Driving Vietnam's Economic Growth– the Role of Private Equity
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Driving Vietnam’s economic growth– the role of private equity and venture capital AVCJ Vietnam Forum 2017 Ho Chi Minh City, May 25, 2017 © Reddal Inc. This material is Reddal proprietary. Key messages Despite rapid growth and foreign investment, Vietnam’s economy (like many of its peers in SEA) remains vulnerable due to weak local supporting industries Vietnam’s private equity sector is still small and volatile but a vibrant ecosystem is starting to shape up, partially due to government support Finding good deals and driving systematic value creation continue to be challenging for private equity players – it is still about finding the “right opportunistic deal”, and there is room for more active HR, process, top- and bottom-line performance improvement Vietnam has promise but requires transparent policy – consumer- and technology-driven sectors have potential, and private equity could have a big economic impact if actively and transparently engaged in SOE reforms © Reddal Inc. This material is Reddal proprietary. 2 After Đổi Mới* reform, Vietnam experienced rapid growth, peaking at double digit GDP growth in 1995 GDP and GDP growth in Vietnam GDP growth (annual %) Asian GDP (current US$) financial crisis Increasing Mismanagement of export Global BTA** signed with financial SOEs and (BUSD) U.S. and increasing privatization reform crisis (%) FDI and export started 10 194 200 9 186 10 Đổi Mới 9 9 171 9 8 8 reform 156 7 8 8 8 7 136 150 7 7 7 7 6 6 106 6 6 7 6 6 6 6 116 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 99 100 5 4 4 77 66 4 3 58 49 3 50 43 37 34 35 38 27 29 2 26 25 21 25 27 14 13 16 6 6 10 10 1 0 0 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 *:Đổi Mới is the name of the major economic reforms started in Vietnam in 1986 to create a socialist-oriented market economy. **Bilateral Trade Agreement Source: World Bank (www.worldbank.com) © Reddal Inc. This material is Reddal proprietary. 3 FDI* and ODA** have been important sources of capital influx for Vietnam, remittances*** taking an increasingly dominant role Capital influx in Vietnam Personal remittances, received (current USD) Net ODA** (current USD) FDI* net inflows (BoP, current USD) CAGR****(%) (in MUSD) 17% 12,000 124% 15% 11,000 7% 17% 10,000 9,000 Vietnam joined 8,000 Revision of Vietnam It took several WTO in 2007, constitution in joined 7,000 years for followed by FDI Vietnam to 1992 ASEAN in 6,000 spike in 2008 see effect of recognized 1995 5,000 Doi moi the role of private sector 4,000 reform on capital inflows 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 2011 1989 2004 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 *Foreign direct investments (FDI); **Official development assistant (ODA); ***Data available after 2000, ****Compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) Source: World Bank (www.worldbank.com) © Reddal Inc. This material is Reddal proprietary. 4 Vietnam’s recent growth has similarities to Korea in the 70s, but with markedly lower growth rate in GDP per capita GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth rate Growth rate - Korea Growth rate - Vietnam GDP per capita - Korea GDP per capita - Vietnam Korea (1960 – 1990) Vietnam (1985 – 2015) (USD, current) (USD, current) (%) (%) 7,000 6,642 16 7,000 16 6,500 13 14 6,500 14 6,000 12 12 11 6,000 10 11 11 12 12 5,500 10 10 5,500 11 9 9 10 5% gap 10 5,000 8 9 8 5,000 8 8 8 8 7 8 4,500 7 7 7 6 4,500 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 6 4,000 5 6 4,000 5 5 5 6 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 3 3,500 3 4 3,500 3 3 4 2 2 3,000 2 3,000 1 2 2,542 0 2,500 0 2,500 1,778 0 2,111 0 2,000 2,000 -2 1,334 -2 1,500 -3 1,500 -4 -4 1,000 646 1,000 699 239 433 292 -6 288 -6 500 156 105 500 98 0 -8 0 -8 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Source: World Bank (www.worldbank.com) © Reddal Inc. This material is Reddal proprietary. 5 Korea used interventionist/protectionist strategy to drive manufactured goods exports, while subsidizing target industries and related chaebols Rest of top 200 SK Hyundai Korean growth and industrial policy Lotte LG1 Samsung2 Chaebols’ assets as a share of top 200 corporate Guided capitalism model assets (1987-2012) 65% Period Main policy direction 5% 57% 1950s • Import substitution 5% 3% • Price stability 100% 1962-1971 • Policy shift to export promotion (EP) • Expanding SOC3 44% 1972-1981 • Heavy and Chemical Industrialization under 51% EP 64% • Administered credit allocation 73% • Import substitution of parts and components 5% 8% 1982-1991 • Industrial rationalization 4% • Initial liberalization and opening 9% 10% 1% 8% • Shift to private sector initiatives 7% 9% 8% 1993-1998 • Deregulation 2% 6% 14% • Globalization (capital and foreign exchange 3% 6% 13% 5% 11% 12% liberalization) 11% • Fairness and transparency in industrial and 11% 19% 11% 12% 14% trade policy 5% 8% • Technology based industrial policy 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 1 Includes LG, GS, LS and their affiliates; 2 includes Samsung, Shinsegae, CJ and Hansol; 3Social overhead capital such as roads, schools and hospitals Source: ERRI, 재벌 및 대기업으로의 경제력집중과 동태적 변화분석; Ahn, The outward-looking trade policy and the industrial development of South Korea © Reddal Inc. This material is Reddal proprietary. 6 ILLUSTRATIVE Most now developed countries (NDCs) used interventionist policies to promote their infant industries Tariff rates on manufactured products by NDCs in early stages (in weighted average percentage value) Period of interventionist trade and industrial policies 1820* 1875* 1913 1925 1931 1950 Interventionist trade and industrial policies U.K 45-55 0 0 5 N.A. 23 • Prime minister Walpole introduced industrial reform in 1971, which was intended to promote manufacturing industries • In addition, following policies lowered import duties on raw materials, abolished export duties on most manufactured goods and raised duties on imported foreign manufactured goods U.S. 35-45 40-50 44 37 48 14 • From 1816 to end of the Second World War U.S. had one of the highest average tariff rates on manufacturing imports Japan R** 5 30 N.A. N.A. N.A. • Until 1911, Japan was not able to use tariff protection due to treaties that barred tariffs rates over 5% • Instead, Japan introduced state-owned pilot plants in selected industries including shipbuilding, mining, textile and military industries • After 1911, Japan started introducing high tariff rates to protect domestic infant industries and make imported raw materials more affordable *Approximate figures; **Import of manufactured goods were highly restricted that tariff was not meaningful Source: Bairoch (1993); Chang (2005) © Reddal Inc. This material is Reddal proprietary. 7 FOR DISCUSSION However, today’s developing nations are endorsed to pursue neoliberal policies – which is not always to their advantage… Economic growth policy guidelines • Organizations such as International Reflections Policy related Monetary Fund and World Bank attach • Today’s developing nations must conditions attached to policy related clauses to receive financial realize that there is no proven “best financial aids assistance • Donor governments also impose similar practice” to catch-up with frontier market liberalism conditions when economies – each country must providing financial support consider solutions from its specific circumstances • The chosen growth model needs to be suitable to the country’s stage of development and current external • Multilateral trade agreements, including environment Trade agreements forbid WTO rules, considerably restrict • Actions must include efforts to tools to promote infant developing nations to leverage active tools strengthen the domestic industry industry growth to protect infant industry growth and ensure its competitiveness • Attracting FDI or driving a strong industrial policy are not by themselves sufficient policies ”Based on our experience the real driver of economic development comes from actions that makes doing business easy – this is not necessarily the same as opening the markets.” - Emerging market investor Source: Reddal analysis © Reddal Inc. This material is Reddal proprietary. 8 Korea pursued substitution, while Malaysia and Taiwan pursued complementary strategy Comparison on national growth models Korea (also Japan, China) Singapore and Malaysia Taiwan (substitution strategy) (compl. strat. – int’l model) (compl. strat. – semi-int’l model) Govern- Local banks Government Foreign ment State Industrial policy banks Banks Banks Promotion GLCs SWF MNCs JVs Public Guangxiqiye* MNCs Loan guarantees, enterprises Chaebols* mutual assistance Support Marginali- sation SMEs SMEs MNCs SMEs Focus on developing local Focus on developing supporting SMEs A mix approach combining Korea’s companies that will “substitute” that complement MNCs by participating substitution and Malaysia’s MNCs, also developing own value in their value chains. This made complementary strategy, that gave rise chain). This gave rise to Korean Malaysia vulnerable to MNCs leaving to to both local business groups and chaebols and strong local industries other countries supporting SMEs Note: MNC = multinational company, SME = small and medium sized enterprise, GLC = government linked company, SWF = sovereign wealth fund, SOE = 100% state owned enterprise: *Chaebols,keiretsu and guangxiqiye all refer to family controlled conglomerates, but with some distinctions.