PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1999-2008
BY:
IRUM SHAHEEN PH.D (RESEARCH SCHOLAR)
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR.
(May 2014) PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1999-2008
A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE
SESSION: 2006-2007
In the Name of ALLAH
The Most Merciful The Most Beneficent
DEDICATION
To The Holiest Man ever born, Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) & My Dear Parents & Family who are an embodiment of diligence and honesty, without their prayers and support, this dream could have never come true
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ACKNOWLEDGEMNTS
All praise to ALLAH, the most gracious and merciful, who gave me the power to do, the sight to observe and the mind to think, judge and analyze.
I offer my humble thanks from the core of my heart to the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) who is forever a torch of guidance and knowledge for humanity as a whole.
I am greatly thankful to my Supervisor Professor Dr. Taj Moharram Khan whose sincere support and supervision enabled me to complete my research.
I am also greatly indebted to my parents who supported me morally, socially and financially and always prayed for my success and bright future.
Irum Shaheen Ph.D Scholar Department of Political Science University of Peshawar
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DECLARATION
I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my individual research and it has not been submitted to any other university for any other degree.
Irum Shaheen Ph.D Scholar Department of Political Science University of Peshawar Date: May 15, 2014
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ABSTRACT
Pakistan and India are two important neighbors in the South Asia and geographically both hold strategic position in the region. Unfortunately, their history of relationship is replete with hostile postures and blame game with rare periods of cordial interactions.
Though the desire for peace and cooperation has always been there, some factors have obstructed any positive development to take place for the development of
Pakistan−India relationship. Both the countries have suffered economically and diplomatically due to their security centered policies for each other. The nuclear power status of both Pakistan and India along with the international pressures has increased the need for peace and collaboration more intensely than before.
The peace process started between Pakistan and India and the steps taken since 1999 clearly marked a significant change in the status quo which prevailed during the previous eras. The Composite Dialogue initiated formally in 2004 and the willingness on both sides to take initiatives regarding all the major disputes by holding negotiations has been, no doubt, a positive change in the tension ridden environment of South Asia.
Provided the healthy and changed environment of trust building and increasing people to people contacts during 1999-2008, one can clearly see and hope for a very close cooperation in economic, diplomatic, political and social fields. War is no more an option for these nuclear powers and in the world of today where regional economic integration is a way forward for development and stability, Pakistan and India need to increase their cooperation in all the potential fields and move for the resolution of all the outstanding disputes. This will surely lead towards the improvement of conditions of the poor people on both sides coupled with the economic integration and development of the whole South Asian region.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
S.No Title Page.No Acknowledgements i Declaration ii Abstract iii Table of Contents iv List of Tables viii List of Figures ix List of Abbreviations xi Map of South Asia xiv Map of Pakistan xv Map of India xvi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Introduction 2-5 1.2 Objectives of the Study 5 1.3 Significance 5 1.4 Literature Review 6 1.5 Conceptual Framework 10 1.6 Methodology 13 1.7 Justification 15 1.8 Chapter Structure 16-18 1.9 Conclusion 18
Chapter 2 Pakistan−India Relations in Historical Perspective 19
2.1 Introduction 20
2.2 Various Phases of Relationship 21 2.2.1. The First Phase: 1947-1966 22 2.2.1.1 Issue of Princely States 24 2.2.1.2 1947: First War on Kashmir 26 2.2.1.3 Dispute on Evacuee Property 30 2.2.1.4 The Issue of Finance Distribution 31 2.2.1.5 Indian Stance over Pakistan’s Share of Military Supplies 32 2.2.1.6 State of Collaboration in Economic Sphere 32 2.2.1.7 Dispute over Indus Water 34 2.2.1.8 Progress on Kashmir: 1960-1965 39 2.2.1.9 The Issue of Rann of Kutch 1965 41 2.2.1.10 Moving Towards a Full Scale War 1965 44 2.2.1.11 Post War Developments and Tashkent Declaration 48
2.2.2 The Second Phase: 1967-1989 52 2.2.2.1 Developments in Kashmir and Impact on Pak−India Relations 53 2.2.2.2 Another Water Dispute 55 v
2.2.2.3 1971 War and Pakistan−India Tensions 57
2.2.2.4 Towards Normalizing Relations: The Shimla Agreement1972 61 2.2.2.5 The Post Shimla Developments: Impacts on Pak−India Relations 65 2.2.2.6 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Pak−India Relations 66 2.2.2.7 Kashmir Question Again 67 2.2.2.8 Siachen Dispute 70 2.2.2.9 The Post 1976 Diplomatic Developments in Pakistan−India Relations 72 2.2.2.10 Conspiracy for Kahuta Attack (1984) 73 2.2.2.11 The 1986-87 Crisis of Brasstacks 74 2.2.2.12 Pakistan’s Re-Entry to Commonwealth and the Indian Stand 76 2.2.2.13 Fruitless Negotiations on Sir Creek Dispute 77
2.2.3 The Third Phase 1990-1998 80 2.2.3.1 Growing Insurgency in Kashmir 80 2.2.3.2 War Clouds Gathering in 1990s 82 2.2.3.3 Consular Missions of Pakistan and Indian Activities 82 2.2.3.4 Cooperation on Disarmament and Nuclearization 83 2.2.3.5 Resuming Dialogue and the Move Towards Cooperation 86 2.2.3.6 Nuclear Tests in 1998 and its Impact on Pakistan−India Negotiations 87
2.2.4 The Fourth Phase: 1999-2008 90 2.2.5 Conclusion 91
Chapter 3 Causes of the Hostile Pakistan−India Relationship 93
3.1 Introduction 94
3.2 Causes of Tension Between Pakistan and India 96 3.2.1 Indian Efforts to undo Pakistan 96 3.2.2 Pakistan’s Perception of Matching with India 98 3.2.3 Pre-Partition Hatred 100 3.2.4 Pro-Conflict Policy advocacy Coalitions 103 3.2.5 Choosing Between War and Peace Options 106 3.2.6 Indian Leadership Role 108 3.2.7 Ideological Differences / Religious Conflicts 110 3.2.8 Post-Independence Hostility 113 3.2.9 Perceptions and Images 117 3.2.10 The Role of the British 120 3.2.11 Role of Media 127 3.2.12 Intra-State Conflicts 131 3.2.13 Nuclear Weapons 135 3.2.14 Military Interests 138 3.2.15 Role of International Actors 141 vi
3.2.16 Economic Instability 146 3.2.17 Minority Complex 147 3.3 Conclusion 150
Chapter 4 Consequences of Pakistan−India Hostility 152
4.1 Introduction 153
4.2 Costs of Pakistan−India Conflict 157 4.2.1 Military Consequences 157 4.2.2 Human Cost 159 4.2.3 Diplomatic Cost 163 4.2.3.1 Membership Problems in Different Organizations 164 4.2.3.2 A Blow to Disarmament and Non-Nuclearization Efforts 166 4.2.3.3 Enemies and Friends 167 4.2.3.4 Diplomatic Tensions 170 4.2.3.5 Dual Policies of International Community 171 4.2.3.6 Prisoners of Hostility 172 4.2.4 Economic Loses 174 4.2.4.1 Absence of Joint Ventures 175 4.2.4.2 Loss of Speedy Economic Growth 176 4.2.4.3 Impacts on Regional Economic Cooperation 177 4.2.4.4 Depressing Bilateral Trade 180 4.2.4.5 Loss of Potential Energy Cooperation 184 4.2.5 Social and Political Damages 186 4.2.5.1 Negative Transformation of the Society 187 4.2.5.2 Hardline Political Approaches 189 4.2.5.3 Less People to People Contacts/ Cultural Relations 191 4.2.5.4 Illiteracy, Poverty and Un-employment 192 4.2.5.5 Lack of Media Flow Across Borders 195 4.2.5.6 Internal Security Problems 197 4.2.5.7 Rise of Authoritarian Governments 198 4.2.5.8 Consequences of the Unresolved Issue of Kashmir 199 4.2.5.9 Possible Nuclear War 203 4.3 Conclusion 206
Chapter 5 The Pak−India Peace Process (1999-2008) 208
5.1 Assessing the Developments During 1999-2008: An 209 Introduction 5.2 Post-Nuclear Tests Phase and Pakistan−India Dialogue Process 212 5.3 Assessing the Developments in Pak−India Relations During 1999-2004 215 5.3.1 Lahore Declaration (1999): A Turning Point in Pakistan−India Relations 215 5.3.2 The Kargil Crisis 219 5.3.3 Military Coup in Pakistan and Pakistan−India Relations 221 5.3.4 The Agra Summit 223 vii
5.3.5 Post 9/11 Trends in Pakistan−India Relations 227
5.4 Need to Re-Approach 229 5.4.1 The Domestic Factor 232 5.4.2 Nuclear Dangers 235 5.4.3 Need of Economic Cooperation 237 5.4.4 Post 9/11 Effects on Pakistan−India Relations 239 5.4.5 International Role and Pressures 240 5.4.6 Track II Diplomacy 241
5.5 The Era of Composite Dialogue: 2004-2008 242 5.5.1 Peace and Security CBMs 246 5.5.1.1 Nuclear CBMs 246 5.5.1.2 Conventional CBMs 248 5.5.2 Siachen 252 5.5.3 Jammu & Kashmir 253 5.5.4 Sir Creek 255 5.5.5 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking 257 5.5.6 Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project 260 5.5.7 Economic and Commercial Cooperation 267 5.5.8 Promotion of Cooperation / Friendly Exchanges in Different Fields 272 5.6 Conclusion 273
Chapter 6 Conclusion (Recommendations and Future 275 Prospects)
6.1 Conclusion 276 6.2 Recommendations 281
Bibliography 303-315
Appendices 316-332
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LIST OF TABLES
CHAPTER−4
Table No. Title Page Table 4.1 Human Loss in Pakistan−India Wars: Casualties by Year 161 Table 4.2 Military Strength of Pakistan and India 162 Table 4.3 Pakistan−India: Their Membership on various Organizations till 2004 166 Table 4.4 India’s Trade Balance with Pakistan (US $ million) 182 Table 4.5 India’s Top Ten Exports to Pakistan (US $ million) 182 Table 4.6 India’s Top Ten Import from Pakistan (US $ million) 182 Table 4.7 Pakistan and India: Basic Indicators 194
CHAPTER−6
Table No. Title Page Table 6.1 Potential Areas for Pakistan−India Cooperation 289
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LIST OF FIGURES
CHAPTER−2
Figure No. Title Page Figure 2. 1 Indus River System 35 Figure 2. 2 General Ayub Khan welcoming Jawaharlal Nehru at Karachi Airport in September, 1960, after the latter’s arrival to sign 37 the Indus Water Treaty. Figure 2. 3 Signing Ceremony of Indus Water Treaty at Karachi on 38 September 19, 1960 Figure 2.4 Runn of Kutch on the top left in turquoise color 43 Figure 2.5 After signing the historic Tashkent Declaration at Tashkent, Soviet Union 50 Figure 2.6 Signing Ceremony of Simla Agreement, June 28, 1972 64 Figure 2.7 Siachen Glacier Area 72 Figure 2.8 The area of Sir Creek disputed between Pakistan and India 78 Figure 2.9 Sir Creek map: The Green Line’ shows the boundary claimed by Pakistan in Sir Creek and the ‘Red Line’ shows 79 the boundary claimed by India.
CHAPTER−3
Figure No. Title Page Figure 3.1 Pre-Partition Map of India 102 Figure 3.2 British India in August 1947 and Pakistan−India Map in 114 August 2007 Figure 3.3 Muslim migrants coming from India and sitting on the 116 roadside: 1947 Figure 3.4 The First Day of Indian Independence on August 15, 1947: 122 Mountbatten and Nehru Figure 3.5 June 3 rd Plan: Nehru, Mountbatten and Quaid-e-Azam 124 Muhammad Ali Jinnah Figure 3.6 Babri Mosque when attacked by the Hindu extremists: 134 December 6, 1992
CHAPTER−4
Figure No. Title Page Figure 4.1 Defence and Education Expenditures as a proportion of GDP 158 in Pakistan and India Figure 4.2 Relationship Pattern of other Countries with Pakistan and 169 India Figure 4.3 Intra-Regional Trade as a Percentage of Total Export of 179 Each Block (2002) Figure 4.4 Pakistan−India Bilateral Trade Level as a Proportion of 181 Pakistan’s Total Global Trade (In percentage)
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CHAPTER−5
Figure No. Title Page Figure 5.1 India's underground nuclear test on May 11, 1998 at 213 Pokhran in Rajasthan Figure 5.2 The Pakistani Scientists posing with a nice view of Koh 214 Kambaran in the background. Figure 5.3 Dust raised on Koh Kambaran in the Ras Koh Mountains 214 by the Pakistan First Test, May 28, 1998. Figure 5.4 Prime Ministers Atal Behari Vajpayee (India) and Nawaz 217 Sharif (Pakistan) exchanging Documents after signing the “Lahore Declaration” at the Darbar Hall of Governor House in Lahore. Figure 5.5 The Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and the visitng 224 President of Pakistan Gen. Pervez Musharraf holding one-to- one talks at Jaypee Palace, Agra on July 15, 2001. Figure 5.6 An agreed text of Clause 1 of the Declaration on Kashmir, 227 followed by the text reformulated jointly by External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar. The first three lines are in Sattar’s handwriting and the rest are in Jaswant’s. Figure 5.7 President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal 244 Behari Vajpayee met in Islamabad on January 5, 2004. Figure 5.8 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh shakes hands with 254 Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf after making a joint statement in New Delhi on April 18, 2005. Figure 5.9 Wulller Barrage / Tulbul Navigation Project Site 262 Figure 5.10 The Baglihar Dam Project 264 Figure 5.11 The Kishenganga Project Location 266 Figure 5.12 The Kishenganga Project Location 266
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AICC All India Congress Committee
APHC All Parties Hurriyat Conference
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BSF Border Security Force
BTU British Thermal Unit
CBI Central Bureau of Investigation
CBMs Confidence Building Measures
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DGMOs Director General of Military Operations
FIA Federal Investigation Agency
FICCI Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
FIEO Federation of Indian Export Organization
FMCT Fissile Material Cut off Treaty
FRIENDS Foundation for Research on International Environment National Development and Security GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHQ General Headquarters
ICG Indian Coast Guards
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPCCI India−Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
IPI Iran−Pakistan−India
IPR Institute of Policy Research
IPRI Islamabad Policy Research Institute xii
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISSI Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad
IT Information Technology
IWT Indus Water Treaty
JATM Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism
LOC Line of Control
MFN Most Favoured Nation
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
MQM Muhajir Qaumi Movement
MW Mega Watt
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDU National Defence University
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PMSA Pakistan Maritime Security Agency
RMCO Royal Military College
RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA South Asian Free Trade Association
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SAPTA South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organization
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute xiii
TAPI Turkmenistan−Afghanistan−Pakistan−India
UAE United Arab Emirates
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNCIP United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UNLCOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USA United States of America
USSR Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO World Trade Organization.
ZAB Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
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SOUTH ASIA
MAP OF THE SOUTH ASIA
Source: http://www.physicalmapofasia.com/regions-of-asia/south-asia/
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MAP OF PAKISTAN
Source: http://www.pakistanpaedia.com/maps/maps-of-pakistan.html
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MAP OF INDIA
Source: http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/india.html 1
CHAPTER−1 INTRODUCTION
2
CHAPTER−1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction
This research work is about the history of Pak-India relations and the efforts directed towards its improvement through the peace process during 1999-2008 particularly.
Based on the developments during this period, what lessons have we learnt and what steps should be taken in future for permanent peace in the region form part of this study.
The need to come closer to each other for peace and prosperity has been felt by both sides in the wake of changing regional and global political and strategic environment. 1
This cooperation has become a great need of the time because both Pakistan and India
are now nuclear powers and it is not in the interest of the two countries to continue their
traditional rivalry. It was in this context that certain positive moves in the political,
social and economic fields were noted during 1999-2008.
Pakistan and India being close neighbors of South Asia have a history characterized
with conflict and intermittent wars since independence. Part of this rivalry can be
attributed to the British legacy and part of it to the historical hostility in the pre-
Independence era. 2 For decades, Pakistan and India refused to accept each other and trust deficit obstructed cooperation in any field coupled with no meaningful negotiation on any outstanding issue. 3 South Asia has been facing high risks of adversarial relations
1. Jessie Lloyd and Nathan Nankivell. India, Pakistan and the Legacy of September 11, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Cambridge: Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, Vol. 15, No. 2, July 2002, p. 281. 2. Sumit Ganguly. Conflict Unending: India−Pakistan Tensions since 1947, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001, p. 24. 3. Vali Nasr. “National Identities and the India−Pakistan”, in T. V. Paul (Ed.), The India−Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 178-201. 3 between Pakistan and India as there is not a single issue on which these two countries are not at loggerheads with each other. There is a line of disputed issues like Kashmir,
Siachen, Sir Creek, Water dispute and trade and economic non-cooperation. The trust deficit and old rival mentality of the governments on both sides has become a bigger cause of increase in the number of conventional and non-conventional weapons. This armament race has not only damaged their already poor economy but has also affected the whole region.4
Today is the age of mutual co-existence and cooperation as the concepts of war and military dominance over other countries has gone after the end of the Cold War. These are replaced with new concepts of trade and economic integration with global recognition. Now, it is the greater responsibility of the people and the governments on both sides to follow the opportunities of building peace created by the changing times.
And, in fact, this was the opportunity which both Pakistan and India took in view in
1999 as an initial step. 5 They understood that war was not going to give them anything other than destruction. The events of 9/11 and further change in global environment changed the attitudes of Pakistan and India towards each other for the better. Both countries recognized the importance of confidence building measures (CBMs) and they started to cooperate in various fields in order to strengthen their relations and give stability to the region. 6 The most important and welcoming event of friendly gesture
and cooperation was the ‘Lahore Declaration’ when Pakistan and India agreed to move
ahead with good intentions of meaningful cooperation. A resolution was adopted to
4. Sumantra Bose. Decolonization and State Building in South Asia, Journal of International Affairs, New York: Columbia, School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA),Vol. 58, No.1, Fall 2004, pp. 95-114. 5. Rifaat Hussain. The India−Pakistan Peace Process, Defense & Security Analysis, London: Routledge Publications, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2006, p. 409. 6. Rizwan Zeb and Suba Chandran. Indo−Pak Conflicts Ripe to Resolve, RCSS Policy Studies, Colombo: Regional Center for Strategic Studies, No. 34, 2005, p. 23. 4 keep negotiations open for all disputed matters including Kashmir. This was the determination for peace on both sides which continued onwards and inspite of some tensions at times, the overall goodwill continued for peace with positive impacts for regional development and economic integration.7 It was in this backdrop that a concrete
process of dialogue was started in 2004 with discussion on multifarious issues i.e.
Terrorism, Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, Water issue and mutual trade and economic
cooperation. This was the first time when all the disputed issues came under the same
head for a comprehensive review and resolve.
The period during 1999-2008 has been very important in view of the fact that extensive
talks were held between Pakistan and India which set the foundation of deep, trustful
and reasonable approach for future initiatives. 8 It can, however, be said that while
Indian attention remained more focused on regional economic cooperation and
emphasizing on Pakistan to make joint efforts to eliminate Terror outfits from Pakistan
and India. On the other hand, Pakistan reminded India that Kashmir issue could not be
left at the mercy of time and needed immediate attention.
In the world of today, it is not a hidden reality that peace and cooperation can create
long term tangible results which cannot be attained with war and hostility. Pakistan and
India are having great potentials both in natural and human resources and instead of
increasing their defence expenditure against each other, both can achieve greater
successes in social and economic fields. 9 The prospects of this dialogue process, started
in 1999 and formally in 2004, are very high provided the governments on both sides
7. K. Sarwar Hasan (Ed.). Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question, Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1996, p. 309. 8. Ashley J. Tellis. “South Asia”, in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Eds.), Strategic Asia 2001–02: Power and Purpose , Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001, p. 28. 9. Maroof Raza. Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia, New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, January 1995, p. 10. 5 take initiatives with good intentions and build trust to forget the old rivalries. It is necessary for them to be serious to fulfill the essentials of dialogue and peace building as this would enable them to achieve greater heights in their relations which have suffered enough in the past and now getting gradually improved, it should not once again be the victim of historical hostile legacies.
1.2. Objectives of the Study
The following objectives are aimed to be achieved through this study:
1. To examine the relationship between Pakistan and India with particular
reference to the change of attitudes at times towards the resolution of disputes;
2. To analyze the causes of the disputed Pakistan−India relationship and its costs
for internal development and regional peace;
3. To evaluate different factors bringing the leadership of Pakistan and India closer
for initiating peace process;
4. To make a detailed analysis of the different steps which Pakistan and India took
between 1999 and 2008 and determine their effects on various fields;
5. To find out a strong foundation for directing the future policy making where
both Pakistan and India can jointly work to strengthen the peace process in order
to avoid any mishap which may obstruct the smooth movement towards peace
and cooperation in the economic sector particularly.
1.3. Significance
This study and its findings will be a good addition to the existing literature on the subject of Pakistan-India relations for the period under review. These developments were different from the previous peace efforts because it was a formal beginning and 6 some degree of readiness was witnessed on both sides for reducing the trust deficit as well as continuing the negotiations without break. The efforts made during this period were more organized, persistent and collaborative on all contentious issues.
While other studies have taken different angles of Pak-India relations in their historical perspective, this study covers the period when Pakistan was ruled by General Pervez
Musharraf, the fourth ruler who determined to make a history on Pak-India relations.
The study provides a detailed account of the achievements during the period.
The study holds great significance from the regional and global security perspective in that Pakistan and India, after becoming nuclear powers, have become a matter of concern for the international community. Have these developments brought any change in the attitude of major powers towards resolving the disputes between Pakistan and
India is a question that needs thorough examination.
The recommendations based on the findings of this study would, hopefully, provide a food for thought for the policy makers because being important neighbors, both
Pakistan and India cannot live in isolation and they have to adopt a conciliatory and negotiating approach in all the matters.
1.4. Literature Review
1. Mahmud Ali Durrani in his scholarly work “India and Pakistan: The Cost of
Conflict and the benefits of Peace, Baltimore (USA): Foreign Policy Institute,
John Hopkins University, 2001” has elaborated the relationship between
Pakistan and India and has also underlined the consequences along with the
potential advantages which this relationship can bring. The main focus of the
book is on India’s dominating perception and the inflexible attitude which has
greatly affected the peace and negotiation efforts between Pakistan and India.
The writer has also suggested that the two countries should try to come out of 7
their historical mistrust and must follow a well-defined strategy to promote
peace and cooperation in the region.
2. Dennis Kux in his book “India-Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue?,
Washington D. C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006” discusses the
historical background of the Pakistan−India relationship with a detailed
overview of the disputes lingering on between them for decades. Besides, the
author throws light on the recent efforts made for building peace and stability
in various developmental fields. The author emphasizes the need to change the
age-old rivalry into an environment of understanding and cooperation for
achieving economic strength that is so vital for their mutual benefits in terms of
the well-being of population of the two countries.
3. J.N. Dixit in his book “India-Pakistan in War and Peace, London: Routledge
Publishers, 2002” gives a detailed description of the major disputes between
Pakistan and India since 1947 i.e. water problem, Kashmir issue and arms race
etc. While discussing the constructive moves taken by the two countries since
1999 like the Agra Summit and Lahore meeting, the writer states it a positive
sign that the two countries have realized the significance of improving their
relationship as the stability and development of South Asia is closely linked
with the resolution of disputes between Pakistan and India.
4. Ted Greenwood and Sumit Ganguly in their book “Mending Fences:
Confidence and Security Building in South Asia, Boulder: Westview Press,
1996” have shed light on the fluctuating trends of relationship, emphasizes the
need for tolerance among the South Asian neighbors, forget their disputed past
and carry on efforts for mutual peace and harmony. And the most useful
instrument for creating this harmony can be the confidence building measures 8
(CBMs) in various fields. The main thrust of the book is the carefully thought
out strategy which, according to the author, can serve the purpose of making the
South Asian neighbors to resolve disputes amicably and learn lessons from the
experiences of Cold War Europe and Middle East which adopted a pragmatic
approach for the resolution of all sorts of their disputes.
5. Sumit Ganguly in his book “The Origins of War in South Asia: The Indo-
Pakistani Conflicts since 1947, Bouder CO: Westview Press, 1994” discusses
the Pakistan−India relationship in a historical background and gives a brief
outline of the important issues between the two neighbors which have caused
serious hurdles in developing healthy environment in the region. The serious
consequences of the dispute which for decades grabbed the poor population on
both sides, have also been discussed. The author, while examining the changed
political and strategic position of the world after the Cold War, stressed the need
for these two neighbors to promote peace and stability in the region with their
cooperative relationship as it is the only key to peace, prosperity and strength.
6. Selig S. Harrison, Paul H. Kreisberg and Dennis Kux in their work “India and
Pakistan: The First Fifty Years, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999”
link the continued tension between Pakistan and India as the cause of
deterioration of peace and stability in both the countries and the region as well.
While analyzing the disturbed economic and political conditions of the two
countries, the author emphasizes the need for peace building and confidence
making between the arch rivals.
7. Pia Malhotra in her research paper “India and Pakistan: Need for creative
Solutions, New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, No. 3068, March
2010” suggests to the state bosses of Pakistan and India to immediately mend 9
all the disputed areas not only through the political channels but also by
increasing the people to people interaction. The political leadership in both the
countries has not been able to resolve the conflicting issues for decades so the
civil society must also come forward to exchange information and bring
improvement in the relationship. The principle of peaceful co-existence, the
author argues, can serve as a sound basis for the two states to remove all biases
against each other.
8. Bushra Asif is yet another contributor of an article “India-Pakistan: Breaking
the Deadlock, Washington D. C: Centre for Strategic and International Studies,
February 2004” wherein she underlines the different factors making the recent
peace building between Pakistan and India essential i.e the domestic need to
cooperate on both sides. The importance of Lahore Declaration in 1999 has been
called as a landmark event which will not only promote peace but will also help
normalize relations in the coming years. Of all the disputes, Kashmir issue has
been regarded as the most prominent one to be solved on immediate basis as
this would promote a conducive environment which is immensely required for
peace and prosperity in the region.
9. Sara Bukhari too, in her research article “Indo−Pak ‘New Peace, Hague: ISYP
Journal of Science and World Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2005” has presented a
factual face of the nuclear neighbors in South Asia which remained indulged in
a longer period of conflicts and wars. The reapproachment since 1999 between
Pakistan and India has been called as the “New Peace” by the author. She has
called upon the nuclear neighbors to forget the past rivalries and initiate serious
peace building efforts and confidence creation. The writer has appreciated the
efforts of the then president General Pervaiz Musharraf for starting interaction 10
with his Indian counterpart for negotiating settlement of disputes that remained
halted for many years. The author suggests continuation of the dialogue as the
only practical process for bringing regional integration in South Asia.
10. Kerry Bausch makes a detailed assessment of the effects of developments in the
Post-Cold War era on the Pakistan−India relations in his research article
“Regional Section. Trends in Context: India, Pakistan and the Dynamics of
Regional Stability, London: Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.
15, No. 2, July 2002”. In the backdrop of 9/11 events when the international
political and strategic conditions changed altogether, the need for peace
increased for both Pakistan and India. The international and regional peace and
stability were at high risk due to the nuclear status which Pakistan and India
have attained and it became the cry of the day to negotiate a peace deal. The
author suggests acceleration of the process of negotiations in order to avoid wars
and move ahead with harmony and confidence and particularly with a
wholehearted, smooth and optimistic approach.
1.5. Conceptual Framework
The history of both Pakistan and India is replete with fluctuations and hostile postures towards one another. This hostility has many causes behind that and then various consequences for both. This research’s main focus will be on the developments during
1999-2008 but in order to understand that, the history, causes and negative results of this tension need to be understood thoroughly. 11
There has been a marked improvement in the traditionally antagonistic relations
between India and Pakistan during 1999-2008. The 1998 nuclear tests resulted in
renewed concerns about the future stability of the region.
The stalled ‘Composite Dialogue’ process was restarted in early 2004. Apart from
increased official exchanges, interaction between the peoples of the two countries has
expanded enormously. Increased people-to-people contact between the two countries
resulted in an unprecedented level of communication between their citizens. These
developments generated optimism about the prospects of peace between them, and
stimulated interest in the academic studies on the issue.
The end of the Cold War, along with vast changes in the political, economic and social
spheres has had tremendous consequences for peace in theory and practice. Developing
a conceptual understanding and clarity is the first step towards finding a peaceful
solution to the conflict between India and Pakistan. The contributions of multi-track
diplomacy to the processes of conflict resolution and reconciliation will also be
analyzed in this regard. The idea is that the lessons learnt from the history should enable
us to develop an insight into the challenge of peace building between India and
Pakistan. In short, the framework of this reseach is based on the peace developed during
the “Composite Dialogue” process and what direction this period should give for future
course of action by both the countries. On the other hand, we saw that peace efforts
since 1999 and the Composite Dialogue was the period never witnessed before in the
history of both the countries . If both these countries can initiate this dialogue towards maintainance of peace then they can obviously establish a permanent friendship based on trust and understanding. Based on the developments which we witnessed during 12
1999-2008, what we learnt and what we expect, hope and suggest for the future
relations form part of the conclusion of this research.
The framework and importance of the study can be gauged by understanding the
relationship between Pakistan and India. Pakistan and India are, since their
independence, known for their rival attitudes towards each other. It is necessary for
both the nuclear neighbors to permanently settle their disputes because that would not
only improve the conditions of their people but also the whole region. The adoption of
a conciliatory and permanent approach has become need of the time as we, today, live
in a different regional and international environment.
A new start was taken in the shape of cordial interaction when Pakistan witnessed a change of government. Pakistan−India relations saw a positive approach and understanding during the President Pervez Musharraf era (1999-2008) as certain initiatives were taken to build trust and confidence which heretofore was missing. This study is to focus on positive approaches adopted, issues debated and improvements made in various fields during 1999-2008. The study will also consist of the advantages which the peace initiatives afforded to each side and the loopholes in different areas requiring immediate attention on serious grounds. We, today, live in an age of different global and regional politico-strategic environment and both Pakistan and India are compelled by various factors to come closer for the sake of economic and social developments. While India, on the one hand, follows her own agenda of regional economic leadership and can no more take the risk of war with serious nuclear implications, Pakistan, on the other hand, is also faced with new challenges both internally and externally to move for better relations with all the countries particularly
India as an immediate neighbor. Apart from this, seen from a factual angle, a good 13
relationship between Pakistan and India in political, social and economic fields can
strengthen the whole South Asian region. That was one factor leading to a vibrant peace
process where the policy makers, from both sides, started discussing new directions to
move ahead for stabilizing the relationship. This study will definitely hold a great
significance from the regional and global security perspective in view of the fact that
Pakistan and India, after becoming nuclear powers, have become a cause of serious
concern for international and regional community.
1.6. Methodology
The methodology adopted for the purpose of this study included descriptive, qualitative,
quantitative, comparative and historical. The descriptive method was used to study and
analyze the relevant literature. The qualitative and quantitative methods included
crosschecking the data validity and for deriving conclusions. Historical method was
employed for examining the background of relationship between Pakistan and India
since independence. Structured, unstructured and semi-structured interviews and
questionnaires from policy makers, think tanks, academicians, common people,
educated starta of the society from educational institutions were used to collect
opinions, information and facts. A comprehensive survey of the literature available e.g
the writings of Johan Galtung, 10 William Zartman 11 and Robert Putnam 12 were studied in detail in order to understand the basics of conflict resolution and peace processes, covering various aspects of the issue under discussion.
10 Johan Galtung, Theories of Conflict: Definitions, Dimensions, Negation, Formations, New York: Columbia University, 1958. 11 William Zartman, Conflict Management: The long and Short of it, SAIS Review of International Affairs, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter, 2000, pp. 227-35. 12 Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, Journal of International Organization , Cambridge: University of Cambridge, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer, 1988, pp. 427-460. 14
This study adopts an interdisciplinary approach in that it works mostly and majorly between and across the disciplines of history and regional and international relations.
The reason for choosing this approach is that historical narrative lends itself to a qualitative enquiry that captures the richness and diversity of data and helps contextualize the processes under investigation. It focuses on how individuals or groups made sense of the events and actions during the time period under scrutiny. Based on oral histories, primary documents and secondary sources, this thesis aims to construct a narrative of the period of 1999-2008 within the context of Pakistan-India relations.
The research design included frequent visits to research institutes and libraries in
Pakistan as part of the fieldwork.
a) Primary Sources
i. The research relies on primary sources such as questionnaires
and structured interviews. Questionnaires have been planned to
be administered on and interviews to be held with the
following groups of respondents:
• Academicians
• Journalists, Political Analysts
• Common people
ii. Data was also gathered from the following documents: • Government/ Official Reports • Official Documents/ Peace Agreements during 1999- 2008 • Leadership Statements/ Media Speeches/Interviews • Autobiographies/Biographies b) Secondary Sources
i. Frequent visits to the research institutes i.e Islamabad Policy
Research Institute (IPRI), Institute of Policy Research (IPR) 15
Islamabad, National Defence University (NDU) Islamabad
and Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) have been
made to get the required data.
ii. The works of researchers on the issue, books, journals,
newspapers and periodicals have also been taken into
account as secondary sources.
iii. Internet sources, websites of research institutes and other
relevant data online through digital libraries have been
accessed in order to collect relevant information.
1.7. Justification
The history of Pakistan−India relations is replete with rival gestures and lack of trust.
Since independence, the two countries have suffered enormously due to wars and resultant poor socio-economic indicators domestically. The period of 1999-2008 in
Pakistan−India relations has been chosen for this study because a peaceful space was created and a remarkable development was made on different issues which was not witnessed before. The interaction at both government and people level increased greatly and positive approach for resolving outstanding conflicts was adopted. The issues discussed and decided within the purview of the ‘Composite Dialogue’ Process were a part of a serious and understandable policy on both sides. The period under consideration was not a recitation of the old transgressions instead very healthy and constructive measures were taken to boost the confidence and to erase the tensions. All outstanding conventional and security issues were discussed in phases.
The developments which took place during the period under consideration were different from the previous peace efforts because it was a formal beginning and 16 readiness on both sides for eliminating trust deficit as well as continuing the negotiations without any major break. The efforts for peace between the two countries during this period were more organized, persistent and collaboration on all important issues was positively within reach.
These efforts for peace building on both sides during 1999-2008 bore fruits and a historic environment was created in which people to people contacts increased even between people of the Azad Kashmir and the Jammu & Kashmir which was something that India never accepted before since independence. But a change of attitude was seen this time on the Indian side. These frequent exchanges at people and government level boosted optimism regarding the peace building during the period. The civil society members on both sides became able to think independently of their respective governments. The assessment of developments during 1999-2008 in India−Pakistan relations clearly shows that great efforts were made by both Pakistan and India with realization of the ground realities in conflicting issues which, in turn, had very positive implications for clearing the ground for future course of action.
1.8. Chapter Structure
Chapter 1: Introduction
This part of the research work includes introduction of the topic, objectives of the study, the justification, a brief review of the relevant literature on the subject and the methodology adopted constitutes part of this chapter.
17
Chapter 2: Pakisatn−India Relations in Historical Perspective
This chapter elaborates the historical background of Pakistan−India relationship since
1947, the changing trends in their relations resulting in the lack of trust and confidence
towards one another. There is also a reference made to the major hurdles in the way of
improving their relationship over the years.
Chapter 3: Causes of the Hostile Pakistan−India Relationship
This chapter takes into account the different political, historical and other causes of
tension between Pakistan and India which prevented any positive development ever
since independence.
Chapter 4: Consequences of Pakistan−India Hostility
In this chapter, various consequences of the tensed relations between Pakistan and India
have been taken into consideration which have seriously affected the poor population
and economic development on both sides. The main theme of this chapter is that had
there been cordial relations between Pakistan and India, South Asia would have been
among the fast developing regions of the world.
Chapter 5: The Pakistan−India Peace Process (1999-2008)
This chapter examines the various social, political, strategic, regional and global factors in the backdrop of 9/11 which had a great impact on the approaches of Pakistan and
India towards cooperation. The peace process initiatives taken particularly since 2001 have been analysed. The achievements gained through this peace and cooperation have been analysed in detail in order to determine the extent to which the peace building efforts contributed towards an improvement in Pak-India relations. 18
Chapetr 6: Conclusion (Recommendations and Future Prospects)
This chapter focuses on the major findings of the research work. In the light of these findings, further areas of cooperation have been identified for confidence building and improvement. How Pakistan and India can work together for the development of trust and peace along with a serious approach adopted for the resolution of disputed issues, have also been analysed.
1.9. Conclusion
To conclude, this chapter has given a preliminary introduction to the thesis which will help the readers to understand the main theme of the research work done. The chapter provides a basic framework and structure about the idea which the research scholar has to explore.
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19
CHAPTER−2 PAKISTAN−INDIA RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 20
CHAPTER−2
PAKISTAN−INDIA RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
2.1. Introduction
Pakistan and India are two important countries of South Asia with a unique history.
Though geographically closed, both countries have been distant neighbours since independence. The relationship between India and Pakistan has greatly been complicated and strained since independence. Both the countries gained independence after the British decided to divide the Subcontinent into two parts in 1947. In fact, the roots of this adversarial relationship go back to the pre-independence era when the
Hindu nationalist movement rejected the representation of the Muslin interests of India and the struggle continued between the Indian National Congress and All India Muslim
League, resulting in the two different national ideologies of Secularism and Islam respectively. 1 The rivalry made it impossible for the Hindus and the Muslims to live as one nation and, as a result, the British Government implemented its own plan whereby the Muslim majority areas joined Pakistan and the Hindu majority areas joined India. 2
Even after division on these lines, the hostility between the two countries did not finish
and new conflicts erupted to make the relationship more difficult and controversial. 3
Though after gaining independence, the people of Pakistan were very happy being a
free nation but, on the other hand, India never accepted Pakistan’s separate status and
1. Selig S. Harrison, Paul H. Kreisberg and Dennis Kux. India & Pakistan: The First Fifty Years, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 56. 2. David Gilmartin. Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative, The Journal of Asian Studies , Michigan: The Asssociation for Asian Studies, Vol. 57, No.4, 1998, pp. 1068-95. 3. P.M. Kamath (Ed.). India−Pakistan Relations: Courting Peace from the Corridors of War, New Delhi: Promilla & Co. Publishers, 2005, p. 75. 21
considered the Muslims as breakers of their country and perceived the state of Pakistan
as a direct attack on their nationalism and this thinking prevails even today. This
animosity and trust gap widened with the passage of time. The hostile relationship
between India and Pakistan for over sixty years has filled the hearts on both sides with
hate syndrome making any political and economic cooperation between them difficult.
Pakistan and India have been a major concern of each other’s foreign and security
policies since partition and their bilateral relation is characterized by mutual distrust.
This visible tension between the two countries has caused several conflicts. Although
there have been periods of cordial agreements, mutual antagonism and conflicting
issues bedevilled Pakistan India relations. Having great civilizations and cultural
richness, the two countries can get a lot with their cooperation and good relations but
cold war continued throughout the history with an environment of acrimony and
distrust. It is very important to understand the history of Pakistan−India relationship in
order to have a clear picture of the conflicts which afflicted both the countries and
prevented any kind of development in the region. 4 The following lines will explain the
history of hostile and strange relationship between the two countries with major
conflicts which plagued the Pak-India relationship.
2.2. Various Phases of Relationship
After gaining independence, the nascent state of Pakistan was greatly supposed to turn
down the intensity of psychological ailment on the Indian side that Pakistan could not
exist for a longer time and this Pakistan could do by building strong and good relations
with India and other neighbors in the region. A strong foreign policy was the need of
4. David Gilmartin. Op.cit. 22
the time for both India and Pakistan as the welfare and security of the whole region was
attached to the mutual relationship of the two countries. This reality was accepted by
the leaders of both India and Pakistan. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister
of India, said once that the conflict between the two countries will wipe them out from
the earth. 5 Similarly, Pakistan’s first Foreign Minister Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan
also had the similar view as he said that Pakistan and India together could play an
important role in the international affairs but in converse, their role is such which
threatens the peace of South Asia and a big danger to the security of the whole world. 6
The start of the relationship was very tense as the creation of Pakistan was unacceptable
to Hindu leaders on account of their dream of ‘Akhand Bharat’ (United India) after the departure of foreigners from their land. But after independence, the two states moved in the direction of hostility and mistrust. The relationship between India and Pakistan since 1947 can be divided into four phases of ups and downs and the efforts made for reconciliation and peaceful co-existence from time to time.
2.2.1. The First Phase: 1947-1966
The initial years of Pakistan−India relationship after independence were very difficult with the wounds of partition which were still fresh. Although the newly independent state of Pakistan was administratively and politically weaker, dependent on India for the share of assets and had to start everything from the scratch, still the people of
Pakistan were having a greater sense of freedom and homeland after long struggle for their rights. As is evident from the statement of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan when he landed in Karachi on August 7, 1947, “I
5. Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speecehes: September 1957-April 1963, New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1964, Vol. II, p. 446. 6. M. Zafrullah Khan. Pakistan’s Foreign Relations, Karachi: Pakistan’s Institute of International Affairs, 1951, p. 8. 23 never expected to see Pakistan in my lifetime. We must be very grateful to God for what we have achieved.”7 While on the other hand, the Indian leaders had a belief that the partition of India would soon become undone and Pakistan would no more be there.
The Indian leaders like Nehru, Gandhi and Patel had treated partition as a temporary abberation and against their philosophy of United India. In fact, this reluctance on the part of India to accept Pakistan as a separate state was the biggest obstacle in the way of developing better and peaceful relationship between India and Pakistan immediately after independence. Pakistani leaders and policy makers had perceived this negative behavior on the Indian side as a big threat to the very existence of Pakistan. That was the main reason why the foreign policy of Pakistan became India centric from security to strategic aspect and from economic priorities to diplomatic policies. India, on the other hand, never left the policy of undoing the existence of Pakistan. Even Gandhi, famous for his non-violence philosophy, did not leave a moment to speak against
Pakistan. 8 In response to that, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah said that it was
certainly a bad and hostile propaganda to paralyse the new state of Pakistan and that it
was now without any doubt that this propaganda was well organized and well directed
against Pakistan. 9 The establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan soon after partition did not build any friendly environment in the region and instead brought more difficulties in the way of regional development.
The many conflicts and differences which erupted soon after independence between
India and Pakistan in the first phase of their relationship can be discussed as:
7. Ardeshir Cowasjee. Not the Business of the State, Dawn, Karachi, August 16, 2009. 8. On one occasion on September 26, 1947, Gandhi said that if Pakistan would not accept its proved mistake then we would be compelled to wage war against it. See Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten , London: Robert Hale Publications, 1951, p. 206. 9. Dawn , Karachi, October 25, 1947. 24
2.2.1.1. Issue of Princely States
After the British Government decided to divide India, the question of the future of
princely states also appeared. There were approximately 600 princely states in
undivided India spreading over 712,508 square miles. 10 These princely states were autonomous and the British Government had been managing their defence and foreign affairs. The Principles of British India partition also applied to the princely states that upon the transfer of power, the Muslim majority states had to join Pakistan and Hindu
Majority states had to go with India. 11 These states acceded to either India or Pakistan by 15 August 1947 except Kashmir, Junagadh, Jodhpur and Hyderabad which became a conflicting issue between India and Pakistan.
The ruler of Junagadh was a Muslim Nawab with 80 percent of Hindu population. The
Muslim ruler of this state decided to align with Pakistan. Mountbatten, then Governor
General of India, opposed the decision of Pakistan to accept Junagadh as its state territory and called it the violation of the partition rules. 12 India started to deploy troops
around Junagardh and the situation worsened. Nawab of Junagadh fled to Pakistan with
his family and state treasures, leaving the state affairs to be handled by his Deewan
(Prime Minister). As the problem worsened, the Deewan of the state decided to accede
to India and after its accession to India, as a result of the plebiscite, it was announced
that majority of the population in the state had voted for India. Although Pakistan
10 . Louis Mountbatten. Time only to Look Forward; Speeches of Rear Admiral, the Earl of Mountbatten of Burma as Viceroy of India and Governor General of the Dominion of India, 1947-48, London: Nicholas Kaye, 1949, p. 42. 11 . On July 25, 1947, the last Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten said that the communal interests and the geographical factors would be considered at the time of accession of Princely States into either Pakistan or India. See Ibid., p. 42. 12 . Security Council, Official Records, 250 th Meeting, February 18, 1948. 25
complained against this move to the Security Council but the case remained unheard
for years.
Another princely state was Jodhpur where the Maharaja of the state also wanted to join
Pakistan but India did not leave the state to take that decision on the ground that the
population of the state consisted of the Hindu majority and that the partition principle
was not allowing the state to join Pakistan. Similar was the case with the state of
Hyderabad with majority Hindu population of 85 percent. The Muslim ruler (Nizam)
of the state desired to join Pakistan or to maintain the separate status but Mountbatten,
the Governor-General, warned the ruler against either courses on the ground that the
principle of partition was to be considered strictly. 13 Although the state appealed to the
Security Council against the Indian pressure but before the case could be heard, the
Indian Government sent her army in the state and took advantage of that critical time and fulfilled her desire to forcibly annex the state of Hyderabad with India.14 When the
British decided to give up their suzerainty of the states under the Indian Independence
Act of 1947, they were free to decide whether to join Pakistan or India or to remain outside the two countries. Most of the states decided to accede to Pakistan or India, while others which decided to remain independent were invaded by India such as Bhopal, Junagadh, Bilaspur and Hyderabad.15 One state left with the fate undecided
till today is the state of Kashmir with the Muslim majority population. As in Kashmir,
the majority population was Muslim so this state should have joined Pakistan under the
partition rules but Indian interference and hostile behavior left this state in trouble since
then and that showed the hypocricy of the Indian government and the non-acceptable
13 . V. P. Menon. The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1961, p. 306. 14 . Shahid Javed Burki. Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999, p. 12. 15 . David P. Henige. Princely States of India: A Guide to Chronology and Rulers, Bangkok: Orchid Press, 2006, p. 125. 26
behavior. The Hindu Raja of Kashmir, Raja Dogra Hari Singh decided to maintain the
independent status of Kashmir but faced very difficult situation as the ground realities
and the Muslim majority of the state was clear indication of the fact that the state was
to be included in Pakistan but political pressure was employed by India not apparently
but covertly to get the State of Kashmir despite the fact that the partition principle
regarding Kashmir was in favor of Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan desired to get
the State of Kashmir and the Muslim majority was also supporting affiliation with
Pakistan so internal uprising in the state threatened the rule of Maharaja who asked
India for help. Indian forces were deployed to the state which aggravated the situation
further to the extent that it brought both India and Pakistan to the brink of war.
2.2.1.2. 1947 − First War on Kashmir
Soon after independence, both India and Pakistan went to war on Kashmir in October
1947 16 when the accession emergency created a very tumultuous situation and the rule of Maharaja in Kashmir was threatened by the Muslim tribesmen of the frontier who organized and supported an internal uprising against Maharaja’s intention to take side of India. By September 1947, the rule of Maharaja in Kashmir was almost wiped out by the Kashmiri rebels. India intervened in Kashmir militarily and by the end of
September, armed Sikh rioters and other militants infiltrated in Kashmir and slaughtered thousands of Muslims in Kashmir. About 200,000 Muslims were killed and tens of thousands were pushed towards West Pakistan. 17 Being inflamed by the atrocities upon the Muslim population in Kashmir, the tribesmen of frontier crossed the border into Kashmir on October 22, 1947 to wage the Holy War (Jihad) against the
16 . Sumit Ganguly. The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo−Pakistan Conflict Since 1947, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994, p. 34. 17 . Ian Stephens. Pakistan, London: Ernest Benn, 1963, p. 200. 27
forces of Maharaja. 18 The Maharaja of Kashmir asked the Indian Government for help
as he got besieged by the internal uprising and the invasion. Indian Government sent
her troops to Kashmir and the Maharaja acceded to India on October 25, 1947, in return.
The tension and conflict increased between the two countries after that decision of
Maharaja. This situation gave rise to an arms race between the two countries and the
need was felt by both sides to solidify the security of the states. In his telegram to Prime
Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, Nehru wrote that they assure not only Pakistan but also the
people of Kashmir that after the restoration of peace in Kashmir, forces would be
withdrawn from the state. 19 The truth of the statement is evident from the later developments and ensuing months when India started to call Kashmir as her integral part. Pakistan, however, did not rely on the Indian stand and promise and instead said that as Maharaja’s authority was overthrown by the internal revolt and he fled from the capital so there was nothing left with the ruler to execute the ‘Instrument of
Accession.’ 20 But the stalemate on the Kashmir issue continued and no fruitful dialogue took place between the two countries on this issue till December 1947. However, by
December 1947, one third of the state on the western side had been liberated by the
Kashmiri Muslims and the Pro-Pakistan tribesmen with areas of Gilgit and a part of
Kashmir valley known as Azad Kashmir while the rest of Kashmir went under Indian occupation known as Indian held Kashmir.21 The Kashmir question was raised by India
in the United Nations Security Council on January 1, 1948 calling upon Pakistan to
cease assisting invaders in Kashmir and providing them moral and material support.
18 . S.M. Burke. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis, London: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 24. 19 . K. Sarwar Hasan (Ed.). Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question, Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966, p. 67. 20 . Security Council Official Records, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 7, UNCIP Third Report, S/1430, December 9, 1949. 21 . Ishtiaq Ahmad. The 1947 Partition of India: A Paradigm for Pathological Politics in India and Pakistan. Asian Ethnicity , London: Routledge Publishers, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 9-28. 28
Pakistan denied all the allegations leveled by India rather accused her of Muslim genocide in Kashmir. India defended her position in the United Nations by justifying the accession of Kashmir to India that not only Maharaja wanted that accession but that request had also come from the National Conference headed by Sheikh Muhammad
Abdullah for the people of Kashmir. India also reassured the international community that the right of self-determination would be given to Kashmiri people under the supervision of United Nations once the law and order situation could restore. In this way, India continued making false promises. The United Nations Security Council had started to consider the issue and a resolution was passed on January 17, 1948 according to which a commission was established known as United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to restore peace in Kashmir and also to make arrangements for plebiscite in Kashmir. Mr. Chester W. Nimitz was appointed as administrator to hold plebiscite but India rejected and implementation of the plan by UNCIP could not be made possible. As Indian offensive had increased in Kashmir by May 1948, the regular
Pakistan Army was called for the protection of the state’s borders as General Douglas
Gracey, Commander-in-Chief of Pakistani Army at that time reported to the Pakistan
Government that Indian advance beyond the general line (Uri-Poonch-Naoshera) could be of grave consequences for Pakistan. Both the countries continued to fight war in
Kashmir throughout the year and no resolution of UNCIP came into effect. On January
1, 1949, however, the UN brought an end to the armed hostilities with the establishment of ceasefire line and both India and Pakistan were asked to fulfill their duty of holding plebiscite in Kashmir. A United Nations Peace Keeping Force was also organized and established but the plebiscite could not as yet be arranged as demanded by the people of Kashmir. The McNaughton Plan and the Dixon Plan of UNCIP, calling for a viable solution of Kashmir issue and the recommended demilitarization was rejected for one 29
or another reason and non-cooperative attitude of India. Another attempt was made to
resolve the issue of Kashmir in a meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in
January 1951 when proposals were made by the British Prime Minister Lord Clement
Attlee proposing India Pakistan Joint Force, Commonwealth Force and a local force to
be organized by the administrator of the plebiscite in Kashmir. Though these proposals
were accepted by Pakistan but India again rejected them. 22 In April 1951, in another
attempt, Frank P. Graham was appointed as the new UN representative supervising the
Kashmir issue between the two countries. Graham presented six reports from October
1951 to March 1958 but India did not show acceptance to any one of them rejecting the
position of the ceasefire line after demilitarization and all later negotiations proved in
vain.
In 1954, the so called Constituent Assembly of Kashmir ratified the Kashmir’s
accession to India and in 1957, a new Indian favored constitution was promulgated in
the state placing Kashmir under the direct control of India. Since then India never
accepted Kashmir’s independent position and never paid heed to the Muslim majority
wishes in the Muslim State of Kashmir. Throughout the 1960s, talks were held between
the two countries and Britain and USA also intervened in the situation to resolve the
conflict to address the grievances of Kashmiri people 23 but all efforts came to naught.
The United Nations, later on, also left administering the issue leaving the two countries
to find the solution by themselves and that is the reason why Kashmiri people are
suffering till today and the issue became a bone of contention between India and
Pakistan since independence obstructing any kind of improvement in their relationship.
22 . Patrick Gordon Walker. The Commonwealth, London: Mercury Books, 1965, p. 176. 23 . Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh. Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Sub- contintent, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 207. 30
2.2.1.3. Dispute on Evacuee Property
Another dispute which occurred between India and Pakistan soon after independence
was the problem of evacuee property. As large number of people migrated across the
new frontiers and were in search of new homelands for themselves, the governments in
India and Pakistan were faced with the dual dilemma of rehabilitation as well as looking
after the lands and properties abandoned by those millions of people who fled. 24 It was
a big problem for Pakistan as she had to bear the brunt of thousands of refugees from
East Pakistan where massacre of Muslims had started just few days before the date of
partition. 25 On the other hand, Kashmiri refugees also had to be taken care of by the new Government of Pakistan which was initially very weak financially and administratively. In this situation, the repercussions had to be faced by Pakistan greatly.
Much illwill and hostile behavior was seen in Pakistan−India relationship on this issue of evacuee property. According to one estimate, about 5 million Sikh and Hindu refugees left West Pakistan for India and about 7,900,000 26 Muslims left India and came into Pakistan. 27 Many meetings and conferences took place to resolve this issue but
with the passage of time, as the refugees settled gradually in both the countries, the heat
on evacuee lands died down and both the countries never raised this problem again.
Eventually, the evacuee lands in both the countries were utilized for the rehabilitation
of refugees who had come across the other frontier.
24 . Josepph B. Schechman. The Hindu-Muslim Exchange of Population: Population Transfers in Asia, New York: Asia Hallsby Press, 1949, pp. 1-50. 25 . Sarah Ansari. Life after Partition: Migration, Community and Strife in Sindh (1947-1962), London: Oxford University Press, 2005 p. 128. 26 . Mushirul Hasan . India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 29. 27 . Joseph B. Schechtman. Evacuee Property in India and Pakistan, Pacific Affairs, Vancouver: University of British Columbia, Vol. 24, No. 4, December 1951, p. 406. 31
2.2.1.4. The Issue of Finance Distribution
After partition, the newly born state of Pakistan was in need of material and financial
resources to carry out her business but the inflexible and non-cooperative attitude of
Indian leadership placed Pakistan at disadvantage. After partition, the question of
finance was presented before the Arbitral Tribunal for decision. In December 1947,
however, both India and Pakistan agreed to the distribution of cash balances. The total
financial resource of undivided India stood at 4000 million rupees. It was decided that
Pakistan would get Rs. 750 million. Out of this 750 million, Rs. 200 million had been
given to Pakistan and the remaining 550 million were withheld by the Indian leadership
on the ground that it would be issued after the settlement of the Kashmir conflict. This
illegal move of the Indian government was severely criticized by Pakistan when her
Finance Minister clarified that it was not mentioned anywhere in the agreement of cash
distribution between the two countries. 28
The later developments clearly showed Indian animosity and non-acceptable behavior
for Pakistan. However, Gandhi got greatly concerned about the tension in Indo Pakistan
relations and, in an effort to do away with this tension, he convinced the Indian leaders
and his companions to release the remaining amount to Pakistan. On January 17, 1948,
Pakistan was paid Rs. 500 million by the Reserve Bank of India and again 50 million
were not given. The heat and anger in India over Gandhi’s demand to give Pakistan her
financial share intensified so much that the discontent in Indian elements did not leave
even Gandhi and before the month of January was over, Gandhi was shot dead by a
28 . Das Gupta and Jyoti Bhusan . Indo Pakistan Relations: 1947-1955, Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1960, p. 46. 32
member of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). This much hatred was shown
towards the soft attitude of their own leader that he was not spared.
2.2.1.5. Indian Stance over Pakistan’s Share of Military Supplies
After independence, the share of military supplies had to be given to Pakistan and as
usual Indian leadership tried to put obstacles in this way as well. The responsibility of
sharing the equipments, ammunition and stores in a just way to Pakistan was given to
Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck 29 who once reported to Premier Clement Attlee
that Indian behavior was not flexible and it was very difficult that Pakistan would get
her share of military supplies appropriately. 30 The same happened when the
Headquarters of the Supreme Command was closed down on 30 November 1947
although Pakistan opposed this move and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan did not
favour the closure but even then the decision was carried out because an assurance was
given by Indian Defence Minister Baldev Singh that India would give Pakistan her full
share of military supplies. 31 The reality of this surety was seen later when Pakistan was
deprived of her rightful share and was ignored altogether.
2.2.1.6. State of Collaboration in Economic Sphere
Greater complexity in relations between India and Pakistan was witnessed when
economic challenges came to the forefront. The partition principle did not take care of
the complementarity rules. West Pakistan used to produce more wheat than its
requirement and the surplus wheat had to be supplied to India. Similar was the case
29 . Javeed Alam. Remembering Partition: A Dialogue with Suresh Sharma, Seminar , No. 461, January 1998, pp. 98-104. 30 . Ravinder Kaur. The Last Journey: Social Class in the Partition of India, Economic and Political Weekly , Mumbai, June 2006, pp. 9-10. 31 . John Connell. Auchinleck: A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude, London: Cassell, 1959, p. 921. 33
with cotton which was in abundance in West Pakistan and used to go to Indian mills in
Bombay and other areas. Likewise, the areas which later became part of India, used to
supply sugar and coal to West Pakistan. Another problem West Pakistan faced was the
logistical issue as major ports went to India after independence except Karachi. Added
to the already complex economic situation was the problem of economic interaction
between East Pakistan and West Pakistan with a distance of about 1000 miles from each
other. 32 No smooth trade was possible between the two parts of newly created Pakistan
without good relations with India which was already hostile towards Pakistan and was
creating hurdles in the way of its survival.
After Partition, though the two states decided free movement of goods and capital for
one year but this agreement did not last long and in November 1947, export duty was
levied by the Government of Pakistan on jute and, in return, India also levied duties on
its goods. The trade war started between the two countries and the intensity halted trade
when Britain devalued pound sterling by 30.5 percent in September 1949. 33 India devalued Rupee but Pakistan did not do so, putting the Indian leadership in greater surprise that how a newly independent country could dare to defy the devaluation pressure. The result of this decision of Pakistan was that the jute and cotton industries in India became fully dependent on Pakistan. India also responded by suspending coal supply to Pakistan in December 1949. Trade relations greatly suffered between the two countries and it was a bigger crises for a country like Pakistan which was also fighting the war of her survival after independence to belie the expectations of the Indian leadership. However, nature also wanted the survival of Pakistan as the demand for
32 . Mookerjea-Leonard. Debali. Divided Homelands, Hostile Homes: Partition, Women and Homelessness, Journal of Commonwealth Literature , London: Sage Publication, 2005, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 141-54. 33 . S.M. Burke. Op.cit, p. 24. 34
Pakistan’s raw material such as jute and cotton increased when Korean War (1950-
1953) started in 1950 and Pakistan’s economy was saved from getting collapsed.34 A well- known journal “Economist” while analyzing this great luck for Pakistan’s economy commented that obviously Pakistan’s independence and existence on the world map must have visited by a good fairy. 35 This development made both Pakistan
and India to expand their trade relations and broaden their markets to China and other
regional and non-regional countries. Pakistan also undertook the construction and
development of jute and cotton mills so as to reduce dependence on India. Although
India and Pakistan started negotiating the trade relations later on and an agreement on
trade was also signed in February 1951 when India accepted the rate of exchange of
Pakistan but still the volume of trade between the two did not touch the new heights
and both the countries had to find new trade partners in the years to come.
2.2.1.7. Dispute over Indus Waters
The distribution and sharing of the Indus water was another most important issue after
independence. The Indus Basin with a total area of about 365,000 Square Miles begins
with its waters in the mountains of Himalaya of Indian Occupied Kashmir. The largest
part of Indus Basin is covered by Pakistan i.e. 217,000 Square Miles. 36 The water of
Indus Basin flows from Himalaya, passing through the lands of Punjab and Sindh, cultivating their major portions and gets emptied in the Arabian Sea in the South of
Pakistan’ city of Karachi. The Indus River System has the Indus River as the main tributary and the major Eastern tributaries are jehlum, Sutlej, Beas, Ravi and Chenab
34 . Morris-Jones. Thirty-Six Years Later: The Mixed Legacies of Mountbatten's Transfer of Power, International Affairs, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 621-28. 35 . Economist , St.Louis (USA), January 27, 1951. 36 . Norman Maclean. A River Runs Through It and Other Stories, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, p. 45. 35
with some of the small rivers on Western side of Indus like Kabul River with its Swat
River tributary. 37 Figure 2.1 shows the Indus River System with its tributaries.
Figure 2.1: Indus River System
Source: http://changinguppakistan.wordpress.com/2008/10/22/
During the colonial period, thousands of acres of land used to be irrigated by the canals in the Indus Basin thus making the Indus Basin highly cultivated area in the subcontinent. After partition, the whole agricultural economy of Pakistan was dependent on these waters with their source in Indian control, Pakistan was in crises
37 . Uttam Kumar Sinha. India and Pakistan: Introspecting the Indus Treaty , Strategic Analysis , New Delhi: The Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, Vol. 32, No. 6, November 2008, p. 965. 36
situation. 38 On the other hand, India wanted to take advantage of this situation also and had her own plan for the Indus Basin development so conflict arose between the two.
The unitary network of cultivation and irrigation created problems of management and sharing in a systematic way. Pakistan’s fear proved true as on April 1, 1948, 39 India
halted the supply of water from the two headworks under her control. The Pakistani
government made immediate arrangements for negotiating the matter and a delegation
rushed to India. An accord was signed between the two countries on May 4, 1948 to
meet the water needs and that too on the Indian conditions. 40 In the years ahead, the
efforts were made to negotiate a permanent settlement of the dispute but in vain. Till
1951, there was no positive development on the issue as Pakistan’s stand to resolve the
issue through the International Court of Justice was not accepted by India which was
adamant on solving the problem only bilaterally. 41
Finally, an intervention was made by the World Bank through its President Eugene R.
Black who proposed constituting a body consisting of Indian, Pakistani and engineers of the World Bank to speed up the resolution of the Indus Water problem. This proposal was accepted by both parties to the dispute in 1952. But a detailed agreement could be signed at a much later stage on September 19, 1960 between Prime Minister Nehru and
President Ayub Khan. In figure 2.2 and figure 2.3, we can see both president Ayub
Khan and prime minister Nehru together for the purpose of signing Indus Water Treaty.
According to the treaty, after a period of ten to thirteen years, three Eastern Rivers Ravi,
Sutlej and Beas would come under Indian control and three Western rivers Sindh,
Jehlum and Chenab under Pakistani control. Under the treaty, a Permanent Commission
38 . 50 years of Indus Basin Treaty, Report of the Seminar organized by Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, on February 20, 2010. 39 . A Tribune Special: Waters of Discontent, The Express Tribune , Karachi, April 4, 2010. 40 . Asian Review , Beijing, April 1955, p. 152. 41 . Adam Nayyar. What Indus Water Treaty Means, Dawn , Karachi, January 10, 2002. 37
was also set up to resolve any differences between the two countries in future with the
option of referring the matter to the ‘neutral expert’. 42
Figure 2.2: General Ayub Khan welcoming Jawaharlal Nehru at Karachi Airport in September 1960, after the latter’s arrival to sign the Indus Water Treaty
Source: http://www.frontline.in/navigation/?type=static&page=flonnet&rdurl=fl2514/
42 . A. A. Michel. The Indus Rivers, New York: Yale University Press, 1967, p. 559. 38
Figure 2.3: Signing Ceremony of Indus Water Treaty at Karachi on September 19, 1960
Source: http://www.pakistanpaedia.com/mega/megaprojects.html
The International Community also took great interest in the issue in order to promote peace in the region and provided financial and technical assistance for the development of the replacement works and infrastructure for building dams and barrages. 43 The Indus
Basin Development Fund of almost 900 million dollars was established to finance the whole program. The whole program was carried out with great help from the friendly countries with USA being the largest contributor in the fund with 177 million dollars. 44
India provided 174 million dollars and with the supplemental funding of 315 million
dollars, this water infrastructure plan became one of the largest undertakings. Since
then, both the governments have followed the principles of the treaty with off and on
kind of behavior from Indian side and threats to Pakistan’s economic security at times
43 . Alexander Cariou. Water, Conflict and Cooperation, Canada: Institute of Peace and Conflict, 2003, p. 54. 44 . Mushirul Hasan (Ed.). India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilisation, Delhi: Nirupama Publishers, 1993, p. 178. 39
too. But overall the Indus treaty has played a vital role in shaping the water management
between the two countries. Most recently, the construction of Dams like the Bhasha,
Kishanganga and Baglihar has brought the issue again on the front with the need of
immediate resolution lest the matter could take the worst shape intensifying the already
hostile relations between the two South Asian neighbors.
2.2.1.8. Progress on Kashmir: 1960-1965
Throughout 1960s, the relationship between India and Pakistan was revolving around
the rise and fall of hopes for some resolution of Kashmir dispute 45 but tensions rose to
peak instead. In 1962, when border clash erupted between India and China, USA and
Britain also intervened to promote settlement of disputes between India and Pakistan
just to keep India away from the influence of USSR. India, on the other hand, also
showed interest in negotiating with Pakistan just to keep the allies against China. Thus
politics of interest was played in the name of efforts for Pakistan India peace. 46 This
lack of goodwill on the part of India was shown when the Indo−China border dispute
ended and India again reverted to her position of no talks with Pakistan on Kashmir.
Almost six rounds of talks were held on Kashmir issue but they did not bear any fruitful
results. An environment of despair and disappointment prevailed in Pakistan over no
positive development on Kashmir problem. 47 The thing which enraged the
administration and public opinion in Pakistan was the Indian effort of manoeuvring
Kashmir legally in October 1963 as changes were made in the Constitution of Kashmir
by the then prime minister of the state Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad who was acting
45 . Penderel Moon. Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 293. 46 . Victoria Schofield. Kashmir and Conflic: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War, London: I. B. Tauris, 2000, p. 56. 47 . Ibid., pp. 81-82. 40
just like puppet for India, 48 in order to change the status of that state. The title of
president of the state (sadr-e-riyasat) was replaced by governor and that of prime
minister with the chief minister just making Kashmir as one of the states of India. This
development shook the basis of any dialogue on the disputed territory of Kashmir.
Internally, the people of Kashmir rose against this decision of Indian government and
unprecedented demonstrations were witnessed in all parts of Kashmir and a political
movement was started for the freedom of Kashmir. India applied strict measures to
suppress the Kashmir movement and resorted to violence against the innocent Kashmiri
people. Pakistan moved towards the UN Security Council for intervention in the matter
and long discussions were held in February 1964 for resolving the dispute but the Soviet
Veto hampered any development on the conflict and the UN Security Council could not
take any effective action. 49
In April 1964, in a surprising move, India showed her commitment for resolution when
Premier Nehru decided to release Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah who was the former prime minister of Indian held Kashmir known for leading the Kashmiri protests against the unfair administration of Maharaja in 1930s. His release was an indication of the
Indian intention to respect the right of self-determination of Kashmiri people. The truth behind the Indian soft gestures was yet to be known. In May 1964, however, Sheikh
Abdullah came to Pakistan to assure the Pakistani Government of full Indian commitment for settlement of Kashmir issue. President Ayub Khan was invited to India for talks and on May 27, 1964, when Ayub Khan was ready to go to India for bringing back any good news on Kashmir, Nehru died and with him the hope for peace also died.
48 . Ayesha Jalal . The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, London: Cambridge Publishers, 1985, p. 87. 49 . Peter Batchelor, P. Dunne and Guy Lam. The Demand for Military Spending in South Africa, Journal of Peace Research, Oslo: Peace Research Institute, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2002, pp. 339-54. 41
Lal Baadur Shastri became Prime Minister after Nahru but his priorities were different
form those of Nehru. Although talks and meetings were held between Shastri and Ayub
Khan in October 1964 but a blow to those talks was seen when India extended laws to
the Kashmiri state in December 1964, giving another proof of her treachery in
negotiations. Since then Kashmir has always been a fundamental conflict between India
and Pakistan hampering any cooperation in other fields too.
2.2.1.9. The Issue of Rann of Kutch 1965
The area of Rann of Kutch is a low lying water logged land, running between the State
of Gujarat in India and Sindh in Pakistan. This area suffers from floods during the
monsoon season. The dispute between Pakistan and India on Rann of Kutch was not
the eruption of a new border clash. The roots of this border dispute go back to the pre-
independence era when the area remained disputed between the State of Kutch and the
British province of Sindh at that time. Both states had their own stand on the border in
Rann of Kutch. 50 India claimed that the boundary was determined in the North of Rann and Pakistan’s stand for this boundary was for the middle of Rann of Kutch. So, overall, the area of about 3,500 square miles was disputed. 51 Though Pakistan and India discussed the matter soon after independence in 1948 52 but later in December 1955,
India refused to acknowledge any claim of Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch and instead
India laid her claim on the whole of Rann of Kutch. The border police at Chhad Bet were attacked by Indian Armed Forces in 1956 and clashes started between the two countries once again. Any negotiation between Pakistan and India was not held till 1960
50 . Philip Oldenburg. India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths, New York: Routledge Publishers, 2011, p. 96. 51 . Altaf Gauhar. Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler, Lahore: Sange-e-Meel Publications, 1993, p. 127. 52 . S.N. Raikes. Memories on the Kutch States, Karachi: Government Printing Press, 1954, p. 65. 42
because of the inflexible attitude of Indian leaders. Diplomatic level talks, however,
took place in January 1960 but except verbal statements, no further effort was made to
resolve the dispute and ceasefire was maintained till the end of 1964. 53 In January 1965,
Indian forces entered the disputed area to establish their posts and border violations
took place with great frequency. In response to this action by India, Pakistan also sent
troops to defend her position and, in April 1965, 54 a full-fledged war flared up in the
Rann of Kutch area between the two armies, deteriorating the relations between the
already hostile countries blaming each other for the provocation of the dispute. Indian
forces were facing severe defeat at the hands of Pakistani forces but President Ayub
khan ordered not to move ahead because of the threat by Indian side to attack Lahore.
The United States did not come to the help to resolve this dispute as the visits by
President Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri were cancelled
by President Johnson of USA. On the other hand, Soviet Union was already in favour
of India and Pakistan could not take risk by forwarding the demand of mediation by
Soviet Union. So the last option left was that of Britain which then mediated and from
April 30, 1965, a ceasefire was established till the formal start of negotiations. On June
30, 1965, an agreement was signed between the two countries through mediation by
Britain to peacefully resolve the dispute when President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister
Shastri went to London to attend the Commonwealth Conference. According to the
agreement, the two countries were given two months to resolve the dispute at ministers’
level bilaterally. In case of failure, the dispute would automatically be referred to a
tribunal which would be constituted within four months of the ceasefire, consisting of
one representative each from Pakistan and India and one as chairman selected jointly
53 . Farzana Khan. The Rann of Kutch Dispute, Pakistan Horizon, Karachi, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1965, p. 374. 54 . The Economist, London, May 1, 1965, p. 513. 43
by the two parties and one to be nominated by the Secretary General of the United
Nations. 55 It was agreed that the decision by the tribunal would not be rejected by any
party and till the solid decision, the tribunal would continue to function. 56 Figure 2.4
shows the area of Runn of Kutch as viewed from NASA Earth Observatory.
Figure 2.4: Runn of Kutch on the top left in turquoise color
Source: NASA Earth Observatory.en.m.Wikipedia.org/wiki/great_Rann_of_Kutch
The tension between the two countries did not allow anyone of them to come closer to resolve the Kutch clash and ultimately the matter went to the consideration of the tribunal. The tribunal announced its decision on February 19, 1969 with 350 square miles of territory in the Rann of Kutch which was awarded to Pakistan i.e. only 10 percent of the entire area. 57 On the other hand, India was awarded 90 percent of the area
55 . Lawrence Ziring. “ The Rann of Kutch Arbitration”, in Masuma Hassan (Ed.), Pakistan in a Changing World, Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1978, p. 144. 56 . Text in Pakistan Horizon, 3 rd Quarter 1965. 57 . Alastair Lamb. Crisis in Kashmir: 1947-66, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966, pp. 115-16. 44
in the Kutch. Though Pakistan was awarded much less than India but was satisfied with
the tribunal’s decision. India with even 90 percent of the territory in the Kutch area
criticized the decision by the tribunal and delayed the implementation of the terms of
the decision. But on July 4, 1969, Pakistan and India signed the last documents with
maps to finish the dispute of Kutch forever. 58 Despite less share than India, the Pakistan
side of the Kutch consisted of the elevation points while Indian side was sea marsh.
This resolution of the Kutch dispute served as a good example for resolving all the
disputes between Pakistan and India including that of Kashmir but the indignant attitude
of India did not leave the two countries to cooperate further on other conflicts and,
instead, Indian government decided not to accept arbitration by anyone in the conflicts
between the two countries in future.59 With the exception of an Indian leader J.P.
Narayan, no one in India praised the peaceful settlement of Kutch dispute, though
Pakistani side also commended the cooperation and joint agreement on the matter.
2.2.1.10. Moving towards a Full Scale War 1965
The Kutch dispute resolution raised anger on the Indian side as jingoistic statements were witnessed flaring up the domestic opinion. As in that crisis, USA also did not come to help the two sides and instead remained defensive. The US arms were used by both Pakistan and India but the fact of the matter was that Pakistan was taking arms from the US alone while major portion of Indian arsenal was of Soviet origin as well as from the US. 60 India still criticized Pakistan for using US arms against her. The
United States claiming to have no role in Pakistan−India dispute, announced embargo on the supply of arms to both the countries which acted as detriment to Pakistan as India
58 . Barry Buzan. People, States and Fear, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 190. 59 . Dinesh Chandra Jha. Indo−Pakistan Relations, Patna: Bharati Bhawan, 1972, pp. 190-92. 60 . Sisir Gupta. Kashmir, New York: Asian Publishing House, 1966, p. 439. 45
was at no damage because of the Soviet help. President Johnson also announced
discontinuation of any loans to either country but Pakistan again suffered as the meeting
of the World Bank consortium for Pakistan was delayed. 61 So, that time was of severe
crisis for Pakistan in her relations with India as well as with the US whose decisions
damaged Pakistan’s interests tremendously.62
At the same time, situation in Kashmir got critical as India again started her moves to integrate Kashmir as her state with the constitutional steps of declaring Sadr-e- Riyasat as the governor to be appointed by the president of India. Many arrests were made by
India including that of Sheikh Abdullah and his companions while returning from Hajj where they had discussed the Kashmir issue with the representatives of different Islamic countries. On June 5, 1965, a Gandhi type non-violent civil disobedience movement was started by Mirwaiz Muhammad Farooq, the leader of Awami Action Committee in
Kashmir. India used her forces to crush the movement but the agitation increased instead. This situation in the Indian held Kashmir had serious repercussions for the
Pakistan held Kashmir where people attempted to help their brothers across the ceasefire line. 63 So tension mounted to the peak and while Pakistan wanted a serious handling of the Kashmir problem, India was not taking the matter seriously and, instead, adopted brutal means to suppress the Kashmiri sentiments. On May 17, 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and occupied three posts in the Kargil which posed a serious threat to Pakistan’s security forces. Though, under the UN pressure, Indian forces later withdrew from the area, that pressure did not stop her from the later moves across the line of ceasefire again in August. Though President Ayub Khan was not very
61 . M. J. Akbar. Kashmir, New Delhi: Penguine Books, 1991, p. 187. 62 . The Pakistan Times, Lahore , May 2, 1965. 63 . Summit Ganguly. Avoiding War in Kashmir, Foreign Affairs, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Vol. 69, No. 5, Winter 1990-91, pp. 57-73. 46
much in support of offensive against India, encouraged by the success in the Rann of
Kutch clash, a war plan named “Operation Gibralter” was prepared to counter the threat
posed by India in Kashmir. 64 This plan was approved by the GHQ calling for the help
of Kashmiri volunteers for incursions in the Occupied Kashmir. The war in Kashmir
escalated when these volunteers entered Kashmir and acted as guerillas against Indian
forces successfully but they could not be joined by the Kashmiri people 65 who had no information about this uprising strategy. Indian forces inflicted major offensive and occupied a huge territory between Uri and Poonch and the Northern Kargil area. This was a greatly threatening situation for Pakistan as Azad Kashmir’s capital
Muzaffarabad was just near the areas wherefrom the Indian forces were moving ahead.
Seeing the Indian offensive, Pakistani forces could not sit silently and responded to forestall the Indian aggression by crossing the ceasefire line and occupying the Chhamb area posts of the Jammu Bhimber sector. India was the first to throw her air force in the battle and Pakistan followed that. 66 The battle now took a very serious mode as
Pakistani forces on August 5, 1965, under the command of Major General Akhtar Malik moved towards Akhnoor, a transport point which linked Poonch and Srinagar with
Jammu. In response to that, India decided to cross the International boundary and on
September 6, 1965, Indian forces entered West Pakistan with the aim to capture Lahore,
20 miles away from the Indian side. Though there was no formal declaration of war by the Indian forces, the legendary acts of Pakistani army, air force and navy removed the
Indian threat. Twenty five Indian aircrafts were shot down by the Pakistani Air force with the loss of nineteen of its own. The contingent in East Pakistan also showed acts
64 . Robert G. Wirsing. India−Pakistan Relations and the Problem of Kashmir, Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations , Kerala (India): School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Vol. 32, Nos. 3-4, December 1998, p. 117. 65 . Victoria Sihofield. Kashmir in the Crossfire, New York: L.B. Tauris Publishers, p. 214. 66 . Kashmir: Portents of War and Hopes of Peace, A Report, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington D. C, 1997, pp. 133-50. 47
of bravery. Pakistani Navy attacked a naval base Dwarka which was 200 miles away
from Karachi capturing hundred ships. The major encounter taking place between the
two forces on September 9, 1965 was in Sialkot and then in the Chavinda area. The UN
adopted its first resolution to ceasefire on September 4, 1965 and the second one on
September 6, 1965 calling the withdrawal of all forces on both sides and establishment
of ceasefire.67 These resolutions did not support Pakistan’s demand of a just and reasonable resolution of Kashmir dispute. Finally, the resolution was passed by the UN
Security Council on September 20, 1965 and was accepted by Pakistan and India on
September 22. This resolution not only called for ceasefire but also promised to decide the Kashmir problem in a just manner. This war ended in stalemate with no loser and no winner. 68
The immediate consideration of the UN Security Council towards the War and ceasefire and the need to resolve the conflict between Pakistan and India can be determined while analyzing the role of China in 1965. China extended help towards Pakistan by condemning Indian aggression along China’s border on August 27, 1965. On
September 8 again, 69 Indian government was warned against her moves along the
Chinese borders. And on September 9, finally, China warned India of serious
consequences for the aggressive acts. That was the reason that the world community
and the UN Security Council felt the seriousness of the issue and an urgency was felt
to decrease the threat of war in the region which was to drag other countries too. So
India also accepted the UN Security Council resolution on September 22, 1965 in order
to fade away the threat from China. Pakistan accepted the resolution partly because of
67 . Seymour Hersh. On the Nuclear Edge, The New Yorker, New York, March 29, 1993, pp. 56-73. 68 . Denis Wright. Indo−Pakistan Relations: 1962-69, Lahore: Vanguard, 1989, p. 62 69 . The Times of India, Bombay, April 29, 1965. 48
the UN commitment to solve the Kashmir problem and partly because of the shortage
of arms and ammunitions which was not allowing the forces to take further risks. So
the war ended and both the countries again kept on the way of cold war. The US, on
this occasion, kept herself silent and neutral. Inspite of the commitments on many
occasions like the 1959 defence pact, the joint communiqué of July 1961 and November
1962 memoir, no assistance came to Pakistan to the extent of even no moral support
from the US for Pakistan. 70 The United Kingdom also remained calm because they criticized the aggression by India on which there was huge Indian storm against the
United Kingdom. As far as Muslim countries were concerned, they helped Pakistan both morally and materially like Iran, Turkey with many East Asian countries. As far as the fulfilling of the promise by the UN Security Council was concerned, that never came into effect on which Pakistan trusted and accepted the resolution for the ceasefire on September 22, 1965.
2.2.1.11. Post-War Developments and Tashkent Declaration
The period after the war of 1965 was also greatly tense between Pakistan and India.
The UN Security Council’s promise of a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute was already relegated to the past with both UK and US not willing to take any step in that regard. On the other hand, the situation in Kashmir was becoming more and more serious because of the Indian aggression across the ceasefire line. 71 It was a very dangerous condition which again could pull the two countries into a warlike situation.
In such circumstances where no one was taking any interest in resolving the dispute, the Soviet Union came forward and invited both Pakistan and India to discuss the
70 . Morrice James. Pakistan Chronicle, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 124. 71 . The Tashkent Declaration (1966), Story of Pakistan, June 1, 2003, See online http://www.storyof Pakistan.Com/ article text.asp?artid=A139. 49
conflicting issues. The first invitation from the Soviet Union came on September 4,
1965 which was again renewed on September 17, 1965.72 One reason for the Soviet
Union’s invitation was her belief that in case China sided with Pakistan in the war, then
India would definitely be joined by USA and, in that situation, the position and influence of Soviet Union would be nowhere in South Asia. 73 So that was the reason
that Soviet leader pushed the two countries to resolve their matters. Initially, Pakistan
was not taking any active interest in the Soviet offer because of the deep rooted
understanding between India and Soviet Union but seeing the passive role of the UN
Security Council and USA and other allies, Pakistan decided to benefit from that
invitation for, at least, the Kashmir dispute resolution and accepted the Soviet stance
on November 11, 1965. It is also worth mentioning here that during President Ayub
Khan’s visit to the Soviet Union in the previous year, Pakistan showed her intention to
finish the Badaber lease* so the Soviet Government had developed a positive image of
Pakistan’s commitment. 74 India, however, delayed her response. In early December
1965, a Communique was issued by the Soviet Government to hold a meeting of the
heads of governments of Pakistan and India on January 4, 1966. 75
The Tashkent Declaration made some headway in the so called promises of removing
hostilities between Pakistan and India. This conference lasted from January 4-10, 1966
and provided for the release of the prisoners of war, the forces to be withdrawn to the
positions before August 5, 1965, returning of the high commissioners to their high
72 . Tariq Ali. Can Pakistan Survive?, New York: Random House, 1984, p. 56. 73 . M. J. Akbar. India: The Siege Within, New York: Viking Penguin, 1985, p. 38. 74 . Mohammad Jamil. View: Pakistan to look Eastwards, Daily Times , Lahore, February 01, 2011. 75 . T. V. Paul (Ed.). The India−Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 48. *. During Ayub Khan’s presidency, the Central Intelligence Agency's activities grew with a secret intelligence base— Peshawar Air Station (Badaber) was leased to the United States in July 1959 to be operated by the US officials.
50
commissions and the continued process of discussions and meetings to resolve the
Pakistan−India differences. 76 Inspite of all these provisions in the historic Tashkent
Declaration, the traditional uncompromising attitude remained very much there in the later developments in Pakistan−India relations due to the inflexible stand of India on the Kashmir issue which, according to the Indian leadership, was now part of Indian internal policy and rejected any negotiation and interference on that matter by Pakistan or any other country. In figure 2.5, we can see the three leaders on the occasion of signing of the Tashkent Declaration.
Figure 2.5: After signing the historic Tashkent Declaration at Tashkent, Soviet Union
From L to R. Lal Bahadur Shastri, Premier of India, Z.A Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan and Kosygin, Soviet Premier.
Source: http://www.pakistanpaedia.com/mega/megaprojects.html
76 . For the Text of the Tashkent Declaration, see Asian Recorder, 1966, p. 68-96. 51
Though Tashkent Declaration did not lead towards any significant breakthrough in
Pakistan−India, it was a good chance for Pakistan to erode the Soviet-India relations to
a greater extent because Soviet Union now had a soft attitude towards Pakistan which
was evident from the increased Soviet economic and military assistance to Pakistan 77
in as much amount as that of India. Furthermore, Soviet Union also withdrew her
previous support to Afghanistan on the issue of Pakhtunistan which was detrimental to
Pakistan’s stand on that issue. The Soviet Union also stabilized her diplomatic position
in the South Asian region which remained either under the influence of UK or US since
partition. 78 Though Soviet leadership tried to resolve a very difficult matter of South
Asia i.e. Pakistan−India hostility through Tashkent Declaration, it also stabilized her
influence in the International arena as was evident from the Soviet struggle for opening
the lock that had no key at all. 79 But whatever was the case, it was a good step towards
warding off the volcano which was again to burst out, had no precautionary steps taken
by the Soviet leadership. 80 Pakistan also got able to smoothen her relationship with the three powers of the world at that time—US, China and the Soviet Union. 81 As far as
Chinese stand was concerned, China did not oppose anything at that time and supported
Pakistan but expressed her concern over the Soviet soft posture for Pakistan and deemed it propaganda of both US and the Soviet Union to move Pakistan’s attention from China which had built friendly relations with Pakistan since independence. In July 1966, in one of the conferences held in Peking (new ‘Beijing’), Chinese representatives called
77 . John Paul Lederach. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 1997, p. 194. 78 . T. V. Paul. Why has the India−Pakistan Rivalry been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict, Security Studies , London: Routledge Publishers, Vol. 15, No. 4, October-December 2006, pp. 600-30. 79 . The Times , London, January 3, 1966. 80 . Hafeez Malik. Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics, London: Macmillan Publishers, 1994, pp. 176-93. 81 . Subrata K. Mitra. War and Peace in South Asia: A Revisionist View of India−Pakistan Relations, Contemporary South Asia , New York: Routledge Publishers, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2001, pp. 365-77. 52
the Tashkent Declaration a very negative development in the regional politics and
regarded it an effort to use Pakistan−India closer relations to counter China under the
garb of peaceful settlement of all disputes between Pakistan and India. However,
Pakistan-China relations did not suffer at any level during the period and even
afterwards because the basis of this relationship was strong enough with respect for
each other’s international and national position and survival. 82
2.2.2. The Second Phase: I967-1989
Under the Tashkent Declaration, it was pledged to solve the Kashmir dispute acceptable
to both the countries as well as the people of Kashmir. Pakistan and India were also
asked to continue meetings for a more smooth relationship essential for regional
prosperity as part of the Tashkent Declaration. Despite all these promising statements,
stalemate continued with the exception of only one occasion when a conference of
Foreign Ministers was held at Rawalpindi on March 1 and 2, 1966. 83 Though the joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting confirmed the two sides agreeing on promoting peace in future but that very conference also raised the issue of purpose of the meetings as both Pakistan and India were giving different reasons for holding those meetings. As far as Pakistani side was concerned, Pakistani Government was very much willing to discuss the Kashmir issue on priority basis in the bilateral meetings but the
Indian side stated that the Kashmir problem was the internal matter of India calling
Kashmir as an integral part of India. This inflexible posture of India added fuel to the fire and created obstacles in the way of further meetings between the two countries. 84
82 . Denise Wright . India−Pakistan Relations: 1962-1969, Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1989, p. 59. 83 . Aijaz Ahmad. Lineages of the Present Ideology and Politics in Contemporary South Asia, London, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 260. 84 . Niloufer Mehdi . Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1971–1981: The Search for Security, Karachi: Ferozesons, 1999, pp. 81-82 and pp. 131-35. 53
The Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin also expressed his deep disappointment on the lack of flexibility and no progress in Pakistan India relations and in 1968 again urged the two countries to resume the cooperation on disputed matters but Indian adamant attitude made that impossible again. On October 1, 1970, in the
General Assembly meeting, the leaders of both the countries exchanged statements but that too was not a very positive development as the Indian side assured of full cooperation and discussion on the disputed matters between the two countries but at the same time declared Kashmir as a part of Indian territory.85 Pakistan’s government
expressed its deep concern over the double policy of the Indian government which was
not understandable and feasible to be carried out. As Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Agha
Shahi said that it was just not understandable that the Indian side was considering
Kashmir as its integral part and at the same time wanted to discuss the Kashmir issue
with Pakistan. That was the development taking place in the post Tashkent period where
no active cooperation and no progress on conflicting issues between the two countries
was seen and that continued in the coming decades too. 86
2.2.2.1. Developments in Kashmir and Impact on Pakistan−India Relations
Being unresolved, the Kashmir dispute continued to shake the foundations of any progress in Pakistan−India relations. 87 Indian and Kashmiri leaders consistently refused
to confirm any possibility of the right of self-determination to be given to the Kashmiri
people. As part of the General Elections in India, elections also took place in Kashmir
85 . Nazir A. Mughal. “Inching Together or a Mile Apart: India and Pakistan towards Detente” , in Mehrunnisa Ali (Ed.). Readings in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: 1971-1998 , Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 113. 86 . Pervez Iqbal Cheema . “Pakistan, India and Kashmir: A Historical Review”, in Raju G. C. Thomas (Ed.), Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 3-4. 87 . Robert G. Wirsing. India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution, London, Macmillan Press, 1994, p. 115. 54
in February 1967. But these elections were not based on fair and democratic principles
as the freedom of press was banned in Kashmir. 88 Legal restrictions were imposed on many important opinion circles of the society. Moreover, an important party “Plebiscite
Front” which was in the forefront demanding the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir, also boycotted the elections.
In January 1968, India released many prisoners who were held at the time of clashes with China and lifted the state of emergency which was declared by India on October
26, 1962 during the Indo−China border war. 89 Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was also
released. Immediately after his release, he started his movement of free Kashmir again
at the pretext of which he was detained earlier. Abdullah, a well-known leader of the
Plebiscite Front was very active in demanding the right of Kashmiris either by
establishing a free state of Kashmir or by joining Pakistan but not as a part of Indian
state. 90 Time and again, he reminded the leadership of both Pakistan and India to resolve the Kashmir problem by calling a round table conference consisting of the leadership of Pakistan, India and Kashmir. But India was adamant in not accepting their demand.
Different statements came from the Indian leadership reminding Pakistan of the
Kashmir as being part of India and non-acceptance of any negotiation with Pakistan which could change the position of Kashmir to anything other than an integral part of
India. In January 1971, the Indian leadership issued orders for the arrest of important workers of the Plebiscite Front and barred Sheikh Abdullah from entering his home town. The reason for this stern action was that in case Plebiscite Front would contest
88 . Khaled Ahmed. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Ideology and Isolation, World Affairs , Washington D.C: American Peace Society, Vol. 3, No. 1, January-March, 1999, pp. 43- 45. 89 . Chris Cook and John Stevenson. The Routledge Companion to World History since 1914: A Compendium of Facts and Figures, New York: Routledge Publishers, 2005, p. 311. 90 . Louis Hayes. The Impact of U.S. Policy on the Kashmir Conflict, Tuscon AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 1971, pp. 16-34. 55
the elections, the Indian leadership would not be able to implement its plans in Kashmir
and would not be able to win the mid-term elections which were to be held within a
short time. 91 In retaliation, the Kashmiri people showed their full support to Pakistan as was evident in their celebration of the Pakistan’s victory in Asian Games against India and Hijacking of an Indian plane by the Kashmir Liberation Front members. That time was very tense between India and Pakistan as India was proceeding with its own policies in Kashmir while Pakistan stuck to the demand of resolving the Kashmir problem in a just and fair way.
2.2.2.2. Another Water Dispute
Another important dispute which Pakistan and India tried to resolve in 1960s was regarding the distribution of water of Ganges. In fact, this dispute was started in 1951 when Pakistan, for the first time, came to know about the Indian intention to build a barrage across the Ganges River at a location known as Farakka, just a dozen mile away from the point where the Ganges River enters Pakistan. 92 The construction of this
barrage was also disadvantageous for the economy of Pakistan as that plan of India was
intended to improve the navigation infrastructure in the Port of Kolkata (old ‘Calcutta’)
as well as making the water supply possible in the city while developing the sanitation
and communication links at the same time. 93 Those Indian intentions were not
favourable for Pakistan as the diversion of water from the Pakistani areas towards India
would put the whole economy of Pakistan at greater threat. As the water supply in
Pakistani areas would be reduced, so many agriculture related policies and projects
91 . Sumantra Bose. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 163. 92 . Peter H. Gleick (Ed.). Water in Crisis. A Guide to the World’s Fresh Water Resources, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 13-24. 93 . S. Tanzeema and I. M. Faisal. Sharing the Ganges: A Critical Analysis of the Water Sharing Treaties, Water Policy , Marseille (France): World Water Council, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2001, p. 13. 56
could not be implemented and would be greatly affected. 94 Similarly, the construction of barrage could provide control to India over the Ganges waters which could stop or reduce the river water causing droughts and destruction of agricultural lands particularly in East Pakistan and, on the other hand, increasing the water flow in the
Pakistani areas would cause floods in East Pakistan as the channel would become silted and the lack of drainage of water into the sea could create more problems.
All these problems were big issues for the government of Pakistan demanding solution on the pattern of Indus water problem. But India, on the other hand, was not in favor of any solution on the basis of arbitration by anyone as for India, the matter was of bilateral nature. India also stated that the Ganges was not an international river but an internal river of India and the problem of delay in resolving the issue was due to Pakistan’s approach which was not ready to provide relevant data highlighting details of cooperation. 95 Since 1950s, Pakistan reminded India time and again about the problem but India adopted delaying tactics each time. Till 1960, no meeting took place to move towards the solution. During the decade of 60s too, the matter could not be practically discussed partly because of the war situation and partly because of the Indian traditional hostile posture towards Pakistan. At last, the leadership of the two countries decided to hold secretary level talk series from December 1968 to July 1970 in which some mechanism was chalked out for the distribution of water from river Ganges. 96 The point of the quantum of water to be supplied to Pakistan was decided to be at Farakka. But the quantity of water at Farakka to be delivered to Pakistan was still to be decided in
94 . Surendra N. Kulshreshtha. World Water Resources and Regional Vulnerability: Impact of Future Changes, IIASA Report , Laxenburg (Austria): Internaiontal Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA), RR-93-10, June 1993, p. 46. 95 . M. Mirza. The Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty: Risk Analysis of the Negotiated Discharge, International Journal of Water , Geneva: Inderscience Publishers, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2003, pp. 57-74. 96 . Keith Callard. Pakistan: A Political Study, London, Allen & Unwin, 1975, p. 156. 57
future. Ironically, no meeting could take place till the end of 1970 to decide the quantum
issue between the two countries. The Ganges water dispute was resolved, to a greater
extent, because the unresolved issue of this water problem could have posed a very
serious danger to the Pakistan−India relations. 97 At least, the acceptance by India of
Pakistan’s right on the waters of Ganges River was an extraordinary development in
improving the otherwise hostile relations of Pakistan and India.
2.2.2.3. 1971 War and Pakistan−India Tensions
The year 1971 proved fatal for Pakistan−India relations. On the one hand, Pakistan was
fighting a diplomatic war for the freedom of Kashmir which already tensed the relations
of the two countries. On the other hand, Pakistan faced an internal holocaust when East
Pakistan issue arose. East Pakistan developed differences with the centre’s policies
soon after independence. 98 Though the majority in East Pakistan were Muslims and they committedly fought the war of a separate homeland for themselves but their reservations for autonomy and rights were not often met in the years after independence. Adding to the problem was the issue of a long distance of one thousand miles between the two wings of Pakistan and the Indian state in between the two.When the differences between the two wings got intensified with the Indian involvement in the internal matter of Pakistan, the Eastern Pakistan preferred to get independence than to remain as part of Pakistan. 99 The language issue, lack of the sense of participation in the governmental affairs, its position of isolation during the war of 1965 and lack of capability of self defence created a sense of deprivation among the people of East
97 . Stephen P. Cohen. India, Pakistan and Kashmir, Journal of Strategic Studies , London: Routledge Publishers, Vol. 25, Issue 4, December 2002, pp. 33-34. 98 . Selig S. Harrison, Paul H. Kreisberg and Dennis Kux. India & Pakistan: The First Fifty Years, London: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 65. 99 . Jamshed Ayaz Khan. Reflection on Matters of War and Peace, Islamabad: Pangraphics Ltd, 2003, p. 55. 58
Pakistan. In March 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman presented ‘Six Points’ which called
for the provision of autonomy leaving the centre to deal with defence and foreign affairs
only.100 As the Government of Ayub Khan was highly centralized, this demand of
autonomy by East Pakistan was taken as tantamount to the secessionist movement. The
leadership of East Pakistan was subjected to suppression as it was considered to be a
deliberate move towards the break up of Pakistan. 101 But, on the other hand, the demand
and reservation of the East Pakistanis was not without substance as they were always
meted out a step motherly treatment. Taking advantage of this situation, India saw an
opportunity to jump in the dispute not for resolution but for the deterioration of the
already burning issue and provoked centrifugal sentiments among the people of East
Pakistan. The clear evidences of the operatives of the Indian agencies planning sabotage
activities in East Pakistan were found. It seemed as if nature was also not favorable for
the solution of this problem and prevention of the intensifying dispute between Pakistan
and India. 102 A cyclone struck East Pakistan in November 1970 with millions of people
drowned and dead. West Pakistan was again accused of negligence from its
responsibilities towards East Pakistan. The last nail in the coffin was the elections of
December 1970 in which the Awami League of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman emerged as
the largest political party to form the government and Pakistan Peoples Party emerged
as the second largest party. 103 Now the transfer of power became a hurdle in the way of
forming a government. The delay on the part of West Pakistan to recognize East
100 . Thomas Perry Thornton. “India’s Foreign Relations: Problems along the Borders”, in Marshall M. Bouton and Philip Oldenburg (Eds.), India Briefing , Colorado: Westview Press Inc, 1988, p. 178. 101 . D. K. Palit. The Lightning Campaign: The Indo−Pakistan War 1971, Salisbury: Compton Press, 1972, p. 125. 102 . Firdaus Ahmed. The Day after 'Cold Start’, Military Articles , No. 2424, New Delhi: Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, November 23, 2007. See online http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/the-day-after- cold-start-2424.html, accessed on July 16, 2010. 103 . Walter C. Ladwig. A Cold Start for Hot Wars?: The Indian Army‘s New Limited War Doctrine, International Security , Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007/08, p. 158. 59
Pakistan as the holder of governmental power after the unprecedented victory made the
East Pakistani leadership further adamant and they started demanding a confederation
structure. All the talks broke down and a military crackdown was launched on March
25, 1971 against the secessionist elements in former East Pakistan. The situation was
getting worse day by day as India found an opportunity to break Pakistan so that was
the best time for India to utilize against Pakistan. A Plane hijack drama was played by
India and Pakistan was accused for that hijacking the reality of which was exposed later
and Indian intentions were brought to the limelight. But instead India carried out its
nefarious designs of damaging the integrity of Pakistan. After Yahya Khan ordered the
start of operation in East Pakistan, Indian policies moved into higher velocity. The
border forces of India started moving inside East Pakistan and provided full moral and
material support to the East Pakistanis and instigated them against West Pakistan and
its policies. 104 Military equipments were provided and a rebel force was built called
‘Mukti Bahini’ which was trained fully in guerrilla war. All these were clear evidence
of Indian open and secret designs against its neighbor.
The Indian and Soviet friendship treaty of August 9, 1971 also provided a good chance
for India to get assistance and support of Soviet Union in the war and that was provided
because the Soviet Union had a veto power in the UN which could save India on that
front as well as the shield of superpower was more than enough for India for the
preparations of better war operations. That was not a good time in the history of
Pakistan when the country was being broken into two parts. 105 The meeting between
Indira Gandhi and President Nixon on November 4-5, 1971 was, in fact, an important
104 . Mutahir Ahmed. Indo−Pak Conflicts, Pakistan Horizon (Quarterly Journal ), Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1996, p. 71. 105 . Victoria Schofield. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan, and the Unfinished War , New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000, p. 95. 60
event in the sense that Nixon realized the Indian designs against Pakistan where
ostensibly India was declaring peace and order and the intentions were not clear with
mood of war.106 That was what happened later on when India launched continuous
military actions from November 21-25, 1971 with full assistance to ‘Mukti Bahini’.
Pakistan asked USA to intervene but USA did not come to the help of Pakistan at that
time knowing even the factual situation which India had designed. On December 3,
1971, Pakistan’s government ordered crackdown across the border from the West
Pakistan. The so called brutalities of Pakistan were given greater projection length but
the Indian policies and plans were not brought to the forefront.
Seeing the seriousness of the situation, the UN tried to pass a resolution for ceasefire
but India never acted on anyone of them despite the heavy vote by the world community
for a ceasefire. This war ended on December 17, 1971 when India offered unconditional
ceasefire under the Soviet and the US pressure and the Pakistani forces surrendered. 107
During all this difficult scenario, China fully supported Pakistan but the latter had to
suffer a greater loss in the shape of broken state. All this situation was created by India
which also captured a large number of prisoners of war and thousands of the people
were dislocated with tremendous hardships. The dream of the Great Quaid was
shattered and the hope of the people for a prosperous land of Muslims was
demoralized. 108 Had the leadership of Pakistan shown a little vision in the early period and had the Indian nefarious designs been grasped years before the holocaust happened,
106 . Richard Nixon. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, Vol. 1, New York: Warner Books, 1978, p. 651. 107 . Stephen P. Cohen. The Pakistan Army, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 73. 108 . Abdul Sattar. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947-2005): A Concise History, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 189. 61
the disaster of 1971 in the shape of separation of East Pakistan could have never
happened.
In fact, that event was the biggest tragedy in the history of Pakistan and India relations
when Indian evil designs were materializing and Pakistan sustaining a great loss. When
the Indian leadership got a standing ovation in their parliament on this act against
Pakistan, Pakistan got another hostile indication from India of no improvement in the
relations as well as the feeling of hatred and animosity were getting stronger and
solidified in the years ahead.
2.2.2.4. Towards Normalizing Relations: The Simla Agreement 1972
The war of 1971 created a very precarious situation for both Pakistan and India halting
any further progress on the disputed issues. After the declaration of ceasefire on
December 17, 1971, no effort was made by any foreign power to initiate the peace
process between the two countries nor did the leaders of the two countries take any step
in this direction. Ultimately, Indian Union Minister D. P. Dhar came to Islamabad to
discuss the matters in detail and the procedure for moving bilateral negotiations forward
and a meeting took place from April 26-29, 1972 in Murree. This meeting did not prove
useful in terms of any positive development in the Pakistan−India relations and, instead,
the status quo continued. 109 The basic hurdle in these negotiations was that India wanted to continue the peace discussions on its own terms and Pakistan wanted that on her own.
So the Murree meeting did not attain any success in setting the criteria for further discussions. However, a step forward was made in the Simla Conference in June 1972.
The Simla Conference, in itself, was not very fruitful as it manifested clearly the
109 . Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, Boulder: Westview Press, 1980, p. 7. 62
positions of both the countries suffering from a wide gulf. The very first round of
discussions was marred by uncertainty and confusion as was reflected by the drafts
prepared by both the countries for negotiations. The difference between the modes of
negotiations of Pakistan and India was that Pakistan wanted to focus on the problems
created by the war of 1971 and wanted to resolve all those problems while the Indian
side was more adamant to discuss the Kashmir question and wanted to dictate the
solution on its own terms. 110 That was the biggest obstacle again which marred any
progress right from the beginning. In the second draft presented by India, Pakistan did
not show its interest because that too was not a healthy proposal to be tabled.
In the post war period, while Simla conference is remembered as an extraordinary
breakthrough in the relations between the two countries but the factual picture of that
conference was not that progressive. The Indian side considered that the opportunity of
the century to exploit further the situation created by the war as was manifested in the
draft presented by India which included the proposal for legitimizing status quo in
Jammu and Kashmir, convincing Pakistan to recognize Bangladesh as an independent
country and adoption of bilateral means to resolve any disputed matter between the two
countries. 111 Furthermore, the issue of prisoners of war was used by the Indian leadership to pressurize Pakistan to abide by its conditions for negotiations. At this point, the refusal by the Pakistani side to bargain on the prisoners issue was an advantage to Pakistan as the continued imprisonment of the prisoners of war was bringing more criticism to the Indian leadership. 112 The POW issue could not, therefore,
be used by India for its advantage. In the Simla Conference, the recognition of
110 . Ian Talbot. India and Pakistan: Inventing the Nation, London: Arnold Publications, 2000, p. 143. 111 . Feroz Hassan Khan. The Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilemmas in South Asia, Arms Control Today, Washington D.C: Arms Control Association, October 2003, p. 15. 112 . Ibid., p. 29. 63
Bangladesh was not accepted by Pakistan and no progress was made on this issue. As
far as the Indian objective of bilateral method of negotiations was concerned, that too
was not accepted by Pakistan because Pakistan did not want to lose the support of the
international forums and the mediations by the third parties in case when the disputed
issues could not be resolved by the leadership of the two countries. According to the
Pakistani side, the mediations and the interventions by the third parties in the past in
the disputing matters between the two countries had facilitated a lot as was evident from
the success of the boundary dispute of the Rann of Kutch and the efforts by the World
Bank to resolve the problem of the Indus Waters. On the contrary, the record of events
where issue was attempted to resolve through the bilateral means, failure was
confronted most of the times so the principle of mediation was prepared by Pakistan. 113
The crucial Kashmir problem as India wanted to address was also a pinch for Pakistan
because India refused to withdraw her forces to the position of 1949 ceasefire line, also
refused by the United Nations resolution 307 (1971). Pakistan’s refusal to abide by the
Indian demands for legitimizing the status quo in Jammu and Kashmir resulted in
retaining by India the territories occupied by her in the war of 1971 but that area was
mostly uninhabited consisting of the mountains in the Kargil area. Pakistan could not
compel India to withdraw from the areas as Pakistan had no means to do that. As a
result of this situation, both the countries had to maintain the positions as held by them
at the time of the ceasefire on December 17, 1971. 114 Pakistan accepted the term ‘Line of Control.’ It can be said that the main focus of discussions in the Simla Conference was the settlement of Kashmir dispute and it was admitted in paragraph 6 of the Simla
Agreement that the resolution of all Pakistan−India disputes depends on the settlement
113 . Lawrence Ziring . Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, Boulder, Westview Press, 1980, p. 25. 114 . Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan in the Twentieth Century , New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 423-24. 64
of Kashmir problem. 115 Figure 2.6 shows the leaders of both Pakistan and India while signing the Simla Agreement.
Figure 2.6: Signing Ceremony of Simla Agreement, June 28, 1972
Source: Story of Pakistan: The Simla Agreement,http://storyofpakistan.com/the-simla-agree ment/,accessed on June 2, 2012.
Analyzing the progress of both the parties in the Simla conference, it can be stated that neither Pakistan nor India made any big success as both had reservations and, instead, the conference was more a playful activity between the diplomats of the two countries with the use of gestures and words in such a way where the real intentions of the two
115 . Sumit Ganguly. Conflict Unending: India−Pakistan Tensions since 1947 , New York: Columbia Universtiy Press, 2001, p. 168. 65 sides were not hidden from each other. Though initially, Bangladesh demanded the trial of some of the prisoners of war but, later on, this fact was realized that using the prisoners of war as instrument could not be beneficial in any way. It took almost two years for both New Delhi and Dhaka to realize that retaining the prisoners was of no value and that was the reason that in September 1973, Pakistani prisoners were released except 195 who were kept for trial on charges of war crimes. Pakistan also agreed to the transfer of Bengalis from Pakistan and also accepted Pakistanis from Bangladesh.
Later on, the Chinese support and moral assistance helped Pakistan a lot when the 195 remaining prisoners were also released and Bangladesh abandoned the idea of trying the prisoners because China used its veto power to stop the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations. Moreover, the Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore in 1974 was also a positive progress in this regard as many countries asked Bangladesh to withdraw its decision of trying the prisoners. Pakistan later extended recognition to Bangladesh too and the relationship was established though some issues still needed to be resolved but the Indian intentions to break Pakistan were, at least, met. Though in the Simla
Conference, India tried her best to dictate her terms in the agreement between the two countries but some conditions did not allow the Indian side to get the full advantage and to exploit the situation. So the Simla Agreement was a partial success for Pakistan and India.
2.2.2.5. The Post-Simla Developments: Impact on Pakistan−India Relations
In the post Simla period, Pakistan tried its level best to raise the issue of Kashmir on various national and international forums and stressed the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir. The international forums also morally attended to the wishes and demands of Pakistan like NAM, Commonwealth and United Nations etc. During 66
this period, the change in Pakistan’ policy was also seen in terms of nuclear
intentions. 116 In fact, India conducted its first nuclear test peacefully on 18 th May 1974 at Pokhran. Pakistani leadership grasped the Indian designs to establish hegemony in the region and that was the reason that Pakistani leadership decided to follow the nuclear program. The prime Minister of Pakistan at that time declared that Pakistan would develop a peaceful nuclear program because Indian threat would be greater otherwise. A very critical situation was faced by Pakistan in the late 1970s and early
1980s when, with the change of government in Pakistan, internal conditions were changing like the policy of Islamization, factional politics and the support provided by
Pakistan to USA in Afghanistan, were all very important events of that era. Though
Pakistan was playing a frontline role in the US-Soviet Cold war, its impacts were greater on Pakistan like the spread of weapons and support to USA again in Afghanistan increased the militancy and insurgency in the region. So 1980 was a very critical time for Pakistan’s internal situation also. Indian friendship with the Soviet Union and
Pakistan’s support for USA created another chapter of new and hot diplomacy between
Pakistan and India.
2.2.2.6. Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan−India Relations
Another shock to Pakistan−India relations was faced by the new developments created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1980. After this invasion,
Afghanistan became a Cold War battleground for the Soviet Union and the United
States in the whole decade of 1980s and the early 1990s. Because of this war, South
Asia was affected badly with great implications on Pakistan India relations. This crisis
116 . Subrata K. Mitra. War and Peace in South Asia: A Revisionist View of India−Pakistan Relations, Contemporary South Asia , London: Taylor and Francis Publishers, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2001, pp. 365-77. 67
situation parted the ways of Pakistan and India diplomatically also. 117 India sided with the Soviet Union as its relations with the Soviet Union had been very amicable and the signing of the ‘Friendship Treaty” in 1971 added more warmth to their relationship. 118
Though India expressed its concerns and demanded the Soviets to withdraw troops from
the Afghan territory but overall there was no noteworthy public condemnation of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan from India. As for Pakistan, the situation was more
tensed as, on the one side, Pakistan became a middleman between the United States and
the Afghan elements which later created a very difficult situation for Pakistan as the
Taliban factor changed Pakistan’s priorities and foreign policy altogether. India, during
that period, maintained good relations with Afghanistan and silent support from the
Soviet Union and, at the same time, not leaving the good basis of interaction and
cooperation with the United States. And still criticizing the United States financial and
political support to Pakistan to deal with the Soviet war in Afghanistan. India raised her
concerns on the issue that the US financial aid and military support to Pakistan could
be diverted towards any aggressive step against India. That negative attitude shown by
India against Pakistan also raised eyebrows in Pakistan and the smooth way to be
followed in relations could not be adopted during that period too because the external
elements affected the relationship between the two countries badly. 119
2.2.2.7. Kashmir Question Again
The situation in Kashmir was not improving because of the inflexible and uncompromising attitude of Indian leadership. India wanted Pakistan to submit to
117 . Robert Wirsing (Ed.). Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-88, London, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 143-44. 118 . W. Howard Wriggins. Pakistan’s Search for a Foreign Policy after the Invasion of Afghanistan, Pacific Affairs , Vancouver: The University of British Columbia, No. 57, Summer 1984, p. 297. 119 . Ian Talbot. “ Does the Army Shape Pakistan’s Foreign Policy”, in Christophe Jaffrelot (Ed.), Nationalism without a Nation, New York: Zed Books, 2002, p. 324. 68
India’s terms on Kashmir and to compromise her position on the issue 120 but Pakistan
neither did that nor surrendered the right of self-determination for the people of
Kashmir. Pakistan continued to draw the world’s attention towards this serious issue
but the fact of the matter is that what was promised in the Simla Conference in 1972 to
find out the final solution of the Kashmir problem was not fulfilled. 121 The people of
Kashmir were constantly struggling for their right of self-determination and were
raising their voice against the Indian atrocities. To dispel their voices, Indian
government appointed Sheikh Abdullah in the state of Kashmir to handle the situation
but he too was totally dependent on the Indian security staff for his protection and
Kashmiri people also refused to support him. In 1984, the agitation of Kashmiri people
reached the zenith when an Indian consular official in England was kidnapped by a
group of Kashmiris and was, later on, killed. Now Indian leadership became more
adamant in her stance and was not ready to listen to the demands of the Kashmiris a bit
even. Unrest became more chronic. Another attempt by the Kashmiri youth was made
in September 1986 when several political parties formed a United Front to take part in
the elections which were due within next six months in the Indian held Kashmir.
Though the turnout was quite good, India declared the elections as unfair and
announced only few seats won by the United Front. Having disappointed by this attitude
of the Indian government, Kashmiris decided to resort to other means for the fulfillment
of their demands then. A regular movement was launched by the Kashmiris to defend
their legitimate rights and strikes and demonstrations were held to raise the anti-Indian
sentiments. A heavy handed approach was adopted by the Indian government against
the people in Kashmir. All this situation in Kashmir badly affected Pakistan−India
120 . Sisir Gupta. Kashmir: A Study in India−Pakistan Relations, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1966, p. 270. 121 . Sumit Ganguly. Op.cit. pp. 43-46. 69
normalization process and all the improvement taken place since 1972 was reversed. 122
The world media was pointing towards the Indian policy in Kashmir and there was hue
and cry in Pakistan as well. This Kashmiri struggle adopted the shape of militancy and
kidnapping and killing of Indian representatives. Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah was
attempted to be attacked in May 1987 but he escaped. 123 All the efforts and the sacrifices of the Kashmiri people fell on deaf ears as Indian leadership adopted strict measures to deal with the situation with the exception of one time submitting to the demands i.e. releasing few detained Kashmiris. 124
When the Soviet Union got disintegrated, the Western world considered Islam as the biggest emerging threat. A new term ‘Fundamentalism’ came to be recognized with widespread publicity. In the guise of this so called concept of fundamentalism, Indian leadership found an opportunity to declare Kahmiri struggle as terrorism, and freedom fighters as extremists, though they were fighting for their rights and democratic norms.
The United States started to declare Pakistan as a state having terrorist elements within its boundaries and placed Pakistan on the list of terrorist states. To give to the world a compromising and soft picture of India, the Indian leadership tried to move the scene in her favour and released some of the important Kashmiri leaders.
Those leaders, after their release, started their efforts to launch a permanent struggle under the platform of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) in February 1993. This movement, later on, contributed a lot in furthering the Kashmiri demands on different
122 . Jones Morris. Thirty Six Years Later: The Mixed Legacies of Mountbatten's Transfer of Power, International Affairs, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 4, 1983, pp. 621-28. 123 . Victoria Schofield. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan, and the Unfinished War, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000, p. 95. 124 . Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Kashmir, India and Pakistan, Foreign Affairs, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, No. 43, April 1965, p. 532. 70
forums and the struggle continued with the same adamant attitude of Indian
government.
2.2.2.8. Siachen Dispute
One of the most important issues which created hurdles in the way of smooth
relationship between Pakistan and India has been the Siachen dispute. Siachen is a part
of the Karakoram Range, at elevations of about 5,000 meters or more in the Northern
areas. This glacier lie across part of Baltistan and the inhabitants of this area threw of
the rule of Kashmir’s Maharaja in 1947. 125 Since independence, this area became
disputed between Pakistan and India and both the countries engaged in cold war to grab
the most advantageous location on the mountain. 126 This dispute has taken the toll of
many human and material losses on both sides. The three wars between Pakistan and
India did not have an impact on this area because of the factors of inaccessibility to,
and inhospitability of, this area. 127 Though many efforts were made after independence
to resolve this problem but in vain. One of the initial steps in this direction was taken
on July 27, 1949 when the military representatives of India and Pakistan met under the
supervision of UN Commission for Pakistan and India and decided the issue of ceasefire
line in Siachen. In this agreement, the line was described as ‘Chalunka (on the Shyok
River), Khor, and while showing on the map, the line finished at NJ 9842 i.e. about 60
miles south of the Karakoram water basin. 128 Upto Karakoram Pass, Pakistan exercised
control but after the Sino-Pakistan agreement of 1962, India started to raise her concern
125 . Robert G. Wirsing. The Siachin Glacier Dispute: Can Diplomacy Untangle it?, Indian Defence Review, New Delhi: Lancer Publications, July 1991, p. 95. 126 . Jasjit Singh. Siachin Glacier: Facts and Fiction, Strategic Studies, Singapore: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 12, No. 7, 1987, p. 667. 127 . Tariq Mahmood. Siachin Dispute and Status of Northern Areas, Defence Journal, Karachi, Vol. 19, Nos. 5-6, 1993, p. 21. 128 . Abdul Sattar. Op.cit, p. 189. 71
over the border areas that the part of Jammu and Kashmir towards the west of the
Karakoram Pass was under Pakistan’s unlawful control. Though permits were issued
by Pakistan to the people going for mountain expeditions in that area, India was
adamant in her stance. 129 No breakthrough was there in 1960s and 1970s for resolving this problem. India started to violate the boundary of this glaciated area in the early
1980s by sending forces and ignored the provision of the Simla Agreement which asked for not altering the situation unilaterally. To stop further advance of the Indian forces,
Pakistan also sent its contingent to control the situation. Ever since, both the countries are involved in battle in the world’s highest battle field. A golden chance to create an ultimate solution of Siachen problem was the agreement in 1989 which was made possible due to the back channel diplomatic efforts between Prime Ministers Benazir
Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi. A joint statement was issued on June 17, 1989 after a meeting of India and Pakistan’s defence secretaries. This joint statement outlined the determination of the two countries to reduce armed conflict and progress on future positions in the area in order to regard the consultations made in Simla Agreement in
1972. But later on, the matter was put to dark by raising new issues from the Indian side when they demanded for a civil position in the area as against the position prior to 1984.
Since the line of control could not be drawn in the conflicting area as demanded by
India, this has delayed the matter completely and put the peace efforts in shambles. The resolution of this dispute is a matter of priority as the area is under severe risk from ecological point of view because of military presence and use of arms/ammunition.
Figure 2.7 shows the Siachen Glacier area and the positions held by both Pakistan and
India.
129 . Ibid., pp. 94-96. 72
Figure 2.7: Siachen Glacier Area
Source: http://defence.pk/threads/siachen-dispute-india-and-pakistan%E2%80%99s-glacial- fight.309100/
2.2.2.9. Post-1976 Diplomatic Developments in Pakistan−India Relations
Though diplomatic relations were resumed after 1976, the Indian leadership was not showing any sign of goodwill. Initially, both the governments decided to reopen the consular offices in each other’s countries and India also promised Pakistan the lease of
Jinnah House in Mumbai for the consulate. That house was on lease to the British High 73
Commission after the Indian Government took that as an evacuee property. 130 Pakistan gave permission to the Indian government to start her consular services in Pakistan in advance and India assured Pakistan that after the British Government would leave the property, it would be leased out to the Pakistani embassy for their consular use. But when the lease period of British High Commission expired in 1981, India refused to lease out that property to Pakistan. Pakistani Government also sought permission of the
Indian government for the construction of consulate building in Mumbai but that was also refused by the Indian government. No help was provided to find out an appropriate place for the Consulate of Pakistan in Mumbai. This attitude of India was not favorable for the smooth process of dialogue and peaceful relationship.
2.2.2.10. Conspiracy for Kahuta Attack 1984
The relations of Pakistan−India got a severe blow when Pakistani officials got clear information with the help of friendly countries about the Indian plan to attack Kahuta with the Israeli or Soviet help to destroy the nuclear installations of Pakistan. This report was also confirmed by the United States’ sources. 131 The U.S. took the lead in getting the report checked from Tel Aviv about the truth of the information and later informed the Pakistani leadership about the falsity of the information. Pakistan, as a defensive mode, also informed the Indian leadership about the destructive impacts of such an attack on Pakistan which would be thought as an act of clear aggression. In the years ahead, both Pakistan and India entered into an agreement with each other according to which it was decided that no one would attack each other’s nuclear installations and the
130 . K. C. Saxena. Pakistan: Her Relations with India (1947-66), New Delhi: VIR Publication House, 1966, p. 14. 131 . New York Times , September 15, 1984. 74
agreement signed formally came into force in 1988. After this agreement, at least
Pakistan’s fear about any such conspiracy from the Indian side lowered down.
2.2.2.11. The 1986-87 Crisis of Brasstacks
The only event since 1971 which brought both Pakistan and India on the brink of war
was the crisis period created by the Indian pretext of so called military exercises in the
Western Rajasthan in the winter of 1986-87. These combined military exercises of
Indian armed forces were having the code name of “Brasstacks”, 132 comparable in scale
to the exercises of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Heavy artillery and armed resources
were utilized in the exercises. According to the understanding reached between the two
parties, India was supposed to inform Pakistan before conducting any such exercises.
But Indian army chief did not inform his Pakistani counterpart about the operation’s
scale and location. It was taken as a big threat because this operation was about to start
just fifty miles away from the Pakistani border giving forces the capability to cut the
Northern Pakistan from the Southern part.133 Although the GHQ in Pakistan requested
India in this regard but no heed was paid towards that. Ultimately, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Muhammad Khan Junejo met Rajiv Gandhi in the SAARC Summit in
November 1986 and discussed the matter. Apparently, India showed the commitment to scale down the operation but nothing was done to the favor of Pakistan. 134
The strategy adopted by the Pakistan army was then to extend the winter exercises and
with the intensity of the situation, moved the army formations to the areas closer to the
132 . Lee Feinstein. Avoiding Another Close Call in South Asia, Arms Control Today , Washington D.C: Arms Control Association, July/August, 2002. 133 . Devin T. Haggerty. The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia , Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998, pp. 102-104. 134 . Zulfiqar Ali Khan. Pakistan's Security: The Challenge and the Response, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988, p. 8-9. 75
Indian town of Fazilka to counter any immediate threat from the enemy and to save the
Pakistani territory, west of the Ravi, in the district of Sialkot. 135 Indian side, instead of taking into account her own actions, accused Pakistan of the massive provocation of the bad situation and also accused Pakistan of supporting the Sikh population in Punjab who already had raised their arms against the Indian leadership for assault on the
“Golden Temple” in 1984.
The crisis increased in January 1987 when both Pakistan and India placed their forces on high alert. India asked Pakistan to withdraw her forces and Pakistan, likewise, asked
India to remove the reason of concern for Pakistan. During the whole crisis period, the defence committee of Pakistan remained involved in intensive discussions and held an emergency meeting on January 20, 1987 and tried to diffuse the tensions. Furthermore,
Pakistani Prime Minister Junejo also called on Rajiv Gandhi and asked him to arrange a meeting of foreign secretaries to resolve the disputed matter. As a result of dialogue at this level, an agreement was reached on February 4, 1987 and the forces of both the countries were withdrawn to the position of peacetime. 136 To prevent any further tension in this regard, “Agreement on Advance Notice of Military Exercises,
Manoeuvres and Troops Movement” and the “Agreement on Prevention of Airspace
Violations and for Permitting Overflights and Landings by Military Aircrafts” were also reached between the two countries on April 6, 1991 which made it compulsory for both the countries to inform each other about any operation and troops movement and the limits of air fly zones were also decided. Brasstacks crisis was, in fact, a creation of the Indian side to cripple the Pakistani state under the garb of military exercises as has
135 . Ibid., pp. 89-90. 136 . Cabeiri Debergh Robinson. Partition: Its Refugees and Post-colonial State-Making in South Asia, India Review , London: Routledge Publishers, Vol. 9, No. 1, January-March, 2010, pp. 68-86. 76
been said by an eminent writer Abdul Sattar that the Brasstacks exercises had more
mammoth objectives than just to test the capability of the Indian armed forces. 137
2.2.2.12. Pakistan’s Re-Eentry to Commonwealth and the Indian Stand
An important stage of determining the Indian friendly posture for Pakistan came when the latter decided to re-enter in the Commonwealth. Pakistan had resigned from the forum on account of the passive role of Britain in the crisis of 1971 and by doing so, the leadership in Pakistan attempted to give a counter punch to the Britain to make her feel the proximity of the worst that happened to Pakistan in the crisis.138 When Zia-ul-
Haque came into power, Pakistan decided to rejoin the organization. The Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi consistently opposed the re-entry of Pakistan in the
Commonwealth. Rajiv Gandhi also followed his mother’s guidelines and did not favour
Pakistan’s re-entry in the Commonwealth. He made this thing his point of opposition
that Pakistan was ruled by a dictator. This reservation was not based on any logical
point because after the elections of 1985, India continued opposing Pakistan’s re-
joining of the Commonwealth. It can be said that if Pakistan’s decision to leave
Commonwealth was hasty, her decision of re-joining it was also immature. 139 Pakistan should have thought twice before withdrawing from the Commonwealth. This event was a blow to Pakistan−India relations because Indian opposition to Pakistan’s entry was not in good faith and this had a very negative impact on the diplomatic relations between the two countries.
137 . Gowher Rizvi. South Asia in a Changing International Order, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993, p. 149. 138 . Hasan Askari Rizvi. Pakistan and the Geo-strategic Environment, New York: St Martin's Press, 1993, pp. 98-105. 139 . Mehnaz Isphani. Pakistan: Dimensions of Insecurity, Adelphi Papers , London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), No. 246, Winter 1989/90, p. 36. 77
2.2.2.13. Fruitless Negotiations on Sir Creek Dispute
Another dispute which marred any positive development between Pakistan and India
was the issue of Sir Creek which became a bottleneck again in the way of resolving the
conflicts. Sir Creek is located in the Western side of the India−Pakistan border in the
Rann of Kutch. Figure 2.8 and 2.9 shows the location of the disputed area i.e. Sir Creek.
When the Rann of Kutch dispute was resolved in 1969 by an arbitration tribunal, the
tribunal, at that time did not think it essential to take up the question of 100 km long
stretch of Sir Creek as this question had already been decided by the British Indian
Government in 1914 140 by a resolution which declared Sir Creek on the Sindh side in a
map. Neither Pakistan nor India brought this issue before the tribunal at the time of the
dispute of Rann of Kutch in 1969 but later when India saw advantages regarding the
maritime resources, it claimed that the area of Sir Creek was disputed. India demanded
that the boundary in the area should run in the middle of Sir Creek and declared Sir
Creek on the Indian side and presented the argument that the channel was navigable so
the boundary was to be considered seriously in that area. That area was an important
economic zone for Pakistan and Indian aims were seemed to be destroying that zone
and to reduce the size of the area for Pakistan. 141 India altogether rejected the 1914
British resolution on the demarcation of the area. To resolve the conflict, the Surveyors
Generals of the two countries met in May 1989 but the dispute could not be resolved and this condition persisted for a long time endangering the lives of poor fishermen on both sides who got caught on the charges of trespassing. India took a harsh action by
140 . Rashid Ahmed Khan. Sir Creek: The Origin and Development of the Dispute between Pakistan and India, IPRI Journal , Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Vol. 7, No. 2, 2007, p. 1. 141 . Bonney Richard, Hyde Colin and Martin John. Legacy of Partition, 1947-2009: Creating New Archives from the Memories of Leicestershire People, Midland History , Leeds: Maney Publishing, Vol. 36, Issue No. 2, September 2011, pp. 215-24. 78
shooting down a Pakistani aircraft which was unarmed and all the members of the crew
died on the spot.
Figure 2.8: The area of Sir Creek disputed between Pakistan and India
Source: http://defence.pk/threads/pakistan%C2%92s-rejection-of-indian-stance-on-sircreek
79
Figure 2.9: Sir Creek map: The ‘Green Line’ shows the boundary claimed by Pakistan in Sir Creek and the ‘Red Line’ shows the boundary claimed by India.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Sir-Creek-map.svg#filehistory
The crisis still continues and has not been under serious consideration by the two countries. Indian adamant attitude and the efforts to undo Pakistan’s economic and political stand became the base of failure in each and every effort made in the direction of peace and regional stability.
80
2.2.3. The Third Phase 1990-1998
Throughout 1990s, the relationship did not improve and the conflict between the two
countries worsened instead. The issues of armament and nuclearization overshadowed
the regional and global politics. The South Asia was the centre of concern because the
hostile attitude and the age old diversity between Pakistan and India made them more
prone towards attaining nuclear status. 142 In case of increased armament race between
the two states, the security of the whole region could be at greater risk and that was
what happened, in fact. The whole 1990s revolved around an increasing armament race
between the two countries with many other issues that surrounded them. Those issues
and conflict which further aggravated the already tensed situation can be discussed as:
2.2.3.1. Growing Insurgency in Kashmir
The freedom struggle of Kashmiris faced a new front in 1990s. Before the disintegration
of Soviet Union, Islam was considered as the biggest force to counter the threat of
Soviet expansionism towards the warm waters. After the Soviet collapse, however, the
major powers also changed their policy and started projecting Islam as the biggest threat
endangering the modernization patterns in Europe and the whole world. 143 On the other hand, India which already was in search of some chance to declare Kashmiris’ struggle and the support from Pakistan as illegal had got another golden opportunity to grab the situation in its own hands. 144 The concept of Islamic fundamentalism was given a
negative projection and India started to label Kashmiri freedom movement as terrorism
and mobilized the international opinion against Pakistan so much so that USA seriously
142 . Owen Bennett Jones. Pakistan: The Eye of the Storm , New Haven, Yale University Press, 2003, p. 95. 143 . Robert G. Wirsing. Op.cit. p. 46. 144 . Mushtaqur Rahman. Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri People, Boulder (CO) and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, pp. 169-70. 81
thought about placing Pakistan on the list of terrorist states. 145 India, inspite of declaring
political window open for Kashmir, never acted upon and continued intensive use of
arms. The Kashmiri leaders, therefore, continued their support for the armed struggle.
Many Afghan Mujahideen and members of some Islamic organizations entered into the
Indian held Kashmir for the help of their Kashmiri brothers. 146
Many organizations of the Islamic world including OIC have always condemned the
atrocities committed by India in Kashmir. Furthermore, any investigation by an
independent agency was also blocked by India. In May 1996, elections were held in
India and a new government came with a new commitment to resolve the issue of
Kashmir in an amicable way. The Government of Pakistan was also feeling good to
have a change and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto talked with the Indian government
and exchanged letters of concern but Indian response at some point was not serious thus
putting all the hopes of resolution in cold water. 147 India decided to hold elections in
Kashmir which was not a very positive move as was evident from the past experience of elections in the Indian held Kashmir. The people of Kashmir boycotted those elections but Indian stern actions were witnessed by their forcing the people in Kashmir to cast their votes at gunpoint and placing the prominent leaders under detention. 148 The boycott of elections proved one thing that Indian leadership could never be the maker of peace in Kashmir unless and until this task is performed by the United Nations and other independent agencies and media. Kashmir issue has always blocked the progress
145 . Ayesha Jalal. Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 14. 146 . Shireen M. Mazari. Kashmir: Looking for Viable Options, Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, February- March, 1999. See online http://defencejournal.com/feb-mar99/kashmir-viable.htm. 147 . Ibid., pp. 170-76. 148 . Victoria Schofield. Kashmir in the Crossfire, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996, p. 159. 82
of relations between Pakistan and India and even at the close of 1990s, no any positive
change was seen in the Kashmir situation.
2.2.3.2. War Clouds Gathering in 1990s
As the situation in Kashmir was becoming more critical, there were reports regarding
Indian military plans to attack Pakistan. 149 This information became so much serious
that analysis was made on both sides regarding that and fears were expressed about the
possibilities of a nuclear war between the two South Asian states. Even the United
States considered it necessary to involve itself in the process and sent its deputy national
security advisor, Robert Gates, to Pakistan and India. After thorough discussion with
the officials in both the countries, the reports which were prepared by the U.S Senate
did not show any danger of a kind. 150 But historians and political analysts commented on the regional situation those days in such a way that there was certainly a possibility of some serious regional destabilization which threatened security of both the countries and USA considered the matter with such a concerned attitude otherwise the matter could be left to be decided by time. 151
2.2.3.3. Consular Missions of Pakistan and Indian Activities
In 1992, Pakistan sent its consular staff to open its office in Mumbai. While staying at
hotel, Pakistani staff was greatly irritated by the Indian intelligence personnel. 152 So
many hurdles were created in the way of Pakistani official functions in India that
149 . Sumit Ganguly. The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo−Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 47-48. 150 . Owen Bennett Jones. Pakistan: The Eye of the Storm, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2003, p. 126. 151 . S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 26-28. 152 . Ibid., pp. 67-69. 83
Pakistan closed down its office in Mumbai in March 1994. On the other hand, the Indian
consulate in Pakistan continued to function. Although the activities of the Indian
personnel were very much known to the Pakistani intelligence that a great number of
the Indian personnel working in Pakistan did not belong to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. When the Indian subversive activities became more evident and the proofs of
Indian involvement in creating terrorism became clear, the Government of Pakistan
decided to close down the Indian consulate in Karachi in December 1994. 153
The lack of political will to follow the bilateral code of conduct signed in 1992 was the
main cause of unstable diplomatic ties. Many accusations have been leveled by both
sides on each other’s consular staff time and again. Many a times, the personnel got
involved in activities out of their legitimate and legal functions. Though the move to
send consular missions to each other’s countries was taken to improve the relations but
that move, instead, destroyed the already existent trust between the two countries and
added to the intense bitterness. 154 This bitterness was broken in 2005 when the two countries again decided to open the consular offices in each other’s countries and the issue of the lease of Jinnah House came to the forefront when India again agreed to lease that house to Pakistan.
2.2.3.4. Cooperation on Disarmament and Nuclearization
The whole decade of 1990s was overshadowed by issues such as disarmament and nuclearization which were having negative impact on Pakistan’ internal situation and on Pakistan−India relations, particularly. During the Afghan war, though Pakistan was
153 . Jean Luc-Racine. “Living with India: Relations between Pakistan and India”, in Christophe Jaffrelot (Ed.) , A History of Pakistan and its Origins , London: Anthem Press, 2002, p. 112. 154 . Hamayun Khan and G. Parthasarthy. Diplomatic Divide, New Delhi: Roli Books, 2004, p. 122. 84
the frontline state for the US but after the departure of Soviet forces from the Afghan
land, Pakistan again came under strict limelight of the US sanctions. In 1980s, USA
expressed her concern over Pakistan’s efforts to develop the weapons research
programme. 155 Pakistan refused that and faced the Pressler Amendment which required an annual certificate from the US president to the effect that Pakistan was not having any nuclear weapon. As long as Pakistan served the purpose of USA, the US president did not create any hurdle in the making of that certificate confirming the non-possession of weapons with Pakistan. 156 But in 1990, after the Soviet withdrawal and change of
US attitude, the situation became critical for Pakistan. Concerned about Pakistan’
nuclear programme, the US president did not issue the certificate and the aid of 700
million dollars for 1988-94 period was stopped. The military assistance, the provision
of F-16s and the defence equipments were not provided even after payment in advance
by Pakistan. Thus, the start of 1990s brought very tough conditions for Pakistan.
Economically, politically and diplomatically, Pakistan was on the brink of
destabilization. 157
It was amidst this tough domestic and regional environment that Pakistan ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 aimed at reduction of the weapons of mass destruction and their ultimate elimination. 158 India, on the other hand, also ratified the convention but the Indian part became dubious because of the covert development of
155 . Scott D. Sagan and Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, New York: W.W. Norton, 2003, p. 117. 156 . T. V. Paul. Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 83. 157 . Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné (Eds.). The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia, Report No. 38, Washington, D.C: Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2001, p. 16. 158 . Farzana Shaikh. Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime, Journal of International Affairs , New York: Columbia School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Vol. 78, No. 1, 2002, pp. 44-46. 85
chemical weapons. Furthermore, this doubtful attitude on India’s part also undermined
any bilateral progress on disarmament issue. Another occasion of the same nature came
when the matter of signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) came which
was aimed at restricting the improvement of weapons technology by all the states
including those aspiring for that. Pakistan favored the treaty from the very beginning
but did not agree to sign it unilaterally because of the fear of India exploiting the
provisions of the treaty later. India clearly declined to sign the treaty and her Foreign
Minister I.K. Gujral candidly said that India would not like to close the nuclear options
in any way and security would be the first priority in case of any threat. Later on, many
a times Pakistan was motivated by the international community to sign the CTBT and
Pakistan was assured of many economic benefits as well as improvement of the
international image of Pakistan. But the leadership in Pakistan decided not to sign the
treaty unilaterally and put the condition of Indian signature first. 159 An important but
unexpected was that the US., instead of pursuing India to sign the CTBT, decided
against any ratification in 1997 thus closing its fate forever. The refusal to sign CTBT
also closed the doors of signing Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) which aimed
at freezing the production of enriched uranium and plutonium. The collapse of CTBT
stopped any further progress in this regard. Furthermore, the US reluctance to move
forward as an active member of disarmament efforts was determined after its non-
serious behavior at the time of signing CTBT. 160 So the issue of disarmament in 1990s did not see any positive and solid cooperation between Indian and Pakistan. Pakistan did not sign any such treaty which was not signed by India. India, on the other hand,
159 . Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty. Fearful Symmetry: India−Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 9. 160 . Devin T. Hagerty. The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998, p. 71. 86
did not sign because she did not want to restrict her nuclear options. 161 Both had their
own reservations and their own concerns put the regional security at greater stake.
2.2.3.5. Resuming Dialogue and the Move towards Cooperation
A change in the regional tensed environment was felt when in February 1997, the
foreign secretaries of Pakistan and India started discussion on bilateral issues. The
dialogue which was suspended in 1994, was hoped to go further with more positive
developments. Pakistan emphasized the resolution of Kashmir issue while Indian focus
remained on other issues including travel and economic relations with focus on trade,
particularly. 162 The Prime Ministers of the two countries met in Male (Maldives) in
May 1997 but Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral said that his minority government was
not able to make bold shifts in the policy. Pakistan stressed the importance of public
opinion inside the country and did not compromise its position on the Kashmir issue.
Meanwhile in Kashmir, the leadership of Kahmiris also held protests those days to
clarify to the world that mere sitting of Pakistan and India was not going to solve the
problem of Kashmir. 163 The participation by the leadership of Kashmir would ultimately resolve the problem of Kashmir and would eliminate the core of regional tensions which had created the risk of nuclear war between Pakistan and India.
These efforts towards resolving the disputed issues were moved further when the foreign secretaries of the two countries met in Islamabad in June 1997 and agreed to set up the working groups for all the problematic issues between the two countries. After three months, the prime ministers of Pakistan and India also met in New York for the
161 . Ibid., p. 84. 162 . Jean Luc-Racine. “Living With India: Relations between Pakistan and India”, in Christophe Jaffrelot (Ed.), A History of Pakistan and its Origins , London: Anthem Press, 2002, p. 112. 163 . Tahir Hasnain Naqvi. The Politics of Commensuration: The Violence of Partition and the Making of the Pakistani State, Journal of Historical Sociology , Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, March-June, 2007, p. 44. 87
UN Summit and renewed their commitments to further increase the efforts to address
all the conflicts and to enhance cooperation in all potential areas. The invigorated
efforts for peace and stability in the years ahead added more warmth to the desire for
regional peace and security.
2.2.3.6. Nuclear Tests in 1998 and its Impact on Pakistan−India Negotiations
A surprising development took place when India carried out multiple nuclear
explosions on May 11 and 13, 1998. That was the biggest regional development and a
threat to Pakistan’s economic condition and security also. Pakistan was now faced with
a very critical situation. In case of Pakistan conducting nuclear tests, she would be faced
with many sanctions as already borne by her in the shape of economic sanctions from
USA in 1990s. 164 Had Pakistan not conducted the nuclear tests, the military security
would have jeopardized leaving India the opportunity to browbeat Pakistan. The Indian
leadership started threatening and asking Pakistan to change its anti-India policies as
the regional strategic balance was changed in India’s favor. 165 Another factor which compelled Pakistan to conduct the nuclear tests was that if Pakistan had not conducted the tests at that time, the international pressure would have not let Pakistan to conduct the tests later on as was evident from the 1974 nuclear tests by India when the international community adopted the policy of discrimination and started preventing
Pakistan from acquiring the nuclear capability. The same thing happened in the shape of political pressure on Pakistan after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests. Now the decision was for Pakistan to fend for its own security.
164 . Gregory Koblentz. Theater Missile Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix, The Non-proliferation Review , Vol. 4, No. 3, Spring/Summer 1997, pp. 52- 62. 165 . Richard L. Russell. The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail, The Journal of Strategic Studies, London: Routledge Publication, Vol. 26, No. 1, March 2003, p. 150. 88
The international community as well as all the major powers initially showed great
concern for the Indian explosions as defence sales for India were announced to be
terminated and the international lending for all the developmental programs was
suspended. But that ostensible show of anger proved not so strong at the later stage as
the US soon after this episode announced to increase the strategic partnership with India
and adopted more intense policy towards Pakistan preventing it to follow the lines of
nuclear tests.
Converse to the US hopes, Pakistan decided to conduct the nuclear tests and on the
memorable day of May 28, 1998, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and
Khan Research Laboratories conducted the nuclear explosions in the Chaghi tunnel in
Balochistan and on May 30, 1998, more explosions were carried out. Pakistan declared
its success in conducting the nuclear tests showing the whole world the capability to
maintain the regional balance 166 and came in the world of nuclear capable countries.
Pakistan and India were both now criticized severely by the international community
and the UN Security Council, by its resolution 1172, condemned the explosions by both
India and Pakistan. Both the countries were asked to sign the CTBT, 167 to follow the
disarmament policies in future and to resume the dialogue for smooth and effective
peace steps resolving the Kashmir dispute and all other conflicts that would help in the
regional stability and international peace.168
During such times of crisis, Saudi Arabia came to the help of Pakistan and proved its
traditional solidarity with Pakistan by providing 100,000 barrels of oil on deferred
166 . Michael J. Mazarr (Ed.). Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World: The Challenge of Virtual Nuclear Arsenal, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997, p. 147. 167 . Michael Quinlan. How Robust is India−Pakistan Deterrence?, Survival , London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter 2000-01, p. 150. 168 . Shaukat Qadir. “Op-ed: Nuclear South Asia: reducing risks”, Daily Times, Lahore (Pakistan), May11, 2002. See online
payment basis daily. All the restrictions which were imposed on Pakistan and India
were relaxed after one year and all the financial institutions were allowed to provide
assistance and loans to both the countries. The IMF provided 1.2 billion dollars as credit
for structural adjustment in Pakistan. Some of the loans given to Pakistan in the past
were also rescheduled by the Paris Club.
While the nuclear tests by Pakistan and India were criticized at the international level,
these tests also created a very positive regional environment in the shape of more
responsibility on the part of both Pakistan and India. The element of restraint was
stabilized and future of peace initiatives became brighter. Pakistan and India were now
in need of showing more responsibility and concern about the use of nuclear weapons
to prevent any serious step in that direction that would be paramount to waging a war. 169
The evidence of this serious behavior was seen when the prime ministers of the two
countries declared in a joint declaration in February 1999 that they were now under a
duty to avoid all kinds of conflicts as the security environment of the region had become
more delicate after the appearance of nuclear dimension in South Asia. 170 Both sides resolved to consider the Kashmir issue more seriously and to provide prior information in case of any missile tests. More emphasis was put on the reduction of risks of the use of nuclear weapons in case of eruption of war situations or any other crisis.
It is clear that the history of Pakistan−India relations is filled with inflexible attitudes either by one side or the other. The disputes within disputes have always marred any positive change in their behaviors. The trust deficit did not leave them to follow any
169 . Digumarti Bhaskara Rao. Nuclear Materials Issue and Concerns , (2 Vol.s), New Delhi: Discovery Publishing House, 2001, p. 997. 170 . Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne (Eds.). The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia, A Report, No. 38, Washington, D.C: The Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2001, p. 32. 90
peaceful road. Though the need was very much there to come closer for the cooperation
and wider understanding but historical and political factors became hurdles in their
way. 171 The testing of nuclear explosions brought both the countries on the brink of
war. There was greater possibility of a big war between the two countries destroying
the security of the whole region and provoking instable circumstances internationally
as well. One the one hand, those nuclear tests created more dangers for regional stability
but, on the other hand, the nuclear tests also proved good for the development of a
feeling on both sides that without peace they would never be able to move further both
nationally and regionally. 172 The events which came later further intensified the need for serious dialogue. The governments of the two countries decided to concentrate on peace moves and all the potential areas of cooperation were tried to be sought out during
1999-2008. 173 That was the reason that the period from 1999-2008 was greatly different from the historically hostile relationship between them because many positive developments took place which brought the people of the two countries closer to each other.
2.2.4. The Fourth Phase: 1999-2008
The changed international and regional scenario during the period and the resultant need to pacify the relationship made it essential for the two neighbours to come closer and to show conciliatory approach towards resolving the disputed issues. India could not take the brunt of hostile policy in South Asia and Pakistan also was in the need of
171 . Akmal Hussain. “ A perspective on Peace and Economic Cooperation in South Asia ”, in Sadiq Ahmed, Saman Kelegama and Ejaz Ghani (Eds.), World Bank Study: Promoting Economic Cooperation in South Asia , New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2010, p. 123. 172 . Arif Nizami. “Finally, A Thaw”, The News , Islamabad: Pakistan, May 01, 2001. 173 . Henry L. Stimson Center, “Confidence Building Measures in South Asia.” Available at http://www. Stimson.org/ southasia/?SN=SA200111204, accessed December 12, 2012. 91
solving many problems−internal and external. 174 That was the reason that the
international community which was interested in the strong Pakistan−India relationship
emphasized further that South Asian stability was linked with the strong position of
Pakistan−India relations. From 1999 to 2008, the Governments in Pakistan and India
followed the policy of peaceful coexistence and tried to resolve the conflicting disputes.
Though there were periods of stalemate 175 also, yet the overall progress was very much positive. The political will to solidify the people to people interaction and the economic policies to improve trade relations were also touched deeply. There were many factors which brought both Pakistan and India to the road of peace initiatives like the security situation, regional environment, economic conditions and the international pressures etc. The high level of cooperation and understanding contributed towards strengthening of relationship.
2.2.5. Conclusion
The survey of the previous history was essential in order to add logic and rhythm to the flow of events in Pakistan−India relationship. The study of historical background was also necessary because only that would enable us to make a comparison between the long disputed history and the peace process from 1999-2008, which would add further to the knowledge of the readers about the significance of this relationship in South Asia and how their relationship can help promote towards the regional and international stability. The details of all those peace initiatives and the factors which made it essential
174 . Jamshed Ayaz. Reflection on Matters of War and Peace , Islamabad: Pangraphics Ltd, 2003, p. 87. 175 . Zafar Iqbal Cheema. “The Strategic Context of the Kargil Conflict: A Pakistani Perspective”, in Peter R. Lavoy (Ed.), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 48. 92 for the two nuclear South Asian countries to move towards Composite Dialogue process would be discussed in the succeeding chapters.
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93
CHAPTER-3 CAUSES OF THE HOSTILE PAKISTAN−INDIA RELATIONSHIP 94
CHAPTER−3
CAUSES OF THE HOSTILE PAKISTAN−INDIA RELATIONSHIP
3.1. Introduction
The two neighbors, in their quarrels, not only harmed each other but also harmed their own selves in their normal social life. The external involvement in their affairs proved another element to increase their hostility. 1 The strained relationship between Pakistan and India speaks volumes about this fact. Since independence, both Pakistan and India have been major concerns of each other’s foreign and security policies and their bilateral diplomacy is characterized by mutual distrust and antagonism. 2
Nearly all the international relations and changes in political and economic life have
been shaped by India’s central position in our policies. The defence and strategic
alliances with other countries have also been made because of the same factor of Indian
centrality in our foreign policy. 3 Same is the case with India for which Pakistan is the hostile neighbor and foreign policy of India revolves around the security issues with main focus on Pakistan. When we talk about security and peace in South Asia, we cannot ignore the significance of Pakistan−India relations. Almost all important events since 1947 have revolved around Pakistan and India like the border clashes, Kashmir dispute, separation of East Pakistan, domestic secessionist movements etc. 4 Had the two countries been honest towards each other, the huge human and material resources
1. Praveen Swami. Extending Terror, Frontline, Chennai (India), January 18, 2002. 2. Robert Wirsing. “Great-Powers’ Foreign Policies in South Asia”, in Davent T. Hagerty (Ed.), South Asia in World Politics , Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 135. 3. Arvind Aditiyaraj. In the Crossroads of Gunfire: The Dynamics of Ideology and Power Politics in Indo−Pakistan Relations, Patna: Janaki Publishers, 2001, p. 211. 4. Kuldip Nayar. Distant Neighbors: A Tale of the Sub-continent, New Delhi: Vikas Publications House, 1975, p. 40. 95
in both the countries could have been utilized for the best benefit of their people. 5 But,
unfortunately, the feeling of uncertainty and the lack of trust has always added to the
insecurity environment.
Pakistan−India relationship has been so fluctuating since 1947 that it can be said to be
like moving on the shifting sand which changes its position. Based on this analogy,
Pakistan and India promise, at one time, to make changes in the status quo and, at
another time, the same status quo is pledged to be maintained. This complicated
scenario of Pakistan−India relations has never let any normalization process to succeed.
Since 1947, after the end of British imperialism, the relationship between Pakistan and
India has been very tense and frosty with few exceptional periods when they moved
towards negotiations also. There has been a visible tension in the region which led
towards the Pakistan−India wars of 1948, 1965 and 1971 and later also many disputes
erupted which took the shape of near war situations. Both Pakistan and India are nuclear
powers now and any intensity in their relationship can create a damaging environment
not only for the region but for the peace of the world as well. The acrimony and distrust
between Pakistan and India has its roots in many factors which have since long
contributed towards increasing the insecurity and bitterness in Pakistan−India
relationship and has obstructed any positive development in social, political and
economic fields. While considering the importance of Pakistan−India relationship, one
cannot underestimate the fact that the two countries account for nearly 20 percent of
the world’s population and the well-being of this huge populace is very much linked to
the stability of Pakistan−India cooperation. 6 Before we discuss the consequences of
5. C. Raja Mohan. Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Viking Publications, 2004, p. 156. 6. India−Pakistan Conflict, News Reports, See online: http: //www.Globalsecurity.org/military/world/ war/indo-pak.htm. 96
their hostile relations, it is very much important to know the causes of tension which
have become the bottlenecks in the way of any positive approach towards peace in their
relationship.
3.2. Causes of Tension between Pakistan and India
The various elements which have caused tension and the resultant confrontation
between the two countries can be described under the following headings:
3.2.1. Indian Efforts to undo Pakistan
After independence in 1947, the Pakistanis were having a sense of fulfillment and
mental satisfaction that Muslims were free to live their lives freely. This independence,
however, brought many problems for this nascent state of Pakistan. Indian leadership
and the Hindu chauvinists adopted very stern attitude towards Pakistan and gave
statements tantamount to creating disturbance in the newly born state of Pakistan. 7
Pakistan was accepted only as a temporary necessity of that time by the Hindu leaders.
As was evident from the resolution of All India Congress Committee (AICC) which
stated that the cherished picture of United India would remain in their minds and their
dream of United India would come true again as the theory of two nations was said to
be false. Since the first day of partition, Pakistan was not accepted by the Indian leaders
and the same attitude continues today even after six decades. 8 Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the First Home Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of India said that the Muslim
7. Keith Callard. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957, p. 11. 8. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, A Survey, Vol. 1, New Delhi: Logos Press, 1988, p. 29. 97
League had done a bigger mistake by making a demand of a separate Pakistan and that
would be a lesson bitter in nature for the Muslims of the newly independent Pakistan. 9
There is no denying the fact that India’s non acceptance of Pakistan and their efforts to undo it has been one of the most important factors in creating hurdles in the way of
Pakistan−India reconciliation. Till his dying days, Nehru had in his mind the wish of undivided India i.e. closer Pakistan and India geographically and constitutionally as he believed that all Indians belonged to one nation. 10 Many obstacles were created for the
leadership in Pakistan to discourage them and to get the dream of United India
materialized but the efforts of the Muslims in Pakistan established the new state to start
everything from the scratch. Pakistan was even deprived of her due share in military,
administration and other assets at that time. The division in itself had many problems
like the water issue which, later on, was exploited by India to give a blow to Pakistan’s
agricultural economy. The Kashmir dispute, the border clashes and the wars from time
to time added fuel to the fire. When Pakistan got divided in 1971 as a result of the
separation of East Pakistan, the Indian leaders were very happy for their belief had
come true that Pakistan would collapse within a very short time. No doubt, India also
played a role in getting Pakistan divided by infusing separatist tendencies in the people
of East Pakistan at that time. Later history is also replete with the same instances. These
conspiracies and Indian desire to undo Pakistan compelled Pakistani leaders to search
for an equalizer and that was the reason that Pakistan moved towards different security
pacts in the early history of Pakistan and has always been following a security policy
with India at the central position. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once clearly said that destruction
9. Abul Kalam Azad. India Wins Freedom, New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1960, p. 242. 10 . Benjamin Zachariah. Nehru: Historical Bibliography, London: Routledge Publishers, 2004, pp. 90- 94. 98
of Pakistan was the most finest dream of India which Indian leaders would never leave
and we see that very much true even today. 11
3.2.2. Pakistan’s Perception of Matching with India
Since independence, Pakistan’s perception has been to match herself with India
politically, economically and socially irrespective of the fact that India is much bigger
in size, population and resources. The military power of India cannot be countered by
Pakistan on the same lines as India is doing with more conventional strength. 12 With more resources and huge potential, there is always a possibility of India going further than Pakistan in economic and political development. But such a bid on the part of
Pakistan has brought both the countries on the verge of war many a times since independence and has taken a heavy toll of energy and resources on both sides. 13
Pakistan realizes the fact that India has her own interests in the region and, hence, the
former needs to follow her own course for development. Pakistan cannot follow what
India is doing. Every economic and political agreement of India with the international
community becomes a bigger threat for Pakistan which takes it as a challenge and
counters with strong political vision.14 Pakistan adheres to a strong strategy instead of
following the same designs and also pleads her case by asking the big powers for the
same treatment as is meted out to India. Pakistan has her own geo-strategic location
with potential economy and strong cultural set up which can be made much stronger
with good leadership and direction. But unfortunately Pakistan has not yet realized the
11 . Prakash Nanda. Reevaluating our Pakistan Policy, India Defence Review, New Delhi (India), October 29, 2010, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/index.php 12 . Noor-ul-Haque. Pakistan and India Quest for Hegemony, IPRI Journal, Islamabad: Islamabad Policy and Research Institute, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2003, p. 21. 13 . Nosheen Abbas. Pakistan: Perceptions vs. Reality, Dawn , Islamabad (Pakistan), February 6, 2009. 14 . B. Raman. India & Pakistan: Can Mindsets & Perceptions Change?, South Asia Analysis Group , New Delhi, Paper No. 2057, December 10, 2006. 99
realities in South Asia and has followed the policy of keeping up a permanent pace with
India in every field. On the other hand, India also cannot afford to keep a hostile posture
of Pakistan in the existing geo-political environment in view of the Indian desire to
become a regional power and ultimately aims at gaining world economic and military
power status. A weak and hostile neighbor would no more suit India for her progress
and stability would be threatened. Further, Indian aims would marginalize if she keeps
non-cooperative and aggressive designs towards Pakistan. Indian policy makers have
realized this fact and have revised their hostile stance towards Pakistan in the light of
India’s global and regional agenda.
No matter India and Pakistan have been great adversaries since partition and Pakistan
has no option but to keep an eye on each and every activity of the hostile neighbor,15
but the fact remains that Indian military might is bigger than Pakistan with more socio-
economic and political potential and today India is competing for a more greater
regional and international role with greater cooperation with the international political
players. According to Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State, the population
and size of India gives her a special role and leadership status in the region and the
increasing strength in the upcoming scenario. 16
Instead of following the policy of matching with India in each and every sphere,
Pakistan opted to focus on her own potentials and the aspects of development. The
confrontation and the desire to keep deterrence to India has cost much to both the
countries and Pakistan as a small country adopted a strategy and program of her own
with an approach by accepting the facts of the time. By doing so, Pakistan adhered to
15 . T. V. Paul. Causes of the India−Pakistan Enduring Rivalry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 3. 16 . US Department of State Bulletin, November 25, 1974, p. 16 100 the principle that present is not the age of idealism and stereotype thinking but the need is to understand one’s position and the policy to be followed accordingly.
3.2.3. Pre-Partition Hatred
Historically, the pre-partition hatred contributed towards increasing antagonism between the two. The biggest factor to create that rift between the two communities was when Indian nationalist movement in the early 1900 refused the representation of the
Muslim interests in India. But while analyzing the issue, we can gauge this fact that the real rift was created when the Muslim rule challenged the Hindu monopoly in India during 600s and particularly between the eighth and twelfth century. 17 With the passage
of time, the rift widened so much that the British rule could not remove the grudges
between them and the two nations continued the same behavior even after
independence. Still at loggerheads, the two nations have been under clouds of distrust
and wars many a times.
Will Durant, in his book “The Story of Civilization" wrote that the bloodiest story in
history is the Islamic invasion of India. He was very right in saying that because the
two distinctively separate communities were living in a single territory which were very
much different in religion and culture and the later political events separated their
courses from each other. The Indian National Congress was established by an
Englishman Allan Hume in 1885. This political party, initially, was established for
representing all communities of India and the Muslims also joined this platform but in
1906, a split was witnessed in the party when some delegates of the Muslims left the
party and a new platform of the Muslims called “All India Muslim League” was formed.
17 . Hamid A. K. Rai. Readings in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1981, p. 306. 101
There were not only the religious factors which separated the Muslims from the Hindu interests but also the nationalistic feelings of Hindu leaders infuriated the Muslims and the catalyst that was a dispute which occurred during 1905-1911 in Bengal when the
Muslims got assured of their less consideration by the government and the so called political parties of India. 18 So the struggle for the representation of Muslims began with
new demands and rights for the Muslims of India. The situation in India took a new
turn with two political parties demanding for independence i.e. the Indian National
Congress working for the Hindus and the All India Muslim League working for the
Muslim interests. The later events further aggravated the hostility between the two
communities particularly during the Congress rule, when the Muslims were subjected
to bad treatment and degradations and no say was given to the Muslims in the political
affairs with ban on the religious and cultural freedom. These events proved as a final
break between the Muslims and the Hindus and now onwards the Muslims accepted no
solution except a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. With the breakout of the
World War−II, the international political environment changed altogether and the
Muslims’ demand also took a strong shape with the passage of Lahore Resolution
(1940) which later became the basis for the creation of Pakistan. The historical events
before the independence clearly show the rift between the two major communities of
India 19 and their independence brought new problems for them with violent riots and
turmoil. The extreme nationalists on both sides caused fierce battle against each other.
Even the widely respected leader of India Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was
assassinated on January 30, 1948 because Gandhi followed the campaign for
18 . Vali Nasr. “National Identities and the India−Pakistan”, in T. V. Paul (Ed.), The India−Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 190-200. 19 . From Interview with Dr. Zohaib Hayat, Islamabad: Department of International Relations, Preston University, May 24, 2012. 102 reconciliation and peace. Figure 3.1 below shows pre-partition map of India and the areas later constituting Pakistan.
Figure 3.1: Pre-Partition Map of India
Source: http://www.thefullwiki.org/Partition_of_India
The separate political and national thinking on the part of Indian Muslims was exclusively a reaction to the nationalist Hindus who, in turn, became reactionaries to the ideology of Islam. No doubt, years before the independence, both Hindus and the
Muslims were working for their own interests but the blame for escalating the rift goes to the Indian National Congress which changed the competition for access to power and 103 material benefits into a conflicting situation by oppressing the Muslims during their rule of 1935-39. 20 Both the groups lost trust on each other forever and the resulting
hatred made one thing clear that the two new countries of Pakistan and India would be
hostile neighbors towards each other from the very beginning. The fact is evident in the
continuing hostile relations between the two nations during the 21 st century.
3.2.4. Pro-Conflict Policy advocacy Coaltions
There are a number of groups in the two countries which oppose any positive move for
the improvement of relations. These pro-conflict coalitions include religious parties,
nationalists, demagogues and various political and military elites. Since independence,
both the countries have been at loggerheads with three wars and the ups and downs
most of the times. 21 The capitalist elites of the two countries get the greater benefits
from this hostile environment with all their families and capital in the foreign countries.
In case of South Asia becoming more trapped in the war and poverty, these capitalists
would also have the opportunity to run away from their countries and to settle in the
foreign states in order to save their skins with the help of their wealthy status. These
capitalists take advantage in both situations. While living in their countries, they try to
turn the things in their favor and when trapped, they try to run away. In such a situation,
the one at the losing end is the poor who has no share in the wealth of the countries
which is mostly directed towards maintaining the armed strength and deterrence. 22
These groups, no doubt, try to disrupt the process for their own interests whenever a
silver lining is seen in the normalization efforts. The bureaucrats and the military elites
20 . Sir Percival Griffiths. The British Impact on India, London: Macdonald, 1952, p. 341. 21 . Aitzaz Ahsan. The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 46. 22 . India and Pakistan-Nuclear States in Conflict, Online: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/ nuclear-weapons/history/post-cold-war/india−pakistan/india−pakistan-conflict.htm 104 would have very little to do if the border conflicts are resolved between Pakistan and
India. The most evident example of this fact was when Lal Krishana Advani and
Jaswant Singh showed a soft attitude towards Pakistan and wished to normalize the relations, they were criticized by the hardliner Hindu extremist groups in India. 23
The ideological commitments of the nationalist elites, on both sides, are very much
different with India following secularism and Pakistan with Islamic orientation. The
main purpose behind all these conflicting situations is to ensure the privileges under the
garb of state security and perceptions of threat and challenges. The same threat
perception has widely been propagated in Pakistan and India since 1947 and even today,
the two countries lack trust for the development of positive relationship.
It is the most interesting feature of the South Asian politics that an institutional shape
has been given to the hostile image by those who hold power. Quite interesting scenario
in state politics particularly in South Asia is that state actors need foes to fulfill their
aims whereas in normal life people need friends for a successful life. 24 The example of
this fact is evident from the prevailing animosity between Pakistan and India with
various other South Asian states having intra or inter-state conflicts. These are the
deliberate policies of the states to continue the war and to promote the enemy fear for
the achievement of their own selfish designs. The threat to peace and the challenges to
national security are given special attention in South Asian politics to ensure the
particular privileges of the elites.
23 . M. Rama Rao. Jaswant expelled from BJP for eulogizing Jinnah and denigrating Patel, Asian Tribune , Colombo: World Institute of Asian Studies, Vol. 12, No. 373, 2009, p. 95. 24 . Nicholas Howenstein and Sumit Ganguly. Pakistan & Afghanistan: Domestic Pressures and Regional Threats: India−Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan, Journal of International Affairs , New York: Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2009, pp. 127-40. 105
The same has been the case with Pakistan and India since 1947 where both the countries, instead of focusing their attention on developmental tasks, continue to promote the hostile perception among the people under the garb of threat and peace challenges. It is a very important question that why states need enemies instead of friends. 25 The answer to this question is very clear that in order to hide the internal
weaknesses, states always try to find the foes to create the threat perception. Such a
kind of state policy could be greatly harmful for the development of good relationship
among the countries.
In South Asia, the enemy image has been created by both Pakistan and India for each
other only because the people living in the two countries are poor and backward and
lack the power to raise their voice against the violation of their rights. In case if people
become powerful and hold a strong desire to come closer to each other, neither Pakistan
nor Indian government can prevent them from cooperating with each other and all the
so called enemy perceptions would be dashed to the ground. 26 Another most important reason for creating a hostile image by the states is that through this way the privileges of the elite class with strong hold on power would be served in a better way. In case of no external and internal enemies, the state bosses can neither misuse power nor continue with their policies directed towards heavy defence expenditures and to do politics in the name of religion. For all these self-interests, the propagation of enemy image is very essential in South Asian states. 27
25 . Chandar S. Sundaram (Ed.). A Military History of India and South Asia: From the East India Company to the Nuclear Era, Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2007, p. 87. 26 . Hasan Askari Rizvi . “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture” , in Michael R. Chambers (Ed.), South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances , Carlisle (USA): US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, pp. 305-28. 27 . Stephen P. Cohen. Shooting for a Century: The India−Pakistan Conundrum, Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 91-95 and pp. 118-130. 106
This is the main difference between the developing countries particularly of South Asia and the developed ones. In South Asia, the enemy image is propagated to cover internal weaknesses and to make the citizens suffer from the conflicts which are unresolved and to pave the way for the elite perks and interests. The moment an environment of peace is created between Pakistan and India, the policies of the states for the provision of necessities of life would be a bigger demand from the citizens. 28 While in the developed world, the policies of the states create very positive changes because of education and economic progress and these states never pursue their policies for an enemy but for regional integration and search for friends in the region and at international level. 29
3.2.5. Choosing between War and Peace Options
Pakistan and India have, no doubt, remained under intense hostile conditions since
independence. Both the countries inherited this animosity from the pre partition period.
With the emergence of Cold War, opposite camps were chosen by Pakistan with
favorable stance towards the Western Block and India which was showing a non-
aligned status but with more tilt towards the Soviet Block. This period added to the
military buildup of the two nations at an enormous scale. The wars of 1965 and that of
1971 have been the most prominent examples of this period. Every passing day added
a new feeling of distrust in their relationship. While analyzing the Post-Cold War
period, we can gauge the fact that the international politics took a new turn with new
approaches and new political and economic policies overcoming the old ones. The
South Asia has been one of the major regions affected by the Cold War parameters.
28 . Collier et al. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy , Washington D.C: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 20-25. 29 . Stephen P. Heyneman. Difference between Developed and Developing Countries, Economic Development and Cultural Change , Chicago (USA): The University of Chicago, Vol. 28, No. 2, January 1980, pp. 403-06. 107
The end of the Cold War created a new aspect of choosing between war and peace.
Both Pakistan and India have been following such policies which sometimes are focused on war steps and sometimes expressing more desire for peace. Because the changes in the Post-Cold War period do not allow for strict steps which could disturb the image of the growing economic power. On the other hand, the countries bound in old rivalry have faced difficulty in changing their policies. The status of power and strength has been replaced by a good regional image with strong economy. This changing scenario has altogether confused the old policies of the South Asian rivals with a great difference in intent and practical steps. That has become the main cause of the problem i.e., whether to choose war or peace option. India and Pakistan, being the important countries of South Asia, have been facing this problem and that is the reason why we see different policy steps chosen by the two governments, i.e. moving forward for peace in the region and at the same time keeping in mind the old hostility. Pakistan and India, sometimes, link their policies with the peace initiatives and sometimes with aggression options. The future security conditions have become very difficult to identify with the vacuum created by the Post-Cold War.
It is one of the major causes of tension between Pakistan and India that they have not yet been able to choose between war and peace because, on the one hand, they are compelled to follow the historical records and, on the other hand, the changed international political and strategic environment does not allow them to go for aggression and hostility. The prevailing confusion has obstructed any positive move in the relationship and in case of any effort to move ahead for peace, the lack of trust always overshadows the scenario. At one time agreements are made to counter each other and the other moment people and media do their best to bring the two nations closer together. 108
3.2.6. Indian Leadership Role
The most important cause of tension between Pakistan and India is the Indian leadership role in South Asia. The so called commanding position of India in the region has added to the already adverse relationship. 30 The most important objective of Indian foreign
policy is to establish Indian hegemony in the region because according to the Indian
political and thinking circles, India deserves this position being a big state in terms of
population, a growing economy, enormous human resources and military strength. 31 It
is widely held among the Indian think tanks that it is the right of India to maintain her
hegemony in the region because in case of not doing so, it would be the biggest mistake
of Indian leadership.
This perception of Indian leadership in South Asia is not anything new. In most of the
writings and speeches of Indian thinkers and politicians particularly Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru in his writings always emphasized India to play a vital historical and leading role
in the region. For this purpose, India must pressurize all the countries of South Asia to
accept her leadership and hegemony. This leadership perception has been presented by
the Indian leaders from time to time requiring Pakistan to accept the dominance of India
and to streamline the relationship on such lines seeking for India an upper hand in all
important matters. 32 This perception was propagated after the debacle of 1971 when
Pakistan lost her Eastern wing. India tried to convince the international community
about the truth of Indian opposition to the Two Nation Theory. According to them,
30 . Jaswinder Kumar. Irritants in Indo−Pakistan Relations, New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1989, p. 18. 31 . Praful Bidwai. India: World Influence Buys New Delhi Little in its Own Back Yard, Global Information Network , March 23, 2006, p. 1. 32 . Manjeet Singh Pardesi. Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives, Draft Working Paper, Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, No.76, April 2005, See online: www.ntu.edu.Sg/rsis/publications/workingpapers.asp?selYear =2005. 109
India has been an important power of South Asia and the foreign policies of South
Asian countries should be made under the supervision of India. As India aspires for a leadership role in South Asia and this leadership model of India is based on the following principles:
‹ All the South Asian countries should frame their political direction and formulate
their foreign policies in accordance with the principles of the Indian foreign policy
and should not take any move against those principles;
‹ In case of any interaction between a South Asian state and a non-regional state,
India should be given a central place. India would be a central power in designing
the lines of relationship between these two parties. Any kind of political, economic
and cultural interaction between South Asia and the international community should
not negate the interests of India;
‹ In case of any dispute between the South Asian countries or any internal dispute of
a state in South Asia, India would play her main role and should interfere to a
considerable extent to manage the disputes. 33
In order to maintain this hegemony in South Asia, India, on the one hand, is increasing her military power and, on the other hand, at political and diplomatic level, she is active to maintain her supremacy in the region. Indian friendship and cooperative relations with Russia is one of these aims in order to increase the military strength as well as economic and industrial development. India gets more than 70 percent of her military supplies from Russia. Russian diplomatic support and assistance has increased the development of India to a considerable level and India cannot go against the principles
33 . Rafique Ahmad. Pakistan−India Relations: Prospects for Durable Peace, Lahore: University of the Panjab, Centre for South Asian Studies, 1989, p. 204.
110 of cooperation with Russia because the loss of this front will make India alone to a greater extent.
An important aspect of Indian leadership model in South Asia is to put political and military pressure on all the regional countries to make them realize that going against the wishes of India would create many difficulties for the South Asian states. While analyzing the relations between India and other South Asian states, it can be said that there have been many conflicts between India and one or another South Asian state.
Pakistan−India relationship has been an example of a conflict and tensions since 1947.
India has always tried to interfere in the internal affairs of other regional countries like her conflict with Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh and particularly with Pakistan which is an intentional effort of India to undo the partition and to make her position stronger in the region. 34
3.2.7. Ideological Differences / Religious Conflicts
Difference in ideology is one of the causes of tension between Pakistan and India. Due to the non-congruity of ideologies, it has been very difficult for Islamic Pakistan and secular India to come closer. These different ideologies held by the two neighbors have always obstructed any positive move in relations. The non-acceptance of the Muslim ideology by India is evident from various anti-Muslim riots in India. The reluctance on the part of Indian leaders to accept the separate position and ideology of Pakistan has been a major problem in improving the relationship. India has always behaved in a way ignoring the true existence of a comprehensive Islamic system and for centuries, though living together, the two ideologies have not been able to absorb each other because they
34 . C. A. Bayly. The Pre-History of 'Communalism'? Religious Conflict in India, 1700-1860, Modern Asian Studies , New York: Cambridge Journals, Issue. 9, No. 2, 1985, pp. 177-203. 111 are distinct political, social and cultural entities. Islam and Hinduism are not only two religions but two different social systems. For centuries, the two communities met at various points culturally, politically, economically and socially and have learnt a lot from each other from time to time but have not been able to fuse in each other and still having their separate existence and position. The contrast between the Muslims and the
Hindus since a long time has been more striking than other communities in the pages of history. 35 The different religious philosophies of the two states have led to the persistence of this major non emergent synthesis. There is a vast difference between the
Hindu and the Muslim social systems and, no doubt, this was the base of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India who demanded for their rights. For centuries, these communities lived together because there was no way out except co-existence. A stage came when this co-existence became impossible and the Two Nations Theory emerged with full force and Pakistan came into being. The opposition of Hindus to Two Nations
Theory in India was because of the fact that they wanted to maintain their hegemony over all parts of India while the Muslims wanted their Muslim majority areas to become powerful with Muslim control and Self Government. For India, it has always been very difficult to accept the separate status of Pakistan as a Muslim entity and this fact is evident from the negative statements of the Hindu leaders just after independence like
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who said that the idea of Pakistan would be rejected by all.36
Similarly, during the crisis of 1971, India again negated Pakistan’s existence by saying
that Pakistan was a false state and was not based on any true principles. It is a great
surprise that despite the historical record of cultural and religious differences, India has
35 . Chaudhary M. Ali. The Emergence of Pakistan, Lahore: University of the Punjab, 1983, p. 1. 36 . V.P. Menon. The Transfer of Power in India, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 384. 112 still not been able to give a positive gesture to the real scenario that changed the political and social set up of the British India.
While the role of religious and ideological divide in creating and increasing tensions between Pakistan and India cannot be ignored, many political scholars in the 21 st
century attribute this conflict to vested interests on both sides and reject the religious
divide syndrome in Pakistan−India relations. Both sides, at times, try to take advantage
of the internal communal and sectarian problems and India is blamed for her
involvement in Pakistan’s internal matters like Balochistan and sectarian strife and
Indian internal communal conflicts are often given the color of Pakistan’s support by
Indian ruling establishment. There are some parties in India i.e religious and political
which are known for their extremist designs. No doubt, the fact exists that different
ideologies were the basis of conflict between the two states but not more than the selfish
interest of the elites on both sides today who exploit the situation and always try to
maintain the scenario of insecurity and tension to take advantages for themselves. So
the realpolitik issue is more prominent in Pakistan−India conflict than to put all the
blame of the problem on religious divide. In the face of the reality that religion does
play a major role in shaping the destinies of the communities, this fact is also worth
mentioning that as neighbors, it is very important for both Pakistan and India to co-
exist in a peaceful environment and for this the people and the establishment, on both
sides, must understand the importance of religions and ideologies of each other which
should not work to exploit the situation further but to bring peace and cooperation in
the region.
113
3.2.8. Post-Independence Hostility
The pre-partition hostility between the Hindus and the Muslims was translated into the national policies of Pakistan and India in the post-partition scenario. After independence, the two countries could have improved their relationship with cooperative postures but unfortunately the Indian intention to undo the partition and to get those areas forming Pakistan back, made the hostility a permanent feature of
Pakistan−India relationship. 37 Obsessed by the freedom of Muslims and a separate homeland for them, the Indian leaders left no stone unturned to destroy Pakistan. 38 It was unbearable for the Hindus to divide the resources of the United India between
Pakistan and India and they were trying to re-absorb the independent areas back in one way or the other. 39 The foreign experts and writers also realized the difficult situation
which Pakistan was facing at that time due to India’s non-acceptance of the newly born
state. The Indian policy after partition was Pakistan centric and aimed at destabilizing
her.40
The Islamic ideology of Pakistan and the Indian secular stance were clearly in contradiction with one another and the problem created by the Indian interference made the situation worst for Pakistan. Immediately after independence, Pakistan faced the problem of membership in the United Nations while India, on the other hand, easily managed to seek that membership. It is worth mentioning here that in order to create hurdles in the way of smooth partition process, a Hindu expert and Khan Abdul Ghaffar
Khan were sent to Kabul to seek support for the Pakhtoon rights and freedom. It was in
37 . Bruce G. Blair. The New Nuclear Threat, Daily Times , New Delhi (India), May 5, 2003. 38 . Qalb-e-Abid. South Asia Challenge and Prospects, Pakistan Vision , Karachi (Pakistan), Vol. 7, No. 1, July 2006, p. 197. 39 . New York Herald Tribune , New York (USA), June 5, 1947. 40 . The Times , London (UK), June 2, 1966. 114 this scenario that the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan also fell victim to distrust and hate since independence and Afghanistan even opposed Pakistan’s membership to the United Nations. In figure 3.2, we can see map of British India in
August 1947 and its comparison with August 2007 map of the same area.
Figure 3.2: British India in August 1947 and Pakistan−India Map in August 2007
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/629/629/6922293.stmt.
The post-partition massacre of Muslims in Indian states of Punjab, Ajmer and Delhi brought a number of administrative and economic problems for Pakistan immediately after independence. Thousands of Muslim refugees who were migrating to Pakistan, suffered a lot at the hands of Hindu extremists. Figure 3.3 shows the plight of the migrants coming from India to Pakistan. The distribution of defence resources also 115 could not be properly completed because of the inflexible attitude of the Indian government. The Supreme commander of the resource division Sir Claude John Eyre
Auchinleck who was heading the process of giving Pakistan her due share himself expressed that the Indian leaders were using all the illegal means and political pressures to sabotage the division of resources and this fact was realized by all the British personnel working in India at that time. 41 In order to destroy the monetary system,
India withheld Pakistan’s share of Rupees 750 million. More than that, the agricultural
system of Pakistan was also targeted with an ill eyed intention by India when the flow
of water into Dipalpur and Bari Doab Canals was stopped which almost destroyed the
crops in Pakistan. Again, India refused to accept the decision of Pakistani government
not to devalue her currency and in order to teach a lesson to Pakistan, India stopped to
enhance the trade relations with Pakistan. The loss to Pakistan’s economic standing at
that time can be estimated from the fact that the biggest trade partner was India with 54
percent of imports and 92 percent of exports.
In such an adverse atmosphere, Pakistan started everything from the scratch. The
administrative and political set up of Pakistan was organized on self-help basis with the
cooperated efforts of the government and the citizens. The Indian thinking at that time
to re-annex Pakistan never came to an end and whenever the opportunity was found,
that was fully utilized. The due financial and economic shares were never given to
Pakistan and her tolerance and flexible stance is evident on every event. According to
a foreign political expert who commented on the Indian policies and intentions in the
region, the Indian policy was directed towards keeping the neighboring states isolated
41 . John Connell. Auchinleck: A Critical Biography (A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck), London: Cassell and Company Publishers, 1959, p. 912. 116 and instable in order to control them and eventually merge them with India. 42 The
statement carries sufficient weight in view of the fact that the Indian hegemonic
designs, from time to time, in the regional and particularly in case of Pakistan, have
been very mush adverse and threatening. This hostility and inflexibility of the Indian
leaders is still intact as every positive step by Pakistan is seen with fear and suspicion.
Figure 3.3: Muslim migrants coming from India and sitting on the roadside: 1947
Source: http://living.oneindia.in/insync/pulse/2008/india-partition-pakistan-independence
42 . Selig S. Harrison. India and United States, New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1961, p. 53. 117
3.2.9. Perceptions and Images
One of the biggest problems in Pakistan−India relations has been the problem of perceptions and images which have been determining the course of interaction between these two nations since independence. These perceptions about each other have been cultivated by the elites on both sides who infuriated the feelings of the people on the basis of religion, culture and pre-partition political turmoil and conflicts. In case of
Pakistan and India, the perceptions and images have contributed a lot in negative developments and trust deficit between them. This problem progressed with the passage of time with more adversarial approach towards each other and change in internal and external environment that cannot be confined to historical legacies alone. Perception cannot be taken in the sense of any real and factual scenario but it may be the opinion and general image of the public that may also include the perceptions shaped by the elites for gaining their selfish interests. 43
In case of Pakistan and India, the pre partition history had a greater impact in formulating the image of each other after independence. The Hindu majority with the support of Indian National Congress and the Muslim majority under the banner of All
India Muslim League, had altogether different way of thinking and their separate political and social courses led to their long term lack of trust and confrontation. 44
Though the Muslims enjoyed the position of political superiority for centuries before
the advent of British rule, yet after the British hold in India, the Muslim rule relegated
43 . M. Yousaf Abbasi. “Problems of Perception in Indo−Pakistan Relations”, in Rafique Ahmad (Ed.), Pakistan−India Relations: Prospects for Durable Peace , Lahore: University of the Punjab, Centre for South Asian Studies, 1989, p. 81. 44 . Matthew Lange, James Mahoney and Matthias Vom. Hau. Colonialism and Development: A Comparative Analysis of Spanish and British Colonies, American Journal of Sociology, New York : Vol. 111, No. 5, 2006, pp. 1412-62. 118 to the past and the Hindu majority became dominant.45 Despite many efforts for conciliation, the two communities could not come closer and the feeling of insecurity led towards an independent homeland for the Muslims. The partition’s traumatic events aggravated the situation further and increased the hostility between the two communities. The Indian leadership never accepted Pakistan and, since independence, started their efforts to dismantle the political and economic structure of the latter. It was such a difficult time that there was no option available to Pakistan except to search for security and that was the reason that Pakistan joined Western sponsored defence pacts after independence. India’s irreconcilable and hostile attitude plus negative image of
Pakistan was shown in the murder of Mahatama Gandhi for conceding to the independence of Pakistan. 46 He was assassinated by an extremist Hindu and was later supported by many Hindu extremist parties who never accepted the existence of
Pakistan as a separate homeland and always conspired to annul the partition. Even in
1971, the perception of Indian leadership for Pakistan was evident in the shape of their recognition to Bangladesh and giving statement that India took revenge for the shame which she suffered due to partition. Many anti-Muslim parties have been thriving in
India whose aims and objectives clearly indicate the hegemonic status which they seek to achieve for India in the region. This thinking and adverse feeling is so dominant in
Indian policy making that it even hides the voices of reason and sanity which very rarely appear on the forefront.
Every country, no doubt, formulates her foreign policy to maintain her image and relations in international affairs but Indian foreign policy purposes focus on Pakistan
45 . Subrata K. Mitra and R. Alison Lewis (Eds.). Sub Nationalism in South Asia, New York: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 43-103. 46 . Prem Mahadevan. The Paradoxes of Ethnographic Intelligence. A Case Study of British India, Faultlines, New Delhi, Vol. 20, January 2011, p. 39. 119 mostly with a view to become dominant in regional affairs. The interests of Pakistan are negatively affected by Indian foreign policy aims like Indian perception of becoming great power after the withdrawal of the British and containing Pakistan with regard to defence and economic capability. The opposition, from India every time, to any power interested in providing defence assistance to Pakistan, is not because it would increase Pakistan’s defence potential but because it would undermine Indian determination for the control of the geo-strategic position and policies in the region.47
The disputes on many issues have already turned the situation to such a stage that the
normal times Cold War can turn into an active war if issues are not resolved timely.
As far Pakistan’s perception of India is concerned, all these developments in the Indian
polices are very threatening for Pakistan which has compelled her to always take a
serious note of Indian hegemonic designs in the South Asian region. The clouds of
distrust and fear always cover the atmosphere in Pakistan−India relations. The
centrality of India in the foreign policy of Pakistan is not without reason. The perception
of Indian negative aims overshadows the positive developments and even those who
advocate friendly relations between Pakistan and India ever ignore the critical position
of their relationship. 48 The disputes, historical adversity, ideological differences and border clashes are very common factors in shaping the perceptions but the real problem is that there is also a lack of genuine information sources to get access to the realities.
Different people have different sources to have an access to information. Some prefer
Western media and some prefer the Indian or Pakistan. 49 The interpretation of the facts
47 . Rafique Ahmad. Pakistan−India Relations: Prospects for Durable Peace, Lahore: University of the Panjab, Centre for South Asian Studies, 1989, p. 86. 48 . W. H. Morris-Jones. Thirty-Six Years Later: The Mixed Legacies of Mountbatten's Transfer of Power, International Affairs, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 4, Autumn 1983, pp. 621-28. 49 . Vali Nasr. “National Identities and the India−Pakistan Conflict” , in T.V. Paul (Ed.), The India−Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 86. 120 often is different in all of these information media. The absence of observation opportunities and lack of free information flow often lead to myths becoming facts and people are presented very different picture regarding any event or fact. This is true not only for Pakistan but for India as well. The inculcation of misleading perception in the minds of the people has distorted the positivity in interaction for more than 65 years in
Pakistan−India relationship.
3.2.10. The Role of the British
While discussing the causes of Pakistan−India tensions, we cannot forget the role played by the British who contributed towards the tensions in the post-partition period.
After the cruel policies of the Indian National Congress were directed against the
Muslims, the Muslims of India began their struggle for freedom from the Hindus as well as the British. 50 The partition process was completed in a great hurry without resolving many issues and problems. These problems certainly created conflicts and tensions between the successor countries. Those issues which were left without resolution in the pre-partition period could not be resolved till today and are big hurdles in the way of improvement of relations. After the World War II, the British power was decreasing and the fears of the Muslims in India were increasing for getting their rights and having share in the political representation. 51 On the other hand, the Congress leaders were not paying any heed to the Muslim demands and completely rejected any claim by the Muslims to have share in power as was expressed by the Hindu leader
Nehru on April 5th , 1946 that even the United Nations would not be able to create the state of Pakistan as demanded by the Muslims of India. 52 The internal disturbances
50 . M. Ayub Khan. Friends Not Masters, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 12. 51 . Khalid bin Sayeed. Western Dominance and Political Islam: Challenge and Response, New York: Albany Publishers, 1995, p. 126. 52 . E. W. R. Lumbay. The Transfer of Power in India, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1947, p. 78. 121 developed so much that the Muslim leaders declared Direct Action Day on August 16 th ,
1946 and as a result communal tension started in India culminating soon into a Civil
War that reached to the height 53 and partition was becoming more preferential because
the wide scale rioting compelled the British and the Congress to agree for the creation
of a separate Muslim state of Pakistan. 54
The Cabinet Mission which came to India in preserving the Indian unity and Lord
Wavell was replaced by Lord Mountbatten as a Viceroy of India. The new Viceroy had
good relations with the Indian leaders and also had close links in the royal family of
Britain. In figure 3.4, we can see both Lord Mountbatten and Nehru shaking hands on
the first day of India independence on August 15, 1947.
As far as the Muslim leadership was concerned, the Viceroy did not get close to them
as he had developed biases against the Muslim leadership and an independent homeland
for them. 55 These biases became stronger when the Muslim leadership refused to accept
Mountbatten as the Viceroy of Pakistan and more complexities started afterwards and
interests of Pakistan were damaged in almost all areas. More than two wars have been
fought on the unresolved issues left behind by the British. The unjust behavior of Britain
at the time of partition caused greater harm to Pakistan’s interests. While Mountbatten
convinced the states of Hyderabad and Jaipur for joining India, he did not play his role
in resolving the issue of Kashmir and there is no evidence of his making any effort in
convincing the Maharaja of Kashmir to accede to Pakistan.
53 . Samuel H. Beer. The Representation of Interests in British Government: Historical Background, American Political Science Review , New York, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1957, pp. 613-50. 54 . Stanley Wolpert. Shameful Flight, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 96. 55 . Patrick Brantlinger. Rule of Darkness: British Literature and Imperialism, 1830-1914, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 51. 122
Figure 3.4: The First Day of Indian Independence on August 15, 1947: Mountbatten and Nehru
Source: http://www.desicolours.com/august-15-1947-first-independence-day-of- india/14/08/2008
Although it was a clear fact that coupled with the geographical factors, Kashmir was a
Muslim majority area which should have been integrated with Pakistan but the injustice and prejudice shown by the Hindus, on the one side, and the British government, on the other, left the issue unresolved and Kashmir problem even today acts as a continuous bone of contention between Pakistan and India. Instead, the close ties of Hindu leaders 123 particularly Nehru with the Kashmiri leaders like Abdullah was known to all who also acted against the wishes of the Muslim majority in Kashmir. 56
The British government had instructed the Viceroy Mountbatten to make arrangements for the transfer of power by June 1948. However, the conditions in India and the negotiations with the Hindu and the Muslim leaders compelled the Viceroy to take some hasty decisions. 57 There was a possibility of forced expulsion of British troops from
India and it could be very risky for the British to stay in India for a longer time. After assessing the conditions in India and the demands for independence by the Hindu and the Muslim leaders, Mountbatten reached to the conclusion to give only seventy three days for the British departure from India. It was quite strange that the British who ruled
India for about two hundred and fifty years were in such a hurry to leave that area.
Accordingly, the partition plan, commonly known as 3 rd June Plan, was prepared and
announced in 1947 according to which India was to be divided into two independent
states of India and Pakistan and Pakistan would be composed of Eastern and Western
Muslim majority areas. According to the partition plan which was made by
Mountbatten with the consent of the British government, 58 the partition was to respect the wishes of the people and the principle of geography was to be taken into consideration. Accordingly, the Hindu majority areas were to be included in India and the Muslim majority areas to form Pakistan. Moreover, there was an issue of the 565 princely states whose fate was to be decided by the British. They were given the option
56 . Matthew Lange and Andrew Dawson. Dividing and Ruling the World: A Statistical Test of the Effects of Colonialism on Post-Colonial Civil Violence, Social Forces (Oxford Journals), New York: Oxford University Press, Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 785-818. 57 . Lucy P. Chester. Borders and Conflict in South Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab, London : Manchester University Press, 2009, p. 45. 58 . N. B. Dirks. Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India, New York: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 98.
124 of joining Pakistan or India. The injustice done in the case of Kashmir by the British was an open example of the breach of partition principles. According to the census of
1941, the population of Kashmir was 77 percent Muslim but despite that hurdles were created for its forced alignment with India. Figure 3.5 shows the three leaders i.e.
Nehru, Mountbatten and Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah on the occasion of June
3rd , 1947 Plan.
Figure 3.5: June 3 rd Plan: Nehru, Mountbatten and Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah
Source: http://www.desicolours.com/august-15-1947-first-independence-day-of- india/14/08/2008
The British government was not showing any impartial behavior towards the partition process and at every step Muslims were getting the motives behind the so called 125 acceptability of partition plan by the Hindu leaders. When Indian Independence Act was presented by the British government, there were many things which reminded the
Muslims of the prejudices and injustices by the British. The Radcliff Award, finalized by a Boundary Commission formed under the Indian Independence Act, was a clear example of partial attitude shown towards the Indian leadership and aimed at depriving
Pakistan. Many Muslim majority districts of Punjab 59 like Ferozepur, Gurdaspur,
Jullundhar and Batala were given to India which were supposed to come to Pakistan.
The allotment of about three fourth of Gurdaspur to India gave India an easy access to
Jammu and Kashmir. Had this district not been given to India, the dispute over Kashmir
between Pakistan and India would have never been so complicated. With the unfolding
of events and the passage of time, it became clear that the violation of the 3 rd June plan was aimed at giving India access to Muslim state of Kashmir. It was a big surprise for the Muslims of Gurdaspur and Kapurthala in Punjab that they were awarded to India and not Pakistan as against the principles of partition decided previously that the
Muslim areas would be given to Pakistan and Hindu areas to India. One of the greatest damages inflicted upon Muslims was that the extremist Hindus and Sikhs in Muslim majority areas in East Punjab started massacre of the Muslims and thousands of
Muslims were killed and pressurized to leave the Eastern Punjab. The head of the
Boundary Commission in Bengal and Punjab, Cyril Radcliff intentionally changed the partition rules and Pakistan was deprived of her legal rights even as against the demands of Muslim leadership. It is a clear fact that India never accepted even the minor area of
Punjab which came to Pakistan and wanted to extend the border much farther towards the West engulfing the whole of Lahore on the Pakistani side. On the other hand,
59 . David Gilmartin. Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative, The Journal of Asian Studies , New York, Vol. 57, No. 4, 2009, pp. 1068-95. 126
Pakistan wanted to extend the boundary line much farther towards East to have Delhi which once remained the capital of Mughal Empire. The British Boundary Commission decided the issue in haste and without any consideration of the later complications created between the two independent countries. 60 The boundary issue was so critical
that it continued to haunt the Pakistan−India relations after partition.
It was without any doubt that the award was one sided and the Muslims expressed their
reservations about the unfair treatment meted out to the newly born state of Pakistan.
But as Muslims had agreed to abide by the rules and principles of partition, they
considered the award binding. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah termed the Award
as abominable and perverse. The injustice done in the Award by the British
Commission became evident when the Muslims and the Hindus came to know that they
were no more belonged to the areas where they had been living since long. It was a big
blow to the communities and the implementation of the Award led towards
insurmountable damage to the people living on both sides. In order to protect the
population of the districts of Punjab, a Boundary Force was established in July 19 th
1947 consisting of about 23,000 men not much to provide security to the populace.
Furthermore, the force operated only in the urban areas of about 37,500 square miles
while the major portion of the population to be secured was settled in about 17,000
village areas. Those rural areas were not developed and had no communication lines
with the urban localities. The Boundary Force was too small to protect the areas and it
was the weak position of that Boundary Force that it could provide only one man from
the force to the security of 630 people in Punjab. With the British commander heading
this force and the personnel, a mixture of Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities, was
60 . Ian Stephens. Pakistan, London: Ernest Benn, 1963, p. 193. 127 unable to maintain peace and prevent riots. 61 All this illogical and hasty steps by the
British left the people in the two countries in miserable conditions. The Punjab was worst hit by the riots as a result of abominable boundary decisions of Radcliff Award.
The Eastern Punjab became a hell for the Muslims who were deprived of their belongings and were mutilated on their way to Pakistan. From Western Punjab, many
Hindus migrated to India as well. Even after independence, the killings and riots continued and extended to Delhi where hundreds of Muslims were massacred by
Hindus and Sikhs and it is not an exaggeration to say that even today the Muslim majority areas in India are victim of killing and cruelty at the hands of extremist Hindus.
The migration that carried out later was the biggest one in the century resulting from the illogical and illegal decisions by the British who divided and left, leaving behind many unresolved matters for the newly born countries which still deteriorate the relations between the two South Asian countries. About seventeen million people migrated on both sides of the two countries and approximately one million lost their lives in the riots and ethnic cleansing accompanying partition. The Hindu poets described the situation thus that the matter would not be resolved and Muslims and
Hindus would never be united except after death.
3.2.11. Role of Media
Though the media can play a very positive and reasonable role, the irony is that media, on both sides, involve itself in highlighting the sensational and hostile news than to give importance to the peaceful causes. 62 Every disorder and negative activity in one country
61 . Andrew Mellor in Asiatic Review , London (UK), July 1952, p. 177. 62 . Michael Krepon. "South Asia: A Time of Trouble, A Time of Need ", in Jill R. Junnola and Michael Krepon (Eds.), Regional Confidence Building in South Asia: The Middle East and Latin America , Washington D.C: The Henry L. Stimson Centre, Report No. 20, December 1995, p. 5. 128 is blamed over another and vice versa. Since independence, the non-acceptable stance of India has been showed by media sources by blaming Pakistan for all the intra-state problems in India. While looking at the other side, Pakistani media has rarely shown any negative trend in Pakistan−India relations except when India raises the matters illogically and irrelevantly. Many a times the propaganda and false headlines become so frequent that the governments are in the need of blocking the channels to be watched by the people. 63 The level of media criticism and media war has been on the rise
between Pakistan and India since partition thus causing damage to the interests of both
in the long run. 64 Media which is famous for its professionalism and passion has made itself mockery in case of Pakistan and India and because more than professionalism now, each and every channel is trying for point ratings and to make money by becoming a corporate industry. Instead of understanding each other’s issues and highlighting those things which are in common, the bad happenings are given publicity to destabilize each other. The governments, political parties and the media in both the countries must realize the fact that addressing the common issues is the need of the day. Media wars have not given any positive results till now and have caused only destruction. There are many issues like poverty, economic cooperation, the disputed matters which need the attention and cooperation of the two countries and can lead towards their peaceful relationship but those issues always face brunt of distrust and suspicions on both sides.
Although the two South Asian countries have greater potential to develop economically provided the skilled labor and the resources which can be utilized. But, unfortunately, all the positive points are ignored and the focus is always on destabilizing the other
63 . Shamshad A. Khan. India−Pakistan Talks: Media’s Role Crucial for Normalization of Relations, New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), June 29, 2011. 64 . A. A. Sullaria. “Irritants in Indo−Pakistan Relations” , in Rafique Ahmad (Ed.), Pakistan−India Relations: Prospects for Durable Peace, Lahore: University of the Punjab, Centre for South Asian Studies, 1989, p. 151.
129 ignorant of the fact that the destruction of one would lead to the destabilization of another and ultimately the whole region.
Every time while one side tries to fan the disputes and misrepresent the facts, the other side comes forward with a step further. Allegations and counter-allegations have become a characteristic of Pakistan−India relationship. No doubt, the history of partition and the communal riots in the post partition period still haunts many on both sides and the question as to why the media has joined this blame game is important to think about and resolve. 65
Media personnel should work for justice and truth and they must act as ambassadors to
fight the falsehood but we rarely see this scenario in Pakistan and India. Instead of
educating the people and promoting harmony, hatred and false propaganda in purveyed
all the time in every major and minor news item. Target ratings and economic factor of
making money and politicizing the issues has taken the place of honest, objective and
true representation of the facts. So the question appears that to what extent, the media
would do for selling itself? It is acceptable in the modern world of economics and
marketing but the fact is that every business is run by the rules and media in case of
Pakistan and India has forgotten the rules. 66 It would not be an exaggeration of the facts
that this media war has played the main role in creating hatred and acrimony for each
other while raising the unimportant events and propaganda campaigns only for creating
more viewers and more readers. 67 The absence of a sense to differentiate between the
65 . A. J. Malik. A Media War, The Nation , Islamabad, November 26, 2009. 66 . Muhammad Azam. Radicalization and Media, Conflict and Peace Studies , Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Policy Studies (PIPS), Vol. 1, No. 1, 2008, p. 37. 67 . M. Gauhar. Cultural Diversity: Essential for Peace or Root of All Conflict , Johannesburg: Presentation at World Summit on Art, Culture & Museum, Africa, September 24, 2009. 130 right and the wrong can never make media to be called a sensible and responsible institution.
In this tug of Pakistan−India cold war, many accused have been languishing behind the bars in both the countries for many years and are condemned to the extreme instead of addressing the issues in a reasonable and logical fashion and media is equal partner in this blame game and playing with the lives of ordinary people on both sides. 68 The terror on the one side is blamed on the other and pointing at each other has altogether deteriorated the base of any trust and cooperation for many years. Reason and sense demands that understanding and sound representation would lead towards an honest media operation. The destructive and terror elements on both sides cannot be dealt with by viciously blaming and thrashing each other or by motivating the armies to teach lesson to the other side and vice versa. How can we call such a media a professional journalism. In fact, it is madness.
Given the troubled historical facts and the post-independence scenario, the kind of approach which media on both sides has adopted can lead towards total destruction of the two and during the present times when the two South Asian neighbors are nuclear powers, any negative development would create complete havoc in the region risking the lives of more than a billion people. In that case, the region is a clear threat for the
68 . The Media of India and Pakistan are neither Weapons of War nor Purveyors of Peace, Q & A with the Telegraph, The Telegraph , New Delhi, June 2003.
131 peace and security of the whole world and both Pakistan and India must adopt reasonable and sound approach in such critical conditions.
3.2.12. Intra-State Conflicts
Intra-state conflicts have also caused greater tensions in Pakistan−India relations. There are many intra-state conflicts in both the countries which haunt the internal security as well as a greater threat to the peaceful relationship of Pakistan and India. The biggest dilemma is that the two states, in the initial years, concentrated more on the process of nation-building and the state-building was completely ignored. 69 The need was to
improve the institution capacities and to work on legal factors to satisfy the multi-
religious and multi-ethnic communities in South Asia. And it is not surprising that in
South Asia, the intra-state armed conflicts have remained much prominent than the
inter-state conflicts. 70 Ethnic, sectarian and religious militancy problems in both the countries have created tensed environment internally and every time the blame is put on the other for the riots and strife in the name of foreign hand involvement.
No doubt, there are problems internally in both the countries and which need to be addressed appropriately by the governments. As far India, though there are many internal secessionist movements like Maoists movement, Naxalism, Islamic movement of students and Sikh insurgency also threatening the legitimacy of the government in
69 . Sumantra Bose. Decolonization and State Building in South Asia, Journal of International Affairs , New York: Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2004, pp. 95-114. 70 . Suba Chandran. “Intrastate Armed Conflicts in South Asia: Impact on Regional Security”, in Dev Raj Dahal and Nishchal Nath Pande (Eds.), Comprehensive Security in South Asia, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2006, p. 159. 132
India but Kashmir is considered as the most serious of all for which Pakistan is blamed for involvement and which India considers its internal matter. 71
The insurgency in Kashmir is the local movement by the Muslim Kashmiris which India alleges that Pakistan provides training and support to them to fight against the Indian army. On the other hand, Pakistan always denies the Indian allegations asking the India government to improve the human rights situation in Kashmir which is the main cause of Kashmiri uprising and give them their due right of self- determination. But since independence, the Kashmir issue has disturbed any positive development in
Pakistan−India relations as well and, in fact, this problem is the foremost to be solved for the peace of the region. The Indian allegations and counter allegations by Pakistan have created a tensed atmosphere in the region. No doubt, the Pakistani side has sympathies and moral support with the Muslims of Kashmir but, according to the Indian neutral political scientists, the problem is domestic and India needs to abolish the human rights abuses causing damage to the lives and properties of the unarmed
Kashmiris every time. 72 Even the Indian government has faced greater problems in managing the Kashmiri insurgency because the number of the troops to fight the insurgents in Kashmir has exceeded the number of six lakhs with greater loss of lives.
Besides Kashmir, India also points at Pakistan for the Sikh secessionist movement also known as Khalistan Movement in the East Punjab since 1970s though, according to some circles, this movement came to an end in 1980s. The plight of the Indian Muslims has always been a matter of concern and Pakistan has always stressed upon to address the communal problem in India which has led to the deaths of thousands of Muslims.
71 . “Student’s Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)”, South Asia Terrorism Portal, www.satp.org?satpor gtp/ countries/india/terroristoutfits/simi.htm. 72 . Amnesty International Report on India, 2001, www.amnesty.org. 133
In this regard, the riots which took place from 1986 to 1992 with regard to the Babri
Mosque, thousands of Muslims lost their lives. The Muslim massacre of Gujarat in
2002 was even more aggressive and cruel and which led to the deaths of over two thousand people mostly the Muslims. It was not only the incident of Gujarat but Karela,
Haryana and many other states were victims of these communal killings during 2002. 73
As far as Pakistan’s intra state conflicts are concerned, they have also created a security
concern for state managers and, moreover, in many instances Indian involvement has
clearly been established. Pakistan too has blamed India for the fanning of insurgencies
in Pakistan. The most evident example of which was the dismemberment of East
Pakistan in 1971 which was a clear indication of the Indian conspiracies and ill designs
against Pakistan and has remained a permanent memory of the ill relations between
Pakistan and India. Many sectarian and ethnic clashes in Pakistan have been directly
blamed on India specially the Karachi disorder and killings during 1990s when India
was alleged to support the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) which was trying to gain
power for Muhajirs*.74 As a protest, Pakistan had ordered closure of the Consulate of
India at Karachi also as a show of retaliation against the incident of Babri Mosque in
1992. In figure 3.6, we can see hindu extremists attacking Babri Mosque on December
6, 1992. Very recently, the Balochistan insurgency has been seen to have the support of Indian elements which Pakistan has very clearly proved in all the interactive
73 . A. A. Engineer. Communal Riots: 2002, South Asia Citizens Web, 2002, Available from http://www. Sacw.net/2002/EngineerJan03.html. *. Muhajirs : Muhajir (sometimes referred to as "Urdu-speaking people") [literally – migrants] is a term used to describe the immigrants and especially their descendants who chose to settle in Pakistan and shifted their domicile (after partition of British India) to Pakistan. 74 . Shireen M. Mazari. Subversion and Its Linkage to Low Intensity Conflicts, Ethnic Movements and Violence, Defense Journal, Karachi (Pakistan), 1999, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 15-17. 134 meetings with the Indian officials. The Balochs being involved in anti-state activities are accused of seeking training and support from India.
Figure 3.6: Babri Mosque when attacked by the Hindu extremists: December 6, 1992
Source: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/28/ayodhya-mosque-india-guardian-
The province which is already facing enormous economic problems is seen by the enemies as a sound base for creating secessionist tendencies on the pattern of 1971 holocaust. It is no denying the fact that provided the increasing role of India in
Afghanistan, her interference in Balochistan is not out of the question and since in many cases, her involvement has been proved, there is no ground for India to hide the truth.
All these intra-state problems have tarnished the base of trust and cooperation. While, on the one hand, these problems pose a threat to the internal security, they have very seriously mutilated the direction of peaceful relationship between Pakistan and India, on the other. The ‘Blame Game’ can never resolve these conflicts but the need of the time is to look towards the problems in a logical manner and address them in a 135 reasonable fashion because these conflicts are not only the internal threat, their permanent existence will never make a ground to sow the seeds of peace and stability.
3.2.13. Nuclear Weapons
The stability and peace in South Asia which already stands threatened, was further worsened as a result of the two countries’ becoming nuclear powers. They became a serious concern for the countries of the region.75
It would be wrong to say that the nuclear capability of the two countries has diminished the chances of any war between Pakistan and India. In fact, the said capability has increased the risk of destruction in the region. Seen in the perspective of already existing hate and distrust between the two, any minor event of discomfort can lead towards a holocaust and, in such a situation, both the countries would have very little time for warning. Furthermore, any surprise attack by one country would substantially diminish the other country’s capability to strike back.
The bilateral disputes and particularly the Kashmir problem are posing a greater threat for such a kind of hair-trigger conditions. Before the nuclear tests of 1998, the
Pakistan−India relations were already hostile but a war between the two could not be easily prevented. Now, when both are nuclear powers, the conventional war is no more a deterrent factor because of the inadvertent use of nuclear power. 76 Although the policymakers of Pakistan and India are aware of the dangers of nuclear weapons, yet the expression of hate, distrust and brinkmanship from both sides may fuel an all-out
75 . Zafar Iqbal Cheema. Conflict, Crisis and Nuclear Stability in South Asia , A Paper from Workshop on New Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia, London: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, July 2004, p. 1. 76 . Rasul Bakhsh Rais. Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Posture, India Review , New Delhi (India), Vol. 4, No. 2, April 2005, p. 144. 136 nuclear war causing death to millions including destruction of the infrastructure. Instead of removing these tensions, both countries are immensely involved in the arms race and are frequently enhancing their military budgets. 77 Every effort to normalize the relationship has been marred by the nuclear rhetoric by Pakistan and India. In the existence of age long hostility, fear and unresolved matters, one cannot guarantee the normalization process between Pakistan and India to become irreversible.
In a situation where one is painted with a bad image in the other state and is shown as an adversary, the CBMs can be overshadowed by the suspicions and distrust. In such a scenario, nuclear risks remain greater and nuclear war has become a permanent threat because both of them now keep the principle of nuclear deterrence a central point in their strategic policies increasing the danger of actual war in case of any crisis between the two.
This environment of insecurity has made the discussion very much necessary over how to manage the risks and dangers of war between the two countries. First of all, it is important for Pakistan and India to understand the seriousness of the issue and to adopt a logical and realistic agenda which should emphasize on practical and sound CBMs like the prevention of conflict, to restrict the damage and to remove the ill perception regarding each other’s intentions and actions. 78 These steps would, in a greater part, confine the risks of accidental nuclear war in South Asia. Moreover, they are also in need of establishing an arms control system in order to restrict the number of arms
77 . Pakistan Terms Raise Unusual: Indian Defence Budget, Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), July 9, 2004. See also “India’s Defence Allocation”, Dawn , July 11, 2004. 78 . Address by Shahbaz Hussain, Director General Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Reported in The News , February 23, 2001. 137 possessed by both as well as preventing the threat warning to each other from time to time. 79
Both the countries have been in a perpetual state of tension and conflict and are, hence, prone to uncertain decisions. Therefore, there is a need to permit the third parties to resolve the conflicts and minimize the threats of dangerous nuclear weapons which can be utilized based on any miscalculation any time. In this regard, the efforts of the United
Nations can work if undertaken in an honest fashion. Both Pakistan and India did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and none of them would sign as long as the other remained non-signatory. 80 In this regard, the efforts of powerful Nuclear States
like France, US, UK, Russian Federation and China can do a lot but the fact is that they
themselves are not fully committed to the reduction of arms. Following the 1998
nuclear tests by Pakistan and India, sanctions were imposed on both but after the
incident of 9/11, those sanctions were removed in order to gain their favor in the war
on terror. The fact is that the major nuclear powers are not sincere to this issue. It is
also a fact that in such a nuclear competition, one country cannot adopt a complete
restrictive policy regarding arms because that would risk her own existence in the
region so to maintain balance is also the essential part of this kind of situation. 81
Nuclear disarmament, no doubt, is very much important for South Asia, there are few circles which equate the Pakistan−India nuclear issue with that of US-USSR conflict during the Cold War and express the view that nuclear capability of Pakistan and India
79 . Brahma Chellaney. CBMs: A Critical Appraisal, in Dipankar Banerjee (Ed.), Confidence Building Measures in South Asia, Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 1999, p. 24. 80 . Gregory Koblentz. Theater Missile Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix, The Non-proliferation Review, New York: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, Spring/Summer 1997, pp. 52-62. 81 . Mario E. Carranza. An Impossible Game: Stable Nuclear Deterrence after the Indian and Pakistani Tests, The Non-proliferation Review, New York: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Spring/Summer 1989, p. 16. 138 would lead to stability and peace. This is wrong as the case of US-USSR is very much different from that of Pakistan and India. Unlike US-USSR, Pakistan and India have age long hostility and distrust that dates back to the communal riots of pre-partition period and secondly, both US and USSR have developed technologically and they have progressed industrially and in defence capabilities, while the leadership factor has also been strengthened there. In case of Pakistan and India, these matters fall victim to underdevelopment and, therefore, shortsighted, hasty and unreasonable decisions may lead to heavy loss of life. Provided the intensity of the risks hidden in the nuclear power of both Pakistan and India, both of them need to understand the seriousness of the matter that weaponization never makes the world a safe place rather destroys the people in both the states. In this regard, the efforts of peace activists on both sides and the honest approach of the international forums can work best to prevent a bigger regional armageddon.
3.2.14. Military Interests
One of the causes of Pakistan−India continuing tensions has been the interests of the military on both sides according to some writers and intellectuals. Though apparently, the conflicts and border tensions are expressed as reasons for dispute, there are internal factors too which have become the cause of prevailing disorder in relationship. 82
Brajesh Mishra, the former National Security Advisor to the Indian Prime Minister Atal
Behari Vajpayee once said that the cause of tension between Pakistan and India has not
been Kashmir or Bangladesh but their own army depends upon such hostility with
Pakistan which means Army has interests in keeping a hostile environment.83 Same is
82 . Brian Cloughley. A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections, London: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 341. 83 . Richard Symonds. The Making of Pakistan, London: Oxford University Press, 1950, p. 74. 139 the case with Indian army which wants to maintain the conflict alive because that is the main factor for their existence and getting more powerful militarily in the name of tension with Pakistan.
There is no denying the fact that conflicts are always used in the international politics to get power and to generate money. The tension between Pakistan and India is one of those cases where the selfish interests are quite active 84 to manipulate the situation and
to wield power. Along with the state and non-state actors, the militaries also achieve
advantages in keeping the disputes alive and the same is apprehensible in relation to
Pakistan−India disputes. Indian desire to become the regional and global player and
Pakistan’s pursuit to match with India has led both the countries towards greater
destruction and they are now more involved in arms race than ever before. According
to one estimate, of all the arms imported by the developing countries during 2002-2009,
Pakistan and India received four percent and eleven percent respectively. All this is the
wastage of financial resources for destructive purposes and militaries are the main
beneficiaries of such transaction.85
The so-called responsible developed states and the permanent members of Security
Council provide heavy arms to these South Asian states and, at the same time, express
their concern over the nuclearization and weaponization of India and Pakistan. The dual
policy of these big powers has also led towards creating an environment for more
conflict and tensions. There is no use of conducting frantic Pakistan−India negotiations
by the big powers when they are not decreasing the level of arms supply to both these
84 . Richard Smoke. War: Controlling Escalation, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, pp. 19-23. 85 . A. H. Dakurah, S. P. Davies and R. K. Sampath. Defense Spending and Economic Growth in Developing Countries: A Causality Analysis, Journal of Policy Modeling , London: Society for Policy Modeling, No. 23, 2001, pp. 651-58. 140 countries. 86 The matter needs to be addressed deeply if the issues are to be resolved.
Every time, the tag of irresponsible states is applied to the two states for not concluding
any peace settlement and creating a danger of nuclear war in the region but the main
thing is ignored that the arms supply from the West has sustained the tensions between
the two countries. If the arms sales are stopped to these states, there is no ground for
them to increase their military strength. 87
The fact of the matter is that the institution, on both sides, which is taking advantage of the tension is said to be the military. The social sectors, in both the countries, do not get the needed attention 88 and that is the reason that these two poor South Asian neighbors have lagged behind in economic and social development. If the defence sector does not get the major portion of the financial resources, the military brass in both the countries would not be having those big chunk of grip over the matters and they would be unable to fulfill their interests so that is the way the arms supply companies even pressurize the top political and military brass to keep the tensions alive because in peace, there is no demand for weapons.89 While talking about the military interests, it is a fact that the
military in Pakistan has control on the economy and has a strong hold over almost all
the important matters ranging from education to farming in both public and private
sectors. They also enjoy exemptions from the taxes, less public accountability and
economic subsidies and more than everything is the political relations which they
86 . Guarav Kampani. “Placing the Indo−Pakistani Standoff in Perspective”, at CNS Web Reports, April 8, 2002, pp.14-15, at
In fact, the hostility between Pakistan and India has been made a compulsion to carry on the affairs and any change is not acceptable to those having selfish interests. Both
Pakistan and India treat each other dangerous and fearful in order to justify their heavy military budgets and financial allocations. Those educated in military educational institutions never raise their voice against the status quo and the rest of the citizens already consider the other country enemy and aggressor. In such a situation, the militaries in both Pakistan and India are at the advantageous end and their financial and political aims are never questioned in any circle while internally they are posing a big threat to the democratic progress and the dangerous level of non-progressive stance in relations with each other. As defenders of the frontiers, their respect is always high on the part of the people and no one can think of them going against the national interests.
But in case of Pakistan−India dispute, the militaries need to move for more progressive steps for peace.
3.2.15. Role of International Actors
The great power struggle has been an important feature of the Indian sub-continent for many years because of the geo-strategic significance of this area. In this regard, the hostility and Cold War between the two powers i.e. US and USSR cannot be ignored
90 . Alastair Lamb. Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute (1947-1948), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 79. 142 which brought their focus towards South Asia. 91 The South Asia became center of attention for the big powers for fulfilling their aims and to get the strategic interests.
Pakistan and India gained maximum advantage of this big power rivalry for promoting their interests. During the Cold War era when Pakistan opted to align with the US, India chose to side with the Soviet Union while apparently showing the non-aligned status. 92
Although Pakistan has shown her willingness for the accommodation of U.S. interests
in the region thus allowing an increasing role for external player in the regional affairs,
this action has made Pakistan−India rivalry stronger. Similarly, Indian stance of getting
assistance from the former Soviet Union has enhanced the level of confrontation
between the big powers i.e. US and Russia. These acts of both Pakistan and India led
towards the increased involvement of the Cold War actors in the political and economic
affairs of South Asia.
One of the causes of tensions between Pakistan and India is that the external actors have
not played their role sincerely in the resolution of disputes irritating their relationship.
Instead, they have always exploited the matters to their own advantage. 93 No doubt, the
great powers have played an important role in the military buildup of both Pakistan and
India and it is because of their assistance that the arms race has come to rise in the South
Asia. But, on the other hand, the South Asian neighbors also needed that assistance to
further their own interests. The defence assistance extended to the two countries has
91 . W. A. Green and J. P. Deasy. Unifying Themes in the History of British India, 1757-1857: A Historiographical Analysis, Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, Albion, Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1985, pp. 15-45. 92 . Mushirul Hasan. Legacy of a Divided Nation: India’s Muslims since Independence, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 126. 93 . Ayesha Jalal. India's Partition and the Defence of Pakistan: A Historical Perspective, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History , London: Taylor & Francis Publishers, May 1987, pp. 303-17. 143 promoted but tensions and instead of improving the environment, has brought the two countries on the brink of war four times and many minor conflicts from time to time.
While analyzing the role of these external actors in exploiting the regional situation, it is a clear fact that many a times they showed their complete ignorance of the problems in the region and failed to understand the proximity of the conditions. In the absence of support from US in troubled times and in the face of Sino-India tensions, Pakistan had a good chance to find another friend in the shape of China which supported Pakistan during the troubled times. Much of the defence equipments supplied to India are Soviet made and is the consequence of Pakistan’s seeking support from the US and China.
There has been much external interference in Pakistan. The military governments many a times have been supported to further external interests. The disorder created in the internal political process and policies ultimately had a negative impact on the relationship between Pakistan and India. Another negative impact of US interference in the internal matters of Pakistan was during the Afghan crises when weapons worth billions of dollars were supplied to Pakistan to fight the Afghan war against Soviet forces and the ill impacts of that war still haunt the political and economic structure of
Pakistan.94 Thus the defence alignments with great powers have damaged the order in both the states instead of serving as a basis for peaceful co-existence. 95
The international actors have not played any positive role in minimizing the conflict. In fact, while analyzing deeply one can say that the war between Pakistan and India will not benefit great powers. One reason is that these powers are already having an access to the markets of the two countries and their influence is increasing in almost all the
94 . Najam Uz Zafar. Vision of a Peaceful South Asia, Efficacy and Options for Pakistan, NDC Journal, Islamabad: National Defence College, 2001, p. 3. 95 . Jamshed Khan. India−Pakistan Relations: An Enduring Rivalry , Term Paper submitted to Dr. Razia Sultana, Islamabad: Quiad-e-Azam University, Department of History, 2010, pp. 17-19. 144 sectors. They are, therefore, not in the need of fanning tensions in the region. War between the two countries would, on the other hand, damage the interests of the big powers as well because they would lose their already existent economic base in the region. Though they have not played a noteworthy role in the normalization of
Pakistan−India relations, they are not in favor of disorder and conflict between the two countries.
Experts of the international politics assume that in case of any war between Pakistan and India, the favors are more prone towards India than Pakistan because India is an emerging economic power in the region and almost all great powers are extending their moral and material support to benefit, in return, from the large consumer base. As compared to that, the consumer base in Pakistan is quite small and weak and, hence, not of much interest for the big powers. Moreover, the political and economic set up of the country is not secure enough to provide guarantees for the stability in structures. In such a situation, an imbalance in the region is prone to erupt and Pakistan−India tension would not decrease in this scenario.
An unfortunate element in this region is that the conflicts have never found honest brokers to transform into peace and stability. The international players have just pursued their own vested interests and have ignored the need for peace between
Pakistan and India by resolving their age old disputes. 96 Even China which is called the all-weather friend of Pakistan has tried to conclude agreements with India for peace and cooperation. Likewise, the powerful Security Council members has not taken a solid step for eliminating differences between the two neighbors. The reason lies in the fact
96 . Richard M. Easton. The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 1204-1760, Berkeley (USA): University of California Press, 1993, p. 214. 145
India is not in favor of any third party involvement in resolving disputes with Pakistan and particularly US and China are seen with suspicion because of their non-neutral approach. While talking about the other European powers, they are almost under the pressure of US and cannot interfere in the South Asian affairs as against the policy of
US. 97 The US policy in South Asia has been to prevent its domination by any single power which may consequently lead towards making this region an open society and economically more developed, not needing the US support for development in different sectors. As US wants to extend its own strategic interests and having position of the superpower so the European role is very less to be seen in South Asia. 98 These hurdles are great to block the process of normalization and conflict resolution between Pakistan and India.
The high level of intellectual capabilities and logical decision making of the international experts and policymakers is always praiseworthy but when it comes to the issue of Pakistan−India tension, their analysis and sharpness of policy making gets silent and all fingers point to one and the only problem of Kashmir as a bone of contention between the two countries but with no agenda for practical solution of the dispute. So all this intriguing scenario leads towards creating obstacles in the peace process. In the absence of any conciliatory efforts, the conflicts have gone further complicated rather than getting resolved.
97 . Heather Conley. Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns in South Asia: Europe’s Role, A Background Paper of the CSIS Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation, Washington D. C: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, January 2014, p. 13. 98 . A. Z. Hilali. Cold War Politics of Superpowers in South Asia, The Dialogue, Vol. 1, No. 2, Peshawar: Qurtaba University, 2006, p. 73. 146
3.2.16. Economic Instability
One of the important causes of conflict and tension between Pakistan and India remain as the economic problems in both the countries. Though this problem does not seem to be the direct cause of the tension, analyzing deeply we gauge the fact that majority of the people in both the countries are poor and are facing lots of economic problems.
Their falling in the hands of the extremists and destructive elements is obvious. The human development indicators in both the countries have remained very low since independence and for that too, tensions is the main cause due to which no cooperation could be extended to each other.99 There is no denying the fact that poverty brings many problems and this is very much true about Pakistan and India where the underprivileged people, in order to fulfill their needs, tend to involve themselves in extremist activities.
As for Pakistan, the social unrest has created such a bad economic atmosphere that the disgruntled sections of the society easily fall prey to the destabilizing elements as has revealed from a survey conducted in 1976 that about seventy to eighty percent students in Pakistani madrassahs come from the rural background 100 and, provided the extreme
level of poor condition, fall victim to the radical activities because they do not find the
opportunities to work and earn legally. 101 These extremist elements have created enormous cross border disorder in South Asia and, provided the Pakistan−India conflict, it always becomes easy for these elements to fulfill their economic needs and
99 . Human Development in South Asia 2005, Published for Mahbub-ul-Haq Human Development Center Lahore, Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 51. 100 . Mumtaz Ahmad. Madrassa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Paper Presented in the Conference on “Religion and Security in South Asia”, Honolulu (Hawaii): Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 19-22 August, 2002. 101 . Farhan Bokhari. The Rise and Long-Term Outlook for the MMA in Pakistan: Working Group Meeting on Pakistan's Future and US Policy Options Project, Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003, p. 19. 147 aggravate the already tensed relations. In one way or the other, the internal economic problems of poverty and underdevelopment are posing a serious threat to the relationship between Pakistan and India. In India, there are many militant outfits which
India blames to be supported by Pakistan. In fact, the problem is economic rather than external involvement. 102 Addressing the economic issues and poor conditions by both the countries would automatically see a decrease in the radical tendencies because, according to the experts, no one is interested in the violence and aggression. In fact, their poor conditions lead them to that way. In most of the cases of terrorism and militancy, often the people arrested are found to be of poor background who are used by the authoritative elements for their own purposes. 103
No doubt, the economic ills can be called one of the most important causes of tension and the basis of slow cooperation. Both the countries are in dire need to mend this evil because wherever the poverty level increases, it produces serious repercussions for the security and peace of the nations. In the case of Pakistan and India, this problem has not only affected the internal security but has also created an imbalance in the relationship between the two countries.
3.2.17. Minority Complex
One of the important causes of tension between Pakistan and India is that both the countries feel threatened from one another. Their conditions make them centric towards one another because an increase in the power of one is tantamount to lower the power level of another and in that case the powerful would be more dominant in the regional
102 . Amartya Sen. Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, London: Allen Lane, 2006, pp. 3-5. 103 . Aditya Pandey. South Asia Polity, Literacy & Conflict Resolution, New Delhi: Isha Books, 2005, p. 200. 148 affairs. In an attempt to acquire superiority over one another, the two countries are continuously engaged in increasing their military power. As far as Pakistan is concerned, the complex of being a small power is, somewhat, logical because India is a big state and her defence and economic potential is much bigger than Pakistan and she has, therefore, been closely observing every new development in the Indian military preparedness.104 The historical and post-partition divergent trends in their foreign policies with conflicts on various issues have made the problem further critical. The so called leadership status of India in the region and the selfish motives of various big powers have made the environment complex for Pakistan as she is always left alone at the international level with the exception of few friends who supported Pakistan during hard times. 105 The active geo-political situation in the region has always negatively affected Pakistan’s national economy and defence. Every positive gesture and economic and defence support of big powers to India added to Pakistan’s fear. No doubt, Pakistan cannot claim to be on the same position like India economically and militarily but the emerging scenario in which India is gaining an important position in the policies of big powers for the region, Pakistan has always been voicing her concerns on both regional and international forums. On the other hand, the aim of India to destabilize Pakistan cannot be denied in anyway. As for India, though the complex of being a small power does not seem to be more relevant, but she has always been trying to boost her military and defence capabilities in relation to Pakistan. And just like
Pakistan, India’s foreign policy also has been Pakistan centric. India’s minority complex arises from her fear to lose her Hindu identity and that is the reason there is a rise in the Hindu movements to establish a stable base for India’ Hindu identity. This
104 . Stephen P. Cohen. Rising India has a Pakistan Problem, A Lecture delivered by him at International Development Research Centre, Ottawa (Canada), April 09, 2009. 105 . Ibid. 149 fear has led India to increase her military power to dominate other regional countries and Pakistan particularly. No doubt, it would be a shame for India to bow before
Pakistan while losing her identity. The identity struggle gets weak in India because of the prevailing linguistic and caste differences which mars any unity to form Hindu identification in India. 106 Though apparently, India does not seem to be in any complex
pattern, there are things which make the Indian position more critical. Both the states
are in their own fears which have for the last so many years, inflicted a greater damage
to the prospects of any positive development in their relationship. In the struggle to
raise their respective power level and to hide their minority complex, they have been a
source of discomfort for the whole region while adopting counter policies and actions
against each other. 107 Despite rich resources and potential economies, very little could be gained to make the South Asia a stronger economic zone and to come out of the age old hostilities to move ahead for a brighter tomorrow.108 The joining, by both Pakistan and India, of the defence pacts and military alliances all have been with the intention to maintain the balance of power and not to let oneself down. Any support by a big power for either Pakistan or India becomes a bigger threat for the other because their minority complex creates a feeling to suppression by the rival. The unique neighborhood has put the reconciliation process in doldrums. The economic and trade relations could not be taken up because of the non-resolving of the core disputes between the two countries. 109
The people to people contacts can be increased in this regard. The goodwill can be
created in the hearts of the people of the two countries by providing opportunities to
106 . Maya Chadda. Ethnicity, Security and Separatism in India, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 50-81. 107 . Pakistan’s Problems and India, July 6, 2009, accessed online http://global moderation.blogspot.com /2009 /07/ pakistans-problems-and-india.html. 108 . Vali Nasr. “National Identities and the India−Pakistan”, in T. V. Paul (Ed.), The India−Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 201-06. 109 . C. Raja Mohan. Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Viking, 2004, p. 156. 150 them in educational, social and cultural fields in each other’s countries. No doubt that the peace process initiated in 1999 had contributed well in this regard and had that spirit been in the coming years, it would have created a tremendous progress in all fields of
Pakistan−India relations.
3.3. Conclusion
In the face of serious causes of tension between the adversaries and their being equipped with nuclear weapons, both Pakistan and India are in intense need to come to the negotiation forum. Such a kind of animosity would certainly become worse if not cured properly. The deficit of democracy in Pakistan has also, many a times, created obstacles in the process of normalization because the repeatedly changing governments could not maintain the consistent peace process and negotiations because of the military’s hold of power. 110 The governments in India too never adopted a committed stance to follow an honest policy for resolving the disputes. The bilateral problems remained unresolved since the British left the Sub-Continent leaving a number of disputes to be dealt with by the two new states. Now, the age old hostility and distrust can be removed with the commitment and practical steps towards peace. 111
The establishments on both sides are sane enough to gauge the consequences of war like situation. Instead of fanning the tension, both Pakistan and India must understand the critical regional environment.
There is no denying the fact that the military and political establishments on both sides are not willing to go to war and even in case of war, the bloody loss to lives would be
110 . Ahmad Faruqui. Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia, Burlington, VA (USA): Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003, pp. 121-36. 111 . Ibid., p. 139. 151 greater enough to destroy the whole region and would also disturb the world peace. The help and support of the allies may not necessarily be available in such a disaster and the last option before surrender would be to go nuclear. Recently, the need for peace and cooperation has been recognized by the two adversaries and contacts have been increased both at the people and the government level. 112
======
112 . Ibid., p. 45. 152
CHAPTER−4
CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN−INDIA HOSTILITY
153
CHAPTER−4
CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN−INDIA HOSTILITY
4.1 . Introduction
Pakistan and India have been in a permanent state of conflict since independence. They
became independent out of the conflicting historical developments. This hostile
environment has blocked the development of the region and the otherwise potential
South Asian region has not been able to become a hub of socio-economic progress and
tranquility. Both Pakistan and India fought three major wars but these wars did not give
them any lesson of cooperation and peace. Rather they have more actively piled up
weapons and propagating evil intentions against each other. Every time the efforts to
move towards cooperation are dominated by entrenched chauvinism. 1 In such a controversial environment, peace and development has become a distant dream. The regional leadership ambitions of India and the inflexible stance on various conflicts have also not let the two countries to come closer.
Pakistan and India are two potential states in terms of economic and military strength and can influence the developments in South Asia to a greater extent by their diplomatic stands. In terms of geographical importance, technological development, human and natural resources, they are better off as compared to other countries in the region but their mutual mistrust and conflict has let the clouds of war to always looming over the region. 2 Given the volatile relationship between Pakistan and India, it is not easy to
forecast the future developments in their relationship but this fact is quite clear that this
1. Vali Nasr. “National Identities and the India−Pakistan”, in T. V. Paul (Ed.), The India−Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 178-201. 2. J.N. Dixit. Indian Regional Developments: Through the Prism of Indo−Pak Relations, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2004, p. 18. 154 dispute has led to serious consequences in the past and would, no doubt, create more complexities in their future relations. In the case of Pakistan and India, war is no longer a desired option because both the states are now nuclear powers and war on any issue would lead to massive destruction of the two. But in such a case too if there is no war, there will be a continuous piling up of the weapons and both would certainly be in a vortex of arms race. 3 Keeping in view the Indian aim of becoming regional power and
the economic trends in both Pakistan and India, it would not be easy for both states to
go to war because of the heavy defence expenditures which eat away all the social
development funds. Financially and militarily too, the war and conflicting condition
would not be suitable for peace because that would cost much to these poor states.
The absence of cooperation is not suitable for both Pakistan and India as the regional
economic model of trade and communication totally depends upon Pakistan−India
harmonious relationship. The protracted conflict has already made the two countries to
involve in subversive activities against each other stretching from Bangladesh to
Afghanistan. The pan-Asian model of economic and social development will never be
possible without the cooperation of Pakistan and India. In the face of massive
challenges of development, the two countries would gain nothing by accusing each
other of interference in internal matters but their peace efforts would, of course, bring
positive changes in the regional environment. Seen in the context of historical and
friendly cultural interaction between the Hindus and the Muslims in India, one could
logically expect very cordial relations between the two states after 1947 but
3. Kamal Matinuddin. “Conventional Arms Race in South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective” , in Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Imtiaz H. Bokhari (Eds.), Arms Race and Nuclear Developments in South Asia , Islamabad: Asia Printers, 2004, p. 14. 155 unfortunately their relationship were based more on emotions and less on understanding. 4
The matter with these two nations is that when steps are taken for peace, there is an
enthusiastic response for peace and cooperation, but during times of ebb, the same
proponents of peace claim for separate ways and interests and reconciliation is avoided.
It is a fact that the mistrust and the undercurrents of misunderstandings and emotions
always obstruct the peace negotiations and resolution of conflicts becomes uncertain.
This unfortunate trend of relationship has drawn a big socio-economic and diplomatic
cost from Pakistan and India. Both have suffered a lot because of their hostile postures
and unfriendly stances. Being home of one-fifth of the world’s population, Pakistan and
India have various socio-economic problems like poverty, illiteracy, unemployment
etc. The GDP of both Pakistan and India together stands at five percent of the total
world’s contribution. They import ten percent of the world’s conventional weapons and
account for three percent of the total world’s defence expenditures. Indian arms imports
increased by more than 100 per cent from 2000 to 2008 according to SIPRI Yearbook. 5
The huge defence spending has always eaten up the social development funds which
could otherwise be spent on improving the social sector, had there been peace between
the two neighbors. A very small cut of military expenditure can make a big contribution
in their socio-economic fields. For instance, if Pakistan and India are able to resolve the
Siachen dispute, they can build approximately four hundred and fifteen hundred schools
respectively. Similarly, the huge price which both these countries pay for modernizing
their weapons and importing sophisticated aircrafts can be diverted towards providing
4. Ian Talbot. Inventing the Nations, India & Pakistan, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 177. 5. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, SIPRI Yearbook 2011 , Washington D.C: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011, pp. 56-59.
156 meals to the under-nourished children and economically backward sections of their populations.
During the modern geo-strategic realities, Pakistan and India must think of changing pattern of their relations from competition to complementing attitude. The hegemonic designs of India and the competing spirit of Pakistan may not give them anything but their peace initiatives can solve many of their problems. It is very unfortunate for
Pakistan and India that their history, post-independence wars and hostility have developed mistrust and inflexible trend in their relationship so much so that even during negotiations on disputes, their attitude is that of hoping for the good and preparing for the bad. Their socio-economic, political and strategic myopia continue to harm the peace environment of the whole region. 6 Moreover, the fragile public opinion on both sides has never let the people to people contact flourish which, at one time, is tended towards peace and at another time crying for war. This kind of shaking base of the perceptions on both sides can never lead towards sound dialogue and cooperation. The need is to change the mindsets. The debilitating hostility has brought to Pakistan and
India numerous costs and damaging consequences which have obstructed the economic and social development of this region and has, for years, kept the people in both the countries to suffer. 7 In order to remove the damaging results of this love-hate
relationship, Pakistan and India must take note of the traditional adverse trends in their
relations and must resolve to solidify the basis of their interaction which can decrease
the costs and can turn the South Asia into a hub of economic activities
6. Umbreen Javaid. Peace and Security in South Asia: Issues and Challenges, Lahore: University of the Panjab, Pakistan Study Centre, 2006, p. 13. 7. Mahmud Ali Durrani. India and Pakistan: The Cost of Conflict, The Benefits of Peace, Washington, D.C: The John Hopkins University Press, 2000, p. 13. 157
The various costs emanating from Pakistan−India conflict have destroyed both of them.
It is very important to understand the past and present of this conflict because only then the significance of peace can be understood. The people on both sides must understand the fact that various selfish interests are involved in the continuation of hostility which has invoked various problems for the two states. Only then the Pakistan−India equation can take positive and harmonious direction. The benefits of Pakistan−India cooperation are far greater than the hostile co-existence and keeping in view those advantages, every dialogue can lead towards a step further than the previous controversial history. 8
4.2. Costs of Pakistan−India Conflict
The consequences of the conflict are many and have been discussed in various forums particularly in academic circles. An understating of these costs only can raise the importance of peace among the people and governments of the two countries. The seriousness of the dispute and the regional peace depends on analyzing the various economic, diplomatic and social consequences which cost the two countries heavily.
4.2.1. Military Consequences
The most serious cost of Pakistan−India conflict which has inflicted a heavy damage to this relationship is the military cost that includes: the policy fluctuations, financial burdens and human loss. Since independence in 1947, full scale wars and many clashes have put great pressure on the financial resources of the two countries and the defence expenditure which has been on the rise, ate away the share of socio-economic sector. 9
8. Robert G. Wirsing. Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age, New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc, 2003, pp. 137-181. 9. Sunny Sebastian. India, Pakistan Should Reduce Military Expenditure, The Hindu , New Delhi (India), February 24, 2011. 158
Figure 4.1 shows the defence and education expenditures as a proportion of GDP in
Pakistan and India from 1950 to 2002.
Figure 4.1: Defence and Education Expenditure as a proportion of GDP in Pakistan and India
Source: S. Mansoob Murshed, The Consequences of not loving thy Neighbour as thyself: Trade, Democracy and Military Expenditure (Explanations underlying India−Pakistan Rivalry), The Hague (Holland): Institute of Social Studies, June 4, 2007.
The allocation of more than half of the total budget to defence in both the countries has weakened the development and the economic progress at the cost of maintaining regional balance and internal security. 10 Wars have never given any fruitful results and so is the case with Pakistan−India rivalry where, according to one estimate, about
30,000 lost their lives and nearly 40,000 military personnel wounded during the four wars between the two countries. 11 Not only war time scenarios have affected the human
10 . Raja Muhammad Khan. Indo−Pak Military Expenditures and Global Trends, Pakistan Tribune , Karachi (Pakistan), June 09, 2010. See online http://paktribune.com/articles/Indo−Pak-Military-Expen ditures-and-Global-Trends-228443.html. 11 . Masood Ismail. Cost of Conflict between India and Pakistan, Strategic Foresight Group Report , New Delhi: Strategic Foresight Group, July 12, 2004, pp. 4-7. 159 and financial resources of the two countries, but even during peace times, the border clashes have claimed thousands of lives annually since 1947.
4.2.2. Human Cost
The human cost of this conflict has taken a heavy lot and the loss of lives of the military personnel as well as the civilians on both sides has also been huge. In the Kargil sector, which is one of the most difficult conflict areas, the troops of both Pakistan and India have been more active since 1999 and even before 1999 the troops used to man the whole area on high altitude posts of about 18000 square feet above the sea level. With the severely cold temperature level during winter ranging between minus 40 to 60 degree Celsius, the Kargil zone is causing heavy burden on the defence resources. 12
Similarly, in another conflict zone of Siachen, the troops of Pakistan and India have
been fighting a difficult war on the world’s highest battleground which is about twenty
two thousand square feet above the sea level. This war costs India and Pakistan a soldier
every two or four days particularly after 1984. The fact of the matter is that in Siachen,
the loss of lives has been less with the firing incidents and more with the extreme
weather conditions. The hostile relationship between Pakistan and India since
independence has made the soldiers to pay in Siachen in the shape of psychological
problems, pulmonary disorders, frostbites and blindness all caused by the severe
climate. 13 In this conflict, not only the military personnel on both sides have suffered
but the civilian population has also faced enormous problems. The wars between the
two countries led to the displacements of the population on both sides and the border
clashes often caused casualties of serious nature. These civilian sufferings were not
12 . Semu Bhatt. The Cost of Conflict-II: Beyond the Direct Cost of War, Special Report, Mumbai: International Centre for Peace Initiatives, 2004, pp. 25-26. 13 . Vineeta Kumar. Only Economics Can Bury South Asia's Ghosts, The Wall Street Journal , New York, July 21, 1999. 160 restricted to the periods of war only but the unabated tensions have made the displacements of the people on both sides a common phenomenon particularly in the border areas. 14 During the Kargil episode, for instance, approximately 150,000 civilians
in India and about 50,000 in Pakistan were compelled to change their places of abode. 15
These regular displacements of the people in both the countries have cost them both
psychologically and socio-economically. The exchange of fire across the border has
claimed thousands of lives and livestock on both sides with the damaging impact on the
properties and the crops. 16 The landmines near the border areas have made the lives of
the residents even more miserable. The heavy defence expenditures, 17 maintenance of troops and military infrastructure development in the difficult and uninhabited areas have resulted in the serious economic losses to both the countries. Table 4.1 shows the human loss caused in Pakistan and India wars.
The diversion of funds towards defence and weapons upgradation has hampered the socio-economic development and trade cooperation since independence. The indirect costs of war have not let the South Asian region to become an economic hub and the disputes between the two states have taken a heavy monetary toll of the annual budgets.
To facilitate the armies to protect, patrol and survive in difficult terrains like Siachen and Kargil, has taken a lion’s share in the allocations of the finances.
14 . Nishat Ahmad. Kashmir in the Pakistan−India Military Equation, New Delhi: Atlantic Publications, 2003, p. 120. 15 . Masood Hussain. What's the Real Cost of Sustaining Indo−Pak Conflict, The Economic Times, New Delhi (India), September 4, 2004. 16 . Javed Hussain. Kargil: What Might Have Happened, Dawn , Islamabad (Pakistan), October 10, 2006. 17 . Huma Mir. Pakistan’s Defense Budget: 2010-11, Pakistan Observer , Islamabad (Pakisatn), July 6, 2010. 161
Table 4.1: Human Loss in Pakistan−India Wars: Casualties by Year
Casualties by Year India Pakistan 1947-48 1, 104 1, 500
1965 3, 264 3, 800
1971 3, 843 7, 900
1999 522 696 Total 8, 733 13, 896
Source: India Courtesy Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, US State Department, 2000.
Since partition, the hostile posture of both Pakistan and India towards each other has not let them to move for peace and they have been paying for the mistakes of their policies. Their engagement in the blame game and the weapons modernization and import of sophisticated arms has brought the task of economic progress and the internal developmental issues to a secondary level. Table 4.2 shows the military strength of
Pakistan and India according to 2012 estimates. This is a major reason as to why the
South Asian region has not been able to rise as a potential market and booming zone for the world 18 rather it has become a dangerous zone because of the nuclearization and
the existing unresolved disputes between the two important South Asia neighbors.
Acquisition of arms by the two has become a regular phenomenon in South Asia
because a weapon deal by one country triggers the desire to get arms by the another and
this arms procurement psychology has been exploited by the Western world who, on
the one side, claims to go against the armaments terming South Asia as the most
18 . Rizwan Tahir. Defence Spending and Economic Growth: Re-examining the Issue of Causality for Pakistan and India, The Pakistan Development Review , Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Vol. 34, No. 4, Part 3, 1995, pp. 1109-17. 162 dangerous region and, on the other side, becomes the cause of increasing weaponization by quietly selling sophisticated arms to them. 19 Almost all the big powers like US, UK,
France, China and Russian Federation are involved in this fray of making money out of this unreasonable hostility of ours. 20 No doubt, the dangers related with the
weaponization of Pakistan and India are not restricted to them alone but would destroy
the whole region in case of any war in future. The irony of the matter is that the
obsession of even more than six decades has not given them anything but reminded
them of the importance of peaceful co-existence. 21
Table 4.2: Military Strength of Pakistan and India
Military Capabilities Pakistan India
Active Military Personnel 617,000 1,325,000
Active Military Reserves 515,500 1,747,000
Total Aircrafts 1,414 2,462
Land Based Weapons 16,461 75,191
Naval Units 11 175
Major Ports and 2 7 Terminals Aircraft Carriers 0 1
Submarines 5 15 Towed Artillery 1,806 10,000 Patrol Coastal Craft 15 31
Defence Expenditure $6,410,000,000 $36,030,000,000
Source: US Library of Congress, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed in September 2012.
19 . Semu Butt. Cost of Conflict, The News , Islamabad (Pakistan), January 19, 2011. 20 . “India and Pakistan: Nuclear States in Conflict”, NuclearFiles.org, See Online http://www. Nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/post-cold-war/india−pakistan/india-pakista n-conflict.htm 21 . Stephanie Flamenbaum. Optimism and Obstacles in India−Pakistan Peace Talks, Policy Brief , Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, No. 98, July 15, 2011, pp. 17-19. 163
There is a dire need to understand the seriousness of the hostile environment and to realize the military consequences the two countries have faced over the years. The civilian and financial costs which this dispute has inflicted on them are mounting higher with the passage of time and getting unmanageable leaving us with compelling scenarios of same vicious policies and postures. 22 There is a growing realization that a peaceful solution of the problem is in the mutual interests of the two countries. There is also an understanding that the horrors of future war could inflict insurmountable damage in view of the military build up of the two nations.
4.2.3. Diplomatic Cost
The diplomatic consequences of the conflict are also more serious in case of Pakistan and India and have not yielded any positive results ever since independence. 23
Ironically, both Pakistan and India maintain their policies with the world through their
centric thinking for each other which has negatively affected their relations with other
countries of the world. That seems to be one reason as to why their policies for various
states and on various issues fall prey to the bellicosity for each other and have lost a
stable ground geopolitically. 24 The strategies and policy measures by one country are always looked with suspicions in another country and hostile postures have altogether disturbed the prospects of any fruitful negotiations between Pakistan and India.
Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan is taken as a conspiracy in Indian circles and vice versa. Pakistan, India and Afghanistan together can open gates of progress and
22 . Shaukat Qadir. Nuclear South Asia: Reducing Risks, Daily Times , Islamabad (Pakistan), May 11, 2002. See Online http://www.Dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?date=5/11/02 23 . Gyanendra Pandey. India and Pakistan: 1947-2002 , Economic and Political Weekly , New Delhi, Vol. 37, No. 11, March 16, 2002, pp. 23-24. 24 . Rizwan Zeb. US Interests in South Asia in Post 9/11 Era: Effects on Pakistan, Margalla Papers , Islamabad: National Defense University, 2004, pp. 73-89. 164 prosperity for the South Asian region but unfortunately that is a dream to come true. 25
The South Asian region has greater potential to develop economically and socially and
the cooperation of the regional states can help solve many economic issues such as
access to the Central Asia market and the energy deficits. The main regional conflict
exists between Pakistan and India which has hampered any coordination between the
two for boosting their potentials. 26 The prevailing disturbance in Afghanistan could
have been avoided with the collective initiatives of Pakistan and India.
4.2.3.1. Membership Problems in Different Organizations
The interaction of Pakistan and India with the world and their membership in different
organizations has also faced serious obstacles because of their divergent stands on
various issues. India’s claim to become member of the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) is hampered by her adversarial relations with Pakistan and her involvement in
the arms race in the region. 27 Similarly, Pakistan’s desire to become a member of
ASEAN Regional Forum is opposed by India which herself has not yet been accepted as a full member of the Forum and only works as a member of ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF). 28 Almost same is the case with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
which has not yet given membership either to Pakistan or India because of their
blocking each other’s membership in the organization in one way or the other i.e.
Pakistan through China and India through Russia. 29 However, there are greater
25 . Giving Peace a Chance, Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), June 1, 2002. See Online at http://www.dawn. com 26 . Saurabh Shukla. Trouble in the Backyard, India Today , No. 68, New Delhi (India), May 2006. 27 . Sreeram Chaulia. U.N. Security Council Seat: China Outsmarts India, Indo-Asian News Service , New Delhi, May 30, 2008, See Online http://www.Worldpress.org/Asia/3161.cfm 28 . Niaz Naik. Confidence Building in South Asia: Problems and Prospects, Paper presented in the International Seminar on South Asian Economic Cooperation: Problems and Prospects , Columbo: The Institute of Policy Studies, September 18, 2001. 29 . Ibid., 165 prospects of their becoming members of this important organization provided relations between China and India, on the one hand, and between Pakistan and Russia, on the other, harmonizes.
The biggest example of regional economic backwardness is the failure of the SAARC to become an active forum for economic cooperation and this failure is largely attributed to the unfriendly relations between Pakistan and India. No decision or policy of SAARC can be implemented in the existence of disputes between these two nations and, therefore, the regional development is lagging behind all the developed regions of the world despite having enormous human and material resources. 30
Non-cooperation and opposing stance in various international and regional forums has not let the two countries to develop internally as well as regionally. Both sides blame each other for blocking their membership in different organizations and the blame game has kept them at odds for years like Indian voice against Pakistan for not leaving her to get an observer status in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Pakistan’s accusations for Indian hand in the suspension of her membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States after the military coup of 1999. All these developments have not produced any fruitful results in terms of social-economic progress of the South Asia.
Table 4.3 shows membership of Pakistan and India on various organizartions till 2004.
30 . Smruti S. Pattanaik. Making Sense of Regional Cooperation: SAARC at Twenty, Strategic Analysis , New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 38-40. 166
Table 4.3: Pakistan−India: Their Membership on various Organizations till 2004
International and Regional India Pakistan Organizations 1. United Nations (UN) Member Member 2. Conference on Disarmament (CD) Member Member 3. International Atomic Energy Agency Member Member (IAEA) 4. South Asian Association for Member Member Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 5. The Commonwealth Member Suspended
Treaties and Agreements India Pakistan 1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ------(NPT) 2. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban ------Treaty (CTBT) 3. Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) State Party State Party 4. Geneva Protocol State Party State Party 5. Nuclear Safety Convention Signatory State Party 6. India−Pakistan Non-Attack State Party State Party Agreement Terrorism Conventions India Pakistan 1. Suppression of Financing of Signatory --- Terrorism 2. Suppression of Terrorist Bombings State Party State Party 3. Against the Taking of Hostages State Party State Party 4. Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of State Party State Party Aircraft 5. Suppression of Unlawful Acts State Party State Party Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 6. SAARC Convention on Suppression Signatory Signatory of Terrorism 7. Prevention of Punishment of Crimes State Party State Party against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents
Source: Report of the Strategic Foresight Group (2010), New Delhi: SFG, pp. 40-41.
4.2.3.2. A Blow to Disarmament and Non-Nuclearization Efforts
One of the diplomatic consequences of strained Pakistan−India relations is their arms race which has become a big hurdle in the way of their signing treaties for the nuclear disarmament and weapons control which is a big blow to the non-nuclearization efforts 167 internationally. 31 Both Pakistan and India have not signed the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and non-
signing of these treaties have caused setbacks to the efforts for denuclearizing the
world. 32 The massive supplies of various sophisticated arms by the big powers has also
damaged the prospects of the disarmament treaty. The dual policy of the superpowers
regarding the nuclearization efforts and arms race has led towards non-attention of the
potential nuclear states towards the hazards of this dangerous armament policy.
Similarly, Pakistan and India have also not signed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) because each of them attach
the condition that they would sign the treaties provided the other side has signed them
as well. 33 The hostile relations between the two neighbors has compelled them to go for
a balance in the region and their centric policies towards each other cannot be changed
so easily unless and until they create an environment of trust for one another. 34 Their persistent resistance to put their signatures on important disarmament treaties has become a bigger cause of their odd diplomatic approaches and image deterioration internationally.
4.2.3.3. Enemies and Friends
The tensed relationship of Pakistan and India has brought to the forefront many friends and enemies of these states and further, a friend of one is the enemy of another.
Ironically, the conflict has also created a confusing environment for the third party to
31 . Rachel Oswald. Pakistan−India Arms Race Destabilizing Strategic Balance, Global Security Newswire , Washington D.C: Institute of Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 20, 2011. 32 . Thomas Graham. South Asia and the Future of Nuclear Non-proliferation , Washington D.C: Arms Control Association, May 1998, pp. 61-62. 33 . Update on Progress towards Regional Non-Proliferation in South Asia, Report to Congress , Washington D.C: Bureau of South Asian Affairs, June 15, 1997. 34 . Samina Ahmed. Avoiding an India−Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation, Pugwash Workshop Report, Lahore, Meeting No. 280, March 11-12, 2003, pp. 3-7. 168 choose one between the two or to maintain a balance in cooperation with the two rivals.
We have the example of US relations with India and Pakistan. Any military or economic deal of the US with one country leads to the raise of concerns by another. The US economic and military assistance to Pakistan, from time to time, has been protested by
India and same is the case with Pakistan because both see the possibility of using the military power against each other. 35 Pakistan’ joining of the defence pacts with US and
Indian defence treaties with the former Soviet Union, Israel and also US has threatened the security of India and Pakistan respectively. While Pakistan’s relations with Israel and Russia have remained at odds because of Israel’s aggressive policies in the Middle
East. In such a scenario, Pakistan looks to China as a potential supporter in the face of a big threat from India’s hegemonic designs in the region. 36 India blames China for
disturbing strategic balance in the region by supporting and providing Pakistan with
defence and strategic nuclear technology assistance.
As far the Central Asian region is concerned, there has never been a kind of
discriminatory policy from that region towards Pakistan and India. In other words, the
Central Asian States keep their relations with Pakistan and India at almost equal
footing. But still the increasing importance of India in view of her rising economic
power and potential market cannot be ignored. 37 So is the case with Iran and
Afghanistan in which both Pakistan and India want to create a supportive approach to
the exclusion of each other. In Afghanistan, the Indian policies are seen by Pakistan
with greater suspicions and vice versa. The increasing involvement of India in
35 . Joyce Battle. India and Pakistan: On the Nuclear Threshold, National Security Archive , Electronic Briefing, Book No. 6, Washington D.C: The Gelman Library, George Washington University, Online accessed on August 21, 2011, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/index.html 36 . Adnan Rehmat. Sky Wars: Pakistan, India and China, Dawn, Karachi (Pakistan), May 24, 2011. 37 . Yevgeny Bendersky. India as a Rising Power, Asia Times Online , Hong Kong, August 21, 2004. See Online http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FH21Df04.html 169
Afghanistan can put Pakistan at critical end by closing Pakistan’s chance to have an access to Central Asia. A flux in the relations with Afghanistan has deprived both
Pakistan and India to work for their interests and to become significant players in the international economic market. Figure 4.2 shows the relationship pattern of other countries with Pakistan and India.
Figure 4.2: Relationship Pattern of other Countries with Pakistan and India
Source: Report of the Strategic Foresight Group (2010), New Delhi: SFG, pp. 56-7.
170
4.2.3.4. Diplomatic Tensions
The diplomatic relations between Pakistan and India have also witnessed tensions over the years. The ups and downs in their relationship had its immediate impact on the diplomats who have been victims of aggression and ill-treatment most of the times.
Many a times the diplomatic staff in both the countries have complained of physical harassment, involvement in each other’s secret official matters e.g. telephone lines disconnections and records tapping, unlawful surveillance activities and many others. 38
And irony of the fact is that these complaints by one nation are followed by complaints
and expulsion of the diplomatic staff in the rival country. Ever since independence in
1947, these counter accusations and diplomatic disquiet have led to complete
diplomatic deadlock during periods of high tension.39
Though Pakistan and India signed the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(1961) and they also signed another Covenant on Bilateral Code of Conduct for
Treatment of Diplomatic Personnel in India and Pakistan in 1992 under which both the
countries are bound by the diplomatic rules and regulations but there have still been
serious cases of violation since the signing of the covenant. 40 These unhealthy practices in the diplomatic domain have, no doubt, complicated the visa seeking by those desiring to make visits for different purposes. This diplomatic tension has, for years, kept the temperatures at high levels and thus preventing the two countries to follow the path of peace and cooperation.
38 . Cost of Conflict: India and Pakistan, A Report of the Strategic Foresight Group , New Delhi: Strategic Foresight Group, 2004, pp. 6-7. 39 . Ahmad K. Majidya. A Reality Check on India, Pakistan, The Diplomat , Tokyo, February 17, 2011. 40 . Sushant Sareen. Restructuring the Dialogue Process with Pakistan, IDSA Comment , New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, July 15, 2010, pp. 1-3. 171
4.2.3.5. Dual Policies of International Community
Pakistan−India adversarial relations have also affected the policies of the international community and they have adopted a dual approach towards this important region. On the one hand, Pakistan and India are involved in the unabated pursuit of weapons with
India trying to implement her hegemonic designs and Pakistan with the aim to keep balance in the region. These aims of the two nuclear neighbors have triggered an arms race in the region and big powers are making money out of this madness. The US interest in this region has brought to the forefront many defence treaties with Pakistan like the sale of F-16 Fighter Jets and supply of advanced military equipments. 41
Similarly, India has also obtained modern cutting edge military technology from the
US from time to time.
India’s good relations with Israel also culminated in the latter’s provision of defence
equipments and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 42 while Pakistan saw
China as her trustworthy friend and both Pakistan and China have jointly coordinated
their efforts in the preparation of various defence equipments. While Pakistan
purchased FT-2000 Surface to Air Missiles (also known as AWACS Killers) in 2003.
India, on the other hand, purchased AWACS from Israel and Russia. 43 India and
Pakistan were ranked as tenth and twenty eight respectively in terms of bigger military and defence expenditures during 2009-2010. 44 The desire of both Pakistan and India to
41 . Gurmeet Kanwal. US Arms Sales are propping up Pakistan as a Regional Challenger, IDSA Policy Brief , New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, July 15, 2010, pp. 15-18. 42 . Harsh V. Pant. India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints, The Middle East Review of International Affairs , Herzliya (Isreal): Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary University, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2004, pp. 126-129. 43 . Bulbul Singh. Pakistan Seeks FT 2000 Missiles to Counter Indian Warning System , Aerospace Daily, Lausanne: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, October 28, 2003, pp. 2-4. 44 . Military Expenditure, SIPRI Yearbook 2010 , Washington D.C: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Chapter 5, http://www.sipri.org. Online accessed on October 23, 2010. 172 be militarily strong against each other has given an opportunity to the international powers to exploit their rivalry and to sell their arms in the name of regional peace while, in fact, adding more danger to the security and peace of the region.
Britain, France and Russia are also involved in fueling the conflict between Pakistan and India. Ironically, these major powers are triggering a race of armament in the region and when tension reaches to the peak between the two rivals, the international community uses the strong diplomatic channels to calm down the temperature tactfully avoiding the reaction against their heavy defence sales to these South Asian neighbors.
The Pakistan−India hostility has given a good opportunity to the international weapon manufacturers for the promotion of their economic interests. Had the two countries understood the importance of peaceful co-existence, there would have never been an arms race in the resource constrained region of South Asia.
4.2.3.6. Prisoners of Hostility
A negative impact of the controversial relations between Pakistan and India has been that the common people particularly the detainees in each other’s countries have undergone a complicated situation. These people are arrested because of the border violations such as the fishermen and the innocent residents of border areas who cross the borders without any awareness of the fact that they have committed an offence. 45
Similarly, many suffer in jails for overstaying their visa allowance for which they could
otherwise, be given the punishment of deportation or fine accordingly. But for minor
offences, heavy punishments are given to these innocent offenders which lead towards
their imprisonments. Any legal support or access to the consulates is not provided to
45 . Yasmin Khan. The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007, p. 112. 173 them for years. The innocent detainees for whom their families wait to return at the earliest possible time, are kept behind the bar for indefinite period. These unfortunate people instead become an instrument in the hands of rival countries for taking revenge of the hostilities. 46 The home countries are often kept unaware of the detainees and even though they complete their sentences, the home countries are not informed in time.
There have been cases where the home country herself showed no interest or concern in taking the prisoners back because they denied detainees to be their nationals.
Confirmation of nationalities and other cumbersome procedures take so much time that the prisoners, in each other’s countries, bide their time in jails hoping for their repatriation. This diplomatic manipulation of the release of the prisoners has, for years, been a regular phenomenon. No doubt, there are those criminals who are caught red handed for committing offences like spying or the smuggling but their percentage is very low as compared to those who are caught for minor offences.
Although Pakistan and India have signed the Geneva Convention for the respect of human rights, yet there are thousands of cases of human rights violation in both the countries. Ironically, the release of detainees in each other’s countries is given the name of goodwill and the regular responsibility of legal deport and fine procedures is put in dark. 47 It is quite good that the non-government organizations, human rights activists
and various other platforms in Pakistan and India raise their voices against the human
rights violation from time to time and it is these active forums which have kept the truth
alive and have kept the people on both sides aware of the ground realities. One of the
most important diplomatic dilemmas of Pakistan and India is the absence of an
46 . Detained Fishermen: Trapped in a Political Game between Pakistan and India, The PILER Report, Karachi: Pakistan Institute of Labor, Education and Research (PILER), 2010, pp. 1-7. 47 . Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), January 17, 2010. 174 extradition treaty which is very much essential for a sensitive and long border between the two countries and also because the large border is easily vulnerable to militants, smugglers, spies and various other criminals. 48 Similarly, lax on the part of both
governments to fight the evil and conspiring forces and to work for economic
development has also kept them to continue with the same hostile approach.
Unfortunately, Pakistan and India since independence never trusted each other’s
diplomatic initiatives and instead of developing positive thinking, they have always
cultivated bad intentions about each other. The negative impact of their mutual non-
cooperation has been that the regional and international strong and developing blocks
have not paid any attention to these neighbors. Moreover, many big powers have also
started to interfere in the internal matters of both countries because of the weakness to
resolve their disputes mutually and peacefully.
4.2.4. Economic Loses
One of the most important consequences of the hostile Pakistan−India relationship is
that they have suffered economically and have not been able to benefit from each
other’s economic potentials since independence. Their mistrust and suspicious outlook
towards each other have hampered any positive development in bilateral trade and
investment. Despite geographical contiguity and easy potential market access, both
Pakistan and India have lagged behind in the economic cooperation and the absence of
their joint economic cooperation has kept the region far behind in the process of
development. 49 That is the reason that neither of them counts the other among the top
48 . The News , Islamabad (Pakistan), December 25, 2009. 49 . Douglass C. North. Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 51. 175 ten trade partners. 50 Their feelings of revenge and avenge have taken them to the point
where huge defence expenditures have deprived the common people of the basic
necessities of life. In both the countries, majority of the people are poor who live below
the subsistence level and the increasing threat perception has put any developmental
trend at the laxing end. 51 All efforts to further economic and trade relations between
Pakistan and India have not gained any momentum because of the problematic mutual relations.
4.2.4.1. Absence of Joint Ventures
The absence of joint ventures between Pakistan and India has also affected their economic development. Although both Pakistan and India compete in the international market for their goods, yet there are many such areas in which their joint cooperation can benefit them a lot and being resourceful and geographically aligned, their joint venture projects can decrease their costs and result in goods more efficient and less expensive for both. 52 No doubt, the human and material resources of both the countries
can jointly produce cost effective products at comparatively low prices which would be
a good omen for the economic development of the whole region.
There is no dearth of the fields in which Pakistan and India can coordinate and develop
relations. The increasing problem of energy shortage can very efficiently be controlled
with the hydropower projects launched by Pakistan and India together. The regional,
environmental and water management issues can also be easily attended to with
50 . Zulfiqar Khan. India−Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry: Perceptions, Misperceptions and Mutual Deterrence, IPRI Report, Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), January 2005. 51 . Ibid., 52 . Aditya Pandey. South Asia Polity, Literacy & Conflict Resolution, New Delhi: Isha Books, 2005, p. 200. 176 supportive stance of both. 53 The water management joint cooperation would effectively
eliminate the problems of electricity, irrigational backwardness, flood disasters etc.
4.2.4.2. Loss of Speedy Economic Growth
The rivalry between Pakistan and India for years has taken a heavy lot of the economic
development in both the countries. Their centric policies towards each other have
strengthened the defence sectors so much that they now lack the financial resources to
develop their economies. 54 The mad race for weapons and wrong perceptions about each other has given a good opportunity to other countries to interfere in their affairs.
The depressing figures of economic growth in Pakistan with the exception of few periods and rising poverty in India are not giving any prospective future for the two neighbours. The matter of the fact is that their tough stands on various issues, inflexible postures in negotiations, wrong intentions about each other and lack of trust have marred not only the internal but also the combined progress and cooperation between the two countries. Today, Pakistan is lagging behind many other developing countries of South Asia which, at times, were assisted by Pakistani economists like Bangladesh.
The growth figures in Bangladesh are giving a good omen for better economic future.
Similarly in India, the hugely populated country is facing the problem of intense poverty. The question is not very difficult to answer that lack of friendly interaction has kept the two countries apart from the economic well- being of the common people.
No doubt, the economic growth and development in both Pakistan and India needs political stability, exploitation of human and material resources, good neighborly
53 . Rizwan Zeb and Suba Chandran. Indo−Pak Conflicts: Ripe to Resolve, RCSS Policy Studies, Columbo: Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Paper No. 34, 2005, p. 23. 54 . From Interview with Dr. Muhammad Khan, Chairman, Department of International Relations, National Defence University on July 20, 2012. 177 relations, a boost in investments, an attentive policy towards developmental expenditure, social and educational reforms, dealing with the problem of corruption and an efficient crime control. All these steps in one way or the other are linked with cooperative and joint efforts otherwise the status quo will continue where one always blames the other for all the internal and regional ills. For the provision of undivided attention to all the internal matters i.e. socio-economic and political, Pakistan and India must develop good and cooperative relations with each other which would improve their regional and international standing as well as would cure many domestic problems.
4.2.4.3. Impact on Regional Economic Cooperation
A region’s economic conditions are always reflective of the economic policies of the region concerned as well as their mutual cooperation in a practical way. The adversarial relationship between Pakistan and India has adversely affected the regional trade. The regional cooperation could have developed the human and material resources of the whole region, had Pakistan and India been moving ahead with peaceful minds. But regretfully, the economic integration of South Asia still remains a dream.
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) which was established in 1985 to further the regional cooperation in socio-economic fields, could achieve but marginal results due to the existence of various disputes in South Asia which have hampered the development of this important organization. 55 The member countries of SAARC (other than Pakistan and India) have been unhappy with the hostile
55 . Non-Traditional and Human Security in South Asia, Collection of papers presented at an international seminar , jointly organized by the Institute of Regional Studies and National Commission for Human Development, Islamabad, October 31-November 1, 2006, pp. 233-34. 178 attitude of the two nuclear members of the organization. Due to the disharmonious relations of the two, SAARC could not do that much as was expected. 56
There is no denying the fact that India is having disputes not only with Pakistan but
also with other regional countries which has not let any positive economic development
in the region. Pakistan and India being the prominent and important countries of South
Asia are much in need of resolving their conflicts for streamlining the process of peace
and coordination in the region. 57 Various other agreements have been signed from time
to time to boost regional economy like South Asian Free Trade Association (SAFTA)
and South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) but nothing outstanding could
be achieved under these agreements. Compared to the intra-regional trade in other
blocks like Europe, North America, East Asia, the percentage of South Asian intra-
regional trade is very low. 58 Figure 4.3 shows the intra-regional trade as a percentage of total exports of each block.
The reason for the low percentage is well known to the world. Despite understanding the changes in the geo-political and economic scenario in the world, Pakistan and India still continue with the same odd basis of thinking to dominate each other and that too with the defence deterrence.
56 . From Interview with Prof. Dr. Taj Moharram Khan, Chairman, Department of History, University of Peshawar on June 14, 2012. 57 . Vali Nasr. “National Identities and the India−Pakistan”, in T. V. Paul (Ed.), The India−Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 178-201. 58 . Ernst B. Haas. “International Integration: The European and Universal Process ”, in Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston (Eds.), Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 1-31. 179
Figure 4.3: Intra-Regional Trade as a Percentage of Total Export of Each Block (2002)
Source: Intra-Trade of Trade Groups as Percentage of Total Exports of Each Trade Grouping, UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2002. See online http: //www.Unctad.org/Template/wab flyer.asp?IntltemlD=2077&lang=1
It needs to be clear to both the countries that the theory of perceptions and military threats has gone obsolete. Now is the time for economic integration and to move ahead with wider dimensions to enlarge the economies and attract the international attention. 59
The social and economic cooperation of the regional countries in the fields such as
telecommunication, environment, energy, water management, rail and road links and
even the joint currency system can also be developed on the pattern of other developed
regions of the world. 60 That would surely make South Asia one of the most attractive sites for investments and a developed zone just after China’s rising economy.
59 . Faisal Bari and Ali Cheema. Towards a Common Investment Strategy for South Asia, Report submitted to the South Asia Centre for Policy Studies (SACEPS) , Dhaka: South Asia Centre for Policy Studies (SACEPS), May 2003. 60 . This proposal was made by H. E. Mr. Manishanker Iyer during his keynote address at the SACEPS Seminar on Regional Cooperation in South Asia at New Delhi on August 31, 2004. 180
4.2.4.4. Depressing Bilateral Trade
The various consequences of Pakistan−India hostile relations are, no doubt, a great horror for the future of the region and loss of bilateral trade is one of those consequences of this old rivalry which does not augur well for the future scenario. The strong regions of the world like Europe and East Asia have developed their economies by developing mutual trade and economic cooperation which always costs less and the products are more convenient and cheap to the people of the regional countries. Pakistan−India mutual trade is only one percent of their total global trade. 61 The lack of trade between
Pakistan and India has greatly affected the internal economic strength of the two countries. The other regional countries too cannot extend their economic support to each other because of the obstacles created by the hardliners in Pakistan and India. The inflexibility and the mistrust have created a big economic vacuum in South Asia which, despite enormous potential, could not be integrated economically because of the ill- wills of rival neighbors. 62 This pattern of relationship and bilateral economic approach
has been continuing since independence (1947) and has given an opportunity to the
third parties to interfere in the affairs of the two neighbors while exploiting their
resources for their own interests. 63 This unfriendly attitude towards serious issues has
made them a mockery for the world. Figure 4.4 shows Pakistan−India bilateral trade as
a proportion of Pakistan’s total global trade during 1950- 2001.
61 . S. Akbar Zaidi. Pakistan’s Development Options: Does India Matter At All, New Delhi: Deterrence Theory and South Asia Workshop, August 26-27, 2003. 62 . S.M. Naseem. Have We Really Broken the Begging Bowl?, Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), November 29, 2004. 63 . Rifaat Hussain. The India−Pakistan Peace Process, Defense & Security Analysis , New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Vol. 22, No. 4, 2006, p. 409. 181
Figure 4.4: Pakistan−India Bilateral Trade Level as a Proportion of Pakistan’s Total Global Trade (In Percentage)
Source: S. Mansoob Murshed, The Consequences of not loving thy Neighbour as thyself: Trade, Democracy and Military Expenditure (Explanations underlying India−Pakistan Rivalry), The Hague (Holland): Institute of Social Studies, June 4, 2007, pp. 67.
The depressing figures of bilateral trade between Pakistan and India since the initial years of independence and the fall in the trade levels with the passage of time clearly shows a disappointing outlook of both in the near future. As shown in the figure 4.4, the trade level after independence between the two states was quite good but then it started dropping down particularly after the 1965 war and then it improved a bit but not as much high as was in the first decade of independence. India’s trade balance with
Pakistan during 2001-2010 is displayed in table 4.4. The trade between Pakistan and
India does not only take place through official level which is very low and faces great problems of quotas and tariffs, but there are also indirect or unofficial channels which are utilized through third world countries.
182
Table 4.4: India’s Trade Balance with Pakistan (US $ million)
Source: Trade Map, Geneva: International Trade Centre, 2012
Table 4.5: India’s Top Ten Exports to Pakistan (US $ million)
Source: Trade Map, Geneva: International Trade Centre, 2012.
Table 4.6: India’s Top Ten Import from Pakistan (US $ million)
Source: Trade Map, Geneva: International Trade Centre, 2012. 183
The lack of official trade between Pakistan and India has given a good opportunity to the black marketeers in both the countries to increase their illegal business. The films, dramas, articles of consumption are sold in black in both the countries to make money.
Even the cricket matches often become big source of profit for the illegal channels of trade. Had Pakistan and India logically understood enormous demerits of their hostility, these huge damages to their economies could have been averted very easily. The illegal channels of trade are those which are used by the smugglers and profiteers. The great volume of illegal trade surely gives an indication of the fact that there is huge potential of bilateral trade between the two countries. Similarly, the unofficial trade which is mostly carried out through the United Arab Emirates (UAE) can be overtaken directly by the two neighbours. No doubt, the cross border trade cooperation between Pakistan and India can decrease the chances of illegal trade as well as the heavy cost of unofficial channels would benefit the treasury resources of both the countries. The trade barriers between Pakistan and India are both formal like the tariff and non-tariff problems and informal barriers which contain rent, transport and other procedural matters along with custom duties, visa difficulties and payment complications. These problems never allowed the two countries to come closer in the economic field. For improving bilateral trade, one of the most important requirements is that both the countries should develop their infrastructure on modern lines and that is possible only when the political will works strongly on both sides. India’s top ten exports to Pakistan and India’s top ten imports from Pakistan are both shown in table 4.5 and 4.6 respectivley.
There are many potential areas in which Pakistan and India can cooperate and can develop their bilateral trade like agricultural products, IT, pharmaceuticals, energy and many others which can create good export markets with value added and cost effective products for both Pakistan and India. Moreover, this bilateral trade would give 184 enormous amount of financial benefit to both the governments which has not yet been possible because of the unofficial trade channels. The transit trade would open the avenues of extending their cooperation with other geographically close regions like the
Central Asia and the East Asia.
4.2.4.5. Loss of Potential Energy Cooperation
Another damage which has been done to the economic set up of both the countries and the region is the loss of energy markets in each other’s countries which could be utilized for fulfilling the growing future energy needs of both Pakistan and India. They have lost the most beneficial and convenient channel to become strong in the energy sector which is the rising need and future survival of each and every country of the globe in the near future. 64 There is no denying the fact that the South Asia is a resourceful region
with greater potential to develop next to Europe or any other developed region of the
world but unfortunately the disputes between the two countries have ruined the
powerful energy structure of this region. 65 Their enmity for years has become very
expensive for them, damaging their image in the world as well as weakening their
internal economic structures.
With the growing demands for energy, both Pakistan and India can cooperate in
importing natural gas from the energy rich region of Central Asia and Iran instead of
setting up their independent pipelines. A joint pipeline in this connection extending
from Pakistan to India would benefit them a lot in terms of costs and integrating them
64 . Abid Qamar. Trade between India and Pakistan: Potential Items and the MFN Status, SBP Research Bulletin , Karachi, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005. See online www.sbp.org.pk. 65 . M. Nasrullah Mirza. Economic Cooperation between Pakistan and India: Need, Problems and Prospects, ACDIS Occasional Paper , Urbana-Champaign: Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS), University of Illinois, USA, November 2005, pp. 7-9, See online http://acdis.illinois.edu. 185 with other regions. The difficulties in transit trade rights have hampered any positive progress in the energy sector for years. The fears infested in both the countries from each other have marred their direct approach for resolving the trade matters. India fears
Pakistan’s non-security stances regarding pipelines and in the same way for Pakistan, it is very difficult to trust the Indian promising gestures.
Water management has always been a big disputing issue between Pakistan and India and both are agricultural economies. Despite various rounds of talks and agreements, the violations have been seen on various occasions from the Indian side. The lack of cooperation on this issue has left the two countries to fall apart from any cooperation in the hydropower. The Indus Basin rivers are a big source of Pakistan’s agricultural development and irrigation depends heavily on this channel alone and on the other side, the Northern areas of India also depend on the same Indus Basin. Joint hydropower projects in the Indus Basin can lower the level of water management problems for both
Pakistan and India and can benefit them for centuries because this kind of cooperative program would not only fulfill the household needs but also the irrigational purpose would meet the desired end. Furthermore, the risks of floods in Pakistan every year could also be contained by taking up this logical step which has been avoided particularly by India from time to time. The setting of a Joint Electric Grid System would be a better option to transmit electricity on inter-state basis. The expensive sources of energy are solar and wind energy which, though requires a heavy cost to be established, once established would create opportunities, for generating high revenues and proving greater benefits as well. No doubt, Pakistan and India are not so developed technologically but India has, for the last few years, developed a good base in the energy sector. In the fields of solar and wind energy, the cooperation between Pakistan and
India is almost negligible which can be increased only by demonstrating willingness to 186 continue with dialogue and implementing the joint projects. Pakistan can, no doubt, take benefits from the Indian energy sector.
Analyzing the economic consequences of Pakistan−India hostile relationship, it can be arguably stated that negative approach and non-cooperative stance has not given them anything except fragile economies, regional weak position, deteriorating image and closed doors 66 which, otherwise, could provide a direction for strong competition in the global markets provided Pakistan and India come out of their old hostilities and adopt a positive approach towards the issues and problems between them. The economic cooperation is lagging behind because of the hostile relations between Pakistan and
India and the conflict continues because there is no cooperation in any field of economy.
Obviously, an environment of trust and harmony cannot be created overnight. In this regard, the role of media is very much important which must highlight the importance of economic interaction because joining hands in the economic field would bring more investments, strong revenues, cost-efficient products, stable growth targets and all these benefits would bring the people of the two countries closer to each other. Ultimately, the attitude of the political leaders can be converted in a more convenient way towards resolving the contentious problems in an apprehensible fashion.
4.2.5. Social and Political Damages
The conflict between Pakistan and India has also been damaging the social and political development of the two countries. The social indicators have not seen any major improvement since long and that is the direct consequence of huge defence expenditures. Similarly, in the political arena negative forces have come to occupy the
66 . From Interview with Dr. Zohaib Hayat, Department of International Relations, Preston University, Islamabad, May 24, 2012. 187 scene with their selfish interests not letting any further development to take place in peace related efforts. 67 The social and political consequences of the Pakistan−India conflict are high enough to engulf the very existence of humanity in the whole region.
Rising poverty, unemployment, negative social trends, illiteracy etc are all the results of lack of focus on the developmental projects in both the countries.
The hostility between Pakistan and India is a unique example of conflicts which, if tried with peaceful initiatives by both the rivals, can lead towards enormous regional progress but still the negative mindset and perceptions even in the Twenty First Century shape their policies towards each other. These negative perceptions have damaged the basic living standards of the common man in Pakistan and India who are living below poverty line facing hard circumstances.
The various social and political impacts of Pakistan−India animosity can be described as under:
4.2.5.1. Negative Transformation of the Society
One of the biggest social impacts of rival approaches towards each other has been that the populations in both the countries have developed negative trends in their social lives like intolerance and negative thinking. 68 The hostility for the last many decades has created a hate among the people of both the countries and intolerant behavior is witnessed many a times. The pre-partition hostilities and the resultant mistrust, along with very less efforts to engage in result-oriented dialogues, has kept the people and the governments fall apart and societies never got the opportunity to understand each
67 . Siddique Agha. Power, Perks, Prestige and Privileges: Military’s Economic Activities in Pakistan, The International Conference on Soldiers in Business , Bonn, October 17-19, 2000. 68 . Maya Chadda. Ethnicity, Security and Separatism in India, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 49-76. 188 other’s culture and social approaches. 69 There is no doubt that the deprived poor population in both the countries have been psychologically so much tarnished that their dissatisfaction with the social set up and social underdevelopment has developed intolerance towards each other. It is very much important to note that wherever social indictors show positive heights with social progress rising, in those societies the people’s attitude experiences a flexible outlook which is lacking in Pakistan and India. 70
The rising defence spending for years has increased the ratio of crimes because socially
underdeveloped countries witness decreasing level of income formation sources which
directly increases the crimes level in the societies because the poor and uneducated
segments of societies can easily be motivated towards wrong doings. And this
backwardness becomes a fertile ground for militancy and terrorism. We see the same
scenario developing in Pakistan and India overtime. Despite understanding the extreme
level of damage done to social structures in both the countries, there has been but a
marginal move towards changing the negative into positive. 71
The hostility has also been exploited by the fundamentalist and extremist elements in
Pakistan and India. In the name of religion, these elements have often been seen
damaging the roadway to peace. The hardline religious elements in India and the
extremist tendencies in Pakistan have become a big hurdle in the way of social
cohesiveness of both the countries. 72 Time and again, anti-Muslim violence in different
states of India has been seen and in reaction to that Pakistan also faces the same
69 . Maria Saifuddin Effendi. Pakistan−India Peace Process: Summits in Focus (1999-2005), Regional Studies , Peshawar: Institute of Regional Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, Summer 2006, p. 76. 70 . Ibid., p. 78. 71 . Douglass C. North. Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 51. 72 . Rizwan Zeb and Suba Chandran. Indo−Pak Conflicts: Ripe to Resolve, RCSS Policy Studies , Columbo: Regional Center for Strategic Studies, No. 34, 2005, p. 23. 189 fundamentalist threat showing hatred towards the Indian violent measures. Communal killings and the religious hatred towards each other can never be a good gesture for developing good relations between Pakistan and India. The prolonged animosity has not only affected Pakistan and India in terms of development and prosperity but also polarization of societies is an evident phenomenon.73 The feelings of extreme patriotism rather jingoism have developed hate to hate relationship suppressing same voices on both sides.
Unless and until the governments and people on both sides do not understand the importance of peace and the disastrous impacts of mutual tensions, the people can never hope for prosperity and the South Asia can never come out of this dirty marsh of hostility. 74
4.2.5.2. Hardline Political Approaches
One of the political impacts of hostility between Pakistan and India has been an inflexible stand of the governments from both sides. Their obsessed behavior and the mistrust have not let any positive progress to take place. Rather the ‘no war no peace’ situation on both sides of the borders has hardened the attitude of politicians. The dialogues and peace steps launched from time to time never saw any fertile ground for long-term prosperity of both the countries. 75 The hardline politicians and the jingoistic
elements tend to aggravate the issues so greatly that the age-old hate relationship has
73 . Asthana Vanadana and Ashok C. Shulkla. Security in South Asia: Trends and Directions, New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporations, 2004, p. 269. 74 . Mahmud Ali Durrani. India and Pakistan: The Cost of Conflict, The Benefits of Peace, Washington D.C: The John Hopkins University Press, 2000, p. 56. 75 . Ali Ahmed. Engaging a Reluctant Pakistan, IPCS Research Paper , New Delhi: The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Paper No. 2789, January 26, 2009. 190 not been converted into love-love relationship. It is the cause and consequence of rivalry which has viciously continued to overcome the relationship.
The lack of political cooperation on both sides has hampered the people to people contacts. Just after independence, the non-cooperation between the Congress leaders and the Muslim League led towards further closing the avenues for peaceful co- existence. The pre-partition hatred together with the hard realities of post-partition and the resulting conspiracies for breaking Pakistan once again showed the negative mind and non-acceptability of Pakistan by the Indian leaders. 76 The later difficulties created by the Indian leaders for damaging the developmental and agricultural base of Pakistan further damaged the element of trust which, in turn, obstructed the hope for peaceful resolution of all the outstanding disputes between the two countries. The hardline Hindu leaders, with their inflexible stance and past perceptions, made the behavior of Pakistani leadership stern and inflexible. 77 In fact, suspicious outlooks for each other’s policies
and approaches and no faith in the intentions of the rival side have blocked the way
forward for peace. Despite the emphasis by the international community to resolve the
conflicts and the need of the regional progress, both sides still continue with the same
old patterns of hostility. Just table discussions and following the age-old political
dealings, Pakistani and Indian leaderships have deceived each other for years
apparently showing the resolve to move ahead and continuing with the same pattern of
relationship as in the pre-partition period. 78 Non-cooperative stances since
76 . David Gilmartin. Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative, The Journal of Asian Studies , New York: Association of Asian Studies, Vol. 57, No. 4, November 1998, pp. 1068- 95. 77 . Virinder S. Kalra and Navtej K. Prewal. “The Strut of the Peacocks: Partition, Travel and the Indo−Pak Border” , in Raminder Kaur and John Hutnyk (Eds.), Travel Worlds: Journeys in Contemporary Cultural Politics , London: Zed Press, 1999, pp. 54-67. 78 . G. Parthsarthy. “India−Pakistan Relations” , in Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (Eds.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities , New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007, p. 629. 191 independence and lack of the people to people contacts have further hardened the mindset of the authorities on both sides and they have reached to the point where they are even not ready to look at each other with positive gesture and are involved in the blame game. This rivalry has created a very dangerous environment in the region where any tragic event from one side against the other may possibly lead towards a full- fledged war. The possibility of these wars could not be avoided in the past and pre-war and post-war scenarios witnessed serious socio-economic and political consequences for both. Being nuclear powers, the possibility of future war can be more destructive if the two countries continue with the same mischievous intentions.
4.2.5.3. Less People to People Contacts / Cultural Relations
One of the socio-political consequences of Pakistan−India age-old hostility has been that people from one side have faced serious hurdles in the way of keeping contact with people across the border. For genuine progress, people can play very significant role in bringing the hostile neighbors closer and, no doubt, at the level of common man in
Pakistan and India, there is a strong desire for increased interaction among the people.
Unfortunately, the political initiatives and the resultant hard approaches have closed the ways to meet their relatives and have faced many visa related problems in reaching the other side of the borders. When the Shimla Agreement was signed in 1972, 79 there was a provision to maintain bilateral people to people contacts and to give more importance to the cultural cooperation to streamline the peaceful negotiations. Despite all such promises and commitments, very little could be done in that regard. Moreover, a
79 . Text of Shimla Agreement provided in the Appendix--II. 192 cultural agreement was also signed between the two in 1988 but those exchanges have remained minimal since then. 80
For the progress and prosperity of South Asia, it is very important to open the ways for people to come closer and to create greater understanding among themselves. 81
Unfortunately, Pakistan and India have faced a serious dilemma of so-called non-
beneficial hostile relations keeping the people on both sides far apart. The inflexible
stances of the governments in Pakistan and India kept the visa procedures much
cumbersome and even after visas are permitted, both sides put heavy restrictions on the
movement of visiting citizens. The lack of cultural contacts between Pakistan and India
kept their unique culture hidden for decades. The artists, students and professional
community in both the countries could develop a fraternal ground for peaceful relations
while economically and socially benefitting from such activities. But the hard realities
of the past still haunt the extremist elements on both sides and despite understanding
the importance of cooperation, they have not been able to go for the change of behaviors
towards each other. This lack of people to people contacts also did not bring any change
in the attitudes of the political leadership and the vicious circle continues.
4.2.5.4. Illiteracy, Poverty and Unemployment
Education, employment opportunities and better standards of life are the basis of a
strong and stable future of any state. Heavy defence spending in Pakistan and India to
maintain the security has diverted the developmental funds from the social sector since
1947. 82 The rising unemployment and illiteracy have marred the economic
80 . G. Parthsarthy. “India−Pakistan Relations” , in Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (Eds.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007, p. 629. 81 . More Needs To Be Done: Manmohan Singh, The News , Islamabad/Rawalpindi (Pakistan), December 12, 2008. 82 . Mubarak Ali. On Indo−Pak Relations, Pakistan Today , Islamabad (Pakistan), August 21, 2011. 193 development of the two. The genuine progress of any nation is measured in terms of socio-economic development which, in the case of Pakistan and India, has not seen any persistent rise. Illiteracy, poverty and unemployment are increasing instead of being curtailed. 83 Military expenditures and the threat perception eat away major portion of the budget every year in both the countries. About 58.7 million population in Pakistan 84
and 148 million in India 85 live in the state of abject poverty and the existing tensions have further marred the situation to an extreme. 86 It is quite absurd that Pakistan and
India are always ready to buy an aircraft worth eighty million dollars but cannot find an appropriate chunk of the funds to educate the masses and to alleviate the poverty.
It is this poverty and unemployment which induce the young people to involve in militant and extremist activities because the downtrodden and deprived people in depressing economic circumstances can go to any extreme and it is evident from the rising crimes rate in Pakistan and India. 87 More than half of Pakistan’s population is
consisted of young people having the age of twenty five .88 The Lack of social development opportunities for them means waste of human resource and this deprived human resource could be a big difficulty for the government to manage in future.
Almost same is the case with India which is one of those countries where poverty is rising with each passing day. No doubt, there is development in many sectors but the
83 . Akmal Hussain. Institutions, Economic Structure and Poverty in Pakistan, South Asia Economic Journal , New Delhi: SAGE Publications, Vol. 5, No. 1, January-June, 2004. 84 . Anwer Sumra. SDPI Report: 58.7m Pakistanis living below Poverty Line, The Express Ttribune, Karachi (Pakistan), February 25, 2014. 85 . Ravi S. Jha. Redefining poverty: what does it mean to be poor in India? , The Guardian, London (UK), August 23, 2013. 86 . Dawood Jan and Philip R. Eberle. Absolute Poverty in Pakistan: Where are the Poor Concentrated?, Sarhad Journal , Peshawar: The University of Agriculture, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2009, p. 322. See online http://www. aup.edu.pk/sj_ pdf. 87 . Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. South Asia and Afghanistan: The Robust India−Pakistan Rivalry, PRIO Project Paper on ‘Afghanistan in a Neighbourhood Perspective’ , Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), No. 2, 2011. 88 . United Nations and the Youth (United Nations Development Program) , New York: Youth in Pakistan Statistics, United Nations Popultation Fund (UNFPA), 1997, See online http://undp.org.pk/un dp 194 lack of sufficient developmental funds has played a havoc with their socio-economic development. Table 4.7 shows basic indicators of economy in Pakistan and India.
Table 4.7: Pakistan and India: Basic Indicators
Variables Pakistan India Population in Million 180 1200 (July 2009) Population in World Ranking 6th 2nd Population below poverty line 24 25 (Percent) 2007 estimates Military Expenditure 3 2.5 (Percent of GDP) Literacy Rate (Percent) 49.9 61 Education Expenditure 2.6 3.2 (Percent of GDP)
Source: CIA, World Fact Book http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-World-actbo okgoes/pk. htm, accessed on January 2, 2010.
The level of illiteracy has not improved much in both Pakistan and India. In fact, both the countries have risked their real development at the cost of security and military strength. 89 Their images and perceptions have shaped their foreign policies towards
each other and the result is that the people, on both sides, are suffering in terms of social
and political development. Gone are the days of defence capability and expansionist
tendencies in international relations. Now the strength of a nation is measured in terms
of social indicators. The disappointing figures of social and political progress have
clearly shown the strength and weaknesses of South Asia. Both Pakistan and India have
to accept the changing realities and to be apprehensive of the fact that they cannot
continue with the hostile outlook for long. They cannot borrow and beg to show their
so called strength to each other. They must stop thinking to go to war and must fight
89 . Edward Dommen and Alfred Maizels. The Military Burden in Developing Countries, The Journal of Modern African Studies , London: Cambridge University Press, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1988, pp. 377-401. 195 their social and economic ills together. 90 It has never been a difficult matter to decide that whether they need hospitals or artillery, schools or bunkers, breads or guns? The answer is very easy and understandable in the civilized sense of the word.
4.2.5.5. Lack of Media Flow across Borders
The politically motivated hard approaches taken in Pakistan and India towards each other have definitely impacted the media across the borders. The lack of media flow has led towards the un-shown realities to the people on both sides. The lack of understanding and inflexible stances continued because of no reliable information channels and media communication between Pakistan and India. 91
In the world of today, media has become one of the powerful elements of the strength of a nation but obsessive behaviors of media in both the countries never created a pleasant environment for people to forget the hard realities of the past and, hence, the so-called past perceptions have shaped their mindsets. 92
There is no doubt that media is the institution which, if allowed to work honestly and
neutrally, can bring the truth and ground realities to the limelight and analyze the issues
logically but the dilemma with Pakistani and Indian media is that it has also become
part of the political domain. 93 The media in both the countries also follow the political sayings and the prejudiced policies of the governments all the time. They talk of peace and prospects for cooperative relationship when the governments are prone for talks and when there are clouds of tension hovering, the media increases those tensions by
90 . Praful Bidwai. Defense spending could spiral out of control, Asia Times Online , Hong Kong, March 4, 2000, See Online http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/BC04Df02.html. 91 . India−Pakistan, Media Restrictions, The News, Islamabad (Pakistan), July 27, 2011. 92 . Ibid. 93 . P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen. Four Crises and a Peace Process , Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2007, p. 154. 196 inflaming the emotions of the people. That is the reason why since independence, there has never been seen an easy flow of media information across the borders. The newspapers, literature and other information materials rarely get a chance to be read in the opposite country. 94 There are hundreds of restrictions over what to read and what to
not in both the countries and the information flows accordingly. Internet sources of
information also face serious obstacles with lack of accessibility. In the absence of such
a powerful source of building interaction, how can Pakistan and India be expected to
go on the way of peace and cooperation when for the last so many decades they have
kept their people apart from understanding each other and blocked the way for the
educated class to see the realities on both sides in the true sense of the word. 95
The tendency to show the negative and hide the positive about each other has inflicted
a heavy damage on both. Any minor news item showing a negative development about
the other captures the front page of the print media and the progress in any sector of the
other is shrewdly avoided due to biased attitudes. 96 The blame game, accusations and throwing dust in each other’s eyes has never been respected in the civilized communities and by adopting these negative trends, the two countries have been violating the ethics of living in the community of nations. Pakistan and India have already made themselves a laughing stock by avoiding opportunities to sit together and work for their own development. Further, the existing trend in the highest informative and communicative source of media has closed the ways for the sane and logical voices
94 . The Media of India and Pakistan are Neither Weapons of War nor Purveyors of Peace, The Telegraph , New Delhi (India), June 2003. 95 . India’s Hostility towards Pakistan, Accessed on August 5, 2011, For Online See http://www. pakistan kakhuda hafiz.com/2010/05/23, India’s hostility-towards-Pakistan/ 96 . Subhash Kapila. “The Role of Indian Media in the Proxy War and Terrorism”, Presentation made by the Author at a Seminar on Role of Media in War and Terrorism, Allahabad (India), July 31-August 1, 2009. 197 to come forward and mend the ills which have haunted the two sides for more than half a century.
4.2.5.6. Internal Security Problems
The internal security of Pakistan and India has also been threatened because of their rival policies. Their counter conspiracies and war-monger behaviors for years have led to the secret involvement of both in each other’s internal affairs. 97 This involvement has disturbed the security situation in Pakistan and India. 98 Being closer to each other
geographically, the need for maintaining high security levels has always been felt. Due
to their hate and obsession with each other, both sides have always blamed each other
for fomenting the secessionist tendencies and thus creating instability in the region. 99
As far as India’s role in the post-independence scenario is concerned, its leadership has
never accepted the existence of Pakistan and there have been evidences of their
involvement in the internal affairs of Pakistan. A clear example of the East Pakistan
episode in 1971 is in place. Similarly in Balochistan, 100 Sindh and the tribal areas, 101
India is accused of involvement. Furthermore, the internal security situation of Pakistan
has also faced serious threat because of the sectarian clashes. India, being a rival
neighbor, has been conspiring to destabilize Pakistan. On the other side, Indian
authorities have been accusing Pakistan of interference in the internal affairs and
97 . Ved Marwah. India’s Internal Security Challenges, Strategic Analysis , New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, Vol. 27, Issue 4, October 2003, pp. 511-12. 98 . The News, Islamabad (Pakistan), June 4, 2008. 99 . T. H. Shah. “Terrorism and Internal Security”, For online see http://www.scribd.com/doc/28229350 / Terrorism-and-Internal-Security-Threats 100 . Solid Evidence of India's Involvement in Balochistan Unrest, The Times of India , New Delhi (India), March 12, 2010. 101 . Qaiser Butt. Foreign Hands: India Suspected of Creating Unrest in FATA, The Express Tribune , Karachi (Pakistan), January 13, 2011. 198 launching extremist and separatist activities in Indian Punjab. 102 The freedom struggle
of Kashmir in many a times been given the name of terrorism by the hardline politicians
in India.
The deteriorating law and order situation, as a result of the security threats, has put the
Pakistan−India relationship in the backburner since partition. Every terrorist activity is
blamed over the other side and the resulting negative consequences block the ways for
negotiations. The selfish political and extremist jingoistic elements on both sides have
tried to derail the process for improvement of relations by exaggerating the security
scenarios. This unabated exercise of blaming each other has led towards internal
security threats to both the countries. No doubt, hostility has not given Pakistan and
India anything except weak socio-economic positions internally and a bad image
internationally.
4.2.5.7. Rise of Authoritarian Governments
One of the consequences of Pakistan−India tension has been the rise of authoritarian
trends in the governments of both the countries. This is true about Pakistan particularly
where military has taken over the control of government many a times. The military
has, over the years, become a powerful institution with its influence on the political
arena. 103 The India’s Pakistan centric policies have created a confidence of the people in the military strength which can be relied upon during times of war and tensions. This fear automatically has given military an upper hand over the affairs of the country for the last many years. The failure of political governments and the rising defence
102 . R. Swaminathan. India’s Internal Security Dimensions, South Asian Analysis Group , New Delhi (India), Paper no. 2629, March 17, 2008. 103 . Robert W. Stern. Democracy and Dictatorship in South Asia: Dominant Classes and Political Outcomes in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001, p. 15. 199 expenditure has made the military stronger and its involvement in almost all state institutions increased with the passage of time. 104 The deteriorating law and order
situation and security threats have, most of the times, led towards curbs on civil liberties
in both the countries.
In India, though no military coup has ever taken place, the political curbs on civil rights
in the face of security threats from the rival neighbor has led towards the deterioration
of the freedom of the common man. 105 The security perceptions have given the reins of power in the hands of authoritative leaders in Pakistan which broke the consistency of political efforts to open the ways of cooperation between the two countries. The hostility between Pakistan and India has also given an opportunity to the vested interests to carry on with the same hostile postures because peace would disturb the status quo which has benefitted many political and military elites on both sides.
4.2.5.8. Consequences for the Unresolved Issue of Kashmir
No doubt, the hostility between Pakistan and India has damaged the interests of both countries but this animosity also increased the sufferings of the Kashmiri people.
Kashmir has been a bone of contention between the two neighbors and one of the main causes of non-cooperative approach by India is her fear of losing Kashmir. 106 Since the days of partition, the issue of Kashmir has not seen any positive development rather increasing violations and cruelty of the Indian forces over the Kashmiri people. In order
104 . Ishrat Husain. Pakistan & Afghanistan: Domestic Pressures and Regional Threats: The Role of Politics in Pakistan's Economy, Journal of International Affairs , New York: Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2009, pp. 1-18. 105 . Christophe Jaffrelot. The Indian-Pakistani Divide, Journal of Foreign Affairs , New York: Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2011, Online: http:// www.foreign affairs.com/articles/67469/ christophe-ja ffrelot/the-indian-pakistani-divide?page=show 106 . Masrook. A. Dar. Negotiations on Kashmir: A Concealed Story, Foreign Policy Journal , Washington D.C: Norwich University, August 5, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy journal .com/2010/ 08/05/negotiations-on-kashmir-a-concealed-story/ 200 to suppress the freedom struggle of Kashmir, their struggle has always been given the name of terrorism by India and Pakistan has always been blamed for supporting the freedom movement of Kashmir. 107 In the cold and hard war between Pakistan and India,
the people of Kashmir have suffered socially, politically and economically. The non-
compromising attitude of both the countries has put the lives and properties of the
innocent people of Kashmir in great danger and peace and progress is a name far away
from the lives of Kashmiris. The war and animosity is more important for the rival
South Asian neighbors with little regard for the precious lives and security of the
endangered region of Kashmir. Despite many efforts by the Pakistani government, the
Indian authorities never changed their uncompromising attitude over this issue.
Thousands of lives have been lost in Kashmir due to Indian hard stance. The lack of
appropriate representative governance and absence of human rights has made the
territory a zone to be supervised on by the international law enforcement agencies. 108
No doubt, Pakistan has raised voice on different forums for eliminating the reign of
terror in Kashmir but the issue is very tactfully sidelined partly because of Indian non-
acceptability of the third party involvement and partly because of the selfish interests
working for furthering their own interests. In this exercise of inflexible behaviors and
futile talks, the issue of Kashmir has become a mockery which every time is discussed
on the table with high protocols but then nothing comes out of those conversations. Had
Pakistan and India tried to improve their relationship with a spirit of trust and
confidence, this issue would have been resolved long before. Unfortunately, the sole
hurdle for the resolution is the hardline attitude while playing with the fate of the
107 . Pakistan-China Relations in the 21 st Century: Regional Situation, Security, Economic and Trade Cooperation: An IPS Study, Policy Perspective , Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2004, p. 70. 108 . Nurul Haque. Pakistan and Indian Search for Hegemony: 1947-2003, IPRI Journal , Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 2003, p. 28. 201
Kashmir. Violence of the Indian forces in Kashmir has led towards the fear, psychological diseases and depression of women and children. 109 Depressing law and order situation has deprived the children and young people from getting education with the closure of schools, colleges and institutions of higher education. Even if the institutions are open, various problems like strikes, protests, atrocities of the Indian armed forces over unarmed civilians has tended to disturb the education of the young kashmiris.
Moreover, the lack of sources of income and investment has increased the poverty and unemployment levels in the territory. One of the potential sources of profit and investment in Kashmir is tourism which, as natural beauty, has attracted large number of international and regional tourists but the prevailing conflict in the territory has, with the passage of time, blocked the ways for this sector to develop. 110 It is also worth mentioning that the absence of international media access and restrictions of the political rights in the territory has kept the Kashmiri people from showing their desire for peace and self-determination. Furthermore, the ecosystem of the territory has been endangered because of the fast disturbing situation.
Not only in Kashmir but the tug of war between Pakistan and India has posed a serious threat to the lives of the precious species in Kargil, Siachen like Ibex, bears and snow leopards which are mostly found in Karakoram, Batalik and the surrounded areas. The heavy amount of artillery and human waste material into the glacier in Siachen annually pose a great threat to the Indus which is the biggest source of water for agriculture and
109 . Ibid., p. 29. 110 . Muntzra Nazir. The Political and Strategic Dimensions in Pakistan−India Relations (1988-2004), Journal of Pakistan Vision , Lahore: University of the Panjab, Pakistan Study Centre, Vol. 5, No. 2, December 2004, p. 38. 202 human consumption. These wars in the world’s highest battlegrounds have rendered the conservation efforts in vain.
No issue is impossible to be resolved when tried with trust and cooperation but in
Kashmir the sufferings of the people have not affected the Indian policies for years.
This hostile posture of Pakistan and India towards each other has increased the plight of the people of Kashmir who have been waiting for their fate to change with some positive negotiations between the two adversarial neighbors. The period under consideration i.e. 1999-2008 was important as far as discussions on the issue of
Kashmir were concerned as the period witnessed more involvement of the people of
Kashmir in the peace process. This could be called a remarkable achievement in the period as the people across borders found an opportunity to meet each other and share their views for building peace. The delegations from Azad Kashmir also met those in
Jammu & Kashmir and vice versa which boosted their confidence in peaceful resolution of the dispute. 111 Both countries tried their level best to bring forward the options for
finding a way out of the conflict and president Pervez Musharraf’s ‘Four Point
Agenda’* was a new development in that regard which, no doubt, paved the way for
further clearing the ground. The need of the time is to focus on the Kashmir’s problem
where the people have been paying a heavy price for the hostility between Pakistan and
India. It is also necessary to understand the sensitivity of the issue and to adopt a neutral
stand instead of propaganda, conspiracies and emotional state of affairs. The past
hostilities and the claims of being right or wrong must be given away by both Pakistan
and India for the good future of their countries, Kashmir and the South Asia. In this
111 . Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra and Seema Shekhawat. The Peace Process and Prospects for Economic Reconstruction in Kashmir, Peace and Conflict Review , San Jose (Costa Rica): The University of Peace, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2008, p. 9. *. Details of ‘Four Points Agenda’are given in Chapter−5. 203 regard, the role of media is very much important which can highlight the real state of affairs and can create flexibility in the attitudes of the governments in Pakistan and
India.
The Composite Dialogue Process initiated during 1999-2008 included discussions on
Kashmir issue and to a greater extent, the issue came under consideration. Provided the commitment and sincere efforts from Pakistan and India, Kashmir issue may be resolved with best possible results.
4.2.5.9. Possible Nuclear War
The nuclear tests conducted in 1998 by Pakistan and India increased the dangers of full- fledged war between the two. 112 There has always been a threat of conventional war
between Pakistan and India since independence and both have entered into active wars
on four occasions but this time the dangers are greater on account of the two adversaries
being nuclear powers. After becoming nuclear power, the Indian Home Minister had
said that India was very much resolved to fight the wrong intentions of Pakistan. 113 In
case of any future war between Pakistan and India, the whole region could face serious
consequences because now the nuclear weapons would play with the humanity not only
in Pakistan and India but also in the region. A single harsh statement or act of aggression
by any one of them could produce a total havoc. 114
The hostility of the two countries has now taken a very serious shape in which the word
“war” means a nuclear war. The dangers of Pakistan−India enmity have increased
112 . “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan: A Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network-Centro Volta”, http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf 113 . Devin T. Hagerty. The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998, p. 71. 114 . Alan Sipress. India and Pakistan were near Nuclear War, Washington Post, Washington D.C. (USA), May 15, 2002. 204 because of their nuclear capabilities. 115 A military exercise by one country could be
thought of a nuclear war preparation by the other and this kind of misunderstanding can
lead towards massive destruction within seconds. 116 In case of any nuclear attack by one country, the other would be provoked to take the same step. Both Pakistan and India are possessing dangerous nuclear warheads with high range and capacity. India has upto hundred nuclear warheads as compared to Pakistan’s eighty to ninety, according to an estimate. 117 No doubt that Indian conventional power is stronger than Pakistan and the latter’s nuclear power maintains the balance with that. Hadn’t Pakistan conducted the nuclear tests, India would have attacked and suppressed Pakistan much before with the conventional power alone. As far as Pakistan is concerned, she would be feeling threatened in both the situations in view of the following:
1. If India launches a heavy conventional attack on Pakistan with overwhelming
forces, the latter could use her nuclear warheads feeling the danger of being
attacked by India;
2. In case, if Pakistan gets misunderstood of being attacked by India which has
happened many a times in the past during the military exercises conducted by
the latter. 118
It is not a matter of consideration for Pakistan only. For India too, the nuclear strikes
would not be so much easy to launch in terms of the disastrous after-effects of these
attacks by India on Pakistan. India would herself be prone to threats of radioactive
115 . From Interview with Hidayat-ur-Rehman, Research Scholar and Visiting Faculty Member at International Islamic University, Islamabad on August 2, 2012. 116 . Michael Richardson. India and Pakistan are not 'Imprudent' on Nuclear Option; Q&A / George Fernandes, The International Herald Tribune , Paris (France), June 3, 2002. 117 . Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance (A Report) , Washington D.C: US Department of Defence, May 3, 2010. 118 . Ayesha Siddiqa Aga. War-Gamming in a Nuclear Environment, The Friday Times , Lahore (Pakistan) July 26-August 1, 2002. See online < http://www.thefridaytimes.com/news6a.htm.> 205 damages in such a situation. Indian nuclear attack on Pakistan would not only affect
Pakistani cities but the adjacent areas of Indian Punjab would also be fully destroyed.
The winds from the West would automatically affect India more than Pakistan as a result of nuclear strikes over Pakistani territory because the radioactive winds would kill the whole humanity in the region with dangerous after-effects. 119 The command
and control systems which are created for preventing the accidental launch of nuclear
war is said to be uncertain in Pakistan and India according to the international standards
keeping in view the hostility levels between the two. 120
The growing tension between the two neighbors could provoke Pakistan to use the
nuclear weapons in the third situation when she would face economic threat from India.
In this regard, the water issue between Pakistan and India and the Indian efforts to stop
the flow of water to Pakistan or to block the necessary and authorized amount of water
to the agricultural lands of Pakistan in violation of the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 could
provoke the nuclear threats from Pakistan and finally an attack on India. In the changed
geo-political world of today, the economy of a country is the base of her survival and
any water blockade from India would automatically turn the green lands of Pakistan
into a desert and the reaction of this would occur in the shape of Pakistan’s nuclear
strike on India. An Indian nuclear physicist said that the nuclear bombs possessed by
both Pakistan and India are of greater intensity compared to the bombs which were
dropped on Hiroshima. 121
119 . A. G. Noorani. War Benefits Neither Side, Frontline (Chennai) , January 18, 2002. 120 . Gregory Koblentz. Theater Missile Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix, The Non-proliferation Review , Washington D.C: James Martin Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, Spring/Summer 1997, pp. 52- 62. 121 . Allan Robock. Local Nuclear War , A Report of the Institute of Scientific American, 2009, http:// climate. envsci. rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf 206
These facts clearly show the negative results of the Pakistan−India hostility which after becoming nuclear powers have created serious dangers for the humanity in the whole region. In order to avoid these dangers, both Pakistan and India must search out the ways for peace and economic cooperation. Otherwise, their animosity would eliminate them from the face of the earth. 122
4.3. Conclusion
While analyzing all the consequences of tensions between Pakistan and India, it is important to understand the basis of the trouble in their relations. Unless and until we understand the past and present of the problem in a logical fashion and the future costs of this rivalry, any positive and productive development in their future relationship can not be determined. Neither of them is a non-sense to the extent of not understanding the roots of trouble in their relationship. The benefits of peace and the insurmountable costs of hostility are not very much difficult to be looked into. The water starved and nuclear capable region of South Asia is giving a very grim look in the presence of high level tensions, the costs of which none of the two could afford.
Led by emotions and less by logic, there are misunderstandings on both sides that continuing with the hostile postures would benefit them in any way. There is a perception that costs are not big enough to manage and that is because there is less awareness of the huge damages the tensions between the two can cause to them and the region as well. It is perhaps a big foolishness of any one of them to think that the disturbance in the country across border would not have any impact on our own country.
In the changed geo-political world, the future of both Pakistan and India would go a long way together with cooperation and peaceful co-existence. The weak position of
122 . Brahma Chellaney. “CBMs: A Critical Appraisal”, in Dipankar Banerjee (Ed.), Confidence Building Measures in South Asia, Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 1999, p. 24. 207 one country would weaken another as well. There is a dire need to put sustainable efforts in the process of improvement of relationship and understanding. The lack of understanding and logical approach would deprive both of the opportunity to come closer and to mitigate the ill effects of the past hostilities.
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208
CHAPTER−5 THE PAK−INDIA PEACE PROCESS (1999−2008)
209
CHAPTER−5
THE PAK−INDIA PEACE PROCESS (1999-2008)
5.1. Assessing the Developments during 1999-2008: An Introduction
Pakistan and India, being the major players in South Asia hold greater importance in the regional politics and this regional politics has remained hostage to Pakistan−India hostility with negative impacts on the poor and poverty stricken sections of population on both sides. Ever since their independence in 1947, they have not been able to resolve their differences and now, being nuclear powers, their mutual disputes have attracted the attention of the world thus making the South Asia a globally focal area.
Lack of trust and worrisome policies towards each other have hampered their way forward for peace and cooperation. The unjustified policies of the British at the time of partition and the post-independence horrible scenario infused the feelings of hate and established a wall of distrust between the two neighbors. 1 The unremitting hostility led
towards wars between Pakistan and India i.e. 1948, 1965, 1971 and a harsh encounter
in 1999, endangering the lives of the people of the two countries. 2
The consistent tug of cold war and blame game never let the two to enjoy a decade of friendship and pleasant cooperative environment. The relationship between Pakistan and India influences not only the regional scenario but the global policies are affected with their approaches towards each other. This situation has become more critical after the two countries became nuclear powers threatening the security of the world in case
1. Ishtiaq A. Choudhry and Rabia Akhtar. India−Pakistan Peace Process (2004-2008): A Case Study of Kashmir, Research Journal of Internatıonal Studıes, Karaganda (Kazakhstan): Karaganda State Medical University, Issue 13, March, 2010, p. 47. 2. Balraj Puri. Kashmir: Insurgency and After, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2008, p. 100. 210 of any serious encounter and with that the importance of peaceful co-existence emerged with a pressing demand for negotiations and dialogue process. 3
It is important to note that Pakistan and India in the post-independence period remained engaged in dialogue on various issues. To some extent, the tensions were eased with the occasional dialogues between the two but these intermittent negotiations have neither resulted in a comprehensive breakthrough nor the resolution of any of the disputed issues seen because very often the peace efforts faced the periods of suspensions. There is no denying the fact that there have been more than hundred agreements signed, pacts and joint communiqués issued by Pakistan and India since their inception 4 but these pacts and agreements could not develop the kind of environment that could help reduce the conflicts through peaceful mechanism. 5 The relationship between Pakistan and India can be termed as a cycle of periods of tensions and normalizations with every tension followed by negotiations and vice versa.
No doubt, the need for peace and cooperation between Pakistan and India has been a pressing demand of every time since independence not only for maintaining peace in the region but also for the betterment of poverty stricken people on both sides. For that reason despite their hostility, the two nations had to engage in dialogue process time and again for solving the conflicting issues. Like they had to deal with the refugees and the division of assets after partition and for that the policymakers on both sides had to engage in the muted interaction with their inappropriate infrastructure and deteriorated
3. www.kashmiraffairs.org/ka1306.pdf. Accessed on April 10, 2008. 4. Rashid Ahmad. No Mourners: Death of Indo−Pak Peace Process, Kashmir Affairs , Ontario: Centre for Justice and Peace in South Asia (CJPSA), Vol. 1, Issue. 3, July-September 2006, pp. 8-16. 5. Ashutosh Mishra. An Audit of India−Pakistan Peace Process, Australian Journal of International Affairs , Deakin: Australian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 4, 2007, pp. 506-28. 211 law and order situation. 6 Similarly, the ensuing marked the signing up of new pacts and agreements for resolving the disputes i.e. the 1948 agreement to share the water of the river in Punjab and again in 1960 for sharing the water of the Indus, both the countries indulged in negotiations with the assistance of the World Bank. The negotiations were also held on the border issues along the Western deserts of India. The Bangladesh debacle again created an environment of suspicions between the two and they had to negotiate the settlement of the conflicting issues like the prisoners of war and the recognition of Bangladesh during 1973 to 1976. In 1988, they agreed to respect each other’s territorial integrity and not to invade the nuclear facilities of each other. The
1992 agreement brought to the forefront their pledge to prevent the use of chemical weapons. After four years in 1996, the military officials of Pakistan and India met to defuse the border tensions at the Line of Control. For tamping down the tensions in
Jammu and Kashmir, the two countries utilized diplomatic channels during 1996-1997.
The same year in 1997, Pakistan offered signing of a ‘Non-aggression Treaty’ presented and to discuss the nuclear and missile issues for putting restraint on the dangers of these capabilities. 7 Though the dialogue between Pakistan and India was suspended in 1994, it saw a ray of hope in 1997 at the foreign secretaries’ level. For Pakistan, the Kashmir issue was significantly important to be discussed on priority basis and India wanted to normalize the travel and trade relations with preferential treatment. A gap was seen in the viewpoints of the two sides when in May 1997, the two prime ministers met at Male and explained their positions clearly. While the Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral clarified that his government was in minority and could not make a major shift in the
6. Urvashi Butalia. The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1998, p. 87. 7. Yahya Hassan Bajwa. Pakistan−India Peace Initiatives, Paper presented in World Conference on Religion and Peace, Baden: Institute for Communication Research, Meggen and Trans Communication, May 11-14, 2004, pp. 6-7. 212
Indian policies, the Pakistani Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif, on the other side, said that it was equally impossible for Pakistan to ignore the public opinion. 8 At the same time, a new development arose in Kashmir when the All Parties Hurriyat Conference
(APHC) called for strike demanding for the participation of Kashmiri leaders for the solution of Kashmir problem at the time of meeting of the two prime ministers. Though the Conference welcomed the negotiations but refused to accept any deal without the consultation of the Kashmiri leadership. 9 At the same time, the world community was also appealed to interfere in the dispute to eliminate the regional instability and erase the danger of nuclear war between Pakistan and India.
In continuation of the talks that started in February 1997 between the foreign secretaries and then prime ministers in May 1997, the foreign secretaries of the two countries met again in June 1997 in Islamabad and an agreement was reached to discuss all the outstanding disputes by setting up working groups. After three months, the prime ministers again met in New York on the sidelines of the UN Summit and showed their extreme desire to renew the peace efforts.
5.2. Post-Nuclear Tests Phase and Pakistan−India Dialogue Process
In the post-nuclear test period after 1998, the relationship between Pakistan and India again suffered setbacks and now, being nuclear powers, the regional security situation was more critical and faced many threats. On the other hand, the need for peace between the two rival nations was also felt on immediate basis. In order to create mutual confidence in relationship, the first meeting of Pakistani and Indian leadership was seen
8. Abdul Sattar. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: 1947-2009, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 254. 9. Ghulam Nabi Fai. What the World Should Care? The News, Islamabad (Pakistan), May 21, 1997. 213 in Colombo in the SAARC Summit in July 1998. In figure 5.1, we can see the location of India’s underground nuclear test at Pokhran in Rajasthan on May 11, 1998. On the other hand, figure 5.2 and 5.3 show the team of Pakistan’s principal scientists responsible for devising and conducting the nuclear tests and the view of Koh
Kambaran in the Ras Koh Mountains respectively where tests were conducted on May
28, 1998.
Figure 5.1: India's underground nuclear test on May 11, 1998 at Pokhran in Rajasthan
Source: Government of India, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/dec2006/2006-11-03.asp
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and Atal Behari Vajpayee of India discussed to create mutual understanding at the official level between the two nations in the post- nuclear era. The Prime Minister Vajpayee met his Pakistani counterpart in September
1998 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session and the two leaders decided to continue the foreign secretary level talks from October 1998 to discuss the peace, security and other disputed issues with Kashmir as the main issue of concern for the two sides. 214
Figure 5.2: The Pakistani Scientists posing with a nice view of Koh Kambaran in the background. The 28 May shot was fired in a tunnel bored underneath this mountain. The principal scientists responsible for developing the devices and conducting the tests were the team leader Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Dr. Tariq Salija, Dr. Irfan Burney and Dr. A.Q. Khan, all of the PAEC Members.
Source: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakTests.html
Figure 5.3: Dust raised on Koh Kambaran in the Ras Koh Mountains by the Pakistan First Test, May 28, 1998.
Source: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakTests.html
In November 1998, the two sides continued their discussions on the eight issues of concern including Siachen, Kashmir, Sir Creek, Trade, terrorism and drug trafficking, 215
Tulbul navigation project, cultural exchanges and peace and security issues. These discussions could not be successful due to the habit of both sides to blame each other for one thing or the other. They continued with the stated positions without any major change in their attitudes. However, the best thing was that they understood the need to initiate dialogue and made efforts to discuss wide range of issues. Some positive developments were also made in November talks like technical committees were set up to discuss the outstanding issues between the two countries. Trade, investments and visa issues were tried to be resolved to a greater extent. It was also decided to exchange the prisoners in each other’s countries on immediate basis. Regular committees were decided to be set up for exchange of operational information between Federal
Investigation Agency (FIA) of Pakistan and Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in
India for acting against various kinds of crimes i.e. cyber-crimes and currency counterfeiting etc. The proposal for initiating Delhi-Lahore bus service also came under discussion in November talks.
5.3. Assessing the Developments in Pak−India Relations During 1999-2004
5.3.1. Lahore Declaration (1999): A Turning Point in Pakistan−India Relations
In the post-nuclear tests phase since 1998, the relationship between Pakistan and India saw a breakthrough in 1999 when the Indian Prime Minister visited Lahore on February
20-21, 1999 on the inaugural drive of Delhi-Lahore bus service. At this moment the priority on both sides for an improvement in relations was felt. Both sides also went ahead with promoting the Cricket Diplomacy and Hockey Diplomacy. The meeting between Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart in Lahore led to the signing of three agreements i.e. Lahore Declaration, a Joint Statement at the end of the meeting and a Memoranda of Understanding which was signed by the foreign 216 secretaries of the two countries. 10 In Lahore Declaration, Pakistan and India pledged to continue talks for the resolution of all outstanding disputes including Kashmir and resolved not to halt the mutual dialogue by any issue of dispute. A number of
Confidence Building Measures were also announced at the end of the meeting which included CBMs on nuclear issue as well as condemning terrorism in all forms. The two sides also agreed to notify each other in advance of conducting ballistic missile tests.
Similarly, an agreement was also made to reduce the risk of any unexplained or accidental use of weapons. The MOU signed between the two governments pledged to abide by unilateral moratorium on further testing. Along with that, trade and travel issues were also addressed and restrictions were decided to be modified to make things convenient for the people on both sides. Pakistan also expressed the desire to give India the status of Most Favored Nation (MFN) under the framework of WTO. In figure 5.4, we can see the prime minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Atal
Behari Vajpayee while exchanging the documents of Lahore Declaration.
Though this event was a landmark progress in relations but soon some negative statements and counter statements brought down the thaw in relations to earth. The
Indian leaders, on their reaching to India, tried to underestimate the importance of
Lahore Declaration and putting pressure on Pakistan to end supporting the Muslim separatists in Kashmir. Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Jamshed Ahmad also responded by saying that Pakistan was not responsible for the bloodshed in Kashmir and reminded
Indian leaders of their pledge in Lahore Declaration that Kashmiris were entitled to the right of self-determination. 11
10 . The Hindu , New Delhi (India), November 11 and 13, 1998. 11 . Hindustan Times , New Delhi (India), March 9, 1999. 217
Figure 5.4: Prime Ministers Atal Behari Vajpayee (India) and Nawaz Sharif (Pakistan) exchanging Documents after signing the “Lahore Declaration” at the Darbar Hall of Governor House in Lahore.
Source: http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl1605/16050090.htm
However, the clouds of tensions were again seen removing when, in March 1999, the
Foreign Ministers of the two countries Jaswant Singh and Sartaj Aziz met in Sri Lanka on the sidelines of SAARC Summit. The two ministers agreed to implement the Lahore
Declaration promises in their letter and spirit and an agreement was also concluded to set up a committee to deal with the issues of prisoners, visa issuance, cooperation in the fields of trade and information technology. A further progress was seen when efforts were made to implement the promises. On March 22, 1999, an exchange of prisoners, held for years, took place between Pakistan and India. As part of the understanding reached during Lahore Declaration and Sri Lanka meeting, India, in order to promote people to people contacts, announced to ease travel and visa restrictions for many 218 categories of Pakistanis. Furthermore, at the military level, the Indian Navy also proposed to the Defence Ministry in Pakistan to arrange for visits of goodwill between the two Navies.
Although, time and again, statements and counter statements were issued blaming each other or refuting the promises made but overall the progress was encouraging. A seventy five member’s business delegation from Pakistan visited the Federation of
Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) in April 1999 and discussed the business aspects of cooperation between the two countries. Pakistani Rangers and the
Indian Border Security Force (BSF) also held meetings on biannual basis along with the representatives of Border Survey Departments and narcotics staff for discussing the matters of exchange of firing across the borders, deportation of the nationals of each other’s country and dealing with the issue of narcotics smugglers. 12 From India, a fifty
eight members’ delegation of business community headed by the President of
Federation of Indian Export Organization, (FIEO) came to Pakistan (Karachi) on March
7, 1999 and a meeting was held with the office bearers of the Karachi Chamber of
Commerce and Industry. In continuation of the business cooperation, the India Pakistan
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IPCCI) was a welcoming development on April
10, 1999. Respecting the terms of the Lahore Declaration, India informed Pakistan of
her testing of Agni II missile on April 11, 1999. These positive developments were
indeed contributory to the melting of ice in the relationship of the two countries.
12 . Times of India , New Delhi (India), April 9, 1999. 219
5.3.2. The Kargil Crisis
Although the Lahore Declaration and the efforts for peace development were worth appreciation in Pakistan−India relations yet the events which occurred in May 1999 in the shape of Kargil crises again shattered the whole spirit of peace process. 13 In May
1999, an intrusion of armed personnel from Pakistani side was reported by India in the
Kargil heights in Kashmir. Pakistan rejected the accusations of India by saying that the
post Lahore Declaration statements and acts of Indian leadership led to an uprising by
Kashmiri people in Kargil because India rejected the Kashmiri people’s rights and
subjected them to severe artillery bombardment in violation of the Lahore Declaration
and Security Council’s Resolution of 1998 to end the tensions by resolving the Kashmir
dispute. 14
With the exception of OIC and few other Muslim countries, all the big powers including
US, Britain, Germany, and G-8 blamed Pakistan for ill action in the Kargil sector of
Kashmir. In response to the increasing penetration by armed men in Kargil-Dras sector which threatened the Srinagar-Leh road, an important artery for Indian stockpiling in
Siachen and Ladakh, 15 India termed Pakistan’s intrusion as the violation of Simla
Agreement and, in retaliation, also acted with army and air operation in Kargil sector as well as the Pakistani side of the Line of Control to dislodge the aggression by
Pakistan. 16 In order to de-escalate the tensions, Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz went to New Delhi for talks and he received a very cold welcome there with no India
13 . Muhammad Rashid Khan. Kargil Conflict: Comparing Indian and Pakistani Newspapers Editorial Treatment, South Asian Studies, Lahore: University of the Punjab, Centre for South Asian Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, July 2008, pp. 9-11. 14 . Ayaz Amir. Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), July 9, 1999. 15 . Zafar Abbas. Whodunnit?, The Herald , Karachi (Pakistan), August 1999. 16 . Pervez Iqbal Cheema. “The Strategic Context of the Kargil Conflict: A Pakistani Perspective” , in Peter R. Lavoy (Ed.), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 48. 220 mood to negotiate until the withdrawal of Pakistan personnel from the Kargil sector.
The international community was also getting concerned about the Pakistan−India dispute in Kargil which could take the shape of a full scale war and, being nuclear weapons states, the war could play havoc with the whole region. China, though did not directly blame Pakistan for the intrusion, asked both Pakistan and India to maintain peace by respecting the Line of Control.
When the cold environment between Pakistan and India reached to its peak, Pakistani prime minister asked the US president to intercede to diffuse the tensions. This approach by the Pakistani prime minister to the US was compared by one of the US officials with the 1971 crisis when General Yahya Khan (1969-71) had requested the
US to intervene and help to decrease tension. 17 It was on July 4, 1999 that Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif met the US president on emergency basis. The matter was discussed and on a telephonic call with the Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, the US president discussed the situation. The US president persuaded the Pakistani prime minister to agree on a joint statement to cease the tension, resuming dialogue as was initiated in Lahore in February 1999 and to respect the Line of Control as per Simla
Agreement. 18 With these discussions, the tension saw some downward trend and
Pakistan withdrew her personnel from Kargil by July 16, 1999. 19
The Kargil Crisis was definitely one of the biggest bumps which came in the process of peaceful negotiations between the two countries. It was quite unfortunate that just after initiating the process of dialogue, the tensed way to deal with each other was
17 . Shirin Tahirkheli. The News , Islamabad (Pakistan), July 13, 1999. 18 . Text of the Joint Statement of President Clinton and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at Washington on July 4, 1999, Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), July 5, 1999. 19 . Shaukat Qadir. An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999, RUSI Journal , London: Royal United Services Institute, April 2002, p. 24. 221 chosen again. No doubt, Pakistan was blamed for the ill-conceived move which isolated
Pakistan 20 and diverted the attention of the world from the human rights violations and
Indian atrocities in Kashmir to Pakistan’s sponsorship of the fighters in Kargil. 21
Internally as well, a rift was witnessed between the military and elected administration
of Pakistan. One of the eminent commentators said that it was a big blunder on the part
of Pakistan to approve the policy which was not sustainable which exposed Pakistan to
international isolation and censure. 22
5.3.3. Military Coup in Pakistan and Pakistan−India Relations
In October 1999, the military took over the government in Pakistan and General Pervez
Musharraf declared the Chief Executive of the country and explained the priorities of the new government. Both domestically and internationally, Pakistan faced extreme financial and economic problems along with the suspension of Pakistan’s membership in the Commonwealth. In this scenario, the peace process started by the previous government in Pakistan and India also suffered a back trend. It was, no doubt, a period of strained relations between the two countries.
During this period, tension along the ceasefire line continued with extra build-up of military on the border areas. While talking about the nuclear issue, General Pervez
Musharraf clearly said that in case of any threat to Pakistan’s security, the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. 23 While the international community
condemned the military takeover in Pakistan, Indian policy to extend hand of peace and
cooperation also saw a backward move. While deliberating on the issue of CTBT in the
joint meeting of National Security Council and Federal Cabinet on December 22, 1999
20 . Altaf Gauhar. The Nation , Lahore (Pakistan) September 5, 1999. 21 . Afzal Mahmood. Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), July 18, 1999. 22 . Maleeha Lodhi. Newsline , Karachi (Pakistan), July 1999. 23 . The News , Islamabad (Pakistan), January 5, 2000. 222 presided over by General Pervez Musharraf, it was explained that in case of India conducting new nuclear explosions, nothing in CTBT could prevent Pakistan to do the same and unless and until India signs the CTBT, Pakistan would be having the right to conduct the tests. 24 India’s response in the issue was equally cool minded. The breakup
of the peace process initiated in Lahore in February 1999 was evident in the negative
statements and non-adjustable stances of both the countries.
While Indian approach to the Kashmir issue was not that of priority, Pakistan’s policy
after the October 1999 coup was expressed in General Pervez Musharraf’s statement
on December 18, 1999 in Islamabad during the 30 th session of Azad Kashmir Council
that Kashmir was the main issue to be discussed with India and that Pakistan would not
discuss with India any other issue leaving Kashmir issue aside. 25 This clearly showed the change of policy on Kashmir because during the peace process after Lahore visit, there was seen a flexibility in stances on both sides but again Kashmir became the flashpoint in South Asian political environment. While India was in no way ready to give Kashmir a central attention in any negotiation, Pakistan’s position during this period increased the resistance by the Indian government to think on peaceful lines. 26
The contrasting positions of the two sides did not allow them to cooperate in other fields
as well such as trade. Neither was seen any move to increase people to people contacts
nor were the diplomatic channels activated in Pakistan and India to continue the
peaceful initiatives for building confidence between the two countries during this
period.
24 . The Nation , Lahore (Pakistan), December 23, 1999. 25 . The News , Islamabad (Pakistan), December 28, 1999. 26 . Mansoor Akbar Kundi. Non-Endurable Bilateralism: Pakistan−India Relationship, Journal of Regional Studies, Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad, Vol. 27, No. 3, Summer 2009, pp. 47-48. 223
5.3.4. The Agra Summit
General Pervez Musharraf, like other Pakistani rulers, had keenly taken up initiatives to improve ties with the neighboring nuclear power.27 A good development was seen in
Pakistan−India relations in 2001 when on New Year’s Day, Indian Prime Minister, in his article, emphasized the need to address all matters of dispute like Kashmir and Babri
Mosque in Ayodhya. Surprisingly enough, he even suggested a meeting with Pakistani
President on the issue of Kashmir and in this regard after just four months, a letter of invitation was also sent to the president of Pakistani to visit New Delhi on July 15 and
16, 2001. It was no doubt, a turning point in the relationship which, after facing a tense period in the aftermath of 1999 coup in Pakistan, saw another good weather.
According to the date decided by the two governments for the visit, President Pervez
Musharraf visited New Delhi and held discussions to transform the tension into good neighborly relations. 28 The president, at this moment, also urged the need to solve the
Kashmir dispute. The foreign ministers of Pakistan and India were also informed of the understanding reached between the two leaders on July 16, 2001. Figure 5.5 shows both leaders sharing views on the occasion of Agra talks on July 1, 2001.
27 . From Interview with Prof Dr. Taj Moharram Khan, Chairman Department of History, University of Peshawar on June 14 th 2012. 28 . Agra Summit at a Glance, BBC News, July 17, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/south_asia/14 30367.stm. 224
Figure 5.5: The Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and the visitng President of Pakistan Gen. Pervez Musharraf holding one-to-one talks at Jaypee Palace, Agra on July 15, 2001.
Source: http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl2510/stories/20080523251007900.htm
The draft of the declaration which was to be issued later on was prepared by the foreign secretaries and foreign ministers and recommended it to their leaders. 29 President
Musharraf gave approval to the draft. As far Indian side was concerned, they decided to consider the draft in a cabinet committee on political affairs. 30 After two hours
meetings, the Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh held a meeting with Pakistani
29 . Text of the Draft is given at Appendix−IV. 30 . Members of the Cabinet Committee included Indian Prime Minister as Chairman, Minister of Commerce, Defence, External Affairs, Home and Finance. Defence and External Affairs Portfolios were held by one Minister at that time. 225 foreign minister at about 6 p.m. and proposed an amendment in a paragraph on Kashmir in the draft. The discussion on the amendment proved fruitful and the two sides amicably agreed to the amendment. While conference officials of India were arranging for the signing ceremony and the Indian foreign minister hoped to get the approval within a short time, the cabinet committee of India again held long meeting and to the disappointment of Pakistani delegation at about 9 p.m., it was informed that the agreement would not be signed. It was, in fact, a great surprise for the media personnel as well as the Pakistani delegation. The event of galore suddenly turned into a great frustration for the Pakistani side which hoped a positive outcome of the visit to Delhi.
The Indian prime minster, though did not explain clearly the issue which prevented the
Indian side to agree on the draft, gave a commitment to the Pakistani side that though it could not be decided on that occasion, he would visit Pakistan to reach on some agreement. 31
The prospect of Indian prime minister’s visit to Pakistan satisfied the Pakistani delegation to some extent. President Musharraf while narrating over the outcome of the
Agra Summit said that the summit was not at all a failure though we could not achieve anything from that meeting at Agra. 32 The Indian prime minister also accepted the progress made in discussions and the draft declaration which could not be finalized then. 33 The foreign ministers of Pakistan and India also termed the summit as “Not
Nakam” (Not failure) 34 in totality rather a step towards cooperation and peace. 35
31 . A. G. Noorani. The Truth about Agra, Frontline , July 16-29, 2005, See online http://www.Hindu onnet.com/fline/fl2215/stories/20050729002104400.htm. 32 . President Pervez Musharraf, Press Conference, Islamabad (Pakistan), July 20, 2001. 33 . Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, Statement in the Indian Parliament, July 24, 2001. 34 . Abdul Sattar (Foreign Minister of Pakistan), Press Conference, Islamabad (Pakistan), July 17, 2001. 35 . Jaswant Singh (External Affairs Minister of India), Press Conference, New Delhi (India), July 17, 2001. 226
Although the two sides were looking positive after the Agra Summit, yet the controversial statements again captured the attention of the media on both sides with
Indian leadership saying that India’s reservations about the cross border terrorism were not discussed and that no agreement was reached upon in the Agra Summit. 36 There
were various other speculations about what were the main factors which rendered the
Agra Summit a non-achievable event for Pakistan and India. Some circles said that
President Musharraf’s over emphasis on the Kashmir issue during the summit turned
the Indian leaders non-positive while others said that Indian concerns were not
addressed like the terrorism across the borders. But all these speculations were not true
as the draft of the Agra Declaration addressed all the issues and there was no any pre-
condition from the Pakistani side to resolve the Kashmir problem first. Seven years
later, L.K. Advani, the Deputy Prime Minister of India, at the time of Agra Summit,
accepted that he had obstructed the finalization of the draft of Agra Summit and this
time again he gave a wrong reason that Pakistani side overemphasized the Kashmir
issue and underestimated the Indian position on cross border terrorism. 37 L. K. Advani
was wrong in his assessment saying that because both the issues were included in the
draft and were the subjects of discussion in Agra Summit.
Overall, it can be stated that while intentions of both sides at Agra were good, the
opposite positions and controversies did not leave the two to focus on the areas of
cooperation and to continue moving towards peace. Figure 5.5 shows an agreed text of
clause 1 of the Declaration on Kashmir followed by the text reformulated.
36 . Report by AFP, Dawn , Islamabad (Pakistan), July 21, 2001. 37 . L.K. Advani’s interview with the Times of India, quoted in Dawn , Islamabad (Pakistan), March 18, 2008. 227
Figure 5.6: An agreed text of Clause 1 of the Declaration on Kashmir, followed by the text reformulated jointly by External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar. The first three lines are in Sattar’s handwriting and the rest are in Jaswant’s.
Source: http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl2510/stories/20080523251007900.htm
5.3.5. Post 9/11 Trends in Pakistan−India Relations
Few months later after the Agra episode, the world witnessed an extraordinary threatening situation when the twin trade towers in New York were attacked by the terrorists which transformed the politics of the whole world and impacted the South
Asian region enormously. This was, in fact, a turning point in Pakistan−India 228 relationship. While the international focus turned towards Pakistan with regard to the new anti-terrorism policy, India tried to paint Pakistan as a country supporting terrorism and labeled the freedom struggle of Kashmiris as a terrorist movement. This war created a new challenge for Pakistan. Pakistan was now to see that India does not take undue advantage of the US success in Afghanistan. 38 Moreover, India also termed herself as the victim of terrorism. This was extremely high time for the policymakers in Pakistan who adopted a logical approach of condemning every act of terrorism and showed their commitment to fight every kind of aggression and terrorist elements. Pakistan once again became a frontline state this time in the war against terrorism. 39 An answer to
India was also given that India should also see that wherefrom terrorism was coming and instead of blaming Pakistan, India should keep an eye on her own terror perpetration acts.
After the attack by armed personnel on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, India adopted a hardline approach towards Pakistan by blaming the terrorists to be supported and having links within Pakistan. The diplomatic relations between Pakistan and India suffered as India suspended air and train services (Samjhota Express) with Pakistan and also forces were moved towards the border areas with Pakistan. In response to that step of India, Pakistan also deployed her troops to the border areas and relationship again became quite tense for a year ahead. There was a great chance of war between the two countries. However, some factors averted the danger of war as both the countries were now nuclear powers and war between them meant disaster for the whole region. Their standing army on borders was taking huge expenditure of both the governments. The
38 . From Interview with Maria S. Effendi. Assistant Professor, Peace and Conflict Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad on May 24, 2012. 39 . President George W. Bush. “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”, September 11, 2001, See online http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010911-16.html. 229 international community also asked the two countries to take care in developing their relations. All these factors contributed in easing of tensions and after a year of controversies, India ordered withdrawal of forces from the border areas. Pakistan proposed resumption of dialogue to discuss the disputed matters.
It was in April 2003 that a positive response from India was seen when Prime Minister
Vajpayee announced to resume the dialogue and diplomatic relations began to improve with High Commissioners taking their positions in each other’s countries. Both removed the restrictions on over flights and cricket diplomacy was also started. Pakistan too gave a positive response by maintaining ceasefire on the Line of Control (LOC).
5.4. Need to Re-approach
There were various factors which brought change in the approaches of Pakistan and
India towards each other and before we discuss the peace steps taken by the two countries during 1999-2008, it is important to know about those factors which pressed for the need to think about the security of the region and people.
A positive change in the South Asian political environment was felt in 1999 when the two nations started to get close as a result of Lahore Declaration and pledged to resolve the disputes once and for all. Being Nuclear Powers, the need for peaceful co-existence was felt much on both sides to prevent any misunderstanding in future. Moreover, there was global attention too to bring the two countries to the table to permanently defuse the tensed environment. The coming into power of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in
March 1998 in India was felt as the end of discussion process between the two countries but, in fact, that turned out to be a good omen for the initiation of a new era of 230 comprehensive dialogue process 40 which started in 1999 with the Lahore Declaration and though there were bad incidents later on like the Kargil War in 1999 and military takeover in Pakistan in October 1999 but overall, the negotiations started in 1999 put a good impact on the relationship between Pakistan and India with a consistent
Composite Dialogue process started in 2004. Both sides felt the need to sit on the table and discuss all the conflicting issues in a more apprehensive way than before.
The history of relationship between Pakistan and India can be said to be a vicious circle of ups and downs or tensions and negotiations. Every tension in their relationship was followed by a process of discussions like in 1987, after gauging the Indian intention to conduct a pre-emptive strike on the nuclear installations of Pakistan, President Zia-ul-
Haque went to New Delhi to re-conciliate. Similarly, the Kashmir tension during 1990 led towards the meeting between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto and ultimately signing up of a number of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). The tit for tat nuclear blasts in 1998 by the two countries brought a wave of jubilation in the two countries as well as global condemnation and the need to understand the sensitivity of the relationship was felt more than before. 41 Though the peace efforts were started in
February 1999 with the Lahore Declaration and both Pakistan and India intended to move forward to resolve the contentious issues, 42 bad luck again came with the Kargil
war in May-July 1999 which brought the two countries at odds. After the war at Kargil,
the leadership of India strongly rejected any dialogue with Pakistani officials. This
tensed environment continued for about two years and a ray of hope for the better
40 . Ihtashamul Haque. Track II Meeting to Discuss Cut in Defence Budgets, Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), December 18, 2003. 41 . Riffat Hussain. The India−Pakistan Peace Process, Defense & Security Analysis , Washington D.C: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4, December 2006, pp. 409-19. 42 . Ashutosh Mishra. An Audit of India−Pakistan Peace Process, Australian Journal of International Affairs , Deakin ACT: Australian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 4, 2007, pp. 506-28. 231 relationship was seen in the summer of 2001 when the president of Pakistan proposed an action plan to diffuse the tension and to promote peace between them. 43 This also led towards softening of the Indian attitude and the Prime Minister of India Vajpayee invited President Musharraf to visit India in the spring of 2001. During the Summit meetings, the conflicting issues were discussed between the two countries and though the summit was not very successful in creating a friendly atmosphere, it still became successful in making the two countries realize the fact that Kashmir problem was the priority issue to be resolved in order to move for further reconciliation. 44
The peace efforts which were started in 1999 and faced hiccups time and again with various negative developments again saw a promising time in January 2004 which marked a consistent start of real thaw in the bitter environment when the leadership of both Pakistan and India met under the auspices of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 45 This time the negotiations between the two
countries were more comprehensive and covered a wide range of issues ranging from
economic relations to Kashmir, Siachen and dealing with the terrorism threats. The
question arises as to what were those factors which intensified the need for peace
process between Pakistan and India and why re-approachment was seen with much dire
need this time than before? No doubt, the need for a cooperative interaction has always
been there between the two hostile neighbors but this time there was seen enormous
enthusiasm in the leadership of both the countries to clear the air of adversity and
43 . Riffat Hussain. Pakistan’s Changing Outlook on Kashmir in strategies in Swords and Ploughshares: The Future of Kashmir, Report of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) , Urbana-Champaign (Illinois): University of Illinois, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2007-08, See online www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/Kashmir/Kashmir.shtml accessed April 10, 2008. 44 . Ashutosh Mishra. An Audit of India−Pakistan Peace Process, Australian Journal of International Affairs , Deakin ACT: Australian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 4, 2007, pp. 506-28. 45 . Sarahh Bokhari. Indo−Pak: New Peace, Journal on Science and World Affairs , Geneva: Executive Board of International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP), Vol. 1, No. 2, 2005, p. 2.
232 distrust. Before assessing the peace process initiated in 1999 with a meaningful beginning in 2004, it is important to discuss those factors which contributed towards the change of attitudes in both Pakistan and India for peace and cooperation after a long spell of tension.
5.4.1. The Domestic Factor
One of the factors which brought change in the approaches of Pakistan and India towards each other and they felt the need to come closer and move ahead with a cooperative spirit was the domestic change in both the countries. Internal conditions in
Pakistan and India were demanding a good relationship because they could not afford adversity anymore. In 1999, when military took control of power in Pakistan and
General Musharraf came into power, a kind of softness and flexibility was felt in the policy of Pakistan over Kashmir. He called for a mutually acceptable solution of
Kashmir problem by a relaxed stand on the policy of conducting plebiscite in Kashmir.
A commitment was also shown that Pakistan would not allow any part of her territory to be used for any destructive purpose by any terror element. 46 General Musharraf, after
coming into power, also tried to present a soft and enlightened image of Pakistan in the
field of culture, tourism and sports. 47
There was a growing realization among the public and the official circles that hostility and hard attitudes in relationship with India would not give anything to Pakistan except bringing both the countries on the brink of war. 48 Moreover, the rising defence
expenditure has always been a factor in Pakistan’s policy towards India and vice versa.
46 . Trading Militancy for Peace in South Asia, accessed online on www.stimson.org, February 26, 2004. 47 . Daily Times , Lahore (Pakistan), August 15, 2004. 48 . Praful Bidwai. Ushering in Peace between India and Pakistan, Asia-Europe Dialogue and Partner , Singapore: Asia Europe Foundation, January 24, 2004, See online www.ased.org. 233
The U.S war on terror and Pakistan’s support in that war was also quite apprehensible but this support and the relationship status with the US was also a matter of concern for
Pakistan because keeping in view the history of relationship between Pakistan and the
US, one can easily gauge the fact that off and on this kind of relationship could possibly deceive again in case of winding up of the U.S war in Afghanistan and resultantly pulling her hand back from supporting Pakistan as well. 49 The US relations with India
also saw a good development during that time. The growing economic market of India
has been becoming a great attraction for the world and specifically to grab those
markets, the US extended her hand of cooperation towards India in a more spirited way.
Many US official visits to India took place e.g during 2002-04, there were four visits
by U.S Deputy Secretary of State, about ten visits by Assistant Secretary of State and
three by the Secretary of State Colin Powell. 50 These visits clearly showed the
increasing importance of India for the US in South Asia. Pakistan could be at much
disadvantageous position in case of not improving her relations with India. This was
also a great cause of consideration for the Establishment of Pakistan due to which a
friendly environment with India was urgently felt being need of the time to clear the
image of the country of supporting any elements i.e. Taliban or any other so called
terrorist organizations. In 2004, a comprehensive dialogue process was started through
re-approachment, initially started in 1999 with the signing of Lahore Declaration.
Another important domestic factor which also impacted the regional environment
towards peace was that of China, a time tested friend of Pakistan whose relationship
with India also saw improvement since the start of the twenty first century with flexible
49 . Sarah Bukhari. Interview with the Honorable Counsel General of Pakistan Mr Ghalib Iqbal in Canada, Journal on Science and World Affairs , Geneva: Executive Board of International Students/Young Pugwash (ISYP), August 10, 2004. 50 . B. Murlidhar Reddy. Continuing Peace Making, Frontline , New York, Vol. 20, No. 11, May 24-June 06, 2003. 234 policies on border issues. 51 On the other hand, China also started to show her concern
over the support for radical elements in Pakistan and the resulting impact on the border
areas with China. Any further hostility with India could give Pakistan a tough time in
its relations with the US and China.
The domestic conditions of India also went in favor of developing good relations with
Pakistan during that period. There was a growing realization on the part of Indian
leadership that persistent hostile engagement with Pakistan would not go forward for
creating any positive results and would further tarnish the image of both. 52 The military involvement and the human rights violations by Indian forces in Kashmir were bringing a bad name to India by inviting anger as well as huge financial and economic burden on the Indian resources. Not settling disputes with Pakistan could not satisfy Indian economic desires. Fixing the problem of Kashmir was also important for India on account of her aspiring for the permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) and for that the regional and global image of India needed improvement. As a pre-condition, India was to ensure cooperative and good relations with all the neighbors particularly with Pakistan for raising her image as a regional power. 53 Moreover, after becoming nuclear power, India was also to act in a responsible way to avoid the nuclear war with Pakistan. Only then could India promote her image in the world for gaining her interests. There were quite good reasons for Indian leadership to associate with peace initiatives and the Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee conducted agreements on all major disputes as well as creating a friendly atmosphere between the
51 . Stephen P. Cohen. India and Pakistan: Steps Towards Rapprochement, Testimony Prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , January 28, 2004. 52 . Keith Jones. Behind the India−Pakistan Ceasefire, December 29, 2003, See online http://www. wsws.Org / articles/ 2003/ dec2003/ipak-d29.shtml 53 . Praful Bidwai. India, Pakistan Take a Stride Forward, Asia-Europe Dialogue and Partner , October 6, 2004, http://www.ased.org/artman/publish/article_652.shtml 235 two countries. Though Vajpayee faced opposition from his own party i.e Bharatiya
Janata Party, on his peace initiatives with Pakistan, he still continued his efforts during
1999-2004 in order to get victory in the next elections as the peace process of Vajpayee government in India got good public support. 54 Hence, one of the factors which changed the policies of Pakistan and India from hostile postures towards peaceful initiatives was the domestic change in both the countries which demanded a positive outlook of both towards each other for a stable future of the region.
5.4.2. Nuclear Dangers
Another factor contributing towards change of policies in India and Pakistan was the realization of the nuclear dangers which their hostility was posing in the region. Being nuclear powers after 1998, the two countries were under an obligation to remove the clouds of nuclear war and for that they felt the need to come closer and start negotiations on all the disputed matters. This was also essential because in case of any nuclear war, there was no chance of any party to win rather destruction would engulf both of them. 55
It was this very reason which compelled both Pakistan and India to initiate the process
of dialogue under the Lahore Declaration 1999 and to sign a Memorandum of
Understanding in February 1999 to restrict any possible nuclear actions against each
other in future. The desire to initiate peace process clearly reflected their intentions to
cage the dangers of nuclear warfare between the two.
According to many nuclear optimists, the nuclear weapons led towards peace initiatives
between the rivals because in such a situation the rivals try to search for common
54 . Navnita Chadha Behera. "Forging New Solidarities: Non-official Dialogues ", in Monique Meken kamp, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen (Ed.), Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp. 212-36. 55 . The News , Islamabad (Pakistan), July 4, 2004. 236 interests in order to contain the threats and possible nuclear encounter 56 and in this
regard these optimists give the example of US and USSR. These two major powers
developed the habit of containing their war intentions since 1946 when both tried to
sign an agreement on the global control of atomic energy and they started their efforts
in this regard with great enthusiasm particularly after the death of Stalin in 1953, the
leadership of US and USSR proposed more tentative steps for transforming the nuclear
weapons race into a cold competition instead of active pursuit of weapons for war
purpose. The world saw the positive outcomes of these steps in the shape of Partial Test
Ban Treaty 1968, Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
(SALT−I) of 1972 and SALT−II of 1979. 57
Almost same was the case with Pakistan and India in 1999 when they realized the dangers of possessing nuclear weapons and tried to convert hostility into a cooperative interaction on all the disputed issues. It is in this regard that the nuclear weapons have been considered an instrument to develop peace initiatives among the rival parties and despite differences, the grounds for common modes of thinking based on reality are found. It was this logical understanding about the dangers of nuclear possessions that the two states realized the need not to delay cooperation in the promotion of peace. No doubt, this was the only way to prevent the people of South Asia from the nuclear holocaust.
56 . David J. Karl. Proliferation Pessimism and the Emerging Nuclear Powers, International Security , Washington D.C: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, Winter 1996/97, also Sarahh Bokhari, Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia – Nuclear Instability in Asia, CISS Journal, Mexico: Inter-American Conference on Social Security, Spring 2003, p. 40. 57 . James R. Schlesinger. “The Impact of Nuclear Weapons on History”, in Jorn Gjelstad and Olav Njolstad (Eds.), Nulcear Rivalry and International Order , Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1996, pp. 56-58. 237
5.4.3. Need of Economic Cooperation
The economic factors also influenced the policymakers in Pakistan and India to change their previous hostile gestures. The need of economic development was given a serious consideration in both the countries and particularly the size of their developmental budgets, a major chunk of which goes to defence related matters. 58 No doubt, the
improved bilateral relations could develop their trade enormously and fill their
treasures. This was the factor which led the two countries to think in terms of initiating
dialogue and cooperation in 1999. India, being the rising economic power in the region,
realized that continuation of adverse relations with Pakistan could stop her journey to
stand in the ranks of big economic powers of the world. Moreover, India could also
develop her trade ties with Afghanistan, the Central Asian and the Middle Eastern
countries via Pakistan and Pakistan could earn much by acting as an energy conduit
between India, the Central Asia and the Middle East. Not only this but the business
circles in India were also in favor of India developing good relations with Pakistan
because their bad relations were negatively impacting the international investments and
the mutual business. Having an aim to become the regional and global economic player,
India could no more afford hostility with Pakistan and wanted to maintain stability in
the region to keep her economic growth rate at double digits plus increase in the foreign
investments. 59
This was the factor which greatly enhanced the spirit in Pakistan and India to move
ahead with cooperative initiatives and to search for common strategic interests. Under
the clouds of positive changes in thinking, the peace process which was started in 1999
58 . Shaheen Akhter. Role of Leadership in India−Pakistan Peace Process, Regional Studies , Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 2007-08, p. 11. 59 . Murlidhar Reddy. Continuing Peace-Making, Frontline , New York, Vol. 20, No. 11, May 24-June 06, 2003. 238 culminated in the agreement on a ‘Composite Dialogue’ process in 2004 and economic interests of both the countries led them to agree on the establishment of a South Asian
Free Trade Zone to work for the economic betterment and stability of the region. This change in environment has been explained by Tanvir Ahmad, a former Foreign
Secretary of Pakistan that the Indian aim to become the regional economic player has increased to the extent of her desire to acquire a hegemonic status over small countries in the South Asia. 60 As far as Pakistan’s change of approach was concerned, the economic factor influenced the policy preferences in Pakistan. For Pakistan, a cordial relationship with India could help the former divert a reasonable portion of the defence resources towards the internal socio-economic development. It is a matter of fact and an acceptable reality among the policymakers in Pakistan is that the defence capability and economic stability are two important ingredients for the overall progress of the country and the military government which took over in October 1999 in Pakistan realized this fact and showed their desire to enhance trade links with India for the sake of economic development. 61 Trade relations, according to Pakistan’s business pundits, could develop the interaction which the diplomatic channels could not achieve for years. Poverty, unemployment and lack of developmental funds in Pakistan already put the country into a dangerous situation and her siding with the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan (1996-2001) brought her severe criticism as well. According to an estimate, the foreign direct investments from US averaged at 202 million dollars during
1998-2003 which was far less than that in Bermuda and Panama. Moreover, Pakistan’s foreign policy attributes like her policy towards Taliban and 1998 nuclear tests also dropped the investments rating from 92 to 129 out of the total 140 countries during the
60 . Keith Jones. India and Pakistan to Pursue Composite Dialogue, January 30, 2004, See online http://www .Countercurrents.org. 61 . Trading Militancy for Peace in South Asia, February 26, 2004, See online www.stimson .org. 239 period under reference. 62 The geo-strategic position of Pakistan could make her an
attractive place for investments and transit trade.
Pakistan could play the role of a bridge and transmission line for economic and energy
purposes between the South Asian and Central Asian regions. Pakistan’s own direct
trade with the Central Asian Republics already remained nominal i.e. only US $ 27
million during 2001-2002. The downward trend in the economic rates and deteriorating
global image were definitely the cause of concern for Pakistan and this turned out to be
a major ground for initiating dialogue with India on all disputed matters.
5.4.4. Post 9/11 Effects on Pakistan−India Relations
One of the important factors for a change in Pakistan−India re-approachment towards
one another was the event of 9/11 after which the whole geo-political situation changed
with the burning issue of terrorism coming to the limelight. It was a defining time for
the normalization of Pakistan−India relations. For Pakistan’s business elites, it was
increasingly important to extend a hand of cooperation towards India because of her
rising economic and strategic significance for the US and other developed countries. It
was considered important because Pakistan associated herself as an important ally of
the US in the war against terrorism and in case of no peace with India, Pakistan had to
deal with a stronger and dominating India in future. Moreover, it was essential to
improve relations with India because Pakistan had to remove the tag of its support for
fundamentalist and extremist elements in Afghanistan and Kashmir otherwise India
could have better opportunity to label Pakistan as a terrorist and extremist country. 63
For India, both domestic and international pressure contributed to change her position
62 . Foreign Direct Investments: A Case of South Asia, Policy Review , Geneva: The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 2003. 63 . Keith Jones. Op. cit. 240 towards peaceful thinking and also her agenda to blame Pakistan as terrorism sponsoring state was not working because of Pakistan’s alignment with the West.
5.4.5. International Role and Pressures
The role of international community in averting the conflict and making the two countries to re-approach for peace cannot be ignored. Being the nuclear powers, any dispute between Pakistan and India could create a great disaster in the whole region and there came many moments when both the countries were on the brink of war after 9/11 and following the December 13, 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament. The armies of the two countries were, no doubt, standing eyeball to eyeball on borders for almost a year. This situation was really hazardous for the regional and international security and that was the reason that almost all the big powers i.e. the Russian Federation, US, China,
Japan, United Nations and the European Union counseled to practice restraint. 64
It is important particularly for the US to bring both Pakistan and India closer to fulfill her own military and economic interests in the South Asia and to dominate the region in the Twenty First Century. The rising economic potential of India was, no doubt, a charm for the US interests as well as using India’s power as a counterweight to China.
That was perhaps the reason that the US, just after the memorable meeting of Pakistan and India in SAARC Summit in January 2004, offered cooperation to India in the fields of technology, space exploration and nuclear activities in the non-military fields. At the same time, Pakistan’s importance for the US was also not out of question because the latter needed Pakistan’s support for her war in Afghanistan, for winning the battle
64 . Abdul Sattar. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947-2009): A Concise History, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 313.
241 against the extremist elements, and for having an access to the Central Asia through
Pakistan and Afghanistan.
It is important to note that during the Cold war, it was the US interest to prevent Pakistan and India to come closer to each other and fanned the conflict between the two countries so that Pakistan could be prevented from being an ally of the Soviet Union. Now, as the interests of the US demanded a cooperative environment between Pakistan and India, therefore, the peace initiative was supported. It is worth mentioning that the US played an important role in averting major encounters between Pakistan and India at the time of Kargil crisis and after the attacks on Indian Parliament in December 2001. 65 The US also wanted to create an environment in the region favorable for herself while eliminating the anti-American feelings in the post 9/11 scenario.
5.4.6. Track II Diplomacy
Along with a number of factors which contributed towards transformation of the course of relationship between Pakistan and India, the Track II diplomacy also played a positive and major role in developing a conducive environment. Many political, retired military personnel, journalists and other members of the civil society cooperated to develop peace between Pakistan and India. 66 Track II diplomacy means the initiatives
taken at the unofficial levels to improve the relations. In this regard, many think tanks
funded by the US played a great role in supporting the Track II steps. In Sri Lanka, the
Regional Centre of Strategic Studies held many workshops on annual basis to give
opportunity to the policymakers as well as the young scholars of both sides to meet in
a cooperative environment. Similarly, the FRIENDS Institute in Pakistan also
65 . Syed Saleem Shahzad. Keeping the Peace Initiative on Track, Asia Times, Hong Kong, February 16, 2004. 66 . Sanjeeb Kumar Mohanty. Post-Cold War Indo−Pak Friendship: Giving Peace a Chance after 9/11, IIAS Newsletter , Amsterdam: International Institute of Asian Studies, No. 46, Winter 2008. 242 contributed a lot in organizing seminars and conferences to share the ideas and interact in a cordial atmosphere for intellectual discussions on the disputed matters and formulate a framework for solution. The India−Pakistan Friendship Society was yet another good Track II diplomatic channel to improve the relations. This society, established in 1987, organized many cultural visits, lectures and discussion sessions with the High Commission of Pakistan from time to time. Another powerful Track II channel was India−Pakistan Soldiers Initiative which was established in 1999 in
Karachi and was supervised by the retired military officials of Pakistan and India. This
Soldiers Initiative provided a chance to the political circles from the government and opposition side to meet and share their ideas and opinions. 67 Apart from the political level cooperation at Track II level, the business class of the two countries also joined hands through Track II efforts. The mutual visits by the higher ups of Chambers of
Commerce and Industries were also organized for promoting trade between the two countries. The efforts of educational institutions in the two countries to organize reunions also cannot be ignored like Kinnaird College for Women Lahore, Doon School
Old Boys Society and RIMCO (Royal Military College) Old Boy's Network etc were in the forefront in sharing culture and ideas of the two countries. 68
5.5. The Era of Composite Dialogue: 2004-2008
A new era of cooperation and peaceful relations began in May 2003 when members of
the Pakistani Parliament visited India (New Delhi) followed by the visit of the members
of Indian Parliament in July 2003. After few months of these exchange of visits,
ceasefire was also declared by the two countries in Kashmir along the Line of Control
67 . Navnita Chadha Behera. " Forging New Solidarities: Non-Official Dialogues ", in Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen (Eds.), Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia , Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp. 212-36. 68 . Navnita Chadha Behera. Need to Expand Track-II Diplomacy, Asia Times Online , Hong Kong, July 16, 2003. 243
(LOC). The same chain of positivity continued that culminated in the shape of a vibrant peace process in January 2004 69 when the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf met on the sidelines of South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Islamabad. Figure 5.7 shows both leaders shaking hands on the occasion. A new round of negotiations “Composite
Dialogue” was started on all disputed issues. 70 Pakistan assured India that any part of
her state territory would not be used for terrorism purposes. It was a positive response
to India’s concerns of cross border terrorism. 71 A change in India’s policy was expected at the time of elections in spring 2004, however, the new Congress party government in India under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh affirmed its support for the peace process started in January 2004 between the two countries.
This vibrant peace process between the two countries was considered important because in the past, their negotiations experienced breakdowns from time to time and after becoming nuclear powers, their controversies could play havoc with the whole region.
69 . Mattoo, et al. India and Pakistan Pathways Ahead, New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2007, p. 101. 70 . Balraj Puri. Kashmir: Insurgency and After , New Delhi: Orient Longman Publishers, 2001, p. 29. 71 . Rifaat Hussain. The India−Pakistan Peace Process, Defense & Security Analysis , Washington D.C: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4, December 2006, pp. 409-19. 244
Figure 5.7: President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee met in Islamabad on January 5, 2004.
Source: Musharraf, Vajpayee agree to maintain peace momentum, Daily Times, Lahore (Pakistan), January 6, 2004, see online http://www.Dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page= story_6-1-2004_pg1_1
245
Under the new arrangement, the Indian and Pakistani policymakers had strong intentions to move with a continuous peace initiatives. 72 The leadership of the two
countries decided to start the Composite Dialogue process in February 2004. This
commitment of the two sides generated a hope for stable economic future of the two
countries and decreasing tension in the region. It was formally in September 2004 that
the Foreign Ministers of the two countries launched Composite Dialogue.
The Composite Dialogue included eight issues for which details were set by the two
foreign secretaries in February 2004. These issues included:
1: Peace and Security CBMs; 2: Siachen;
3: Jammu and Kashmir; 4: Sir Creek;
5: Terrorism and Drug Trafficking; 6: Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project;
7: Economic and Commercial Cooperation; and
8: Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields.
The progress which was made between the two countries on these issues during 2004-
2008 was quite hopeful and continuation of this dialogue in future could lead towards
vibrant economic development thus preventing the region from the tense atmosphere.
Both countries started negotiations on different outstanding issues with strong desire
for peace and continuation of dialogue process without any bias and mistrust.
72 . Pakistan−India Relations: Best in 60 years (DAWN Report), Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), October 22, 2007. 246
The progress made on each of the eight issues can be summarized thus:
5.5.1. Peace and Security CBMs
Peace and security CBMs was one of the most important issues discussed under the
Composite Dialogue since 2004. This issue made enormous public impact. 73 These
CBMs included both conventional and nuclear CBMs and were based on the
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 1999 in Lahore and the joint statement issued on June 20, 2004. The most evident and institutionalized efforts for
Pakistan−India peace process were seen in the peace and security CBMs which really marked the ground by showing a practical approach towards normalization of age old hostility. Through these CBMs, many steps were taken to cover the grey areas in relationship by bringing the common people closer and by initiating negotiations on security issues. These CBMs were not limited to discussions only rather logical ground was carved and decision making was started on very basic issues of importance.
5.5.1.1. Nuclear CBMs
In order to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons by the two sides, a nuclear hotline was established at the level of Foreign Secretaries of the two countries in June
2004. At the same time it was also decided to keep moratorium in a self-declared manner on the nuclear testing by the two sides.
In a meeting held on December 14-15, 2004 at the expert level, the two countries decided to prevent any kind of misunderstandings regarding nuclear issues and to reduce the risks of any negative situation. The agenda of this meeting also included early operationalization and upgrading of the hotline between the Director Generals of
73 . Samarjit Ghosh. Indi-Pak Composite Dialogue-2008: A Review, New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2009, p. 1. 247
Military Operations (DGMOs) and establishing a secured hotline between the Foreign
Secretaries of the two countries. 74 On December 27-28, 2004, the Foreign Secretaries
met to further discuss the contacts between DGMOs, 75 promotion of regular contacts at
the local levels and work for more CBMs along the Line of Control and the international
boundary. During this meeting, various differences on the issue of pre-notification of
flight testing and ballistic missiles were also narrowed down. It was agreed upon to
complete the finalization of these agreements on early basis. 76
In continuation of the confidence building on nuclear issues, the next meeting at an expert level was held on August 5-6, 2005 in which the two sides developed an understanding on pre-notification of flight testing of ballistic missiles. In this way transparency of intention and mutual trust on nuclear issues was built in a better way.
In October 2005, the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries, Riaz Mohammad Khan of Pakistan and Shayam Saran of India also concluded an agreement in Islamabad according to which it became obligatory for both the countries to notify the other at least seventy two hours before testing of ballistic missiles within the radius of forty km of the international boundary and the Line of Control (LOC). 77 The Indian side also gave a draft of the agreement proposed on February 21, 1999 in the Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) on the issue that both Pakistan and India would take national measures to reduce the risk of accidental or illegal use of nuclear weapons. The agreement was finally signed in February 2007. The third round of talks between the
74 . K.S. Manjunath and Seema Sridhar. Indo−Pak Composite Dialogue 2004-05: A Profile, Special Report , New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Number 12, February 2006, pp. 45-46. 75 . Pakistan−India CBMs on Nuclear related matters, Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), October 19, 2009. 76 . Tariq Rauf. Confidence-Building and Security-Building Measures in the Nuclear Era with Relevance for South Asia, Contemporary South Asia , London: Taylor and Francis Publishers, Vol. 14, No. 2, June, 2005, pp. 175-89. 77 . Umbreen Javed. Compulsive Confidence Building in South Asia, IPRI Journal , Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 2006, pp. 23-27. 248
Foreign Secretaries of the two countries began on January 17-18, 2006 which decided to continue discussions and consultations on the nuclear and security issues. It was also proposed to conclude agreements to improve the navigation facilities by preventing incidents at sea and air.
On January 1, 2006, Pakistan and India exchanged the lists of their nuclear facilities which was in terms of the accord of 1988 in force since 1992 prohibiting any attack on nuclear installations. Pakistan also proposed not to relocate the military strike formations on either side to forward locations in order to avoid any serious confrontation in future at the time of movement of strike corps formation.
5.5.1.2. Conventional CBMs
• Ceasefire and Line of Control (LOC)
Among the CBMs which were signed between the two countries, conventional CBMs greatly contributed towards institutionalization of the negotiations since 2004. Both
Pakistan and India announced ceasefire along the Line of Control (LOC) in 2003 which has been in place since then and even during the times of crisis, this ceasefire continued like in Tangdhar sector when Indian forces alleged that Pakistani forces opened fire.
Similarly, after the train blasts of Mumbai in 2006 when the Foreign Secretary negotiations were suspended, the Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) and Pakistani
Rangers continued their quarterly meetings and discussed various matters including drug trafficking, security lights, joint patrolling and determining disputed points along 249 the Line of Control (LOC), infiltration across the borders and also defence infrastructure and construction. 78
• Security Cooperation
Under the Composite Dialogue process, the security cooperation between Pakistan and
India also led towards coastal managing naval agencies of the two countries to establish hotline for facilitation of direct communication. This hotline was established in
November 2007 79 and was aimed to avoid the arrests of fishermen in each other’s countries who might accidently enter into each other’s territorial water. This naval cooperation led towards considerable reduction in the number of fishermen who used to be arrested in both the countries before. Feasibility discussions were also held on rescue and search operations to be on joint basis and also collaboration in pollution control. 80
• People to People Contacts
The CBMs which contributed towards people to people contacts included launching of
bus service which was one of the most important steps to give opportunity to the people
to come closer. Before the beginning of Composite Dialogue in 2004, there was only
one bus service plying between Lahore and New Delhi which was launched in 1999.
In 2005, another trans-LOC bus service was launched which connected Srinagar with
Muzzafarabad. After this, Poonch-Rawalkot bus service was launched in 2006 in order
to facilitate the people. When Earthquake struck this part of the region i.e Kashmir in
78 . Joint Statement on Fourth Round of India−Pakistan, Expert Level Dialogue on Conventional CBMs, New Delhi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2007. 79 . Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Delhi, November 20, 2007. 80 . J. R. Junnola. Maritime Confidence Building in Regions of Tension, A Report, Washington D.C: The Henry L. Stimson Center, No. 21, 1996, p. 78. 250
October 2005, the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus service was suspended for four months.
In 2008, the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus service increased its service frequency from fortnightly to weekly.
For developing people to people contacts, these bus services have played a very important role in bringing the families on both sides of the border together. Besides
Lahore and Amritsar, a new bus service was to ply between Amritsar and Nankana
Sahib which was the opening up of a new bus route in Punjab. This route played an important role in bringing lots of Sikhs from India to Pakistan for vising religious places such as Nankana Sahib—a holy place for Sikh community being the birth place of Guru
Nanak, the Founder of Sikhism. The frequency of Delhi-Lahore bus service was increased during 2006-2007 along with rationalization of fares from both sides. In 2007, the very first overland truck route at the Wagah border crossing was opened between
Pakistan and India.
• Train Services
Besides bus service, train services were also started as part of the Composite Dialogue
process. The train services were extended to the following routes:
‹ Samjhota Express, also called as the Friendship Express which linked
Lahore with Amritsar and New Delhi;
‹ Thar Express which linked Munabao in Rajhastan (India) with Khokhrapar
in Pakistan’s Sindh province.
As part of the confidence building measures, air services were also attended to. It was agreed upon by the two sides to double the number of weekly flights in each other’s countries in order to increase the level of cooperation in trade and business. The weekly 251 flights increased from 12 to 28 and for cross-LOC travel, triple-entry permits were introduced.
In September 2005, Pakistani government gave a license to a private firm named "Land
Ocean Ferry Service" to operate a Karachi-Mumbai ferry service. Similarly, a MOU was also signed between Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA) and Indian Coast
Guard (ICG) in October 2005 according to which the communication links were enhanced along with sharing information regarding early resolution of fishermen issue held in each other’s territories for straying into the waters outside their territorial boundaries, rescue operations, searches, natural disasters, drug trafficking, smuggling and pollution control etc.
• CBMs for avoiding conflicts between Pakistan and India
In order to boost the cooperation and to avoid further conflict, and for resolving the issue of prisoners in each country, a Joint Judicial Committee on Prisoners was set up under the peace process. This committee aimed at suggesting steps for humane treatment of the prisoners and their speedy return to their respective countries of origin.
As a result of Committee’s decisions, both sides released over 500 prisoners during
2003-2009. 81
In 2006, the two countries agreed upon ground rules for implementation along the borders, holding flag meetings on quarterly basis, a ban on the development of new posts and not to start any defence work along the Line of Control (LOC). It was also
81 . Samarjit Ghosh. “Two Decades of Indo−Pak CBMs: A Critique from India”, IPCS Journal , New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Issue Brief 132, September 2009, p. 31.
252 decided that those inadvertent people along the LOC who cross the borders would be returned forthwith.
5.5.2. Siachen
Demilitarizing Siachen has been an important part of Pakistan−India peace process.
Siachen has been a burning issue raising tension between Pakistan and India since long. 82 The resolution of this dispute is very much important for creating a positive
environment. At a meeting of Defence Secretaries on August 5-6, 2004 in New Delhi,
discussions were held between the military officials to redeploy and disengage the
troops. 83 An assessment of the ceasefire already in effect since 2003 in Siachen was also made. After sixteen months of Composite Dialogue initiation, the Defence
Secretaries again discussed to reach on some mutually agreeable solution on Siachen in April 2005. Similarly, in the next meeting of Foreign Ministers on October 4, 2005,
an agreement was reached to exchange information and develop understanding on the
Siachen issue in order to move ahead with confidence and motivation in the Composite
Dialogue Process. 84 However, after the third round of talks on January 18, 2006, it was evident that the two sides did not make any particular reference to Siachen. 85
Though Pakistan and India resolved to solve the Siachen issue, some resistance from both sides prevented them to move ahead like India wanted recognition of actual ground position line and no redrawing of boundaries while Pakistan could not accept it as that
82 . Tariq Mahmood. Siachen Dispute and Status of Northern Areas, Defence Journal, Karachi (Pakistan), Vol. 19, No. 5-6, 1993, p. 21. 83 . Rana Qaisar, “Kasuri and Natwar Meet Today: Progress on Siachen Pullout Likely”, See online http: //www.Dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_3-10-2005_pg1_5.Also see Qudssia Akhlaque,“ Guarded Optimism Ahead of Talks: Pakistan, India to Discuss Siachen, Sir Creek” See online http:// www.Dawn. Com/2005/10/03/top1.htm. 84 . Ajay Kaul. India, Pak 'Understanding' on Siachen by January, October 04, 2005, See online http://in.redi ff.com/news/ 2005/oct/04natwar.htm 85 . India Considering Siachen Proposal, Daily Times , Lahore (Pakistan), January 18, 2006. 253 would be tantamount to leaving up Saltoro ridge for which Pakistan was unwilling. It was on June 10-12, 2005 that the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh gave the idea of making Siachen “a Mountain of Peace.” 86 In 2007, the Indian government tried to convert the Siachen into a tourist destination by hosting a civilian tourist trek and
Pakistan, no doubt, objected to that. Siachen has been a significant issue of discussion in Composite Dialogue process but severe stands by the two countries did not leave the two to arrive at any solution during this period.
5.5.3. Jammu & Kashmir
Another important issue which came under discussion during the Composite Dialogue process was the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. In a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in 2004, the two sides decided to carry on the dialogue process in order to reach some peaceful agreement on the disputed issue. In fact, the ceasefire along the Line of Control during the dialogue process had also brought positive changes in the mindsets of the two countries. The peaceful environment created by the Composite Dialogue also augured well for the economic progress of the region. Though the subsequent meetings did not see any encouraging move towards the Kashmir problem, the CBMs were seen working well to create positive thinking in Pakistan and India. 87 The Trans-LOC bus
routes and their successful functioning clearly demonstrated the desire of the two
neighbors to resolve the issue on common grounds. 88 President Pervez Musharraf, while
addressing a private dinner on October 25, 2004, suggested some alternatives to resolve
86 . Samarjit Ghosh. Indo−Pak Composite Dialogue-2008, Special Report , New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 65, No. 3, New Delhi, February 2009, pp. 86-89. 87 . Pakistan−India Discuss Kashmir CBMs, Daily Times , Lahore (Pakistan), July 19, 2008. p. 15. 88 . India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilizing a Cold Peace, Asia Briefing , Brussels: International Crisis Group, No. 51, 15 June, 2006, pp. 14-15. 254 the Kashmir problem. He, however, clarified these alternatives to be his personal ideas.
The alternatives suggested by him included:
• The State of Jammu and Kashmir included seven regions geographically with
different sects, religions and languages;
• Some of the regions should opt to be included with one country or the other;
• The remaining/other regions should be kept autonomous or under the
Trusteeship Council of the UN or divided between Pakistan and India. 89
This solution suggested by President Musharraf was, in some way, contradictory to the
well- known and traditional stand of Pakistan and was, therefore, criticized by many
sections of Pakistan’s population. India also did not respond to these suggestions.
Figure 5.8 shows both leaders shaking hands on April 18, 2005, on the occasion of
making a Joint Statement, agreeing on opening up Kashmir and furthering negotiations
of that issue.
Figure 5.8: Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh shakes hands with Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf after making a joint statement in New Delhi on April 18, 2005. Declaring their Peace Process irreversible, nuclear rivals Pakistan and India agreed to open up the heavily militarized frontier dividing Kashmir, capping a successful visit by Musharraf.
Source: Peace process "irreversible", say India and Pakistan, April 18, 2005, see online http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/18/content_435226.htm
89 . Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), April 19, 2005. 255
Similarly, in 2006, a four point agenda was presented by President Pervez Musharraf i.e.
• Development of linkages between Kashmiris of both sides;
• Self-governance;
• Demilitarization;
• Softening of borders.
Though India responded well as far as the economic development and development of linkages through CBMs was concerned, the softening of borders and demilitarization options were conditioned with more efforts by the Pakistani government to prevent terrorist activities across borders as per statements of the Indian government. 90 With the coming into power of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in Pakistan (2008-2013), it was reaffirmed that Pakistan and India would not stop going ahead to resolve the outstanding issues including Kashmir. The cooperation was to be carried on in the economic and trade fields.
So it can be said that in case of Kashmir, CBMs have worked well to bring the people closer across borders through the Composite Dialogue process. Along with the official channel of dialogue, the unofficial and back channel process continued for searching out the options for resolution of Kashmir dispute.
5.5.4. Sir Creek
Sir Creek was also one of the issues which came under discussion in the Composite
Dialogue process in 2004. Both sides agreed to reach some mutually acceptable solution
90 . Shaheen Akhter. India Pakistan Peace Process: Challenges and Prospects, BIISS Journal , Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIIS), Vol. 29, No. 4, October 2008, pp. 486- 87. 256 of this issue. The concerns of the two countries towards this issue were increasing because of the international obligations under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and further delay could make the situation more serious bringing the continental shelf areas of both the countries under the purview of the
International Seabed Authority. 91 So, it was very important for both the countries to resolve the issue at the earliest. In continuation of the peace process initiated in 2004,
Pakistani and Indian delegation met on August 6-7, 2004 in order to determine and demarcate the international boundary in the Sir Creek. In September 2004, the Foreign
Ministers of the two countries decided to take up joint survey of the blue dotted line
(Boundary Pillars) in Sir Creek. In December 5-6, 2004 meeting in Rawalpindi, both
Pakistan and India decided to start the joint survey from January 3, 2005. 92
After the visit of President Musharraf to India in April 2005, a joint statement was
issued underlining the need to agree on some mutually acceptable solutions on the issue
of Siachen and Sir Creek. 93 Again in October 2005, when the Foreign Ministers of
Pakistan and India met, they considered the joint survey which was undertaken in the horizontal section of the boundary line in Sir Creek for delimiting their maritime boundaries. In this connection, Pakistani and Indian technical experts met on December
20-22, 2005 but those talks were partly successful because of Pakistan’s reservation to address the issue of International maritime boundary before resolving the Sir Creek issue.
91 . Suryakant Samir. Composite Dialogue Process, Special Report, New Delhi: Institute of Conflict and Peace Studies (IPCS), Vol. 53, June 2008, pp. 10-11. 92 . An overview on India−Pakistan Relations, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs (PAI Division), 2008, Available at http://meaindia.nic.in/foreignrelations/21fr01.pdf 93 . Pakistan says Differences over Sir Creek Narrowed Down, Outlook India , New Delhi, November 29, 2006, See online http://news.Outlook india.com/item.aspx?433249 257
Another month-long survey took place in January 2007 which was participated by the navies of the two countries with hydrographers in order to verify the outmost points of the lines of the coast in the disputed area. 94
It is important to note that the Indian position on delineating the border has been that the boundary should be in the middle of the tidal estuary and, on the other hand,
Pakistan’s position was that it should lie on the South-East bank. The joint survey created a kind of positive environment in the two countries with greater convergence shown from both sides but the positions still remained the same with their specific claims on the area. Similarly, in the first formal meeting of May 2007, the fourth round of talks under the Composite Dialogue process discussed the issue of Sir Creek 95 and
the military officials from both sides exchanged maps of the maritime boundaries and
Sir Creek with their respective claims. The developments that followed, brought
positive changes in the relationship of Pakistan and India. Keeping in view the deadline
given by the UN for resolution of this dispute, set in 1982, both countries need to
expedite their efforts. The UN deadline underlined the need for both countries to reach
to an amicable solution otherwise the area of Sir Creek would convert into international
waters. It is worth mentioning that the deadline has been expired in May 2009 and after
a lapse of so many years since 1982, both countries are still in the process of
negotiations which need to be expedited on logical grounds.
5.5.5. Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Pakistan and India also decided to tackle the issue of terrorism and drug trafficking
under the Composite Dialogue process. The first official meeting to discuss these
94 . Sir Creek Dispute, Khalij Times , Abu Dhabi, January 17, 2007. 95 . Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad (Pakistan), May 18, 2007. 258 matters were held in New Delhi on August 29-30, 2005. During this meeting, both sides decided to combat the menace of terrorism by taking appropriate steps. They also resolved to create closer cooperation between the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and to work out modalities for the successful implementation of the cooperative plans by the agencies on both sides.
After the Composite Dialogue process that started in 2004, the hiccups were faced in moving the relations ahead on the issue of terrorism. 96 After the Mumbai bombings of
July 2006, the tremors were felt on the dialogue process because India suspended the
Foreign Secretary level talks. The process was re-initiated in September 2006 at Havana
during a meeting between Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and the Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh. The two heads of governments decided to create a joint
mechanism to deal with terror outfits. A Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism (JATM) was
created which was mainly an additional Secretary-level arrangement comprising three
members from each side. The task of this mechanism was to identify the causes of terror
events in the two countries and to implement counter-terrorism investigations. During
the 4 th round of Composite Dialogue process, the first meeting of JATM was held in
March 2007. India and Pakistan discussed the cross-border terrorism issue and
presented their reservations to each other. The second meeting in this connection was
held in October 2007 which led to the sharing of updated and specific information on
the issue. This meeting also included healthy negotiations on identifying further steps,
exchanging expertise and cooperation in counter-terrorism investigations 97
96 . Pakistan, India ink MoU to check Drug Trafficking, Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), September 13, 2011. 97 . Pervez Iqbal Cheema. Pak-India Talks on Terrorism and Culture, Pakistan Observer , Islamabad , July 10, 2008. 259
On the occasion of seventh SAARC Conference, Pakistan and India reaffirmed their resolve to cooperate against terror activities. Being members of the SAARC, both the countries also showed their commitment to establish a Regional Police Agency on the lines of Interpol. With the increasing efforts of JATM, it was hoped that the Composite
Dialogue process would become a major factor in boosting the relationship of Pakistan and India by creating confidence regarding the issue of terrorism because hurling accusations would only serve to deteriorate the relationship as had been in the past. 98
• Drug Trafficking
On this important issue, the dialogue process started in August 2004 in which both
Pakistan and India decided to increase cooperation between the Narcotics Control
Authorities of the two countries and in order to institutionalize the cooperative endeavours, they agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). 99 In the
Seventh round of Composite Dialogue initiated on December 2, 2005, the two sides
signed a MoU on anti-narcotics issue. The subsequent meetings held in 2007 and 2008
also outlined the main drawbacks in the cooperation strategy between the drug agencies
of the two countries. The resolve, made by the two countries during the Composite
Dialogue process at the seventh SAARC Conference, to establish a Regional Police
Force was a big achievement for monitoring the drug offences and trafficking issues.
98 . Pakistan, India ink Pact to tackle Drug Trafficking, The Times of India , New Delhi, September 14, 2009. 99 . Regional Cooperation: Pakistan India to Eradicate Drug Trafficking, Express Tribune , Karachi (Pakistan), September 12, 2011. 260
5.5.6. Wulller Barrage / Tulbul Navigation Project
Water division between Pakistan and India was provided by the Indus Water Treaty
(IWT) which was signed in 1960 by the two countries and was brokered by the World
Bank. Through this treaty, three Eastern rivers i.e. Ravi, Sutlej and Beas were given to
India and three Western rivers i.e. Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were given to Pakistan.
The Composite Dialogue process did not include or classify the issues of Baglihar and
Kishanganga directly but talks were held on these issues on the sidelines of Composite
Dialogue, in fact.
• Tulbul Navigation / Wullar Barrage
As part of the Composite Dialogue Process, the Tulbul Navigation Project/Wuller
Barrage was discussed between Pakistan and India. The talks on this water issue were resumed on July 29-30, 2004 at the secretary level between the Water Ministries of
Pakistan and India. These talks were held within the purview of Indus Water Treaty provisions but could not produce any logical outcome.
It is worth mentioning that both Pakistan and India have disagreement on the very name this dispute. Pakistan, on the one hand, names it as Wuller Barrage and, India, on the other hand, refers to it as Tulbul Navigation Project. The dispute is on the construction by India of 40 feet wide and 439 feet long barrage on the river Jhelum, at the mouth of
Wullar Lake near Sopore, a town in Kashmir.
As far as the work on the project is concerned, that was started in 1984 by India which was then protested by Pakistan and the work was stopped in 1987. 100 Since then many
rounds of Secretary-level talks had been held but without any positive outcome. India
100 . Wullar Barrage, The Nation , Islamabad (Pakistan), May 15, 2010. 261 defended her position by saying that the Indus Water Treaty allowed the use of water for navigation purposes while Pakistan accused India of violating the Treaty by building a barrage for water storage. The original treaty i.e. the Indus Water Treaty provides the use of water of each other’s rivers for the following four purposes:
‹ Agricultural use;
‹ Domestic use;
‹ Restricted use for hydroelectric power through a run of the river;
‹ Non-Consumptive use i.e. navigation etc provided the water does not diminish
in quantity. 101
India defends her position by saying that navigation purposes did not violate Indus
Water Treaty and that she wanted to make River Jhelum a navigable river through which the small boats could ply between Baramulla and Srinagar, but Pakistan accuses
India of violating the treaty 102 in the sense that the Treaty prohibits both the parties to take up any “man-made obstruction” causing a change in the volume of the daily flow of waters unless it is of an insignificant amount as mentioned in Article I (11) of the
Treaty. 103 Article III (4) also stopped India from constructing any storage facility on the
Western rivers except a very insignificant amount (10,000 acre ft.) for flood control
purpose. Figure 5.9 shows the location of Wuller Barrage / Tulbul Navigation project
on the River Jhelum.
101 . Suryakant Samir. Composite Dialogue Process, IPCS Special Report , New Delhi: Institute of Conflict and Peace Studies (IPCS), Vol. 53, June 2008, pp. 9. 102 . Khaleeq Kiani, India offers to amend design of Wuller Barrage, Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), May 14, 2009. 103 . Mallika Joseph, Delhi Round of Indo−Pak Talks – II: Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage, IPRI Fact File , Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), November 21, 1998.
262
Figure 5.9: Wulller Barrage / Tulbul Navigation Project Site
Source: http://www.indiawaterreview.in/Story/News/india−pakistan-water-secretaries-
In order to further discuss this issue, the delegations from both sides met on June 28-
29, 2005 in New Delhi. The joint statement issued by both Pakistan and India on Tulbul
Navigation Project/Wuller Barrage in June 2005 also resolved to continue discussions to solve the disputed issue according to the provisions of the treaty. Though India offered to bring structural changes in the project, Pakistan rejected the offer on two accounts:
• The project had storage capacity 32 times greater than the one allowed by the
Indus Water Treaty (IWT) (0.1 million acre feet of water storage on Jhelum);
• India did not inform Pakistan in advance about the starting project.
Another meeting in this regard was held in New Delhi on August 30-31, 2007 where the Pakistani delegation was represented by Secretary Ministry of Water and Power, 263
Mr. Muhammad Ismail and Indian delegation by Secretary Ministry of Water Resource
Mrs. Gauri Chatterji. The two sides shared their positions on the issue and appreciated each other’s cordial attitude to further the negotiations.
The defensive position adopted by India on this issue was rejected by Pakistan though the discussions continued throughout the Composite Dialogue process.
‹ Baglihar Dam Project
On June 20, 2004, Pakistan and India held Secretary level negotiations in New Delhi
on the disputed Indian project in Jammu and Kashmir on River Chenab. The water
Secretaries and commissioners of the two countries were part of these negotiations.
Baglihar Dam had been under construction in the Doda district having the capacity of
450 MW power generation for the areas of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian position
on this project has been that the design of the Baglihar project did not violate the terms
of the Indus Water Treaty and was within the national and international practices. 104
Pakistan, on the other hand, objected to this project because this hydropower project
could affect the water flow downstream. 105 Moreover, the gated structure of the project
could stop approximately 8,000 cusecs of water to Pakistan. Figure 5.10 shows the site
of Baglihar Project.
In October 2003, a delegation of Pakistan’s Indus Commission visited the dam site in
Jammu and Kashmir. After this survey, Pakistan decided to bring in the neutral experts
from the World Bank. In January and May 2004 meetings, both the countries again
discussed the matter. Pakistan took the matter to be decided by the World Bank experts
104 . Qudssia Akhlaque. Final Notice to be served on India: Baglihar Dam Issue, Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), November 30, 2003, See online http://www.dawn.com/2003/11/20/top3.htm. 105 . Pakistan asks India to stop work on Hydel Projects, Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), June 4, 2007. 264 in June 2005. 106 A Swiss Civil Engineer Raymond Lafitte was appointed as an adjudicator and he upheld Pakistan’s objections in his decision of February 2007. Both
Pakistan and India agreed to abide by the decision and this decision by the World Bank expert was hoped to have a positive impact on other water disputed issues between the two countries.
Figure 5.10: The Baglihar Dam Project
Source: Baglihar Dam, Jammu and Kashmir, October 10, 2010, India NET Zone, Mumbai, see online http://www.indianetzone.com/33/baglihar_dam_jammu_kashmir.htm
• Kishenganga
Another hydropower project of India had also been objected to by Pakistan. India
planned to construct this project on the Neelum River in the Gurez Valley and India
also wanted to divert the course of the river to the Wullar Lake through a tunnel. Figure
5.11 and 5.12 show the site of Kishenganga Project. This project was defended again
by India in such a way that diversion of water from one tributary of Jhelum to another
was allowed under the Indus Water Treaty. Three rounds of talks were held on this issue
106 . Pakistan−India Relations, PILDAT Report, Islamabad: Pakistani Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), June 13, 2011, pp. 13-14.
265 between Pakistan and India. The last round of talks was held from May 9-11, 2005 in which Pakistan and India was represented by their respective officials from the permanent Indus Water Commissions. Pakistan objected to the design of the Indian project because Pakistan also planned to construct power station on Jhelum which could be affected by India’s intentional diversion of water. The project with 330 MW capacity could violate the terms of the Indus Water Treaty according to Pakistan. The Indian proposal of accepting certain changes in design was rejected by Pakistan and Pakistan preferred international arbitration by the World Bank on the issue like Baglihar project. 107
On the demand of Pakistan, arbitral proceedings were initiated against India in 2010 by the Hague Court of Arbitration, asking India to clarify the position and permissibility of the diversion of waters of Neelum/Kishenganga to be used for Kishnganga
Hydroelecrtic Project with its impacts on Pakistan’s hydroelectric project which was under construction downstream. The Court gave its final ruling i.e. “Final Award” on
December 20, 2013 allowing India “to release minimum flow of 9 Cumecs* into the
Kishenganga/Neelum Riverat all times below the Kishenganga Hydro Electric
Project.” 108 The Court further decided that though the nature of the decision was
binding on both parties yet Pakistan or India may request for reconsideration of the
decision after seven years from the first water diversion from Kishenganga/Neelum
River through the Indus Water Treaty mechanism which provides for permanent Indus
Commissions.
107 . Dilshad Azeem. The Hague Court asks India to stop Kishanganga Project, The News , Islamabad (Pakistan), September 25, 2011. *. The cumec is a measure of flow rate, as shorthand for " cu bic me tre per se cond. 108 . Steven Arrigg Koh. Hague Court of Arbitration Rules in Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India) (December 20, 2013), International Law in Brief , Washington D.C: American Society of International Law, January 23, 2014. 266
Figure 5.11: The Kishenganga Project Location
Source: Government wakes up to India’s hydel projects, February 27, 2011, Dawn, Karachi, see online http://beta.dawn.com/news/609504/govt-wakes-up-to-indias-hydel-projects
Figure 5.12: The Kishenganga Project Location
Source: India completes 75% of work on Kishanganga Project, August 18, 2013, see online http://dunyanews.tv/index.php/en/Pakistan/188355-India-completes-75%25-of-work-on- Kishanganga-Project
267
5.5.7. Economic and Commercial Cooperation
The economic and commercial cooperation was another important aspect of Composite
Dialogue and under this aspect, various agreements were concluded. The Joint Business
Councils and Joint Economic Commissions were brought into effect in 2004. The second round of talks on economic cooperation was held in August 2005 in which the two countries agreed on:
• Bilateral discussions to review the Shipping Protocol of 1975 according to
which para 3 and 5 were deleted and this initiative lifted the restriction of lifting
the cargo between the two countries by a third country and also lifting of third
country cargo by Pakistan or India flag vessels from each other’s ports. This
agreement enabled the ships of the two countries to carry increased tonnage and
also had positive impacts on the competitive shipping rates; 109
• Bilateral Maritime Shipping agreements were also under discussion during that
period under the Composite Dialogue;
• Talks on aeronautics to review the air service agreement;
• Meeting of the Joint Study Group to focus on cooperation in customs and trade
fields including non-tariff barriers;
• Banking and commercial cooperation between the two countries. It is important
to note that this commercial cooperation developed banking coordination in the
two countries. The National Bank of Pakistan opted to open the first branch in
India and the Reserve Bank of India also proposed the names of the banks to be
opened in Pakistan.
109 . S. Akbar Zaidi. India−Pakistan Trade, South Asian Journal , Trenton, No. 4, April-June 2004, see online http:// www.Southasian media.net/Magazine/Journal/indiapakistan_trade.htm 268
Apart from these issues, an issue of granting MFN status to India was also taken up by
Pakistan. 110 When the South Asian Free Trade Association (SAFTA) came into force in January 2006, India automatically assumed De Facto MFN status from Pakistan but
Pakistan initially was reluctant to ratify SAFTA. 111 In February 2006, though Pakistan
ratified SAFTA but linked granting MFN status to India with the resolution of Kashmir
dispute first.
The Fourth Round of India−Pakistan negotiations was held at Secretaries level in New
Delhi on July 31 st -August 1 st , 2007 within the framework of the Composite Dialogue on Economic and Commercial Cooperation. 112 These negotiations were held in a cordial environment. The issues discussed and decisions taken were as following:
The two sides agreed on the following:
• India agreed on the facilitation of cement import from Pakistan and the related
statutory certification and policy changes to be worked out on priority basis.
India also presented its stance of involving third party certification in cement
import;
• Like cement import from Pakistan to India, Pakistan agreed to facilitate tea
import from India through rail with further agreement to provide concessions
on duties for import of India tea;
• A delegation from Pakistan also visited India to see IT enabled tele-medicines
facilities on the invitation of India in order to increase cooperation and
collaboration in this field;
110 . Abid Hussain Imam. What the MFN Means, Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), November 7, 2011. 111 . Shahbaz Rana. MFN Status to India: Pakistan Proposes Safeguards for Local Industry”, The Express Tribune , Karachi (Pakistan), December 23, 2011. 112 . Joint Statement on the Fourth Round of India Pakistan talks on Economic and Commercial Cooperation, New Delhi, August 1 2007, See online at http://indembkwt.org/press/aug0107.htm 269
• An agreement was also reached between the two countries to nominate
representatives for the Joint Working Group to negotiate the issue of registering
Basmati rice jointly as a Geographical Indication (GI);
• It was also proposed by the Indian side that the Munabao-Khokrapar route for
freight movement should be made functional and operative for the purpose of
decreasing pressure on Attari-Lahore rail route and further developing the trade
links;
• In order to improve trade between the two countries, a list of 484 tariff lines was
provided by India to include in the positive list of importable items from India.
Pakistan decided to consider the proposal in a meeting with stakeholders;
• One of the healthy initiatives taken in these trade talks was the decision to
facilitate and hold exhibitions of trade in each other’s countries. In this regard,
Pakistan was invited by India to hold a trade exhibition in India with the name
of “Made in Pakistan;”
• In order to facilitate Pakistan’s exports to India, Pakistan was invited by India
to identify 20 products of its export interest to India enabling India to inform
Pakistan in a detailed way about its import regime on the items identified by
Pakistan;
• The Indian delegation informed that a Task Force constituted for the purpose of
considering Non-tariff barriers and para-tariffs was in the process of making
recommendations for removing all barriers for facilitating market access to all
SAARC members;
• In order to develop an Integrated Check-Post (ICP) at Wagah/ Attari Border,
both Pakistan and India shared views and presented their positions regarding the 270
infrastructure and plan for development on either side. They agreed to continue
sharing information and collaboration on the development of ICP;
• Both Pakistan and India showed satisfaction over their step of allowing cross-
border truck movement up to Wagah/Attari for unloading and reloading cargo.
Both sides agreed to hold further meeting to decide the modalities in that regard;
• An agreement was reached between the two sides to constitute a Joint Group
represented by the Joint Secretaries of Commerce from both sides in order to
coordinate the understanding reached in the meeting and to monitor the
activities accordingly.
The bilateral trade between Pakistan and India stood at 1.7 billion dollars during 2007-
08 and this figure remained in favor of India. The volume of trade between Pakistan and India rose from 235 million dollars in 2002 to 1,956 million dollars in 2008. 113 But
the volume of Indian exports to Pakistan remained high as compared to Pakistan’s
exports to India. However, the two sides aimed to reach the target of 10 billion dollars
in bilateral trade. In October 2007, both the countries allowed cargo trucks to carry
goods from each other’s territories. Many agricultural products were expected to take
benefit from this policy of the two countries.
• Iran-Pakistan−India (IPI) Gas Pipeline
The most important economic and commercial cooperation was in the field of gas
pipeline known as Iran−Pakistan−India (IPI) Gas Pipeline, a 2,775 Kilometers long
pipeline project which was decided to be initiated with the coordination of the three
countries from Assaluyah, 114 South Pars in Iran to India while passing through
113 . Aditi Phadnis. Bringing Down Barriers: Phased Expansion of India Trade from February, The Express Tribune , Karachi (Pakistan), November 15, 2011. 114 . Shamila N. Chaudhary. Iran to India Natural Gas Pipeline: Implications for Conflict Resolution & Regionalism in India, Iran, and Pakistan, Trade and Environment Database (TED) Case Studies, Washington D.C: School of International Service, American University, March 3, 2010. 271
Pakistan’s provinces of Sindh and Balochistan. In order to build the trust between
Pakistan and India, this project augured well for the future as economic cooperation under this project could touch the heights of development. However, the various individual problems of the three countries kept the work and further discussions on the proposed project inconclusive. Iran’s position in terms of regional and international political situation, Pakistan’s domestic problems and India’ uncertain outlook on the issue delayed any solid decision in this regard. In 2007, the three partners again started discussions and Pakistan and India tried to resolve the issue of transit fee. While India wanted to give Pakistan 0.15 per million British Thermal Unit (BTU)* as against the demand of Pakistan of 0.493 per million BTU. Finally, the two countries started discussion on resolving the issue and technical teams from the two countries met in
April 2007 to form the structure committees and to streamline the process of resolving the issues of transit trade and tariffs relating to the project. No doubt, the committed stance on this project would open the ways for the two countries to cooperate in the project of Turkmenistan−Afghanistan−Pakistan−India (TAPI) Gas Pipeline Project and
Qatar−Pakistan Pipeline Project. 115 These economic and commercial projects would
surely remove the trust deficit between the two rival neighbors. The IPI pipeline project
would also generate many employment opportunities in both Pakistan and India. In
order to make this project successful, political cooperation is also very important
between the two import dependent and energy deficit economies.
*. The British Thermal Unit (BTU or Btu ) is a traditional unit of energy equal to about 1055 joules. It is the amount of energy needed to cool or heat one pound of water by one degree Fahrenheit. In science, the joule, the SI unit of energy, has largely replaced the BTU. The BTU is most often used as a measure of power (as BTU/h) in the power, steam generation, heating, and air conditioning industries, and also as a measure of agricultural energy production (BTU/kg).
115 . Sohaib Shahid. Iran-Pak-India Gas Pipeline: Implications and Prospects, Business & Finance Review (Jang Group of Newspapers), Islamabad (Pakistan), January 15, 2007. 272
5.5.8. Promotion of cooperation / Friendly Exchanges in Different Fields
The Composite Dialogue process also covered areas where the two countries were to promote collaboration. People to people contacts had increased and bus and rail services in this regard were attended to by the governments of the two countries. It is worth mentioning that the cricket series held in March 2004 really marked an important event in changing the psychology of the two sides for support and peace building instead of thinking negatively. In April 2005, President Pervez Musharraf went to watch an
India−Pakistan cricket match during his state visit to India. These friendly exchanges have very positively changed the perceptions of common people in both sides. The
people on both sides got the opportunity to meet under the newly initiated bus and rail
links as a component of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Various upheavals in
relations after the initiation of Composite Dialogue did not disturb the flow of good
relations. 116 During the meetings of Cultural Ministries of both countries, an emphasis was particularly made on easing visa regimes for common people and facilitating the pilgrims seeking to visit religious places on both sides.
The visits of civil society members representing media, sports, culture and arts contributed a great deal into developing good relationship between the two nuclear neighbors. A noteworthy development in this regard was made by reaching an agreement in 2008 to facilitate regular collaboration and exchange between the state- run think tanks i. e. the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (Pakistan) and the
Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi (India) for the purpose of developing and promoting communication and information between the scholars of the two countries. For promotion of friendly exchanges, both Pakistan and India decided in
116 . Shamshad Ahmad. Wishful Claims of Progress, Dawn , Karachi (Pakistan), May 3, 2007. 273
2006 to host each other’s movies’ festivals. In 2008, the government of Pakistan gave decision with regard to release of Indian movies legally in Pakistan.
‹ October 2005 Earthquake in Pakistan and Indian Offer of Support
After October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, India offered help to Pakistan. However,
Indian proposals to send food supplies and medical personnel across the Line of Control
(LOC) were not accepted by Pakistan. But Pakistani helicopters were permitted to fly
up to the LOC for relief purposes. It is worth mentioning that in normal times, this
practice of flying up to the LOC was not allowed. 117 On October 19, 2005 the telephone lines were restored across the LOC in order to facilitate people across the borders.
India decided to set up three points along the Line of Control (LOC) i.e. Kaman, Tithwal and Poonch for providing medical treatment, food and relief to the affected people.
Moreover, it was also allowed that the Indian nationals could come to meet their relatives on these points who might come from across the border. Pakistan decided to set up five points along the Line of Control (LOC) i.e. Nauseri-Tithwal, Chakoti-Uri,
Hajipur-Uri, Tattapani-Mendhar and Rawalkot-Poonch. However, Pakistan’s suggestion of sending her pilots to India for bringing Indian helicopters to Pakistan for relief purposes was not accepted by the Indian government. The overall development during this period was encouraging in view of the goodwill demonstrated from the two sides.
5.6. Conclusion
Peace process, no matter of whatever scale and dimension, always brings results even if of temporary nature. A peace initiative can contribute even if in the shape of status
117 . Indian Troops Cross LoC to back up Relief Efforts, Dawn- Top Stories; Karachi (Pakistan), October 13, 2005. 274 quo. Pervez Musharraf’s period of government in Pakistan did create a change in the tension-ridden relationship between the two nuclear powers. 118 Though the Composite
Dialogue, initiated in 2004, produced enormous gains in various fields and both the
countries moved ahead with more positive outlooks, there was still more needed to be
done. For example, the people to people contacts should be increased with attention
paid to the relaxation of visa regimes in both Pakistan and India. Moreover, various
prisoners on both sides languishing in jails should be released on immediate basis as a
Confidence Building Measure (CBM) to strengthen the relationship on sound footing.
Both need to understand the dynamics of changing geo-political and strategic
conditions and should not lose a single moment to streamline their relationship
economically and politically.
======
118 . From Interview with Prof. Dr. Adnan Sarwar Khan, Chairman Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar on June 15 th , 2012. 275
CHAPTER−6 CONCLUSION RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
276
CHAPTER−6
CONCLUSION
RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
6.1. Conclusion
History is always made of the experiences which the people of any nation face and
Pakistan−India relations have seen a history of mistrust and intense rivalry during the years after independence. With the exception of few friendship gestures, the relationship between the two countries has never been sound. The South Asia is an important and potential region economically but having enormous problems. These problems have not let the nations in South Asia to utilize the human and material resources which the nature has blessed them with. The security of South Asia depends, to a greater extent, upon the sensible approaches and rational decision making based on cooperation and peace between Pakistan and India. 1
Pakistan and India, being important nuclear states of South Asia, carry greater responsibility and a sense of logical approaches for making their future better both politically and socio-economically. Non-resolution of disputes has made South Asia a critical area with extreme dangers of nuclear holocaust. It is worth mentioning that
Pakistan and India remained under the process of dialogue at various occasions in the post-independence period which, to some extent, removed ill-feeing on both sides but lacked permanent feature because of the suspension of negotiations on various occasions. 2 Pakistan, with about 180 million population, and India with about 1.4
1. Shaheen Akhtar and Sidra Tariq. The India−Pakistan Peace Process, IRS Regional Brief, Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, No. 16, January-February 2010, pp. 83-84. 2. Umbreen Javaid. Peace and Security in South Asia: Issues and Challenges, Lahore: University of the Panjab, Pakistan Study Centre, 2006, p. 13. 277 billion, together make over one fifth of the population in the world. The serious and delicate relationship between these two neighbors has eaten away major chunk of their resources. The resolution of all sorts of conflicts is essential for both Pakistan and India not only for the survival of the people but also for the diversion of financial resources from defence to developmental objectives.
There is no denying the fact that the problem of perception is the major one in
Pakistan−India relationship. People in both the countries are captives of their own perceptions about each other and unless and until these perceptions and negative images are corrected, no way to positive development can be found in Pakistan−India relations. 3 The policy of conciliation and cooperation is the need of the day instead of
confrontation. The removal of fear and dangerous perceptions on both sides would
begin a new and true approach based on trust between Pakistan and India mending the
already deteriorated regional and bilateral environment since partition.
The survival and security of the people is very much connected with the determination
shown by the two sides to resolve their disputed issues and develop cooperative
relationship. There is no other option for Pakistan and India to move forward while
leaving each other. They can neither change their geographical position nor can afford
to go for war in this age of nuclear dangers. The only way to go for is to continue the
dialogue process which can lead towards better understanding as well as solution of the
problems obstructing their national development. 4
3. Aijaz Ahmad. Lineages of the Present Ideology and Politics in Contemporary South Asia, London : Penguin Publishers, 2000, p. 260. 4. Ishtiaq Ahmed. India−Pakistan Relations: Post-Mumbai Terrorist Attacks , ISAS Insights, Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, No. 89 , January 2010, pp. 27-29. 278
The age old problem and animosity needs to be mended because now is the age of economic and technological development and without cooperation and trust, both
Pakistan and India would lose the opportunity to create a peaceful environment for better future of the people.
The peace process initiated since 1999 can also fall victim to the same hostile policy designs if India and Pakistan do not understand the logical and reasonable stance to be taken for their own prosperity as well as the progress of the whole South Asia.
The dialogue process which started in 1999 and continued till 2004, really worked and has changed the things for the better. Many issues had come under discussion in meetings taking place at high levels. The Track II diplomacy also played an important role in bringing the two states closer. The Composite Dialogue process had marked a prominent shift when compared with the past experiences. 5 A structured dialogue process was initiated for all the problems discussed during the period. With greater understanding of the region’s political situation, Pakistan and India had been moving forward with positive approaches and were trying their best not to repeat the mistakes of the past. Apart from media hypes, the back channel diplomacy had also been utilized for discussing matters of mutual concern.
One of the important features of the Composite Dialogue Process initiated by Pakistan and India is that both the countries have started multilayered negotiations on various disputed issues like terrorism, drug trafficking, peace and security, CBMs and other cooperative exchanges showing commitment to resolve them as compared to the previous irregular meetings. 6 Considering the importance of peaceful relations between
5. G. Parthsarthy. “India−Pakistan Relations” , in Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (Eds.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities , New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007, p. 629. 6. The Hindu , New Delhi, February 18, 2004. 279 the two countries, the pressure to attain immediate successes on all the issues was averted logically and a gradual progress was noted on various topics of discussion.
Instead of criticizing each other for anything, an approach was adopted to put aside an issue for the time being or to arrange a meeting at the appropriate level. 7
According to a questionnaire report of the researcher, 51 percent of the people in
Pakistan from different walks of life have the opinion that the dialogue between
Pakistan and India during the period under reference had established significantly better
contacts between the two governments. They felt more prone to come on the discussion
table than to run away from each other. The positivity in the composite dialogue process
was comparatively much better than the previous meetings because almost all disputed
issues were outlined for the resolution and the reservations of the two sides were put on
the table. 90 percent of the respondents said that the tolerance and mutual trust shown
since 2004 was remarkable and with the exception of few events which put the process
on halt, the overall progress had been very constructive. 8
With the beginning of peace efforts and dialogue between the two countries, the visits by cultural and business delegation increased and the media also found a way to have access to the opinion prevailing on both sides, the lack of which had previously marred any positive development in the peace efforts. In this age of economic cooperation and regional peace, the shifting of public opinion, in both the countries, for peaceful co- existence was a good omen for a bright future of the South Asia.
The think tanks and academic circles in the two countries had started favoring a supportive stance for peace and cooperation. For India, in order to become a power in
Asia, it is very important to resolve her disputes with neighbors and for Pakistan, on
7. P. R. Chari. “The Need for Confidence Building Measures”, in Monique Mekenkamp, Paul Van Tongeren and Hans Van De Ven (Eds.), Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Activities , Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp. 237-48. 8. Conclusion drawn by the researcher from the answers given by respondents in questionnaires. 280 the other side, peace with India is necessary to address several of her domestic, economic and social problems. It has also been observed that the old condition from the Pakistani side to hold discussions on all other economic and political issues once
Kashmir issue is resolved, has also been somewhat relaxed and now all the issues are discussed simultaneously with reasonable approach and understanding.
The improvement of the bilateral relationship and commitment to maintain ceasefire in
Kashmir clearly shows a modest approach from the two sides to reach an agreement on the issue. It can be said that dramatic moves have been made in the peace and security field along with the desire and signing of the agreements on rail and road links. These were the issues which no side could imagine to discuss in view of their hostile thinking towards one another. The bus service between Srinagar (Indian held Kashmir) and
Muzzafarabad (Pakistani side of Kashmir) provided an opportunity to the people of
Kashmir to come closer and meet their loved ones across the border. This was not an easy issue to be decided and discussed by Pakistan and India as it is always said to be the bone of contention and a root of mistrust between the two sides. But the peace process initiated in 1999 opened the doors of cooperation with “Not looking back” theme. Special travel documents were issued for the Kashmiri people on both sides of the Line of Control.9 It is worth mentioning that the earthquake which devastated the
Muzzafarabad area intensely brought the two countries more closer with India offering financial assistance as well as opening of the checkpoints for easy movement of the relief goods and volunteers. 10
No doubt, the peace process is going on between Pakistan and India and the two countries have been making greater progress in their relationship while moving on
9. Hindustan Times , New Delhi , February 18, 2005. 10 . Nayyar N. Khan. Kashmir Conflict and Prospects of Peace in South Asia, See online The normal relations between Pakistan and India depend on the good faith of the leadership of the two countries. They need to work for the continued dialogue ahead on all the issues which can be resolved. The more Pakistan and India come closer to understand each other, greater would be the prospects of their shunning differences. In order to strengthen the present Pakistan−India dialogue process and to remove the hurdles which can impair the Composite Dialogue, it is very important to make spirited efforts for the resolution of contentious issues and for that purpose, the following recommendations can be offered: 6.2. Recommendations • Among all the issues which need resolution between Pakistan and India, Kashmir occupies a key position. Lasting peace is impossible without the resolution of this dispute. 12 Though the Pakistan−India peace process was initiated in 1999 and, formally in 2004, the Kashmir problem was included as a priority issue for discussion, the matter has not moved ahead from simple 11 . The statement was read by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf on the occasion of the later’s state visit to New Delhi, Dawn, Karachi, April 19, 2005. 12 . From interview with Dr. Zohaib Hayat, Department of International Relations, Preston University, Islamabad on May 24, 2012. 282 discussions. 13 During the negotiations between President Pervaiz Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, this issue came to the discussion table and a progress was made 14 on few elements of the problems other than any transfer of the territory that included: a) A phased withdrawal of the troops by both Pakistan and India on both sides of the border; b) Some cooperative mechanism across the Line of Control; c) Arranging an organized and increased movement of goods and people across the borders; d) Working and negotiating autonomy and self-governance in Kashmir on both sides of the border. In this regard, a number of steps were taken including launching of a bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad in April 2005 and between Rawalakot and Poonch in June 2006, opening of the five points of crossing in October 2005 on the Line of Control. 15 The trade across borders still faces extreme difficulties like the procedural checking and absence of trade supportive mechanisms which takes hours and causes enormous expenditures. 16 According to one estimate, even a two day trade in a week between Pakistan and India takes two crore of Indian Rupees. 17 This figure can tell us the gravity of the situation and the need to address the situation by both the governments. 18 It seems sometimes that the 13 . Sumit Ganguly, Counter Terrorism Cooperation in South Asia , Special Report, Washington D.C: National Bureau of Asian Research, No. 21, December 2009, pp. 9-11. 14 . All Options are open, The Hindu, New Delhi, December 20, 2001. 15 . “Manmohan Singh open to soft borders with Pakistan”, Times of India , New Delhi, May 26, 2004. 16 . Nayyar N. Khan. “Kashmir Conflict and Prospects of Peace in South Asia”, See online steps initiated have not been taken that seriously and a reverse is still seen to their old traditional positions. 19 There is an intense need to understand the situation seriously and take all such measures that can help bring long-term normalization in relations. Both Pakistan and India are not prepared to abandon their principled stand on the issue. It is because of the rivalry over Kashmir that Pakistan has been facing security threats from across the border. We have fought three wars on the dispute and lost East Pakistan in 1971 with the active involvement of India in the said disintegration. This is true about India as well because changing her policy over Kashmir will give strength to centrifugal elements in India. The best way for Pakistan is to keep the issue burning while working on the diffusion of tension as well. A peaceful solution is possible provided the international community extends moral support. 20 • Among the most important and hot issues that can create a holocaust in the South Asia, water problem ranks foremost and needs to be dealt with seriously. Since independence, Pakistan has faced serious problems on water distribution issue and has time and again called the Indian government to resolve the issue with mutual consent. 21 It was the same problem which made the World Bank to intervene and in 1960 Indus Water Treaty 22 was signed between Pakistan and India but still Pakistan is facing breach of the agreement by India and building of dams on Pakistan’s share of water. 23 19 . Mehreen Zahra Malik. “Kashmiris are not tired but they need a change in strategy”, Friday Times, Lahore , February 2-8, 2007. 20 . From interview with Prof. Dr. Adnan Sarwar Khan, Chairman Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar on June 15 th , 2012. 21 . Amy Kazmin. “India and Pakistan to Arbitrate Water Feud”, Financial Times, London, June 18, 2010. 22 . Details available on http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-1105 73725 35 88/I ndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf 23 . Saleem H. Ali. Water Politics in South Asia: Technocratic Cooperation in the Indus basin and beyond, Journal of International Affairs , New York: School of International and Public Affairs, Spring 2008, pp. 24-25. 284 For Pakistan, it is an important issue to be resolved because of the increasing energy crisis which Pakistan is currently faced with. In case the water issue is not handled properly and reasonably, Pakistan will face extreme shortage of water as India is building new hydro-power projects on Indian side of the Kashmir wherefrom Pakistan’s share of water also flows. 24 Both the countries need to make joint efforts to deal with the problem of changes in river flow on both sides, joint utilization of the rivers and storage issues for economic purposes. Both Pakistan and India should take up this issue seriously in order to prevent a dangerous war on this important resource as current is the age of ‘resource warfare.’ • All steps towards cooperation can be meaningful only if the leadership is sincere in developing friendship between the two countries. The media, think tanks and academic circles need to play some role in the removal of the age old rivalry that has produced nothing but hatred and miseries. The defence budgets of Pakistan and India have kept on rising since independence and no gesture of friendship could reduce their size. But the peace process initiated in 1999 brought changes in thinking. Still the need is there to solidify the positive thinking and to divert a major chunk of the defence budgets to social development. Given the good intentions of the political and administrative leadership from both sides, all the ways of mutual trust and friendship can be opened with the passage of time provided the process of dialogue continues. • A question of central importance put to the respondents was the future prospects of a nuclear war between Pakistan and India. A majority of respondents were of 24 . Farzana Shah. Hydrological War of India against Pakistan: Plans, Impact and Consequences, Brass Tacks Security Analysis , Islamabad, Vol. 1, No. 2, July 2010, pp. 3-15. 285 the view that the two countries must agree to a ‘No War’ agreement and particularly avoid the use of nuclear weapons. As many as 89 percent of the people answered that poverty in Pakistan and India is because they pay more attention towards their security issues. 25 What is needed is to give this conviction a formal shape and that is possible only through signing a “No War Pact” and “No to first use of the Nuclear Weapons.” And these pacts must be approved by the legislatures in both the countries for putting them into the category of laws which should then be endorsed by the people on both sides by holding referendum nationally in each country. 26 This would positively affect the peace efforts and would make a real positive change in the traditional age old hostility and trust deficit. • Apart from Kashmir, there are various issues between Pakistan and India lingering on for years which need to be addressed on immediate basis. And the most important issues of concern are those of Sir Creek and Siachen. 27 Though these issues were included in the Composite Dialogue and the negotiations progressed a lot,28 a stalemate came in 2008 on the issue of withdrawal of Indian army and the boundary determination but hopes are still high for the solution of the problem. The UN Charter provides a mechanism for solving disputes. Help can be sought from the UN Security Council for mediation. Siachen and Sir Creek are the boundary disputes and can be resolved through the involvement of International Boundary Commission. The International Court of Justice also enjoys jurisdiction over such cases provided parties to the dispute make a 25 . Conclusion drawn by the researcher from the answers given by respondents in questionnaires. 26 . M. G. Chitkara. Indo−Pak Amity: A New Concept, New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1994, p. 130. 27 . Raspal S. Khosa. The Siachen Glacier Dispute: Imbroglio on the Roof of the World, Contemporary South Asia , London: Tylor and Francis Publications, Vol. 8, No. 2, July 1999, p. 194. 28 . Parvez Iqbal Cheema. Siachen Disappointment, The Post, Lahore, April 15, 2007. 286 written recourse to the Court. 29 People to people contacts including academic and intellectual interaction and the political will to resolve the disputes should be there. 30 These issues are not that difficult to be resolved provided the leadership on both sides show a strong commitment and desire towards the maintenance of peaceful environment in the region. Once these issues are resolved, other matters can be taken up with hope and confidence. 31 • Media today has become one of the most important channels of information for even a common man. Media can very easily and strongly influence the policies in both Pakistan and India. One reason for intense enmity between the two neighbors has been the media hype created in the two countries on every minor issue. Media, both print and electronic, can play a very positive role in creating a friendly environment between the two neighbors. Instead of manipulating the facts, it must understand the realities in the region and the positive face of neighborhood which can have a deeper impact on the lives of people socially and economically. “Aman ki Asha”*, a healthy initiative launched by the Jang Group of Newspapers is a noteworthy development which can sufficiently 29 . From Interview with Prof. Dr. Adnan Sarwar Khan, Op. cit. 30 . From interview with Hidayat-ur-Rehman, Op. cit. 31 . Rizwan Zeb and Suba Chandran. Indo−Pak Conflicts: Ripe to Resolve, RCSS Policy Studies , Columbo: Regional Center for Strategic Studies, No. 34, 2005, p. 23. *. Aman ki Asha (Hope for Peace) is a campaign jointly started by the two leading media houses The “Jang Group” in Pakistan and the “Times of India” in India. The campaign aims at mutual peace and development of the diplomatic and cultural relations between the two nations in South Asia. It started on January 1, 2010. Bennett & Coleman, the holding company of Times Group has been trying valiantly to keep the campaign afloat through a high decibel media campaign. “Aman ki Asha” was inspired by the groundbreaking work of “Friends without Borders”, an International NGO, that launched bold, love-based people-to-people campaigns between the children and people of both countries between 2005-2007. The “Times of India” and the “Jang group” both partnered with “Friends without Borders” and picked up the efforts after the Dil se Dil Border Concert was canceled in August 2007. The main aim of “Aman ki Asha” is that peace efforts between India and Pakistan are the real need of the hour and only prudence, foresightedness and sincerity can do wonders for both countries. In this, people of India and Pakistan communicate with each other. 287 bridge the gulf provided the intentions are sincere in moving forward on the road to friendship. Given the already tensed atmosphere between the two nations, the media people should not create hype for each and everything. They should, instead, fight the intolerance and injustice and should create the environment where the two nations can get closer to each other. In this regard, the efforts of media on both sides during 1999-2008 are appreciable but that needs to be strengthened in order to avoid all the ills that can invade the peace and cooperation. Both the nations must fight their problems together particularly extremism and economic ills that they face equally. Peace and stability for Pakistan and India is the need of the time because the nuclear assets of the two can create a holocaust for the whole region in case of any war-like situation. It is certainly an illogical approach to hype up the conflicts which neither of them would be able to afford and which has for long disturbed the stability of the region and is prone to derail the newly initiated peace process also. 32 Sane voices on both sides have started thinking about the media war which has gone out of control. So before it plays havoc with the survival of the two nations, it must be addressed to bring the media professionals on line because they are neither the policy makers nor answerable for the policies of the states, then there is no need for them to justify the wrongs and hide the truth. 33 Reactive assaults must be mended by the media itself and emotional hype motivating conflicts 32 . Muhammad Amit Rana. Media in Pakistan: An Overview, Conflict and Peace Studies, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Policy Studies, Vol. 1, 2008, pp. 7-9. 33 . Andrew Buncombe. Who has the “Most Free” Media? India or Pakistan?, The Independent , London, November 11, 2010. See online http://blogs.independent.co.uk/2010/11/11/who-has-the-most-free- media-india-or-pakistan/ 288 must be cooled off in order to see the issues and problems in a reasonable perspective. • It is the need of the time that objective approach should be adopted with regard to the flow of information and instead of hiding the truth, both Pakistan and India should provide an easy access to the information available and truth must be brought to the limelight. Many research and strategic institutions are working in Pakistan for the purpose and their work is appreciable but still there is more to be done. These sources must act not only for creating awareness among the general public but also guide the policy making in both the countries. The non- availability of the Indian publications and research also makes the matters more worse. Efforts should be made on both sides to make the research and publications accessible so that people are able to make their own conclusions. The prevalent conspiracies and propaganda campaigns by the Indian information and communication media can be averted only if India rises above the so-called leadership approach to issues and reservations. Only then Indian people and leaders would find greater goodwill and friendly environment in Pakistan. • There are many potential areas of cooperation in which both can put their efforts mutually like the IT related projects which can be undertaken jointly and can become a boosting business for both the countries as well as a good market for the international business companies. Similarly, the joint support in telecommunication is also a potential sector for the people which, in turn, would 289 definitely have a positive impact on the people to people contacts between the two countries. 34 In the field of energy, Pakistan and India can create joint ventures in fulfilling each other’s electricity needs. One of the most promising areas for future cooperation is the wind energy which is quite expensive but is a strong and efficient source of power generation. The interlinking of this sector can give a powerful base for the establishment of energy zone in the South Asia. Table 6.1 shows many potential areas in which both Pakistan and India can cooperate. Table 6.1: Potential Areas for Pakistam-India Cooperation Potential Areas For Pakistan−India Economic Cooperation Agriculture Water Management Environment Issues Automobiles Leather Pharmaceuticals Tea/Coffee Textile Industries IT Joint Ventures Telecommunication Hydropower Plastics Minerals Tourism Chemicals Wind Energy Electricity Gas Infrastructure Generation Engineering Products Transportation Technology Source: http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB118-Ploughshares-Raghav.pdf • A lot of scope for cooperation exists in the above mentioned sectors and also because these have got greater prominence in the face of growing importance of regional cooperation. 35 Though the trade between Pakistan and India has increased over time, it still forms a fraction of the international trade which the two countries conduct with other countries. 36 In this regard, the Chambers of Commerce and Industries of the two countries need to increase their contacts. 34 . J.N. Dixit. Indian Regional Developments: Through the Prism of Indo−Pak Relations, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2004, p. 18. 35 . Sadiq Ahmed and Saman Kelegama. Promoting Economic Cooperation in South Asia: Beyond SAFTA, The World Bank Report , New York: Sage Publications, 2010, p. 195. 36 . S. Akbar Zaidi. India−Pakistan Trade, South Asian Journal , April-Jun 2004, See online http://www. southasian media.net/ Magazine/Journal/indiapakistan_trade.htm 290 According to the researcher’s questionnaire report, 62 percent people favored granting of MFN status to India by Pakistan and considered that as a healthy development in the relations. It can restore trust and confidence on each other. An environment of understanding and cooperation is a must for bringing the two hostile states closer to each other. 37 Currently, a huge quantity of trade commodities enter into the territories of the two countries through illegal means. What is wrong if the transaction is regularized for this will create business opportunities for many and also bring enormous revenue to the government exchequer. 38 The bureaucratic and technical hurdles which Pakistan−India trade faces need to be addressed on emergent basis. 39 In this regard, the Chambers of Commerce and Industries in both countries have started their efforts to deal with the snags which economic cooperation has been facing for a long time. The governments of the two countries should work on this issue and must take the matter out of the administrative problems. For the sake of prosperity and stability, it is very essential that the two countries move ahead for meaningful collaboration for the purpose of economic strength and to curtail the ill- feelings which sowed the seeds of hatred in the hearts of people for years. There are many potential areas in which Pakistan and India can enhance their cooperation and gain greater advantages in the economic and social sectors. The success of regional organizations is heavily dependent upon the strength of Pakistan−India relations and success in this direction can lead 37 . Conclusion drawn by the researcher from the answers given by respondents in questionnaires. 38 . From interview with Prof. Dr. Taj Moharram Khan, Chairman Department of History, University of Peshawar on June 14 th , 2012. 39 . Mohsin S. Khan. India−Pakistan Trade: A Roadmap for Enhancing Economic Relations, Policy Brief , Washington D.C: Peterson Institute for International Economics, No. 09-15, July 2009, pp. 10-12. 291 towards decreasing dependence on the Western powers. 40 So it is the cry of the day to catch the opportune moment and to move the energies from ill activities to the utilization of human skills for the exploration of natural resources which they are blessed with. It is the time to shun hatred and suspicion and, instead, initiate a process of long-term cooperation for economic development between the countries otherwise the race for arms and power would eat up their meager resources. 41 Nothing will remain of this blessed region if the sensitivities are not addressed timely by the leadership of the two countries. The future holds a greater opportunity for both the states either to become strong through mutual peace and cooperation or to destroy themselves by involving them in the never ending hostility. It is a clear fact that the future of South Asia in terms of socio- economic progress, would be shaped by the trends in Pakistan−India relations in the 21 st century. • It is very important for Pakistan and India to arrange visits of various societal circles including sports, music, arts and literature and this can be possible only when visa regime is liberalized. The exchange visits of college and university students and the resulting understanding would help in removing the biases caused due to the absence of close interaction. • It is good that Pakistan and India have adopted a number of security and conventional CBMs in the Composite Dialogue process and it is the need of the time to agree on more CBMs because it will pave the way to the resolution of 40 . Sumantra Bose. Decolonization and State Building in South Asia, Journal of International Affairs , New York: Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2004, pp. 95-114. 41 . Henry D. Sokolski (Ed.). Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries beyond War, A Report of the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks (USA): Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2008, p. 3. 292 major issues. 42 There cannot be two opinions about the utility of CBMs in the reduction of tensions. In the case of Pakistan and India, however, any achievement is sabotaged by a tragic event. It is, therefore, very much like “one step forward and two steps back.” But hopes still need to be kept high. There is now a growing realization on both sides that differences be shunned and let there be a dawn of friendship and cooperation. 43 It is hoped that Pakistan and India will continue to work for increasing the CBMs in order to move forward for peace in the interest of 1.3 billion population. • In order to strengthen the composite dialogue process between Pakistan and India, it is very important that academic and student interaction should be increased and for this purpose, visa restrictions must be eased to the extent possible. It is worth mentioning that the South Asian University was established in New Delhi for increasing the faculty contacts across borders but this effort cannot be successful unless the students and faculty find an easy way to see their fellow faculty members across the borders. For faculty positions as well, Pakistan can compete in a well manner. The promotion of research on Pakistan−India relations can open avenues of understanding based on each other’s point of views. In this regard, the organization of conferences, publication of journals, managing web portals can work in promoting the mutual trust. 44 Another thing which can boost the confidence of the people to cooperate with each other on a more sound footing includes the prisoners who have been lying in the prison cells of both the countries. The detention of fishermen who 42 . Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2003, p. 145. 43 . From interview with Prof. Dr. Taj Moharram Khan, Op. cit. 44 . Peoples Empowerment is the only way out, Kashmir Times, Jammu & Kashmir, February 17, 2007. 293 mistakenly cross the borders, need a very sympathetic treatment from the governments of the two sides. 45 Their cases need to be handled on immediate basis and it is, indeed, a happy development that the work had been expedited by both the governments during the period (1999-2008). Many prisoners were released as a gesture of goodwill and for strengthening this process, the Judicial Committee of Pakistan and India on Prisoners had played an important role. • Terrorism, no doubt, has become a major concern of not only the South Asian countries but also the whole international community. It is not only the problem of Pakistan alone and, therefore, while moving forward in promoting relations, Pakistan and India should combine their efforts to curb the menace of terrorism as well.46 India should leave blaming Pakistan for militancy and cross border terrorist activities and vice versa. In this age of economic strength, each and every situation should be understood on reasonable grounds and create an atmosphere of trust and friendship instead of hostile postures all the times. It is necessary for both Pakistan and India to keep the other side informed about their reservations, share important information and jointly make strategies to deal with the problem. 47 In this regard, Pakistan must channelize its diplomacy to tell the world that militancy has never been an instrument of Pakistan’s foreign policy. India, on the other hand, also needs to recognize this fact and stop raising slogans of terror emerging from Pakistan. 48 Similar to this, the 45 . Qudsia Akhlaq. Conflict Resolution Vital for Peace with India, Dawn, Karachi, October 23, 2008. 46 . “Text of President General Pervez Musharraf’s Speech at SAARC Summit”, The News, Islamabad, January 6, 2002. 47 . Hasan Askari Rizvi. “Analysis: Terrorism in Pak-India relations”, Daily Times, Lahore, April 04, 2010. 48 . From interview with Shafiq Shahzad, Senior Instructor at English Language, Pakistan Air Force Islamabad on June 19, 2012. 294 problems of drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal movement of the people across the border are important issues to be dealt with on sound footing.49 • While talking about the cooperation between Pakistan and India, one can never take up this discussion without going into the very delicate aspects of the problem and which very seriously touch the overall trust building between the two neighbours. The issue of Afghanistan holds central position in developing good Pakistan−India relations. Any move to build trust between the two neighbors will remain inconclusive without taking up the Afghanistan factor. In Afghanistan, NATO/ISAF forces have been conducting their operations ever since October 2001 and after their proposed withdrawal in 2014, no doubt, other countries of the region would try to increase their influence. India, being one of the potential players in the new great game, will be very much prominent in the coming years in Afghanistan. In view of the recent Indian involvement in Afghanistan through the economic assistance programs, one cannot deny the fact that Pakistan must try to build full confidence with India and address all the issues including peace and stability in Afghanistan with joint efforts of the regional countries including Pakistan and India. Though Pakistan has already started negotiation on peace in Afghanistan with Saudi Arabia and Iran including Afghanistan itself but the Indian participation is very much essential. Being two important neighbors, both Pakistan and India can play a very significant role for peace and stability of Afghanistan. In no way can a healthy cooperation between Pakistan and India be ignored for a peaceful and stable Afghanistan and resultantly its impact on the whole region. 49 . S. D. Muni. “ Terrorism and Inter-State Relations in South Asia” , in Sridhar K. Khatri and Gert W. Kueck (Eds.), Terrorism in South Asia: Impact on Development and Democratic Process , New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2003, p. 329. 295 And it is only through this way that clash of interests in Afghanistan can be prevented between Pakistan and India. 50 • Pakistan must understand the realities in the sub-continent and instead of competing India in a confrontational tone, the former must follow a logical approach. The competition should be positive and constructive rather than damaging each other. The policy of keeping up a permanent confrontation with India in defence, diplomacy and technology cannot lead towards reasonable solutions like periodic test firing of missiles and answering Indian military preparedness in the same tone. This would aggravate the hostile environment further. No doubt that Pakistan is seemed to none but matching India on all the fronts and moving ahead without thinking the consequences can be disastrous for the regional peace. Every policy and strategy should be aligned with real approaches instead of utopian ideas. One thing alarming for Pakistan is her deteriorating economic health. Indian national economy is progressing at a fast rate. Pakistan is lagging far behind in this respect, a situation demanding serious attention of the state managers. 51 Pakistan should also adopt good relations with other countries by respecting their territorial integrity and political independence. Pakistan should focus on domestic security situation and address the issue of leadership crisis as peace and stability within will strengthen her negotiating status with India on equal footing. 52 • The intellectual and political elites in Pakistan and India must play their positive role in accelerating the process of cooperation. Instead of filling each other’s 50 . Sharad Joshi. Siachen: A Ridge Too Far, Foreign Policy in Focus, Commentaries, Washington D.C: Institute of Policy Studies, November 6, 2010. 51 . From interview with Prof. Dr. Adnan Sarwar Khan, Op. cit. 52 . From interview with Ms. Maria S. Effendi, Assistant Professor, Peace and Conflict Studies, National Defence University Islamabad on May 24 th 2012. 296 hearts and minds with negative emotions and hostile thoughts, they should now use their intellectual capabilities to fill hope and mutual love based on economic and trade strength. 53 The barren old policies should be left aside to adopt a well- defined and mutually beneficial strategy to motivate the youth on both sides to think positively and to work reasonably in this age of regional economic integration. There is a dire need in South Asia to replace the hostile image with friendship, peace and cooperation and that can happen only when the elite class in both the states i.e. the political parties, religious groups and nationalist platforms change their attitude towards each other and bring positive change in their policies. The need to focus on the welfare of the citizens and development of the economies is more essential than to look for the enemies and to use the resources of the state for arms and ammunition. This lack of appropriate strategy has brought a very dangerous kind of vacuum in the regional politics. For the success of policy at the national, regional and international affairs, the commitment and trust counts a lot but, in South Asia, the situation presents a very odd scenario, making it to suffer politically, economically and socially. The huge potential of the region cannot be explored without the adoption of cooperative behaviors and policy patterns and a directed stance on all the disputed issues. Otherwise, South Asia is more prone to destruction if Pakistan and India keep deceiving each other with their dual policies and lack of trust. The international relations experts emphasize on improving the old patterns of interaction from hate to peace efforts but a more 53 . Stephen P. Cohen. India: Emerging Power, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2001, pp. 204, 209-11. 297 sincere interest is needed in this regard in both Pakistan and India. They should forget the old ways of dealing with each other and should take more practical steps for improving the regional peace scenario. Another most important thing is that there is a need to bring social change with education and awareness because if people are backward and are not aware of what is right and what is wrong then a positive change cannot be introduced in the society. The role of media should also be positive because media today is the most powerful instrument to influence the state policies so both Indian and Pakistani media should contribute towards streamlining the state policies on positive basis and create a good image of each other and a cooperative environment in South Asia instead of propagating negatively and sowing the seeds of hate against each other. • It is very important for India as well to accept the realities in South Asia and the changing geo-strategic position of the region which demands cooperation rather that going for war and a desire for military ascendancy. Gone are the days when a country would weaken her enemy by conspiring to break it. It is true that we lost half of Pakistan in 1971 because of the enmity factors but now the benefits which we can attain with trust and economic co-operation, can never be attained by destroying our neighbors because conspiracies always are counter- productive. So while there lies a responsibility with Pakistan to see the matters with logical approach, India should also take useful initiatives for boosting her ties with Pakistan. • Tourism can also serve the cooperation between Pakistan and India. The cultural relics, historical sites, trekking, hiking and wildlife visits in both the countries can be opened for the students and interested circles in order to understand each 298 other’s culture and heritage. Lack of mutual tourism activities is affecting the potential cooperation. The tourism departments of the two countries can take up joint programs for the people. In this way, not only the interaction of people would increase but it would also develop tourism which is lagging far behind despite the fact that there is greater potential in this industry to develop Pakistan−India relations. 54 Tourism by various individual and group organizations can play an encouraging role in creating flexibility of attitudes for one another. In fact, exchange of state sponsored visits of special groups of people have been taking place from time to time.The need is to expand and accelerate such visits. The social contacts and the desire to increase the level of economic trust can be built through tourism industry. Not only the tourism industry itself can flourish in both the countries but would also open ways for investments and strong economic contacts between business circles of Pakistan and India. It is important to note that frequent encounters have barred the tourists to visit each other. Tourism development initiatives can be taken by providing aid packages to the private investors to build hotels, improve tourist sites and to upkeep their attractions. A close cooperation of the Ministries of Tourism of the two countries can narrow the gap that has prevailed over a longer period of time. • One of the regional organizations which can increase cooperation in South Asia is the SAARC which remained underdeveloped for years only because of non- supportive stance of the member countries particularly Pakistan and India. Strengthening SAARC would greatly help in promoting the cause of Pakistan−India peace process. The examples of European Union and ASEAN 54 . “Taking the Peace Process Forward”, Daily Times , Lahore, September 23, 2004. 299 are in place which became successful and today their trade relationship is progressing a lot. 55 But in South Asia, the question of regional cooperation has largely remained dormant because of mutual conflicts which have hampered the economic and trade relations 56 among the member countries. In order to improve this situation, regional organizations need to be strengthened and in this regard, SAARC’s importance cannot be ignored. For both Pakistan and India, the need of the hour is to understand the problems of the region seriously and make progress in peace initiatives without blaming each other for historical mistakes. 98 percent of the respondents in the questionnaire held the view that peace in South Asia is linked with harmonious Pakistan−India relations. 57 Being immediate neighbors, the aspirations of both Pakistan and India can be fulfilled in the upcoming years if the belief in co- existence becomes strengthened. It is always the positive or negative designs of the governments which culminate into peace or war. Pakistan and India have suffered a lot due to their continuous tug of war and it is ironical that both these neighbors have been having very cordial and peaceful relations with distant countries like Paraguay but not with each other. 58 Timely dialogue process can achieve many milestones. Calculative incidents and tragedies never took place in the history of the world. In fact, most of the tragedies have been accidental. Nothing can stop war but the need is to address the problems and find their solutions. We have a good example of France and Germany who had historically 55 . Mohsin S. Khan. Improving India−Pakistan Relations through Trade (A Presentation), Canberra: East Asia Forum, The Australian National University, April 19, 2010, pp. 12-14. 56 . Vermon Hewitt, The New International Politics of South Asia, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997, p. 107. 57 . Conclusion drawn by the researcher from the answers given by respondents in questionnaires. 58 . J.N. Dixit. Indian Regional Developments: Through the Prism of Indo−Pak Relations, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2004, p. 118. 300 been hostile neighbors and fought with each other during the two world wars. But today, they are having border free trade and economic, political and cultural relations under the European Union. Today, the standard of living and the economic conditions in these two countries are much higher than it was at the time of two world wars. One should always be optimistic. A troublesome neighbor is always a source of discomfort. A “No” answer to the question would simply mean hopelessness. A “Yes” answer would cost nothing but would open a window of hope. If East Germany and West Germany can reunite and Russian Federation can live in harmony with the Western Europe despite suffering territorial disintegration, there is likelihood that Pakistan and India will one day learn to live together and would find themselves compelled to resolve differences amicably. 59 There is, obviously, no magical formla to reform the rival attitude of one towards another but it was the economic factor that dominated the previous quarrels between the European States and they had no strong reasons to justify the gains through hostility. The same path can be followed by Pakistan and India who have, for decades, been entangled in contention and controversies. Their cooperation in mutually advantageous fields can develop a ground for peace and a march towards development and prosperity in all walks of life. The time is ripe for peace efforts otherwise the prevailing status quo will further aggravate the conditions. On the one hand, the external actors are playing with the destiny of these South Asian states for balancing their geopolitical interests and, on the other hand, the political and military elites in both the countries are also having time for the fulfillment of their vested interests while keeping the two states in a perpetual state of war and conflict. No doubt, the people on both sides can play a very pivotal 59 . From interview with Prof. Dr. Taj Moharram Khan, Op. cit. 301 role in bringing to the limelight the importance of peace and recognizing the need for resolving all the disputed matters. The hostility is never a compulsion but has been made so by the vested interests. The peaceful efforts towards normalization of relations would not give a chance to these vested interests to use the hostility to their advantage. With coming into power of a new government in India as a result of 2014 General Elections in India, hopes are high for moving forward with peace talks on different conflicting issues between the two countries. At this time, both Pakistan and India can be seen at an important historical juncture with change of government in New Delhi on the one hand, and a civil government completing one year in office in Pakistan on the other. The expectations for mutually beneficial interactions on different issues have been expressed by policy makers, academic circles and think tanks on both sides. The timing is ripe for boosting economic cooperation and thinking beyond conventional differences for taking practical measures towards peace. With few exceptions, there are positive thoughts prevailing in Pakistan and India in view of initial formal interactions between the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his newly elected Indian counterpart Narendra Damodardas Modi on his swearing-in ceremony in New Delhi held on May 26, 2014. There is a great potential for economic and cultural cooperation between the two countries and increasing collaboration can make both to capitalize on the rising and dynamic future of the region. For socio-economic development and building a strong regional economic block, the leaders in both countries need to understand the importance of their relations. Gone are the days to repeat and recite past faults and keep wasting potentials on negative propaganda against each other. This is a moment to take practical measures and to see an opportunity to boost cooperation in different fields. 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A Report of the Conversation between Hussain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis , Washington D.C, January 2004. 312 3. Centre for Research and Information System for the Non-Aligned & other Developing Countries, South Asia Development & Cooperation Report 2004, New Delhi, 2004. 4. Council on Foreign Relations, “ India−Pakistan: Peace Talks”, New York, April 19, 2009. 5. CUTS (Consumer Unity & Trust Society), Building Peace through Trade: The Future of Indo−Pak Relations, Jaipur (India), February 2011. 6. Indian International Centre, The Changing Nature of Global Security and its Impacts on South Asia, Monograph Series Number 18, New Delhi (India), January 1992. 7. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Indo−Pak Composite Dialogue- 2008: A Review , Number 65, New Delhi (India), February 2008. 8. Institute of Policy Studies, SAFTA: Current Status and Prospects , Colombo, 2008. 9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pakistan), “Address by Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri on Challenges Confronting Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” at the Lowy Institute, Sydney (Australia), May 13, 2005. 10. Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), Pakistan−India Relations: Old Problems New Initiatives , Islamabad (Pakistan), August 2011. 11. Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, Dispute: Pakistan’s Position on Kashmir , Islamabad (Pakistan), December 2006. 12. Pakistan Security Research Unit / Department of Peace Studies, “ Pakistan Taking Stock: Recent Trends and Future Developments”, University of Bradford (UK), December 10, 2008. 13. South Asia Analysis Group, “India−Pakistan: What Next?” , New Delhi, March 26, 2010. 14. The Canadian Centre for Global Security, Regional Approaches to Curbing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia, Ottawa (Canada), March 1995. 15. The Henry L. Stimson Centre, Beyond the Nuclear Peril: The Years in Review and the Years Ahead, A Report of the Standing Committee , Washington D.C (USA), August 1995. 313 16. The World Bank Report, The Challenges and Potential of Pakistan−India Trade , June 2007. 17. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Will Trade Suffer From India−Pakistan Tensions?”, Washington, D.C (USA), December 19, 2008. PRESS/MEDIA INTERVIEWS 1. A Discussion held between the Renowned Scholars and Think Tanks, Pakistan−India Dialogue Quest, April 20-21, 2006. 2. Asif Ali Khan Host: Habib Akram, Badalta Pakistan (Pak-India Relationship), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X6YsO0o6R7o&feature=related 3. A Panel Discussion held among Scholars on Pakistan−India Relations, Dunya TV: Pakistan, August 2011, http://pakistanmediawatch.com/tag/meher-bokha ri/ 4. Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary General: http://articles.economictimes. indiatimes.com/2012-04-24/news/31392576_1_ban-ki-moon-india-and-pakist an-combat-terrorism 5. Brajesh Mishra’s Interview to The Indian Express ’ Editor-in-Chief, Shekhar Gupta. ‘India−Pakistan Were At the Brink of War Twice Last Year’, Daily Times (Lahore), May 24, 2003. 6. Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institution, http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=Y_Hj--KQrM0 7. Capital Talk - Pakistan India Peace Process (April 2, 2009) Guests: Kuldip Nayyer (India), Yasin Malik (Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front), Dr. A.H. Nayyer (Educationist), Salman Haider (Former Indian Foreign Secretary), Tariq Fatemi (Former Ambassador), Dr. Kamal Mitra Chinoy (Professor, Jawahar Lal Nehru University), April 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=PbATiUoVa18 8. Chomsky on India−Pakistan Relations, Foreign Policy in Focus, A Project of the Institute for Policy Studies, May 2007, http://www.fpif.org/articles/choms ky_on_india-pakistan_relations 9. C. Raja Mohana and Adil Najam (Experts and Scholars in International Relations), http://www.asiasociety.org/policy-politics/international- relations/intra-asia. 314 10. Dr. Humayun Khan, Distinguished Bureaucrat, Career Diplomat, Former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador to India, (On Pakistan−India Relationship), http: //www.youtube.com/ watch?v= 37LNDzzfdyg 11. Dr. Mooed Pirzada Discussion on Pakistan−India Media Role, April 2011, http://www.you tube.com/watch?v=yGqWD5nCDqY&feature=relmfu 12. Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao gave interview to CNBC (India) Published by Daily Times, http://jinnah-institute.org/pak-india-pcm/pcm- archive/282-Pakistan−india-want-to-normalise-relations-rao 13. India−Pakistan Peace Talks, October 2007, http://www.youtube.Com/watch? V=SQ5mAw 4HQC0 14. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh addressed a Summit in SAARC, November 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ru5gR0gEshc& feature= relmfu 15. Jaswant Singh (Interview to CNN- IBN), http://www.hindu.com/nic/karan.pdf 16. Khurshid M. Kasuri, http://forbesindia.com/search.php?searchtext= Khurshi d+Mahmud +Kasuri# 17. Manmohan Singh Indian Prime Minister, http://www.Youtube.com/watch? v=wCpbEpljf ps 18. Najam Sethi Cambridge Educated Renowned Pakistani Journalist, http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=YserIaEhNy4 19. Najam Sethi, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52-B30smo20 &feature= relmfu 20. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, India, Pakistan Hold New Round of Talks, July 2011, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xk7uek_india- pakistan-hold-new-round-of-talks_news 21. Samjhauta Express TV Program on India−Pakistan Relations, Voice of America, http://www .youtube.com/watch?v=T8S4u-vJP3g 22. Well known journalist Mr. Muqtadda Mansoor, Well Known Journalist and Prof. from India, Prof. Vijay Singh and Mrs. Fainaana Farnaam Chevening Scholar on Peace and Conflict Resolution, Talk Show on India−Pakistan Relations, http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Y8 v7k1ndeZ4 315 NEWSPAPERS (DAILIES) • Dawn (Karachi) • The Guardian (London) • The Hindu (Madras) • The News (Islamabad) • The Nation (Lahore) • The New York Times (New York) • The Jang (Rawalpindi) • The Sunday Times (London) • The Times (London) • The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) • The Daily Telegraph (London) • The Financial Times (London) • The Frontier Post (Peshawar) • Tribune (Lahore) • The Observer (Islamabad) • The Pakistan Times (Lahore) • Herald (Karachi) • Herald Tribune (Paris) MAGAZINES • The Herald (Karachi-Pakistan). • News Line (Karachi-Pakistan). • Time (USA). • Far East Economic Review (Hong Kong). • Newsweek (USA). 316 APPENDICES 317 APPENDIX – I Text of the Tashkent Declaration Signed on January 10, 1966 The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan. I The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighborly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They consider that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo- Pakistan Sub-Continent and, indeed, the interests of the people of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position. II The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 24 February, 1966, to the positions they held prior to 5 August, 1965, and both sides shall observe the cease- fire terms on the cease-fire line. III The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. IV The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country, and will encourage 318 propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries. V The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Intercourse. VI The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing agreements. VII The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that they will give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war. VIII The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue the discussion of questions relating to the problems of refugees and eviction/illegal immigrations. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict. IX The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognized the need to set up joint Indian- Pakistani bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan recorded their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the 319 Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality. They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to witness this declaration. The Prime Minister of India President of Pakistan Lal Bahadur Shastri Mohammad Ayub Khan Tashkent, January 10, 1966. 320 APPENDIX – II Simla Agreement (July 2, 1972) The Government of Pakistan and Government of India are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people. In order to achieve this objective, the Government of Pakistan and the Government of India have agreed as follows: i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries; ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance and encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations; iii) That the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co-existence, respect for each other’s territorial integrity; and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit; iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means; v) That they shall always respect each other’s national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality; 321 vi) That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other. Both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them. In order progressively to restore and normalize relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that: i. Steps shall be taken to resume communication--postal, telegraphic, sea, land including border posts, and air links including over flights; ii. Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other countries; iii. Trade and co-operation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible; and iv. Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted. In this connection, delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the Governments agree that: i. Pakistani and Indian forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border; ii. In Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from threat or the use of force in violation of this Line; iii. The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this Agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof. 322 Both governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians, resumption of diplomatic relations. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (President) Indira Gandhi (Prime Minister) Islamic Republic of Pakistan Republic of India Simla, July 2, 1972 323 APPENDIX – III Lahore Declaration (February 21, 1999) Parties: India and Pakistan The following is the text of the joint declaration issued by India and Pakistan at Lahore on February 21, 1999. Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress and prosperity for their people; Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future; Recognizing that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries; Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence; Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit; Committed to the objectives of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for improving the security environment; Recalling their agreement of 23 September, 1998, that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose; 324 Have agreed that their respective governments: • Shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir; • Shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs. • Shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda; • Shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict; • Reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realization of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development; • Reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace; • Shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. Atal Behari Vajpayee Muhammad Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister Prime Minister The Republic of India The Islamic Republic of Pakistan Joint statement 1. In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Pakistan from February 20-21, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore Bus Service. 2. The prime minister of Pakistan received the Indian prime minister at the Wagah border on February 20, 1999. A banquet in honour of the Indian prime minister and his delegation was hosted by the prime minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort, on the same evening. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Minar-i- Pakistan, Mausoleum 325 of Allama Iqbal, Gurudawara Dera Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. On February 21, a civic reception was held in honour of the visiting prime minister at the Governor's House. 3. The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. They decided that: a) The two foreign ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues; b) The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions; c) The two sides shall determine areas of cooperation in Information Technology, in particular for tackling the problems of Y2K; d) The two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalizing the visa and travel regime; e) The two sides shall appoint a two-member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to Civilian detainees and missing POWs. 4. They expressed satisfaction on the commencement of a bus service between Lahore and New Delhi, the release of fishermen and civilian detainees and the renewal of contacts in the field of sports. 5. Pursuant to the directive given by the two prime ministers, the foreign secretaries of Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on February 21, 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries. 6. The two prime ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples. 7. Prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee extended an invitation to prime minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif to visit India on mutually convenient dates. 8. Prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee thanked prime minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of 326 his delegation and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit. ______ Memorandum of Understanding The foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan: Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter; Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit; Guided by the agreement between their prime ministers of September 23, 1998 that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose; Pursuant to the directive given by their respective prime ministers in Lahore, to adopt measures for promoting a stable environment of peace, and security between the two countries; Have on this day, agreed to the following: 1. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict; 2. The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard; 3. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides further undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the 327 possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two sides shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose; 4. The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests; 5. The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides; 6. The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs; 7. The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Directors- General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications; 8. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora. Where required, the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, before mid- 1999, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements. K. Raghunath Shamshad Ahmad Foreign Secretary Foreign Secretary The Republic of India The Islamic Republic of Pakistan 328 APPENDIX – IV The Agra Declaration 2001 Draft Agreement Having met at their retreat in Agra on 15-16 July 2001 and held wide-ranging discussions on Pakistan-India relations, particularly on Jammu and Kashmir and having affirmed their commitment to addressing each other’s expressed concerns, creating an environment conducive to the establishment of peaceful, friendly and cooperative ties, for the welfare of the peoples of the two countries. Agree on the following: 1. Progress towards settlement of Jammu and Kashmir issue would be conducive towards normalization and will further the establishment of a cooperative relationship in a mutually reinforcing manner; (Before the amendment the sentence read: Settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue would pave the way for normalization of relations between the two countries.) 2. There was progress in the discussions towards an understanding of each other’s viewpoints. There was also recognition of the requirement of keeping the door open for future dialogue. There was agreement on continuing the process of dialogue; 3. The two sides will resume a sustained dialogue at the political level on: a) Jammu and Kashmir; b) Peace and Security, including both Conventional and Nuclear CBMs; c) Terrorism and Drug Trafficking. 329 4. The following will be addressed at the appropriate level of officials of the two countries: a) Economic and Commercial Cooperation; b) Siachen; c) Wuller Barrage/ Tulbul Navigation Project; d) Sir Creek; e) Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields. The progress on these issues would be reviewed by the foreign minister of Pakistan and the external affairs minister of India at their meetings. 5. The president and the prime minister further agreed and directed that all these issues be addressed purposefully, constructively and in an integrated manner, with a sense of urgency; 6. There was also agreement of following dialogue structures: a) Annual Summit Level Meetings; b) Bi-annual meetings between the minister of foreign affairs of Pakistan and minister of external affairs of India; c) Foreign office consultations at the level of foreign secretaries. 7. The two sides will support reactivation of the SAARC process and the holding of the Eleventh Summit on a date convenient to the host country and the other member states of the Association; 8. The president of Pakistan invited the prime minister of India to visit Pakistan. The invitation was accepted. Dates would be fixed through diplomatic channels; 9. The president and the prime minister also agreed to meet again in New York in September 2001 during the session of the UN General Assembly; 330 The president of Pakistan thanked the prime minister of India for the warm reception and gracious hospitality extended to him and his delegation during their stay, as well as for the excellent arrangements for the visit. 331 APPENDIX-V “QUESIONNAIRES DISRIBUED AMONG THE PEOPLE OF DIFFERENT WALKS OF LIFE” “Pakistan-India Relations: An Assessment of Developments during 1999-2008” 1. Can Pakistan and India be reliable friends ever? a) Yes b) No 2. Have both the countries learnt anything from their past armed hostilities? a) Yes b) No 3. Can Peace Process be effective provided the past hostilities between Pakistan and India? a) Yes b) No 4. Should Pakistan give MFN status to India? a) Yes b) No 5. Has Musharraf era Peace Process brought any positive shift in relations? a) Yes b) No 6. What is the biggest problem preventing the two countries to come forward and peacefully resolve their differences? a) Kashmir b) Trust Deficit c) Lack of people to people contacts d) Historical hostilities 332 7. Do you think the progress in South Asia is linked with peaceful Pak-India relations? a) Yes b) No 8. Compared to the past, do you see any positive change in Pakistan-India attitude towards one another? a) Yes b) No c) To some extent 9. Do you see any prospect of nuclear war between Pakistan and India? a) Yes b) No 10. Do you think that poverty in both India and Pakistan is because they have been paying more attention towards their security issues? a) Yes b) No 11. What should be the immediate cooperative stance of Pakistan and India to improve the straightjacket stated positions on disputes? a) People to people contacts b) Economic Cooperation c) Kashmir problem resolution d) All of the above ======