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Virtual Issue No. 1 2013 TRUTH VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY THE VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. I 2013 Featuring classic papers from the archive & commentaries by contemporary philosophers TRUTH F.P. RAMSEY / PETER SULLIVAN J.L. AUSTIN / CHARLES TRAVIS P.F. STRAWSON / PAUL SNOWDON MICHAEL DUMMETT / IAN RUMFITT PETER GEACH / GRAHAM OPPY JANE HEAL / JULIAN DODD JENNIFER HORNSBY / GILA SHER GUEST EDITOR Guy Longworth, University of Warwick © 2013 THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY First published 2013 by The Aristotelian Society © The Aristotelian Society 2013 Produced and designed for digital publication by the Aristotelian Society, London. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing from the Aristotelian Society. editor Matthew Soteriou, University of Warwick guest editor Guy Longworth, University of Warwick executive administrator Mark Cortes Favis, The Aristotelian Society activities and publications The Aristotelian Society, founded in 1880, meets fortnightly in London to hear and dicuss philosophical papers. The Proceedings is published as a journal in one annual print edition, with three online journals appearing via Wiley Online Library in March, June and September. The Supplementary Volume, published annually in June, contains the papers to be read at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association in July. The Virtual Issue, published annually in August, contains commentaries on classic papers from the Society’s archive. Information about individual subscriptions can be found on the Society’s website at http://www.aristoteliansociety. org.uk. CONTENTS I. Introduction by Guy Longworth 6 II. F.P. Ramsey & Peter Sullivan 12 Paper: Facts and Propositions by F.P. Ramsey 14 Commentary: An Introduction to ‘Facts and Propositions’ 29 by Peter Sullivan III. J.L. Austin & Charles Travis 37 Paper: Truth by J.L. Austin 39 Commentary: As a Matter of Fact by Charles Travis 55 IV. P.F. Strawson & Paul Snowdon 66 Paper: Truth by P.F. Strawson 69 Commentary: Strawson’s Truth by Paul Snowdon 92 V. Michael Dummett & Ian Rumfitt 100 Paper: Truth by Michael Dummett 102 Commentary: Michael Dummett’s ‘Truth’ by Ian Rumfitt 120 VI. Peter Geach & Graham Oppy 128 Paper: Truth and God by Peter Geach 130 Commentary: Truth and God by Graham Oppy 144 VII. Jane Heal & Julian Dodd 151 Paper: The Disinterested Search for Truth by Jane Heal 153 Commentary: Jane Heal’s ‘The Disinterested Search for 166 Truth’ by Julian Dodd VII. Jennifer Hornsby & Gila Sher 175 Paper: Truth: The Identity Theory by Jennifer Hornsby 177 Commentary: Introduction to and Commentary on Jennifer 204 Hornsby’s ‘Truth: The Identity Theory’ by Gila Sher INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION GUY LONGWORTH IN celebration of the 125th year of the Proceedings, we are proud to present the first Virtual Issue of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. The Virtual Issue is based upon an Online Conference on the theme of Truth that took place 12th–18th April 2013. This weeklong event featured papers from our back catalogue, commentaries on these papers delivered by contemporary philosophers, and an online-based discussion forum that was open to all. The Virtual Issue comprises the classic papers and commentaries from the conference. Questions about truth have figured centrally in Philosophy throughout its history. What is it for the things we say or believe to be true? Does truth depend on a relation between what we say or believe and the world? What are the natures of the things we say or believe, the bearers of truth? To what are the truth-bearers related when they are true: are they related to facts, ordinary objects, or something else? What is the required relation? We’ll want an account of the nature of truth that addresses those questions also to fit with an account of truth’s importance: why should it matter to us that what we say or believe is true rather than false? Our views about truth are liable to impact widely on our views about other things. Are moral claims or views apt to be true or false, or are they to be evaluated along different dimensions? Does truth figure in an account of the nature of belief or the nature of assertion? Is the acquisition of beliefs that are true amongst the fundamental aims of inquiry? The papers selected for the Online Conference and Virtual Issue were chosen for the distinctive answers that they advance to some or all of these questions. In some cases, papers were chosen because they have had a decisive impact on later discussions. In some cases, papers were chosen because they present views and arguments that deserve more careful consideration than they have thus far received. In all cases, there is much to be gained from becoming acquainted, or reacquainted, with these important texts. The main aim of the commentaries is to stimulate discussion by highlighting major themes in its associated paper and pointing to ways in which those themes are of continuing importance to current debates. Some of them also point to specific challenges that Guy Longworth The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 1 ! ! might be brought against claims or arguments in the associated paper and indicate connections with themes discussed in the other papers. The remainder of this introduction to the conference theme presents a slightly more detailed overview of some of the central philosophical questions about truth that are discussed within the target papers and commentaries. It also provides some links to useful entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. In its most general form, the central philosophical question about truth can be stated simply. We say, and judge, that various things are true or false. For example, suppose that you think that snow is white. I might judge that what you thereby think is true. What would it take for my judgment to be correct, for what you think to be true? What is the most fundamental account of what it is for the sorts of things that can be true to be true? More specifically, we can consider the following two questions: 1. What do we say to be true or false? Is it things people think? If it is, what are the things people think? Is it things people say? Is it sentences that people use to say things? Is it episodes in which people say things or think things? 2. What is required for the things we say to be true to be true? On one view, for something to be true it must correspond with the world, or with the way things are. This is the general form taken by correspondence theories of truth. If a theory of that general form is right, further questions arise. First, what must something correspond with if it is to be true? Must it correspond with the facts? For example, is the claim that snow is white true because it corresponds with the facts? Or is it true because it corresponds more specifically with the fact that snow is white? If it is the facts, what are they? And if it is the fact that snow is white, what is the nature of that fact? A second range of questions that arise concern the nature of correspondence. Does correspondence amount to some sort of similarity between the things that are true and the things that make them true—the truth-makers? Or is the relation more intimate than that? Are truths identical with facts? Almost all of the pieces discuss correspondence theories of truth. Hornsby’s piece defends an identity theory of truth, on which truths are identified with facts. ! 8 Guy Longworth The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 1 ! ! Many philosophers have held that truth depends upon one or another form of correspondence between things that are true and other things. However, many other philosophers think that such a view is mistaken. The most radical amongst the latter group reject correspondence theories of truth because they hold that there is really nothing very much to be said about truth. Such philosophers endorse versions of deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, defenders of deflationary theories of truth focus on what many people take to be a platitude about truth, that claims of the following forms are bound to be correct: (S) The sentence ‘S’ is true if and only if S. For example, the sentence ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. (P) The claim, thought, assertion, or statement that P is true if and only if P. For example, the statement that snow is white is true if and only if snow is white. Now many philosophers, including many defenders of correspondence theories of truth, agree that such claims are bound to be true. However, those that defend correspondence theories think that agreeing to that much is consistent with saying more about the nature of truth. By contrast, defenders of deflationary theories of truth hold (roughly) that there is no more to be said about truth than that claims of the form (S) or (P) are bound to be true. The nature of truth, insofar as it has a nature, is fully captured by its role in guaranteeing the truth of claims like (S) or (P). Ramsey’s piece provided inspiration for deflationary theories of truth. Such theories are explicitly discussed in, or figure in the background of, all of the pieces. One reason that addressing such questions about truth is important to us is that truth itself seems important to us. It seems important to us that our claims and beliefs are correct, and that seems to depend in turn on whether what we claim and believe is true.
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