Communist China's Foreign Policy in the Early
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MILITARY-DIPLOMATIC ADVENTURISM: COMMUNIST CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY STAGE OF THE KOREAN WAR (1950-1951) Wenrui Zhong Thesis Prepared for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS August 2013 APPROVED: Harold Tanner, Major Professor Geoffrey Wawro, Committee Member Olga Velikanova, Committee Member Richard McCaslin, Chair of the Department of History Mark Wardell, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School Zhong, Wenrui. Military-Diplomatic Adventurism: Communist China’s Foreign Policy in the Early Stage of the Korean War (1950-1951). Master of Arts (History), May 2013, 159 pp., 1 figure, bibliography, 73 titles. The thesis studies the relations of Communist China’s foreign policy and its military offensives in the battlefield in Korean Peninsula in late 1950 and early 1951, an important topic that has yet received little academic attention. As original research, this thesis cites extensively from newly declassified Soviet and Chinese archives, as well as American and UN sources. This paper finds that an adventurism dominated the thinking and decision-making of Communist leaders in Beijing and Moscow, who seriously underestimated the military capabilities and diplomatic leverages of the US-led West. The origin of this adventurism, this paper argues, lays in the CCP’s civil war experience with their Nationalist adversaries, which featured a preference of mobile warfare over positional warfare, and an opportunist attitude on cease-fire. This adventurism ended only when Communist front line came to the verge of collapse in June 1951. Copyright 2013 by Wenrui Zhong ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My research interest lies in the history of Communist Chinese Party (CCP), especially its foreign relations. Professor Tanner allowed me to write a thesis on CCP’s diplomatic behavior in Korean War, although UNT History program is more prepared in military history than diplomatic history. In this regard, I am grateful to his approval of my proposal. More importantly, he provided vigorous and extremely helpful advice and suggestions to my drafts in aspects of reorganizing the structure, adding new sections, citing additional sources, using more accurate terms, as well as rectifying language errors such as sentence structure. Without his professional and devoted guidance, this thesis would not have achieved the current level of accomplishment. Two other committee members also provided important advice to my paper. Professor Wawro suggested me to extend my research to the current international controversies in South China Sea, in order to see if CCP’s diplomatic thinking in early Korean War (and in a broader sense, Chinese Exceptionalism) still plays a significant role in the current Beijing leadership’s decision-making process. Professor Velikanova suggested to keep a closer eye to the factors that shaped the Communist doctrines in its diplomacy, such as personality, and cultural influence. To all these suggestions, I express my deepest thanks and believe that they would be invaluable in my future study and research. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iii LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................... vii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1 1.1 Literature Review.....................................................................................................3 1.2 The Mis-learned Lessons of China's Civil Car: CCP’s Mentality on Cease-fire ...17 1.3 The Sources of Military Adventurism ...................................................................28 1.4 A New Start: PRC’s Diplomatic Doctrines and Foreign Policy ............................36 1.4.1 General-Ambassadors: the Dismissal of Nationalist Diplomats ................37 1.4.2 Diplomacy as a Struggle ............................................................................40 1.4.3 Split with the West .....................................................................................42 1.4.4 Lean to One Side: Sino-Soviet Alliance ...................................................44 CHAPTER 2 WU XIUQUAN’S MISSION TO THE UN ............................................................47 2.1 Korean War: the Turning Point..............................................................................47 2.2 Motivation of the Delegation .................................................................................53 2.3 Preparation and Departure .....................................................................................56 2.4 Arrival ....................................................................................................................58 2.5 UNSC Debates .......................................................................................................59 2.6 Impacts ...................................................................................................................65 2.7 Cease-fire Arrangement: Private Interactions .......................................................68 2.8 Calculations of Moscow and Beijing on the War ..................................................72 2.9 American-British Summit ......................................................................................75 2.10 The End of Wu Mission .........................................................................................77 2.11 A Review of the Mission .......................................................................................81 iv CHAPTER 3 THE CEASE-FIRE INITIATIVES AND THE AGGRESSOR RESOLUTION ....86 3.1 The UN Resolution of December 13: UN Cease-fire Group .................................86 3.2 Zhou’s Reply ..........................................................................................................90 3.3 The Role of India as a Mediator of Cease-fire .......................................................92 3.4 The Arab-Asian Group ..........................................................................................94 3.5 The CCP’s Assessment of Britain’s Attitude.........................................................96 3.6 Assessments from the Battlefield Commander: Marshal Peng Dehuai’s Perspective .............................................................................................................99 3.7 The Five-Principle Plan .......................................................................................106 3.8 The Aggressor Resolution....................................................................................116 3.9 The Impact and Implications of the Aggressor Resolution .................................127 3.10 Communist Willingness for a Cease-fire .............................................................130 CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION......................................................................................................142 4.1 The Immaturity of the PRC’s Diplomatic System ...............................................142 4.2 Military Adventurism...........................................................................................144 4.3 Diplomatic Adventurism ......................................................................................146 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................155 v LIST OF FIGURES Page 1. CCP (Chinese Communist Party) Cease-fire Prediction Model .......................................28 vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CCP Chinese Communist Party CCPCC Chinese Communist Party Central Committee CINCUNC Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command CKS Chiang Kai-shek or Jiang Jieshi CPV Chinese People's Volunteers Army DMZ Demilitarized Zone DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) FRUS Foreign Relations of United States KMT Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSC National Security Council (US) PLA People's Liberation Army (People's Republic of China) POW Prisoner of War PRC People's Republic of China ROC Republic of China ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea) UN United Nations UNC United Nations Command US United States USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics vii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION This thesis studies the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) foreign policy and its UN diplomacy in the early period of Korean War from the outbreak in June 1950 to July 1951, when both sides finally agreed to start the truce negotiation after eight months of serious fighting and failed mediation efforts. The process of the decision-making of Communist China’s leadership, as well as the major events and figures of this process are examined and its significance and impact would be analyzed, especially the PRC’s UN delegation in November and December, 1950, the UN cease-fire mediation and debates in the following two months, and the General Assembly Resolution of February 1, 1951, in which the PRC was condemned as conducting aggression in Korea. Although it is necessary to address the context and process of Truman’s administration in making their China policy (such as, domestic political pressure, limited war, and vision of Kremlin’s world expansionism), the bulk of this study is focused on Communist Chinese