention to reassess its strategy. This asymmetry leads to generate security dilemma between China, India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s security dilemma remains acute due to smallest among the three. Trilateral security dilemmas and traditional Indo-Pak rivalries have created vulnerability in the strategic environment of the South Asian region. This research seeks to explore the main options and solutions to maintain the regional strategic stability in the coming chapter.

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Chapter 7

Regional Security Dilemma, Strategic Stability-Instability: Options, Findings and Solutions

Introduction

The security dilemma between India-Pakistan and China has created serious security repercussions for the strategic stability of the South Asian region. Pakistan’s security dilemma remains acute due to smaller one among the three and has been facing tense relationship with India since its inception. The track record of Pak-India relations indicates that an acute lack of trust exists between them which is serious matter of concern for the regional strategic stability. Such frenzy strategic environment between two states remained hazardous after the nuclear tests of May 1998. However, both India and Pakistan showed balanced response and they evaded nuclear conflict in 1999, 2001- 2002 military standoff and in 2008 Mumbai incident, but the vulnerabilities related to nuclear escalations have made the South Asian strategic environment critical for its foreseeable future. The main focus of this study is to explore the areas due to which the South Asian strategic stability can be preserved.

The world is experiencing unipolar world order. After having obtained a unipolar status at the end of the Cold War, the role of the US remained prominent not only at the global but at the regional levels also. The US role for conflict management is therefore obvious between India and Pakistan. The undergoing study estimates US contributions in the ongoing South Asian strategic environment. Likewise, arms control measures have significant impact for establishing strategic stability, and arms control mechanism at the bilateral, trilateral, multilateral and regional institutional level are elaborated in the context of South Asian strategic environment. To sustain regional stability, informal measures are comparatively more practicable and this study evaluates various kinds of informal measures i.e. CBMs and advocates symbolic and incremental changes for their result oriented applications.

This study also evaluates China’s Grand strategy of peaceful and economic rise in the context of South Asian strategic environment. China’s recent initiative about a new Silk Road Project with a new name of ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) is an enormous development to uplift economic and

263 trade relations that would become the prime source of economic integration between India. Pakistan and China. This would have long-lasting impact on their economies which could lead towards regional strategic stability. The whole of this discussion is concluded by assessing appropriate options, and solutions which would be manageable for India, Pakistan and China.

7.1 Understanding South Asia’s Deterrence Stability

Deterrence stability is referred to the conditions or factors which provide assurances against the failure of nuclear crisis stability, political stability and arms race stability.1 The main objective of stability can be divided into two concepts as ‘arms-race stability’ and ‘crisis stability’.2 Arms-race stability is obtained by reducing the nuclear arms competition because arms-race enhances nuclear stockpiles and generates more threatening weapons that intensify the likelihoods of nuclear war. Arms-race stability might be achieved by signing the agreements for eradicating the nuclear arsenals on the basis of both qualitative and quantitate.3 On the contrary, to obtain crisis stability, the aspirations of each side to initiate a pre-emptive counterattack for pursuing military advantages might be obliterated.4 The outcomes of such pre-emptive attacks in the existence of military confrontation or in political crisis may divert each of them towards nuclear confrontation. Crisis stability can be endorsed by proceeding the initiatives for assuring the effectiveness and survivability of retaliatory strategic forces during pre-emptive attack. This perception can be reinforced by restraining the offensive strategic forces by threatening the existence of retaliatory forces and the defensive strategic forces to avert the retaliatory forces for obtaining the targets. However, the initiatives for crisis stability do not prevent the likelihood of military confrontation which may lead to nuclear confrontation but the chances of pre-emptive attack can be minimized by compelling both the parties not to use nuclear weapons during conflict since they are destructed.5 Leon Sigal elaborated that strategic stability existed due to a reliable strike potential of both the states even after suffering from nuclear attacks. He differentiated between crisis stability and arms race stability. No specific targets are revealed during first strike while in arm race stability, both the states expand their nuclear arsenals without realizing the fear of nuclear

1 Riffat Hussain, ‘Analyzing strategic stability in South Asia with pathways and prescriptions for avoiding nuclear war’, Contemporary South Asia, Vol.14, No.2 (June 2005), p.144. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.

264 strike from each other.6 It is critical to avert conflicts between nuclear rivals under deterrence stability as explained by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin:7

A balance of deterrence – is a condition in which the motivations to wage wars are contented by the disincentives of both the states and is stable when it is rationally protected against alarms, shocks and trepidations. Thus, the deterrence is stable when political events, external or internal to the states involved, accidents, misunderstandings, false alarms, crises technological change, advancements in intelligence of both the states are dubious to disrupt the motivations appropriately to make deterrence fail.

To analyze deterrence stability of the South Asian region, two camps of deterrence theorists (deterrence optimists and deterrence pessimists) led to a debate over whether South Asia’s nuclear environment will avert conflict or elevate escalation.8 Deterrence optimists maintain that stability exists between nuclear rivals because nuclear weapons have made war devastatingly costly and Kenneth N. Waltz elaborated four advantages of nuclear deterrence:9

First, deterrence strategies are based on caution all around which minimizes the chance of nuclear conflict. Second, in the presence of nuclear weapons, wars remained limited due to fear of retaliation with nuclear weapons of the adversary if its national interests are under threat. Third, conflict must be limited according to the expected gains of the adversary because those gains may reduce the uncertainties of war. Fourth, if deterrence fail, then the existence of nuclear weapons will compel the international community for mediation.

In response, deterrence pessimists express that conflicts are avoided not due to massive destructive potential of nuclear weapons but there are range of technical, organizational and political factors which generate stability among the states,10 and Sagan elaborated three main proponents for stable nuclear deterrence.11 Some precise distresses which could undermine stability between nuclear

6 L.V. Sigal, ‘No First Use and NATO’s Nuclear Posture’, in J.D. Steinburner and L.V. Sigal (eds), Alliance Security: NATO and the No First Use Question (Washington D.C: Brookings Institute, 1983), pp.106-133. 7 Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p.50. 8 M.Krepon (ed) Strategic Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Washington D.C: Stimson Centre, 2004), p.3. See S.D. Sagan, ‘Perils of Proliferation, Asian Survey, Vol.XLI, No.6 (November-December 2001), pp.1044-1063; and F.H.Khan, ‘The Independence-dependence Paradox: Stability dilemmas in South Asia’, Arms Control Today, Vol.33, No.8 (October 2003), pp.29-34. 9 K.N.Waltz, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better’, Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p.24. 10 Riffat Hussain, p.144. 11 See Ref 113 of Chapter 1.

265 states including irrational ladder or risk acceptance, incentives for small arsenals and command and control complications. By addressing these concerns, A. Katsourin and D. Goure argues:12

There are several divergent areas of concerns relating to nuclear-arms race between India and Pakistan. There are probabilities of nuclear accidents or unauthorized launching of nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons might be stolen. Political mindsets of both the sides could initiate nuclear escalation for coercive purposes or unplanned launch of conventional war that intensifies unpredictability. During conventional war, one side may plan to launch first strike. Poor early warning system and communication network could be misperceived that one party is planning a missile attack…. existing South Asian nuclear environment indicates serious security challenges without historical parallel.

Scott Sagan is very much concerned about the nuclear future of India and Pakistan and expressed that inadequate persons inside inadequate organizations will hardly produce reliable nuclear deterrence.13 Likewise, P.R.Chari stated that, the nuclearization of South Asia destabilizes a widely held a priori belief … that the states having nuclear weapons do not involve in conflicts with each other.14 Michael Krepon, a self-styled deterrence pessimist has pointed out a series of conditions that tend to destabilize the nuclear deterrence stability and escalation control between India and Pakistan, which are given as:15

Suspicion about nuclear equation between India and Pakistan…. India’s disposition due to its command and control…. Pakistan’s aggressive posture of pre-emption due to India’s hair trigger alert arsenals, asymmetry about conventional military balance between the two states, lack of initiatives for risk reduction…. the potential of both the states to pursue the brinkmanship over Kashmir… and coincidence of India’s war fighting doctrine mainly focused on limited conflicts with its nuclear doctrine about massive retaliation.

Despite the debate between optimists and pessimists, there are some other factors of nuclear instability between India and Pakistan as Durrani listed, ‘mistrust… territorial disputes… lack of

12 A. Katsourin and D. Goure, ‘Strategic Crossroads in South Asia: The Potential Role for Missile Defense’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 18, No.2 (1999), p.178. 13 S.D. Sagan, ‘For the Worse: till death do us part ‘, in S. D. Sagan and K.Waltz (eds) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003), pp.106-107 14 P.R. Chari, ‘Nuclear restraint, nuclear risk reduction and the security-insecurity paradox in South Asia’, in M. Krepon and C. Gragne (eds) The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia (Washington DC: Stimson Center, 2001), p.16 15 Michael Krepon, ‘The stability-instability paradox, misperceptions and escalation control in South Asia’, in M. Krepon and C. Gragne (eds) The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia (Washington DC: Stimson Center, 2001), p.72

266 coordination about deterrence and nuclear strategy… lack of established mechanism for crisis management, are the prime components due to which deterrence instability exists between India and Pakistan.16 Additionally, Michael Ryan Craig elaborated the sources of deterrence instability between India and Pakistan as:17

Vulnerabilities due to geographical proximity… the existence of ethno-religious cleavages which are the main proponents of the national identities of both the states… absence of established treaties for resolving territorial disputes… the absence of reliable nuclear safety measures of nuclear devices… the lack of reasonable early warning systems… the existing internal violence constraints… and lack of sophisticated command and control system which endorsed trustworthy civilian control during crises.

Table 7.1 elaborated five different aspects that can engender the circumstances proceeding towards deterrence failure between India and Pakistan, i.e. the intensification of conventional conflict towards nuclear exchange, the launching of pre-emptive attacks during crises due to misperceptions, disastrous outcomes due to the accidental use of nuclear weapons, the instigation of nuclear war by terrorist organizations and disarming surprise assaults. The prospects of these circumstances are materialized by restraining a number of aspects (as indicated in column second of table7.1), and is responded by a series of proactive measures (as indicated in column three of table 7.1) that both the states can implement for assuring the strategic stability.

Thus, despite becoming de-facto nuclear states, India and Pakistan are under stress for maintaining deterrence stability. For assuring survivability and strategic stability, both the states initiated the prerequisites of CMD,18 but their CMD postures did not prevent them from limited conflict (Kargil incidence) in 1999.19 Likewise, the South Asian strategic stability was again at stake during 2001- 2002 military standoff20 and in Mumbai terror attack in 200821, which indicates the vulnerability of regional strategic stability for its foreseeable future. The regional strategic stability might be preserved if both the states have the aspirations to work together to seek as an overarching goal.

16 M.A. Durani, Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons, CMC Occasional Paper (Albuquerque: Sandai National Laboratories, July 2004), p.31 17 M.R.Kraig, ‘The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia’, India Review, Vol.2, No.1 (January 2003), p.3 18 For details, see Chapter 5. 19 For details, see Chapter 4. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid.

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Table 7.1 Prospects and Prescriptions for Assuring South Asian Strategic Stability

Factors Affecting the Arrangements for Prospects of Nuclear War Probabilities of Nuclear Reducing the Likelihood of War Nuclear War Indo-Pak conventional conflict. Conflict management and Intensifying conventional Symmetry of conventional crisis prevention. conflict. forces. Maintaining balance of power. Susceptibility about emerging Reducing the susceptibility by nuclear force effective command and Miscalculations/misperceptions. control. Transparency, openness, predictability. Conflict management and Imminence of unavoidable war. crisis prevention. Pre-emption during crisis. Nuclear force balance. Maintaining nuclear force Miscalculation/misperception. balance. Reducing susceptibility of nuclear forces. Maintaining the ability to launch vulnerable force during crisis. Progression for preventing Unauthorized or accidental use. unauthorized or accidental use Advancement in and effective device communication systems. management. Conflict management and Permissive Action Link (PAL). crisis prevention. Communication systems. Credible safety and security Proactive terrorist groups. Access of terrorist groups to measures for nuclear weapons nuclear weapons and delivery including delivery systems. systems. Incentives for the reinforcement of peace. Maintaining nuclear force balance. Surprise attack Rise of Indo-Pak hostility. Reducing susceptibility of Nuclear force balance. nuclear forces. Miscalculation/misperception. Measures for arms control/No First Use. Assuring survivability and command and control by counterforce capabilities. Source: Riffat Hussain, ‘Analyzing strategic stability in South Asia with pathways and prescriptions for avoiding nuclear war’, Contemporary South Asia, Vol.14, No.2 (June 2005), p.150.

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7.1.1 South Asian Stability under Polarity

In international politics, polarity debate is directly related to the preservation of stability through an ideal international structure. George Liska argues in the context of institutional perspective as, ‘the stability may be preserved by ‘coveted values’ of prestige, welfare and security which are firmly delegated through institutions in a way for assuring the disposition of capabilities in the system’.22 Richard Rosencrance emphasizes more on the elite’s attitude, the status quo and the available resources in the system for offsetting the equilibrium.23 Rosencrance compares stability with the inputs of disturbance (domestic insecurity, ideologies, conflicting national interests and the disparities between nations in resources) over regulatory forces (United Nations and the initiatives of great powers for maintaining peace), as stability is inversely proportional to the disturbance inputs and vice versa.24 Karl W. Deutsch, David J. Singer and Kenneth Waltz agree in system structures (Bipolarity and Multipolarity) for maintaining stability but they disagree on the suitable systems in support of stability as first two support Multipolarity while Kenneth Waltz favors Bipolarity.25 In support of Bipolarity, Waltz elaborated four arguments:26

1. In Bipolarity, no periphery exists because the loss of one superpower would be the gain of the other. 2. Despite the non-existence of peripheries, the range of factors intensify the competition between the superpowers. 3. Despite the existence of pressure and crises, limited wars may be avoided. Waltz repeated Machiavellian maxim as the war is unavoidable but it can be postponed for attaining the advantage of others. 4. The attention of superpowers is focused on crises related to their major competitors that resulted in a strong emphasis on the environment for effective crises management.

The effective crises management is referred to the capability of the parties to deter each other from escalation, to threaten credible escalation and to generate a crises de-escalation outcomes

22 P.A Mc Carthy, Hirarchy and Flexibility in World Politics: Adaptation to Shifting Power Distribution in the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund (Aldershot: Ashygate, 1996), p.13. 23 Richard Rosencrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International System in Perspective (Boston: Brown and Little, 1957), pp.239-256 24 Ibid. 25 Karl W. Deuth and David J. Singer, ‘Multipolar System and International Stability’, World Politics, Vol.16, No.1 (April 1964), pp.390-406. Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Stability of Bipolar World’, Daedalus, Vol.3, (1964), pp.881-909 26 Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Stability of Bipolar World’, Daedalus, Vol.3, (1964), pp.881-909

269 according to their assertions.27 Deutsch and Singer present two arguments in support of Multipolarity in sustaining stability. The first argument is focused on ‘interaction opportunities’,28 which runs as, ‘there would be the higher probabilities of pair-wise interaction in the presence of the greater number of independent actors in the international system. When such interactions undermine deep lines of cleavage and display cross-cutting tendencies, it reflects negative outcome for sustaining stability’.29 The second argument is concerned with the distribution of consideration among the independent actors within the system.30 The argument is based upon the postulation that more emphasis on the attention of one actor is anticipated before escalating the conflict between them.31 During the existence of more actors in the system, relatively less attention to any one actor can provide the leverage to attract any other actor and the reduction of attention among the actors stemmed the escalation of fewer conflicts.32 Thus their arguments are based upon the proclamation that stability is casually attached with diversity, quantity and qualities of interaction opportunities.

The outcome of crisis management is evidently connected with the crisis behavior in the international system. Power under Bipolarity is speculated to be more advantageous for stability as compared to Multipolarity as elaborated by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff:33

In Bipolarity, the arrangements are evident and rearrangements do not disturb the propensity of balance of power. In Multipolarity, arrangements are uncertain and projected more attention and generated ambiguity which resulted in more risk taking, miscalculations and prone to changes in the concept of interests that create hazardous

27 The prerequisites of effective crises management are novel concepts of control, conduct and planning of military personnel. G.A. Craig and A.L. George pointed out seven proponents of crises management for the decision makers: coordinate military and diplomatic moves, sustain top level control of military operations, create disruption in pace military actions, avoid such military mobilization which gives the impression to the opponent that one is initiating to wage war at the massive level which compel him to consider preemption, restrain military moves to the persons which are delegated to resolve to one’s limited objectives, select diplomatic-military options to convey the signal for negotiations despite seeking military solutions, give the opponent a way out during crises that is compatible with his fundamental objectives. See G.A. Craig and A. L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp.206-207 28 Karl W. Deuth and David J. Singer, ‘Multipolar System and International Stability’, World Politics, Vol.16, No.1 (April 1964), p.394 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. PP.392-400 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Longman, 2001), p.588

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strategic environment. In Multipolarity, the negotiating process is more critical among allies and in adversaries during crisis.

Benjamin Miller elaborated that the configuration of international system is casually connected with the prospects of ‘inadvertent wars’ due to the impact of polarity and military advancement.34 He evaluated that nuclear arsenals minimized the likelihoods of planned conflicts and intended wars in Bipolarity.35 He emphasized the spirit of Bipolarity as:36

Bipolarity enforced stability by boosting the alignments between caution and resolve, minimizing shared goods problems, isolating the decision makers from unnecessary domestic stress, supporting control over overwhelming allies and restraining the threatening impacts of misperceptions and miscalculations during crisis. Thus, the sustainability of Bipolarity was the main factor in enabling the aspiration for avoiding war by applying tacit rules for controlling the use of force during crises.

On the contrary, during Unipolarity, only one great power possesses preeminence of power without facing any competition.37 The US is declared as the sole super power after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1990s and is sustaining the status of more powerful state at the global level through its military modernization.38 The US military expenditures are near to half of the global military expenses and it possesses matchless power-projection potential at the global level,39 and the post- Cold-War international system is declared as unipolar. The analysts are suspicious about the durability of Unipolarity as Robert Kagan argues that the US sole supremacy is doubtful and proceeding towards decline.40 Christopher Layne expressed that the US is in serious downturn.41 Kenneth Waltz elaborated that it is irrational to undertake that a state will maintain its preponderance of power for a very long time.42 Robert Gilpin advocated that no state has the potential to take over the absolute control of international system.43 Likewise Michael Mastanduno

34 Banjamin Miller, Why Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003), p.60 35 Ibid, p.61 36 Ibid, pp.66-67 37 Christopher Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p.5 38 Nuno P. Monterio, ‘Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful’, International Security, Vol.36, No.3 (Winter 2011/12), p.9 39 Ibid. 40 Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Alferd A. Kanof, 2008), p.86. 41 Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion: The Coming End of the United States, Unipolar Moment’, International Security, Vol.31, No.2 (Fall 2006), pp.7-41 42 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), pp.191-192. 43 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.28.

271 is optimist about the deterioration of Unipolarity and even predicted that it will no longer proceed after thirty years.44

In contrast, for more than two decades, no state has been in a position to challenge the US in the context of any element of power. The US is the single state in the existing international scenario which has attained all the components of power: technology, military, economic and geography.45 Another prevailing argument related to the durability of Unipolarity is elaborated by applying power transition theory as the chances of military conflicts among Unipolar and the remaining major powers are less likely as compared to Bipolarity and Multipolarity.46 The US policy makers are very much confident about the stability of Unipolarity as Semuel Berger (former US National Security Advisor) argued:47

The US is blamed due to commanding the others as in zero-sum term (the gain of any other state would be the loss of the US). But it is absolutely misinterpreted. It is not due to becoming the first Unipolar in history, but due to the US initiatives for uprising prosperity, collective security and intensifying freedom for the rising states for over 50 years.

The ways due to which Unipolarity might decline are, regional integration, differential growth power or by the counterbalancing of other states, but the existing international structure is less likely to follow even as a single way in near future.48

Thus, the world is currently existing under Unipolarity and the US is executing as the sole superpower under Unipolarity. Unipole tends to preserve the status quo and the other states are

44 See Reference 45 of Chapter 6. 45 Jerry W. Legro and Andrew Moravisck, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’ International Security, Vol.24, No.2 (Fall 1999), pp.38-40 46 A.F.K. Organski advocated the power transition theory in sustaining stability in the international order as: ‘A powerful state tends to establish a set pattern of relations with other states to sustain stability. Under such condition, all the states are very much aware about the habits and pattern of the others which would be acknowledged by all the actors. Under such pattern, certain states are recognized as leaders, certain are assumed to assist others, and even rules of war and diplomacy are also elaborated’. See A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1958), pp.315-316. Thus, the chances of conflicts are minimized when the states are aware about the outcomes of wars under the sureties of powerful state. G.John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, State Behavior and Systemic Consequences’, World Politics, Vol.61, No.1 (January 2009), p.22 47 Samuel R. Berger, ‘Addressing Council on Foreign Relations’, American Power: Hegemony, Isolationism or Engagement, 21 October 1999, downloaded from www.cfr.org/publication/3600/american_power/html on June 27, 2015. 48 William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Stability of Unipolar World’, International Security, Vol.24, No.1 (Summer 1999), p.28

272 projected to uphold the existing state of affairs due to fear against their security.49 If a state or a number of states are determined to transform or disturb the status quo, by territorial conquests, increase in relative power or by altering international alignments, the unipole hardly admits such developments and emphasizes for its reversal.50 In August 1990, Iraqi president Saddam Hussain provoked war and invaded Kuwait by anticipating that the US would not react against such adjustment in status quo. The US condemned and accumulated an international coalition for the restoration of Kuwait and engaged the UN to enforce Iraq for the restoration of Kuwait and initiated a military action and evacuated Kuwait in 1991.51 Likewise, Serbian leaders misjudged US endurance and started violence in Kosovo in 1999, and the US organized a conference with the collaboration of international community and signed Rambouillet agreement.52 After the Serbian’s denial of agreement, NATO planned a bombing campaign against Serbia and forced the Serbian authorities to compromise at the end of war.53

In the South Asian strategic environment, the US played a considerable role in defusing the tension between India and Pakistan during Kargil crisis in 1999,54 in 2001-2002 military standoff55 and in Mumbai terror attacks 2008.56 Thus, it can be predicted that under Unipolarity, the US role during conflict management for obtaining strategic stability in the South Asian region would be prominent until the emergence of any competitor for the containment of the unipolar status of the United States in future.

7.2 Initiatives for Arms Control

According to Yitzbak Rahin (former Israeli Prime Minister), ‘you cannot make amity with friends, you can only make amity with enemies’. So, the provocation of formal restraint measures between India, Pakistan and China would have a significant impact for normalizing their adversarial

49 James D. Fearon, ‘Rationalist Explanation of War’, International Organization, Vol.49, No.3 (Summer 1991), pp.379-414. 50 Nuno P. Monterio, ‘Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful’, International Security, Vol.36, No.3 (Winter 2011/12), p.27. 51 Ibid. 52 According to Rambouillet agreement, it was demanded from Serbian authorities to restore Kosovo’s autonomy, downloaded from www.peacemaker.un.otg/kosovo-rambouillet-agreement99 on June 28, 2015. 53 Barry R. Posan, ‘The war for Kosovo’s Political-Military Strategy’, International Security, Vol.24, No.4 (Spring 2000), p.40. 54 See References 79-89 of Chapter No.4. 55 See References 142-144 of Chapter No.4. 56 See References 190-194 of Chapter No.4.

273 relations. In the existing trilateral strategic competition, the three states are busy not only in augmenting their military capabilities but enhancing their nuclear weapons also, and these are vulnerable for the South Asian strategic stability. For avoiding conflicts and promoting strategic stability in the region, cooperative measures, i.e. dialogues, compromise, deal-making, have the potential for manipulating adversarial relations. Likewise, threat reduction, confidence building and arms control measures have the capability in motivating the three states from national security to mutual security. The concept of arms control is elaborated as, ‘the multiple restrained measures in exercising the armament policy which creates distinction between structural and operational arms control in the context of their deployment or use’.57 The former is very much relevant for the South Asian strategic environment especially for regulating the quality and quantity of arms at the regional level. Despite the efforts for eradicating nuclear proliferation, the initiatives for controlling all the weapons of mass destruction are in progress separately. After the nuclear tests of May 1998, the vulnerability of the South Asian strategic architecture emphasized to address arms control measures for preserving the regional strategic stability which is elaborated under the mechanism of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral arms control measures. Likewise, the measures at the regional institutional level (SCO) are also analyzed for sustaining South Asian strategic stability.

7.2.1 Bilateral Mechanism: Indo-Pak Arms Control Measures

During the debate of arms control about South Asia or any other troubled region, one must be clear about the procedure of arms control by avoiding any ambiguity. Unilateral or inadvertent efforts will be anticipated as to dominate one on the other especially during the dialogue process between India and Pakistan due to the existence of distrust between them. So, it is prerequisite to pay serious attention while discussing arms control measures of the South Asian region. Four occurrences come to mind while analyzing arms control measures between India and Pakistan. One is ‘moratorium of further nuclear testing’.58 Despite declaring the policy for not conducting further nuclear tests, both the states are suspicious about each other due to the absence of legal binding.

57 Shaun Gregory and Maria Sultan, ‘Towards strategic stability in South Asia’. Contemporary South Asia, Vol.14, No.2 (June 2005), p.138 58 Jonathan E. Medala, ‘Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty: Background, Current Developments’, p.11, downloaded from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL33548.pdf on July 11, 2015.

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Both may withdraw any time.59 Second is the ambiguous status of both the states for removing hair-trigger alerts,60 because they did not specify the main proposition due to which they planned their nuclear forces away from combat-ready status and in the absence of any legitimate obligation, they again might be instigated to hair-trigger position in future.61 Third, the dubious postures of both the states related to their declared policies of CMD. Despite declaring CMD, both the states are not clear for how many nuclear warheads sufficient for CMD? Both are busy in not only enhancing their nuclear stockpiles but are modernizing their nuclear programs along with enforcing their delivery mechanism also. They have no specific constraints for arms control compliance or the system for verification including feeble sanctions and inadequate political compulsions from the world community.62 However, both the states have the opportunity under the aforementioned arms control regime by instigating the dialogue process that can discharge hollow postures against each other.

Fourth arms control is about the unilateral nuclear ‘NFU’ pledges of India and Pakistan.63 India also urged that its NFU stance be reciprocal by Pakistan, while Pakistan’s response is objected by its intentions to deter India’s aggressive conventional military superiority.64 Pakistan’s suspicion about India’s NFU stance may generate nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan which would disrupt the process of arms control in the South Asian region. South Asian strategic environment comprises on profound variations as compared to superpowers during Cold War especially in the context of arms control initiatives. Both the US and the Soviet Union had scarce information about each other’s military intentions and proclivities in the post war years and they spent much of their resources in collecting the information about each other’s military preparations.65 Dialogues on arms control between the states have significant impact in establishing mutual understanding in eliminating nuclear conflicts and such information has the significance in determining opponent’s aims and policies for forecasting the assumptions during worst-case scenarios. This arms control

59 Rodney W. Jones, ‘Prospects for arms control and strategic stability in South Asia’, Contemporary South Asia, Vol.14, No.2 (June 2005), p.199 60 Both India and Pakistan decided to redeploy their nuclear forces from combat-ready status to peacetime position as mentioned by Arvind Kumar, ‘Missile Defense and Strategic Modernization in Southern Asia’, p.29, downloaded from www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdf/SABNDKumar.pdf on July 12, 2015. 61 Rodney W. Jones, p.199 62 Ibid. 63 For details, see Chapter 5. 64 Rodney W. Jones, ‘Prospects for arms control and strategic stability in South Asia’, p.200. 65 Ibid.

275 diplomacy is not feasible in the South Asian strategic environment, where both India and Pakistan presume that they know each other extremely well. Both India and Pakistan assume that they have the capability to predict each other’s aspirations and the strategies as they may adopt during nuclear crises.66 Despite the ideological differences, i.e. Hinduism versus two nation theory, there are some common characteristics which instigate in understanding about the military strategies of India and Pakistan, i.e. aggressive elite mindsets, Jingoistic political culture and religious extremism, political unpredictability, internal turbulence and terrorism.67 Additionally, their poor culture of conflict management and limited reaction time during conflict have created a diverse strategic environment which was not observed during Cold War. The incitements of arms control during Cold War might not be politically convincing for the existing South Asia’s strategic environment.

7.2.2 Sino-Indian Arms Control Measures

In the pursuit of nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control, China plans to follow the new security concept including mutual benefit, equality and coordination, mutual trust and commit itself in generating advantageous regional and global security environment, for maintaining global peace.68 According to Li Huaqui (former Chinese Foreign Minister), ‘the change is from idealism to realism, from an absolute manner of Chinese way to a steady application of global practices and from criticism to joint cooperation’.69 During proceedings towards non-proliferation, disarmament and global arms control measures, China’s policy making is based upon the judgement, whether it endorses the security and mutual trust among the states, it provides safeguards to its sovereignty and security and to promote global strategic stability.70 The prohibition and destruction of WMD

66 Ibid, p.201. 67 See References 20-22 of Chapter 2. 68 ‘China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation’ issued by China’s State Council on September 1, 2005, downloaded from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/armscontrol.htm on May 15, 2016. 69 Liu Huaqui, ‘Evolution and Analysis of China’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy’, Conmilit, Beijing (12 November 1995). Liu Huaqui was also quoted by Hua Han, ‘Sino-Indian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control’, in Eric Arnett (ed) Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban, SIPRI Research Report No. 14 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.49. 70 China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation’ issued by China’s State Council on September 1, 2005, downloaded from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/armscontrol.htm on May 15, 2016.

276 is a shared determination of the world community and China also actively involved in arms control initiatives at multiple forums.71

As far as India’s arms control initiatives are concerned, it offered a test ban treaty and cut-off treaty on the production of nuclear weapons and signed Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT).72 In post-Cold War scenario, India realigned to comprehend the new strategic architecture and decided to sustain its nuclear policy without joining international non-proliferation regime.73 On the contrary, China’s stance in support of CTBT74 engendered suspicions between China and India that could not permit them to sign arms control agreements up to the present era. Besides Sino-India disagreements on arms control, China aspires to avert nuclear proliferation in its neighboring states, to eliminate the threat of nuclear intimidation, and its unconditional commitment about not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons75 provides safeguards to its neighboring states in general and to India in particular.

7.2.3 Trilateral Arms Control Measures (India, Pakistan and China)

The South Asian strategic environment remained skeptical due to the absence of provoking arms control regime in the region.76 The South Asian region became unable to adopt the strategy for minimizing the existing arms competition in by employing the strategy of the superpowers (the

71 On multiple forums, China actively participated in strengthening arms control measures right from its first nuclear test in 1964. China is committed unconditionally, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear- weapon-free-zones or non-nuclear-weapons states. In 1995, China offered positive security assurances to non- nuclear weapons states in 1996, China firmly supported CTBT treaty and expressed the desires that all the states not only sign CTBT but to ratify it also. In 2000, China reaffirmed security assurances according to UN Security Council resolution 984. Likewise, China contributed to the Conference of Disarmament (CD) a working paper, ‘China’s Position on and Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issues of Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference of Disarmament’, and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space must be one of the top priority of CDs agenda. In 2002, China along with Belarus, Syria, Indonesia, Zimbabwe and Russia submitted the proposals for the prevention of arms race in outer space. During 2004-2005, China and Russia jointly started initiatives for preventing of an arms race in outer space. Expanded China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non- Proliferation’ issued by China’s State Council on September 1, 2005, downloaded from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/armscontrol.htm on May 15, 2016. 72 Hua Han, ‘Sino-Indian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control’, in Eric Arnett (ed) Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban, SIPRI Research Report No. 14 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.50. 73 Ibid. 74 See Reference 71. 75 See Reference 44 of Chapter 5. 76 Zafar Khan, ‘Prospects for an Arms Control Regime in South Asia’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.39, No.1 (Spring 2016), p. 177.

277 former Soviet Union and the United States) for restraining arms competition during Cold War.77 The trilateral arms control measures might become viable by China’s proactive participation but China’s involvement is critical due to the existing South Asian strategic architecture.78 The three states are suspicious due to their enduring arms race and military preparations against one another which engenders lack of trust among them, and ‘extra regional links’ exacerbate their distrust. Bhumitra Chakma elaborates, ‘Pakistan’s strategic perceptions are Indo-centric and India’s security concerns are China-specific, and while China’s are the US’ specific.79 The states are interlinked together in terms of arms proliferation and developments. The strained and frenzy relations between China and the US exert stress on India and Pakistan, which exacerbate nuclear arms race between them. So, it can be assumed in the context of ‘extra-regional link’, that despite the other factors, the key motive of India’s nuclear program is China. Likewise, the China’s nuclear program is launched due to the fear of US nuclear stockpiles,80 while nuclear program of Pakistan is India specific. Additionally, India is affected due to Pakistan-China relationship in the development of conventional forces buildup and Pakistan is sensitive about US-India nuclear deal.81 Under such perilous environment, China may initiate arms control measures by employing multiple strategies. For instance, despite adopting military balancing strategies, China announced the formation of new economic and political order of stability for promoting justice and peace according to its Grand strategy, which was based on Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.82 Likewise, dissimilar to the super powers during Cold War, China is not involved in an acute regional arms race. China is mainly focused on its internal, regional and global economic development and planning to settle the territorial issues with Russia and India.83 While assessing arms control initiatives, negotiations on the issue of TNW could become an important aspect for regional strategic stability. It might be practicable between India and China because both the states are reluctant in deploying TNW. After the nuclear tests of 1998, India emphasized more on CMD

77 Robert Ayson, ‘Arms Control in Asia: Yesterday’s Concept for Today’s Region’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.67, No.1 (2013), pp.1-17. 78 Ibid. 79 Bhumitra Chakma, Pakistan Nuclear Weapons (London: Routledge Publications, 2009), p.378. 80 Ibid, pp.378-379. 81 Rodney W. Jones, ‘Prospects for arms control and strategic stability in South Asia’, pp.201-202. 82 For details about Five Principles (Punjsheel), please see reference 65 of Chapter 2. 83 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Stanford University Press, 2014).

278 rather than relying on nuclear war-fighting capabilities.84 It is not interested in TNW.85 Likewise, China is not committed to deploy TNW.86 So the provision of agreement for restraining TNW between China and India occurs. It might exclude their deployment in Tibet and in southeast provinces of China.

On the contrary, it is critical for India-Pakistan nexus while negotiating on TNW. India announced CSD in 2004 to restrain conflicts with Pakistan in future.87 In India’s CSD response, Pakistan introduced TNW renamed as Hataf-IX (Nasar) missile,88 which generated the South Asian environment more hazardous for its strategic stability.89 To avoid the conflicting environment and to maintain strategic stability, both the states must be compelled to adopt rational behavior as advised by Redeny jones.90 Likewise, there would be severe challenges for India and Pakistan to maintain regional strategic stability during conventional conflict. India could deploy Prithvi I, close to the border along Pakistan during conventional conflict. Prithvi I is transported with the support of numerous vehicles that can be easily traced and targeted by Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan’s Hataf II might be deployed, traced and targeted at the similar pattern as Prithvi I. Both Prithvi I, and Hataf II are nuclear equipped and in a condition of attack, the likelihoods of nuclear exchange might increase between two nuclear rivals. Feroz Hassan Khan presented submissions for minimizing the destabilizing aspects of short-range missiles of India and Pakistan as:91

First, both India and Pakistan apply restrictions on the flight tests of short-range missiles having the range of 150 km or less. Second, the common border of both the states must be declared as non-deployment area for short-range missiles. Third, both the states would mutually decide to eliminate short-range missiles, because such missiles are perceived for both conventional and nuclear conflicts which engender vulnerability

84 Rodney W. Jones, Minimum Nuclear Postures in South Asia: An Overview. Final Report for the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, (October 2001), p.28, downloaded from www.policyarchitects.org on July 15, 2015. 85 Micheal Krepon, Zaid Haider and Charles Thornton, ‘Are Techtial Nuclear Weapons Needed in South Asia?’ in Michael Krepon. Jones and Haider (eds), Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia (Washington D.C: The Henry Stimson Center, 2004), PP.119-147. 86 Rodney W. Jones, ‘Prospects for arms control and strategic stability in South Asia’, p.202. 87 See References 270-274 of Chapter 5. 88 See Reference 258 of Chapter 5. 89 See Reference 283 of Chapter 5. 90 See Reference 288 of Chapter 5. 91 F.H. Khan, ‘Nuclear signaling, missiles, and escalation control in South Asia’, in Michael Krepon. Jones and Haider (eds), Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia, p.99.

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about nuclear threshold. Fourth, both the states plan to delimit their short-range missiles only for conventional conflicts.

Arms control agreements related to deploying or prohibiting the short-range missiles or keep them away from nuclear warheads between India and Pakistan, could be the outstanding participation in the nuclear stability.

Both India and Pakistan might be convinced to constitute a proportionate ceiling of their nuclear stockpiles for sustaining their existing postures of CMD. But it would be critical for India in preserving the proportionality with Pakistan because it may allocate some additional weapons as deterrent against China. Additionally, lack of trust and political disagreements in resolving the security-oriented issues have engendered nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. One provision for arms control between both the states, which provide assistance in defining parameters due to which both the states will decide whether or not to sign the NPT, would be convenient for resolving the contending issues between them.92 Nonetheless, few essential commonalities generate room for regional arms control mechanism, but these are inadequate and further arms control measures are obligatory for sustaining regional strategic stability and for evading the likelihood of Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak conflict in future.

The trilateral arms control mechanism could be developed by the following essential components:

 The three states could establish their unilateral moratorium related to their nuclear testing according to the principles of CTBT, without joining this in the beginning. However, after the complete enforcement of CTBT and the establishment of arms control mechanism, the three states could mutually plan to join CTBT without disturbing their deterrence force structure.  They could plan a trilateral mechanism of a ‘hot line’ at the foreign minister/foreign secretary or Director General Military Operations (DGMOs) level for preventing escalation.

92 NPT is not in favor of further nuclear tests and promotes negotiations on minimizing the proliferation if the elimination of nuclear weapons is not practicable. George Bunn, ‘The World’s Non-Proliferation Regime in Time’, IAEA Bulletin, Vol.46, No.2 (March 2005), p.8, downloaded from www.cisac.fsi.standford.edu/sites/default/files/bunn-nonproliferation-regime.pdf on July 16, 2015. Zafar Khan, ‘Pakistan and the NPT: Commitments and Concerns’, Margalla Papers, Vol.XVI, Issue.1 (2012), p.15.

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 For evading the accidental use of nuclear weapons, the three states could plan the official meetings once or twice in a year on regular basis.  The three states could establish mutual understanding about no deployment of military forces and the use or threaten to use of nuclear weapons against one another.  For preventing the missile race in the region and addressing the existing trilateral conventional asymmetry, the three states could launch early warning notification mechanism before their military exercises or nuclear tests. For confronting distrust, the three states could learn from the arms control mechanism between super powers during Cold War as US President Ronald Regan states ‘Trust but Verify’,93 and the three states learn to trust each other as they are neighboring nuclear states. They have to proceed along with their nuclear weapons. Mutual trust and transparency would be the prerequisites about their arms control mechanism.  China’s participation in trilateral arms control mechanism would be advantageous for China in two ways: first, China’s involvement for evolving strategic stability between India and Pakistan would promote China’s economic and strategic advancement in Asia-pacific region and in the Indian Ocean.94 Second, arms control mechanism could restrain India to establish deterrent forces that could encourage its balance or contain China.

7.2.4 Multilateral Arms Control Measures

The idea of arms control flourished during the Cold War era between the superpowers and their related alliances.95 Arms control measures had attained center stage in the West during late 1950s and early 1960s because an understanding about the dangers of nuclear arsenals was developed when they were in 1945. Arms control was not conceived as an end itself but was considered as a tool for stabilizing the strategy for national security and preventing a nuclear attack.96 During Cold War, the main objectives of arms control were: initiating agreements for discouraging nuclear arms

93 President Regan was quoted by Zafar Khan, ‘Prospects for an Arms Control Regime in South Asia’, p. 180. 94 See Reference 103 of Chapter 6. 95 The concept of arms control among the sovereign powers is traced around 200 years back, when victors denied to accept the withdrawal of forces from detained areas at the end of wars. Formal arms control initiatives were taken between the superpowers and their allies during the massive deployment of their nuclear arsenals. See Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations (Washington D.C: US Control and Disarmament Agency, 1996), pp.1-3. 96 Rodney W. Jones, ‘Prospects for arms control and strategic stability in South Asia’ p.194.

281 race and for minimizing the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, eliminating the main aspects which entice the pre-emptive calculations during crisis, describe the limitations about the quantitative and qualitative advancements while modernizing nuclear programs.97 These objectives are recognized as operative presumptions during the negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union on Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) I and (SALT) II agreements, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and (START) II, the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty.98 The US and the Soviet Union anticipated that arms control initiatives would reduce the likelihoods of another war in Europe and any nuclear conflict between their opposing allies. Similar methods were applied for eliminating heavy conventional military equipment in Europe especially between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as the Open Skies Treaty was signed for verifying the mechanism for additional transparency.99

97 Ibid, p.195. 98 SALT I was initiated in 1969 and signed in 1972 along with Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty which pledges the US up to 1054 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos and 656 Submarine Launch Missile (SLBM) launch tubes, while the Soviet Union was bound up to 1607 ICBM silos and 740 SLBM launch tubes. SALT II was signed in June 1979 which restricted both the US and the Soviet not to exceed bomber based nuclear forces including IDBM and SLBM more than 2400 delivery vehicles along with imposing a series of restrictions on the deployment of nuclear forces. Due to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, the US refused to ratify the treaty. Despite its failure, the US and Soviet Union decided to adhere to the treaty. START I was initiated by the US and the Soviet Union in 1980s and signed in 1991. According to the treaty, the US and the Soviet Union were bound to reduce their strategic arsenals up to 1600 and the warheads less than 6000. According to the Treaty, the surplus delivery vehicles and warheads will destroy and verifies through site inspections. However, the treaty was not enforced due to the collapse of Soviet Union. START II was signed in 1993 between the US and Russia for reducing the deployment of strategic arsenals within the limit of 3000-3500 warheads including multiple warheads and land based missiles. The deadline for the implementation of the treaty was Jan 2003, but it was extended up to Dec 2007. The treaty was deferred in 2002 due to US denial to ratify the treaty. See Jonathan Schell, The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henery Holt and Company, 2007), p.107. Tughral Yameen, ‘A Study on Weapon of Mass Destruction and Their Impact on Strategic Stability in South Asia’ (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies PhD, 2011), pp.142-145. Rodney W. Jones, ‘Prospects for arms control and strategic stability in South Asia’, Contemporary South Asia, Vol.14, No.2 (June 2005), p.195. SALT I, US- Soviet/Russian Arms Control, ‘Arms Control Today’, downloaded from www.armcontrol.org/factsheets/USRussian- Nuclear-Agreement/March2010 on July 10, 2015. Treaty between United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, downloaded from www.fas.org/Anti-Ballistic-Missile-Treaty on July 10, 2015. 99 The Open Skies Treaty was signed for developing mutual confidence and understanding between all the nations regardless of their size for collecting the information related to their air forces in support of their military forces. Open Skies Treaty is considered as the most wide-ranging international arms control in providing transparency among the military forces, down loaded from www.state.gov/t/avc/cca/os/ on July 11, 2015. Also mentioned Rodney W. Jones, ‘Prospects for arms control and strategic stability in South Asia’, p.196.

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The formal outcome of arms control initiatives was observed with the establishment of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) according to President Dwight Eisenhower’s proposal for ‘Atom for Peace’, that was progressed towards the completion of NPT in 1968.100 The NPT101, CTBT,102 the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)103 and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)104 and the legal and political efforts for nuclear-free zone, and for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons played pivotal role in eliminating nuclear proliferation. In 1972, the regime for Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was introduced with the consent of the US and was completed in 1993. It was implemented in 1997 after long discussions and confirmation of all the beneficiaries of CWC.105 In the South Asian region, both India and Pakistan joined CWC in 1993 as signatories and ratified it in 1996 and 1997 separately.106

The initiatives of arms control might become under strain at the end of Cold War because Russia does not intend to ratify START II since it is subject to the conditions which are not acceptable for the US.107 Likewise, the denial of US congress to ratify CTBT in 1996 and President Bush’s decision to eliminate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty created vulnerabilities among the states

100 The succeeding role of IAEA was to monitor, assist and compel the states not to use the civil nuclear technology in manufacturing the nuclear weapons. Rodney W. Jones, ‘Prospects for arms control and strategic stability in South Asia’, p.197. 101 NPT provided base for international proliferation regime and according to its preamble, ‘the commitment as expressed by the parties in 1963 treaty, all kinds of nuclear tests are banned including the atmosphere, in outer space and underground and the negotiations for the discontinuation of the explosion of nuclear devices would be encouraged, downloaded from www.ctbt.org/faq/?vid=35&Hash=f127513525ceb7ea335d4ceOb452d90 on July 11, 2015. 102 Ibid. 103 PTBT was signed in 1963 between the US, UK and USSR for the unidentified period for restricting the nuclear tests in Outer Space, Atmosphere and in Underwater, but did not ban underground tests. However, PTBT was merged into CTBT in 1996, downloaded from www.nti.org/treties-and-regimes/treaty-banning-nuclear-test- atmosphere-outer-space-and-under-water-partial-test-ban-treaty-ptbt/ on July 11, 2015. 104 The UN Conference of Disarmament (CD) established FMCT in 1995. According to this treaty, the states having nuclear weapons prefer to stop the production of new fissile material and the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. Kingston Reif and Madelein Folly, ‘Fact Sheet on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)’, downloaded from www.armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-on-the-fissile-material-cutoff-treaty-fmct/ on May 11, 2016. 105 Rodney W. Jones, ‘Prospects for arms control and strategic stability in South Asia’, p.198. 106 Internationally, Indian officials declared that it had not possessed chemical weapons in 1998, 1989 and in 1993 during signing CWC in Paris but surprised the international community in 1997 by admitting that it had not only produced, tested chemical weapons but had a stockpile also and pledged to eliminate it according to CWC. See discussion on Federation of American Scientists downloaded from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/cw/ on July 11, 2015. Both India and Pakistan signed a mutual declaration for eliminating chemical weapons in 1993. Pakistan’s apprehension related to India’s confession of chemical weapons, while splitting this declaration which was revealed by its mechanism of CWC ratification. See the document on Henry L. Stimson downloaded from www.stinson.org/?SN=CB20011220107 on July 11, 2015. 107 Rodney W. Jones, ‘Prospects for arms control and strategic stability in South Asia’, p.197.

283 related to arms control initiatives. Even India and Pakistan also anticipated to sign CTBT in 1999, but they refused to sign after US denial.108 China also emphasized the US to ratify the treaty.109

Similarly, China, India and Pakistan showed misgivings about FMCT. China interlinked its support to FMCT subject to the US patronage and the remaining members on the treaty for the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Additionally, China is suspicious about treaty that it would impose restrictions on its existing nuclear program and its enduring fissile material.110 Similarly, India asserts that FMCT would have a negative impact on its future production of fissile material and on other nuclear explosive devices as its CD representative stated, ‘we will not accept compulsions in keeping with nor detrimental to our national security interests which may hinder our strategic program’.111 Pakistan has reservations about existing India’s fissile material and issued a letter to the president CD in 2008 and enforced a verification treaty about the past, present and future production of fissile material.112 Additionally, Pakistan approached to CD for the second time in 2011 and expressed its denial due to the advancement of India’s fissile material stockpiles.113 China’s contribution in FMCT has direct influence on trilateral arms control measures as without China’s involvement in FMCT, India will not sign it and in response, Pakistan will not sign it unless India does.114

On NPT, China again revealed disagreement and proclaimed that it issued a solemn statement about the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear stockpiles soon after becoming nuclear power, and compelled that besides convincing to the NNWS, a comprehensive plan for eliminating the nuclear stockpiles is implemented.115 As far as India’s stance on NPT is concerned,

108 Ibid. 109 Sha Zukang, ‘The Entry into Force of the CTBT: The Chinese Perspective’, downloaded from www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-entry-into-force-of-the-ctbt-the-chinese-perspective-1790.html on June 10, 2016. 110 Kingston Reif and Madelein Folly, ‘Fact Sheet on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)’, downloaded from www.armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-on-the-fissile-material-cutoff-treaty-fmct/ on May 11, 2016. 111 Annette Schaper and Morten Bremer Maerli, ‘The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as a Nuclear Security Policy Driver’, in Bremer Maerli and Sverre Lodgaard (eds), Nuclear Proliferation and International Security (London: Routledge, 2007), p.238. 112 Kingston Reif and Madelein Folly, ‘Fact Sheet on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)’, downloaded from www.armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-on-the-fissile-material-cutoff-treaty-fmct/ on May 11, 2016. 113 Ibid. 114 Hui Zhang, ‘China and A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty’, downloaded from www.belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/inmm2002-zhang.pdf on June 9, 2016. 115 ‘Report of China on the Implementation of NPT’, downloaded from www.china.un.org/eng/chinaandun/disarmament-armscontrol/npt/t196288.htm on June 9, 2016.

284 it disapproved signing of NPT due to its fundamental discriminatory reality. Besides imposing sanctions on NWS, all the NNWS were made to sign on an agreement that will retain them to relinquish nuclear weapons in future. Naeem Salik elaborated India’s distresses on NPT as:116

 By employing NPT, NWS intend to close the doors on NNWS to join them and treaty will divide the world between nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’.  The treaty did not address the vertical proliferation.  The treaty inherited the disparity between NWS and NNWS as voluntary safeguards were provided to NNWS while comprehensive safeguards to NWS.  India anticipated that as a sovereign state, it had the right to acquire advance nuclear technology.

Despite criticizing NPT, India revealed dubious response and initially, advocated a thorough destruction of nuclear weapons on China’s similar spiraling but, after the nuclear tests of 1998, India demanded the global powers to accept its newly acquired status before enforcing it to sign NPT.117

Pakistan also expressed negation about NPT, and its policy towards the treaty after the nuclear tests of 1998 was summed up by Naeem Salik:118

In the post 1998 South Asian strategic environment, it is not practicable for Pakistan to revert back its realistic posture on NPT and join the treaty as NNWS. The prevalent framework of the treaty is not flexible enough to accommodate the nuclearization of India and Pakistan and as well as the ambiguous nuclear status of Israel. It would be challenging for the treaty and for the international community to follow a complex amendment procedure for accepting India and Pakistan and possibly Israel as well.

Another violation of NPT is observed in recent US-India nuclear deal, which implicates not only the transfer of nuclear technology to India but also instigates the remaining states the similar deal with India, that provides the excuse to the NPT signatories to assist the states outside the NPT.119 Similarly, the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal has provided leverage to India to deal with NPT signatories by recognizing it (India) as a de facto NWS and to give the access to NSG for civilian

116 Naeem Ahmad Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective (Karachi: Oxford University press, 2009), p.161. 117 Ibid, p.161. 118 Naeem Ahmad Salik, ‘Pakistan and the Future on Non-Proliferation’, IPRI Journal, Vol.6, No.1 (Winter 2006), p.30. 119 Many in Pakistan accuse the US of violating not only the NPT but also dishonored UNSC resolution 1172, which was approved after the nuclear tests of May 1998, to deter them for carrying out more tests. Andrew Bast, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Calculus’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.4 (2011), p.79.

285 nuclear trade without joining the NPT.120 In order to convince NSG members to allow trade with India, US has already initiated consultations with the group.121

The Indo-US civil nuclear deal and India’s exertions on joining NSG would augment India’s nuclear stockpiles that could exacerbate arms competition between India, Pakistan and China which would destabilize the South Asian strategic stability. US Senator Sam Nunn expressed, ‘it is widely estimated that both China and Pakistan will become reactive on this deal by intensifying their nuclear activities – including additional weapons material and weapons’.122 Thus, multilateral arms control measures i.e. CTBT, FMCT and NPT, have not considerably contributed to arms control mechanism for the strategic stability of the South Asian region.

7.2.5 Regional Institutional Arms Control Measures (SCO)

Presently, the world is experiencing Unipolarity along with the deliberate portray of double standards demonstrated by the US during its transnational dealings.123 The US hegemonic tendencies under Unipolarity have compelled the rising states to instigate countermeasures for eradicating the Unipolarity at the regional and the global level. So, the formation of SCO was initiated by Asia’s economic and nuclear giants, which has obtained center stage in the present era due to its peculiar and unique characteristics. SCO is a reformulated version of Shanghai Five and was established in 2001.124 The primary objective of SCO since its formation is to counter terrorism, separatism and extremism which lead towards regional stability.125 Beside these, the

120 The NSG was established after India’s PNE, which articulated the rules to prevent the likelihood of any misuse of nuclear technology in future provided to a country for peaceful purposes. It is a group of 45 countries aimed at regulating nuclear trade within the group and with other countries, who are signatories to the NPT, therefore, India is ineligible for nuclear trade with other countries since it is non-signatory of NPT, as long as NSG amends its rules or makes India specific through a consensus decision. See Adil Sultan, ‘Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Implication on South Asian Security Environment’, p.11, downloaded from www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/AdilSultan.pdf on June 9, 2016. 121 ‘NSG Begins Mulling Response to the US-India Cooperation Deal’, Nuclear Fuel (September 26, 2005). 122 Sam Nunn, ‘Nuclear Pig in a Poke’, The Wall Street Journal (May 24, 2006). 123 The Indo-US unilateral civil nuclear deal and US assistance to India for joining the NSG indicate the US double standards. 124 See Reference 58 of Chapter 6. Currently, it comprises on six permanent members (China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), two consenting states (India and Pakistan), four states (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia) bearing observer’s status, six dialogue partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey) and here guest attendants (ASEAN, CIS and Turkmenistan), explained Muhammad Ihsan Qadir and Saif ur Rahman, ‘[SCO]: Harbinger of Regional Peace and Prosperity’, Journal of Political Science, Vol.23, Issue.1 (2016), p.118. 125 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Expanding SCO for Regional Stability: Pakistani Perspective’, in ‘SCO’s Role in Regional Stability: Prospects for its Expansion’, IPRI (2013), p.76.

286 declared objectives of SCO are to encourage effective cooperation between the members in trade, economy, culture, science and technology, energy, education, ecology, transportation, strengthen mutual trust and joint efforts to maintain and ensure security and stability of the region.126

To accomplish these objectives, SCO has been steadily engaging the non-member states through various ways, i.e. contact group, dialogue partners and official observers. Likewise, SCO has provided a forum to the regional powers of South Asia to carry on dialogue process on the basis of shared principles. It is anticipated that all the regional forums endorse bilateral relationship between the states for resolving their long-standing issues even among the belligerent neighbors as Julie Boland stated, ‘all the prominent regional organizations including the EU have surpassed state-to-state relations for the widespread alignment between central to western European nations by captivating security and economic priorities’.127 SCO might become capable to mitigate in lowering tension between disputing states by addressing their security and economic issues on the similar pattern as EU. In 2009, SCO announced its policy for its expansion which encouraged SCO observer states to acquire full membership. Both India and Pakistan expressed their desire to obtain its full membership.128 A progressive development occurred during Ufa Summit SCO-2015 for the formal approval of the membership of India and Pakistan of this organization. That is a welcoming development for the regional integration in Asia so far. Their membership was appreciated by Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Gouping as, ‘the induction of India and Pakistan in SCO will play a significant role not only in SCO’s development but for the improvement of their bilateral relations also’.129 China is previously a big player and the initiator of SCO. So, the three states of strategic triangle India-Pakistan and China may not only avail the opportunity in comprehending the state of their security dilemma but endorse South Asian strategic stability also.

In understanding SCO’s contribution in endorsing South Asian strategic stability, the functions of regional organization are elaborated in four categories: first, containing and avoiding armed

126 Nivedita Das Kundu, ‘SCO, BRIC, and RIC: Bringing Together Two Asian Economic Powers India and China’, in Sudhir Kumar Singh (ed) Sino-Indian Relations: Challenges and Opportunities for 21st Century (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2011), p.142. 127 Julie Boland, ‘Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner of the US?’ 21st Century Initiative Policy Paper, Brookings (June 20, 2011), p.13. 128 It is anticipated that both India and Pakistan will obtain the status of full membership during SCO summit held in December 2016 at Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 129 ‘China Welcome India-Pakistan Membership in SCO’ Daily Times (July 11, 2015).

287 conflicts, second, productive military cooperation among the member states, third, promoting good governance or democracy and indorsing security reforms and finally contending nontraditional security threats.130 For eliminating conflicts, SCO initiated measures for reducing tension between its member states by instigating cooperative mechanism on security oriented issues.131 SCO may contribute in arms control measures for sustaining South Asian strategic stability. Professor Shabir Ahmad argued:132

Regional arrangements in the form of regional organizations serve as basis for regionalism due to institutional organizational structure that can act better than the coalition or alliance.

SCO is not permitted for the development of BMD due to its potential in accelerating into an offensive, defensive arms competition which entails strategic instability in the region.133 In South Asia, India intends to acquire BMD134 which generates anxiety in the Pakistani strategic enclave. The expansion of SCO would provide an opportunity to India to restrain from acquiring BMD. According to Shabir Ahmad, ‘SCO’s search for harmonious region and harmonious periphery on the basis of mutual trust and common development would directly and positively impact on South Asian geo-politics’.135 Shabir Ahmad further argued:136

SCO has accumulated vast experience of resolving disputes in Shanghai Five’. Moreover, the presence of China and Russia can be an integral pull factor for Pakistan and India in resolving their disputes under the various fora of SCO.

According to Xing Guangcheng, ‘SCO is useful platform to eliminate trilateral security dilemma’.137 Thus, after becoming SCO members, both India and Pakistan will play a constructive role for stabilizing the South Asian strategic power equilibrium that indicates SCO’s potential to

130 Alyson J.K. Bailles and Andrew Cottey, ‘Regional Security Cooperation in Early 21st Century’ in SIPRI Year Book, Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security (London: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.195-223. 131 Muhammad Ihsan Qadir and Saif ur Rahman, p.125. 132 Professor Shabir Ahmad Khan, Director, Area Study Center (Central Asia) University of Peshawar, Interview (Peshawar, 15 July 2017). 133 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Expanding SCO for Regional Stability: Pakistani Perspective’, in ‘SCO’s Role in Regional Stability: Prospects for its Expansion’, p.85. 134 See References 289-292 of Chapter 5. 135 Shabir Ahmad, Interview (2017). 136 Ibid. 137 Xing Guangchen (Director General, Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing) expressed during roundtable conference at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad on May 5, 2017.

288 diminish trilateral security dilemma, reduce arms competition and promote strategic stability in the South Asian region.

7.3 Initiatives for CBMs

CBMs are the engagements planned to increase the promises of mind and belief among the states…. confidence is assumed as much broader arrangement of relations as those which relate it to military strategy.138 According to the US State Department, ‘CBMs are the agreements in- between the states to establish mutual understanding, communication and sincerity for reducing the probabilities of conflicts’.139 CBMs provide submissions for boosting the national interests between the states by adopting political and diplomatic means for reducing the tension and obtaining favorable environment for conflict resolution during crisis.140 The implications of CBMs might differ from region to region but their experiences are employed for accomplishing the expected gains.141

The main proponent of CBMs may be summed up as, “separating a state’s military might from military intent”142, that is derived from following three perceptions:143

138 Johan Jorgen Holst, ‘Confidence Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework’, Survival, Vol.25, No.1 (Jan-Feb 1983), p.2. 139 CBMs as defined by the US State Department I 1985 in Mussarat Qadeem, ‘The Debate on Non-Nuclear CBMs in South Asia’ in Moonis Ahmar (ed), Paradigm of Conflict Resolution in South Asia (Dhaka: University Press, 2003), p.160. 140 A.Z.Hilali, ‘Confidence and Security-Building Measures for India and Pakistan’, Alternative: Global, Local and Political. Vol.30 (2005), p.191. 141 Agreement on Disengagement was signed between Israel-Syria in May 1974 for declaring demilitarized zones, but such disengagement is not suitable for the South Asian region due to ongoing regional conflicts especially in the context of Kashmir conflict. See ‘Disengagement Agreement 1974’, downloaded from www.securitycouncilreport.org/arf/cf/%7B65BFCFAB-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4F96FF9%7D/s_11302_add_1.pdf on July 22, 2015. After the Indo-Pak war 1965, both the states established hotline between their Directorates Military Operations on the same pattern as the hotline between the US and USSR after the Cuban Missile crisis. See ‘Hotline established between Washington and Moscow’, downloaded from www.history.com.this-day-in-history/hotline-established- between-washington-and-mascow on July 22, 2015. India-Pakistan signed an Agreement on Advance Notice of Military Exercises in April 1991 on similar spiraling of the pact between NATO and Warsaw in Helsinki Accord about the prior information relating to military exercises. See Helinski Accord downloaded from www.britanica.com/event/Helinski-Accord on July 22, 2015. 142 Shaun Gregory, ‘Rethinking Strategic Stability in South Asia’, SASSU Research Report, No.3 (September 2005), p.25. 143 Joseph Goldbalt, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2002), p.10.

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(a) Safeguards are provided to the states against the aggressive aspirations of their adversaries and minimizing the likelihoods of misrepresentation in various activities. (b) Reducing the range of political domination of major powers. (c) Reducing the unintended escalation of inimical acts during crises.

Strategic stability is not simply achieved by signing military pacts and in addition to that, the contribution of economic, political and social measures also have the significant impact in improving the long-lasting relationships with the adversary.

7.3.1 CBMs between India and Pakistan

The CBMs are observed in subsequent categories which are perceived during analyzing South Asia’s strategic stability.

 CBMs that intensify communication between the states.144 Both India and Pakistan established hotline between their Director General Military Operations (DGMO) including commander ‘hotlines’ along LoC.145 Hotline between DGMO of both the states is utilized for illuminating the ambiguous circumstances during crisis. Likewise, two additional ‘hotlines’ between the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of both the states are also established which would be beneficial for diffusing the tense environment between the two traditional rivals.146 Another alternative for improving communication between the states is to follow Track II diplomacy. The main objective of Track II diplomacy is to explore the substitutes for addressing the existing issues between the states with the collaboration of nonofficial actors.147 Under Track II diplomacy, the recommendations under Balusa Group, Ottawa Dialogue, the Chaophraya Dailogues, Pugwash Conferences, and Regional

144 Gabrielle Kohlmeier, ‘India, Pakistan hold nuclear talks’, Arms Control Today, downloaded from www.armscontroltoday/act/2004-07-08/Hotline on July 22, 2015. Michalle Maise, ‘Confidence-Building Measures’, downloaded from www.stimson.org/Southasia/?SN=SA2001112047 on July 22, 2015. Aslo quoted Umbreen Javaid, ‘Confidence Building Measures in South Asia: Limitations and Prospects’, South Asian Studies, Vol.25, No.2 (July- December 2010), p.344. 145 Rodney W. Jones, p.205. Shaun Gregory, ‘Rethinking Strategic Stability in South Asia’, p.25. 146 Shaun Gregory, p.25. 147 Rachel Goldberg, ‘Track Two Diplomacy in India and Pakistan: Initiatives, Impact, Challenges and Ways Forward’, PRAID (Partnership for Research in International Affairs and Development) Policy Journal, Vol.1, No.2 (July 2013), p.3. Presently, the CBMs between India and Pakistan are executed under three levels, i.e. Track I (at the Governmental level), Track II (nonofficial) and Track III (Multinational level), see Umbreen Javaid, ‘Confidence Building Measures in South Asia: Limitations and Prospects’, South Asian Studies, Vol.25, No.2 (July-December 2010), p.346.

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Center for Strategic Studies (RCSS) Workshops, were submitted for the strategic stability of the South Asian region.148  CBMs that endorse transparency and sincerity among the states.149 The initiatives are taken under this category as:150  Notification prior to military exercises.  Early warning notification about missile flight tests.  Notification about unauthorized, unexplained or accidental incidents that could generate the chances of nuclear exchange.

To obtain these initiatives, India and Pakistan signed Lahore accord for reviving dialogue process and restraining the strategic issues.151 Both the states signed various agreements for acquiring transparency and sincerity.152

148 Rachel Goldberg, ‘Track Two Diplomacy in India and Pakistan: Initiatives, Impact, Challenges and Ways Forward’, PRAID (Partnership for Research in International Affairs and Development) Policy Journal, Vol.1, No.2 (July 2013), pp.4-12. 149 Gabrielle Kohlmeier, ‘India, Pakistan hold nuclear talks’, Arms Control Today, downloaded from www.armscontroltoday/act/2004-07-08/Hotline on July 22, 2015. Michalle Maise, ‘Confidence-Building Measures’, downloaded from www.stimson.org/Southasia/?SN=SA2001112047 on July 22, 2015. Aslo quoted Umbreen Javaid, ‘Confidence Building Measures in South Asia: Limitations and Prospects’, South Asian Studies, Vol.25, No.2 (July- December 2010), p.344. 150 Shaun Gregory, ‘Rethinking Strategic Stability in South Asia’, p.25. 151 For details, see Reference 60 of Chapter 4. 152 Following agreements were signed for sustaining transparency;  Both the states signed an agreement in 1991 on advance notification about troop’s movements, maneuvers and military exercise and the agreement played pivotal role in reducing tension along LoC.  Agreement for the prevention of airspace violation and about the landings and overflights of military Aircrafts was signed in 1991 that created mechanism to redress in case of oppressions and mistrust.  An agreement about not to attack on nuclear installations of each other was signed in 1998. This agreement is also considered as an informal understanding between the two states on the suspension of further nuclear testing.  Agreement about the biannual meetings between Pakistani Rangers and Indian Border Security Forces was signed in 2004 for resolving local problems through frequent meetings of local commanders.  Agreement about early firing notification of Ballistic missiles tests was enforced in 2005 and according to the agreement, ‘both the states will bound to inform the other 72 hours in advance before the test of any Ballistic missile within the radius of 40 km along LoC and the international border. See Samarjit Ghosh, ‘Two Decades of Indo-Pak CBMs: A Critique from India’, IPCS Issue 132 (September 2009), p.1, downloaded from www.ipcs.org on July 23, 2015. Rodney W. Jones, ‘Prospects for arms control and strategic stability in South Asia’, Contemporary South Asia, p.204. Umbreen Javaid, ‘Confidence Building Measures in South Asia: Limitations and Prospects’, South Asian Studies, Vol.25, No.2 (July-December 2010), p.348. Michael Krepon, ‘The 1990s: The Decade of Confidence-Building Measures’, in Mukesh Kumar Kayathwal (ed), Security and Foreign Policy in South Asia (Jaipur: Pointer Publishers, 1999), p.29.

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 CBMs inflict restrictions on the behavior of the states.153 According to this category, both the states signed an agreement on avoidance of chemical weapons.154 A joint statement was released by the President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh in Islamabad on January 2004 for the commencement of composite dialogues on all the bilateral issues including Kashmir dispute.155 Both the states instigated a positive development during the meeting of SAARC conference in January 2004. However, the SAARC charter could not permit its members to discuss their political disputes. Despite that, ‘both the states agreed to start “composite dialogue” including on Kashmir issue, and for avoiding nuclear war, CBMs would be taken in future’.156 For uplifting trade, joint Economic Commission and Business Councils of both the states were activated in 2004 and trade routes between Srinagar- Muzaffarabad, Poonch-Rawalakot and Wagha-Atari were reopened.157 Likewise, air links were resumed in 2004,158 and both the states agreed to display the movies of each other’s in 2006. 159 Both the states planned to institutionalize the mechanism on anti-terrorism to identify and implement counter-terrorism measures and investigations in 2006.160 Railway links were reopened between Monabao-Khorapar and Samjhauta Express between Delhi- Lahore was resumed despite the 2007 blasts.161  CBMs that engender the stability of states through political, economic and social cooperation.162 The Foreign Ministers of both the states agreed to initiate Kashmir-specific CBMs in 2008 and allowed the issuance of triple-entry visa to the Kashmiris for crossing

153 Shaun Gregory, ‘Rethinking Strategic Stability in South Asia’, p.25. Gabrielle Kohlmeier, ‘India, Pakistan hold nuclear talks’, Arms Control Today, downloaded from www.armscontroltoday/act/2004-07-08/Hotline on July 22, 2015. Michalle Maise, ‘Confidence-Building Measures’, downloaded from www.stimson.org/Southasia/?SN=SA2001112047 on July 22, 2015. Aslo quoted Umbreen Javaid, p.344. 154 Ibid. 155 Umbreen Javaid, p.349. 156 B.M. Reddu, ‘India and Pakistan Agree on Timeframe for Talks’, The Hindu (17 February 2004). 157 Samarjit Ghosh, ‘Two Decades of Indo-Pak CBMs: A Critique from India’, IPCS Issue 132 (September 2009), p.2, downloaded from www.ipcs.org on July 23, 2015. 158 Ibid. 159 Umbreen Javaid, p.350. 160 Ibid. p.350 161 Samarjit Ghosh, p.2. 162 Shaun Gregory, ‘Rethinking Strategic Stability in South Asia’, p.25. Gabrielle Kohlmeier, ‘India, Pakistan hold nuclear talks’, Arms Control Today, downloaded from www.armscontroltoday/act/2004-07-08/Hotline on July 22, 2015. Michalle Maise, ‘Confidence-Building Measures’, downloaded from www.stimson.org/Southasia/?SN=SA2001112047 on July 22, 2015. Aslo quoted Umbreen Javaid, , p.344.

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LoC.163 For establishing transport links, both the states started bus service between Srinagar-Muzafarabad, Lahore-Amritsar, and Amritsar-Nankana.164 An agreement was signed in 2008 about facilitating the regular contact between the think tanks of both the states (Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis New Delhi and Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad).165 Furthermore, the Prime Ministers of both the states agreed to continue dialogue process between both the states in Egypt (Sharm-el-Sheikh) in July 2009.166 Both the states initiated talks and their National Security Advisors started dialogues in December 2015 in Bangkok to discuss wide range of bilateral issues called the ‘Bangkok Mechanism’.167 However, the attack on Indian airbase in Pathankot in January 2016 had a deteriorating impact on the dialogue process between the two states at the foreign secretary level.

Various CBMs were made to create trust between India and Pakistan especially after Pokhran II. Political will is the most dominant factor in trust-building but due to lack of trust, misgivings on variety of issues, the two states were unable in validating many of CBMs.168 To establish regional strategic stability, sincere determination of both the states is inevitable, but besides obtaining parochial motives, both the states intend to get politico-diplomatic point scoring. According to Rodeny Jones, ‘the initiatives of nuclear arms control of India and Pakistan are not intrinsic arms control specific but for enticing outside powers and for gaining political utility’.169 Likewise, Indo- Pak CBMs clearly indicate lack of serious promise for obtaining arm control goals and are mostly focused on politico-diplomatic motives. In a condition when the lack of serious political

163 Umbreen Javaid, p.350. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 ‘India-Pakistan Resumed Peace Talks’, The NEWS (17 July 2009). 167 Subasini Haider, ‘Indian Pakistani NSAs Meet in Bangkok’, The Hindu (6 December 2015). 168 Both the states are involved in violating ceasefire and exchange of fire is frequently observed along LoC which precipitates mistrust and suspicion. Lahore accord was signed in February 1999 and Kargil incidence happened within three months after the accord. The two states are suspicious about information sharing mechanism through hotlines due to lack of trust between them. Both the states agreed in resuming the composite dialogue process in a meeting in Sharm-el-Sheikh but Prime Minister Singh refused to ratify it soon after his arrival from Sharm-el-Sheikh. Likewise, visa restrictions from both the states are also far from conducive to confidence building. Each traveler is bound to report to a police station within 24 hours of his arrival in a city and again report 24 hours before his departure. Despite signing Kashmir-related CBMs about cross border and trade, few of them were implemented but its main clauses were ignored. See Samarjit Ghosh, p.3. P.R. Chari, ‘Strategic Stability in South Asia: the role of confidence- building and threat reduction measures’, Contemporary South Asia, Vol.14, No.2 (June 2005), p.212. 169 Rodeny W. Jones, ‘p.206.

293 commitment is obvious during CBMs, the effectiveness of CBMs becomes minimal as Zafar Nawas Jaspal undertakes:170

The track record of Indo-Pak relationship unveils that recognized and traditional CBMs are less likely in the existing South Asian strategic environment and for resolving the Indo- Pak disputes, because many of the agreements between the two states were signed in military and non-military domains of CBMs, these were not addressed which generated a reliability crisis for the CBM mechanism.

Additionally, Kashmir issue is the main source of contention due to which both the states were involved in conflicts and are reluctant in maintaining confidence building with each other. The resolution of Kashmir issue could make a huge contribution to confidence building which could consequently lead to resolve all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan.171 The existing CBMs could not contribute in resolving Kashmir issue. So, it is critical for both the states to proceed towards peace and stability by adopting existing CBMs.

For sustaining regional strategic stability, a new approach with the combination of incremental and symbolic changes emerge more appropriate for the South Asian region.172 The CBMs might become more effective by adopting both incremental and symbolic strategies under the following ways:

 Political will is the most prominent aspect in confidence building and the Prime Ministers or the Presidents of both the states mostly rely on foreign services and security bureaucracies during negotiations, halting incrementalism without achieving tangible outcomes. Negotiating process must be carried out with the collaboration of civilian and military bureaucracies of both the states because it will be critical for the political leaderships in assuring the applicability of agreements through unsupportive bureaucracies.

170 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures and Restraint Regime in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 2004), pp.103-104. 171 Abdur Rashid, From Makkah to Nuclear Pakistan (Lahore: Feroz Sons, 2001), p.391. For the details about outstanding issues between India and Pakistan (disputes on water, i.e. Wuller/Tulbural and Kishanganga projects and territorial disputes, i.e. Sir Creek and Siachin), please consult References 129-155 of Chapter 2. 172 Incrementalism maintains status quo in South Asia while symbolic acts with the combination of small steps, for details, Toby Dalton, ‘Beyond Incrementalism: Rethinking Approaches to CBMs and Stability in South Asia’, Stimson, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (January 30, 2013), p.19, downloaded from www.Stimson_CBM_India_Pakistan_Jan_30_2013 on July 23, 2015.

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 Despite the presence of political leaderships and bureaucracies, technical experts are also included in negotiating team. Negotiations under bureaucracies of both the states create scarcely-construed agreements that contribute little in reducing strategic uncertainties and the presence of political leadership might reduce this dynamic. Similarly, technical experts provide assistance to bureaucrats and the politicians about the implementation of the agreements on technical grounds. Agreement on early warning notification about missile tests was initiated by the politicians and was shaped by bureaucrats, while implemented by technical experts.  Balanced approach about incrementalism and symbolism must be followed during the formulation of the agreements. For instance, Lahore accord was greatly symbolic and has the potential to enhance confidence building, but it needs symbolic changes for its affective implementation especially in the social and economic sphere. Amritsar-Lahore bus service via Wagha was a great start but symbolic changes were required for opening the other transport and communication links.  Symbolic or incremental strategies are adopted according to the nature of CBMs. Socio- cultural and economic CBMs are fit for symbolic strategy. Such CBMs are closely associated with everyday life of ordinary citizens and symbolic acts generate tangible impacts on their lives. The expansion of economic activities through trade would enhance bilateral cooperation that would lead towards the strategic stability of the region. Similarly, politico-military CBMs are fit for incrementalism because such CBMs require serious participation of security personnel to meet security challenges and to averse risky measures.  The existing deadlock on arms control might be revealed by the acceptance of CTBT as both India and Pakistan once promised.173 Both the states might define CMD, non-

173 India’s Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh showed willingness to sign CTBT to Clinton administration officials privately, but could not officially materialize it and declined to materialize the treaty before the US officials. For details, see Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, and the Bomb (Washington D.C: Brooking Institution Press, 2004), pp.145-146 and 183-184. Likewise, Talbott pointed out that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif intended to sign CTBT under various conditions, i.e. security assurances, U.S. military assistance, and good offices of the Kashmir issue. Ibid, pp. 108-109. According to Kamal Mattinuddin, ‘Pakistan decided to sign CTBT subject to a condition if India did so too’. Kamal Mattinuddin, ‘Nuclearization of South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.205.

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deployment and materialize the provisions of non-intrusive verification by instituting dialogue process.

Both the states must assure their mutual strategies during crises and maintain reliable mutual communication network for collaborating their intentions with each other. Communication gap might generate uncertainties and anxieties which can compel them towards irrational decisions. This would be unacceptable for both the states because both have no second option in the presence of nuclear weapons.174

7.3.2 CBMs between China and India

China presumes that by instigating economic cooperation, it can stabilize its relations with India which remain vulnerable due to unresolved border and water issues.175 Since 2003, the two states have established various channels for consultation, bilateral dialogue, mutual understanding, forming political framework for promoting bilateral cooperation and resolving territorial disputes.176 China is convinced that by sustaining the existing economic development, it would accomplish not only the status of major economic global power, but would undertake the superpower status also.177 The growing economies of China and India compelled them to establish mutual economic relations as China’s GNP has grown by 10 percent a year while India has 6 percent and China was the second largest trading partner of India after the US.178 During last decade, China-India bilateral trade took a marvelous leap from $2.9 billion in 2000 to $ 73.9 billion in 2011.179 China assumes CBMs and security dialogues as a fundamental approach for enforcing mutual trust among the states of the region. It insisted India for the peaceful settlement of its border

174 Banerjee Jyotirmoy, Nuclear World: Defense and Politics of Major Powers (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2004), p.216. 175 Li Li, ‘Stability in South Asia’, in Ashley J. Tellis and Sean Mirski (eds), Crux of Asia: China, India, and the Emergence of Global Order (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), p.127. For the details about Sino-Indian border and water issues, please see Chapter 2. 176 Jingdong Yuan, ‘Beijing’s Balancing Act: Courting New Delhi, Reassuring Islamabad’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.64, No.2 (Spring/Summer 2011), p.37. 177 China pretends that its military modernization due to its rapid economic growth will enable it to become near superpower status by 2020. Subrata K. Mitra, ‘The Relutant Hegemon: India’s Self-Perception and the South Asian Strategic Environment’, Contemporary South Asia, Vol.12, No.3, (2003), p.407. zheng Bijian, ‘China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great Power Status’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.84, No.5 (September-October 2005), pp.23-24. 178 ‘Two Future Economic Powers: India, China’, Dawn (16 February 2004). 179 Li Li, ‘Stability in South Asia’, in Ashley J. Tellis and Sean Mirski (eds), Crux of Asia: China, India, and the Emergence of Global Order (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), p.127.

296 and water issues.180 During the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to India in 2010, China and India estimated that their mutual trade will extent up to $ 100 billion at the end of 2015.181

Some latest developments on bilateral relationship occurred during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India during 17-19 September 2014. Xi signed a comprehensive five year economic and trade development plan and pledged to invest $20 billion in India and 12 agreements were signed for the investment in the following Areas:182

 Industrial parks would be established in Gujrat and Maharashtra states.  The construction of high speed railway track along Chennoi-Banglore- Maysore.  The access of Indian companies especially in IT, agriculture and pharmaceutical sectors to Chinese markets for establishing balanced bilateral trade relationship.  Both the states decided several initiatives for strengthening their cultural and people to people contacts and declared 2015 ‘visit India’ year in China, while 2016 ‘visit China’ year in India.

However, some irritants i.e. disputed borders, energy and security persist in developing Sino- Indian relations. The search for secure energy sources might aggravate a competition between India and China. Both the states repeatedly stated about bilateral cooperation on energy resources but their existing border disputes remain a constant source of suspicion and mistrust between both the states.183 Despite having well economic and trade relations with India, a strong refutation exists in a strategic triangle India-Pakistan and China, where China and Pakistan on one side and India is on the other.

7.4 Sino-Pak Economic Engagement: A Way Forward to Regional Stability

Both the states assume that by establishing strong bilateral economic and trade relations, the people of both the states would transform towards prosperity that would lead to provoke their friendly relations in future. China intends to access a trustworthy trade route to sustain its economic rise

180 Ibid, p.128. 181 ‘China, India agree to rise bilateral trade to $100 billion’, The Hindu (16 December 2010). 182 ‘The Sino-Indian relationship: Multi-dimensional and ongoing global’, downloaded from www.bolgs.ise.ac.uk/southasia/2014/09/29/the-sino-indianrelationship-multi-dimensional-ongoing-globe on August 1, 2015. 183 Esther Pan, India, China and the United States: A Delicate Balance (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, February 27, 2006), downloaded from www.cfr.rog/india/india-china-united-states-delicate-balance/p9962 on August 1, 2015.

297 and to fulfill its energy requirements which is central to its ‘Grand Strategy’. Pakistan’s geostrategic location is very practicable for China’s access to Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s Gwadar port might become a gateway for China’s shortest trade route because Xingjian is just 2500 km from Gwadar while 4500 km from China’s east coast.184 China is suspicious about its trade route from Gulf and Africa via Straits of Malacca due to insecurities from terrorists/pirates and intends to develop the alternative routes.185 Additionally, China’s presence in Gwadar might provide it the opportunity to control the Straits of Hormuz for assuring its smooth energy supply from West Asia.186

On the other side, Pakistan is facing serious energy crisis and China signed an agreement in 2006 between National Development Reform Commission of China and Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources of Pakistan to overcome energy crisis.187 According to the agreement, China provided technical and financial assistance in Diamir-Bhasha dam,188 Neelam-Jehlum project189 and Kohala hydro power project, and International Water and Electrical Corporation of China promised to invest $1.7 billion in various hydel power generation projects in Pakistan.190 Additionally, China is assisting in Thar Coal and in the Quaid-i-Azam Solar Park Project.191

Both China and Pakistan planned to focus on China-Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC) for the construction of road and rail networks between Gwadar and Xingjian. Both the states signed 51

184 Waheeda Rana and Hasan Mahmood, ‘Changing Dynamics of Pak-China Relations: Policy Recommendations for Pakistan’, American International Journal of Contemporary Research, Vol.5, No.2 (April 2015), p.99. 185 Malika Joseph, ‘India-China Strategic Partnership: Implications for US and Pakistan, downloaded from www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-china-strategic-partmership-implications-for-us-and-pakistan-1711.html on August 6, 2015. 186 Dr. Subhash Kapila, ‘Pakistan and China Relations, Post-September 2001: Analysis’ Paper 505, downloaded from www.southasiananalysis.org/paper-505 on August 6, 2015. 187 ‘Pakistan-China Energy Forum Held in Islamabad’, Embassy of Peoples Republic of China in Islamabad, May 3, 2006. 188 China financed the project by contributing $8.5 billion and offered 17000 skilled laborers for the construction of dam who were involved in the construction of three Gorges Dams in China. Fazal-ur-Rehman, ‘Traditional and emerging areas of strategic cooperation between Pakistan and China’, Strategic Studies, Vol.xxix, No.2&3 (Summer and Autumn 2009), p. 58. 189 For the construction of project, a contract was signed with a Chinese company, M/S CGGC-CMEC China. Ibid. 190 A Chinese company who has the experience of constructing the dam and hydro power projects in Pakistan (Gomal Zam dam, the Dubair Khawar and Khan Khawar project) was given the contract for the construction of Kohala hydro power project. Fazal-ur-Rehman, ‘Traditional and emerging areas of strategic cooperation between Pakistan and China’, pp. 58-59. 191 ‘Chinese delegation assures to invest $3.5 billion in Thar coal project’ Daily Times (April 20 2015). ‘PM unveils country’s first solar power plant’ The Nation (May 6 2015).

298 agreements of $46 billion during the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Islamabad on 21 April 2015.192

Table 7.2

China Pak- Economic Corridor Road and Railway network

Name Destination Length Lanes Design Speed Estimated Cost KM Highway Gwadar-Khungrab 2395 2-6 70-120 kph Rs. 1200 billion Motorway Karachi-Lahore 1186 6 120 kph Rs. 677 billion Expressway Muzafarabad- 196 4 120 kph Rs. 75 billion Mirpur Freight Train Gwadar-Khungrab 2653 _ _ $ 2.3 billion Source: Riffat Hussain, Sino-Pakistan Ties: Trust, Cooperation, and Consolidation (Islamabad: NUST Global Think Tank Network, 2014), p.21. Aarish U. Khan, ‘Pak-China Economic Corridor: The Hopes and Reality’, Regional Studies, Vol.xxxiii, No.1 (Winter 2014-15), pp.50-58. Gwadar-Kashgar Intermodel Network downloaded from www.scci.com.pk/image/file-php%3Ffile%3Drand-ENGLISH-4.pdf on August 7, 2015.

China is planning to construct a 3,300-kilometer-long oil pipeline with 30-inch diameter from Gwadar to Khunjrab with the capacity to handle 12 million tons of oil per year and the estimate cost of pipeline is about $ 4.5 billion.193

Nevertheless, the existing Pakistan-China relations are without question mark and both the states are justified to declare their relations as ‘higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel and sweeter than honey’. For sustaining such remarkable relations, both the states are determined to address the irritants which might disrupt their relationships which are given below.

 China is worried about underground movements of separatism, terrorism and extremism of Uighur organizations. They intend to withdraw from China in the Muslim majority province of Xinjiang. Xinjiang is located near the borders of Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhtan, Tajkistan and Pakistan, and all these Muslim states are facing religious extremism up to certain degrees. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan

192 ‘Economic Corridor in focus as Pak-China sign 51 MoUs of $46 b’, Pakistan Observer (21 April 2015). 193 Fazal-ur-Rehman, ‘Traditional and emerging areas of strategic cooperation between Pakistan and China’, pp.60- 61.

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and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the emergence of five Central Asian Muslim majority states created perceptive impact on separatists’ movements in Xingjian during 1980s and 1990s. China complained to Pakistan about alleged involvement of some Pakistani political religious parties with the separatists groups in Xinhiang.194 During the first half of 1990s, Pakistan showed lukewarm response but initiated serious measures to curb such activities in the second half of 1990s.195 Pakistan gave the assurances that its soil will not be utilized for any detrimental activities against China.196 In December 2003, Pakistan killed a number of alleged terrorists including Hasan Mahsum, a leader of separatist movement in China.197  For containing Uighur separate movement,198 both the states agreed to institutionalize an anti-terrorism dialogue and to establish intelligence sharing network. Both the states conducted joint military exercises on anti-terrorism in 2004 and 2006.199 China and Pakistan signed an agreement on combating extremism, separatism and terrorism in 2005 during Premier Wen Jiabo’s visit to Pakistan.200

The enduring Sino-Pak economic and trade engagements are the part of ‘China’s grand Strategy’ that has recently announced with a new name of ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) on March 2015.201 The OBOR is not a single trade route and comprises on the combination of multiple routes as, China-Mongolia-Russia, a new Eurasian Land Bridge, China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridors, China-Central Asia-West Asia, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor

194 Fazal-ur-Rehman, ‘Pakistan’s Relations with China’, Strategic Studies, Vol.xix &xx, No. 4&1 (Winter and Spring 1998), pp.81-84. 195 Ibid. 196 General Musharraf gave the assurances to China during his visit to Beijing in 2001. 197 Fazal-ur-Rehman, ‘Traditional and emerging areas of strategic cooperation between Pakistan and China’, p.49. 198 Ibid, p.50.Uighur separatists accepted the responsibility of four major terrorist attempts which were designed for targeting Chinese nationals in Pakistan during 2004-2008. Though, the casualties of Chinese nationals were limited but had deep scar on the face of Pak-China relations. 199 Ibid. 200 ‘Pak, China sign extradition treaty’, Daily Times (12 December 2007). 201 China’s OBOR initiative is not a simple trade route but it is a comprehensive strategy as Chinese undertake it as, ‘an aspiring economic idea of the cooperation and opening up an organized project planned by the silk route spirit that pursues to establish a community of common interests, destiny and obligation’. National Development and Reform Commission 2015, downloaded from www.en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/20150330_669367.html on june 11, 2016. Tim Summers, ‘Road to Wider Market’ downloaded from www.slideshare.net/gurconnector/what-exactly-is- one-belt-one-toad-summers on June 8, 2016.

300 and as well as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.202 According to Xing Guangchen, ‘CPEC has the significance not only for Pakistan but will encompass the remaining states of the region’.203 Thus, it is anticipated that China’s OBOR would become a prime source of economic integration between India, Pakistan and China that would lead towards South Asian Strategic stability.

7.5 Additional Solutions for Regional Strategic Stability

To encompass trilateral security dilemma and to sustain South Asian strategic stability, stability under Unipolarity and arms control measures within bilateral, trilateral and multilateral levels are elaborated, and the above discussion provides appropriate interpretations in determining workable solutions for the regional strategic stability which are given:

 The existing global strategic architecture is under Unipolarity and the US is executing as a unipolar. The US has the capability for defusing the conflicting South Asian environment as it has contributed during Indo-Pak crises, but for maintaining status quo under Unipolarity, it would not intrude in the existing regional political and strategic issues. Thus, the US will hardly get involved in resolving the core issues between India and Pakistan for sustaining South Asian strategic stability and mediating the demand for the US may remain fruitless. The realistic preference for regional strategic stability will be assimilated by addressing the trilateral core issues with mutual consensus.

The strategic stability of South Asian region is mainly based upon the strategic relations of India and Pakistan. Bilateral formal Indo-Pak arms control measures are insufficient for abating nuclear arms competition and for procuring regional strategic stability. So, informal measures are more appropriate and in view of above discussion, following solutions are given:

 Political will of both the states can seek to make the incremental progress with a significance leap by addressing small issues. For instance, by reviewing the procedure of bilateral visa requirements and by opening regular and multiple transportation routes,

202 Irina Lonela Pop, ‘Strength and Challenges of China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative’, Center for Geopolitics and Security in Realism Studies London (February 8, 2016), p.2, downloaded from www.cgsrs.org on June 14, 2016. The OBOR seeks to bring together Central Asia, Baltic States, Russia and China; linking China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and Indian Ocean; joining China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central and West Asia, downloaded from www.en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/20150330_669367.html on June 11, 2016. 203 Xing Guangcheng (Director General, Institute of Chinese Bordrland Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing) expressed during roundtable conference at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad on May 5, 2017

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they would proceed towards trust building and the spill over impacts of such measures would lead in resolving the long standing issues i.e. Sir Creek, Siachin and even Kashmir. During the existing regional strategic environment, a crisis could erupt at any time, but above mentioned measures might minimize the destruction of next crisis and sustain stability. This idea already appears in the minds of policymakers of both the states as Menon (Indian National Security Advisor) stated:204

While building economic and other links during addressing the security and political issues, one should not assume that we ignore security and political issues. We are proceeding rapidly on the connectivity, people to people, tourism, trade and economic links, including energy and grid connectivity, which can contribute much for improving our future

Similarly, similar views were expressed from Pakistan as, ‘addressing trade ties, both the states may receive a boost towards the solutions of longstanding issues from Siachin to an issue as big as Kashmir’.205  Political leadership of both the states could establish understanding at a higher level without involving their bureaucracies. For instance, sporadic natural disasters may provide the opportunities for cooperation that can change sentiments in an emotional context. After the earthquake 2005, India offered Pakistan for relief supplies through Kashmir. Regional organizations, i.e. SAARC might be utilized for the preparation on disaster managements that could bring security and relief agencies closer for a common cause. Additionally, cricket diplomacy might be adopted in creating the condition for symbolic change.  When civil-military bureaucracy remains involved in incremental politico-military measures, political leadership may initiate symbolic changes in remaining fields i.e. trade and energy cooperation, which may lead towards major progress but it might not be feasible for security CBMs. For instance, at the political level, both the states would plan to expand trade opportunities and Pakistan could announce ‘Most Favored Nation (MFN)’ status to India. In response, India could remove many of stifling non-tariff barrier to trade. The establishment of trade zone at Wahgah is a major step towards trade

204 Speech by Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon at the Asian Relations Conference, March 9. 2012, downloaded from www.icwa.in>pdjs/NSASpeechARC2012.pdf on August 10, 2015. 205 ‘Pakistan-India Trade’ Dawn (9 May 2012).

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that may lead towards starting of other trade zones.206 Such initiatives have significance in developing CBMs but security establishments might be suspicious and they can be motivated by involving them in trade affairs. Economic activities by trade expansion can enhance bilateral cooperation that can lead to regional strategic stability.  The existing communication mechanism between the security establishments of both the states is pertinent in seeking incremental progress in areas where technical and legal notifications are irrelevant especially in security field. Civil and military bureaucracies of the states are involved in such negotiations. For instance, if both the states intend to expand the missile notification up to the tests of cruise missiles, the security officials of both the states could proceed beyond the formal negotiations. The participation of technical experts of both the states during negotiations on nuclear security would provide assistance about the implementation of decisions on technical grounds. With the consultation of technical experts, the reciprocal regional training courses about nuclear safety and security might be arranged between the two states, because such training would be useful during upcoming crises and it will provoke the process of CBMs between the two states.

According to Sino-Indian arms control measures, both the states have initiated formal and informal measures for promoting harmony between them. China has reassessed its policy for accomplishing the superpower status by upholding its economic rise and planned to initiate trade relations with India, but their existing territorial issues are the main source of mistrust between them. For contending mistrust, both the states have initiated various measures i.e. formal political framework, bilateral cooperation for resolving territorial and water issues etc. such measures could invoke the South Asian strategic stability in the following ways:

 China falls among the fastest growing economies at the global level and for sustaining its economic rise, it would aspire to promote peace both at the global and regional level and especially with India.  China may minimize US influence in the region by economically engaging India.

206 Aditi Phadnis and Shahram Haq, ‘Major Strides: India Opens Door to More Trade with Pakistan’, Express Tribune (14 April 2012).

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 Presently, China is relying upon a trade route of India’s southern coast via Strait of Malacca in Indian Ocean, for fulfilling its energy requirements and for the transportation of its exports. China is a net oil importer since 1994 and its one third oil import is approximately seven percent of the overall world’s oil demand as 5.46 million barrels a day. While, India consumes 2 million barrels a day and imports two third of its oil demand which could reach to 7.4 million barrels a day by 2025. China’s 50 percent oil import is transported from Middle East via Indian Ocean and 80 percent of its imports are also transported close to India’s southern coast via Strait of Malacca. China’s oil consumption is estimated double by 2025 and its 70 percent would be imported from Middle East. India is an important Indian Ocean power and Sino-Indian friendly relations would provide security assurances to China during transportation.207  Sino-Indian friendly relations may have spillover impact in normalizing Pak-India relations in future.

The existing China’s Grand strategy about peaceful and economic rise compels Pakistan to realign its objectives about Pak-China relations as:

Besides accomplishing military modernization and adopting realist theory of balance of power, Pakistan may focus upon Sino-Pak economic ties according to the realist theory of interdependence. The latest developments on CPEC are the most feasible proceedings for Pakistan to overcome its economic strangulations, but the prevailing poor governance and ruthless law and order situation of Pakistan may generate complications for the roadmaps of CPEC. So, Pakistan must eliminate these issues and shape appropriate environment for economic development not only for China but for the rest of the world also.

The trilateral relations between India, Pakistan and China have become multi-dimensional, deeper and more complex over a period of time besides the realist’s assumptions in determining China’s calculations towards South Asia. Due to its expanded interests in the South Asian region,

207 Rizwan Zeb, ‘Pakistan-China Relations: Where they go from here? UNISCI Discussion Papers, No.9 (May 2012), pp.54-55. Amna Yousaf Khokhar, ‘Sino-Indian Relations: Implications for Pakistan’, Paper presented at the seminar on ‘Pakistan-China Relations-2011: Year of Friendship’, organized by the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, (11-12 January 2011), pp.4-5.

304 it is anticipated that China would employ more attention to the region in future on the following grounds:

 China has signed the agreements with both India and Pakistan to establish mega infrastructure in the region in support of its trade routes i.e. CPEC, the construction of high speed railway track along Chennoi-Banglore-Maysore etc. China’s particular economic desires including its trade routes and natural resources for its sustainable economic growth transformed the scale of its impact and the balance of its relations in the region. China will aspire to retain peaceful strategic environment in support of its trade routes that will compel it to actively participate in reconciliation between India and Pakistan, which will ultimately uphold the strategic stability in the region. Additionally, China’s recent initiative about OBOR would not only bridge the gap between the continents but would increase economic activities between India, Pakistan and has the potential to become a gateway to Central Asian States and Russian Federation also.  However, The US role under Unipolarity may compel China in maintaining status quo. The continuing South Asian disputes may not have been addressed, but it would be supportive for maintaining the regional stability in the nuclearized region while carrying along more economic rewards.

Likewise, after elaborating multilateral arms control measures, i.e. CTBT, FMCT and NPT in the context of South Asian strategic environment, it is anticipated that despite encouraging arms control, the existing multilateral initiatives diversified regional strategic atmosphere due to Indo- US civil nuclear deal and the US backing of India’s favor for membership in NSG. Multilateral measures may endorse South Asian strategic stability if the US ratify them and by eliminating its discriminatory posture by providing similar provisions to both India and Pakistan. Additionally, SCO forum may minimize arms competition and strengthen strategic stability in the region which will ultimately restrain South Asian security dilemma, the strategic triangle: India-Pakistan and China, by addressing their economic and security concerns.

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Conclusion

The primary objective of this research has been to examine trilateral relationship by evaluating their socioeconomic and strategic environment within the parameters of the theories of international relations. In the post-Cold War era, the China’s growing military modernization due to its rapid economic growth has undermined India’s aspirations of becoming regional super power. In response, India’s defense preparations for containing China have created serious repercussions for the survivability and security of Pakistan and deepened its (Pakistan’s) security dilemma.

South Asian security architecture is mainly based upon Pak-India’s strategic relations while China has a direct impact in intensifying nuclear and conventional arms competition that ultimately generates South Asian security dilemma and regional strategic instability.1 The central argument of this research comprised on the findings that ‘Sino-Indian competition and security dilemma affects the Indo-Pak security framework’. To investigate the main exponents due to which South Asian strategic instability persists and China’s role in promoting South Asian strategic stability are examined within realist paradigm.

The present research has given the answers of the following key questions articulated at the beginning of this study.

The objective of this study was to explore these questions and realism provides understanding about triangular relationship between India-Pakistan and China. For evaluating state’s response in an anarchic world, power is striking in realism due to which states seek to maximize their power

1 See references 139-146 of Chapter 6.

306 potentials which ultimately leads towards arms race that creates asymmetry and exacerbates security dilemma between them. Trilateral security dilemma is asserted by applying four models of realism (theory of strategic triangle, key approaches of realism, security dilemma and trilateral strategic cultures).

The first model ‘theory of strategic triangle’ evaluates multiple dynamics of triangular relationship and elucidates that weaker one among the three states may opt to establish strategic relations with anyone of remaining two states to contain its security dilemma. Second model is based on the key approaches of realism i.e. classical, neo realism, defensive and offensive. Classical realism explicates that the attainment of power is rooted in the flawed nature of humanity that compels the states to maximize their power potential. Similarly, neo realism clarifies that lust of power is a source of rivalries among the states and the states have the options either to become defensive or to attack the aggressors. Defensive realism proposes that states should enhance their power potential according to their available resources while, offensive realism argues that the states must maintain an ‘appropriate’ amount of power to inflict unacceptable damage to the aggressors. Third model ‘security dilemma’ provides exponents in determining the complexities of trilateral relationships and its supporting approaches i.e. stability-instability paradox, theory of deterrence and balance of power elucidate various strategies for containing trilateral security dilemma. Fourth model ‘trilateral strategic culture’ evaluates strategic response of India, Pakistan and China during crises. The diverse cultural backgrounds of the three states provide understanding in assessing their forthcoming strategic response.

The attainment of power is a main proponent in realism due to which the states intend to reassure their sovereignty and survival. During World War II, international politics was a struggle of power that engendered insecurity and shaped arms race among the states as, Britain and Germany were busy in a very costly ‘boat race’ and both had the intentions to build more battleships then the other. After World War II, the states planned to follow various strategies to augment their power potentials i.e. by joining alliances, signing defense pacts. Likewise, the basic concept of strategic triangle was also associated with the triadic relationship between USA, the Soviet Union and China during 1960s that attracted debate in the academia and political arena. Triangular relationship was assumed as a strategic tool among various states and strategic triangle India-Pakistan and China is also included among them. The trilateral strategic relations between India-Pakistan and China are

307 analyzed within the debate of China’s impact on Pak-India’s strategic relations in endorsing South Asian strategic stability.

The South Asian strategic construct is focused around Indo-Pak relations and the root cause of animosity between them can be traced back to the times prior to partition. Apart from some common characteristics between Hindus and Muslims in the Sub-continent (common language, social and cultural background), religion is the prime factor in developing hatred due to mutually antithetical approach of Hinduism and Islam. Under the powerful hold of Mughal emperors, Hindus followed Kutilya’s asana (staying quite) and kept a low profile which did not permit them to adopt an aggressive attitude.

In British colonial rule, Hindus carried belligerent posture towards Muslims which led to the division of the Sub-continent's population while giving birth to two nation theory. This resulted in the territorial division of the Sub-continent into two separate states. The image of India in Pakistan is that of a hostile nation and the primary threat to Pakistan’s security. Legacies of mistrust between India and Pakistan at the time of partition (communal riots, unfair distribution of civil and military assets and disputes on the accession of princely states of Junagarh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir2) contributed severe security crises for Pakistan. Likewise, differences on the issues of Siachin, Sir Creek, Wullar Barrage and Tulbural Navigation project, also accompanied the already existing mistrust and animosity between India and Pakistan. India intends to acquire its preeminence both at regional and global level due to its population, strategic location and according to Nehruvian philosophy of ‘Greater India’, and assumes Pakistan the main obstacle on its way of becoming a regional superpower. The glorification of militant culture of India and Pakistan also intensified warlike atmosphere between them.

China’s strategic culture is defensive in nature and is based on its five principles of peaceful coexistence that compelled China to establish friendly relations with the remaining world including India.3 Both China and India enjoyed warm relations during 1949-1959, but both got

2 The two states were involved in wars in 1948, 1965 and in 1971 on Kashmir issue. However, the war of 1971 was not directly related to Kashmir issue but its consequences had the impact on the future of Kashmir. After the war of 1971, Shimla agreement was signed in July 1972 provided that both the states would resolve their disputes through bilateral talks, but India did not show seriousness in holding talks on Kashmir issue. Whenever, Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue at the international forum, India denied to accept third party mediation and proclaimed bilateral issue according to Shimla agreement. Kashmir issue is still bone of contention between India and Pakistan. 3 See References 64-65 of Chapter 2.

308 involved in a territorial dispute which led to a full scale war in 1962. After 1962, both China and Pakistan found a common enemy in India that compelled them to establish friendly relations. Ever since, Sino-Pak relations are partially India specific and Pakistan’s threat perceptions remain Indo- centric that compelled Pakistan in enhancing its military might with the collaboration of China’s assistance. The main adjunct of China’s support to Pakistan was to align regional balance to contain India that was according to realist theory of balance of power. China conducted nuclear test in 1964 to contain its adversaries in the absence of nuclear allies and supported Pakistan during Pak-India war 19654 that provoked India’s security perceptions against China and Pakistan. To comprehend both China and Pakistan, India adopted neo-realist model by signing defense pact with the Soviet Union in 19715. It conducted a nuclear test in 1974 and proclaimed it to be a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE).6 India’s PNE intensified Pakistan’s threat perceptions and provoked its security dilemma that compelled Pakistan to adopt realist theory balance of power by initiating its nuclear weapon program. Despite various hindrances (US embargo, India’s plan to target Pakistan’s nuclear installations, international pressure for the cancellation of France- Pakistan deal for nuclear reprocessing plant and India’s media propaganda against Pakistan’s nuclear program), Pakistan steadily carried on with its nuclear program and in 1983-84, pronounced its nuclear weapons capability. China continued its cooperation with Pakistan in the sphere of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and US repeatedly accused China in support of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, which was frequently denied by both Pakistan and China.7 To evaluate Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear potential, India launched two military exercises during 1986-87 and in 1990, but their nuclear capabilities did not permit them to proceed in combat. Both India and Pakistan became overt nuclear weapons states by conducting nuclear tests in May 1998.

4 See References 161-164 of Chapter 2. 5 This pact could not permit China to intrude in Pak-India war 1971. However, China continued economic and arm assistance to Pakistan even after 1971 and provided a remarkable beginning for a durable and productive relationship in military assistance and cooperation for Pakistan. China’s assistance was perceived as a provocation for India’s security perceptions. 6 The main objective behind India’s PNE was to get international standing and prestige to procure greater leverage in international affairs. Similarly, Nehruvian assumption of ‘Greater India’ also compelled India to acquire nuclear posture. 7 See Reference 201 of Chapter 3.

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After obtaining overt nuclear power status, it was anticipated that the two states would not involve in conflicts. However, their prevalent strategic atmosphere refuted this assumption. During the Kargil crisis in 1999, in 2001-2002 military standoff and after Mumbai attacks 2008, likelihood of nuclear conflict loomed higher than ever. Likewise, extremists’ role in the region and the elite mind-sets, have further widen the schisms. After the 1999 crisis, the role of domestic actors has particularly precipitated the vulnerability of regional strategic environment. Their existence has often disrupted the proceedings of peace initiatives between India and Pakistan.

Nonetheless, the presence of nuclear weapons kept the conflict between India and Pakistan at a limited level. The realist theory of decision theoretic deterrence provides the understanding about their nuclear stances during crises. In the beginning of 21st century, China introduced the term ‘Peaceful Rise’ that did not permit it to intervene in post 1998 Indo-Pak crises that relegates China’s involvement in upcoming South Asian conflict management during crises.

In post-Cold War era, significant changes emerged in international system and global strategic architecture shifted from Bipolarity to Unipolarity and the US is executing as a sole superpower. Unipolar power would tend to maintain the status quo and would not admit territorial conquests or international alignments initiated by the rising states.8 So, the US played pivotal role in maintaining status quo and defused tensions in the South Asian region during Kargil crisis in 1999, in 2001-2002 military standoff and in Mumbai terror attacks 2008. This state behavior of the US predicts the enduring importance of the US in regional conflict management in future as well.

For sustaining its Unipolar status under Unipolarity, the US has adopted both the strategies of internal balancing (enhancing internal economic and military capabilities) and external balancing (forging alliances). The US anticipated China as its potential competitor due to its (China’s) enduring economic growth and military modernization,9 and planned to contain China by encircling it with the collaboration of likeminded allies such as India.10 Similarly, the US containment strategies11 compelled China to initiate the policy of ‘Active Defense’ by adopting internal balancing and decided to focus on its military modernization to encompass the US

8 See References 50- 53 of Chapter 7. 9 See References 3-4 of introduction. 10 See Reference 48 of Chapter 6. 11 See Reference 49 of Chapter 6.

310 hegemony. So, China’s persisting force posture, doctrine and command and control are mainly focused to comprehend the US. The motive behind China’s military modernization is to get the superpower status at the global level while India has the desire of becoming regional superpower. It presumes China the main impediment on its way of becoming South Asian super power. Control over the Indian Ocean is the main conflicting point, because it is anticipated that whoever regulates the Indian Ocean would rule Asia. Both the states adopted containment and counter containment strategies towards each other and power transition theory provided theoretical understanding related to their strategic behavior. India adopted ‘Look East’ policy by applying triangular model in shaping actor’s external behavior in the context of economic interdependence, institutional identification and power structure. China followed the strategy of ‘String of Pearls’ in matching India. The US and Japan also reinforced India in restraining China’s growing influence in the region. Sino-Indian countering strategies resulted in an arms race that make the regional strategic environment critical.

Sino-Indian arms race has serious implication on South Asian strategic environment. In a regional triangle India, Pakistan and China; India confronts China and Pakistan which it has for many decades deemed to be its main security threat. But they are quite unequal one: as China is bigger and stronger than India, while India is bigger and stronger than Pakistan. An asymmetry due to Sino-Indian arms race further aggravates Pak-India strategic environment critical. To sustain South Asian strategic stability, both India and Pakistan initiated measures for assuring their nuclear deterrence credible by adopting CMD postures. The three states are not only striving in enhancing their nuclear stockpiles but have established their delivery mechanisms also. Moreover, the states have possessed sufficient nuclear arsenals to deter each other and their credible delivery mechanisms made them capable to target all important military and civilian installations of each other. To meet the challenges during crises, the three states have developed their nuclear doctrines but lack of trust between them could not permit to concede the nuclear doctrines of each other. India introduced 'Cold Start Doctrine' to counter any nuclear threats from Pakistan during crisis. Pakistan, on the other hand, developed ‘Nasar’ missile to counteract India’s Cold Start Doctrine. Moreover, India’s initiative to obtain BMD shaped diversified regional strategic environment. Due to the persistence of asymmetry, both India and Pakistan have developed a credible command and control systems on the similar strategies for the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals and for avoiding any nuclear accidents and miscalculations. The South Asian region could avoid

311 nuclear confrontation due to the existence of nuclear deterrence but the realist postulation of Stability-Instability Paradox12 explains the susceptibility of the existing strategic environment between India and Pakistan. The outcome of Sino-Indian arms competition has generated serious strategic repercussions on Indo-Pak relations that lead to security dilemma between India-Pakistan and China. Pakistan being the smallest one between the three assumes the severity in its security dilemma the most that exacerbated South Asian strategic instability.

In South Asian strategic environment, Indo-Pak conventional and nuclear arms competition is a stable factor and the existing trilateral strategic competition e.g. China versus India and India versus Pakistan engenders Indo-Pak security framework and intensifies South Asian security dilemma that exacerbates regional strategic instability. Thus, the entire debate validates the hypothesis of this research as, ‘Sino-Indian competition and security dilemma effects the Indo-Pak security framework’.

The fragility of the South Asian strategic architecture emphasizes to address arms control measures and both formal and informal measures are elaborated in determining regional strategic stability. Formal arms control measures are analyzed by examining multiple mechanisms i.e. at bilateral, trilateral, multilateral and regional institutional level and regional stability is re-examined under Unipolarity.

It is problematic to instigate bilateral arms control measures between China and India because China’s military preparations are mainly to contain the US at the global level, and India comprehends China a threat at the regional level. This generates asymmetry between them. Furthermore, the two states have established various channels for consultation, bilateral dialogue, mutual understanding, formation of political framework to promote bilateral cooperation and resolve territorial disputes, but their existing border and water disputes remain a constant source of suspicion and mistrust between them.

South Asian strategic stability is mainly based on India and Pakistan and formal arms control measures are hardly feasible due to lack of trust, ambiguous status between them related to hair- trigger alerts and conflicting strategies about NFU and India’s determinations about BMD.

12 See References 90-96 of Chapter 1.

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Similarly, political disagreements in resolving strategic issues have provoked nuclear arms race between them.

Likewise, it is critical to evaluate trilateral arms control measures between India, Pakistan and China due to their persisting arms competition and military preparations that generate lack of trust between them. Both India and Pakistan might be convinced to establish a comparable ceiling of their nuclear stockpiles but it would be challenging for India because India would be required to allocate some additional weapons as deterrent against China. Furthermore, Indo-Pak disagreements on NPT further created diverse strategic environment to restrain trilateral arms competition.

After elaborating multilateral arms control measures, i.e. CTBT, FMCT and NPT in the context of South Asian strategic environment, it is anticipated that despite encouraging arms control, the existing multilateral initiatives diversified regional strategic atmosphere due to Indo-US civil nuclear deal and the US backing in India’s favor for NSG. Multilateral measures may endorse South Asian strategic stability if the US ratify them. The US needs to eliminate its discriminatory posture by providing similar provisions to both India and Pakistan. On the contrary, SCO has the potential to reduce arms competition and promote South Asian strategic stability by addressing their economic and security issues. To avoid conflicts and promote strategic stability in the region, cooperative measures, i.e. dialogue, compromise, deal-making, have the potential to transform the adversarial relations. Similarly, threat reduction and confidence building have the capability in promoting peace and stability.

The existing global strategic scenario is experiencing Unipolarity and the US has appeared as a Unipole. The US has the capability of defusing the conflicting South Asian environment as it has contributed during Indo-Pak crisis, but in order to maintain the status quo under Unipolarity, it would not intrude in the existing regional political and strategic issues. Thus, the US will not get involved in resolving the core issues between India and Pakistan to sustain South Asian strategic stability. The demand for mediation is hence in vain. The realistic preference for regional strategic stability will therefore be in addressing the trilateral core issues with mutual consensus.

The aforementioned arms control measures are less likely to promote South Asian strategic stability. However, the informal arms control measures between India, Pakistan and China are

313 comparatively more applicable in sustaining regional strategic stability by engrossing the root causes of their trust deficit through CBMs. Both India and Pakistan also initiated various CBMs for obtaining regional strategic stability i.e. establishment of communication network between high officials, early warning notification about missile tests and military exercises, opening up new trade routes, encouraging people to people contact and the revival of dialogue process on strategic issues. To materialize CBMs, both the states signed Lahore accord on February 21, 1999.13 Likewise, to explore the substitutes in resolving the core issues, both the states initiated Track II diplomacy with the collaboration of nonofficial actors.14 Both the states expressed their determinations to address all bilateral issues including Kashmir during SAARC conference in January 2004.15 Both the states initiated various CBMs to provoke trust during 2006-2016.16 Both the states must adopt symbolic and incremental strategies during formulating the agreements.17 To acquire fruitful outcomes, sincere determination of both the states is inevitable, but besides obtaining parochial motives, both the states intend to get politico-diplomatic point scoring. Moreover, CBMs are powerless to address Kashmir issue which is the focal point of contention. Without resolving Kashmir issue,18 it would be critical to promote strategic stability in the region.

Under such provisions, China planned to initiate a new economic order for promoting justice and peace according to its Grand Strategy, which was based upon its five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. China reviewed its policy and followed more evenhanded approach towards India and Pakistan. It professed Sino-Indian and Sino-Pakistani relations independent of each other. China planned to establish economic relations with India and has become second largest trade partner after the US, and both China and India planned to raise their mutual trade up to $ 100

13 For details, see reference 60 of Chapter 4. 14 See reference 147 of Chapter 7. 15 Nonetheless, SAARC charter could not allow the member states to address their political disputes, but both the states agreed to start dialogue to resolve Kashmir issue and avoid nuclear conflict. 16 For details, please see References 160-168 of Chapter 7. 17 Symbolic strategy is adequate to address socio-cultural and economic CBMs because these are closely related with the everyday life of a common people that generate tangible impact on their lives. Likewise, politico-military CBMs are associated with incremental strategy because these are appropriate for the security personnel to encounter security challenges and to averse risky measures. 18 For details, please see References 133-141 of Chapter 2. Under the existing regional strategic environment, the most appropriate resolution on Kashmir is Pervez Musharraf’s four-point agenda, a gradual withdrawal of troops, self-governance, no changes to the region’s borders and joint supervision mechanism. ‘Musharraf Offers Kashmir ‘Solution’, The Guardian (5 December 2006), downloaded from www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/05/pakistan-india on November 26, 2016.

314 billion during 2010-2015.19 China and India have signed a comprehensive five-year plan for economic and trade development in 2014 and pledged to invest $ 20 billion in various projects.20 China intends to access a trustworthy trade route to sustain its economic rise and to fulfil its energy requirements which is central to its ‘Grand Strategy’. Pakistan’s geo-strategic location has significance for China’s access to Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s Gawadar port has a vital potential to become a gateway for China’s shortest trade route between Xingjian and Gawadar. The construction of road and rail network between Xingjian and Gawadar, the agreement on China- Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC) was signed including 51 agreements of $46 billion to provide technical and financial assistance to Pakistan to overcome energy crisis in April 2015.21 China’s latest development about a new Silk Road Project with a new name of ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) is another mega economic development that has a significance not only for India, Pakistan and China, but for the whole of South Asia, Central and West Asia also.22 China’s trade relations with both India and Pakistan are critical for China’s policy makers to manage China’s relations with both the states because Pakistan is its time tested ally while India is its potential competitor. Despite persisting Sino-Indian economic and trade relations, a strong refutation exists in strategic triangle of India-Pakistan and China, with China and Pakistan on one side and India on the other. Strategically, China is more inclined towards Pakistan because Sino-Pak relations are based on ‘all weather’ strategic cooperative partnership, while Sino-Indian strategic partnership is still underway. China’s emerging economic rise has generated vulnerabilities between the states in envisaging China’s strategic response in future but it is projected that Pak-China relations would become stable due to their past record of cordial bilateral relations, shared strategic and regional stances, mutual trust and in the absence of territorial disputes. Pakistan admired China’s economic rise because it is expected that China’s rise would become the source of security and strength for Pakistan. Apart from obtaining economic and strategic objectives, both China and Pakistan have anticipated a transformation of the people's welfare of both the states in the times to come.

It is hardly foreseeable to estimate the impact of Sino-Indian trade relations on Pak-India’s enduring strategic relations because enmity between India and Pakistan is deep rooted and has

19 See Reference 181 of Chapter 7. 20 For details, please see Reference 182 of Chapter 7. 21 Please see Reference 192 and table 7.2 of Chapter 7. 22 For details, please see References 201-203 of Chapter 7.

315 thrived over the years. Despite Indo-China growing economic ties, it is less likely that it would help in the reduction of mistrust between India and Pakistan. To mitigate the existing arms race between the two under the circumstances look distant. However, it can be anticipated that China’s trade relations with both India and Pakistan may have spill over impact in lessening their ongoing mistrusts.

The existing China’s Grand strategy about peaceful and economic rise compels Pakistan to realign its objectives in Pak-China relations. Besides accomplishing military modernization and adopting realist theory of balance of power, Pakistan needs to focus on Sino-Pak economic ties according to theory of interdependence. The latest developments on CPEC are the most feasible proceedings for Pakistan to overcome its economic strangulations. Understandably, the existing discrepancies in sliding governance and law and order situation is an impediment in achieving the desired results, however, by addressing these issues effectively and by the provision of conducive environment, the region can bear the fruits of prosperity and development. This would have a domino effect on the environment in the world at large.

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