Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria

CONTENTS Foreword ...... 6

Executive Summary ...... 7

Acknowledgement, disclaimers ...... 9

Chapter 1. An impact study ...... 10

1.1. Introduction ...... 10

1.2. Methodology ...... 11

1.3. Structure of the report ...... 12

Chapter 2. Figures, features and trends ...... 13

2.1. Figures concerning the impact of persistent violence 13

2.1.1 Christians targeted ...... 13

2.1.2. Christians killed ...... 16

2.1.3. Christians displaced and Churches abandoned/closed/destroyed/burnt 22

2.2. Features of the impact of persistent violence 25

2.3. Trends in Muslim control over society .... 29

2.4. Conclusions ...... 32

Chapter 3. Church life and personal life of Christians 34

3.1 Church Life ...... 34

3.2. Personal life of Christians ...... 36

3.2.1. Attitude of Christians ...... 36

3.2.2. Behavior of Christians ...... 39

3.2.3. Spiritual and emotional well-being ...... 44

3.2.4. Challenges for Christians ...... 46

3.2.5. Conclusions ...... 48

Chapter 4. Responses and perspectives of the Church50

4.1. Current responses ...... 50

4.2. Mid and long-term strategies and perspectives 51

4.3. Conclusions ...... 56 3

Chapter 5. Northern Nigeria in context ...... 58

5.1. Early developments (1900 – 1960) ...... 58

5.2. Recent developments (1960 – 2015) ...... 63

5.3. Conclusion ...... 66

Chapter 6. Actors of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria 67

6.1. Northern Muslim political and religious elite 67

6.2. Radical Islamic groups ...... 72

6.3. The Fulani herdsmen ...... 74

6.4. The Culture of political violence ...... 76

6.5. Conclusion ...... 76

Chapter 7. The Church in Northern Nigeria ...... 78

7.1. The Colonial period (1857 – 1954) ...... 78

7.2. The period of Independent Churches (from 1954 – 1987) 80

7.3. The period of religious violence (from 1987 – present) 81

7.4. Conclusion ...... 84

Chapter 8. Conclusions ...... 86

8.1. Conclusions ...... 86

8.2. Scenarios ...... 87

8.3. Follow-up ...... 88

Appendix 1. List of In-Depth Interviews ...... 89

Appendix 2. Results of Structured Interviews ...... 90

Appendix 3. List of Focus Group Discussions ...... 102

Appendix 4. Estimated Christian and Muslim populations per northern state in 2014 103

Appendix 5. Christians victim of persistent violence ‘by targeting’ 108

Appendix 7. Affected Christians in Northern Nigeria (2000–2014) 112

Appendix 8. Affected congregations in Northern Nigeria (2000 – 2014) 116

Appendix 9. Location of the six representative areas 119

Appendix 10. Political and religious affiliation of northern (deputy) governors 125

Appendix 11. Staff of big media houses in Northern Nigeria (as at 2014) 127 4

Appendix 12. Nigerian past and present leaders from 1960 to the present 130

Appendix 13. Prominent figures of the northern political and religious elite 132

Appendix 14. Overview of percentages Christians, Muslims and ATR in northern states 134

Appendix 15. Summary of attacks on Christians in Northern Nigeria 137

Appendix 16. Christians killed by targeted violence151

Literature ...... 151

Foreword The statistics of persecution and violence against Christians world-wide has become unprecedented in recent times. Christians in the Middle East; Western, Central and Southern Asia; North and East Africa have had their own share. One of the worst examples and it affects us personally, is the current phenomenon of persistent violence of Christians in Northern Nigeria. This report is a specific confirmation of this global phenomenon against Christians in Northern Nigeria. Furthermore, it is also a documentation of a field research on the impact of persistent violence on Christians in Northern Nigeria. The research work presents the facts that show grave and gross violation of human rights and religious freedom of Christians in Northern Nigeria, which have over the years failed to catch and attract sufficient sympathy and attention of the Nigerian and worldwide Church, the Federal and States’ Government and the International community.

This research has revealed by giving evidences that violence on Christians in Northern Nigeria has been well calculated and targeted based upon social, cultural, religious, economic and political interests. But these interests cannot be placed above human rights, religious freedom and democracy in Nigeria. Moreover humanity and freedom of the Christian minority in Northern Nigeria cannot be trampled upon by any reason or cause. Perpetrators of violence against Christians should be held accountable. However, through compromise, the Federal Government of Nigeria and that of the states in Northern Nigeria have never taken a strong, constitutional and political stand that guarantees the safety, security, rights and freedom of Christians anywhere in Northern Nigeria.

In view of these gross violations of the rights of Christians, both the Nigerian Federal Government and that of the states have turned a blind eye. From where will help come for the Christian minority in Northern Nigeria? The Nigerian and worldwide Church and the International community do not know these social facts as the propagandists for the Muslim North do deliberately hide these. The significance of this research report is that it draws attention to the devastating impact of persistent violence on Christians in Northern Nigeria.

This impact of the persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria is well researched and defined in the report. It gives a very good historical background, the progressive nature and the development of the problem. It also explains the active role of the dominant actors, the influence of the prevailing social factors and presents a well- researched description of the nature of the impact of violence upon the Northern Church. This research provides the Church in Nigeria with very valuable information about the impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria. The Nigerian and the Northern Church can use these research findings to develop strategies for its own survival in a northern hostile religious and political environment.

Moreover, the research calls for the necessity of taking appropriate actions by the Federal and States’ Governments and the International community. Otherwise, this systemic and persistent violence towards Christians in Northern Nigeria, if unchecked and halted, could lead to the extinction of Christianity and Christian communities in Northern Nigeria.

Rev. Musa Asake, PhD. General Secretary Christian Association of Nigeria National Christian Centre Abuja, Nigeria February 2016

Executive Summary Northern Nigeria is a British colonial construct in which the Muslim Far North and the non-Muslim – now predominantly Christian – Middle Belt areas of present day Nigeria were united in one common entity. This entity of Northern Nigeria was ruled by the British colonial administration (indirect rule) within the Sokoto Caliphate structure of Hausa-Fulani emirs. This Muslim Hausa-Fulani rule was extended after Nigerian independence, but challenged under democracy. The non-Muslim population in the northern region wants freedom from Hausa-Fulani domination, which is difficult to get as the holders of power in the northern region want it to remain undivided with regards to the northern-southern divide in competition over access to power, resources and state funds. Christianity has grown in Northern Nigeria from non-existent in 1857 to an estimated >30 million (31.2%) now. This is a minority in a Muslim context, but a sizable one. There are high concentrations of Christians in 7 Northern states. In 6 Northern states Christians are in the majority. Christian existence in Northern Nigeria is under threat through persistent violence, but at the same time the Church is growing in size through an increasing number of Muslim converts and is growing in strength through a substantial rise in the commitment of nominal Christians making radical choices in faith. Christians in Northern Nigeria are a substantial minority but targeted for different reasons by persistent violence (biggest minority, exponential church growth, ethnic composition and associated with the West). They suffer from targeted violence by politically motivated communal clashes, the 2011 post-electoral crisis, the Boko Haram insurgency and Fulani herdsmen attacks. They also suffer from marginalization and discrimination by forced Islamization through Sharia state governments and Islamic society at large. Actors of persistent violence impacting the Church in Northern Nigeria are: the northern Muslim political and religious elite, radical Islamic groups, and the Fulani herdsmen, acting within the framework of a Culture of political violence. Drivers of violence can be summarized as follows: protection of northern Muslim endangered interests (political-economic), protection of Muslims’ endangered identity (social-cultural), and protection of Islam’s endangered ‘legitimate’ position (religious). March 2015 about 500,000 Christians were displaced. Between 2006 and 2014 an estimated 11,500 Christians were killed and within the period of 2000 and 2014 over 13,000 churches have been abandoned, closed, destroyed and/or burnt. In the same period up to 1.3 million Christians have been affected and most were forced to flee. The severely affected communities are in the predominantly Muslim Far North. Christians relocate mainly to the predominantly Christian Middle Belt, but at the same time Christian communities in the rural areas of this sub-region are the most affected by Muslim herdsmen attacks. Between 2000 and 2014 Church life, according to Christians, diminished substantially to dramatically in violence- ridden areas. The Christian behavior towards Muslims deteriorated from negative to strongly negative due to experiences of perceived marginalization, discrimination and violence by Muslims. Positive Christian attitudes towards Muslims according to Christians substantially worsened due to feelings of fear and adversity through personal experiences of killing, mistreatment, etc. And the result is growing distrust, antagonism and segregation. Muslim involvement in politics is seen by many Christians as a Muslim partisan game and consequently useless. But many more Christians feel the need for liberation from Muslim dominance through political self-empowerment and engagement in the political domain. Faith however has not been abandoned. Moreover although many churches have seen a decline in membership and subsequent attendance; those who have stayed show an increase in commitment to their faith and church. Christians however face major challenges in coping with trauma, living in mixed communities, involvement in politics, and access to employment in government services. Christian communities in the hardest hit areas that remain are small, traumatized and inclined to resort to vigilante groups for self-defense. Christian communities that receive relocating Christians are overwhelmed by the humanitarian crisis and lack human, financial and other resources to cope with the urgent needs. The property and land of fleeing Christians are bought, confiscated or simply occupied by local or migrant Muslims. Returning Christians have great difficulty in starting all over again. Responses of the Church leadership so far lack coherent vision, strategy and planning to cope with this. What will be the effects of persistent violence for the future? The Church in Northern Nigeria had its ‘golden age’ from the time of the first missionaries until the 1987 Kafanchan crisis in which it expanded beyond the Middle Belt and had great inroads into the Far North. But the impact since then of Muslim dominance in terms of religion and politics, Islamist insurgencies and Muslim herdsmen attacks has led to a decline of the Church in the Far North and an overburdening of the Church in the Middle Belt through relocating Christians. At the same time in certain areas the Church seems on the verge of death.

Will the Church in Northern Nigeria disengage from society, close in on itself in order to survive, slowly fall into decline and over time cease to exist? Or will the Church in Northern Nigeria engage within society, opening up its resources from the Gospel to the benefit of all, and thrive? The Church in Northern Nigeria has to do some thorough analysis of the challenge it is presently facing, come up with a vision and strategy for the future, develop accompanying measures that are comprehensive and realistic at the same time, and apply these effectively. At the same time the Church in Northern Nigeria should urge the Nigerian government and the International community to take action to guarantee equality and the realization of the rights of Christians to religious freedom, as well as their economic and social rights as citizens of Nigeria.

Acknowledgement, disclaimers

Acknowledgement The author expresses his gratitude to Church leaders, lay Christians and scientists in Northern Nigeria that contributed to the report through their participation in In-Depth Interviews, Structured Interviews and Focus Group Discussions. The interviews and discussions were all done in June 2014. The report was read, appreciated and commented upon by three professors in Northern Nigeria. The author appreciates their contribution greatly for without it the report would not be the same. Their comments were communicated by internet and in the country in September 2015. The results of the report were presented in consultations to senior Church leaders of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in Northern Nigeria at all levels. The author thanks these Church leaders for their appreciation, comments and recommendations. The consultations were held in September and December 2015. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) fully endorses the content of the report and wants the Church and international policy makers to take action to provide security for Christians in Northern Nigeria as well as safeguard their federal rights in the religious, political, economic and social domain of society. At last the author thanks his colleagues of Open Doors International in Nigeria and abroad that contributed to the report in research, discussions, comments, moral support and other. At last Open Doors International thanks local Christians in Nigeria who participated in and contributed to the research, as well as staff of Open Doors International.

Disclaimers The choice of the names of actors of persistent violence (i.e. northern Muslim political and religious elite, radical Islamic groups and Muslim Fulani herdsmen), and drivers of persistent violence (i.e. Northern Muslim endangered interests, Muslims’ endangered identity, and Islam’s endangered ‘legitimate’ position) is to accommodate the controversy regarding the identity of those allegedly involved in persistent violence, in both formal and informal reports. However, it is not intended to target one particular political, economic, socio-cultural or religious group. The report is based upon field and media research among mainly Christians and as a consequence the Muslims mind is mostly presumed and interpreted by Christian victims, those interviewed and from the views of scholars. For the purpose of this report this is sufficient as the research was to present data about the impact of persistent violence on the Church. But for a good balance of knowledge, further research is necessary on the targeted Muslim groups as the perpetrators of violence on Northern Christians so that the Muslim mind could also be captured and a comparative analysis of both the Christian mind and Muslim mind be made. Although Christians as a minority are targeted by persistent violence in Northern Nigeria, some Christians however have also brought conflict upon themselves through their own tribalism, political agenda, hatred, retaliation and violence. Other Christians have not always responded well to conflict and violence, and violence by Muslims has sometimes been encouraged by the negative responses of perpetrators perceived to be Christians. Muslims sometimes react because they feel marginalized (e.g. Plateau State in which they are considered non-indigenes with all implications). Names not published for security reasons For security reasons, the names of those interviewed cannot be published in this report. The interviews were conducted with different categories of Christians considered as church leaders, scientist, and victims in Northern Nigeria. There was no distinction in gender, class, ethnicity or political affiliation.

Chapter 1. An impact study

1.1. Introduction This report focuses on the impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria. The Church in Northern Nigeria in the report is the entirety of the Christian community, the organized church denominations and the individual Christians in this region. With persistent violence we characterize the apparent ongoing sequence of incidents of violence and with the impact we mean the consequences of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria. In the first quarter of 2014 it became obvious that the Boko Haram (BH) insurgency was having a great impact on the Church in Northern Nigeria. This was just some months away from what we now know as the peak of this insurgency with the establishment of the Gwoza Caliphate on August 24 2014, and subsequent large scale violence in the Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. People were traumatized, wounded and killed; women and girls were raped, kidnapped and/or forced into marriage. The number of internally displaced people and refugees to neighboring countries increased enormously. Among the victims were many Christians, and attacks on churches, Christian properties, lands, houses, shops, schools and clinics caused great damage and loss. Many Christians relocated to safer areas and Christian communities in violence-stricken areas were reduced to small numbers. As church buildings were burnt or destroyed, congregations became incapable of paying their pastor’s stipend (as is common in Africa), Believers did not meet otherwise out of fear, churches closed or were abandoned, Christian communities ceased to exist and at times Muslims, some from neighboring countries, took over the empty spaces. The Boko Haram insurgency was not the only form of persistent violence the Church in Northern Nigeria has been suffering from. In the Sharia states and other Muslim dominated areas long before the Boko Haram insurgency, Christian communities were marginalized and victim to discrimination at times amounting to violent targeting. Many Christians migrated to the safer areas leaving behind their more vulnerable remaining communities. Muslim Fulani herdsmen attacks on Christian communities in Middle Belt states are another form of violence the Church is experiencing. Although one could assume this to be purely economic, the religious overtones are believed by many Christians as attacks also aimed at conquering Christian lands in order to Islamize them 1. Philip Jenkins in his book about the history of the Church in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, states that: “the deeply rooted Christianity of Africa and Asia did not simply fade away through lack of zeal, or theological confusion: it was [finally] crushed, in a welter of warfare and persecution.” Although oppression and persecution are not inherent to Islamic rule – Muslim regimes have tolerated other faiths for long periods – this tolerance failed at various times and collapsed at critical points 2. And in the context of the decline of the Church, five other factors he cites are relevant 3. Is this the future of the Church in Northern Nigeria? Will this be the impact over time of the persistent violence on Christian communities in this part of the country? An impact study as to the effects of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria is timely. More precisely, at the level of strategy and operations, what is the present status of persistent violence, what is its impact on the Church in Northern Nigeria, and what can be done to counteract the devastating effects on the Church, which is in danger of extinction in some areas if nothing is done to strengthen it? This report aims to address these issues. This impact study can also serve to gain better insight for policy makers in Church, government and society in Nigeria and at the level of the International community. Because persistent violence in Northern Nigeria is much larger and has more causes then commonly perceived. And the negative impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria is also more profound than many think. Church, government and society in Nigeria and the International community have to know about the scope of this violence and its negative impact in order to respond in a proper way to the violence.

1 Cf. Abdulbarkindo Adamu and Alypse Ben; ‘Migration and Violent-Conflict in Divided Societies: Non-Boko Haram Violence against Christians in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria’, by, NPVRN Working Paper No. 1, Abuja-Nigeria; For World Watch Research, Open Doors International, Netherlands, March 2015; https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/research/3777637 2 Cf. p. 100 in Philip Jenkins, The Lost History of Christianity, The Thousand-Year Golden Age of the Church in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia and How It Died, Harper One, New York, 2008. 3 Cf. Ibid, p. 207 Chapter 7, ‘How faiths die’.

This report is the result of the study about the impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria with respect to Open Doors International, the Christian Association of Nigeria, and national and international policymakers. 1.2. Methodology Open Doors International gave the assignment for an impact study into persistent violence towards the Christian Church in Northern Nigeria. The following problem statement was formulated: What has been the impact of the persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria and how can the Church best be strengthened?

Research questions were: What is Northern Nigeria?; What is the history of the Church in Northern Nigeria?; What are the actors of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria?; What is the impact of the persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria?; What are the responses and perspectives of the Church to the impact of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria?; and What can be done to strengthen the Church in Northern Nigeria in view of the impact of persistent violence? Recommendations as to what can be done will be brief however, as these will be done more extensive in a follow-up in cooperation with the Christian Association of Nigeria. The following methods were used: Media Research (MR): through MR relevant articles, reports and other written sources were consulted via the Internet (e.g. International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Nigeria Watch), library (e.g. Africa Study Center, Leiden, the Netherlands) and other sources (e.g. contacts in Nigeria) 4. In Depth Interviews (IDI): IDIs were held with 14 church leaders and scientists with expertise about persistent violence in Northern Nigeria 5. Structured Interviews (SI): 3 geopolitical zones in Northern Nigeria were chosen and 3 states were selected in each of them: a. Northeast zone (Borno, Yobe, Adamawa) – current focus of BH violence; b. North-Central zone (Plateau, Nasarawa, Benue) – current focus of much of the Fulani herdsmen violence; c. North-West zone (Kano, Kaduna, Zamfara) – current impact of Sharia conflict. In each state 2 churches were selected and classified according to their interaction with violence (6 churches per zone of which 2 are High Impact, 2 are Medium Impact and 2 are Low Impact): a. High Impact (HI) : a church or a Christian community has been directly affected by a high level of violence through either one or more of the following ways: pastor(s) killed, bomb attack(s), members killed, church(es) burned, women abducted, children abducted, many Christians have fled; b. Medium Impact (MI) : a church or a Christian community has been directly affected by a medium level of violence through either one or more of the following ways: no one or just a few are killed, little destruction of houses and/or church(es), church(es) closed, houses deserted, Christians have fled; c. Low Impact (LI) : a church or a Christian community has been indirectly affected by violence. The general atmosphere and insecurity in Northern Nigeria has impacted the Church’s functioning. There are high levels of fear, threat letters may have been received, but no church has yet been closed, no houses are deserted and refugees from directly affected areas may have flocked to the Church or Christian community for shelter, food and medical assistance. In each church Structured Interviews were done with pastors, youth leaders, women leaders and 3 members (6 interviews per church). In total SIs were done in 3 geopolitical zones; within each zone in 6 churches (2 in each impact of violence category); within each church 6 interviews, which make altogether 108 Structured Interviews in 18 churches 6. Focus Group Discussions (FGD); 3 FGD were held in each of the 3 geopolitical zones but in separate states, which altogether makes 9 FGDs. Each FGD consisted of a mixture of representatives selected from churches with different levels of interaction with violence (HI, MI, and LI). Each FGD had some division between rural and urban churches. Preferable representatives for the FGD were from Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)-aligned Church Groups 7 (5

4 See references in the footnotes of successive chapters. 5 See list in Appendix 1. List of In-Depth Interviews. 6 See the results of Structured Interviews in Appendix 2. Results of Structured Interviews. 7 To qualify for the membership of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) a church must have been registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1990 or previous legislation and shall belong to one of the five Church Groups, namely: * Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria (CSN); (footnote continued)

11 categories). Representatives could be ordained or lay people, but were knowledgeable people and had an opinion about strategy, vision, problems, challenges and perspectives of the Church in Northern Nigeria 8. 1.3. Structure of the report Chapter 2 presents the impact of persistent violence on Northern Nigeria in figures, features and trends. Chapter 3 handles the impact of persistent violence on Church life and personal life of Christians. Chapter 4 shows the short, mid and long-term responses and future perspectives of the Church on persistent violence in Northern Nigeria. Chapter 5 describes Northern Nigeria as a region by its early and recent developments. Chapter 6 takes up the actors of persistent violence (Northern political and religious elite; radical Islam; Fulani herdsmen; and the Culture of political violence). Chapter 7 is about the Church in Northern Nigeria in the colonial period, the period of independence churches and the period of growing religious violence. Chapter 8 presents conclusions about the impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria and recommendations about what to do to. At the end of the report the appendixes are given.

* Christian Council of Nigeria (CCN); * Christian Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (CPFN) / Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN); * Organization of African Instituted Churches (OAIC); * TEKAN and ECWA Fellowships; http://cannigeria.org/membership/. 8 See list of FGDs in Appendix 3. List of Focus Group Discussions.

Chapter 2. Figures, features and trends This chapter will show some figures (1), features (2), trends (3) and conclusions (4) about the impact of the persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria. Figures are given about affected Christians, their communities and churches, by persistent violence in terms of religious issues, political issues, and cattle grazing/land issues. It will show the features of violence towards Christians in highlighting the impact on 6 representative areas, and present trends of Muslim domination over Christians in Northern Nigeria.

2.1. Figures concerning the impact of persistent violence This part argues that Christians are a targeted minority in Northern Nigeria, presents figures concerning the numbers of Christians killed and displaced, gives figures about the most affected Christian communities and churches and the number of Christians affected by persistent violence throughout the researched period. 2.1.1 Christians targeted Sub-chapter in short: Christians form a substantial minority in Northern Nigeria (an estimated 30,665,000/31.2%), one which is the most potentially targeted group for four reasons (biggest minority, exponential church growth, ethnic composition, and associated with the West), and the most actually targeted groups for three more reasons (protection of northern Muslim endangered interests [political-economic], Muslims’ endangered identity [social- cultural], and Islam’s endangered legitimate position [religious]. In cases of persistent violence Christians may well account for up to 41.2% of the victims. Map 1. Northern and Southern Nigeria 9

Christians form a substantial religious minority in Northern Nigeria of an estimated number of 30,665,000 (31.2%). Christians live in all 19 northern states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja and form majorities in Adamawa, Benue, Kogi, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba states 10 . (See Table 2 Percentage of Christians per northern states in 2014 and Map 2. The political division of Nigeria in 36 states)

9 See for link map: http://nigeriamasterweb.com/Masterweb/MasterwebMobileNews.php?rss_id=MTAzMg == 10 See Table 5 in Appendix 4: Christian and Muslim populations per northern state.

Table 1. Religious adherence in Northern Nigeria in 2014 11 Religious adherence Numbers and percentages Christians 12 30,665,000 (31.2%) Muslims 62,431,000 (63.5% African Traditional Religionists 13 5,213,000 (5.3%) Total northern population 98,366,000 (53.6%)

Table 2. Percentage of Christians per northern states in 2014 14 State Percentage of Christians Adamawa 53.6% Bauchi 25.3% Benue 81.0% Borno 30.0% Gombe 40.0% Jigawa 7.0% Kaduna 46.7% Kano 8.3% Katsina 9.0% Kebbi 24.0% Kogi 51.3% Kwara 41.7% Nasarawa 51.7% Niger 39.0% Plateau 73.3% Sokoto 4.3% Taraba 50.0% Yobe 6.7% Zamfara 2.3% FCT Abuja 43.3%

With regards to persistent violence there are two ways in which Christians can be regarded as victims: either ‘at random’ or ‘by targeting’. With ‘at random’ Christians are victims of violence just like any other person in society, but with ‘by targeting’ Christians are singled out, selected and focused upon, and is their group identity at stake. Open Doors argue that Christians are the most potentially targeted religious group in

11 See Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 4: Christian and Muslim populations in northern state. 12 Religious figures are highly controversial in Nigeria. When this report was presented to Nigerian church leaders in the fall of 2015, these statistics were challenged in saying that they underestimate the population and percentage of Christians. One of the reasons they forwarded was the fact that during the last census in 2006 no religious demographic information was taken. Many leaders see this as a silent acknowledgment of Muslims who insisted religious information must not be in the census and of Christians being in the majority now. 13 Adherents of ATR plus < 1% adherents of other religions and non-religious. 14 Ibid, Table 3..

Map 2. The political division of Nigeria in 36 states 15

Northern Nigeria which become factual in the context of tensions in society for 4 reasons they share with other Christian minorities worldwide 16 : 1. Christians form the biggest religious minority in a Muslim context and if occasions for marginalization, discrimination and violence exist or appear, Christians statistically bear the brunt. 2. The Christian faith has grown exponentially in Northern Nigeria. Between 1857 and 2006 the Christian faith grew from virtually non-existent to 31.2% of the population due to Christian mission, indigenization of African churches and the Pentecostal movement. Christianity through this growth is seen as a threat to the dominance of Islam in the region. 3. Christians often belong to ethnic, linguistic and cultural minorities. They are Tiv, Berom, Jukun, Maguzawa (a sub-Hausa group), or transplanted southern Yoruba or Igbo; speak other languages; and have different values and norms. The Muslim majority belongs to the Hausa-Fulani or Kanuri tribes and tensions with minority tribes may easily rise. 4. Christians are associated with Western secular or ‘Christian’ culture that arouses much anti-European and anti-American resentment, which is felt as alien to Islamic culture. As a consequence Christians are often objects of vented frustrations towards the West. Open Doors also argues that Christians are the most actually targeted religious group in Northern Nigeria for 3 more reasons that are specific for them in the northern context. These are the drivers of violence as shown in Chapter 4. Actors of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria: (a) protection of northern Muslim endangered interests (political-

15 https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d2/Nigeria_political.png 16 Cf. pp. 35-37 in Le Livre noir de la condition des Chrétiens dans le monde, by Jean-Michel di Falco, Timothy Radcliffe and Andrea Riccardi (dir.), XO Editions, Paris, 2014.

15 economic), (b) protection of Muslims’ endangered identity (social-cultural), and (c) protection of Islam’s endangered legitimate position (religious). If Christians are victims ‘at random’ a demographic percentage can be applied to the number of victims that corresponds with the presence of Christians in Northern Nigeria (31.2%). But if it can be accepted that Christians are targeted in Northern Nigeria, the number of Christian victims may well exceed their demographic presence by 10% (41.2%) 17 . In Appendix 5. Christian victims of persistent violence ‘by targeting’, we explain how the targeting of Christians in Boko Haram related violence varies in intensity over time and leads to an average estimated increase in numbers of Christians killed with 10% more compared to Christians being killed at random. Moreover a study about the number of Christian victims at the peak of the Gwoza Caliphate (November-December 2014) supports the estimated 10% increase figure. In the same appendix we explain how the targeting of Christians by Fulani herdsmen-related violence is affecting Middle Belt states where Christians are in the majority. A conservative estimate percentage for Christian victims in this case we argue amounts to 70%. For other types of persistent violence Christians are targeted by, there is a significant data shortage; so here we take the demographic 31.2%. As the overall majority of Christian victims of persistent violence (2006-2014) are Boko Haram related, we argue that the 41.2% for Christians targeted by persistent violence can be taken for estimation’s sake. 2.1.2. Christians killed In the following paragraph we use the Nigeria Watch (NW) 18 data on non-natural deaths to identify the numbers of Christians killed by targeting through religious related violence in Northern Nigeria. Sub-chapter in short: In the period 2006 – 2014 Northern Nigeria was the most violent region in the country (45,278 people killed). In 2010 the region accounted for over 50% of total deaths with a staggering peak of 82.3% in 2014. This is due to the Boko Haram crisis. An estimated 11,500 Christians have been killed due to religious, political, and cattle grazing / land issues in the researched period. These issues we argue fall into the category of religious related violence. According to the data of Nigeria Watch (NW) 45,278 people were killed for a number of different reasons in Northern Nigeria between 1 st June 2006 and 31 st December 2014. (See table 3) When compared to those killed in the whole country in the same period, we see that the northern percentage gets over 50% in 2010 and arrives to a staggering 82.3% in 2014. (See table 4) This is largely due to the Boko Haram crisis (e.g. in 2014 the northeast region accounted for 9,884 deaths of which 7,174 were in Borno alone19 ). Table 3. Recorded number of non-natural deaths in Northern Nigeria (June 2006 – December 2014) 20

20000 17525 18000 16000 14000 12000 10000 7629 8000 6000 4988 3927 4000 2612 2655 3011 1937 2000 944 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

17 See Appendix 5. Christian victims of persistent violence ‘by targeting’. 18 NW is a research project monitoring lethal violence, conflicts, and human security in Nigeria. The project started in July 2006 and is now based on the campus of the University of Ibadan with the support of the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA-Nigeria) since July 2013. See: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?html=10. 19 The insurgency started in 2009 and headed for a peak after August 2014 with the proclamation of the Gwoza Caliphate. The most serious government clampdown on Boko Haram was in February 2015 just before the March presidential elections. For figures see: p, 2, Nigeria Watch, Newsletter no. 4, Sept-Dec, 2014. 20 Cf. March 2015 figures. See: http://nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtStat&type=default.

Table 4. Comparison between Nigeria and Northern Nigeria’s number of non-natural deaths (2006 –2014)

Issue/Area Nigeria (NG) % Northern % of NG Nigeria (NN) 2006 4,443 100 9,44 21.2 2007 6,520 100 2,612 40.1 2008 5,624 100 1,937 34.4 2009 5,635 100 2,655 47.1 2010 5,799 100 3,011 51.9 2011 6,704 100 3,927 58.6 2012 7,670 100 4,988 65.0 2013 10,854 100 7,629 70.3 2014 21,299 100 17,525 82.3 Totals of non- 45,228 natural deaths (not double counted)

The main reasons for the killings are political issues (19,623), religious issues (19,572), crimes (18,005) and car accidents (7,271). (See table 5) But if we compare northern figures with the whole country a different pattern prevails: 99.7% of the deaths caused by religious issues are in Northern Nigeria (19,572), and it is the same for 85.9% of the deaths caused by political issues (19,623), 82.9% of the deaths caused by cattle grazing (611) and 77.2% of the deaths caused by land issues (2,190) 21 . (See table 6)

Table 5. The main causes of violence in Northern Nigeria (June 2006 – December 2014) 25000

car accidents 19623 19572 20000 cattle grazing 18005 convict executions crimes 15000 fires/explosions land issues 10000 market issues 7271 natural disasters 5416 oil distribution 5000 oil production 2190 1681 611 1014 792 other accidents 1 67 0 230 0 political issues religious issues sorcery

21 The figures for cattle grazing / land issues are too low due to insufficient recording, NW admits. Cf. ‘Trends and patterns of cattle grazing and rural violence in Nigeria (2006-20014)’, by Philip Olayoku, IFRA-Nigeria Working Papers Series No. 3, 28/11/2014, and, ‘Land Conflicts and Lethal Violence in Nigeria: Patterns, Mapping and Evolution (2006 – 2014)’, by Conroy, Stone; IFRA-Nigeria Working papers Series No. 38, 28/11/2014.

Table 6. Comparison between Nigeria and Northern Nigeria of causes of non-natural deaths (2006 – 2014)

Issue/Area Nigeria (NG) % Northern % of NG Nigeria Car accidents 16,112 100 7,271 45.1 Cattle grazing 737 100 611 82.9 Convict executions 21 100 1 0.04 Crimes 32,001 100 18,005 56.3 Fire/explosion 10,124 100 5,416 53.5 Land issues 3,258 100 2,190 77.2 Market issues 427 100 67 15.7 Natural disaster 1,833 100 1,014 55.3 Oil distribution 4,677 100 792 17.0 Oil production 1,555 100 0 0.0 Other accidents 4,342 100 1,681 38.7 Political issues 22,852 100 19,623 85.9 Religious issues 19,637 100 19,572 99.7 Sorcery 726 100 230 31.7 Totals of non- 76,473 natural deaths by causes of violence (possibly double counted)

This different order of causes 22 in Northern Nigeria reveals the persistent violence the Church is impacted by:

• Religious issues (99.7 of NG; see table 6%) 23 Main examples are: • The 2000 Sharia crisis in Kaduna State; Christians protested to the implementation of enhanced Sharia law by the state government. Muslim counter protests led to violent clashes with Christians. • The Boko Haram insurgency since 2009; Security forces clamped down on the movement in the same year and killed many members among which founder Muhammad Yusuf. The insurgency targeting Christians among others was Boko Haram’s reaction to this. • The 2000 - 2012 communal riots in Jos, Plateau state; Muslim and Christian communities clashed about the results of local elections and property of land24 . Religious issues are those where some main actors are religious organizations – mainly churches and Islamic groups – and seek to advance a religious agenda in which violence occurs 25 .

22 The most violent incidents concerning these four are: the 2008/2010 Inter-communal Riots in Plateau State (1,617 deaths), the 2009 military clashes with Boko Haram in Borno and Bauchi states (597 deaths), the 2011 post-electoral crisis in Kaduna State (331 deaths), the 2008 conflict over land ownership in Taraba State (200 deaths) and the Boko Haram insurgency itself being the biggest of all (in 2014, largely by BH, 9,884 deaths). Cf. p. 6 of Nigeria Watch, Third Report on Violence (2006–2011), June 2011, and page 22 of Nigeria Watch, Fourth report on Violence (2006-2014), June 2014. See http://www.nigeriawatch.org/ 23 ‘Muslims, Christians and religious violence in Nigeria: patterns and mapping’ (June 2006–May 2014), by Akinola Ejodame Olojo, IFRA-Nigeria Working Papers Series No. 32, 27/11/2014. 24 Cf. p. 11 in Nigeria Watch, Fourth Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-2014), June 2014. See link: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/ 25 Cf. p. 21 in Nigeria Watch, Third Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-2011), June 2011. See link: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/

Borno (12,099 death due to religious issues) is the most affected, followed by Adamawa (1,659), Plateau (1,423) and Yobe (1,373). Kaduna (920), Kano (626) and Bauchi (559) are medium affected 26 .

• Political issues (85.9%) 27 Main examples are: • The 2008 Jos Plateau local election violence erupted after the results of local elections were contested by the Muslim Hausa Fulani. • The 2011 post-electoral crisis; southern Christian Goodluck Jonathan won the 2011 presidential elections in detriment of northern Muslim Muhammad Buhari. Frustration of northern Muslims led to clashes in the northern region with supposed Jonathan voters, mainly Christians 28 . • The 2013 emergency rule in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states; the reaction of the government to contain the Boko Haram insurgency in mainly the northeast of Nigeria and the Gwoza caliphate 29 .

Borno (12,118) is the most affected, followed by Adamawa (1,669), Yobe (1,388) and Plateau (1,299). Kano (759) and Kaduna (774) are medium affected 30 .

• Cattle grazing (82.9%) and land issues (77.2%) 31 Main examples are: Fulani herdsmen attacks on Christian communities in the Middle Belt and especially in Taraba State 32 . Benue (169), Nasarawa (155) and Taraba (62) are the most affected in cattle grazing. Plateau (843), Benue (613), Taraba (299) and Nasarawa (223) are the most affected in land issues 33 .

Religious related violence We have seen that the Church in Northern Nigeria has been impacted by persistent violence due to religious issues, political issues and cattle grazing/land issues. These issues however, cannot be separated as totally distinct for the religious, political and socio-economic issues in Northern Nigeria are intertwined. For instance, the 2008 local elections and 2010 communal riots in Plateau, the 2011 post-electoral crisis in Northern Nigeria, and the 2013 emergency rule in the northeast, also have religious causes. This is confirmed as some of the examples NW gives appear under the categories of religious and political issues. A clear distinction between the NW causes of violence seems to be impossible to draw. NW affirms this again in saying that each incident may have several causes 34 and in stating that, for example, political interpretations in cases can be alternatively religious 35 . This is also in accord with Open Doors International’s observation that incidents of violence in which Christians are victims in a Muslim context can be religious, political, economic, and social-cultural at the same time. Moreover – as we conclude in Chapter 4 – the four categories of violence the Church is impacted by are connected through a common religious denominator (defending northern Muslims’ interests, Muslim identity and Islam’s position 36 ). So the issues of religious, political,

26 See: Appendix 6. Non-Natural deaths by cause per northern state (2006 – 2014). 27 ‘Political and electoral violence in Nigeria: mapping, evolution and patterns (June 2006 – May 2014)’, by Shamsudeen Kabir Bello, IFRA-Nigeria Working Papers Series No. 49, 04/03/2014. 28 ‘Muslims, Christians and religious violence in Nigeria: patterns and mapping’ (June 2006–May 2014), by Akinola Ejodame Olojo, IFRA-Nigeria Working Papers Series No. 32, 27/11/2014. 29 Cf. p. 10 in Nigeria Watch, Fourth report on Violence (2006–2014), June 2014. 30 See: Appendix 6. Non-Natural deaths by cause per northern state (2006 – 2014). 31 Both categories mainly deal with the same phenomenon of struggles between Fulani herdsmen and local farmers about access to grazing grounds and land. Cf. Cf. ‘Trends and patterns of cattle grazing and rural violence in Nigeria (2006-20014)’, by Philip Olayoku, IFRA-Nigeria Working Papers Series No. 3, 28/11/2014, and, ‘Land Conflicts and Lethal Violence in Nigeria: Patterns, Mapping and Evolution (2006 – 2014)’, by Stone Conroy , IFRA-Nigeria Working papers Series No. 38, 28/11/2014. 32 Cf. Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (November 2015); ‘Violent Conflict in Divided Societies: The Case Study of Violent Conflict in Taraba State (2013 - 2015), NPVRN Working Paper No. 2, Abuja-Nigeria; For World Watch Research, Open Doors International, Netherlands; see link: http://theanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Violent-Conflict-in-Taraba-State-2013-2015.pdf 33 See: Appendix 6. Non-Natural deaths by cause per northern state (2006 – 2014). 34 Cf. p. 7 in Nigeria Watch, Fourth report on Violence (2006–2014), June 2014. 35 For the 2011 post-electoral crisis see p. 19 in Nigeria Watch, Third report on Violence (2006 –2011), June 2011. 36 (a) Protection of northern Muslim endangered interests (political-economic), (b) protection of Muslims’ endangered identity (social-cultural), and (c) protection of Islam’s endangered legitimate position (religious).

19 cattle grazing/land issues fall, for the purpose of our impact study, into one single category of ‘religious related violence’ (see Frame: ‘Open Doors International reasoning concerning incidents of violence’).

Open Doors International’s reasoning concerning incidents of violence

In the reasoning of Open Doors International monitored incidents of violence in which Christians are victims in a Muslim context can be religious, political, economic and social-cultural at the same time for in the Islamic perspective, contrary to the secular perspective, there is no separation between these spheres of society. Moreover in a true Islamic society all men and things are governed by Allah through Sharia so sincere Muslims ought to be in control of the main domains of society through key institutions and companies in a nation state to the detriment of non-Muslims who become henceforth 2 nd class citizens, discriminated against employees and victims of persistent violence. According to the experience of Christians we work with in Muslim dominated societies or in societies where large groups of Muslims live, the non-secular perspective of an undivided religious and socio-cultural sphere, and the drive to control the political and economic domains, are prevalent among Muslims. Christians we work with experience being ‘inferior’, treated accordingly and becoming victims of violence.

With this in mind we can present Table 7 about religious related violence with the restriction that total figures cannot be presented given the fact that each incident – in the Nigeria Watch system - may have several causes and subsequently every registered death may be double counted 37 .

Table 7. Estimated non-natural deaths by religious related violence in Northern Nigeria (2006 – 2014) (Figures taken from Table 6.)

Category Numbers Religious issues 19,572 Political issues 19,623 Cattle / land issues 2,801 Totals of non-natural deaths 41,996 by causes of religious related violence (possibly double counted)

Estimation of Christians killed by targeting According to a June 2015 estimation of Amnesty International 38 17,000 people have been killed since 2009 by Boko Haram. OCHA 39 estimates 9,300 to be the number of people killed since 2009 by Boko Haram alone. Only Human Rights Watch 40 in its May 2015 estimations speaks about different causes of sectarian, communal and political violence – our category of religious related violence – and comes up with a total figure of 20,000 deaths since 1999. To get a credible estimation of the numbers of Christians killed by targeting (not double counted), however, we argue as follows.

37 Note on NG database: each incident may have several causes. Hence cumulative figures are higher than the total number of deaths recorded in the database. For this reason total numbers are avoided. Cf. p.7, Nigeria Watch, Fourth Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-2014), June 2014. 38 Cf. overview ‘Facts and Figures, Nigeria: Horror in numbers’, by Amnesty International, 3 June 2015; see link: https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/facts_and_figures.pdf 39 Cf. OCHA – North East Nigeria Crisis: Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 30 January 2015): http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/NE_Snapshot_Jan30.pdf 40 Cf. Nigeria: ‘New President Should Address Abuses, Act Boldly on Violence, Corruption, and Lack of Accountability’, Human Rights Watch, 26 May 2015: http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/26/nigeria-new-president-should-address-abuses

As the Nigeria Watch figures are more comprehensive and take into account multiple causes, we base our estimations upon their data. We start with the figures for non-natural deaths by causes of violence (possibly double counted). Here we find a percentage for non-natural deaths by causes of religious related violence (59.2%). Then we proceed to the figures for non-natural deaths (not double counted) and apply the percentage for non-natural deaths by causes of religious related violence (59.2%). In this way we find the number of Christians killed by religious related violence (not double counted). As the number of death by religious related violence (not double counted) are a mixture of Christians, Muslims and adherents of African Traditional Religion, we apply the ‘at random’ (31.2%) and ‘by targeting’ (41.2%) percentages for Christians killed and come up with an estimation of the number of Christians killed by targeting due to religious related violence in Northern Nigeria (not double counted). (See table 8).

Table 8. Number of Christians killed by religious related violence in Northern Nigeria (2006 – 2014) Number of non-natural death (possibly double counted) Numbers Totals of non-natural deaths by causes of violence 76,473 (100%) (cf. Table 6. Totals Northern Nigeria ) Totals of non-natural deaths by causes of religious related violence 41,996 (59.2%) (cf. Table 7. Totals Number of victims) Conclusion: 59.2% of the non-natural death (possibly double counted) are by religious related violence Number of non-natural death (not double counted) Numbers Totals of non-natural deaths 44,228 (100%) (cf. Table 4. Totals Northern Nigeria) 59.2% of these non-natural deaths are by religious related violence 26,775 (59.2%) Estimated number of Christians killed by religious related violence Numbers (taken from the number 26,216) Christians killed ‘at random’ among these non-natural deaths by religious related violence 8,354 (31.2%) (the 59.2%) are: Christians killed ‘by targeting’ among these non-natural deaths by religious related violence 11,031 (41.2) (the 59.2%) are:

Therefore we arrive at an estimated 8,354 Christians killed ‘at random’ or an estimated 11,031 Christians killed ‘by targeting’ due to religious related violence in Northern Nigeria. But as the NW figures for cattle grazing/land issues are too low due to insufficient recording 41 , the percentage for Christians targeted by Fulani herdsmen related violence is a conservative 70% 42 , and the percentage of Christians killed by other forms of persistent violence is at least the demographic 31.2, our final estimations are slightly higher as we estimate in round figures that between 9,000 (at random) and 11,500 (by targeting) Christians have been killed in religious related violence in Northern Nigeria (see Appendix 16 for further details).

Estimated number of Christians killed by targeting due to religious related violence (2006 ---2014): 11,500

41 Cf. the admission of NW on respectively page 3 in Philip Olayoku, op cit. and, on page 10 Conroy, Stone, op cit. 42 Cf. Page 111 of Appendix 5.2. Christians targeted by Fulani herdsmen related violence in the Middel Belt.

2.1.3. Christians displaced and Churches abandoned/closed/destroyed/burnt Sub-chapter in short: March 2015 an estimated 468,226 Christians in Northern Nigeria were displaced by Boko Haram related violence and 40,716 Christians were displaced mainly by Fulani herdsmen attacks. Between 2000 and 2014 over 13,000 churches have been abandoned, closed, destroyed and/or burnt in Northern Nigeria. In the same period up to 1.3 million Christians in Northern Nigeria have been affected by persistent violence through loved ones being killed or wounded, houses or churches destroyed, property stolen or forced to flee. The Christian communities in the Far North 43 (e.g. Borno -87.3%, Yobe -77.8% and Kano -63.4%) are the most affected by Christians who flee. The Christian communities in the Middle Belt (e.g. Plateau +75.6%, Nasarawa +44%, Benue +40%, Taraba +30.4%) are the most affected by Christians who relocate. Christians displaced According to the March 2015 data of the United Nations’ Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 1,235,295 people are displaced in Northern Nigeria. 92% (1,136,470) are displaced by Boko Haram related violence and the remaining 8% (98,824) are mainly displaced by Fulani herdsmen attacks, and by natural disaster44 . If we apply the ‘at random’ and ‘by targeting’ percentages to the displaced Christians we arrive at the data in Table 10. Table 9. Estimated number of Christians displaced by Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen attacks (as of March 2015)

Category/numbers Number of Number of Number of displaced displaced displaced Christians at Christians by random (31.2%) targeting (41.2%) Boko Haram related 1,136,470 354,579 468,226 violence Mainly Fulani 98,824 30,833 40,716 herdsmen attacks and some by natural disaster Total 1,235,294 385,412 508,942

To the known figures we have to add the unknown figures about the displacement of Christians as an effect since 2000 of the application of Sharia in 12 northern states, the 2011 post-electoral crisis, and other crises in Northern Nigeria (e.g. Kano, Kaduna and Yobe 45 ) in which Christians not only relocated to safer areas in the Middle Belt, but also to South Nigeria. The impact on Christian communities in northern states is shown in Table 9 where the number of affected Christians of five main churches in each northern state in 2000 and 2014, by persistent violence, is given. The difference in numbers over the years is essentially 46 due to the displacement and relocation of Christians to different states 47 and although the percentages are for the five main churches, they are representative Open Doors International argues for the impact on Christian communities per state.

43 Areas in Northern Nigeria with Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri Muslims in the majority. 44 Cf. Displacement Hits 1.2 Million in Northern and Central Nigeria; International Organization for Migration; see: http://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/displacement-hits-12-million-northern-and-central-nigeria?utm_campaign=mailto 45 See: ‘Christian molestation and plight in Yobe State’, by Rev. D.D. Awayi, 2014 (in Open Doors’ possession). 46 The other reason “being killed” through persistent violence, is a ‘minor’ one compared to the huge numbers of displaced. 47 The data are not presenting the overall picture in a state for they only relate to the five main churches in each state. A total figure for Northern Nigeria is not possible as Christians may be counted as displaced in one state and counted again for relocating to another state.

Table 9. Affected Christians per northern state (2000 – 2014) 48

State/ church Total number Total number Increase/decrease Percentage affected affected between 2000 and Christians of Christians of five 2014 five main main churches in churches in 2014 2000 Adamawa 37,700 32,300 -5,400 -14.3% Bauchi 63,500 48,400 15,100 -23.8% Benue 536,000 750,500 214,500 40% Borno 79,000 10,000 -69,000 -87.3% FCT Abuja 76,100 79,800 3,700 4.9% Gombe 58,900 77,600 18,700 31.8% Jigawa 9,400 6,350 -3,050 -32.5% Kaduna 367,000 279,000 -88,000 -24% Kano 173,800 63,700 -110,100 -63.4% Katsina 38,000 34,810 3,190 -8.4% Kebbi 29,000 44,500 15,500 53.5% Kogi 42,000 52,500 10,500 25% Kwara 293,000 363,000 70,000 23.9% Nasarawa 91,000 131,000 40,000 44% Niger 58,000 74,000 16,000 27.6% Plateau 164,000 288,000 124,000 75.6% Sokoto 14,400 12,800 -1,600 -11.1% Taraba 56,000 73,000 17,000 30.4% Yobe 39,000 8,650 -30,350 -77.8% Zamfara 19,500 181,00 -1,400 -7.2%

The general picture about the decrease is that Christians are leaving the Far North. They do so in high percentages in violence-ridden areas and/or Sharia states (north Adamawa, Borno, Yobe and Kano). They are leaving in medium percentages from some of the more ‘violent’ Sharia states (Bauchi, Jigawa and Kaduna) and in low percentages from relatively ‘peaceful’ Sharia states (Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara).

The general picture about the increase is that Christians are relocating to safer areas in Middle Belt states. They do so in high percentages (e.g. Benue, Nasarawa, and Plateau), medium percentages (e.g. Kogi, Kwara and Taraba), low percentages (e.g. FCT Abuja) and in unknown percentages to South Nigeria. The effects of the Fulani herdsmen attacks on Christian communities in the Middle Belt are included, but hidden in this picture because displacement and relocation in these cases take mostly place within the same state.

Exceptions to the general picture are Gombe and Niger, both states where there is no outright conflict and Sharia is only applied in parts with a Muslim majority 49 . The other one is Kebbi, not a Middle Belt state but a Sharia state. Here

48 Cf. Appendix 7. Affected Christians in Northern Nigeria (2000 –2014).

Christians from neighboring states in case of violence flee to the Zuri and Yauri local government areas that are predominant Christian 50 .

Churches abandoned/closed/destroyed/burnt The impact on Christian churches in northern states is shown in Table10 where the number of, by persistent violence, affected congregations of the five main groups of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in each northern state in 2000 and 2014 is shown. The difference in numbers over the years is due to the abandonment, closure, destruction or burning of churches or the creation and/or opening of new churches in the different states.

Table 10. Affected congregations in northern states51 State/church Total number Total number Increase / decrease Percentage congregations congregations in between 2000 and in 5 CAN 5 CAN groups in 2014 groups in 2000 2014 Adamawa 12,308 8,410 -3,898 -31.7 Bauchi 4,111 3,508 -603 -14.7 Benue 10,900 10,790 -110 -1.0 Borno 6,210 890 -5,320 -85.7 FCT Abuja 560 671 111 19.8 Gombe 4,853 4,745 -108 -2.2 Jigawa 405 338 -67 -16.5 Kaduna 21,600 19,912 -1,688 -7.8 Kano 2,530 2,312 -218 -5.5 Katsina 4,530 5,525 995 23.6 Kebbi 3,625 3,853 228 6.2 Kogi 8,296 8,718 422 5.1 Kwara 8,496 9,022 526 6.2 Nasarawa 3,227 2,481 -746 -23.1 Niger 4,165 4,219 54 1.3 Plateau 18,315 19,420 1,105 6.0 Sokoto 660 682 22 3.3 Taraba 4,196 4,014 -182 -4.3 Yobe 246 52 -194 -78.7 Zamfara 204 228 24 11.8 Totals 119,437 109,790 -13,067 / +3,487 -10.9 / +2.9

49 Cf. p. 575 and 603 in Ostien, Philip and Albert Dekker (2010); ‘ Sharia and national law in Nigeria´, Chapter 13 in ‘Sharia Incorporated, a comparative overview of the legal systems of twelve Muslim countries in past and present’, edited by Jan Michiel Otto, Leiden University Press, 2010. And also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia_in_Nigeria 50 Kebbi state is one of the states with a sizable number of Christians. Many Christians from other Sharia states and the northeastern part of Nigeria have relocated to mostly Yauri and Zuru local government areas, because here is large number of Christians. Christians here are accommodative, and there are opportunities for farming and livestock keeping. 51 Cf. Appendix 8. Affected Congregations in Northern Nigeria (2000 –2014).

The general picture about the decrease in the number of churches is that they in high percentages are abandoned, closed, destroyed or burnt in the violence-ridden northeast (north Adamawa, Borno and Yobe); in medium percentages so in 4 Sharia states (Bauchi, Jigawa, Kaduna and Kano) and in 1 Fulani herdsmen targeted Middle Belt state (Nasarawa); and in low percentages so in 2 Fulani herdsmen targeted Middle Belt states (Benue and Taraba). The general picture about the increase in the number of churches (parishes and/or buildings) is that they in medium and low percentages are created and/or opened in 4 Middle Belt states (FCT Abuja, Kogi, Kwara and Plateau); in medium and low percentages in 2 Sharia states (Sokoto and Zamfara) and in 1 (partly) Sharia state (Niger). The exception is the Sharia state of Katsina with a medium percentage of increase due to an apparently effective church planting program of ECWA/Tekan churches and some Pentecostal groups. We see that 13,067 churches have been abandoned, closed, destroyed and/or burnt in Northern Nigeria due to persistent violence between 2000 and 2014. We also see that 3,487 churches have been newly created and/or opened through church growth mainly due to the relocation of Christians from violent areas in the same period.

Up to 1.3 million affected Christians According to northern Church leaders the average number of members of a congregation in (rural) Northern Nigeria is between 50 and 100. This means that 653,350 to 1,306,700 Christians are affected by the burning, destruction, abandonment or closure of their churches through persistent violence. Although there are different ways Christians are affected, the main feature is that small numbers remain in violent ridden areas and that many flee. Again if the average number of members of a congregation in Northern Nigeria is between 50 and 100, between 174,350 and 348,700 Christians are implicated in the creation of new churches. And although the increase through child birth and conversion in this case is difficult to assess, relocation of Christians will be a substantial part of it. If we compare the number of fleeing Christians (the main part of those between 653,350 to 1,306,700) with relocating Christians (a big part of those between 174,350 and 348,700), the difference is large. How can this be accounted for? The answer is simple for according to northern church leaders, many fleeing Christians are not accounted for in official figures about IDPs and refugees as Christians stay more with relatives and acquaintances and Muslims settle more in camps for displaced. And as official figures only register inhabitants of camps, Muslims are likely overrepresented and Christians are likely underrepresented. Moreover as Christians that stay with relatives and acquaintances join existing congregations, they hardly start new congregations so they are not accounted for in the number of new churches as well 52 .

2.2. Features of the impact of persistent violence Persistent violence towards the Church in Northern Nigeria appears to have certain features. We will exemplify them by highlighting the impact on six representative areas. These are: • Lassa, Borno State (forced Islamization, marginalization, discrimination and Boko Haram targeted violence); • Potiskum, Yobe State (forced Islamization, marginalization, discrimination and targeted violence due to the 2011 post-electoral crisis and Boko Haram); • Wukari town, Taraba State (targeted violent attacks by Fulani herdsmen for land attribution, communal clashes instigated by Muslim politicians arguable to their own ends; • Tudun Wada Dankadai, Kano State (marginalization, discrimination by the Sharia government and due to violence by the 2011 post-electoral crisis); • Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi State (political manipulation and violence by the Muslim state government for political control of the area); and • Jos, Plateau state (struggle for access to power, resources and land between settler Muslims and indigene Christians).53

52 The discrepancies between the percentages of affected Christians (Table 9) and affected congregations (Table 10) per state are due to differences in method of registration and in categories (fleeing Christians and destroyed churches although with some similarities are definitely a different phenomenon of impact of violence). Moreover in many cases not all incidents are registered and sometimes registration is weak. 53 See Appendix 9. Location of six representative areas.

Map 3. Location of the six representative areas

Lassa town 54 Lassa town, Askira Uba Local Government Area (LGA), is situated in southern Borno State. Although some Hausa- Fulani migrants settled themselves in the past for commercial reasons, the town and its surroundings are originally inhabited by the Margi tribe. Southern Borno was never part of the Kanem-Borno Empire or conquered by the Hausa- Fulani jihad and the Marghi were governed by their traditional chieftaincy. There was little influence of Islam and when in the 19 th century missionaries from the Brethrern Church (EYN) brought the Gospel many Margi converted to the Christian faith. With independence in 1960, however, the Muslim started to dominate Borno State government extended its influence over southern Borno and slowly the educational system (e.g. missionary schools being de-Christianized), the legal system (Sharia courts) and the political system (Muslim chiefs), were Islamized. Christians started to face discrimination at all levels: government, education, health system, and infrastructure. Some Margi as a result became Muslim, but many Christians chose to move out of southern Borno. Boko Haram violence touched Lassa in 2012 and targeted churches, missions, schools and police stations. First Christians and government personnel were targeted; later on everyone not willing to cooperate was attacked. People left towns and villages and started hiding in the forests. Lassa has been conquered like nearby cities Chibok, Gulak

54 Names of interviewees known to Open Doors but for security reasons withheld.

26 and Magdagali. In August 2014 Boko Haram erected its Caliphate in neighboring Gwoza and large areas of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe were incorporated. The EYN Church is committed to do the only thing they feel they can do which is to pray and to the help the victims. According to a church report of 2015: 36 of the 50 Church Districts, 278 Local Church Councils out of the 456 and 1,390 Local Church Branches (local churches) out of the 2,280 have been destroyed. 356 pastors, 346 assistant pastors and 1,390 evangelists were unemployed. Moreover 700,000 members have been displaced to neighboring Nigerian states and abroad and 8,038 members have been killed. 178 out of the total Chibok girls are children of EYN members. 55 Potiskum city 56 Potiskum city, Potiskum LGA in southern Yobe State, was severely affected by the 2011 post-electoral crisis and subsequent Boko Haram insurgency. Southern Yobe Christians constituted an estimated 15% in 2011, but have reduced now to about 3.5%. Most non-indigene Christians (notably Yoruba’s and Igbo’s) left and indigene Christians remained. Half of the churches (80) have been closed, attendance has dramatically reduced (sometimes by up to 75%) and many Christians have fled to Plateau, Abuja, Kaduna, Nasarawa and Taraba states 57 . Southern Yobe was never part of the Kanem-Borno Empire or conquered by the Hausa-Fulani jihad. 100 years ago SIM missionaries brought the Gospel and ECWA churches were established. After independence in Muslim dominated Yobe State Christians became marginalized and discriminated against in education, politics and employment. Sharia is now applied so churches cannot be rebuilt, repaired or created anew and freedom of worship is very limited. Much church work is ‘underground’ as pastors and worship services are targeted, and Christian families divided as mothers and children are relocated to safer places. Yobe Christians have become a traumatized community. Wukari town 58 Wukari town, Wukai LGA in southern Taraba State, according to local sources has a population of over 50,000; 35% are Muslims, 45% are Christians and 20% are adherents of traditional religion. The population is mainly Yukon, Tiv and Christian; most Muslims are Hausa-Fulani who have settled in the town during the last 60 years. Since 2010 southern Taraba has been suffering from violence due to Fulani herdsmen attacks in rural areas and communal violence in towns like Wukari. In the perception of Christians Muslims have always wanted to take over political power and land in Taraba State 59 . For this reason local Muslims incite to violence. There were crises in 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2014, and during the last one 100 churches were destroyed and 200 churches were abandoned in southern Taraba. After three days of fighting in Wukari town approximately 50 people were killed and 101 wounded. Violence in southern Taraba has to do with politics. Taraba State was created in 1991 and there is an agreement to alternate the governorship between the three existing northern, central and southern senatorial zones. The northern zone had its turn before 2011 and its governors were Christians. The central zone had its turn in 2011 and a Christian governor was elected. His health condition however was severely affected in a plane accident and his Muslim deputy became acting governor 60 . The southern zone was to present a candidate in the 2015 gubernatorial elections. The then acting Muslim governor however wanted to stay in power and used religious violence to destabilize the southern senatorial zone. If this zone is in disarray it cannot present a serious Christian candidate. But the then acting governor was defeated in the PDP primaries by a Christian candidate who won gubernatorial elections in 2015 61 . The contestation for power in Taraba State however seems to take another turn as an elections tribunal in November 2015 ruled out that a Muslim women candidate of the APC is the rightful winner. This decision was taken because the PDP did not follow the proper procedure in nominating its Christian candidate, the present PDP governor. The Christian governor however will appeal the ruling 62 .

55 Cf. Dante Dali, Rev. Dr. Samuel - EYN President (2015); ‘The effect of the Boko Haram on EYN Church of the Brethren in Nigeria’, text in Open Doors possession by courtesy of prof. D. McCain, Jos Nigeria. 56 Ditto. 57 Ditto. 58 Op cit, ditto. 59 See also p. 52-55 in Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (November 2015); ‘Violent Conflict in Divided Societies: The Case Study of Violent Conflict in Taraba State (2013 - 2015), NPVRN Working Paper No. 2, Abuja-Nigeria; For World Watch Research, Open Doors International, Netherlands; see link: https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org 60 He did not actually die as some people say. But he was taken out of the country and there was a rumor that he died. He was actually brought back to the country and to the state and there was an an attempt to re-install him as governor but it appears that he was mentally affected by the plane crash and eventually was removed from office, apparently on medical grounds. 61 See table 2. in Appendix 10. Political and religious affiliation of northern (deputy) governors. 62 Cf. MailOnline (2015); ‘Seven killed in clashes after election upset in eastern Nigeria: police’, 8 November 2015; see link: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3309649/Seven-killed-clashes-election-upset-eastern-Nigeria-police.html

Tudun Wada Dankadai town 63 Tudun Wada Dankadai town, Tudun Wada LGA, is situated in Kano State. Of the 9 million inhabitants of Kano State, according to our source 1 million are indigene Christians 64 . In the 2007 local Muhammed picture drawing crisis, Christian students of a secondary school were accused of drawing an offensive picture. All Christian students were attacked and expulsed. Subsequent attacks targeted the eight churches in town that were burned and their members forced to flee. Today besides some southern Christian police and business men, no indigene Hausa Christian remains in the city. The Christian minorities in the villages around Tudun Wada town are marginalized, discriminated against and at times violently targeted. Christians are hindered to buy land, or to build churches on native land; most mission schools and hospitals have been taken by the government and de-christianized and Christian children hardly receive scholarships for studies. Christian girls are often abducted and forced into marriage with Muslim men. Christian businesses are easily closed down and Christians have great difficulty in being employed as government workers. Moreover, rent for hiring churches and houses is steadily increasing. Christian youth have either to be schooled at home, change names to Muslim ones to get access to government schools or relocate to schools in the Middle Belt. As a result, many Kano Christians have migrated to the Middle Belt. Tafawa Balewa town 65 Tafawa Balewa town, Tafawa Balewa LGA, is one of the four Christian majority LGAs in Bauchi State 66 . Tafawa Balewa town is its capital where the state government headquarters were situated. In 2012 Bauchi State House Assembly decided to relocate the headquarters to Bununu, a Muslim village next to Tafawa Balewa town. The Christian representative of Bogoro LGA in the Assembly protested to that decision and was as a consequence immediately suspended. The High Court of Bauchi State resolved in her favor but the case was brought by her opponents to the Federal Supreme Court and in the meantime her suspension has not been withdrawn. Tafawa Balewa has a lot or resources (e.g. minerals, precious stones) and from the Christian perspective Muslims want to get access to these through the political manipulation and violence they perpetrate. Since 1991 Tafawa Balewa has been under attack on a regular basis by its Muslim neighbors. Christians defend themselves through youth vigilante groups that battle with stones and traditional weapons. Some of them have been caught and are imprisoned by the police. The two secondary schools in Tafawa Balewa town have been closed; the boys now have no access to education and the girls need to travel to the schools in the other areas. On the road however they risk being kidnapped and forced into a Muslim marriage, or raped and killed. The churches are poor and have no significant defense. Due to the hopeless and violent situation, many Christians relocate to nearby Jos. Others stay for as indigene to the area they have no place to go. Jos city 67 Jos city, Jos North LGA in Plateau State, experienced several crises between 1994 and 2012. Fulani herdsmen attacked Christian villages in rural areas south of Jos and the native Berom, Anaguta, Afrizere (BAA) community clashed with the Hausa-Fulani migrant group in Jos. Thousands of Muslims and Christians were killed, wounded and displaced; public property was destroyed; mosques, churches and schools attacked; cattle stolen and complete villages ransacked. These clashes were primarily about access to political power, economic resources and land but viewed through a religious perspective. The core of the problem is the indigene/settler quest in which indigenes to a state have preferential opportunities to the detriment of the settlers. Native Christian BAA in this conflict are the antagonists of the Muslim Hausa-Fulani of migrant descent. The focus is on Jos north LGA, which is effectively Jos metropolis, capital of Plateau State and center of power and business. At stake is control of the city which is apparently control over the state. Jos north LGA was especially created to give the majority Muslim Hausa-Fulani access to political power. During colonial times the BAA were marginalized by the indirect rule that was handed to the Muslim Hausa-Fulani. During independence successive military regimes extended Hausa-Fulani control over the larger Plateau province.

63 Ditto. 64 One of the leaders of a local Hausa Christian organization. Name for security reason withheld. 65 Op cit, ditto. . 66 Tafawa Balewa, Bogoro, Dass and Warji. 67 See: ‘Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos crisis’, Africa Report No. 196, 17 December 2012; http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west- africa/nigeria/196-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-i-the-jos-crisis.aspx ; ‘Persecution of Christians in Jos (1)’ by Arne Mulders, IIRF, 2010; http://www.iirf.eu/index.php?id=232&no_cache=1&L=%2Fetc%2Fpasswd%5C%5C%5C%5C0&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=13&tx_ttnews%5Bback Pid%5D=106&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1082 ; ‘Persecution of Christians in Jos (2)’ by Arne Mulders, IIRF, 2010; http://www.iirf.eu/index.php?id=232&no_cache=1&L=%2Fetc%2Fpasswd%5C%5C%5C%5C0&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=13&tx_ttnews%5Bback Pid%5D=106&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1083.

With democracy in 1999 and the creation of Plateau State itself the BAA finally got access to power through their majority in numbers. At that point the Hausa-Fulani felt marginalized and discriminated against. Because Jos north LGA in Muslim Hausa-Fulani hands is a threat to the Christian BAA for in their perspective and experience that power will only grow. This threat transcends the local dimensions of Plateau State as Muslim Hausa-Fulani in power historically (Sokoto Caliphate) and actually (Sharia states, Boko Haram) marginalize, discriminate and violently target non-Muslims of whom the majority presently is Christian. 2.3. Trends in Muslim control over society In the Christian experience there are three trends in Muslim control over society in Northern Nigeria by which Christians are marginalized, discriminated against and at times victims of persistent violence. Muslims dominate sectors of society in politics, in economics and in media. Moreover after analyzing the results of our research we observe an increase in this control over society over the years. Politics Muslim participation in politics is traditionally strong in Africa. It relates to their credo in which religion and state ( ar. din wa dawla ) are one and undivided. Moreover with the heritage of the Sokoto Caliphate and British indirect rule the northern political and religious elite have strengthened their hold on the political structures of the northern region after independence. Although 6 northern states have a Christian majority, only 3 have a Christian governor. And although 6 northern states plus FCT Abuja have substantial Christian minorities (25-50%), only 4 have a Christian deputy governor. Table 11. Christian and Muslim state (deputy) governors (2015 - 2019)68 State Percentage of Deputy State State Governor Christians Governor Adamawa 53.6% Muslim Christian Bauchi 25.3% Muslim Muslim Benue 81.0% Christian Christian Borno 30.0% Muslim Muslim Gombe 40.0% Muslim Christian Jigawa 7.0% Muslim Muslim Kaduna 46.7% Muslim Christian Kano 8.3% Muslim Muslim Katsina 9.0% Muslim Muslim Kebbi 24.0% Muslim Muslim Kogi 51.3% Muslim Christian Kwara 41.7% Muslim Christian Nasarawa 51.7% Muslim Christian Niger 39.0% Muslim Muslim Plateau 73.3% Christian Christian Sokoto 4.3% Muslim Muslim Taraba 50.0% Christian Muslim Yobe 6.7% Muslim Muslim Zamfara 2.3% Muslim Muslim

68 See Table 2. In Appendix 10. Political and religious affiliation of northern (deputy) governors.

Economics In sub-Saharan Africa Muslims are traditionally strong in business. In following the Prophet of Islam who was a businessman and by coming along the trans-Saharan trade routes, Muslims developed excellent attitudes and skills in commercial activities. Within the Sokoto Caliphate and under British indirect rule Muslim businesses grew and extended throughout the northern region dominating city markets, petty trade, food production, etc. Northern Christians, mainly agricultural farmers and civil servants, did not engage in business and developed a certain disadvantage in their relations with Muslims in this regard, as many interviewees have stated (e.g. the doubling of prices for Christians, all shops closed during Friday prayer, conversion to Islam as a prerequisite for getting a job, supporting the Muslim community with one’s earnings). Media Muslims in the northern region are also strong in the Media as the examples of the New Nigerian Newspapers Ltd. (NNN) and the Federal Radio Corporation in Kaduna (FRCK) show. Through these media northern Muslim interests are put on the agenda at federal and state levels and are well developed (see Chapter 4. Actors of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria). As the FRCK became the recruiting ground for personnel for the Hausa services of the BBC, Voice of America, and other, Muslim domination became extended to the big media houses in Northern Nigeria and through this the presentation of realities on the ground.69 Christians feel their cause to be neglected in the news as the Muslim perspective is presented. BBC – Hausa Service The BBC-Hausa Service staff in 2014 consisted in the London office of 1 base director, 1 chief producer, and 7 producers; in the Abuja studio of 19 staff workers, 3 engineers, and 1 independent staff worker, and 5 state correspondents (Enugu, Kaduna, Kano, Plateau/Bauchi/Gombe and Lagos). The total is 37 staff; all of them are Muslims. There are qualified Hausa Christian journalists all over Nigeria but they are apparently not given opportunity. The news reporting in the northern region by the BBC Hausa service is carried out entirely by Muslims (see Table 12)70 . Voice of America -Hausa Service The Voice of America-Hausa Service staff in 2014 consisted in the Washington office of 1 director and 11 producers; in Nigeria of 11 state correspondents (Borno, Abuja [3x], Sokoto, Gombe, Lagos, Minna, Kaduna, Jos/Nasarawa/Benue and Yola). The total is 23 staff; in Washington 1 director and 4 producers are Christian and 2 state correspondents (Kaduna, Jos) are Christian. There are qualified Hausa Christian journalists all over Nigeria but they are apparently not given a fair share in job opportunity. The news reporting in the northern region by the VoA is carried out by Muslims for 70%71 (see Table 12). Deutsche Welle and Radio France International - Hausa staff The Deutsche Welle - Hausa staff in 2014 constisted of 1 chief officer and 7 correspondents. All staf is Muslim 72 . Radio France International - Hausa staff in 2014 has 1 member who is based in France. He is a Muslim. The news reporting in the northern region by these Hausa Services is carried out entirely by Muslims (see Table 12) 73 .

69 See Appendix 11. Staff of big media houses in Northern Nigeria (per 2014). 70 BBC-Hausa has a large number of listeners among Hausa-speaking people in Northern Nigeria. For them it is the main source of information. For Hausa speaking Muslims it is also a source of inspiration, because when news of an attack on Muslims in any part of the world is broadcasted, the Muslims in Nigeria can react. The BBC-English is mostly for the educated ones, it has very few listeners and the correspondents are mostly located in the cities. In the perspective of northern Christians BBC-English corrrespondents are more factual in their reporting, unlike their counterparts in Hausa service who are more biased in reporting on religious incidents. Because of the lack of interest for English service among northerners, it is hard to find the names of the English correspondents. According to different sources the English correspondents are mixed (Christians and Muslims) unlike the Hausa section where all the correspondents are Muslims. 71 Having 70.8% Muslim journalists is not really too far off of statistical fairness as earlier shown (Muslims 59.6%). Therefore the VOA example is not as strong as the BBC or Deutsche Welle examples. However, if we go back to 2001, 100% of the VOA staff was Muslim then. It was only after September 11 th that VOA tried to balance the Hausa speakers! 72 See Appendix 11. Staff of big media houses in Northern Nigeria (per 2014). 73 See idem.

Table 12. Staff of important media houses in Northern Nigeria (in August 2014) Media house Muslims Christians Total BBC Hausa Service 37 (100%) Nil 37 staff Voice of America 16 (70%) 7 23 Hausa Service staff Deutsche Welle 8 (100%) Nil 8 Hausa staff Radio France 1 (100%) Nil 1 International – Hausa staff

Features in the increasing dominance of Muslims Analyzing the results of our research, we can observe an increase in the control of Muslims over society Northern Nigeria that is growing over the years. In this increasing control, six distinctive features can be observed that have great impact upon the Church in Northern Nigeria in terms of marginalization, discrimination and violence: 1. The phenomenon of organized violence (e.g. the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, the Muslim Fulani herdsmen attacks on Christian communities in the Middle Belt, the Jos Plateau communal clashes, the 2011 post-electoral crisis). 2. The alliance of religion and politics (e.g. the protection of the interests of the northern Muslim religious and political elite, the application of Sharia in 12 northern states, the Hausa-Fulani in power in southern Kaduna local governments, the political manipulation in the Wukari, Taraba State communal clashes and the Fulani herdsmen attacks on Christian communities in the southern senatorial district of Taraba State). 3. The ongoing influx of Muslims through migration (the migration of Muslim Fulani to Middle Belt states for land and cattle reasons, the relocation of Muslim inhabitants from the Far North to the Middle Belt due to desertification and draughts, the settling of foreign mercenary jihadists in the property and lands of relocating Christians in Taraba State). 4. The constant pressure to convert to Islam (e.g. Hausa Christians being considered as settlers in Sharia states; discrimination against Christians in terms of access to promotion, jobs, scholarships, in terms of being awarded school notes, having access to doctors, clinics and hospitals of the government; the suppression of teaching in Christian Religious Knowledge at many government schools 74 ; the dominance of Muslims in northern politics, economics, culture and the media leading to the squeeze of becoming Muslim in order to be able to marry a beautiful lady, to get nice employment and/or a substantial loan from the banks; the implicit threat of the mosques and Islamic schools not destroyed in Boko Haram conquered territory in the northeast). 5. The combination of Hausa culture and Islam (e.g. the use of Hausa as a lingua franca in the northern region, the adoption of Hausa names by Christians in order not to be identified as Christian and subsequently marginalized and discriminated against in society, kidnapping of young Christian girls and their subsequent forced Hausanization and Islamization, capture of mission schools in the 1970s by northern state governments and subsequent de-Christianization 75 ) 6. The promotion of Islam as a religion that brings success (e.g. the effective 20-year Muslim rule in the period between the Christian President Obasanjo’s first and second government (1 October 1979 – 29 May 1999), the manipulation of the Christian constituency for Muslim political ends during democracy, the failure of the Christian Goodluck administration to beat Boko Haram, the economic effectiveness of northern

74 There is discrimination and prohibition by northern states. Kano State for example has not allowed CRK in public schools, but recently hosted a seminar for those who teach CRK in private schools. And in Yobe and Borno states workshops for CRK teachers also in private schools, officially sponsored by the state governments, were held. 75 To put this in context, it was not just a northern issue. Nearly all mission schools in the whole country were taken over by state governments. Moreover it was not an anti-Christian issue, but an anti-colonial reaction. Interestingly, some of the states have returned some of those schools to their original owners because they now know the church was doing a much better job in education than the state has been able to do. The result in the northern region however was that the Christian imprint on education in these schools was taken away in favor of an Islamic imprint.

Muslim businessmen, the Hausa domination of retail business in Northern Nigeria, the poverty of many northern Christians in rural areas 76 ) These distinctive features look much alike factors - Philip Jenkins describes 77 - that are responsible for the decline of the Church in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. The history of the Church in these regions can be divided into three distinct periods. First there was its golden age from the time of the Apostles until the 14 th century when the Christian faith spread to China, sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, and flourished in bishoprics with beautiful cathedrals and renowned universities. Even under Islam from the 8th century Christians lived in relative peace, the Eastern Church engaged in its largest missionary enterprise in Asia and Muslim lands in the Middle East remained largely Christian. From the 14 th until the 19 th century however Christianity fell into decline caused by climate change (economic), tribal migrations (social) and the Mongol invasions (religious-political). It lost its majority status, became a minority in different lands and collapsed in a mixture of warfare and persecution leaving only small communities behind (e.g. Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq). Finally, since the 20 th century Christianity has ceased to exist in organized form, and a Muslim world free of Christians is emerging (e.g. Turkey, Iraq and Syria). Is the Church dying in the heartlands of the Middle East as once it did in Asia and North Africa? The largest single factor in this decline - in spite of all efforts of Christians to adapt - was organized violence in the form of massacre, expulsion or forced migration 78 . Other factors were the combination of religion and politics : when power was in the hand of a rival faith, the state had a primary role in the elimination of churches and communities. Dominance reinforces dominance: Islam grew by the migration of Muslim tribes into Muslim conquered lands and in the case of conflict only the dominant faith received government funds for repair and reconstruction of life. The power of Islam: Muslim regimes succeeded in creating a society in which pressure to convert to the dominant religion was paramount. Participation in the benefits of society was only open to Muslims, Christians were marginalized and this created a kind of natural default to Islam (through marriage, jobs, loans, etc.). Moreover Christians received the dhimmi status and became 2 nd class citizens and worse. Arabization and Islamization: as Arabic became the dominant language non-Muslims adopted this as well as the Muslim culture and Islam usually followed. Islam is a successful religion: the triumph and victory of Islam in the 8 th and subsequent centuries appeared irreversible, Muslims created a global civilization and Christianity became the religion of the losers79 . What will be the impact on the future of the Church in Northern Nigeria? Will its fate be the same as the Church in the Middle East, Africa and Asia or will it stand out? 2.4. Conclusions Christians form a substantial minority in Northern Nigeria (an estimated 30,665,000/31.2%) that is the most targeted group for different reasons (biggest minority, exponential church growth, ethnic composition and associated with the West). In terms of persistent violence they may well account for up to 41.2% of the victims. In between 2006 – 2014 Northern Nigeria was the most violent region in the country (45,278 people killed). In 2010 the region accounted for over 50% of the total deaths with a staggering peak of 82.3% in 2014. This is due to the Boko Haram crisis. An estimated 9,000 – 11,500 Christians have been killed in religious, political, and cattle grazing / land issues during the researched period. These issues we argue fall into the category of religious related violence. Early 2015 an estimated 468,226 Christians in Northern Nigeria were displaced by Boko Haram related violence and 40,716 Christians mainly by Fulani herdsmen attacks. The Christian communities in the Far North (e.g. Borno (-87.3%, Yobe -77.8% and Kano -63.4%) have been the most affected by Christians who flee. The Christian communities in the Middle Belt (e.g. Plateau +75.6%, Nassarawa +44%, Benue +40%, Taraba +30.4%) are the most affected by Christians who relocate. Between 2000 and 2014 over 13,000 churches were abandoned, closed, destroyed and/or burnt and nearly 3,500 churches were newly created and/or opened in Northern Nigeria. Persistent violence towards the Church in Northern Nigeria is features by forced Islamization, marginalization and discrimination by Sharia state governments and Muslim society at large, and targeted violence by politically motivated communal clashes, the 2011 post-electoral crisis, the Boko Haram insurgency and Fulani herdsmen attacks.

76 Although the general picture is true, some nuancing observations have to be added. It is hard to criticize people who work hard and develop economically successful businesses even if they are from another religion. Many of the Christian non-indigenes in Jos, like Yorubas and Igbos complain that the local indigenes are lazy and and drunkards, compared to the hard-working Muslims. Hausa business men domination of the economy in the north is true, but in the country as a whole Igbo businessmen supersede them. 77 Cf. Jenkins, op cit, p. 100. 78 Cf. ibid, p. 141. 79 Cf. ibid, Chaper 7. ‘How faiths die’.

In the Christian experience Muslims dominate Christians in politics in Northern Nigeria (6 states Christian majority, 3 Christian governors; 7 states large Christian minorities, 4 Christian deputy governors), in economics (e.g. city markets, petty trade, middle men in food production) and in media (e.g. the BBC and VoA Hausa Services have respectively 100% and 70% Muslim staff). Dominance of Muslims in Northern Nigeria is steadily increasing. In this increasing dominance, six distinctive features can be observed that have great impact upon the Church in Northern Nigeria in terms of marginalization, discrimination and violence. This impact could be the same as on the Church in the Middle East, Africa and Asia that went into decline in most lands and is on the verge of extinction in the heartlands of the Middle East. So the question is will the future of the Church in Northern Nigeria be similar or will the Church stand out?

Chapter 3. Church life and personal life of Christians In this chapter we look at the impact of the persistent violence on Church life (6.1), the personal life of Christians (6.2), and draw conclusions (6.3). The chapter deals with the results of the Structured Interviews that were made with 102 members of different churches in the Northwest, the Northeast and the Northcentral geopolitical zones of Nigeria.

3.1 Church Life In the section ‘Church life’ we asked respondents to answer questions related to how church attendance, membership, evangelism, social involvement, etc. have been affected by the violence. Respondents could answer with various categories in the ‘decreased – increased’ continuum. Sunday worship One third of the respondents 80 indicated that attendance to Sunday worship has decreased by more than 50%, while another third also indicated a decrease by less than 50%. Paradoxically one third of the respondents also indicated that attendance has increased by more than 25% (See Pie Chart 1. Church membership) Attendance at Sunday worship has decreased in places where many believers have been killed in persistent violence, or due to fear and threats have fled to safer areas. In particular non-indigenes (e.g. Igbo, Yoruba) fled to their areas or origin in the South Nigeria. People from the villages flee to bigger towns where there is more security. In Yobe, after the post-electoral crisis in 2011 and the killing of many Christians, apparently 80% of the believers fled. An increase in Sunday worship has been noticed in places where the attitude of the pastor is strong in faith, where good Biblical teaching about faith and persecution is given, and where many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have relocated to. The increase is also due to the growing commitment of believers to attend worship services and because believers have grown close to God through the effects of persecution. One of the respondents said: “The killing of Christians would not stop so believers made up their minds to continue coming to church without fear of death”. Midweek Bible study, prayer meetings, involvement in evangelism and community projects One third of the respondents said that attendance at mid-week Bible study, prayer meetings, and involvement in evangelism and community projects had dropped by 50% or more. Almost half of the respondents said that involvement in outreach and evangelism to Muslims dropped by more than 50%. The decrease is due to fear of violent attacks, bombing, etc. of churches and a lesser level of protection during the week compared to Sunday worship services when security guards are present. In outreach efforts the difficulty is that Muslim areas are not accessible, that Christians started to hate Muslims, that Christians fear negative responses from Muslims, that permission for public evangelization or campaigns is difficult to obtain. Note this quote from an interviewee: “The Christians are afraid to expose themselves to such danger as public evangelism. And this could attract Muslim attack and persecution”. Engagement in community projects is also difficult for the Church basically lost strength and resources due to poverty among members who are victims of the persistent violence. Members also departed and/or lost their businesses and the Church is afraid of Muslims destroying their new investments. Many of the churches, schools and clinics have been closed or are burned down, and in some areas (e.g. southern Yobe) the remaining Christian population is so little that they lack the force and courage to re-engage. Church membership One third of the respondents indicated that church membership in their church dropped dramatically (by 50% or more), while another one third saw membership increase.

80 There is no clear-cut geographical location linked to the answers of respondents as persistent violence occurred in the Northwest, the Northeast as well as the Northcentral zone. The general picture however is that Chuch membership is in decline in the Far North, notably in violent ridden areas of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa and Kano states. Church membership is increasing mainly in Middle Belt states where fleeing Christians relocated to. Cf. Chapter 2.1.3.

Pie Chart 1. Church membership

increased don't know / >50%; 10% NA; 1%

decreased >50%; 33% increased 25- 50%; 19%

increased <25%; 7% decreased 25- 50%; 18% same; 4% decreased <25%; 9%

The decrease in certain places is due to the many church members who have fled, relocated to safer areas, been killed, or do not come out of fear of being attacked or killed. The increase in other places is caused by the many Christian IDPs that have flocked to these areas and joined those churches. Another factor is the growing commitment to faith in the crisis: pastors start teaching differently, people need God’s protection (fear of the crisis), or have experienced God’s rescue in their lives. In some places people want to belong or openly to testify of their faith. Quote from an interviewee: “Those who were attending the church services but not baptized are eager to get baptized now to fulfill the biblical injunction as a public declaration of their faith” Financial situation of the church With regards to the financial situation of the Church the view is also mixed. Almost 70% of the respondents indicated that church tithes and offerings were down. One third indicated that tithes and offerings were down by 50% or more. The financial situation of the Church is difficult in places where violence has caused people to relocate to safer areas, and where businesses have been destroyed. For many the level of life has reduced to one of poverty. This affects church offerings as people are only trying to feed their family in living hand to mouth. Support for the pastor Support for the pastor has also dropped according to 63% of the respondents. And also here in more than one third of the cases it has dropped by 50% or more. At the same time one third of the respondents indicated that support for the pastor increased. Pastors are facing a great challenge in the lack of support due to the reduction of membership and poor economy of believers. This is one of the consequences of the attacks, the violence and the insecurity due to which believers relocate and become impoverished. In some cases the pastor has even left his congregation because of this. In other places believers are determined to support the pastor in the context of the violence and see it as part of serving God. In their financial giving they want to show love and compassion for their pastor and encourage and appreciate him for they understand his role and relevance for the community. With regards to the spiritual – in church – activities of the church (attending worship services, mid-week Bible study and prayer meetings), we observed the pattern of one third of the respondents seeing an increase, while two thirds saw a decrease.

Example 1: Potiskum town, the capital of Yobe State, in the North East zone , has experienced violence that has had a high level of impact on the Church.

The violence Potiskum experienced Danish cartoons. The Danish cartoons that made a caricature of Prophet Muhammad published in September 2005 also had serious repercussions in 2006 in Northern Nigeria. In Potiskum violent demonstrations were held but soon after Muslims went on the rampage burning shops, churches, Christian homes, and properties worth millions of naira (the national currency) were destroyed.

The post-electoral crisis. The 2011 April riots started after presidential elections in which Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian on the PDP ticket, won the elections. Supporters of Muhammad Buchari, a northern Muslim on the CPC ticket, protested and soon these riots led to riots in 12 northern states in which in three days over 800 people were killed, more than 65,000 displaced, many houses and shops destroyed, and much property looted. Hundreds of Muslim youths protested In Potiskum and attacked the General Hospital and the house of a former Minister for Police. Further in town various churches, houses, shops and other Christian institutions were set ablaze.

Boko Haram attacks. In 2012 in Yobe State Boko Haram threatened to annihilate Christians from the entire state and subsequently there were several attacks on Christian communities. Since 2013 Potiskum has suffered from the Boko Haram insurgency in which many lives have been lost. Christians and churches are prime targets.

The impact on the Potiskum Church Rev. Daniel Awayi in his report 81 says that between 2011 and 2014 over 300 Christians were killed in Potiskum, capital of Yobe State, and surrounding villages, and that in the same period 28,000 Christians fled Yobe for safer areas. During the 2011 post-electoral crisis in Yobe alone 164 people were killed and buried in a mass grave, 27 wounded, 53 churches burnt and property worth millions of naira destroyed. The condition of the Church is such that about 85% of the church buildings have been closed down and only 15% are operating. Some churches have no pastors; their pastors have left and members no longer attend church – they are scattered. About 80% of members have relocated to neighboring states. The remaining Christians are mostly indigenes of Yobe and will not leave. Church attendance has dropped to 30%. A church that on Sunday used to have 2 worship services with an attendance of about 2,000 at each service now has 1 service with an average attendance of 500. Some churches have lost all members since 2011. Local Christians say they feel targeted ever since and that none of the killers has been brought to justice. A very small number of Christian schools are still operating. Some parents have resorted to sending their children to other states to continue their education despite the exorbitant cost. Most Christian businesses have been forced to close, their business premises looted or burnt down and their owners killed. The remaining few are facing serious threats to their lives 82 .

3.2. Personal life of Christians In the section ‘Life of Christians’ we asked respondents about the impact of persistent violence on their attitude, behavior, spiritual and emotional well-being, and the challenges they face in their personal life. 3.2.1. Attitude of Christians Violence often affects inter-communal relationships. We have tried to measure the influence of the many years of violence on people’s attitude, especially as regards the religious divide between Muslims and Christians. How has the attitude of Christians towards Muslims been affected by the violence and vice versa? Please note that we have only researched Christians in Northern Nigeria.

81 Cf. Awayi ,op cit. 82 Source: Interviewee 11 on Appendix 1. List of In-Depth Interviews and results of the Focus Group Discussion in Potiskum town,Yobe State. See also page 106, Potiskum incident, in ‘The 2011 Post-election Violence in Nigeria’, by Dr. Nkwachukwu Orji and Nkiru Uzodi, Published by Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC), 2012; see: http://www.placng.org/new/publications/PEV.pdf.

Feelings towards Muslims To the question ‘How have feelings towards Muslims developed in your Christian community over the past 10 years?’ some 80% of the respondents answered with ‘negatively’ (33%) or ‘strongly negatively’ (47%). Pie Chart 2. Christian feelings towards Muslims

strongly don't positively ; 3% know / positively; 6% NA; 0%

same; 11% strongly negatively; 47%

negatively; 33%

These negative feelings developed because of the impact of riots, killings, acts of terrorism, church burnings, destruction, abductions, forced conversions, persecution, massacre, etc. Another factor is the bad treatment Christians have experienced by Muslims: condescension, being labelled kafir [‘unbeliever’], and discrimination in employment, at the marketplace and in school. Specific feelings Christians have mentioned are: suspicion, hatred, distrust, animosity and fear towards Muslims. Their perception of Muslims is changed as well – they are seen as: killers, terrorists, thieves, criminals and deceivers. The end result has been s segregation between Muslim and Christian dominated areas as we can see in Kaduna and Jos city or in the – at that time – Gwoza Caliphate, where Christians have not been found. Freedom of speech, association and religion Some 67% of the respondents also feel that freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of religion and other human rights have been negatively affected. The application of human rights that Christians experience in a Muslim dominated context – notably the 12 Sharia states – in most cases is they are overwhelmingly absent. Many Christians say they face harassment, hatred, marginalization, partiality, intense persecution, intimidation and violence by Muslims. They often have very limited freedom to worship, to build churches, and to do outreach. They seldom have real access to the public media, to government posts for employment, and hardly are represented in local politics. Young Christians largely feel discriminated against in schools. Christians in many areas label themselves a voiceless community that is under severe threats. Future perspective As regards the perspective of the future of Christians in Northern Nigeria, almost half of the respondents feel that the perspective is ‘strongly negative’ while another 26% answered with ‘negative’. So 3 out of 4 Christians in Northern Nigeria have a negative outlook for the future of Christians in the northern region. This negative outlook is that of a gloomy, bleak, dark and uncertain future, for what many Christians see is destruction and death at the hands of Muslims. Many fear that Christianity will be extinct soon for the –– as perceived by them – objective of Muslims is to destroy them. They encounter (growing) hatred, marginalization and discrimination through the northern local and state governments which are instruments of Muslim domination and persecution. Especially in the domains of education and employment Christians say that Muslims are strongly favored over Christians. Hope for the future of Christians, according to them, is diminishing by the day. Remarkably some 20% so one out of 5 Christians respond positively when asked about the (general) future perspective for Christians in NN. Despite of all the violence going on, they still see a bright future for Christians in NN. Three reasons were given, (1) growing political awareness among Christians that theirs is a struggle for liberation; (2) growing higher levels of awareness for violence and security within Christian communities, and (3) growing faith in God. Respondents said: ‘the gates of hell shall not prevail’; ‘God is on our side’; and they observed ‘Church growth 37 through Muslims converts and commitment of nominal Christians’; and concluded ‘persecution as a blessing in disguise’. Feelings of Muslims Christians also state that they think that the feelings of Muslims towards Christians have worsened. Three out of four respondents state that the attitude of Muslims towards Christians is negative. According to our research Christians say that Muslims have developed negative feelings towards Christians. Christians say that they desire Christians to become non-existent, to eliminate them; they consider Christians as a danger that is threatening them and hate them with a passion. According to Christians Muslims are taught by radical preachers to consider Christians as infidels that are to be dominated and brought into the fold of Islam. But Christians are also considered by Muslims as unholy, unclean and can be treated like animals. Moreover Christians have said that they observe in Islam an unforgiving spirit contrary to the notion of forgiveness that is taught in their own faith. Level of impact We distinguished three levels of impact violence could have on Christian communities in Northern Nigeria (see Chapter 1.2). A low, medium and high level of impact however has no effect on the level of deterioration in relations between Christians and Muslims. The impact of the persistent violence on Christians apparently is not related to the specific incidents people have experienced. Some reasonable explanations are: a. The incidents of violence happen so frequently and are so widespread in Northern Nigeria that nearly every Christian is psychologically touched by it in more or less the same way. (One does not have to have experienced violence directly to develop a negative attitude towards the perpetrators; and one should not underestimate the impact of reports about violence through radio, television and newspapers.) b. The persistent violence has a history going back to 1987 (the first large scale Muslim-Christian clashes were in Kafachan, Kaduna State) and has grown in intensity since then. These days practically every Christian is born and bred in a “culture of violence” regardless of where he/she is born in Northern Nigeria.

Example 2: Kaduna city, the capital of Kaduna State, in the North West zone, has experienced violence that has had a medium level of impact on the Church.

The violence Kaduna experienced The 2000 Sharia crisis. The February riots in Kaduna city started after pro and contra Sharia demonstrations in previous weeks. During a 50,000 Christian contra-Sharia demonstration an Igbo Christian was attacked and in reaction two Muslims were killed; subsequently killings between these factions started and ended with approximately 2,000 deaths. Several parts of the city were practically in ruin. In May of the same year another crisis occurred with the same devastating effects. In total an estimated 200 churches, 105 mosques and about 9,000 houses were destroyed. Property worth millions of naira was looted, burnt, and the deep mistrust between communities led to the segregation of Muslims and Christians that concentrated in respectively the northern and southern parts of the city.

The post-electoral crisis. The 2011 April riots started after presidential elections in which Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian on a CPC ticket, won. Supporters of Muhammad Buchari, a northern Muslim on a PCP ticket, protested, which led to riots in 12 northern states in which in three days over 800 people were killed, more than 65,000 displaced, and many houses and shops destroyed as well as much property looted. In Kaduna and Zaria at least 180 people were killed.

The impact on the Kaduna Church After the Sharia crisis most churches relocated to the southern part of the city; Christians and Christian ministries sold their property and left the city or relocated to its southern part. Churches dropped outreach activities like evangelism and Christian youth started to seek education in other states.

After the post-electoral crisis Christians grew stronger in faith, in determination to attend meetings, and in unity among members of different denominations. Christians also discovered that sharing your faith in a personal way with others was an effective tool by which to reach over barriers. 83

3.2.2. Behavior of Christians Violence also affects people’s behavior; the way they act and operate in everyday life. Questions interviewees responded to were about shopping with Muslim shopkeepers, the number of Christian shopkeepers, living among Muslims, inter-religious marriage, buying land for church building, promotion and employment, defection to Islam, involvement in politics and Muslim converts. Shopping with Muslim shopkeepers Due to the violence 50% of the Christians said that their level of shopping with Muslim shopkeepers has decreased. However in some cases Christians said it has increased (17%). The decrease is due to lack of confidence and growing fear among Christians. For example some Christians say ‘Muslims may inject the fruit I buy with poison!’ Another factor is the lack of will to support, to strengthen and to patronize Muslim shopkeepers. Some Christian youth, especially, started their own shops in order to become independent of Muslim businessmen for often Muslims dominate the marketplace and the business centers in towns and villages. Other comments suggest that Muslims discriminate against Christians by increasing prices. In other areas the decline has also to do with the relocation of Christians to a different place for reasons of security and refuge. The increase is mainly due to having no other option. Quote of an interviewee: “Most of the Christian shop owners have been forced to close and relocated to other states, some were even killed in their shops while others were

83 See Chapter 7.3 in paragraph ‘Conflict and clashes’; See afrticle ‘Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800’, May 16 2011, Human Right Watch; link: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800 ; Source is also the results of the Focus Group Discussion in Kaduna city, Kaduna State.

39 persuited into their homes and killed. The remaining Christians are often forced to buy from the Muslims because there are no options. Number of Christian shopkeepers With regards to the numbers of Christian shopkeepers that are present in cities and villages, the evidence is mixed. Some 43% say their numbers have decreased while also 43% see an increase. Pie Chart 3. Number of Christian shopkeepers

don't know / NA; 1%

strongly strongly decreased; increased; 22% 25%

decreased; 18% increased; 27%

same; 7%

The decrease has to do with the impact of the violence: Christian shops are burned, looted, and their owners have relocated to safer areas where Christians are in the majority. Many Christian shop owners have been attacked several times and they do not have the courage to start all over again or simply lack the funds to do so. In some places Christian customers simply lack, because they fled away due to the violence. Poverty is the result. In particular southern Christian merchants (Yoruba and Igbo) went back to Southern Nigeria and are not willing to invest again in the violence-ridden Northern region. The increase in the number of Christian shopkeepers is related to areas where Muslims have fled from and Christians towards; and where Christians form the (near) majority. In these areas, due to the absence of Muslims, due to the necessity of self-empowerment (and to avoid the former dominance of Muslims in business) and given the opportunity (the lack of shops), more and more Christians have engaged in shopkeeping. Living among Muslims Violence has led to the further segregation of communities. The willingness of Christians to live among Muslims has greatly decreased. 87% of the respondents say it has been ‘negatively’ affected by the violence, and of those 88%, some 64% says it has been ‘strongly negatively’ affected. The decrease relates to Christians feeling unsafe or insecure living among Muslims. This is due to experiences of violence like killings, attacks, persecution, constant uproar, intimidation, discrimination and forced Islamization. There is no longer enough confidence or trust in the Muslim community and some think of it as even suicidal to live among Muslims. Most of all there is the fear of the unknown which may include an attack at any given moment. Christians are migrating (relocating) to areas where they are in the majority (segregation). There is a small minority view reflected by an interviewee, however, in this following quote 84 : “The Christians are selling their houses in Muslim dominated areas and relocating to other places that are more accommodating. My husband and I will never leave the Muslim dominated environment because God has been faithful; He is our protector and one of the many ways we can show them love is to live among them.”

84 Interviewees throughout the report remain anonymous for security reasons.

Interreligious marriage Interreligious marriage has also been negatively affected. The perception is that this practice has decreased by 61%. Before the crisis interreligious marriage existed but most Christian parents do not want their daughters to marry Muslim men. They are against it, regarding it as backsliding (a term for weakening in one’s faith); they see it as a danger and as recruitment for Islam. It is also considered to be against biblical teaching for Islam to them is not the true religion and Muslims and Christians are not viewed as serving the same God. So some Christian parents have even disowned their daughters who have chosen to marry Muslims. Presently the existing practice of interreligious marriage has seriously decreased due to a lack of confidence and growing feelings of hatred and animosity towards Muslims. Even the youth are aware now of the dangers of interreligious marriage (forced conversion to Islam, maltreatment by the husband and quick divorce) and many girls are no longer interested in such marriages. Buying land for church building Respondents also feel it has become more difficult for Christians to buy land from Muslims for erecting churches. 64% of the respondents feel this has decreased, of whom almost 50% indicate that is has strongly decreased. The decrease relates to what Christians have observed - that Muslims do not sell land to Christians as they do not want churches and other Christian worship places to be built in the areas they live. In Sharia states most governments do not permit the selling of land for church building; some speak even of government decrees in this regard and of churches not being permitted to register formally 85 . According to Christians this is out of fear for the increase in the numbers of Muslims being converted to the Christian faith. Another factor as perceived by Christians is that Muslims do not like Christian communities to prosper or to expand. Moreover Christians say Muslims have strong feelings of hatred and animosity towards them and do not want to live near Christians. The two religious communities apparently are living apart with a wide social, cultural and religious gap in between.

85 In Muslim dominated areas in northern Nigeria no church has a Certificate of Occupation (CoO) for its church building. Only churches that ereced buildings under Colonial rule obtained a CoO for their church building.

Example 3: Dogon Na Hawa village, Plateau State , has experienced violence that has had a high level of impact on the Church 86 .

The violence Dogo Na Hawa has experienced The village massacre. On March 72010 a group of Fulani herdsmen armed with guns, machetes, and knives attacked residents of the villages of Dogo Na Hawa, Zot, and Ratsat, 10 kilometers south of Jos, the capital of Plateau State. They massacred at least 200 Christian villagers in Dogon Na Hawa alone, including women and children. Among the victims were the Dogon Na Hawa COCIN 1 church pastor’s wife and daughter. The church and the pastor’s house were burned.

The impact on the Dogon Na Hawa Church The villagers rebuilt their homes and churches with help from donations (NGOs, churches), but the trauma of so many loved ones’ deaths remains. The church is suffering spiritually and financially because many members simply are gone 87 .

Promotion and employment Three out of four respondents say that it has become more difficult for Christians in Northern Nigeria to get promotion at work, while also 3 out of 4 state the same about getting employment with the government in NN. This difficulty is large in Far North states, to a lesser extent in Middle Belt states and smaller in states with Christian governors. Christians state that they are hardly promoted at work for positions that are seen as belonging to Muslims and should not be given to others. Moreover Christians expressed their opinion that Muslims think that no Muslim should serve under a non-Muslim. Ultimately - according to Christians - Muslims dislike and hate Christians, and for that reason want to frustrate and break them morally and economically. Read the quote of an interviewee 88 : “My auntie and many other Christians have been on the same grade level for over 10 years without promotion even though faithful and committed to their work. They [Muslims] know the Christians are industrious and would make them do all the work but would not be promoted except with a bribe. They have vowed never to allow any Christian to reach the position of a Permanent Secretary, Director or any influential position of authority.” The same is true for employment with the government. In many states and local government areas respondents say Muslims dominate and for religious, parental and ethnic reasons favor their brothers and sisters in faith, family and tribe. 99% of the job vacancies respondents say are for Muslims. Any Christian who bears a Christian name such as Grace, John, Daniel and David, respondents say again, will seldom be employed. Sometimes Christians try to overcome this obstacle by changing their names to Muslim ones just to get employed, others bribe, and women sometimes even exchange sex for employment. Defection to Islam Christians are hardly seen or observed defecting to Islam – say 30% or are unknown say 26%. One in five Christians however does see Christians convert to Islam, but state that they are bribed by money, marriage (e.g. young girls, widows) or career opportunities (e.g. to get a position in leadership). In other cases people look for protection (e.g. charms, amulets of the marabou), have doubts about their Christian faith (e.g. God is not seen to rescue them quickly enough in times of difficulty), or look for an easy way out of some difficulty (such as being in captivity, having debts or receiving death threats). In these cases becoming a Muslim may help.

86 The Dogo Nahawa incident occurred just a few weeks after an event in Kuru Karama, a village in which many Fulanis lived, about 20 kilometers away. Here about 150 Muslims, including women and children, were killed in almost the same way. Was the attack on Dogo Nahawa a reprisal attacks, we don’t know? But the conflict between Muslim Fulani herdsmen and Christian farmers has been going on for long and is apparently inspired by Islamic propaganda to dominate Christian territories and bring them under the darul Islam (house of Islam). Cf. Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (March 2015) op cit. 87 Cf. p. 65 in ‘Leave everything to God, Accountability for inter-communal violence in Plateau and Kaduna states, Nigeria’, HRW 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/08/nigeria-investigate-massacre-step-patrols . See also results from the Focus Group Discussion in Jos, Plateau State. 88 Interviewees throughout the report remain anonymous for security reasons.

Involvement in politics With regards to Christian involvement in politics in the northern region, the data are mixed. Some 40% say that the involvement of Christians has decreased, while 52% say that the violence has resulted in an increase in political involvement by Christians. Pie Chart 4. Political involvement by Christians

don't know / NA; 1%

strongly strongly decreased; increased; 22% 25% decreased; increased; 18% 27%

same; 7%

The violence has apparently resulted in more political involvement among mainline Protestants (12 out of 20 say so) and Evangelicals (32 out of 49 say so) compared with Pentecostals (8 out of 18) 89 . When looking at state level there seems to be more political involvement among Christians in southern Kaduna and Plateau states (large numbers of Christians live in a kind of frontline situation). Political involvement seems nearly absent among Christians in violence-ridden Borno and Yobe states (large numbers of Christians affected by the Boko Haram insurgency). 90 The decrease relates to the fear of Christians being targeted after elections (e.g. the 2011 post-electoral crisis). Christians also refrain from politics because they perceive it to be all a northern Muslim partisan game where Christians are discriminated against, given no chance and only serve as it were as voting cattle for Muslim candidates 91 . Moreover Christians don’t have a platform from which to be heard within political parties in the far northern states. In some areas like Yobe and Borno states Christians have lost all hope in politics. The increase relates to a relatively new situation in which Christians want to fight for their freedom by participating in politics. Christians want to contest elections and have a fair share in access to power and resources. Here are some quotes from interviewees 92 : “Christians are beginning to see the need for getting involved in politics even with pressure from Muslims to frustrate them in making sure they do not succeed in elections.” And: “We see the need for political empowerment. So we are going into politics in large numbers and we are more aware.” So there has also been a growing interest in political engagement among Christians due to the violence. Christians want to resist the (growing) Muslim domination. They also seem to be becoming more aware that Muslim politicians only use them out of selfish interest. So there is an upsurge in political awareness among Christians resulting in Christians actively seeking political self-empowerment through engagement in the political domain. Muslim converts One out of 5 respondents says that they have seen an increase in the number of Muslims becoming Christians as a result of the violence. The reasons for this are the love Christians show despite persecution, the effects of sleepless nights on Muslims after killing Christians, and visions and dreams of Jesus that Muslims have experienced. Quote of

89 Respectively the members of the CAN blocks: the Christian Council of Nigeria (CCN), TEKAN and the ECWA Fellowships, and the Christian Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (CPFN) / Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN). 90 The results in Adamawa State were rather positive in this regard. But at the time of our interviews (July 2014) the Boko Haram insurgency had not yet affected the state fully (Gwoza Caliphate August 2014). 91 In Sharia states Christians can contest a political post. But in practice they are frustrated in being unable to register as candidates and to raise support among wealthy businessmen. They even run the risk of being attacked for presenting themselves as candidates for an election. 92 Interviewees throughout the report remain anonymous for security reasons.

43 an interviewee 93 : “Many among the Muslims want to become Christians, but they are afraid of been killed or pressurized by fellow Muslims”. Example 4: Tudun Wada Dankadai, Tudun Wada LGA, Kano State , in the North West zone, has experienced violence that has had a high level of impact on the Church.

The violence Tudun Wada has experienced The Muhammed picture drawing incident. In September 2007 the Muslim students of the Government Secondary School, in Tudun Wada Dankadai accused the few Christian students of the school of drawing a picture of prophet Muhammed on the wall of the mosque in the school. This led to the attack on the Christian students by the Muslim students with help of other Muslims from the town. They invaded the school, harassed the Christian students and left most of them with various degrees of injuries. As a result the Christian students were expelled from the school. A few hours after the school attack, the Muslims of Tudun Wada Dankadai came together and attacked all the churches in town and set them on fire. Houses and shops of Christians were also attacked and much property was looted. As a consequence nearly all Christians in town feared for their lives and fled away. The attacked churches are: ECWA Church, Anglican Church, Catholic Church, Assemblies of God Church, Baptist Church, Deeper Life Bible Church, Mountain of Fire and Miracle Church, Cherubim and Seraphim Church. In the riots 19 Christians were killed, 8 churches were destroyed, 60 people were injured and over 500 Christians were displaced.

The impact on Tudun Wada Church Since September 2007 when the churches in Tudun Wada Dankadai were destroyed, the Muslim community opposed the rebuilding of the churches in the town. Several attempts by the churches to rebuild their premises were frustrated by demolishing the bricks and blocks brought to the different sites for reconstruction. The lands belonging to churches are still there, but no building activity is taking place. And the Muslim youths in the area are vigilant as to the effect that no church can be rebuilt. During 2011 post-election violence Tudun Wada Dankadai town did not experience any violence as the churches were already destroyed and the few remaining Christians fled the area before the announcement of the election results. The present situation is that the Muslim community with the traditional chief has expressed its strong resistance against any church ever to be rebuilt in Tudun Wada Dankadai. The leaders of the churches in Tudun Wada Dankadai in 2015 however seek to redress this situation in court as to exercise their freedom of religion as enshrined in the secular constitution of Nigeria 94 .

3.2.3. Spiritual and emotional well-being Boko Haram, the main phenomenon of radical Islam in northern Nigeria, has explicitly made it clear that its aim is to Islamize the northern region of Nigeria and establish a caliphate based on Sharia law. In its view there should be no room for the Church or Christianity for that matter. Many attacks have been on churches and church property with the aim of scaring Christians and prompting them to leave Christianity altogether. Fulani herdsmen attacks and marginalization and discrimination in the Sharia states and Islamic society at large have similar effects upon the Church and Christianity. The results from the research show that the violence has produced the opposite. It is true that many churches have seen a decline in membership and subsequent attendance. However those who have stayed show an increase in commitment to their faith and church. Personal prayer With regards to personal prayer, some 64% of the respondents see an increase. For in the crisis people need spiritual strength and stand strong in adversity. Quote from an interviewee: “The violence has awoken the members [sic] and they now see greater need for prayer …. For me it has greatly increased my faith in God.” Prayer groups, fasting and commitment

93 Interviewees throughout the report remain anonymous for security reasons. 94 Source Open Doors field researchers and the results of the Focus Group Discussion in Tudun Wada LGA, Kano State.

Some 50% say that attendance to prayer groups is up, as is participation in fasting. And some 70% of the respondents say the number of committed Christians in the church has grown. According to the respondents persistent violence has revived many who were weak in faith. The Church encourages members to pray and fast at home. Many Christians turn out to prayer and fasting due to fear and the challenges they face. They call on God for intervention in their social, economic and spiritual problems. Many believe that the “End Times” are approaching. In some cases believers have a personal encounter with God in various ways and see being rescued from poverty, sickness, etc. Quote from an interviewee in Yobe 95 : “The violence is a revival. People who were not serious with Christianity have now embraced Christianity more than ever before – there was laxity before but the violence has awoken them [sic]. The violence has also weakened some of the members.” Perseverance The number of Christians who persevere in faith despite personal loss, material damage or psychological trauma has also grown, according to 82% of the respondents. Pie Chart 5. Perseverance in faith despite personal loss, material damage or psychological trauma

don't know / decreased NA; 1% >50%; 5% decreased >25-50%; 5% decreased <25%; 5% same; 2% increased increased >50%; 34% <25%; 13%

increased 25- 50%; 35%

Many Christians face the challenge of life and death daily; they hold on to God, persevere in faith, live with the Bible, and as they see it experience miracles. Listen to two quotes from interviewees in Yobe: “In X, they burned their houses, churches and killed some of them but those alive are still active in their faith. Mrs. Y lost her husband and son yet she is still serving God actively. Some had their houses set ablaze and lost everything except the clothes they had on yet are still serving God. Some had their vehicles and motor bicycles burnt in the church premises yet they are still serving God.” And “The few remaining have suffered personal loss of loved ones and property. We believe that God is the giver of all things and he will replenish all that has been lost at the appropriate time. We are encouraged because we know Christians worldwide are praying for us.” In some cases participation in evening activities (night vigils) of the church has dropped due to the increased insecurity, which is especially felt at night. Yet interpreting the figures more closely does give us the picture that those who have stayed in spite of the persecution have become more active in their faith personally and corporately in the church. They have sought refuge in this crisis in their faith and the community of faith. They have drawn closer to God and also experience God more in their daily life. Considering defection Most Christians are not interested in leaving the Christian faith. 46% don’t see any conversion to Islam (or other religions for that matter). Respondents say that no Christian is interested in Islam, but turns to God and experiences support and comfort. Basically many Christians have concluded that Islam as not a religion of peace and truth. One particularly interesting thing is that many Christians view persecution in terms of ‘we’re living in the End Times and have to hold on to faith even when persecuted’.

95 Interviewees throughout the report remain anonymous for security reasons.

Example 5: Talata Mafara, Talata Mafara LGA, Zamfara State, in the North West zone, has experienced violence that has had a low level of impact on the Church.

The violence Talata Mafara has experienced More enhanced Sharia application. Zamfara was the first northern state to implement more enhanced Sharia in January 2000 under Governor Ahmad Sani. Since then Christians feel that marginalization, discrimination and violent persecution has grown more intense with the help of the state apparatus. Contrary to promises made about Sharia not affecting non-Muslims, Christians do feel affected. Since the introduction of Sharia authorities have prohibited Christians from sharing their faith and from building churches by preventing them from buying land. Between 2000 and 2006 70 new mosques were built. In October 2013 St. Peter’s Anglican Church in Bukara Sani’s home town was demolished and 14 other churches in the state were marked for demolition .There is little employment for Christians in government and Christian radio and television programs have been banned. Christian students are discriminated against at schools by having to pay higher fees and there is an absence of teaching in Christian Religious Knowledge (CRK) 96 . The application of Sharia in criminal matters affects Christians more than Muslims. Christians feel pressured to stop serving God.

The impact on Talata Mafara Church In Talata Mafara these effects of intimidation, discrimination and violent persecution are felt by Christians. There is great insecurity during church services for there have been attempts by presumed Muslim attackers at night to come and attack the church and frighten Christians to leave. There is also stiff competition in business between Christian and Muslim shopkeepers. Christian children are kidnapped and forced to convert to Islam. Due to discrimination and persecution many Christian girls feel compelled to marry Muslim men or convert to Islam. Christian girls are also at times forced to wear the hijab when going to school. There has not been any Christian secondary school principal since 1993. Furthermore Christian student fellowships are not allowed to meet publicly 97 .

3.2.4. Challenges for Christians We asked the respondents to rank various challenges that the Church in Northern Nigeria faces in terms of importance. These range from the economic challenge of surviving as a Christian in Northern Nigeria to the emotional challenge of dealing with the trauma that the violence produces. Persecution and loving of enemies The most important challenge that Christians in Northern Nigeria face according to our interviewees is the spiritual challenge to understand persecution and love their enemies. Some 80% of the respondents said this was an important to very important challenge. Christians experience that the biblical command to love your enemies and to pray for those that persecute them is humanly impossible, but with the grace of God is possible. Some quotes from interviewees: “The church is aware of the persecution but not fully prepared to withstand it … the love for the persecutors is very difficult, the Church must work on that” (from Kaduna) and “Persecution has developed hatred in Christians, so they need healing to love their enemies” (from Yobe). Coping with trauma The next important issue was the emotional challenge of how to cope with the trauma of the violence on the Christian community. 3 out of 4 respondents said this was an important to very important challenge.

96 Though still in transition, the new name for Christian Religious Knowledge (CRK) is Christian Religious Education (CRE). The professional body that represents that profession has changed its name from the National Association of Bible Knowledge Teachers of Nigeria to the National Associaton of Christian Religious Educators of Nigeria (NACREN). 97 Cf. p. 553 in Ostien (2010) op cit. See also article ‘Nigerian Churches Marked for Demolition in Zamfara State’ Wednesday, February 1st, 2006 in ‘Jesus is Lord, A Worshipping Christian's Blog, Bringing a Christian's Perspective to Current Events’. Link: http://worshippingchristian.org/blog/?m=20060201. Source also results of the Focus Group Discussion in Talata Mafara LGA, Zamfara State.

Christians feel that trauma counselling and how to deal with emotional challenges are important for many of them are highly traumatized and suffer in silence. See quote from an interviewee: “She (the interviewee) lost some loved ones and this affected me (interviewer) adversely; she was traumatized without trauma coping strategies and was always crying. However, she attended a program in Jos, which helped her out of this situation. Addressing trauma will be very important because there are many others who are traumatized.” Business and living together The economic and social challenges were deemed as important to very important by 63% of the respondents: “How can we as religiously mixed communities live in peace and harmony? Christians want to be free from the usual Muslim domination of the economy. After violence in which they lost everything, they have to restart, and are motivated to go into business, breeding and farming, but often have no capital or training. Christians complain that they had an inclination to be employed within the civil service, but that these opportunities ceased to exist due to the crisis. See quote of interviewee: “Empowering Christians economically is very important for sustainable livelihood. It will also enable us to assist the indigent and to also preach the Gospel.” Christians also observe Muslims and Christians living side by side but carefully watching and monitoring each other’s actions. They see great challenges as distrust, fear and hatred are paramount. Quote of interviewee: “We need to coexist – we need each other; if we integrate and exchange goods and services between North and South tension and suspicion will be reduced, and trauma will be reduced.” Political involvement With regards to the political challenge, dealing with civil rights, access to politics and government services, the respondents are divided. 45% of the respondents find this challenge important to very important, while some 39% find this challenge not really important or not important at all. 16% find this challenge not important but also not unimportant. Pie Chart 6. The challenge of involvement of Christians into politics

not important at all; 22% very important; 35% not really important; 17%

not important important; 10% but also not unimportant; 16%

According to what we read in all rankings, but especially in politics, the comments deal much with the interviewee’s personal situation. In the rankings important and very important , Christians refer to situations in which they see the possibility to free themselves from Muslim domination, to start in business or something else, or to look for (economic) empowerment in another way. Here we encounter them highly motivated and ready to work for it at the political level (e.g. Kaduna, Adamawa). Quote from an interviewee: “Christians should be able to exercise their civic right without discrimination. We cannot continue to be slaves in our land.” In the rankings not important but also not unimportant , Christians refer to situations in which they are impoverished, discriminated against and oppressed. Here we encounter them paralyzed without being able to see a way out politically (e.g. Yobe). Is the ranking not really important and not important , Christians refer to situations in which they are persecuted and marginalized (e.g. Zamfara, Borno). Here we encounter them as incapable and with little or no hope for a change through politics! And as the different rankings are often from the same context, they are not only expressing the

47 importance or non-importance of the challenges, but also the mindset of the particular Christian in believing or not- believing that a change in his or her situation is possible.

Example 6: Obi town, Obi LGA, Nasarawa State , in the North Central zone, has experienced violence that has had a low level of impact on the Church.

Violence Obi has experienced Politics and land. The frequent eruption of crisis among the Fulani and pre-dominant Christian Eggon communities in Nasarawa State has become out of control. Although the crisis is about politics (a Muslim non- Eggon governor over a majority Eggon population in the state) and land (the Muslim Fulani herdsmen acquiring land from local Eggon and other farmers), religion comes into it as most Eggon are Christians and adherents of traditional religion (e.g. the Ombatse cult). Between December 2012 and September 2013, 534 people were killed in clashes. 21 November 2012 – violence erupted in Agyaragu, a suburb of the state capital of Lafia, when Ombatse killed at least 10 people of the Christian and animist Koro ethnic group with firearms, machetes and axes. Some 50 homes were also burnt to the ground; 9-14 January 2013 – 7 Fulani were killed by Ombatse members in a pair of remote villages in Nasarawa State. The Ombatse members also killed a large number of Fulani-owned cattle, which they leave behind in accordance with their beliefs. Dozens may have been killed in the retaliatory fighting that followed; 7 February 2013 – 4 villages and towns in Nasarawa State experienced Fulani vs. Eggon violence. Both Eggon and Fulani blamed the other ethnic group for initiating the fighting.

The impact on the Obi Church The impact on the churches has been great. Their members are scattered all over the country. Church attendance is close to zero and most churches (approx. 80%) are closed. Bible study, prayer meetings and other church activities have ceased. Many Christians are resorting to traditional practices and witchcraft in the name of protection. Churches and church members are getting poorer and hardly survive. Christian schools and Bible schools become weaker as many of their students relocate to safer places 98 . There are some signs of a different attitude as women in most churches are coming together to pray and dialogue.

3.2.5. Conclusions

Church life Church life diminished (over 60% of the interviewees say so) substantially (>25%) to dramatically (>50%) in violence- ridden areas (e.g. southern Yobe, rural areas of Nasarawa) where many Christians were killed, their houses were burnt and their shops or farms were looted and destroyed. Church life increased (over 30% of the interviewees say so) in areas where Christians fled to out of fear, or relocated to (e.g. Christian majorities in Plateau, south Kaduna, and Benue states). Church life increases also for congregations where individual pastors have made a stand or Christians have remained very committed (e.g. some in southern Yobe). Muslim related activities like outreach and evangelism mostly went down (about 70% say so). Lives of Christians In the rankings for the attitude of Christians towards Muslims, this has deteriorated negatively to strongly negatively (over 2/3 of the respondents say so) due to experiences of marginalization, discrimination and targeted violence towards Christians by Muslims. The feelings of Muslims towards Christians in the latter’s perception have deteriorated very negatively due to radical Muslim preachers. Here radical Islam, with the notion of purification of society and the notion of infidel ( kafir ) in the Koran, are applied to Christians. What is remarkable is that 20% of Christians are positive about the future prospects for Christians due to greater political awareness, higher levels of security and a growing faith in God, as they see it.

98 Cf. article ‘Ombatse: Nigerian Religious Cult Joins War on the State in Central Nigeria’, by Andrew McGregor for Jamestown Foundation, 17 May 2013; link: http://www.refworld.org/docid/519c7a984.html . See Article ‘Nigeria: Pulling the Root of Crises in Nasarawa State’, 28 August 2014 in Daily Trust magazine; link: http://allafrica.com/stories/201408281419.html . Source also results of Focus Group Discussion in Obi, Obi LGA, Nasarawa State.

The behavior of Christians towards Muslims has substantially deteriorated (between 60% and 80% say so) due to the persistent violence. Fear of and adversity towards Muslims is the main cause, next to experiences of killings, mistreatment, etc. Muslims in the Christians perception refuse to sell land for church building or to employ Christians for fear that Christianity will grow or prosper. In the Sharia states Christians are heavily discriminated against in this regard. Shopping with Muslim shopkeepers has greatly reduced, but sometimes (17% say so) Christians are forced to do so for there is no other option. The number of Christian shopkeepers has evenly decreased and increased as they left violent areas and relocated to safe areas. Defection to Islam is little known or seen (56% say so), but if observed, is mainly for reasons of material gain and protection. Muslim converts to Christianity have been seen by 25% of the respondents. They often convert for spiritual reasons (visions and dreams). Remarkable too is the increase in involvement in politics (52% say so). Christians want to resist the (growing) Muslim domination and have become aware that Muslim politicians only use them out of selfish interest. So there is an upsurge in political awareness among Christians resulting in Christians actively seeking political self-empowerment and engagement. In terms of the spiritual and emotional well-being of Christians the research shows that violence has produced the opposite of the abandoning of the Christian faith. It is true that many churches have seen a decline in membership and subsequent attendance. However those who have stayed show an increase in commitment to their faith and church. Engagement in personal prayer, participation in prayer groups, fasting and commitment to faith, has increased (50% to 70% of the respondents say so). Considering defection to Islam, traditional religion or other has substantially decreased (44% say so). Many experience God’s rescue, protection and presence, and persevere despite personal loss, material damage and psychological trauma (80% say so). In the challenges Christians experience , understanding persecution and loving their enemies were the most important factors. Although humanly impossible, it is shown to be the case that with the grace of God we can do these things (81% say so). Coping with trauma inflicted through violence is also very important (76% say so). Economic empowerment for Christians and freeing one’s community from Muslim domination in business is important too (63% say so). The same is true for living together in religiously mixed communities. The picture about political involvement is mixed. Many are disillusioned about Muslim politicians in the northern region, who are corrupt and use violent means to achieve their apparently selfish ends. They feel impoverished, discriminated against, oppressed and as it were paralyzed or without hope (39% say so). Others on the contrary are high spirited and speak about liberation from Muslim domination in the northern region and the means of politics to do this (45% say so). This difference is linked to the region a Christian is living in (e.g. southern Yobe, with a high impact level of violence) or the mindset of a Christian, believing that a change in his or her situation is possible.

Chapter 4. Responses and perspectives of the Church In this chapter we describe current responses of the Church to the crisis (1), the mid and long- term strategies and perspectives (2) and draw conclusions (3). 4.1. Current responses Our interviewees have observed that churches more recently confronted with violence (e.g. southern Borno and northern Adamawa since 2011) were surprised, shocked, as it were paralyzed, and unprepared for targeted violence, but churches with some history in experiencing violence appear to be relatively better prepared (e.g. Kaduna and Kano since 2000). The following are the current responses of the churches to the violence: (1) In the public domain at denomination level, press conferences are held, days of fasting and prayer are invoked, and church leaders discuss the crisis. At a local level, churches publish press releases and preach sermons to voice their condemnation of the violence and those involved. When incidents of violence occur, churches condemn the violence, ask for peace, hold the government and/or security forces accountable for not having done enough to prevent the crisis, and appeal for help to stabilize the situation. But in few cases do churches directly and firmly address those in political office who are either responsible behind the scenes, could have prevented the violence, or should have protected the victims. Concerning the victims, offerings are collected, contributions are made and as much help as possible is sent to the crisis area. (2) With regards to the victims churches become places where IDPs first go for refuge and help. So churches give victims material assistance and financial aid, and encourage and comfort them through Bible studies and prayer. (3) When it comes to the security of Christian property, church leaders regularly meet with security agencies and vigilante groups to implement security precautions. On Sundays security measures are high (e.g. using vigilance around strangers, visitors and the parking of strange cars; barricades in front of the portal, and the use of scanning devices when entering churches). (4) At the level of politics churches put high expectations on the influence of Christian politicians. In this regard the example of the former Governor of Plateau State, who apparently was present in every crisis, is mentioned. The influence of a seemingly high-moral government under a so-called ‘born-again’ President of Nigeria 99 is the hope of some. (5) In the spiritual domain, Christians have to make a choice where they stand and many indeed become serious in their faith. Believers show increased commitment to Bible study, personal prayer and community crisis outreach. Pastors exchange their often materialistic attitude for a spiritual one, remain more faithful to their calling now, start building confidence around them, and comfort and encourage their church members. There is an apparently growing opinion among Christians that security depends on ‘doing the will of God’. (6) The creation of a think tank is an example at church district level that consists of lay professionals that are to come up with practical solutions to the urgent challenges (security; food and housing; the problems of economic dependency and political domination; and the occasional lack of biblical leadership and vision). According to the initiators it would be good to have this think thank at different levels within the structure of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) as this is the body for cooperation among churches nationwide 100 .

99 Although we cannot say anything about former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan being ‘born again’ as this is a spiritual category, some significant born-again Pentecostal pastors were befriended with him. Cf. article ‘Jonathan dumps Oritsejafor for Oyedepo, Enenche, others – Report’ 5 February 2015, in Daily Post magazine; link: http://dailypost.ng/2015/02/05/jonathan-dumps-oritsejafor-oyedepo-enenche-others-report 100 Some church leaders, however, have doubts about the role CAN can play in terms of advocacy on behalf of Christians because the government financially contributes to CAN structures and programs.

Example 7: Gbajimba, Guma LGA, Benue State , which has experienced violence that has had a medium impact on the Church.

The violence Gbajimba has experienced Fulani herdsmen attacks. Early on the Sunday morning of 17 October 2012 Fulani herdsmen attacked Yogbo village, Guma LGA, Benue State. 30 persons, mostly women and children, who could not escape, were killed. The local Tiv farmers were surprised at this unusual hour as most had gone to church. On Sunday July 7 2013 suspected Fulani herdsmen attacked Akuroko village in Guma Local Government Area . They killed about 34 people, many were injured and many people have been displaced since. On Sunday 25 May 2014 Fulani herdsmen attacked Gbajimba town, headquarters of Guma LGA of Benue State. They burned many houses, killed 80 persons and wreaked a lot of destruction. Women and children, of whom some were pregnant, were among the victims. Some persons are still missing. These and more attacks have been occurring for years in Guma LGA.

The impact on the Gbajimba Church Presently all churches in the villages of Guma LGA (except Gbajimba) are either burnt or closed down. Out of the 87 Roman Catholic mission outstations, only 3 are still standing. Schools, hospitals and farms have been completely vandalized. Fear of the Fulani is paramount as they roam about looking for better grazing grounds. At the spiritual and emotional level Christians have turned apathetic as poverty reigns due to the destruction of farms. Churches and Christian institutions cannot help but become poor as well when most members fled 101 .

Responses, challenges, strategies and future perspectives for the Gbajimba Church The first response to the violence was that the churches united as the one Body of Christ irrespective of denomination and worked for the restoration of the Christian communities, first of all in helping each other with food, clothes, shelter and money. But the challenges remain as church members were scattered all over the country looking for safety, and there are little or no offerings to the treasuries. Poverty has come upon many members as the Fulani herdsmen are still wrecking farms and the insurgents are mocking any remaining Christians. The government securities operatives are just in the main town, and do not regularly go into the villages where the herdsmen are terrorizing the local population. The churches have set up a “peace committee” to restore peace between the Fulani and natives. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) has come to give information about security measures that can be taken and their local representatives have been pressurizing the government to come to the rescue. The strategy of the Church so far is for all to pray and fast, and not to resort to violence.

4.2. Mid and long-term strategies and perspectives Our interviewees see little or no mid and long-term strategy of the churches concerning the persistent violence. They observe a lack of consistent analysis by the churches as to its causes and solutions; consequently there is no coherent vision for the future. Analysis The root cause of the persistent violence – presented in summary here and based upon comments of our interviewees 102 – is a struggle for (political) power, for (scarce economic) resources and for recognition as a stakeholder in the government (state funds i.e. oil money). In this struggle are engaged political and religious elites at federal, state and local government levels through a system of patronage embedded in a culture of violence

101 Cf. Article ‘Bloodbath as Tiv, Fulani clash in Benue’, 17 October 2012, in Vanguard magazine; link: http://issuu.com/vanguardngr/docs/17102012, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/07/fulani-herdsmen-kill-34-in-benue/#sthash.kdchnoU0.dpuf . See article ‘Fulani violence: 80 death bodies found in Gbajimba, Benue State, More To Come – Locals’, 25 March 2014 in Naij.com News ; link : http://www.talkofnaija.com/local/fulani-violence- 80-dead-bodies-found-in-gbajimba-benue-state-more-to-come-locals . Source also Focus Group Discussion in Gbajimba, Guma LGA, Benue State. 102 In Structured Interviews, In-Depth Interviews, Focus Group Discussions and coupled with our findings by media research.

51 characterized by corruption and impunity 103 . This has led to the outworked belief that all means are more and more justified by the ends and that presidential, gubernatorial and LGA chairman elections have become the focal point of power battles. Religion and ethnicity have evolved into major players in this battle as they shape the identity of the main groups involved and are used by politicians to divide and rule (e.g. northern Muslims and southern Christians; Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, Yoruba, Tiv, Kanuri and Berom; Middle Belt Forum). Since Obasanjo’s regime and the return to democracy in 1999, religion has had the tendency to supersede ethnicity as an identity maker as religion has the capacity to unite multiple ethnic groups for a common cause (e.g. the presidential elections of 2011 and 2015). Moreover religions like Christianity and Islam have additional power as they promote ideas about a just and fair society and as such vocalize the aspiration of millions of their adherents. A complicating factor in this respect is the fact that the Far North – according to most northern Muslims – had this kind of just and fair society under the Sokoto Caliphate and that radical Muslims want to repeat this in an even more ideal and pure one under e.g. the Gwoza Caliphate. This struggle for power, resources and stakeholder recognition ideally takes place within the secular context of a nation state with separate the state powers of good governance, fair justice and equitable laws ( trias politica 104 ) in which everybody is equal before the law and has equal chances in society (through participation in education, healthcare, politics and the economy). This context however is a Western one brought by colonialism to Nigeria and adopted after independence. Yet the real context of Nigeria is not secular but multi-religious as Christianity, but in the northern region more so Islam and African Traditional Religion, shaped its history, values and perspectives. So concepts like the separation of religion and politics, and the separation of the 3 state powers are not really applied. At the same time the peoples of Nigeria are still struggling with the concept of the nation state as their basic bonding is as tribes, people groups and regions. Finally equality in Nigeria is frustrated by the political domination, economic subjugation, corruption and patronage of political and religious elites that make people vulnerable to the option of violence. Muslims seemingly have a natural inclination to actively participate in society through the main domains of politics and the economy (business) and Islam offers them some sort of coherent vision (Sharia) to do so. When the result of Muslims’ active participation in society leads to their political dominance and economic subjugation of non-Muslims however – as Christians in Nigeria experience – the churches in Nigeria are vulnerable as they have no adequate response. The Protestant churches in Nigeria in particular have no answer in this regard due to the missionary legacy of a more pietistic Gospel which teaches that a person should not engage with the world but prepare for the afterlife through a holy living that abstains from political and economic involvement with their supposed inherent corrupting influence 105 . To address this deficiency a holistic vision of the Gospel is needed, derived from the biblical perspective of the Kingdom of God in which personal salvation is coupled with transformation in society. The Catholic Church in Nigeria is better prepared as it can benefit from the social teachings of the global church 106 . Vision and strategy Elements of a coherent vision and strategy with future perspective could be (as given by respondents): (1) to fight despair and cynicism caused by traumatization as a result of the persistent violence. This includes training trauma counsellors as well as providing in trauma counselling. It also involves making a stand for the Christian faith and its values and to get rid of the system of patronage politics, corruption and impunity at all levels in society e.g. sacred cows (important politicians and businessmen) are in no way holy and their protection by immunity laws is evil. (2) to invest in the youth of the Church so that they can find a way to live from the Christian perspective, and to stay calm in the midst of violence and how to react to it. This way, they can find alternatives for retaliation. Moreover, they need to learn how to empower themselves economically through setting up their own businesses or find employment. (3) to increase political involvement in a meaningful and constructive way . This includes teaching Christian politicians how to apply Christian values in the political domain and in times of difficulty not to regress to traditional and occult practices like sorcery that often result in violence. For the Christian message of love, peace and forgiveness is strong and Christians can live by the teachings of Christ. Moreover prayer is a powerful weapon to bring the crisis under control where the powers of government, army and police cannot

103 Cf. Chapter 6.1. 104 Cf. article ‘Trias Politica (Separation of Powers)’ by Jan Ott in ‘Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research’, pp 6742-6743; link: http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-94-007-0753-5_3064 105 Cf. p. 196 in “Christianity in Nigeria Part II”, by Bulus Y. Galadima and Yusufu Turaki, in Africa Journal of Evangelical Theology 20.2, 2001; link: http://www.biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/ajet/20-1_085.pdf 106 Cf. article ‘Catholic Social Teaching: A Framework for Faith in Action’. By Catholic Education Office Sydney, December 2012; link: http://www.ceosyd.catholic.edu.au/Parents/Religion/Documents/20130124-broc-CatholicSocialTeaching.pdf

help. The Church has a role to play in the political domain, in the domain of dialogue, peace and reconciliation, and in the domain of social action: the Church should seriously be involved in healthcare, education and enriching the livelihood of the poor. It also includes advocating with the government that the rights of minorities are secured, and that Christians in Northern Nigeria can have freedom of thought, conscience and religion, receive adequate protection and are no longer marginalized and discriminated against. (4) to generate good leadership that can cope with the challenges of persistent violence. For the Church needs intelligent leaders with a profound vision about its role in the life of individuals and society. For this to happen, for example, the recruitment process for pastors would have to change. Pastors need to be genuinely called to serve the Church and not seek employment or material gain. Pastors need to be rigorously trained and in tune with the reality on the ground. (5) to tackle the existing dependency mentality . This dependency mentality is one of the main reasons why Christians are second-class citizens in Nigeria and not the Sharia system, according to some of our interviewees. Christians in the northern region are often not engaged in the domains of the economy, politics and education. He or she does not really want to advance in income, influence and knowledge through hard work, but is inclined to more easily relying on fate (e.g. donations to the pastor, sacrifices to the sorcerers) or people (e.g. rich family members, the money of politicians, government jobs). The Church must sensitize believers to this and motivate them to exchange this worldview for a biblical one. For in the biblical perspective a person can develop his or her life by obedience to God, become a productive steward in society and work with the resources entrusted. In the context of Northern Nigeria the challenges are to create a secure environment (a nation state with an effective army and police) in which everybody is equal before the law (effective and equitable justice) and has equal chances (participation in education and healthcare, participation in the economy through employment or business, and participation in politics through democracy and a free press). The Church must facilitate this process of sensitization through for example organizing workshops and giving clear messages from the pulpit. Furthermore the Church must lay the necessary foundations to achieve these goals and to raise funds accordingly. (6) to speak uncompromisingly about the root causes of the persistent violence, with a clear perspective for the future. This means also to address them within the Church, according to our respondents, where the leadership sometimes have been too close to the government. We need a new generation of Nigerians that is looking beyond the veil of politics, sees the difference with other nations, and is capable of surmounting the religious divide. (7) to prepare its members for religious related violence through knowing their faith, following Jesus truly and suffering for His sake. The pastor of every parish needs to know the members of his congregation and to mentor and coach them. The Church also needs to be united for outreach (mission and social works) and to live out what the Bible says. It also includes equipping the Church how to deal with suffering and to act out the Biblical challenge to ‘love your enemies’. (8) And finally to enter into dialogue, peace initiatives and reconciliation with adherents of other faiths. This can include building bridges in communities through dialogue, multi-religious education and promoting equality. Meeting believers of a different religion can be a wake-up call for getting to know each other and to realize what they possibly suffer because of us. An example of the result of dialogue and reconciliation is a group of Muslims and Christians that wanted to go back to where they stay and live as they did before the persistent crisis. The condition for this however would be that leaders of religions must educate their followers about the containment of violence, the abolition of prejudice and the creation of an open mind-set towards the ‘other’.

Example 8: Biu city, Borno State , which has experienced violence that has had a low impact on the Church.

The violence Biu has experienced Borno LGA is the 4th most violent LGA in Nigeria. The Fund of Peace stated in 2014 that ‘Biu was the fourth most violent LGA on a per capita basis, with insurgents frequently targeting religious communities.’ In April 2011 Biu was touched by the post-electoral violence. In June 2012 a church was attacked during a worship service; 2 people were killed and 100s wounded. On 10 June 2012 an attack by suspected Boko Haram insurgents was reported. In July 2013, 13 Christians were handcuffed and burnt to death in a church while in August 8 people, including teachers and clerics, were killed in an attack. In 2014 the Boko Haram insurgency touched the whole of Borno State seriously as an Islamic Caliphate was declared in nearby Gwoza. Biu is the only town in southern Borno that has not been captured by Boko Haram; attacks on the city have been made recently; e.g. on 18 February 2015, 3 suicide bombers killed 9 people 107 ; on 12 February 2015 a female suicide bomber killed 2 and wounded 15 108 .

The impact on the Biu Church Before the persistent violence Christians were marginalized and discriminated against through the Sharia law that Borno has adopted (only the civil part of Sharia in 2001). Under Sharia Christians are seen as inferior, and neglected. Christians have found it difficult to advocate for their rights; preaching on radio and television especially has been denied. Christian Religious Knowledge (CRK) in primary schools has become prohibited while Islamic Religious Knowledge (IRK) is allowed. Churches were attacked after the 2011 presidential elections and burned; furniture, equipment, farm produce (tithes) were looted and books were burnt. Security men were beaten, for example the Overcomer Assembly church was completely burnt down with everything inside. Presently over 60% of the churches in Borno State are closed due to the Boko Haram insurgency. Affected areas in southern Borno are: Gwoza, Chibok, Biu, Askira Uba, Bama, Damboa, Konduga LGAs. Among the dead victims are several pastors; some pastors have been abducted by the insurgents. The present violence has affected the life of Christians, Christian institutions, Christian businesses and churches very seriously. Believers live in poverty, fear and under heavy trauma due to the violence. Many people relocate to safer areas out of fear and at the same time many internally displaced persons flock to Biu town109 .

Responses, challenges, strategies and future perspectives for the Church Christians in Biu see that there is no protection for Christians in Northern Nigeria as Boko Haram freely operates in the Northeast region and there is little or no confrontation with security agencies to stop it. Christians in affected areas in Biu LGA should pray and show love to their neighbors, and exhort each other to peacefully live together. The present challenges are to enlighten the Christians security-wise; for the local and state government to create vigilante and community policy to supplement the federal security agents. There is also the need for spiritual maturity, economic empowerment, educational empowerment and political empowerment. In the mid and long- term Christians must invest in land property, establish schools, and develop in agriculture. Politics is a weapon to influence decision-making in the country and Christians need to engage in it much. There is, finally, the need for prayer and being strong in faith. The future perspective is that Christians will be taught about politics and be encouraged to participate in political activities (e.g. congress meetings at ward level) and thus change their fortunes.

107 Cf. article ‘12 Killed in Suicide Attacks in Yobe, Borno’, 18 february 2015 in This Day Live magazine; link: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/12- killed-in-suicide-attacks-in-yobe-borno/202111 108 Cf. article ‘Bomb rocks Biu market in Borno, many feared killed’’, 12 February 2015 in Peoples Daily magazine; link: http://www.peoplesdailyng.com/bomb-rocks-biu-market-in-borno-many-feared-killed 109 Cf. article ‘ Conflict Bulletin: Borno State’, by Fund for Peace; see link: http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cungr1420-nigeriaconflictbulletin- borno-05a.pdf . See article ‘12 Killed in Suicide Attacks in Yobe, Borno’, 18 February 2015 in This Day Live; see link: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/12-killed-in-suicide-attacks-in-yobe-borno/202111. cf. article ‘Bomb rocks Biu market in Borno, many feared killed’12 February 2015, in Peoples Daily magazine; see link: http://www.peoplesdailyng.com/bomb-rocks-biu-market-in-borno-many-feared- killed . See also results of Focus Group Discussions in Biu, Borno State.

Some examples of a more specific vision and strategies with future perspectives: (A) There is the dialogue, peace and reconciliation approach to teach Christians and Muslims about Islam and Christianity. For violence is easily read into the texts of the Holy Books. Islam especially has the tendency to incite its adherents to violence, but in reality – according to this approach – it is a religion of peace like any other religion. For example, Sufi Muslims have one common rule with Christians which is to take responsibility for your life, do the right things, and respect and value life above all. Nationhood can bind Muslims and Christians to a common origin and – from this perspective – dialogue is to be engaged in, peace is to be initiated, and reconciliation is to be effectuated. As a consequence of this approach emergency aid donated in times of crisis for example is to be shared with affected Christian and Muslim communities on both sides. Archbishop Ignatius Kaigama, the Catholic Archbishop of Jos 110 and the President of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria is practicing this approach. The Rev’d Yakubu Pam and Dr. Katrina Korb in a similar way have been working for peace and reconciliation through methods of conflict resolution 111 . (B) There is also the contextual approach to relate to Muslims with great knowledge and respect for Hausa culture. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) under the present CAN leadership is practicing this approach, and to good effect, our interviewees say. Professor Andrew Haruna, Head of the Department of Linguistics at the University of Jos and a Hausa Christian himself, has greatly contributed to this. (C) There is the peace and justice approach of the Ekklesiyar Yan’uwa a Nigeria (EYN), the Church of the Brethren in Nigeria. As the Church of the Brethren is one of the historical peace churches (with the Quakers and the Mennonites)112 they take a strong stance for non-resistance and pacifism, and have a great commitment to works of peace and justice with a high value placed on human life and dignity. Some say however that the church has not been prepared for persecution in the Boko Haram context as its message of pacifism has never been practiced on the ground 113 . Because the church of the Brethrern in 2014 has been the direct target of persecution and its believers relocated en masse to safer areas 114 . The church has lost ground and might need to rethink its position. (D) There is the communal approach of Professor Yusuf Turaki 115 which believes that the Church should develop a communal response. Christians have an individualistic approach to the conflict, he says, but Muslims fight as a community. Christianity lost this communal dimension as a result of the missionary legacy of the West. The concept of the Christian response to an aggressor is based upon the response of an individual Christian to violence. Christians cannot use guns or be offensive; they can only be pacifists and accept a situation as it is. Christianity also lost communal Christian law and order, and as a consequence the response to the violence of Christians in Nigeria lacks this communal dimension for this reason too. Christianity must be defined as a community of believers, like the people of God in the Old Testament. In this regard Turaki is referring to the ideas of Abraham Kuyper (1837 – 1920), a Calvinist pastor, politician and philosopher, whose ideas led to a truly pluralistic state in the Netherlands 116 . According to this approach a pluralistic state might be just the alternative for Nigeria.

110 ‘Dialogue of Life, an urgent message for Nigerian Muslims and Christians’, by The Rev’d Dr. Ignatius Kaigama, Fab Educational Books, Jos, Nigeria, 2006. And ‘Peace, Not War: A Decade of Interventions in the Plateau State Crises (2001-2011)’, by The Rev. Dr. Ignatius Ayau Kaigama, Hamtul Press Ltd. Jos Plateau, 2012. 111 Fighting for peace: Learning from the peace heroes among us, by The Rev’d Yakubu Pam and Dr. Katrina Korb, Fab Educational Books, Jos, Nigeria, 2011. 112 Church of the Brethern, about us; see link: http://www.brethren.org/about/beliefs.html . Article Wikipedia about Church of the Brethern; see link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_of_the_Brethren . 113 Cf p. 93 of ‘The EYN concept of Pacifism and its Relevance to the Nigerian context’, by Ndamsai Anthony Addu’a, thesis for a masters at the Theological College of Northern Nigeria, Jos University, November 2006. 114 Dante Dali, Rev. Dr. Samuel - EYN President (2015) op cit. 115 Currently Professor at Jos ECWA Theological Seminary. 116 “Kuyper was a pastor, theologian in the Reformed or Calvinist tradition, a Christian philosopher, Christian politician, Christian educator in The Netherlands. He even served as Prime Minister of his country. His stimulation led to the establishment of a Christian educational system, a fully- fledged university, a Christian political party, a Christian press and led to the formation of a truly pluralistic state, in distinction from a secular one that created structural and institutional room for all major persuasions in the country”, quote of Jan H. De Boer in the Introduction to his translation of ‘You Can Do Greater Things Than Christ, Demons, Miracles, Healing and Science’, by Dr. Abraham Kuyper; original title: ‘Pro Rege of het Koningschap van Christus’, Volume 1; Kampen, The Netherlands: J.H. Kok, 1911; Translator: Dr. Jan H. Boer, Copyright by J.H. Boer, Nigerian edition of English translation published by Institute of Church and Society/Northern Area Office, (Christian Council of Nigeria), First Printing: 1991, Reprinted: 1993, P.O. Box 6985, Jos, Nigeria.

The Kuyperian Perspective “Most of my previous books (the author dr. Jan Boer writes) have been written for and published in Nigeria. My readers, mostly Nigerians, will have noticed a certain perspective common to all of my writings. It is the perspective of a holistic way of thinking that I have initially learned from the late Professor H. Evan Runner, formerly a philosophy professor at Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan, USA. The perspective is often referred to as Neo- Calvinism or Kuyperianism. This is a school of thought and social action that originated in the Netherlands, but that is now increasingly sought after by Christians from every continent, including countries like Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Australia, South Africa, Hungary, United Kingdom, various Latin American countries, Canada and the USA. In all of these countries, this perspective is seen by a growing group of scholars and social activists as offering a viable arsenal of tools in the Christian struggle to develop and survive. Joel Carpenter, for example, has outlined the way this school of thought is influencing Christian higher education throughout North America and producing leading scholars. It is this perspective that underlies this book. It is a perspective as wide as life itself and world affirming. As Carpenter put it, Kuyper’s solution to the problem of competing world views—and that is Nigeria’s problem—in his native Netherlands was:

to embrace pluralism and to emphasize the value-laden, commitment-driven nature of knowledge. He reasoned that people quite naturally formed communities of the likeminded that shared a singular view of reality, a distinctive pattern for living and a socio-political agenda. A just society would recognize this social, intellectual and religious pluralism and encourage the various communities to negotiate the common good. Likewise, Kuyper insisted, one’s knowledge of the world was inevitably colored and shaped by one’s prior commitments – most fundamentally, religious commitments – concerning the nature of reality. Knowing was never value-free; science could not be completely objective. Scientific naturalism thus had no claim to a privileged position over against other world views. Kuyper was not calling for the fragmentation of public life, however. Given God’s common grace, he argued, there would be much overlap in human efforts to understand nature and humanity, and thus opportunities for conversation, debate and negotiation, both in learning and politics. Yet the social-intellectual and religious differences that drove outlooks and agendas were real, and they should not be forced into unitary national establishments, whether religious, intellectual or political. Various communities of faith and values could play public roles, yet not feel compelled to choose between domination, accommodation or withdrawal. They would have the social and intellectual space to work out their particular convictions, but would retain the right to put their ideas into play on an equal basis.” 117

4.3. Conclusions Churches in Northern Nigeria in general are not well equipped to face marginalization, discrimination and targeted violence. Although they express their concern and protest openly, they do not effectively deal with politicians responsible behind the scenes and/or responsible for their protection. Churches show great compassion to victims of violence through practical and spiritual help, and spiritual commitment of pastors and ordinary believers is growing strong. Churches however lack consistent analysis of persistent violence and as a consequence have little or no vision for the future and mid and long-term strategies to cope with the existing situation. However the root cause of persistent violence – according to our respondents – is the struggle for power, resources and recognition as a stakeholder in the government. In this struggle are engaged political and religious elites at all levels through a system of patronage embedded in a culture of violence characterized by corruption and impunity. This makes federal, state and local elections the focal point in which religion is the main identity marker and the instrument of rallying mass support for political ends. As a general rule, politics in Nigeria is based upon the concept of the secular nation state inherited from the West. This concept is heavily challenged by realities on the ground in which religion, region, clan and tribe are determinant factors. Moreover Muslims have an alternative concept (Sharia-based) in the context of the present Nigerian troubled state that they long to apply. The churches have as yet no answer to this but the Kuyperian Perspective, together

117 Excerpt from Nigeria’s decades of bloodshed 1980 - 2002, Volume I in Studies in Christian – Muslim Relations, pp. 16-24, by Jan Boer, Steam Christian Publishers, Jos Plateau, Nigeria, 2003.

56 with other approaches (i.e. dialogue, context oriented, peace and justice), might be a solution to competing worldviews in a pluralistic society in order to stop persistent violence.

Chapter 5. Northern Nigeria in context 118 This chapter will describe the context of the Church and the persistent violence it is impacted by in Northern Nigeria. It describes developments in Northern Nigeria since the beginning of the 20 th century up to the present. The period is divided into one segment about Northern Nigeria as a region created by the British colonization (1), another about Northern Nigeria as part of the independent nation state of Nigeria (2) and conclusions (3). 5.1. Early developments (1900 – 1960) Before the creation of Northern Nigeria by British colonization three socio-political entities were present in the area: the Kanem-Bornu Empire, the Kano Emirate and the Sokoto Caliphate. The creation of Northern Nigeria led to the conception of the Middle Belt and the challenge of intertribal relations. The Kanem-Bornu Empire 119 The Kanem-Bornu Empire around the Lake Chad Basin existed from the 9 th to the 19 th century. It had a large territory and extended into areas of present day countries like Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria. The Bornu part was created in the 14 th century. Islam was introduced in the 11 th century through Muslim scholars who arrived along the trans- Saharan trade routes from North Africa 120 . Kanem-Bornu functioned as an independent Islamic state until the 19 th century when warlord and slave trader Rabih Zubayr 121 , a fleeing Sudanese rebel, conquered large parts of Central Africa including Kanem-Bornu. In 1900 however Rabih was defeated in present day northern Cameroon by the French who wanted to extend their influence into the interior of Africa. The remnants of the Kanem-Bornu Empire were divided between the British (Nigeria) and French (Niger, Chad) colonial parts of West and Central Africa. The Kano Emirate 122 The Kano kingdom was founded as one of the seven Hausa Bakwai (“Seven True Hausa States”) 123 in the 10 th century in present day Northern Nigeria. It was situated at the end of the trans-Saharan trade routes coming from Tripoli, Tunis and Fès. Commerce was done in leather, cotton, all kinds of other goods, and slaves. Islam came to Kano in the 14 th century with Muslim scholars from the ancient Mali Empire situated to its west. Kano was a tributary state to different African empires in subsequent centuries. In the 19 th century Kano was conquered in the jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio (see next paragraph) and became an emirate (1807) in the newly established Sokoto Caliphate. Under British indirect rule Kano remained an emirate and developed into the largest and most populous state of the Northern Nigeria. The Sokoto Caliphate 124 The Sokoto Caliphate was one of the largest empires of West Africa in the 19 th century. It covered parts of present day Burkina Faso, Niger, Northern Nigeria and Cameroon. The Empire was founded by Uthman Dan Fodio, its first Sultan and a radical Fulani Muslim cleric, who started a jihad from 1804 – 1815 out of frustration about the bad governance by the Hausa kings in the Hausa states and the discrimination against his Fulani tribesmen. He gathered disenchanted Hausa and Fulani behind him and conquered large parts of the region. After Dan Fodio’s death in 1817 the Caliphate was divide into Western (Gwandu as capital) and Eastern (Sokoto as capital) parts, but eventually Muhammad Bello, Dan Fodio’s son, was recognized as second Sultan and gained control over all of the Caliphate. The Caliphate became the center of power in the region, but disintegrated by the 1880s through internal rivalry. French and British colonial troops conquered its territory in 1903.

118 Cf. ‘Northern Nigeria Protectorate (1900-1014) in ‘Fast Facts’ in ‘Dead country stamps and Banknotes’; see link: http://www.dcstamps.com/?p=3756 and http://www.dcstamps.com/?p=164 119 Cf. article ‘Empire of Kanem-Bornu (c. 9th century-1900)’, by Ali Bilow, University of Washington, in Black History on Blackpst.org; see link: http://www.blackpast.org/gah/empire-kanem-bornu-c-9th-century-1900 120 Cf. article ‘Kanem-Bornu, historical empire, Africa’, by the editors of the Encyclopedia of Britannica, see link: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/310975/Kanem-Bornu 121 Cf. article ‘Rabih az-Zubayr, African military leader’ , by the editors of the Encyclopedia of Britannica, see link: Cf. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/487969/Rabih-az-Zubayr 122 Cf. article ´Kano, historical kingdom, Nigeria´, written by editors of Encyclpedia Britannica; see link: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/311216/Kano 123 Biram, Daura, Gobir, Kano, Katsina, Kano, and Zaria; see: article ‘Hausa Bakwai, historical region, Africa’, by the editors of the Encyclopeida Britannica; see link: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/257096/Hausa-Bakwai 124 Cf. article ‘Sultanate of Sokoto (Sokoto Caliphate)’ by Yoo, Jiwon Amy from the University of Washington, Seattle, in Blak History Blackpaste.org; see link: http://www.blackpast.org/gah/sultanate-sokoto-sokoto-caliphate and http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/9.htm

Map 1. Historical map of Northern Nigeria

The Middle Belt 125

The Middle Belt is the southern part of Northern Nigeria which stretches like a kind of belt between 8th and 12th parallels north through the middle of Nigeria. It comprises the areas of Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba, Adamawa, southern Borno, Plateau, southern Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Niger, southern Kaduna, FCT Abuja, southern Gombe and three local government areas in southern Bauchi (Dass, Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro). The Middle Belt is ethnically and linguistically very heterogeneous. Large parts were never conquered by Dan Fodio’s jihad and many tribes actively

125 Cf. see article ‘Nigeria's New "Middle Belt", by Alan Craig, March 7, 2014, Gatestone Institute; see link: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4206/nigeria-middle-belt ; http://newsrescue.com/the-middle-belt-holds-nigeria-together/#ixzz3Eu8bWAU3 ; see map 7 on p. 65 in chapter 5 of ‘Christianity in Northern Nigeria’, by E.P.T. Crampton, Geoffrey Chapman, London, 1979.

59 resisted domination by the Hausa-Fulani within the Caliphate and its 30 emirates. It was only the British who placed those areas under the jurisdiction of an emir by their policy of indirect rule in the 20 th century. At independence Middle Belters advocated for a separate Middle Belt entity apart from the northern Hausa-Fulani dominated areas, but the Colonial Minority Commission recommended against it. Thus Northern Nigeria, consisting of the Far North (predominantly Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri) and the Middle Belt (other, different tribes), has remained united to this day 126 . Map 2. Middle Belt in Nigeria

126 In 1995, 6 geopolitical zones were created with the intention of a better allocation of state resources. The northern region for that purpose was divided into the northwest, the northcentral and the northeast zones. In spite of this division there are four main regional groupings of which the northern region with its 3 zones is one. These four groupings have different agendas and interests. See article ‘List of 6 Geopolitical Zones in Nigeria and their States’ on Nigerian students Official Blog for University, Scholarships and Tech News, 23 September 2015; see link: http://ngstudents.com.ng/list-of-6-geopolitical-zones-in-nigeria-and-their-states

Northern Nigeria

Northern Nigeria became a creation of the British colonial administration as a protectorate on January 1, 1900 . Since the 2nd half of the 19 th century British influence started growing in this part of Africa and its interests were later represented by the Royal Niger Company. Growing competition on the African continent, however, forced Western countries to carve out precise colonies or protectorates and have their frontiers internationally accepted. The famous Berlin conference of 1884 – 1885, where all major European powers were represented, served that purpose. From the start, British troops conquered Northern Nigeria and subdued the three existing socio-political entities. The protectorate was administered by indirect rule in which native authorities (chiefs and emirs) under the supervision of British staff ruled the people 127 . Due to resistance to taxation by the emirates and the powerful merchant class, the protectorate was never economically profitable. To get the financial budget balanced the Northern Nigerian protectorate was merged with the more profitable Southern Nigerian protectorate in 1914 to form the colony of Nigeria. Map 3. Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 128

Intertribal relations Nigeria is a country with a large tribal diversity. There are three main tribal groups which make up approximately 70% of the total population. The Hausa-Fulani (29%) live in the North, the Yoruba in the South-West (21%) and the Igbo in the South-East (18%). The remaining tribes constitute 32% of the population. The three largest tribes dominate politics in the country. In Northern Nigeria the Hausa-Fulani are the largest tribe, but as mentioned before they share this region with lots of smaller tribes from the Middle Belt. The Hausa-Fulani previously dominated politics in Northern Nigeria under military regimes. With the election of Obasanjo as president in 1999 however their domination has been contested and rivalry with other tribes (mainly north-south) has increased. The Hausa-Fulani are a fusion of Hausa and Fulani peoples that merged during the jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio and the subsequent Sokoto Caliphate in the 19 th century. The Hausa belong to an ethnic group that lives in Northern Nigeria and South Niger. The Hausa were farmers and petty businessmen. The Fulani belong to an ethnic group that is widespread across West Africa from Senegal to Cameroon.

127 ‘Indirect rule’ from being ”just an expedient in times of financial hardship and lack of staff to a complete philosophy of government for Britain’s colonial peoples”. See: p. 54 in Crampton, op cit. Northern Nigeria 128 Cf. article ‘Southern Nigeria Protectorate (1900 – 1914)’ in ‘Dead country stamps and banknotes’ see link: http://www.dcstamps.com/?p=164

Map 4. Tribal diversity in Nigeria 129

The Fulani are usually pastoralists of whom many eventually settled in cities. The Fulani at the elite level adopted Hausa language and culture in Nigeria and merged with the Hausa elite 130 . During the jihad of Dan Fodio both groups turned into well trained and experienced warriors and their descendants in the Caliphate ruled over the non-Hausa- Fulani who served them as slaves. The Hausa-Fulani elite had got used to ruling under indirect rule by the British colonial administration and have tried to continue this during independence. Their present attitude according to many non Hausa-Fulani is characterized by a mentality of ‘born to rule’ and many Hausa-Fulani serve in the Nigerian army with their inherited ‘warrior capacities’. The Hausa-Fulani are predominantly Muslim. The Igbo 131 are a people in south-eastern Nigeria who speak their common language, Igbo. Their homeland is situated in the present day South Eastern region (Anambra, Imo, Abia, Eboni, Enugu states). The Ibgo are an educated, commercial and prosperous people that have spread all over Nigeria for business sake. The Igbo have dominated southeastern Nigeria for decades and unsuccessfully tried to gain independence from Nigeria as Biafra in 1967. They felt threatened in the after independence economically, politically and ethnically unstable country in which the Hausa-Fulani dominated parliament and harnessed much resentment towards the Igbos after the first Igbo led military coup. In 1966 for example 10,000 – 30,000 Igbo were massacred in Northern Nigeria 132 . The Igbo are predominantly Christian. The Yoruba are a people in the south-west of Nigeria, Benin and northern Togo. They speak the Yoruba language. They are traditionally farmers, craftsmen and traders who lived in the cities of their kingdoms (e.g. Ibadan, Ile-Ife, and

129 Cf. for map: http://www.katyjon.com/tag/nigeria The ‘Kaje’ ethnic group should be read as ‘Baju’. 130 The masses of Fulanis speak their own language, Fufulde, and have a very different culture than the Hausas. 131 See article ‘Igbo people’ in Encyclopedia Britannica; link: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/282215/Igbo 132 The January 1966 Ironsi coup (southern Igbo dominated) was followed by the July counter coup (northern dominated). The Igbo massacre was the result of ethnic hatred towards Igbos and revenge for killed northerners in the first coup. See p. 569 in Ostien (2010) op cit.

Ilorin) and eventually the Oyo Empire in the 17 th century. This empire declined in the 18 th and 19 th centuries and was invaded by the Don from Dahomey (Benin) and the Muslim Fulani from Northern Nigeria. The Yoruba have a strong cultural heritage with an emphasis on education. Many Yoruba work in the educational sector in present day Nigeria; they are evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. The remaining more smaller ethnic groups (368) live in the riverine area of Southeastern Nigeria (Edo, Delta, Bayles, Rivers, Aiwa Ibom and Cross Rivers states) There are other minority ethnic groups in the Far North that have not been absorbed by the Hausas. And the greatest concentration of smaller ethnic groups is in the Middle Belt. The history of slavery makes intertribal relationships in the Northern region very sensitive. The economics of the Soot Caliphate were based upon slavery and the non-Hausa-Fulani were the subjects 133 . There was also a societal imperative upon the non-Hausa-Fulani within the Caliphate to convert to Islam. Resistance to Hausa-Fulani dominance in religion, politics, economy, and the socio-cultural domain exists to this day and plays a very important role in intertribal relations, and within the broader context of Nigerian society. The struggle for resources is a second factor in intertribal relations in the northern region 134 . Reduced fertility (desertification) in the north has brought northerners to the Middle Belt states for pasture, work and employment. This has also moved pastoralist Fulani south in search of grazing land for their cattle, which has often led to violent encounters with agriculturalist farmers. The indigene-settler divide is a third factor in intertribal relations in the northern region 135 . To avoid the dominance of larger over smaller tribes and equal participation in government, the Nigerian Constitution mentions the word ‘indigene’. Next to state of origin, ethnic group and religion the Constitution states that “the President should appoint at least one minister of every state that is an ‘indigene’ of that state”. While this concept of indigeneity has contributed to the equal participation of majority and minority tribes at the federal level, the opposite has been true at the level of state and Local Government Areas. For in many states the ‘minority’ tribes in fact constitute the majority. Therefore the concept of indigeneity has been used to reserve rights and privileges for the natives (indigenes) and to exclude the non-natives (migrants or settlers). The settlers in their turn have sought to remove these limitations by protests, force or other means. 5.2. Recent developments (1960 – 2015) After independence developments in Northern Nigeria have been intertwined with Nigeria as a whole and characterized by changing leadership. This presents a framework for better understanding realities in Northern Nigeria today 136 . Independence and First Republic 1960 – 1966 Nigeria became independent on 1 October 1960 137 and as the prior 1959 elections had resulted in a stalemate, Chief Benjamin Zakie (eastern region) was appointed as General Governor and AL haji Abu-Bakr Tafawa Balewa (northern region) as Prime Minister. When Nigeria declared itself a republic in 1963, Zakie became President and Tafawa Balewa remained Prime Minister. Ethnic and regional tensions however soon emerged between the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. These tensions mainly had to do with differences in development between northern and southern region. The northern region felt threatened by the southern region due to its advantages in education (e.g. many qualified southern civil servants) and resources (notably the revenues of the industry, business and taxes in Lagos, Port Harcourt, and the selling of Niger Delta oil). First period of military rule and civil war 1966 – 1979 On January 15 1966 some young (Igbo) officers staged a coup and killed some politicians among who was Prime Minister AL haji Abu-Bakr Tafawa Balewa. The Igbo suspected the 1963 census to have overestimated the number of Hausa-Fulani in order to give the Northern region a better representation in parliament. Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi (eastern region) emerged from the chaos as the new strongman. On July 29 1966 northern Muslim

133 Cf. ‘Tainted Legacy: Islam, Colonialism and Slavery in Northern Nigeria’, by Yusufu Turaki, Isaac Publishing Inc., 2010. 134 Cf. Mulders, ‘Persecution of Christians in Jos (1)’, op cit; http://www.iirf.eu/index.php?id=232&no_cache=1&L=%2Fetc%2Fpasswd%5C%5C%5C%5C0&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=13&tx_ttnews%5Bback Pid%5D=106&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1082. 135 Cf. ibid. 136 See Appendix 12. Nigerian past and present leaders (1960 – present). See overview ‘Political History of Nigeria’, by Robert Crawford, September 2011; see link: http://www.crawfordsworld.com/rob/apcg/Nigeria/Unit4NigeriaHistory.html See ‘Nigeria country profile from the World Missions Atlas Project’, 2001 W. Seminary Drive, Fort Worth, TX 76115, (817) 923-1921, Copyright WorldMAP © 1995-2011; see link: http://worldmap.org/country.php?ROG3=NI&QryHead=Christian%20Religion&QryFld=CP_Religion_Christian 137 Nigeria’s independence from Brittain was executed in phases, hence the different dates.

63 officers led a contra coup to reverse what they perceived to be Igbo domination. Christian General Yakubu Gowon (northern region) was seen as the compromise candidate to head the federal government.

Yakubu Gowon (1966 – 1975) In order to reduce tribal hegemony and competition Gowon made plans to divide the four existing regions (northern, eastern, western and Lagos) into twelve states. The Igbo refused and on 29 May 1967 Lieutenant-Colonel Emeka Ojukwe declared the eastern region as ‘Biafra’ independent. The civil war that resulted lasted until 1970 with an estimated death toll of 3.5 million. As a result however Nigeria remained a united country. On 29 July 1975 General Murtala Mohammed (northern region) put an end to Gowon’s regime for not having honored his promise to revert to civilian rule. Mohammed however was assassinated on 13 February 1976 in a coup attempt for reasons of corruption, indecision, arrest and detention without trial, and weakness and mismanagement in government. After the coup attempt was put down General Olusegun Obasanjo (western region), his chief of staff and a Christian, became head of state and prepared a return to civilian rule with a new constitution. Second Republic 1979 – 1983 This new constitution was drafted and Alhaji Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari (northern region) won general elections for the presidency in 1979 and was re-elected in 1983. Second period of military rule, abortive Third Republic and third period of military rule 1983 – 1999 On 31 December 1983 however General Muhammadu Buhari (northern region) overthrew Shagari to great acclaim of the population for bringing an end to economic mismanagement, corruption and the widely seen as rigged elections of 1983. The Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the Iraq-Iran war (1979) raised the price of oil spectacularly and as large quantities of money poured into Nigeria, political competition over access to these resources hardened. On August 27 1985 General Ibrahim Babangida (northern region) however overthrew Buhari for reasons of corruption, misuse of power and failure to tackle the economic crisis. General Babangida promised a return to civilian rule by 1990 (the Third Republic). A constitution was adopted in 1989, local government, state and national legislature elections were conducted and a democratic government began functioning at state level in about 1990. President elections were finally held in 1993. Rich businessman Moshood Abiola (western region) won, but Babangida annulled the results claiming fraud in what many interpreted as an effort to stay in power. Political chaos in the country erupted and Babangida was obliged to transfer power to Chief Ernest Shonekan, a Christian (western region) in 1993. Shonekan was to be the interim leader until the next elections, but was unable to reduce the political tensions and solve the economic problems. General Sani Abacha (northern region) ousted him on November 17 1993.

Abacha brought the country back to military rule and locked up many of his political opponents in prison. His regime was brutal and there were several coup attempts. Promises of a return to civilian rule were made, but Abacha did not follow through. On June 81998 he died of a heart attack at the age of 54 and General Abdulsalami Abubakar (northern region) took his place. Abubakr prepared for a return to democracy in 1999 and well known Christian General Olusegun Obasanjo (western region) won presidential elections in the same year.

Olusegun Obasanjo (1976 - 1979 and 1999 - 2007)

Fourth Republic 1999 – present Obasanjo’s election ended 16 years of military rule. He inherited a country with many problems he had to tackle (i.e. dysfunctional bureaucracy, collapsed infrastructure, corruption, the return of the military to the barracks). Human rights were improved and freedom of the press was installed, but interreligious crisis erupted around the adoption of more enhanced Sharia by 12 northern states. Some governors of northern states used the issue of threatened Muslim identity in a secular state as a means of getting more power in putting the federal government at a distance. Obasanjo was re-elected in 2003. In the next presidential elections in 2007 Katsina State Governor Umaru Yar'Adua

Goodluck Jonathan (2010 - 2015) (northern region) was elected with Bayelsa State Governor Goodluck Jonathan (eastern region) as Vice-President. Yar'Adua however fell ill in 2009 and died in May 2010. Jonathan became acting president in February 2010, was elected as President in 2011 and stood for re-election in 2015. His presidency has been contested by northern Muslims since the beginning. There is apparently an unwritten power-sharing agreement within the ruling party

(PDP) that the presidency should rotate to various regions to safeguard national unity 138 . Northern Muslims lost the presidency in 2010 and wanted to regain it in 2015. Southern Christians wanted to retain the presidency for essentially the same reasons: access to the abundant state revenues through oil money. Although a sitting president had up till then never lost elections, Goodluck Jonathan did and Muhammed Buchari (northern region) won the 28 March 2015 elections. 5.3. Conclusion Northern Nigeria is a British colonial construction in which the Muslim Far North and the non-Muslim – now predominantly Christian – Middle Belt areas of present Nigeria were united in one common entity. This entity of Northern Nigeria was ruled by the British colonial administration (indirect rule) under the Sokoto Caliphate structure of Hausa-Fulani emirs. This Muslim Hausa-Fulani rule was extended after Nigerian independence, but has been challenged under democracy (since 1999). The non-Muslim population in the northern region (mainly Middle Belt states) wants freedom from Hausa-Fulani domination (e.g. Plateau State). But this is difficult to get as the holders of power in the northern region – the Muslim political and religious elite – wants the region to remain undivided under its domination. Because an undivided northern region is strong with regards to the competition between the northern and southern regions over access to power, resources and state funds. Twenty years of unabated northern Muslim rule during the second, third republic and periods of military rule (1979-1999) favored Muslim dominance over the northern region.

138 Cf. article ‘Nigeria: An Ailing President and the Problem of Succession’, by Stratfor, 6 January 2010.; see link: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/nigeria-ailing-president-and-problem-succession

Chapter 6. Actors of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria 139 This chapter deals with the actors of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria: the Northern Muslim political and religious elite (1), radical Islamic groups (2), Fulani herdsmen (3), at work within the Context of a culture of political violence (4). It summarizes the impact on the Church and the Christian minority in Northern Nigeria as marginalization, discrimination and targeting by violence. These effects appear as the direct consequences of the politico- economic, social-cultural and religious agenda of the actors in protecting northern Muslim endangered interests, Muslims’ endangered identity, and Islam’s endangered ‘legitimate’ position. At the end we draw conclusions (5). 6.1. Northern Muslim political and religious elite The Northern Muslim political and religious elite is a merging of the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy who had prominence as emirs in the Sokoto Caliphate in the 19 th century and under the indirect rule of the British colonial administration in the 20 th century, with the Hausa-Fulani politicians of more common descent who emerged as a political class after independence in 1960. The essence of this merging was the preservation of royal and northern Muslim interests in the context of a united Nigeria. This merging of former competitors in the political domain was in the interest of gaining political power 140 . For within a united Nigeria the southern and northern regions were in a battle for power and influence. Access to political power, economic resources and state funds at the federal, state and local government levels passes through political parties that gain elections. To win elections in Nigeria ethnic, religious and political elites create political alliances

Former Central Bank of Nigeria Governor, Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, as the new Emir of Kano 141 characterized by the patronage system and the importance of ‘godfathers’ (rich and powerful men with great influence in some sectors of society) 142 . In this battle with the south the northern Muslim elite needed to be well organized, to have sufficient financial resources and be widely backed by the northern population. So they joined

139 Proposed additional text of ‘Epilogue 1975 – 2010’ for a new edition of Crampton’s book, by Musa A.B. Gaiya, Professor of church history at Department of Religion and Philosophy, University of Jos, received from the author, September 2014. 140 See Appendix 13. Prominent figures of the northern political and religious elite. 141 Cf. article ‘Sanusi Lamido Sanusi: From the CBN to the Emirate’ in This Day Live, 13 June 2014; see link: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/sanusi-lamido-sanusi-from-the-cbn-to-the-emirate/180832 142 Politicians, once chosen, can normally appoint their own candidates for political posts. In the context of corruption and violence in Nigeria however politicians seek protection and sponsorship by powerful godfathers. These godfathers ask for privileges in the form of political posts for their cronies and access to important state funds in return. Influence is never provided for free. The common believe is that important sums of money flow from godfathers to to-be-elected politicians, but once elected large sums of money flow back.

67 forces to create the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) party 143 in which the traditional and new rulers (politicians and emirs) worked together, developed financial support by acquiring patronage from wealthy emirs and businessmen, and got support from the local – mainly Muslim – population during elections by appealing to the traditional and religious concept of power in Hausa culture. In this concept local chiefs and emirs used to direct ordinary people in the choices they made, and in this case which party to vote for. The objectives of the northern political and religious elite are to protect class interests, access to power and resources, and to strengthen an endangered Muslim identity. Class interests The Hausa-Fulani aristocracy ruled over the Muslim and non-Muslim commoners during the Sokoto Caliphate and the period of British colonial indirect rule. Much of this rule had a feudal character under which many commoners served as slaves. The privileges of this class were threatened by democracy in which commoner politicians assumed power (political parties); non-Muslim peoples in the Middle Belt formed a formidable electorate (presently 31.2% Christians in Northern Nigeria); and Southern Nigeria well advanced in education (e.g. teachers, public servants, merchants), economic development (e.g. Lagos and Port Harcourt cities and ports) and resources (e.g. Niger Delta oil). These threats had to be tackled by the Northern elite. Access to power and resources The British merged their colonies of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 and made the northern economically dependent on the southern. This dependency was strengthened through the discovery of crude oil in 1956 in the Niger delta e and large sums of money flowed into the public treasury. In spite of developing northern agricultural potential, mineral resources, untapped oil resources and human resources, the northern priority was to ensure access to southern economic resources 144 . Endangered identity Islam came to the Far North of present day Nigeria in the 14 th century. The Hausa-Fulani jihad in the 19 th century extended the influence of Islam over large parts of Northern Nigeria. In the Sokoto Caliphate Sharia was applied and an Islamic society was shaped in which Muslims felt at home. British colonial rule extended this Islamic society in time over large non-Muslim populations, but Sharia became limited by British law (especially the penal code) and slowly Western influence reshaped northern society into an entity alien to Muslims in which they felt their identity endangered. A secular state was created after independence and large numbers of non-Muslims (including many Christians) migrated from the southern region to the northern region for commercial and administrative reasons.

Nigerian Muslim man 145 Moreover many northerners living in the Middle Belt converted to the Christian faith and Christian missions made large inroads into the Muslim Far North. Northern Muslims in the 1980s were shocked to learn that in spite of Christianity’s late arrival, it became the equal of Islam in terms of adherents. Islam’s ‘legitimate’ position in the northern region as the religion of the erstwhile Caliphate, and now majority population, was threatened. In this context all forms of Westernization (e.g. state structures, education systems, capitalist industry, and Christianity) were experienced as alien to Muslims and seen as endangering the Islamic society that once existed in the Far North. Alongside issues in the political and economic domains, the northern Muslim elite had a role to play in

143 The NPC leadership is supposed to be in the hands of a person of royal birth. A person belonges to this class though being of royal Fulani blood, speaking the Hausa language and being a Muslim. Cf. p. 11 in ‘Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria’, by The Rev’d Fr. M.H. Kukah, Spectrum Books, 1993. 144 Cf. p. 19 of ‘Who speaks for the North? Politics and Influence in Northern Nigeria’, Research Paper by Leena Koni Hoffman, Africa program, Chatham House, July 2014; see link: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140703NorthernNigeriaHoffmann.pdf 145 Cf. for picture link: http://www.ynaija.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/nigeria-muslim-eid-al-adha-2010-11-16-6-30-13.jpg

68 the social-cultural and religious domain in protecting the endangered Muslim identity and the by them seen as ‘legitimate’ position of Islam in the northern context. Battle The Northern Muslim elite had to battle on three fronts: the internal Muslim division, the external threat of the northern non-Muslim population, and what was seen as an aggressive menacing influence from the mainly Christian southern region. The internal division was for example between the most prominent representatives of royalty: the Sardauna of Sokoto 146 and the Emir of Kano 147 , and for example between its main representative bodies: the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) allied with the Qadiriyya brotherhood and the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) allied with the Tidjaniyya brotherhood. The external threat was against the non-Muslim population that was largely Christian and felt threatened by northern Muslim dominance. In pre-independence days the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) advocated for a separate region, but the colonial administration did not consent and the north remained united. In 1967 the Northern Christian Association (NCA) was created to form a bloc of Christian interests, much like the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (Society for the Support of Islam – JNI) created in 1961 for Muslims 148 . But the Northern elite was afraid of electoral losses and through buying the power it wanted, it was able to neutralize the NCA by courting and bribing its leaders. Finally the northern region felt invaded by much better educated southerners through the immigration of merchants, teachers and civil servants, who were predominantly Christian. In northern-Muslim eyes the southern Igbo dominated coup of 1966 and subsequent Biafran civil war was shocking and seen as an aggressive attempt at southern Christian domination. General Yakubo Gowon, a northern Christian, was the northern “compromise” presidential candidate. He was able to contain the southern secession and prevent the country from falling apart. In all aforementioned challenges the Northern Muslim elite has been well able to retain power over a united northern region.

Nigerian Christian Woman 149

146 As the Sultan of Sokoto is a religious position as spiritual leader of all Muslims, his Sardauna or kind of adjunct is a key position for operating in society. 147 As Kano grew to become the most populous and richest emirate, the Sanusa Emir family grew in influence and importance in the northern region. 148 Cf. article ‘Jama’atu Nasril Islam @ 50 ’ , by Bala Muhammad, in Daily Turst, 19 April 2014; see link: http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/weekly/index.php/saturday-column/16282-jama-atu-nasril-islam-50 149 Cf. for picture: http://pamelageller.com/2015/01/nigeria-christians-debunk-reports-that-muslims-protected-christians.html

Defending interests To defend northern Muslim interests, Muslim identity and the legitimate position of Islam, the Northern elite used some instruments and techniques that impacted the Church and the Christian minority to the effect of marginalization, discrimination and violent targeting. We present some examples: a. Marginalization Propaganda through the media has a great effect on society for it shapes the minds of the general public about what is happening and how it should be interpreted. To this end over the years New Nigerian Newspapers Ltd. (NNN) and the Federal Radio Corporation Kaduna (FRCK), both in Kaduna, were used 150 . They became the leading outlets for northern interests. About the NNN it is stated: “After all, the managing director, editor and other senior editorial staff were all Muslims and northerners with impeccable credentials and all of them represented the ideological cream of northern interest and hegemony” 151 . The FRCK managed to acquire the status of as it were a miniature BBC and to become the recruiting ground for staff of the international media of the BBC Hausa service and the Voice of America Hausa service. It even presented itself as ‘setting the tone for the political discourse in Nigeria’, however as others have said, this was ‘… within the context of putting the northern interests on the agenda’ and it had ‘the intuition and the ability to develop … antennae for sensing the direction of northern interests and how to help build them’ 152 .

Local newspapers sold in Kano city 153 With the influence through other institutions at the economic level such as the New Nigerian Development Corporation (Kaduna) 154 and the Bank of the North (Kano), and at the education level like the Ahmadu Bello University (Zaria) and the Kaduna Polytechnic (Kaduna), the hegemony of the Muslims in the northern region increased with the effect of marginalizing the influence of the substantial Christian minority at the different levels of society. b. Discrimination As northern Muslims felt their identity endangered in a secular state as we explained earlier, enhanced application of Sharia (towards application of civil and penal codes) and Sharia courts at all levels 155 (towards establishment of federal and state Sharia courts of appeal) was likely to be of great help. Therefore Sharia was brought into the Constitution debates of 1976 – 1977 prior to the 2 nd Republic in which it met great opposition from representatives of the Middle Belt and the mainly Christian southern region who were afraid of northern hegemony. Finally Sharia was not accepted into the new constitution and Muslims somehow lost this opportunity. A second effort to strengthen Muslim identity was the 1986 Babangida administration’s secret application for membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Nigeria had observer status in the 1970s and Babangida sought to redefine the secular character of the state. It sent shockwaves through the Christian community

150 Cf. p. 67 of Kukah, op cit. 151 Cf. p. 71, ibid. 152 Cf. p. 97 and 100, ibid. 153 Cf. for picture: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/24/africa-media-who-gets-right 154 Cf. article ‘Arewa's NNDC, Northern Governors & Accountability, by Bashir Ibrahim Hassan ( [email protected] ) in Gaijmi.com articles; see link: http://www.gamji.com/article6000/NEWS7925.htm 155 At this stage however they were only agitating for a civil Islamic court at the federal level.

70 that felt OIC membership as a threat to its position and ruined the 1989 constitutional debate on the Sharia issue. This put great pressure on the secular character of Nigeria. After the Bangangida and Abachi era return to civil rule southern Christian Obasanjo came to win general elections in 1999. The northern Muslim political and religious elite however reacted with distress for their interests were at stake. The local Muslim population felt discouraged and in reaction between 2000 and 2001 12 northern states decided to apply enhanced Sharia 156 . This created a lot of fear among the Christian population and led to fierce protests against the fuller implementation of Sharia. The Muslim population reacted to this and violence resulted throughout the whole northern region. The Kaduna February 2000 Sharia riots were the worst with an estimated 2,000 deaths157 . Although harsh Sharia penalties (amputation, flogging, execution) were suppressed after worldwide protests, implementation of fuller Sharia confirmed the 2 nd class position of the Church and the substantial Christian minority in the northern region by discriminating against them in the domains of for example marriage, business, employment, education, housing, healthcare, political representation and justice. c. Targeted violence Galadima and Turaki argue 158 that Nigerian governments (colonial and independent) have a pro-Islamic bias and a tendency to protect it. Throughout the years Islamic power and dominance have grown particularly in the northern region and made Islam the gateway to northern political fortunes and the determining factor in defining who a ‘true’ northerner is. This tendency and bias led to the first military coups (1966) and subsequent civil war (Biafra 1976 – 1970) in which southern Igbo Christians fought against northern Muslim domination. It also created opportunities for the frequent religious riots in the northern states (since the 1980s) in which Christians were targeted. Jan Boer describes 15 religious riots that were all originated by Muslims, although Christians sometimes started riots later 159 . The most prominent are: • the Kano riots in 1982 (St George's Anglican Church was too close to neighboring mosque), in 1991 (the Reinhardt Bonnke ‘crusade’ provoked Muslim anger) and in 1995 (beheading of Gideon Akulaka for supposed profanation of the Koran); • the Kafanchan, Kaduna riots in 1987 (MBB pastor sparked tensions by quoting from the Koran) and the Zangon-Kataf, Kaduna riots in 1992 (relocation of Hausa dominated market in Christian quarter); • the Katsina riot in 1991 (Muslims defying Christian governor over secular character of state); • the Kaduna city riots in 2000 (Sharia crisis); • the Bauchi riots in Tafawa Balewa in 1991, 1994, 2000 and beyond (Christian Sawaya indigenes against Hausa-Fulani settlers over the latter’s drive for political dominance); • the Yobe/Borno riots in Potiskum in 1994 (radical Muslim preacher appealed for fighting for the cause of Islam and in Maiduguri in 1998 (Muslim protest against authorization of Christian Religious Knowledge teaching at public schools); and • the Plateau riots in Jos city and Plateau State in 1994, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2012 (Christian BAA indigenes 160 against Hausa-Fulani settlers over the latter’s drive for political dominance).

156 In popular words this was called the ‘implementation’ of ‘full’ Sharia. In reality Sharia that had been applied in the Far North for longtimes, was now more applied and this not only in civil matters but also in criminal matters. The extent of application however was different in the 12 shari states. This so-called implementation of enhanced Sharia. was done by the 12 northern state governors in making laws and institutions conform more with Islam on the basis of their claimed constitutional right to make laws on criminal matters and to freely practice their religion. Cf. pp. 575- 576 in Ostien (2010) op cit. 157 Ibid, p. 577. 158 Cf. pp.192-195 in Galadima and Turaki, op cit; ; cf. http://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/ajet/20-2_177.pdf . 159 Cf. Chapter 2 in ‘Nigeria’s Decades of Blood, 1980–2002’, by Jan Boer; Essence Publishing, Belleville, Ontario, Canada, 2003. 160 The Berom, Anaguta and Afizere indigenous Plateau tribes.

d. Marginalization, discrimination and violence towards Christians through politics Moreover Kukah 161 describes how religion is used to political ends and how Christians in this process are sidelined, used and at times become victims. In the 2 nd Republic and subsequent military regime (1979–1985) religion was already used to support politics, but the 1980 – 1985 Maitatsine riots in Kano, Maiduguri, Jimeta and Gombe showed the strength of religion. As a result, under the military regimes of Babangida and Abacha (1985 – 1998) religion became an even more political instrument as democracy was annulled. In this period Muslims voiced their hopes and frustration towards the government through the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) and the Council of Imams. Christians acted towards the same ends through the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). After 1999 under civil rule however it became obvious that within the two party system in Nigeria appeal to religious affiliation rallied major support. Religious identities became critical in elections. So when southern Christian President Obasanjo served his two constitutional terms (1999 – 2007), northern Muslims thought their turn had come. But due to northern Muslim Yar’Adua’s premature death as president in 2010, southern Christian Goodluck Jonathan (Vice- President) acceded to power as interim president and was elected in the 2011 presidential elections. A sign of the Northern elite’s unhappiness was the 2011 post-electoral crisis that resulted in many Goodluck voters being killed. These were mainly Christians seen as Goodluck voters, but also some Muslims belonging to the opposition party 162 . Another sign has been the Boko Haram uprising that many suspect to be supported by northern politicians in order to incapacitate the Goodluck regime 163 , and the sudden increase in Muslim Fulani herdsmen attacks in Middle Belt states approaching the 2015 elections 164 . The formation of the new All Progressive Congress party with northern Muslim Muhammadu Buhari as contester of the Peoples’ Democratic Party Goodluck Jonathan 165 in the 2015 presidential elections has been a successful effort in turning the picture in favor of northern dominance with Buhari’s election in March 2015 166 . 6.2. Radical Islamic groups From 1966 – 1979 and from 1983 – 1999 Nigeria was under military rule and as democracy was suppressed, religion during that time became the platform for social and political ideas and an outlet for frustration and protest 167 . Radical Islamic groups benefitted from this setting as they emerged in the 1980s in Northern Nigeria. These were created by returning Nigerian scholars and students from Arab countries influenced by Wahhabi and Salafist teaching who benefitted from the - at that time - successful Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran (1979). These radical groups presented an alternative society based upon Islamic prescripts. For according to them poverty, unemployment, corruption and the failing Nigerian nation state were due to the Western and secular concepts it was built upon. The ideal of a pure form of Islam in which Sharia was applied to society to create justice and equal opportunities for all especially appealed to the imagination of those – university students and unemployed youth – that did not belong to the favored class of the Northern elite. Furthermore, when charismatic leaders like the Abubakar Gumi (Yan Izala), Ibrahim Sulaiman (Muslim Student Society), Ibrahim al-Zakzaky (Islamic Movement) 168 or at a more popular level al-Hadji Muhammed Marwa (Maitatsine 169 ) and Muhammad Yusuf – later Abubakar Shekau – (Boko Haram 170 ) emerged, their followings grew rapidly. When finally in 1999 democracy came, it brought southern Christian President Obasanjo to power much to the displeasure of the Northern Muslim elite and radical Islamic groups. As a reaction to his election and for practical reasons in order to obtain Muslim domination in the northern region and substantial influence over the country as a whole, the Northern elite and the radical Islamic groups started working together. This cooperation at times however was mere manipulation of radical Islamic groups by the Northern elite to influence politics in their favor. For both groups had a common cause but differed in opinion about the desired outcome. The Northern elite wanted to retain

161 Cf. Kukah, op cit. Northern Nigeria 162 In the debate about the 2011 post-electoral crisis having been political or religious, NW refers to other analysts suggesting ‘… it had more to do with frustration of the Muslim North against the Christian South …” Cf. p. 19 in Nigeria Watch Third report on Violence (2006–2011), June 2011. 163 See the notion of ‘contract’ with northern politicians about the kidnapping of the Chibok girls to discredit the Jonathan administration in article ‘The man who talks to Boko Haram’, by World Watch Monitor, 26 March 20115; see link: https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2015/03/3786031 164 Cf. p. 16 in Adamu and Ben, op cit, https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/research/3777637 165 An important different perspective however is presented by Leena Koni Hoffman as she says: “Dismissing the problems of the north as self- inflicted or using the argument of the north’s long stay in power is unhelpful and taps into inaccurate perceptions of the region that can only reopen old wounds. The north as a region never controlled political power in Nigeria: rather, power has been controlled by the nation’s military, which happened to be dominated by northerners. This distinction is important because notions of a northern stranglehold on power since independence impact strongly upon current debates about political instability and economic decline in the north.” Cf. p. 19 of Hoffman, op cit. 166 Cf. Appendix 13. Prominent figures of the Northern elite. 167 Cf. Kukah, op cit, p. 184. 168 Cf. article ‘Die radikale islamische Opposition in Nordnigeria’, by Roman Loimeier, Africa Spectrum 32, 1997, 1:5–23. 169 Cf. article ‘The Maitatsine Riots in Kano, 1980: an assessment by Mervyn Hiskett’, Journal of Religion in Africa, XVII, 1978, 3. 170 Cf. ‘Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency’, Crisis Group Africa Report No.216, 3 April 2014; see link: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf

72 its leading position in society to protect class interests, while the radical Islamic groups wanted to change society to create justice and opportunities for all. The objectives of radical Islamic groups to purify the once Islamic lands 171 and the clashes and opacity behind the scenes between elite and radical groups created very often a backlash towards the Christian community in Northern Nigeria. Here are two examples to demonstrate this are: Abubakar Gumi and the Yan Izala (1) 172 The Yan Izala is a Wahhabi reform movement whose objective is to fight evil in society and establish pure Islam. Amidst Muslim political fragmentation and the influence of Christian pressure groups in northern society (e.g. the 1976 failure to establish a federal Sharia court rooted in the Constitution), Abubakar Gumi created the Kaduna based Yan Izala in 1978 as a political platform and action group to unite Muslims in order

Praying Yan Izala 173 to regain predominance in northern society. Initially he had the support of the Northern elite and attracted a lot of young Muslims. But his personal ambition to become the Grand Mufti and his opposition to the Tidjaniyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods in order to purify Islam led to a period of great inter-Muslim clashes. He finally had to give in and reconcile because the Muslim cause was greatly hindered by this division, because the Middle Belt, regarded as the domain of conservative Muslims, fell to Christian candidates in the 1987 local government elections 174 . Muhammad Yusuf, Abubakar Shekau and Boko Haram (2) 175 Muhammad Yusuf founded the Boko Haram sect in the early 2000s in Northeastern Nigeria. He advocated a pure form of Islam in the Yan Izala tradition 176 . To advance its cause he began cooperating with local politicians, but was frustrated by unfulfilled promises once elections were won. Things climaxed in 2009 when Boko Haram started an armed insurgency. But Muhammad Yusuf was arrested by the military and extra-judicially executed. Abubakar Shekau took over the Boko Haram leadership 177 . Being far more radical and violent, he drastically changed the nature of the sect. Under his leadership and especially since 2010 not only security forces and government officials, critical Muslim clerics, traditional leaders and suspected collaborators were targeted, but also Christians. Pushed back by the Nigerian army and security forces Boko Haram since then retreated into its homeland in the forests of the Northeast. Supported by (inter)national donors, which becomes apparent when seeing the number of sophisticated weapons, armored cars and pickup trucks, it started a full blown insurgency killing many and forcing many others to flee. In August 2014 the sect declared a Caliphate in Northeast Nigeria much like the one of ISIL in Syria and Iraq 178 .

171 Cf. pp. 214–218 in article ‘Body Count and Religion in the Boko Haram Crisis: Evidence from the Nigeria Watch Database’, by Gérard Chouin, Manuel Reinert and Elodie Apard, 2014. See link: https://www.academia.edu/4245284/2014_- _Religion_and_bodycount_in_the_Boko_Haram_crisis_evidence_from_the_Nigeria_Watch_database 172 Cf. article ‘Islamic Reform and Political Change; The Example of Abubakar Gumi and the Yan Izala Movement in Northern Nigeria’, by Roman Loimeijer, in ‘African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists’, edited by Eva Evers Rosander and David Westerlund, Hurst and Company, London, 1997. 173 See for picture: http://www.voahausa.com/content/kungiyar-izala-ta-kai-tallafi-gidan-kason-yola/1710883.html 174 Cf. p. 304, ibid. . 175 Cf. pp. 11–13 in ‘Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II)’, 3 April 2014. 176 Cf. Chouin, Reinert and Apard, op cit, idem. 177 There are doubts that he is still alive and the leader of Boko Haram. YouTube Videos are purportedly showing a look-alike. 178 Article ‘Boko Haram: How the new ‘Caliphate’ emerged’, in Daily Turst magazine, 3 November 2015; see link: http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/weekly/index.php/top-stories/17517-how-boko-haram-s-islamic-caliphate-compromises-nigeria-s-sovereignty

According to important sources Boko Haram has become a political tool for destabilizing the northern region and the former Nigerian administration of Goodluck Jonathan, with the ultimate aim of forcing a change in government, notably in the March 2015 presidential elections 179 . The apparent ineffectiveness of Goodluck Jonathan in dealing with Boko Haram was an important reason for his defeat in these elections and Muhammad Buhari took his place in May 2015. 6.3. The Fulani herdsmen Through the centuries there has always been antagonism between agriculturalists and pastoralists about limited grazing grounds for herds in Nigeria. In Northern Nigeria the herdsmen are Muslim Fulani who roam around with their cattle in search of pasture and water. The process of ongoing desertification has led them to gradually move more southwards and therefore into increasing conflict with the mainly Christian indigene agriculturalists in the Middle Belt states. The Fulani generally do not respect the boundaries of agriculturalist lands and often clash with non-Muslim local tribes. Many of the members of these local tribes became Christian through missionary enterprise with the effect that in these clashes the Muslim-Christian religious overtones have become paramount. The Fulani herdsmen want to chase away the non-Muslim population, appropriate the lands and Islamize them 180 . The clashes even increased in intensity and frequency approaching the 2015 presidential elections 181 . Politicians are likely complicit in the clashes 182 and some even suspect an obscure cooperation between the Fulani herdsmen and Boko Haram in this regard183 . A case study in Taraba state indicates that the Fulani herdsmen attacks are connected to a missionary agenda to Islamize non-Muslim areas and that local Muslim politicians use these attacks to increase their power over non- Muslim owned land 184 .

179 According to Stephen Davis, former troubleshooter for international oil and mining companies in Nigeria and advisor to two Nigerian presidents, Boko Haram does not speak with one voice but has many factions. In the summer of 2014 he was negotiating with someone about the release of the 200+ Chibok girls. The deal was compromised by early leakages to the media. According to Davis the deal was frustrated by political backers of Boko Haram inside and outside the country who used it for their own political game. He has revealed the names of Boko Haram sponsors in the following articles: - Article ‘Australian Negotiator Reveals Boko Haram Sponsors’, in Naji.com, 2014; see link: https://www.naij.com/283220-australian-negotiator-insists-modu-sheriff-ihejirika-boko-haram-sponsors.html - Article ‘El-Rufai Tags Modu Sheriff, Gen. Ihejirika As Boko Haram Sponsors’ in Naji.com, 2014; see link: https://www.naij.com/282311-el-rufai-tags-modu-sheriff-gen-ihejirika-boko-haram-sponsors.html - Article ‘Australian Negotiator Says CBN Enables Boko Haram Funding’’ in Naji.com, 2014; see link: https://www.naij.com/283043-revelations-cbn-helps-funding-boko-haram-australian-negotiator.html - Article ‘Gen Ihejirika Blames El-Rufai In Boko Haram Support’ in Naji.com, 2014; see link: https://www.naij.com/282341-el-rufai-is-boko-harams-commander-ihejirika.html Although some Nigerian articles question the objectivity and professionalism of Stephen Davis to be a proper negotiator: - Boko Haram Negotiator, Stephen Davis is Fake, Allege Shettima’s Aide, DSS in thisDaylive; see link: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-negotiator-stephen-davis-is-fake-allege-shettima-s-aide-dss/196977/ - BreakingNews 9/9/14 - Sponsorship Of Boko Haram Insurgency: Dr. Stephen Davies Is A Compromised Third Party in Nigeria Master Web; see link: http://nigeriamasterweb.com/Masterweb/breakingnews-9914-sponsorship-boko-haram-insurgency-dr-stephen-davies-compromised-third-party - Nigeria: In Search of Dr Stephen Davis in Daily Trust; see link: http://allafrica.com/stories/201409111048.html These articles however - according to Stephan Davies - are fostered by cirles around the political backers of Boko Haram and ment to discredit him for revealing their identity. 180 Cf. p. 24 in Migration and ViolentConflict in Divided Societies, op cit. 181 Cf. p. 16 in Adamu and Ben (

Fulani herdsmen 185 We give some examples of Fulani herdsmen attacks on Christian communities in the Middle Belt states of southern Kaduna, Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa and Taraba 186 . Clashes between Muslim Fulani herdsmen and the predominantly Christian population of southern Kaduna especially in the Local Government Areas of Kaura, Sanga, Kafanchan, Kachia Jama’a and Kagarko, have been observed since 2011. Incidents with people killed, people injured and houses destroyed are reported and from the observation of witnesses it appears that the Fulani want dominance in order to take land and property, and diminish the Christian presence 187 . The same is true for Benue State, where the local agriculturalist tribes of the Tiv, Agatu and Idoma peoples, who are majority Christian, clash with the Muslim Fulani herdsmen about grazing land. The Local Government Areas concerned are Makurdi, Gwer-West, Gwer-East, Guma, Logo, Katsina-Ala, Kwande, Zaki Biam, Kyado, and Ukum. Incidents are reported and from the observation of witnesses it is clear that these ethnic clashes have serious Muslim- Christian religious undertones. In Taraba State since 2010 the Christian communities in southern Taraba Senatorial District: Wukari and Ibi Local Government Areas, and those bordering them in the Central Senatorial District: Gassol and Bali Local Government Areas have been attacked by Fulani herdsmen. Incidents with people killed, people injured and houses destroyed are reported and the pattern is the same as in other Middle Belt states. Here too Muslim Fulani want to take the land of the local population, but the conflict has clear religious undertones. Because local sources indicate that behind the Wukari and Ibi incidents was a political agenda to influence the 2015 gubernatorial elections. The former Muslim deputy governor, who became the interim governor after the plane accidental of his Christian predecessor, wanted to be elected. The governorship rotates between the northern, central and southern parts of the state. The former governorship was from the central part and the next in line would be from the southern part. And a majority Christian southern part of the state in disarray through persistent violence was to favor his election 188 . This former Muslim deputy governor did not pass the PDP primary elections, but his PDP Christian opponent did and won the 2015 gubernatorial elections. His position however is contested as an elections tribunal annulled his victory due to procedural errors in favor of a Muslim women from the rival APC. Since the Christian governor will appeal to this ruling the battle for power between Christians and Muslims in Taraba state goes on 189 . The Taraba case study supports the religious dimension even more clearly. It indicates that ‘there is a sophisticated and systematic attack on Christians in Taraba state’ by Fulani herdsmen. The case study suggests also that apart from land and cattle grazing issues, the persistent violence of Muslim Fulani herdsmen attacks on Christian communities in Taraba State is also connected ‘to the historical migration of Muslims into non-Muslim territories in Northern Nigeria

185 Cf. for picture: http://pulse.ng/gist/war-mongers-fulani-herdsmen-kill-and-abduct-women-and-children-in-delta-state-id3249099.html 186 Cf. Chapter 3 in Abdulbarkindo Adamu and Alypse Ben, op cit. About 21 similar incidents can be found on p. 15 in International Crisis Group, op cit. And see Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (November 2015); op cit. 187 Cf. the parallel in Taraba state: ‘Whatever the controversies surround the understanding of genocide, the ongoing violent conflict in Taraba state and the atrocities committed by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen demonstrate certain features that might cautiously be considered as genocide. Cf. p. 40 in Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (November 2015); op cit. 188 Cf. Chapter 2.2 Features of the impact of persistent violence; the Wukari case. See also p. 52-55 in Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (November 2015); op cit. 189 MailOnline (2015); op cit.

75 to promote the Islamic religious and missionary agenda in Islamizing all parts of Northern Nigeria’. And finally that Fulani herdsmen attacks are used by the Muslim political and religious elite in the state together with other means to dominate by Christians owned land in Taraba state 190 . In Nasarawa State the Christian farmer communities of the Mighili, Tiv and Eggon tribes in Kokona, Awe, Lafia, Doma and Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Areas are concerned. Incidents with people killed, injured and houses destroyed are reported and from observations it is clear that the clashes are religious as Muslim dominated areas are not attacked while Christian areas are. Muslim Fulani apparently want to dominate society and take land and property from the local Christian farmers 191 . 6.4. The Culture of political violence 192 Human Rights Watch addresses the culture of political violence in Nigeria under three facets: (a) systemic violence by politicians and other political elites that undercuts freedom and security, (b) corruption that characterizes it and (c) impunity for most involved. The essence of this culture of political violence is survival of the political fittest and that the fittest are effectively not under the rule of Nigerian law. These facets are the apparently long-lasting effects of Nigeria’s military rule that have become endemic. Coupled with prevalent bad governance, weak state institutions and a failing electoral system, the democratic competition for political power shifted to the streets where gangs and thugs recruited by politicians helped secure victory over adversaries. Next to this street fighting, attacks on political party headquarters or homes of politicians, intimidation of voters and rigging of the outcome of the ballot box took place. In many cases powerful godfathers took control of politicians who needed their financial support and support of gangs they controlled for the political battle. As a consequence godfathers got access to government funds and institutions as a kind of prize in return. Formal investigation and prosecution of these practices are in vain as governing politicians protect them and prevent any real positive effect. An example is the use of ‘Kalare Boys’ in Gombe State 193 . Foreign mercenary jihadists Presently within this framework we hear reports about the influx of (poor) Muslim nationals from neighboring states who are recruited for jihad purposes by politicians and radical Islamic groups. Local politicians, Boko Haram and other radical Islamic groups are recruiting (child) soldiers from neighboring countries like Niger, Chad and Cameroon. These soldiers come from the group of young unemployed Muslim youth who are chanceless in their own countries 194 . Sometimes even well trained Muslim fighters from these countries join their brothers in jihad 195 . Moreover as there is no salary to be paid they receive booty in terms of women, property and land. For example the Muslims that support the Fulani herdsmen in Wukari and Ibi LGAs have taken over the farmland of the original Christian population 196 . Another example is the kidnapping of the mainly Christian Chibok girls in order to marry them off to Muslim men 197 . Little or no research has been done in this area, but according to observations mainly Christian farmers and families are concerned. 6.5. Conclusion The actors of persistent violence impacting the Church in Northern Nigeria are: the northern Muslim political and religious elite, radical Islamic groups and Fulani herdsmen, acting within the framework of a Culture of political violence. Drivers of violence can be summarized as follows: 1. Protection of Northern endangered interests (political-economic) Groups and individuals compete for access to or protect the access they have to power, resources and being accepted as stakeholders by the government (e.g. oil money), notably the northern Muslim political and religious elite and the Fulani herdsmen. This competition is within the framework of a culture of political violence (corruption

190 Cf. p. 58 in Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (November 2015); op cit. 191 ‘Finally, the ongoing policy consultations by the state governments in Kaduna, Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa states to allocate lands and ‘classify’ them as grazing fields, means that vast swathes of land will be taken away from indigenous Christian communities and made into grazing fields for Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen’’. See p. 29 in ‘Migration and Violent-Conflict in Divided Societies’, op cit. 192 Cf. 1-5 in ‘Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria’, by Human Rights Watch, Volume 19, No. 16 (A), October 2007. 193 Cf. Ibid, p. 91. 194 Cf. article ‘Niger hit by Nigeria's Boko Haram fallout’, by Thomas Fessy in BBC News, 22 April, 2014; see link: http://www.bbc.com/news/world- africa-27111884 195 See: movie ‘ Foreign fighters joining Nigerian jihad: Islamist terror group Boko Haram recruiting internationally’, in YouTube 27 October 2013; see link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3Byp1ce8Jo 196 Cf. p. 25 in Adamu and Ben, op cit. . 197 See article 'The Chibok girls are never being freed,' says Boko Haram leader, by Harriet Alexander, in the Telegraph.co.uk, 1 November 2014; see link: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11203099/The-Chibok-girls-are-never-being-freed-says-Boko- Haram-leader.html

76 and impunity) that is inherited from the long period of military rule Nigeria as a country has experienced. In it the north-south divide is geographically (northern region roughly 80% versus southern region 20%198 ), demographically (northern region 53.5% versus southern region 46.4%199 ), and politically (Muslim north with help of southwestern Muslims 45.9% of the population versus Christian south with the help of Middle Belt and Far North Christians 46.11% of the population 200 ) important, especially with regards to elections and consequently access to power and resources. 2. Protection of Muslims’ endangered identity (social-cultural) Nigeria inherited the concept of the secular state through colonialism by the West. Northern Nigerian Muslims adhere more to the concept of the Islamic state which they adopted through Islam from the Arab world and practiced for about a century in the region. The identity of northern Muslims is very much attached to an Islamic society, and this is challenged by Westernization of Nigerian society and its concept of the modern state. Moreover the fragility of the Nigerian state through violence, corruption, and impunity is, according to many Muslims, caused by the vices of Western civilization. Northern Muslims long for a re-Islamization of their society and many radical Islamic groups offer ways to attain that objective. There is one minor factor that contributes to this endangered identity which comes from the southern region. Northern Muslims felt superior and supreme in their region until in the aftermath of colonialism in the 1950s - 1960s better trained southern Christians, through employment in education, public service and commerce, migrated to the northern region. Moreover the first military coup Nigeria experienced in 1966 was by southern Igbos and this was very much felt as southern Christian aggression. 3. Protection of Islam’s endangered ‘legitimate’ position (religious) Islam is by virtue of divine revelation in the Koran (Q 3, 110) believed to be by Muslims the best religion on earth. This was demonstrated by Muslims in the Middle East in their conquest of the then known world (7 th – 14 th century) and subsequently in the at-that-time according to their knowledge unmatched Islamic civilization (15 th – 18th century). Northern Muslims in Nigeria viewed it in the same way with the peak during the Sokoto Caliphate and Islam’s favored position in the northern region. But the phenomenal growth of the Christian Church in the Middle Belt and the inroads it made in the Muslim Far North shocked Muslims to the extent that they felt their religion to be endangered. Their youngsters, their women and all the non-learned men needed to be protected from diversion from the right path and prevented from apostasy. Sufi brotherhoods (e.g. Tijaniyya) and radical groups (e.g. Yan Izala, Ahl as-Sunna, Muslim Student Society) revitalized Islam – in the wake of the resurgence of Islam in the Muslim world – in the Nigerian context, attracted many followers and started a process of re-discipling of the common people. Therefore competition at the level of dawah/evangelization with charismatic groups in Christianity is great.

198 Cf. The figure of the FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nation) for the former Northern Region is 79% of the surface of the country; in FAO article ‘Nigeria’ (no date), by Eroarome Martin Aregheore; see link: http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpc/doc/counprof/nigeria/nigeria.htm 199 The same FAO Nigeria article gives 53% for the former northern region, 25% in the former western region and 21% in the former Eastern region. Cf. FAO article ‘Nigeria’ (no date) op cit. And the Nigerian census of 2006 gives 53.6% for the former northern region. Cf. Nigerian Population Commission, HQ Abuja: http://www.population.gov.ng/ 2006 Census. 200 The World Christian Data Base (WCD) figures for 2010 are: Population 159.708.000, Christians 73.632.000 (46.1%), Muslims 73.275.000 (45.9%), African traditional religionists 12.251.000 (7.8%). The WCD figures for 2010 are: Population 159.708.000, Christians 183.523.000 (46.1%), Muslims 84.474.000 (46%), African traditional religionists 13.805.000 (7.8%). Cf. http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd

Chapter 7. The Church in Northern Nigeria This chapter gives a brief history of the Church in Northern Nigeria, its extensive numerical growth, its large diffusion over the Middle Belt and the inroads it created into the Far North 201 where large numbers of Muslims live. At the same time it shows that the existence of the Church is under threat by the impact of persistent violence. The history of the Church in Northern Nigeria can be divided into three periods: the colonial period from 1857 – 1954 (1), the period of independent churches from 1954 – 1987 (2) the period of religious violence from 1987 – present (3). At the end we draw conclusions (4).

7.1. The Colonial period (1857 – 1954) With the advent of colonial administration in Northern Nigeria the British applied the policy of indirect rule. As the British much valued the emirate structure of the Caliphate, this ‘extant’ structure was formalized as the emirs presented it to them 202 . As a consequence the northern region became divided into Muslim and Pagan emirates. The Pagan emirates were in the majority non-Muslim, but the Muslim emirates, although largely Muslim, contained important numbers of non-Muslims. Map 7 shows the large numbers of pagans notably in the Muslim emirates and the potential growth for Christianity and Islam in Northern Nigeria. The Muslim emirates however were a barrier to the spread of the Gospel and Christian missions started in the Pagan emirates. First mission The Anglican Bishop Crowther of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in 1857 established the first Christian missionary station in present day Northern Nigeria in Lokoja, capital of present day Kogi State 203 . Crowther was of African descent and his approach to the local people was one of a gradual process of leaving traditional religion and acceptance of the Christian faith. CMS missionaries who arrived later however opted for a more radical rupture. The work was in the hands of Western missionaries and efforts of African Christians (e.g. in Sierra Leone, Southern Nigeria) to bring the Gospel to their fellow Africans had been discouraged by them. The results were few. In 1882 the number of Christians in the Lokoja CMS mission and surrounding villages was 220, with 50 communicants 204 . Missionary work in the Far North was blocked for the first 30 years due to the colonial policy of preventing it from entering Muslim dominated areas 205 . The reason was that the colonial government wanted to appease the hierarchy of the Sokoto Caliphate and to win it over for cooperation with Britain. To this end fair and just rule and non- interference with the Muslim religion in Northern Nigeria was promised 206 . As a consequence all inhabitants of Muslim emirates were considered Muslims. Initially some emirs welcomed missionaries for

201 Far North area where Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri tribes reside which are pre-dominantly Muslim. 202 ‘Usually the emirs succeeded in giving the impression that they had effective control over larger areas than they actually had’, p. 52 in Crampton, op cit. 203 Cf. p. 93 in Galadima and Turaki, “Christianity in Nigeria Part I”, op cit. 204 Cf. p. 22 and p. 29, Crampton op cit. 205 Until the early 1930s when the ban was lifted. Cf. p. 88 in Galadima and Turaki, ibid; cf. http://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/ajet/20-1_085.pdf . 206 British Governor of Northern Nigeria, Lord Lugard, in his speech at the installation of the new Sultan of Sokoto in 1903; cf. p. 358 in Gaiya, op cit, and p. 47 in Crampton, ibid.

Map 7. Muslim and Pagan emirates in Northern Nigeria in 1936 207

political reasons and so Dr. Miller from the CMS mission started a school in Zaria town, present day Kaduna State. But soon the emir forced the CMS mission to relocate to Wusasa, outside Zaria town. Miller used the Gospels in Hausa language in reading and writing lessons, but the emir was afraid students would convert to the Christian faith. The exclusion of mission from the Muslim emirates was also a blessing in disguise as the missionary resources that were limited could be well spent in this initial phase to the Pagan emirates in Northern Nigeria 208 . Around 1900 Faith Missions209 arrived: the Sudan Interior Mission (1894), the Sudan United Mission (1904), the United Missionary Society (1905) and the Seventh Day Adventist Mission (1905). The work grew slowly with centers, for example in Nupe land (SIM – present day Niger State), Hausa land (CMS in Wusasa – present day Kaduna State) and Tiv land (SUM – present day Benue State). The Catholics started work in the Western part and in present day Benue State. African Independent Churches arrived from the southern region in the 1930s and 1940s; some examples are the Aladura churches and the Synagogue of All Nations of ‘prophet’ Joshua Balogun. These churches are sometimes syncretistic and have few adherents among the people of the northern region because they are seen as ethnic churches from the southern region. In spite of the small results Christianity grew: churches were founded, Christian families established, Christians grew in maturity of faith and Christian communities were founded. Table 13 gives an impression of the number of Christians at the end of this period.

207 Cf. p. 65, ibid. 208 Cf. p. 51, Crampton, op cit. 209 Faith Missions are missionary organizations that encourage its missionaries to "trust in God to provide the necessary resources". These missionaries financially are said to "live by faith" and are supported by a group of individual donors that finance their work through regular gifts. Faith missions are initiated by interdenominational groups of Christians and eventually found local churches that have no counterpart in the West. Church missions function within the ecclesial context of church hierarchy; their missionaries are paid through regular salaries. Church Missions eventually found denominational daughter churches with which they keep (financial) relations over long periods.

Table 13. Growth of Christianity in Northern Nigeria (1857 – 2014)210

35000000 30665168 30000000

25000000

20000000

15000000

10000000 2880112 5000000 454561 0 0 1857 1952 1963 2014

7.2. The period of Independent Churches (from 1954 – 1987) Before Nigerian independence in 1960 the missions started to indigenize the work. Nationals were taking over and independent churches emerged, for example the Evangelical Church Winning All (ECWA – from Sudan Interior Mission), the Nongu u Kristu u i Ser u sha Tar or Universal Reformed Christian Church (NKST – from Christian Reformed Mission), the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN – from Sudan United Mission). Some Protestant churches however could not hold on to unity and split due to leadership and tribal issues. The Church in general however grew tremendously due to emphasis on education, medical work, literacy work, the establishing of mission stations and churches, indigenization (native evangelists) and African national leadership 211 . Growth was especially seen in Hausa land (Far North), where ECWA, Anglican, Baptist, COCIN, Reformed and Catholic churches started to work. 212 Independent Evangelical missions arrived and added to the work of the churches, for example Calvary Ministries (CAPRO), the Great Commission Movement of Nigeria (GCM) and Harvesters for Christ. Theological schools were established, for example ECWA Theological College in Jos, Plateau State; the Theological College of Northern Nigeria in Bukuru, Plateau State; and Veenstra Theological College in Donga, Taraba State. The Bible was translated into local languages, for example Hausa, Tiv and Berom. In the 1950s prior to independence (1960) Christian missions advocated for human rights and in particular for freedom of religion for the Christian minority in the northern region. They were concerned about the consequences of Muslim dominance at state and local government level over the Church after independence. But this Muslim dominance affected the Church after independence indeed as Christians experienced growing marginalization and discrimination under northern state governments. And as a consequence in 1967 the Northern Christian Association was formed in order to deal with these issues. . In 1973 all missionary schools (except Bible schools and theological colleges) were taken over by the government. Although the act was not primarily anti-Christian but anti-colonial, the backlash for Christian education in Northern Nigeria was big. The now former mission schools were de-Christianized by name change, change in personnel, removal of teaching in Christian Religious Knowledge (CRK) and the general erosion of moral standards that developed. With growing Muslim dominance in the whole of Nigeria the Christian Association of Nigeria was formed in 1973 to advocate for Christian human and religious rights in the context of a multi-religious society. The Pentecostal and Charismatic churches, like the Assemblies of God, the Deeper Life Bible Church and the Redeemed Christian Church of God, appeared only in the 1960s and 1970s in the northern region. They are the fastest growing churches worldwide and also in Northern Nigeria.

210 Cf. Appendix 14. Overview of Christians, Muslims and ATR in northern states. 211 Cf. Crampton, op cit, p. 209. And see also p. 96 in Galadima and Turaki, op cit, idem. 212 Cf. pp. 12-14 in “Christianity in Northern Nigeria, 1975-2000” , by Musa A.B. Gaiya, in Exchange, Volume 33, Issue 4, 2004. Cf. Crampton, ibid, p. 209. And also see p. 96 in Galadima and Turaki, ibid. ibid, idem.

The Church denominations in Northern Nigeria grew spectacularly, first of all among southern migrants, then among the non-Hausa-Fulani in the Middle Belt, and finally made inroads among Muslims in the Far North 213 . Table 13 provides the numbers of Christians at the end of this period. 7.3. The period of religious violence (from 1987 – present) The March 6 1987 the Kafanchan, Kaduna State crisis was the turning point in relations between Muslims and Christians in Northern Nigeria 214 . Until that date Muslims and Christians had lived in ‘relative’ peace and harmony together. There were some religious crises but the effects on the Christian communities were limited. Kafanchan The Christian students of the Kafanchan College of Education held a rather high profile end to its Christian activities week with a ‘Welcome to the Jesus Campus’ banner. A Muslim Background Believer (MBB) guest pastor made reference to the Koran for some necessary illustration. This sparked fierce reaction among Muslim students against their fellow Christian students at the same campus. The next day there were consequences among the local population in Kafachan town and its surrounding villages, where violence erupted. 12 people were killed and 2 churches, 4 mosques and 29 private houses were destroyed. In the following days however large-scale riots broke out in Zaria (Ahmadu Bello University), Kaduna and other cities in northern states. On March 12, 1987 a state of emergency was imposed on Kaduna State and the army took control. Reports state that in six days of violence a total of 19 individuals were killed, 169 hotels, 152 churches, 152 houses and 5 mosques were destroyed 215 . The direct cause at the College of Education was the irritation of radical Muslim students at the visibility and influence of evangelical/charismatic Christian students on the campus. Muslim students felt their religion endangered through the impact of the Christian presence in the College. At Kafanchan town level Christians felt dominated by Hausa-Fulani Muslims who controlled the Jema’a local government area they lived in as well as the wider Kaduna State. The discrimination and marginalization of non- Muslims in business, education and access to jobs had its impact as well and to their great frustration they were significantly left behind. At northern region level Muslims felt their identity, interests and the position of Islam endangered in a secular Nigeria as we explained before (see Chapter 4). Notably during colonial times southern Christians benefitted from Westernization in the form of education, literacy and access to jobs. At independence northern Muslims were far behind in these respects and feared marginalization in the Nigerian Republic through southern Christian domination and migration of many to the northern region. Growing Christianity in the Middle Belt and its inroads into the Far North was felt by Muslims as an even bigger threat. Although Muslims began dominating northern states at independence, the Kafanchan incident was a catalyst for Muslims’ deep and long-felt frustrations 216 .

213 Cf. Gaiya, op cit, pp.15-24. 214 Cf. Chapter 6 of Kukah, op cit. 215 Cf. Different figures are given for the same incidents e.g. 158 churches were burned and over 100 people died on pp. 6-7 in paper ‘Religious Riots in Nigeria’, by Jarlath Walsh, Center for the Study of Islam and Christian – Muslim Relations (CSIC Papers), Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, May 1993. 216 Cf. Kukah, op cit, p. 186 and Gaiya, op cit, p. 29.

Table 14. Christian and Muslim presence in northern states in 2014 217

12.000.000

10.000.000

8.000.000

6.000.000

4.000.000

2.000.000

Christians Blue Muslims Green

Christian and Muslim interests To counteract Christian influence in the northern region and in the country as a whole, Muslims developed a policy of ‘northernization’ in the 1960s in which all major positions were kept in Muslim hands and through them Muslim interests, identity and religion were safeguarded in the region. The impact of this policy was greatly felt among Christians in the Middle Belt area for in most northern states Muslims were in control, giving little space for Christians or their churches to prosper 218 . This ‘policy of northernization’ led to growing fears among southern Christians as well for they feared domination by a suspected ‘demographic Muslim majority’ in the country. See Table 14 for the presence of Christians and Muslims in northern states. The Sharia debate in 1978 about the establishment of a federal Sharia court of appeal and the in 1986 application of Nigeria for membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference played an important role in the above- mentioned fear of Christians. The growth in the northern region of radical Muslim groups through links with the Muslim world (i.e. the Salafi and Wahhabi inspired Maitatsine and Izala movements) after the 1980s and the rapid increase of Pentecostal and Evangelical churches in the same period fueled suspicion on both sides. In the Middle Belt the memory of the Sokoto Caliphate, with its enslavement of non-Muslims, was still very much alive and seen in the still present political dominance of Muslim Hausa-Fulani emirs over non-Muslims, mainly Christians. Thus a little provocation could as it were spark a fire. After the Kafanchan crisis others erupted (see Chapter 7.3.).

217 Cf. Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix 4: Estimation of Christian and Muslim populations per northern state in 2014. 218 Cf. pp. 87-88 in article ‘The Role of Religion in National life: Reflections on Recent Experiences in Nigeria’, by Ibrahim Gambari, in ‘Religion and National Integration in Africa’, editor John O. Hunwick, Northwestern University Press, Illinois, 1992.

Conflict and clashes Between 2000 and 2001 enhanced Sharia was introduced in twelve Northern states 219 . Although Sharia had been institutionalized in present day Northern Nigeria since the Fulani jihad, the British colonial administration had subordinated it to its laws. This had been to the effect that the civil parts of Sharia were applied, but the penal and most cruel parts prohibited 220 . But Muslims longed for more application of the Sharia as according to their understanding Sharia brings forth the ideal Islamic society and would liberate them from the vices of Western civilization: for example corruption, bad governance, alcohol, prostitution, unemployment and other vices. Therefore when southern Christian Obasanjo was chosen as President in 1999 northern Muslim governors used this longing to implement enhanced Sharia in their states to strengthen northern interests, Muslims’ identity and Islam. Christians however protested fiercely against it, especially through the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). CAN declared that a state in Nigeria promoting any religion violates Article 10 of the Constitution prohibiting the federal government and any state from adopting a state religion 221 . The protests were without effect and as a consequence many Christians left the Sharia states for experiences with Sharia before and after enhanced application had shown that it affected the Christian minorities through marginalization and discrimination, for example court disputes (land and divorce), job opportunities and access to education. Many southern Christians fled to their state of origin, others relocated to non-Sharia states (e.g. Plateau), but most indigene Christians decided to stay 222 . Frictions concerning Sharia grew especially tense in Kaduna State where many indigene Christians in the southern part lived under Muslim political domination. In February 2000 over some weeks large for and against Sharia demonstrations were held. During a contra-Sharia demonstration by 50,000 Christians a southern Christian was attacked and in reaction two Muslims were killed. Subsequently killings started between these factions and in the end about 2,000 were killed. Parts of the city were practically in ruin. In May of the same year another crisis erupted with the same devastating effects. In total an estimated 200 churches, 105 mosques and about 9,000 houses were destroyed. Property worth millions of naira was looted and burnt, and the deep mistrust between the communities led to the segregation of Muslims and Christians in respectively the northern and southern parts of the city 223 . Radical Islamic groups emerged as well. The most important was the Boko Haram sect, which was created in 2002, and its offspring Ansuru, since 2012. Boko Haram advocates a pure version of Islam opposed to Westernization imported through colonization and responsible, as they see it, for corruption, poverty and a fragile state. It advocates for an Islamic state with application of full Sharia to foster justice, equality and prosperity according to Islamic conceptions, for all. Boko Haram radicalized in 2009 more rapidly under new leadership after the extra-judicial killing of its founder. Members of Boko Haram indiscriminately targeted representatives of the Westernized system: Nigerian government officials and security officers, traditional and secular Muslim leaders, as well as churches and individual Christians. The Boko Haram insurgency reached its peak of power and influence in 2014 with the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the northeastern provinces. Thousands were abused, driven away, or killed 224 . Another development has been the intensification since 2011 of herdsmen and farmers’ conflicts in Central Nigeria in which Muslim Fulani herdsmen attack non-Muslim mainly Christian farmers for land and cattle related reasons. The religious connotations are clear as the link with the historic slave raids on non-Muslims and conquest of land for Islam during the Sokoto Caliphate are obvious 225 . This is also clear with the link to the historical migration of Muslims into non-Muslim territories in Northern Nigeria to promote the Islamic religious and missionary agenda in Islamizing all parts of northern Nigeria 226 . Is there a link with Boko Haram, many people ask 227 ? Of course there have been efforts of dialogue and peacebuilding between Muslims and Christians. We think of the Nigerian Interreligious Council (NIREC in 1999) with the Sultan of Sokoto and the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria as chairmen. In addition, worth mentioning also are the Kaduna Interfaith Media Center, the Kaduna Peace Committee and the Kaduna Peace Declaration in 2002. These efforts however have had little impact on average Christian and Muslim communities as the roots of the crisis were left untouched 228 .

219 Article ‘On the introduction of the Sharia in Northern Nigeria’, by Stanislaw Pilaszewicz, Africana Bulletin, 2004. 220 Cf. p. 93, ibid: amputating, whipping, stoning, decapitating and crucifying were prohibited or changed to imprisonment. 221 Cf. p. 96, ibid. 222 Cf. p. 100 in Pilaszewicz op cit. See also pp. 63– 79 in Boer, ‘Nigeria’s Decades of Blood 1980 – 2002, Volume ‘I, op cit. 223 Cf. pp. 63-79 in ibid. 224 See Appendix 15. Summary of attacks on Christians in Northern Nigeria, for an overview of targeted violence towards Christians. 225 Prof. Turaki makes a strong point that there is a link between the original trading of slaves from the Middle Belt and the present day intense hatred of the Hausa-Fulanis by the people of the Middle Belt. Cf. Turaki, Yusufu (2010); op cit. 226 As is the reasoning of Adamu and Ben in their case study on Taraba State. Cf. Adamu Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (November 2015); op cit. 227 Cf. Adamu and Ben (March 2014), op cit. 228 For root causes see Chapter 4. Actors of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria.

Church growth Although Muslim-Christian relations deteriorated in this period and violence deeply affected the Church, there was substantial growth in the Church particularly among the Hausa-Fulani in the Far North of Nigeria. Gaiya gives the following figures in 2004 229 : the Association of Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri Christians numbers up to 9.8 million members; the Evangelical Church Winning All (ECWA) has 76 Hausa congregations in Katsina District Church Council alone 230 . The Maguzawa (Hausa) churches in Katsina State have grown to 229. Wusasa, the center of the Anglican mission in North Nigeria, is a diocese with 9 districts and 131 churches in which, between 1999 and 2000, 1,442 child baptisms, 560 adult baptisms, and 626 confirmations were recorded. In the Ikara local government area, Kaduna State, are 8 Anglican parishes, 6 ECWA congregations, 4 Baptist churches, 5 Deeper Life Bible churches and 5 Roman Catholic parishes. In 1993 100,000 Hausa Christians of Kano origin were counted. There are 46 Baptist churches among the Hausa in 1999 in Katsina State. The Roman Catholic Church came to the Far North through Katsina State (Malumfashi), later on Zamfara (Gusau, Funtua) and Kebbi (Yelwa); they established important work among the Maguzawa. Substantial growth in the Middle Belt occurred there as well. In 2015 the Evangelical Church Winning All (ECWA) had over 5,000 congregations, over 5,000,000 attendees and over 3,000,000 members 231 . The Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) had over 2,000,000 members in 2015 232 . The Nongu u Kristu u i Ser u sha Tar (N.K.S.T), the Universal Reformed Christian Church that started among the Tiv people in present day Taraba and Benue states, in 2014 has moved beyond and spread to all states of Nigeria. It has about 1,000,000 followers, over 137,115 baptized and professing members, 572 pastors, 4,143 churches and 360 congregations 233 . The Ekklesiyar Yan'uwa a Nigeria (EYN), the Church of the Brethren in Nigeria, started in 1923 in northeast Nigeria among the local tribes. It is divided into 50 districts and 2,280 congregations with over 700,000 members. It has 356 pastors, 346 assistant pastors and 1,390 evangelists 234 . The Anglican Church has a 2013 estimated membership of 18 million and 161 bishops 235 . Northern region Anglicans are likely to be over 4 million. The Roman Catholic Church presently has an estimated 20,176,000 adherents 236 . Northern region Catholics are likely to be 5,000,000 at least. With regards to the Charismatic and Pentecostal churches, the Assemblies of God are the largest in Nigeria. They presently have over 2.6 million adherents and 14,300 congregations 237 . Their following in the northern region are likely to be over 1,000,000. The Deeper Life Bible Church has a 1988 estimated 800,000 members all over Nigeria 238 . Their following in the northern region is likely to be over 250,000 at least. Nowadays, Gaiya says, in the main northern cities there are Pentecostal and Charismatic congregations in nearly every street. Therefore by virtue of their presence and evangelistic zeal they present a real challenge to Islam 239 . 7.4. Conclusion Christianity has grown in Northern Nigeria from non-existent in 1857 to an estimated > 30 million (31.2%) now (see Tables 13 and 14). This is a minority in a Muslim context, but a sizable one. There are high concentrations of Christians (25-50%) in 7 Northern states. In 6 Northern states Christians are in the majority (>50%). And in 158 out of the 417 Local Government Areas (LGA) Christians are in the majority (> 50%). Christian existence in Northern Nigeria is under threat due to persistent violence, but at the same time the Church is growing through an increasing number of Muslim converts and a rise in the commitment of once nominal Christians making radical choices in faith.

229 Cf. Gaiya, op cit, pp. 359-362. 230 ECWA Katsina District Church Council (DCC) is one of several DCCs in Katsina State. A DCC is a kind of district like in other churches . It is a decision-making body which sends representatives to the General Church Council (GCC), the highest decision-making body of ECWA. 231 Cf. http://www.sim.org.au/nigeria ; (2015). 232 As figures are difficult to assess, we are obliged to consult http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_of_Christ_in_Nigeria (11-01-2015). 233 As figures are difficult to assess, we are obliged to consult http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/N.K.S.T (11-06-2014). 234 Dante Dali, Rev. Dr. Samuel - EYN President (2015); ‘The effect of the Boko Haram on EYN Church of the Brethren in Nigeria’, text in Open Doors possession by courtesy of prof. D. McCain, Jos Nigeria. 235 As figures are difficult to assess, we are obliged to consult http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_of_Nigeria . 236 Cf. http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries ; the PEW percentage for Nigeria applied to UN 2010 medium fertility figures for 2015. 237 Cf. http://worldagfellowship.org/fellowship/countries/wagf-participating-members-m-r/nigeria/ 238 idem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deeper_Christian_Life_Ministry 239 Cf. Gaiya, op cit, p. 367.

Table 15. Concentration of Christian population in Northern States in 2014 240

5.000.000 4.502.790 4.500.000

4.000.000 3.728.200 3.500.000 3.072.667 3.000.000

2.500.000 2.227.929 2.223.247 2.015.520 2.000.000 1.635.300 1.538.493 1.499.500 1.500.000 1.236.400 1.287.917 1.262.217 1.023.833 1.021.440 1.000.000 796.467 682.380 398.930 500.000 202.267 209.690 99.983 0

Christianity has grown phenomenally in the northern region. It has created a solid base in the Middle Belt and made inroads into the Muslim Far North. The multi-religious and multi-cultural character of Northern Nigeria remains a challenge that is heavily contested by the rise in persistent violence. Its impact on the Church is something we will discuss in the next chapters.

240 See Tables 3 and 5 in Appendix 4: Christian and Muslim populations per northern state in 2014.

Chapter 8. Conclusions Our problem statement was: What has been the impact of the persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria and how can the Church best be strengthened?

Sub-research questions dealt with were: • What is the impact of the persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria in figures, features and trends (see Chapter 2) and in Church life and personal life of Christians (Chapter 3); • What are the responses and perspectives of the Church to the impact of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria (Chapter 4), • What is Northern Nigeria (Chapter 5), • What are actors of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria (Chapter 6), and; • What is the history of the Church in Northern Nigeria (Chapter 7). Finally the question was: what can be done to strengthen the Church in Northern Nigeria in view of the impact of persistent violence and what can be done to better inform policy makers at the national and international level about the negative impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria in order to respond in a proper way (Chapter 8)? Conclusions, scenarios and a follow-up concerning our problem statement will be given in the next subchapters Conclusions (1), Scenarios (2) and Follow-up (2). 8.1. Conclusions Our conclusions regarding the impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria are given in the next 9 points. Persistent violence in Northern Nigeria is an inheritance from the past Northern Nigeria is a British colonial construct in which the Muslim Far North and the non-Muslim – now predominantly Christian – Middle Belt areas of present day Nigeria were united in one common entity. This entity of Northern Nigeria was ruled by the British colonial administration (indirect rule) within the Sokoto Caliphate structure of Hausa-Fulani emirs. This Muslim Hausa-Fulani rule was extended after Nigerian independence, but challenged under democracy. The non-Muslim population in the northern region wants freedom from Hausa-Fulani domination, which is difficult to get as the holders of power in the northern region want it to remain undivided with regards to the northern-southern divide in competition over access to power, resources and state funds. The twenty years of unabated northern Muslim rule during the 2 nd and 3 rd Republic and the period of Military rule (1979 – 1999) favored Muslim dominance in the northern region. Christianity in Northern Nigeria is threatened but strong at the same time Christianity has grown in Northern Nigeria from non-existent in 1857 to an estimated >30 million (31.2%) now. This is a minority in a Muslim context, but a sizable one. There are high concentrations of Christians in 7 Northern states. In 6 Northern states Christians are in the majority, and in 158 out of the 417 Local Government Areas Christian are in the majority. Christian existence in Northern Nigeria is under threat through persistent violence, but at the same time the Church is growing in size through an increasing number of Muslim converts and is growing in strength through a substantial rise in the commitment of nominal Christians making radical choices in faith. The Christian minority in Northern Nigeria is a targeted community Christians in Northern Nigeria are a substantial minority (Muslims >62 million / 63.5%) but targeted for different reasons by persistent violence (biggest minority, exponential church growth, ethnic composition and associated with the West). They suffer from targeted violence by politically motivated communal clashes, the 2011 post-electoral crisis, the Boko Haram insurgency and Fulani herdsmen attacks. They also suffer from marginalization and discrimination by forced Islamization through Sharia state governments and Islamic society at large. Actors and drivers of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria have a common religious denominator Actors of persistent violence impacting the Church in Northern Nigeria are: the northern Muslim political and religious elite, radical Islamic groups, and the Fulani herdsmen, acting within the framework of a Culture of political violence. Drivers of violence can be summarized as follows: protection of northern Muslim endangered interests (political-economic), protection of Muslims’ endangered identity (social-cultural), and protection of Islam’s endangered ‘legitimate’ position (religious).

Christians in Northern Nigeria are killed, displaced and in other ways affected by the thousands March 2015 about 500,000 Christians were displaced. Between 2006 and 2014 an estimated 11,500 Christians were killed and within the period of 2000 and 2014 over 13,000 churches have been abandoned, closed, destroyed and/or burnt. In the same period up to 1.3 million Christians have been affected through loved ones being killed or wounded, houses or churches destroyed, and their property stolen; most fled or were forced to flee. The severely affected communities are in the predominantly Muslim Far North (e.g. Borno -87.3%, Kano -63.4% and Yobe -77.8%). Christians relocate mainly to the predominantly Christian Middle Belt (e.g. Plateau +75.6%, Nasarawa +44%, Benue +40%, Taraba +30.4%), but at the same time Christian communities in the rural areas of this sub-region are the most affected by Muslim herdsmen attacks (e.g. Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba). Church life and personal life of Christians in Northern Nigeria are severely disturbed Between 2000 and 2014 Church life through participation in church services (60%), prayer groups (62%), bible study (60%) and outreach (68%), according to Christians, diminished substantially to dramatically in violence-ridden areas. The Christian behavior towards Muslims in shopping with Muslim shopkeepers (50%), living together with Muslims (87%), interreligious marriage (61%), deteriorated from negative to strongly negative due to experiences of perceived marginalization, discrimination and violence by Muslims. Buying land for church building (64%) and getting promotion or employment (75%) from Muslims in the experience of Christians has become even more difficult. Positive Christian attitudes towards Muslims according to Christians (80%) substantially worsened due to feelings of fear and adversity through personal experiences of killing, mistreatment, etc. And the result is growing distrust, antagonism and segregation. Muslim involvement in politics is seen by many Christians (40%) as a Muslim partisan game and consequently useless. But many more Christians (52%) feel the need for liberation from Muslim dominance through political self-empowerment and engagement in the political domain. Faith commitment of Christians in Northern Nigeria in the middle of violence is increasing Faith however has not been abandoned. Moreover although many churches have seen a decline in membership and subsequent attendance; those who have stayed show an increase in commitment to their faith and church. Engagement in personal prayer (64%), participation in prayer groups (49%), fasting (51%) and commitment to faith (69%), has increased. Many experience God’s rescue, protection and presence, and persevere despite personal loss, material damage or psychological trauma (82%). Christians face major challenges in the spiritual, emotional, social, economic and political domain Major challenges Christians see are understanding persecution and loving ones enemies (80%), coping with the trauma of violence (75%), living and doing business together in mixed communities (63%), involvement in politics, dealing with civil rights, and access to politics and government services (45%). The negative impact of persistent violence on Christian communities in Northern Nigeria is big Christian communities in the hardest hit areas that remain are small (e.g. Tudun Wada Dankadai, Kano State), traumatized (e.g. Southern Yobe) and inclined to resort to vigilante groups for self-defense (e.g. Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi State). Christian communities that receive relocating Christians (e.g. Jos, Plateau State; Yola, Adamawa State, Biu, Borno State) are overwhelmed by the humanitarian crisis and lack human, financial and other resources to cope with the urgent needs. The property and land of fleeing Christians are bought, confiscated or simply occupied by local or migrant Muslims (e.g. Southern Taraba State). Returning Christians have great difficulty in starting all over again (e.g. Northern Adamawa). Responses of the Church leadership so far lack coherent vision, strategy and planning to cope with this. 8.2. Scenarios There are two scenarios for the future of the Church in Northern Nigeria. What will be the effects of persistent violence for the future? The Church in Northern Nigeria had its ‘golden age’ from the time of the first missionaries until the 1987 Kafanchan crisis in which it expanded beyond the Middle Belt and had great inroads into the Far North. But the impact since then of Muslim dominance in terms of religion and politics, Islamist insurgencies and Muslim herdsmen attacks has led to a decline of the Church in the Far North and an overburdening of the Church in the Middle Belt through relocating Christians. At the same time in certain areas the Church seems on the verge of death (e.g. southern Yobe and Tudun Wada Dankadai city, Kano State). Will the future of the Church in Northern Nigeria be similar to that of the Church in the Middle East, North Africa and Asia ( scenario 1 )? Is the impact of persistent violence in the context of religion, politics, economics and the socio- cultural simply too strong? And will the Church as a consequence more and more disengage from society, close in on itself in order to survive, slowly fall into decline and over time cease to exist? Or will the future of the Church in Northern Nigeria not be similar to that of the Church in the Middle East, North Africa and Asia ( scenario 2 )? Can the impact of persistent violence in the context of religion, politics, economics and

87 the socio-cultural – from a Christian faith perspective –be dealt with? And will the Church as a consequence be engaged within society, opening up its resources from the Gospel to the benefit of all, and thrive? 8.3. Follow-up The following actions should be taken by the Church in Northern Nigeria. Within this last scenario the first thing for the Church in Northern Nigeria is to do some thorough analysis of the challenge it is presently facing, come up with a vision and strategy for the future, develop accompanying measures that are comprehensive and realistic at the same time, and apply these effectively. These accompanying measures will have to deal with a response of the Church at spiritual and emotional, social-cultural, economic and political levels. At the same time the Church in Northern Nigeria should urge the Nigerian government and the International community to take action to guarantee equality and the realization of the rights of Christians to religious freedom, as well as their economic and social rights as citizens of Nigeria. Open Doors International (ODI) and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) are discussing the implications of this report for the Church in (Northern) Nigeria. A committee on behalf of CAN has been formed to develop: • Recommendations to develop an appropriate vision, strategy as well as plans and actions for the Church in Nigeria to effectively deal with the impact of persistent violence in order to increase the resilience of Christian communities, their properly functioning and serving of society for the common good, and; • Recommendations to develop an appropriate advocacy strategy, so the Church can speak effectively to the Nigerian government and the International community. This way they may know about the scope of this violence and its negative impact and respond in a proper way to end the violence, restore the situation to normality and deal with the negative consequences for Christian communities as well as intercommunal relationships.

Appendix 1. List of In-Depth Interviews

1. [name for security reasons withheld] 2. [name for security reasons withheld] 3. [name for security reasons withheld] 4. [name for security reasons withheld] 5. [name for security reasons withheld] 6. [name for security reasons withheld] 7. [name for security reasons withheld] 8. [name for security reasons withheld] 9. [name for security reasons withheld] 10. [name for security reasons withheld] 11. [name for security reasons withheld] 12. [name for security reasons withheld] 13. [name for security reasons withheld]

Appendix 2. Results of Structured Interviews

Basic data Number of people interviewed: 102 Average age: 42 Average # years in church: 12 Number of unique churches visited: 44

Church denomination of respondents per CAN category

CSN 8 8% CCN 20 20% CPFN/PFN 21 20% OAIC 0 0% ECWA/TEKAN 53 52% Total 102 100%

Category of violence church of respondent experienced

1 (low) 35 34% 2 (medium) 39 39% 3 (high) 28 27% Total 102 100%

Level of highest finished education of respondents

1 - Primary 17 17% 2 - Secondary 23 23% 3 - Tertiary 62 60% Total 102 100%

State in conflict zones that respondents reside in

Adamawa 12 12% Benue 12 12% Borno 12 12% Kaduna 17 16% Kano 10 10% Kebbi 1 1% Nasarawa 9 9% Plateau 12 12%

Yobe 11 11% Zamfara 6 6% Total 102 100%

Response to Questions

Question 1 – Social and community – Attitude Violence often affects inter-communal Total Same

relationships. Please read the attitude below and Positive Positive Strongly Strongly indicate the answer by ticking the box Negative Negative Don't know / N.A. a. How have feelings towards Muslims developed in your Christian community over the past 10 3 3% 6 6% 11 11% 34 33% 48 47% 0 0% 102 years? b. How has the application of human rights for Christians in your community developed over the 2 2% 7 7% 15 15% 28 27% 41 40% 9 9% 102 past 10 years? (e.g. freedom of speech, life, association, religion) c. How has the future perspective for Christians in Northern Nigeria developed over the past 10 3 3% 17 17% 6 6% 27 26% 49 48% 0 0% 102 years? d. How have feelings about peaceful co-existence between Muslims and Christians in your Christian 0 0% 12 12% 13 13% 37 36% 38 37% 2 2% 102 community developed over the past 10 years?

e. How have feelings about Muslims and politics in your community according to you developed 2 2% 5 5% 14 14% 32 31% 49 48% 0 0% 102 over the past 10 years? f. How have feelings of Muslims towards Christians in your community according to you 2 2% 3 3% 17 17% 24 24% 53 51% 3 3% 102 developed over the past 10 years?

g. How has the feeling of confidence of Christians in their relations with Muslims in your community 1 1% 2 2% 5 5% 32 31% 58 57% 4 4% 102 developed over the last 10 years?

Question 2 – Social and community – Behavior Violence often affects people's behavior. To what extend has the below mentioned Total Same

behavior increased or decreased as a result increased Decreased of the violence Don't know / N.A. Strongly increased Strongly Decreased a. The level of shopping of Christians in my 8 8% 9 9% 27 26% 30 29% 21 21% 7 7% 102 community with Muslim shopkeepers has… b. The willingness of Christians in my community to live among Muslims (or in 0 0% 1 1% 5 5% 23 23% 66 64% 7 7% 102 Muslim majority quarters) has… c. In my community cases of interreligious marriage between Muslims and Christians 0 0% 7 7% 20 20% 24 24% 39 37% 12 12% 102 has… d. The last 10 years the level (number) of Christian shop owners in my community 23 23% 20 20% 13 13% 12 12% 33 312% 1 1% 102 has… e. The last 10 years, the opportunities for Christians to buy land from Muslims for 0 0% 3 3% 20 20% 17 17% 49 47% 13 13% 102 building churches in my community has… f. The last 10 years, the opportunities for promotion at work for Christians in Northern 0 0% 3 3% 5 5% 32 31% 45 44% 17 17% 102 Nigeria has… g. The last 10 years, the opportunities for Christians to get employment with the 2 2% 5 5% 7 7% 32 31% 47 46% 9 9% 102 government has… h. As a result of the violence the number of apostates / defectors in my Christian 5 5% 14 14% 26 25% 12 12% 18 18% 27 26% 102 community has… i. As a result of the violence the participation and influence of Christians in politics in my 25 25% 29 2708% 7 7% 18 18% 22 22% 1 1% 102 community has… j. The number of Muslims that have become Christians in my community during the 0 0% 20 20% 22 22% 7 7% 18 18% 35 33% 102 violence has…

Question 3 – Church Life Please indicate for the following church activities what you have Total Same <25% >50% observed over the last 10 years >50% <25% 25-50% 25-50% Increased Increased Increased Decreased Decreased Decreased Don't know a. Attendance at Sunday worship service 32 30% 24 24% 6 6% 3 3% 3 3% 15 15% 19 19% 0 0% 102 b. Attendance at mid-week bible study 34 32% 13 13% 15 15% 10 10% 12 12% 11 11% 7 7% 0 0% 102 c. Attendance at prayer meetings 35 33% 14 14% 15 15% 5 5% 16 16% 8 8% 9 9% 0 0% 102 d. Church membership 34 32% 18 18% 9 9% 4 4% 7 7% 19 19% 10 10% 1 1% 102 e. Church activities in outreach and evangelism in general 35 33% 25 25% 10 10% 14 14% 4 4% 7 7% 3 3% 4 4% 102 f. Church activities in outreach and evangelism to Muslims 48 46% 17 17% 10 10% 10 10% 7 7% 0 0% 1 1% 9 9% 102 g. Church involvement in social community projects (clinics, 28 26% 17 17% 3 3% 11 11% 9 9% 9 9% 11 11% 14 14% 102 schools etc.) h. Church offering revenue 35 33% 19 19% 16 16% 2 2% 9 9% 9 9% 12 12% 0 0% 102 i. Church financial support for the pastor 37 35% 16 16% 12 12% 1 1% 10 10% 12 12% 13 13% 1 1% 102

Question 4 – Spiritual and emotional well-being Please indicate for the following activities of individual Christians in Total Same your community what you have observed over the last 10 years <25% >50% 25-50% 25-50% Increased Increased Increased Decreased Don't know Decreased >50% Decreased <25% a. The level of commitment of Christians in my church for personal 4 4% 10 10% 11 11% 5 5% 15 15% 32 30% 19 19% 6 6% 102 prayer has…. b. The level of commitment of Christians in my church for 11 11% 18 18% 15 15% 7 7% 12 12% 23 22% 15 15% 1 1% 102 participation in prayer groups has… c. The level of commitment of Christians in my church for personal 1 1% 6 6% 9 9% 3 3% 22 22% 27 25% 13 13% 21 21% 102 reading of the Bible has… d. The number of Christians in my church who consider becoming 32 31% 6 6% 8 8% 14 14% 7 7% 2 2% 0 0% 33 32% 102 Muslim, animist or atheist has... e. The level of commitment of Christians in my church for fasting, 15 15% 16 16% 13 13% 5 5% 10 10% 24 23% 18 18% 1 1% 102 night vigils etc. has… f. The number of committed Christians in my church has… 6 6% 11 11% 10 10% 2 2% 13 13% 34 32% 24 24% 2 2% 102 g. The number of Christians in my church that experience God's 3 3% 1 1% 8 8% 1 1% 14 14% 33 32% 35 34% 7 7% 102 deliverance, protection and presence has... h. The number of Christians in my church that persevere in faith 5 5% 5 5% 5 5% 2 2% 13 13% 36 35% 35 34% 1 1% 102 despite personal loss, damage or trauma has...

Question 5 – Please rank the following challenges of the church in Northern Nigeria

according to the importance you contribute to <2> <3> <4> <5> Total them Important Very important not not unimportant Not reallyNot important Not important Not butalso Not importantNot atall <1> a. Economic challenge – surviving as a Christian 8 8% 17 17% 12 12% 17 17% 48 46% 102 community economically in NN b. Social challenge – dealing with the issue of religiously mixed communities living in peace in 8 8% 20 20% 9 9% 16 16% 49 47% 102 NN c. Political challenge - dealing with civil rights for Christians in NN (access to politics, education, 22 22% 17 17% 16 16% 10 10% 37 35% 102 healthcare) d. Emotional challenge – dealing with trauma that 5 5% 12 12% 8 8% 25 25% 52 50% 102 Christians in NN experience e. Spiritual challenge – understanding persecution 4 4% 10 10% 5 5% 12 12% 71 69% 102 and how to love your enemies as Church

Structured interviews: names and places of churches represented by the persons interviewed # Church Name Town State # interviews 1 ECWA Good News Garin Mija, Potiskum Yobe 1 2 ECWA Good News Fadawa, Nangere LGA Yobe 1 3 ECWA Good News Degobi, Potiskum Yobe 1 4 ECWA Good News Potiskum Yobe 2 5 First Baptist Church Potiskum Yobe 6 6 Overcomers Assembly Biu Borno 8 Church 7 EYN Biu Borno 4 8 ECWA Mayo Ladde Adamawa 6 9 ECWA Gashala Adamawa 6 10 COCIN Rikkos, Jos Plateau 3 11 ECWA Dogo na hawa Plateau 6 12 ECWA Jos Plateau 2 13 ERCC Angwan Gindiri Plateau 1 14 Baptist Obi LGA Nasarawa 5 15 Baptist Akunbezum Nasarawa 1 16 ERCC Obi LGA Nasarawa 3 17 NKST Gbajigba, Guma LGA Benue 6 18 St. Ignatius Gbajigba, Guma LGA Benue 6 19 CAC Talatar Mafara Zamfara 2 20 Assemblies of God Talatar Mafara Zamfara 1 21 Voice of Jesus Talatar Mafara Zamfara 2 22 ECWA Talatar Mafara Zamfara 1 23 Catholic G/Yadi Kano 1 24 ECWA G/Yadi Kano 1 25 ECWA U/Maigada Kano 2 26 Anglican Katsinawa Tudun Wada Kano 1 27 ECWA Katsinawa Tudun Wada Kano 1 28 ECWA Unguwan Korou Kano 2 29 Catholic Unguwan Korou Kano 1 30 ECWA Katsinawa Kano 1 31 Gospel Faith Mission Zuru Kebbi 1 32 ECWA Kakuri Kaduna 1 33 Anglican Ikara Kaduna 2 34 AoG Karreh / Kameh Kaduna 2 35 ANCA Unguwan Ganji Kaduna 1

100

36 ECWA Unguwar Yelwa Kaduna 1 37 AoG Unguwar Yelwa Kaduna 1 38 Harvesters for Christ Barnawa (S. Kaduna) Kaduna 1 39 COCIN U/Boro Kaduna 1 40 Gospel Min inistry Kurim Mashi Kaduna 1 International 41 Jesus Evang. Crusade Sabon Tasha Kaduna 1 Outreach 42 Hekan Unguwar Television Kaduna 1 43 Anglican Makwata Kaduna 1 44 ANCA Kaduna Kaduna 2 44 ERCC Sanga Kaduna 1

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Appendix 3. List of Focus Group Discussions

North-West zone 1. High Impact; Tudun Wada Dankadai town, Tudun Wada LGA, Kano State 2. Medium Impact; Kaduna city, Kaduna south LGA, Kaduna State 3. Low Impact; Talata Mafara, Talata Mafara LGA, Zamfara State North-Central zone 4. High Impact; Dogon Na Hawa, Jos soutg LGA, Plateau State 5. Medium Impact; Gbajimba, Guma LGA, Benue State 6. Low Impact; Obi town, Obi LGA, Nasarawa State Northeast zone 7. High Impact; Potiskum city, Potiskum LGA, Yobe State 8. Medium Impact; Mayo Ladde, Hong LGA, Adamawa State 9. Low Impact; Biu town, Biu LGA, Borno Sta te

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Appendix 4. Estimated Christian and Muslim populations per northern state in 2014

Table 1. Percentage of Christians per northern state in 2014 No. State Population per Percentages Percentages Percentages Percentages state 241 of Christians of Christians of Christians of Christians (OD) 242 (WCD) 243 (Gaiya) 244 (Final) 245 1 Adamawa 4,154,000 75.9% 30% 55% 53.6% 2 Bauchi 6,081,000 35% 15% 35% 25.3 246 % 3 Benue 5,559,000 85% 73% 85% 81.0% 4 Borno 5,451,000 40% 20% 30% 30.0% 5 Gombe 3,091,000 45% 30% 45% 40.0% 6 Jigawa 5,699,000 2% 10% 9% 7.0% 7 Kaduna 7,989,000 60% 35% 45% 46.7% 8 Kano 12,286,000 7% 9% 9% 8.3% 9 Katsina 7,582,000 10% 7% 10% 9.0% 10 Kebbi 4,256,000 40% 10% 22% 24.0% 11 Kogi 4,331,000 55% 50% 49% 51.3% 12 Kwara 3,091,000 40% 45% 40% 41.7% 13 Nasarawa 2,443,000 55% 45% 55% 51.7% 14 Niger 5,168,000 55% 25% 37% 39.0% 15 Plateau 4,190,000 80% 60% 80% 73.3% 16 Sokoto 4,839,000 1% 5% 7% 4.3% 17 Taraba 2,999,000 60% 30% 60% 50.0% 18 Yobe 3,034,000 5% 10% 5% 6.7% 19 Zamfara 4,285,000 1% 5% 1% 2.3% 20 FCT 1,838,000 45% 247 40% 45% 43.3% Abuja 21 Northern 98,366,000 30,66 5,000 Region (53.6%) (31.2%) 22 Nigeria 183,523,000 (100%)

241 Data source religions field: Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds. World Religion Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed July, 2014); see link: http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/ 242 Numbers based upon percentages given to Open Doors field researchers by church leaders, CAN Public Relations officers, CAN Office of Northern states, Kaduna, CAN officials (in some Local Government Areas), and pastors and church workers in the Northern region. 243 Data source religions field: Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds. World Religion Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed July, 2014); see link: http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/ 244 Percentages according to Professor Gaiya, as given by email and telephone call, March 2015. 245 Numbers based upon average rate percentages of OD, WCD and Gaiya. 246 As %Christians + %Muslims = >100%, we decreased both % with 3.0%. 247 Due to lacking estimate figures for Christians in FCT Abuja we propose for calculation reasons 45% (Muslims 45% and ATR 10%).

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Table 2. Percentage of Muslims per northern state in 2014 No. State Population Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Nbr/perc of per state 248 Muslims Muslims Muslims Muslims (OD) 249 (WCD) 250 (Nigeria (Final) 252 Watch) 251 1 Adamawa 4,154,000 24% 65% 49.8% 46.3% 2 Bauchi 6,081,000 60% 80% 82.9% 71,3 253 % 3 Benue 5,559,000 5% 5.0% 4 Borno 5,451,000 55% 60% 81% 65.3% 5 Gombe 3,091,000 45% 55% 66.3% 47.2% 6 Jigawa 5,699,000 97% 88% 91.1% 92.0% 7 Kaduna 7,989,000 35% 50% 55% 46.7% 8 Kano 12,286,000 90% 91% 90.2% 90.1% 9 Katsina 7,582,000 85% 91% 89.5% 55.2% 10 Kebbi 4,256,000 45% 88% 65.5% 11 Kogi 4,331,000 40% 40.0% 12 Kwara 3,091,000 55% 50% 52.5% 13 Nasarawa 2,443,000 35% 35.0% 14 Niger 5,168,000 40% 70% 70.2% 60.1% 15 Plateau 4,190,000 15% 21% 18.0% 16 Sokoto 4,839,000 98.9% 94% 92.5% 95.1% 17 Taraba 2,999,000 15% 55% 35.0% 18 Yobe 3,034,000 90% 87% 81.5% 86.2% 19 Zamfara 4,285,000 99% 94% 96.5% 20 FCT 1,838,000 45% 254 45% 45.0% Abuja 21 Northern 98,366,000 62,431,000 Region (53.6%) (63.5%) 22 Nigeria 183,523,000 (100%)

248 Data source religions field: Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds. World Religion Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed July, 2014); see link: http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/ 249 Numbers based upon percentages given to Open Doors field researchers by church leaders, CAN Public Relations officers, CAN Office of Northern states, Kaduna, CAN officials (in some Local Government Areas), and pastors and church workers in the Northern region. 250 Data source religions field: Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds. World Religion Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed July, 2014); see link: http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/ 251 Average of minimum and maximum percentages on p. 230 in Chouin, Reinert and Apard, op cit. No figures given for Benue, Kebbi, Kogi, Kware, Nassarawa Taraba and Zamfara. 252 Numbers based upon average rate percentages of OD, WCD and NG Watch. 253 As %Christians + %Muslims = >100%, we decreased both % with 3.0%. 254 Due to lacking estimate figures for Christians in FCT Abuja we propose for calculation reasons 45% (Muslims 45% and ATR 10%).

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Table 3. Estimated Christian population per northern state in 2014 State Population per state % Number of Christians Christians Adamawa 4,154,000 53.6% 2,227,929 Bauchi 6,081,000 25.3% 1,538,493 Benue 5,559,000 81% 4,502,790 Borno 5,451,000 30.0% 1,635,300 Gombe 3,091,000 40.0% 1,236,400 Jigawa 5,699,000 7.0% 398,930 Kaduna 7,989,000 46.7% 3,728,200 Kano 12,286,000 8.3% 1,023,833 Katsina 7,582,000 9.0% 682,380 Kebbi 4,256,000 24.0% 1,021,440 Kogi 4,331,000 51.3% 2,223,247 Kwara 3,091,000 41.7% 1,287,917 Nasarawa 2,443,000 51.7% 1,262,217 Niger 5,168,000 39.0% 2,015,520 Plateau 4,190,000 73.3% 3,072,667 Sokoto 4,839,000 4.3% 209,690 Taraba 2,999,000 50.0% 1,499,500 Yobe 3,034,000 6.7% 202,267 Zamfara 4,285,000 2.3% 99,983 FCT Abuja 1,838,000 43.3% 796,467 Northern 98,366,000 34.8% Region (total (53.6) 30,665,000 population) (31.2%) Nigeria (total 183,523,000 population) (100%)

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Table 4. Estimated Muslim population per northern State in 2014 State Population per state % Muslims Number of Muslims Adamawa 4,154,000 46.3% 1,921,917 Bauchi 6,081,000 74.3% 4,335,753 Benue 5,559,000 5.0% 277,950 Borno 5,451,000 65.3% 3,561,320 Gombe 3,091,000 47.2% 1,458,952 Jigawa 5,699,000 92.0% 5,244,980 Kaduna 7,989,000 46.7% 3,728,200 Kano 12,286,000 90.4% 11,106,544 Katsina 7,582,000 88.5% 6,710,070 Kebbi 4,256,000 65.5% 2,787,680 Kogi 4,331,000 40.0% 1,732,400 Kwara 3,091,000 52.5% 1,622,775 Nasarawa 2,443,000 35.0% 855,050 Niger 5,168,000 60.1% 3,104,245 Plateau 4,190,000 18.0% 754,200 Sokoto 4,839,000 95.1% 4,603,502 Taraba 2,999,000 35.0% 1,049,650 Yobe 3,034,000 86.2% 2,614,297 Zamfara 4,285,000 96.5% 4,135,025 FCT Abuja 1,838,000 45.0% 827,100 Northern 98,366,000 Region (total (53,6) 62,431,000 population) (63.5%) Nigeria (total 183,523,000 population) (100%)

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Table 5. Estimated concentration of Christian population in northern states in 2014 255 State States with States with Number of LGAs with Christians >50% / total number of Christians Christians > LGAs per State + names of LGAs with Christians > 50% between 25 50% and 50% Adamawa X 18/21 Demsa, Michika, Madagali, Mubi North/South, Numan, Fufore, Ganye, Girei, Gombi, Guyuk, Hong, Jada, Lamurde, Maiha, Mayobelwa, Shelleng

Bauchi X 4/19 Tafawa Balewa, Dass, Bogoro, Warji Benue X 22/23 Ado, Agatu, Apa, Buruku, Gboko, Guma, GWest, Katsinaala, Konshisha, Kwande, Logo, Makurdi, Obi, Ogbadigo, Oju, Opkpokwu, Ohimini, Oturkpo, Tarka, Ukum, Ushongo, Vandeikya Borno X 7/27 Biu, Chibok, Hawul, Askira Uba, Damboa, Kwaya Kwasar Gombe X 3/11 Billiri, Kaltungo, Shongom Jigawa 0/26 Nil Kaduna X 9/23 Jemaa, Jaba, Kachia, Kaduna south, Kagarko, Kaura, Sanga, Zangon Kataf, Lere Kano 0/44 Nil Katsina 0/34 Nil Kebbi 2/21 Zuru,Yauri Kogi X 18/21 Ajaokuta, Ankpa, Bassa, Dekina, Ibaji, Idah, Igalamelaodulu, Ijumu, Kabba/Bunu, Kogi, Lokoja, Mopa, Ofu, Ogori, Okehi, Okeneolamobolo, Omala Yagba east, Yagba west Kwara X 15/15 Asa, Baruten, Edu, Ekiti, Ifelodun, Ilorin east, Ilorin west, Irepodun, Isin, Kaiama, Moro, Offa, Oke-ero, Oyun, Pategi Nasarawa X 13/13 Akwanga, Awe, Doma, Karu, Keffi, Kokona, Lafia, Nasarawa, Eggon, Obi, Toto, Wamba, Keana Niger X 16/25 Agaie, Agwara, Borgu, Bosso, Chanchaga, Edati, Gurara, Katcha, Kontagora, Magama, Mariga, Mashegu, Muya, Paikoro, Rijau, Shiroro Plateau X 17/17 Barkin Ladi, Bassa, Bokkos, Jos east, Jos north, Jos south, Kanam, Kanke, Langtang north, Langtang south, Mangu, Mikang, Pankshin, Quanpan, Riyom, Shendam, Wase Sokoto 0/23 Nil Taraba X 13/16 Bali, Donga, Gashaka, Ibbi, Jalingo, Kurmi, Llau, Sardauna, Ussa, Takum, Wukari, Zing, Yorro Yobe 0/17 Nil Zamfara 0/15 Nil FCT Abuja X 0/6 Nil

255 Based upon data source religions field: Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds. World Religion Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed July, 2014); see link: http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/ (See table ‘Overview of Christians, Muslims and ATR in Northern States per 2014’)

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Appendix 5. Christians victim of persistent violence ‘by targeting’

How many Christians are victim of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria? As religious affiliation is a highly sensitive issue in Nigeria – national censuses since 1963 have been without it – statistics about the religious affiliation of victims or persistent violence have been hitherto unknown. For the sake of the impact on the Church however, it is important to have an estimated number of Christian victims at least. Here we present a percentage for the number of Christians being targeted by Boko Haram (BH) related violence (1), a percentage of the number of Christians being targeted by Fulani herdsmen related violence (2), we refute the claim of Nigeria Watch that Christians are killed at random (3) and argue for an overall credible percentage for Christians targeted by persistent violence in Northern Nigeria (4). 1. Christians targeted by Boko Haram related violence In this part we argue that the targeting of Christians by BH violence over time has varied in intensity and we present a percentage based upon informed reasoning that is endorsed by a case study from the Northeast. Targeting varied in intensity The targeting of Christians by Boko Haram varied in intensity during the insurgency. To arrive at an average credible percentage for the period of 2009 – 2014 we need to describe this variety in targeting by an estimated percentage. • The number of Christian victims corresponds with the demographic presence of Christians in the northern region (31.2%) at the beginning of the insurgency in 2009. • The number of Christian victims has risen proportionally since 2009 as Christians were expressly targeted (next to representatives of the government, army and police, and Muslim leaders that condemned BH). We estimate an average increase above the demographic percentage with 5% (36.2%). • The number of Christians has flattened out proportionally since 2012 as Muslims were attacked as well as Christians. Boko Haram’s policy was somehow ‘those who are not with us are against us’. We estimate an average decrease of the previous percentage with 2.5% (33.7%). • This number of Christian victims has risen proportionally since 2014 again as strong Christian regions in the northeast (notably southern Borno and northern Adamawa states) were attacked. We estimate an average increase of the above percentage with 5% (38.7%). • This number of Christians has risen since October 2014 even more, when Boko Haram apparently dropped its policy of attacking Muslims as well as Christians. Observations have been made of large numbers of Muslims being transported into Boko Haram controlled territory 256 . The caliphate most likely needed workers for agriculture, cattle rearing and business. We estimate an average increase of the above percentage with 2.5% (41.2%).

256 In November 2014 it was reported to Open Doors by known sources that in Yola, Adamawa State, over fourteen days buses transported IDP Muslims who were invited by Boko Haram to return to Maiduguri and surrounding areas. Promises were made that no harm would come to them and that they would be able to resettle and build a new life.

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A case study: Data from the peak of the Gwoza Caliphate In order to endorse the just mentioned percentage, we’ll have a closer look at the number of Christian victims at the height of the Gwoza Caliphate between December 2014 and February Map 1. February 2015 Boko Haram controlled or contested Local Government Areas (LGAs) in the Northeast 257

2015 in the Northeast. At that time 24 Local Government Areas (LGA) were concerned. Map 1 shows the 17 Boko Haram controlled LGAs and the 2 in contention as at February 2015. In December 2014 however 5 more LGAs in north Adamawa (Hong, Gombi, Maiha, Mubi-north and Mubi-south) were conquered by the Caliphate. They were recaptured by the Nigerian army in January 2015.

257 Cf. Lake Chad Region - Nigeria Crisis: Displacement overview - February 2015, Map from International Organization for Migration, 23 February 2015, snapshot. See link: http://reliefweb.int/map/nigeria/lake-chad- region-nigeria-crisis-displacement-overview-february-2015

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Table 1. Data for Christian victims in the Gwoza Caliphate (December 2014 – February 2015) LGAs/Data Population Percentage of Numbers of (Census 2006) 258 Christians Christians (OD) 259 Adamawa Madagali 135, 142 90 121, 628 Michika 155, 238 95 147, 476 Hong 260 169, 183 90 152, 265 Gombi 261 147, 787 90 133, 008 Maiha 110, 175 90 99, 158 Mubi north 151, 515 90 136, 364 Mubi south 129 , 956 90 116 , 960 Borno Mobbar 116, 633 1 1, 166 Abadam 100, 065 1 1, 000 Kukawa 203, 343 1 2, 033 Monguno 109 , 834 1 1, 098 Marte 129, 409 5 6, 470 Ngala 236, 498 5 11, 824 Kala Balge 60, 834 2 1, 217 Dikwa 105, 042 2 2, 101 Bama 270, 119 10 27, 012 Gwoza 276, 568 90 248, 911 Damboa 233, 200 80 186, 560 Konduga 157, 322 20 3, 146 Chibok 66 , 333 95 63 , 016 Askira Uba 143, 313 70 100, 319 Yobe Geidam 155, 740 0.1 156 Gujba 129, 797 1 1, 298 Gulani 103 , 516 1 1, 035 Totals 3, 596, 562 (100%) 1, 565, 221 (43.5%)

And if we look at the number of Christian victims in the 24 LGAs Table 21 gives, we see a percentage of 43.5%. As the percentages for Christians in the LGAs are estimates, we consider the 43.5% as support for the Open Doors estimated percentage. So a percentage of up to 41.2% for Christian civilian victims targeted by Boko Haram might well be realistic. Therefore Open Doors argues for a low and high percentage for Christian victims of Boko Haram. The first is for Christian civilian victims affected at random 31.2% (based on demographics) and the second is for Christian civilian victims affected by targeted violence 41.2% (based on an estimated 10% more).

258 Nigeria population Census 2006. Cf. http://www.population.gov.ng/images/Vol%2003%20Table%20DSx%20LGAPop%20by%20SDistrict-PDF.pdf. 259 Source: estimated percentages by Open Doors field research. The Christian majority areas were specifically targeted e.g. in Gwoza LGA – majority Christian – all churches and villages were destroyed; in Kukawa – majority Muslim – a selected number of villages were destroyed and Kukawa city was spared. 260 Hong town was not captured, but the rural areas were. 261 Captured for less then a months period.

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2. Christians targeted by Fulani herdsmen related violence in the Middle Belt Adamu and Ben argue that Christian communities are targeted by Fulani herdsmen attacks in Middle Belt states. They did research in southern Kaduna, Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa states and a 2015 case study in Taraba state 262 . In the case study they found out that 1,478 Christians were killed by Fulani herdsmen attacks in the southern and central senatorial zone of Taraba State. They also found out that 11,898 by Fulani herdsmen attacks displaced Christians are found in IDP camps in Taraba State, 12,664 in camps in Benue State and over 10,000 at the Cameroonian/Nigerian border. No figures could be given for those in IDP camps in southern Adamawa State and for the many that are hosted by local families. But we estimate that up to 50,000 Christians are displaced by Fulani herdsmen attacks in Taraba State in 2015 alone! What total number would we get if case studies had been done in other Middle Belt states? Table 2. Christians targeted in Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba State Cattle grazing issues (NW) Land issues (NW) Benue 169 613 Nasarawa 155 223 Plateau 36 843 Taraba 62 299 % out of total 69.03% out of total 611 90.03% out of total 2,190

According to Nigeria Watch (see Table 22) Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba are by far the most affected states by Fulani herdsmen related violence (in cattle grazing and land issues Fulani are the main actors) 263 . So the 31.2% demographic percentage or the Boko Haram targeted 41.2% percentage will not do for an estimation of Christian victims in this context. But since Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba as the main affected areas have 69.07% (cattle grazing issues) and 90.03% (land issues) of the registered causes, 70% would be a safe average percentage for an estimation of Christian victims of Fulani herdsmen related violence. 3. Nigeria Watch and the ‘at random’ Boko Haram body count 264 Nigeria Watch (NW) claims that Christians are victims ‘at random’; we however argued (Chapter 2.1.1.) that Christians are victims ‘by targeting’. Here we refute the NW claim. NW states that 1 out of 3 civilian victims killed by BH related violence are Christians, and that 2 out of 3 are Muslims. This appears strange as the 317 for this article by NW researched incidents between 2009- 06-24 and 2012-12-31 indicate at first glance that 5 out of 6 killed civilian victims are Christians. Moreover – according to NW – starting in July 2009 265 BH targeted Christians associating them with earlier targeted groups such as the army, police, representatives and institutions of the secular state and Muslim leaders that condemned its ideology. The main assumptions for doubting that 5 out of 6 killed civilian victims are Christians, are the – according to NW – biased over reporting of Christian victims in southern based newspapers written for a mainly Christian public (A), and the – again according to NW – highly unlikely number of Christian

262 Cf. Adamu and Ben (March 2015); op cit. and Adamu and Ben (November 2015); op cit. 263 Cf. Tables 3 and 4 of Appendix 6. Public violent deaths by cause per northern state 2006–2014. 264 See abstract p. 213 in Chouin, Reinert and Apard, , op cit; cf. https://www.academia.edu/4245284/2014_- _Religion_and_bodycount_in_the_Boko_Haram_crisis_evidence_from_the_Nigeria_Watch_database. Based upon 317 researched incidents. 265 Cf. ibid, p. 216.

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victims in view of the minority presence of Christians in Northern Nigeria (B). These two assumptions lead NW to the conclusion that its own database gives an over-representation of Christian victims 266 . The method NW now presents to discuss the religious affiliation of victims in the BH crisis, is the way one can speculate in an informed manner on the religious affiliation of the victims whose faith is unknown 267 . And as the vast majority of victims are civilians, this informed speculation focusses on civilian victims. Moreover, and here another NW assumption comes in, as civilians are a kind of collateral damage between the Boko Haram insurgents and security forces, Christians and Muslims are killed alike and at random. As no credible statistics about the religious affiliation of victims are known, NW now turns to the application of demographic percentages of Muslims and Christians in northern states to the registered killed civilian victims per state whose faith is unknown. As a consequence a demographic percentage (1/3) is applied to the general data of victims that coincides with the minority presence of Christians (1/3) in Northern Nigeria. This leads to NW’s conclusion as stated before that 1 out of 3 civilian victims (1/3) killed by BH related violence is Christian, and that 2 out of 3 (2/3) are Muslim. Our objections to NW’s informed manner of speculation are the following: • If the biased reporting of the southern based newspapers NG Watch is using is true, why is the NW database not balanced with reporting from Muslim northern based newspapers and notably BBC Hausa and VoA Hausa services which have a predominantly Muslim staff (respectively 100 and 70%)? • How can Christians and Muslims alike be randomly victim when even NW is speaking of targeting Christians: ‘deliberate attacks against Christians’ (July 2009) and ‘systematically targeting people – such as Christians’ (since December 2010)268 ? And if this is true, is the minority presence of Christians in Northern Nigeria not becoming irrelevant somehow? The perspective of Christians being killed ‘at random’ and as a consequence the application of the demographic percentage of their presence in the northern region leads, according to us, to a minimum number of Christian victims. The perspective of Christians being killed ‘by targeting’ and as a consequence the application of a higher percentage will lead to a higher number. This percentage for the targeting of Christians by BH related violence however needs to be speculated upon in an informed manner as well. And this we do in parts 1 and 2 of this appendix. 4. A percentage for Christians targeted by persistent violence in Northern Nigeria We presented a percentage for the number of Christians being targeted by Boko Haram (BH) related violence (1), a percentage for the number of Christians being targeted by Fulani herdsmen related violence (2) and refuted the claim of Nigeria Watch that Christians are killed at random (3). As it remains important for the sake of our impact study to have an estimation of Christians targeted, we need to arrive at an overall percentage for Christians targeted by persistent violence in Northern Nigeria. We shall complete this here. According to a June 2015 estimation of Amnesty International 269 17,000 people have been killed since 2009 by Boko Haram. OCHA 270 January 2015 estimates 9,300 to be the number of people killed since 2009 by Boko Haram alone. Nigeria Watch reports 9,884 people killed in 2014 of which 7,174 were in Borno State through Boko Haram related violence 271 . As the number of people killed increased substantially due to the Boko Haram insurgency since 2009, and the insurgency is largely responsible for the number of deaths through its 2014 figures, we take the 41.2% for Christian victims by Boko

266 ibid, p. 226. 267 NW concentrates on the 51% killed civilian victims in the 317 researched incidents whose faith is unknown. 268 Cf. ibid, idem. 269 See overview ‘Facts and Figures, Nigeria: Horror in numbers’, by Amnesty International, 3 June 2015; see link: https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/facts_and_figures.pdf 270 Cf. OCHA – North East Nigeria Crisis: Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 30 January 2015); http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/NE_Snapshot_Jan30.pdf 271 Nigeria Watch Newsletter No. 4, Sept-Dec, 2014, p. 2.

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Haram violent targeting as an overall percentage for Christians targeted by persistent violence in Northern Nigeria for estimation’s sake.

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Appendix 6. Non-Natural deaths by cause per northern state (2006 – 2014)

Table 1. Non-natural deaths due to religious issues per northern state (2006 – 2014)

14000 12099 12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000 1659 1423 1373 920 559 626 28 183 236 73 11 0 48 0 93 60 25 151 5 0

Table 2. Non-natural deaths due to political issues per northern state (2006 - 2014)

14000 12118 12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

1669 2000 1299 1388 774 759 377 201 119 210 245 79 28 10 123 22 79 27 80 16 0

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Table 3. Non-natural deaths due to cattle grazing per northern state (2006 – 2014)

180 169

160 155

140

120

100

80 62 60

40 36 36 28 27 21 16 14 15 20 9 10 7 4 0 0 1 1 0 0

Table 4. Non-natural deaths due to land issues per northern state (2006 – 2014)

900 843 800

700 613 600

500

400 299 300 223 200 76 100 33 4 6 0 6 11 1 7 0 16 20 23 0 0 9 0

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Appendix 7. Affected Christians in Northern Nigeria (2000–2014) Table 1. Affected Christians in Northern Nigeria presented by five denominations in the corresponding CAN church groups (2000 – 2014)

State/ Catholic Catholic Anglican Anglican Assemblies Assemblies Celestial Celestial ECWA ECWA Church Church: Church: Church: Church: of God of God Church of Church of Church: Church: number of number of number of number of Church: Church: Christ: Christ: number of number of affected affected affected affected number of number of number of number of affected affected Christians Christians in Christians in Christians in affected affected affected affected Christians in Christians in in 2000 2014 2000 2014 Christians in Christians in Christians in Christians in 2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014 Adamawa 13, 000 10, 000 10, 000 13, 000 3,000 2, 100 0, 700 1, 200 11, 000 6, 000 Bauchi 20, 000 15, 000 10, 000 7, 500 7, 000 5, 500 1, 500 2, 400 25, 000 18, 000 Benue 500, 000 700, 000 15, 000 20, 000 5, 000 7, 500 10, 000 15, 000 6, 000 8, 000 Borno 40, 000 3, 500 20, 000 2, 000 2, 000 0, 350 2, 000 0, 150 15, 000 4, 000 FCT Abuja 50, 000 55, 000 12, 000 6, 000 7, 100 9, 000 2, 000 2, 800 5, 000 7, 000 Gombe 18, 000 22, 000 10, 000 12, 500 4, 000 6, 000 1, 900 2, 100 25, 000 35, 000 Jigawa 4, 500 2, 100 1, 000 0, 400 1, 200 0, 600 0, 700 0, 250 2, 000 3, 000 Kaduna 300, 000 210, 000 15, 000 14, 500 14, 000 12, 000 3, 000 3, 500 35, 000 39, 000 Kano 150, 000 45, 000 5, 000 1, 800 7, 600 8, 000 3, 200 0, 700 8, 000 8, 200 Katsina 18, 000 16, 000 8, 000 7, 500 6, 000 4, 000 2, 000 0, 310 4, 000 7, 000 Kebbi 10, 000 15, 000 6, 000 10, 000 6, 000 8, 000 4, 000 5, 500 3, 000 6, 000 Kogi 15, 000 18, 000 15, 000 18, 000 8, 000 11, 000 1, 000 1, 500 3, 000 4, 000 Kwara 250, 000 300, 000 18, 000 25, 000 4, 000 10, 000 15, 000 19, 000 6, 000 9, 000 Nasarawa 40, 000 55, 000 18, 000 21, 000 10, 000 15, 000 18, 000 25, 000 5, 000 15, 000 Niger 20, 000 23, 000 8, 000 12, 000 7,000 10, 000 19, 000 21, 000 4, 000 8, 000 Plateau 40, 000 60, 000 20, 000 38, 000 20, 000 31, 000 4, 000 9, 000 80, 000 150, 000 Sokoto 3, 000 5, 000 4, 000 2, 500 5, 000 1, 200 0, 400 0, 600 2, 000 3, 500 Taraba 25, 000 28, 000 20, 000 25, 000 5, 000 11, 000 4, 000 5, 000 2, 000 4, 000 Yobe 10, 000 3, 000 5, 000 2, 000 2, 500 1, 000 1, 500 0, 150 20, 000 2, 500 Zamfara 10, 000 6, 000 3, 000 2, 500 1, 500 2, 300 1, 000 1, 200 4, 000 6, 100 Totals 1, 536, 500 1, 591, 600 223, 000 241, 200 125, 900 155, 550 94, 900 116, 360 265, 000 343, 300

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Table 2. Affected Christians per northern state (2000 – 2014) 272 State/Church Total number Total number Increase/decrease Percentage affected affected between 2000 and Christians of Christians of five 2014 five main main churches in churches in 2014 2000 Adamawa 37, 700 32, 300 -5, 400 -14.3% Bauchi 63, 500 48, 400 15, 100 -23.8% Benue 536, 000 750, 500 214, 500 40% Borno 79, 000 10, 000 -69, 000 -87.3% FCT Abuja 76, 100 79, 800 3, 700 4.9% Gombe 58, 900 77, 600 18, 700 31.8% Jigawa 9, 400 6, 350 -3, 050 -32.5% Kaduna 367, 000 279, 000 -88, 000 -24% Kano 173, 800 63, 700 -110, 100 -63.4% Katsina 38, 000 34, 810 3, 190 -8.4% Kebbi 29, 000 44, 500 15, 500 53.5% Kogi 42, 000 52, 500 10, 500 25% Kwara 293, 000 363, 000 70, 000 23.9% Nasarawa 91, 000 131, 000 40, 000 44% Niger 58, 000 74, 000 16, 000 27.6% Plateau 164, 000 288, 000 124, 000 75.6% Sokoto 14, 400 12, 800 -1, 600 -11.1% Taraba 56, 000 73, 000 17, 000 30.4% Yobe 39, 000 8, 650 -30, 350 -77.8% Zamfara 19, 500 18,100 -1, 400 -7.2% Totals 2, 245, 300 2, 448, 010 -202, 710 -9%

Christians affected by persistent violence are Christians that are killed, or saw their relatives killed, their houses and shops looted, attacked, destroyed or burnt, and consequently were traumatized. Some of those that stayed alive remained, but most fled from where they lived and relocated elsewhere for safety reasons. The difference in numbers between 2000 and 2014 is essentially due to displacement, the other reason, ‘being killed’, is a ’minor’ one compared to the huge number of displaced people. Because Christians flee and relocate to different states the figures and percentages of Christians may be double counted. As a consequence all figures tell us only something about the number of affected Christians per state.

We see a decrease in the number of affected Christians in northern Adamawa (-14.3%), Bauchi (-23.8%), Borno (-87.3%), Jigawa (-32.5%), Kaduna (-24.0%), Kano (-63.4%), Katsina (-8.4%), Sokoto (-11.1%), Yobe (-77.8%) and Zamfara (-7.2%) states. A total of ten states 273 .

272 Cf. Appendix 6. Affected Christians in Northern Nigeria. 273 Sharia is instituted in 12 Northern states with full application in personal and penal codes in: Bauchi, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara states. Sharia is applied in personal matters in: Borno, Gombe and Yobe states. Sharia is applied in parts of Kaduna, Gombe and Niger where large numbers of Muslims live. Cf. p. 576 in Ostien (2010) op cit. and also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia_in_Nigeria

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The large decrease in northern Adamawa, Borno and Yobe corresponds with the 2009 – present Boko Haram insurgency and also, in Yobe, with the 2011 post-electoral violence that led to a decline in Christian presence of about 80% 274 . The large decrease in Kano and to a lesser extent Jigawa states is due to the same 2011 post-electoral violence; many southern Christians that had settled in Kano for commercial reasons relocated to their places of origin in Southern Nigeria. Bauchi was touched by the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009, southern Kaduna was touched by the 2011 post-electoral violence and the since 2011 increased Fulani herdsmen attacks. Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara are relatively ‘peaceful’ states as there is much marginalization and discrimination towards Christians under Sharia, but little violence.

We see an increase in Benue (40%), FCT Abuja (4.9%), Gombe (31.8%), Kebbi (53.5%), Kogi (25%), Kwara (23.9%), Nasarawa (44%), Niger (27.6%), Plateau (75.6%) and Taraba (30.4%) states. A total of ten states as well.

The increase in all these states corresponds with the relocation of many Christians from Boko Haram affected areas to relatively safer states, but also with the (inner-state) relocation of Christians affected by the Fulani herdsmen attacks in Middle Belt states from rural areas to the more safer towns. For instance, many Christians in eastern Benue fled from Fulani herdsmen attacks that affected their region due to the clashes in southern Taraba state in 2013/2014. Many Nasarawa Christians relocated within the state or fled to FCT Abuja when 6 LGAs were attacked by Fulani herdsmen and Boko Haram fighters that were brought in from elsewhere. In that incident 100 churches were destroyed and 25 pastors killed 275 . Plateau has had the strongest increase (76%) since 2012 due to the attraction of Jos city for IDPs from Boko Haram affected areas as a safe haven.

The figures for affected Christians however are to be understood in their complexity. In some churches in some states the numbers are declining (e.g. Catholic, Assemblies of God, and ECWA) and in others to the contrary they are going up (e.g. Anglican, Celestial Church). The explanation is that most affiliates and members of churches decreasing in numbers are not indigenes of the state, so they relocated to other, safer areas. For example most adherents of Anglican and Catholic churches are Igbos from Southern Nigeria with a few Hausas and members of other minority tribes in North Nigeria. If we look at Yobe and Borno states the violence affected all church categories because these states were worst hit by the insurgency even before Adamawa State became targeted in 2014. So the general explanation is that the Northeast suffers a great decline, followed by a smaller decline in the north-west. The northcentral has become a safe haven for all categories of the church. Sources : Officers of the Christian Association of Nigeria al different levels in northern states, Church leaders of different denominations, Officers of Christian NGO’s in northern states, Christian civil servants at different levels in northern states, Christians at high positions in northern society (e.g. judges, engineers).

274 Cf. Chapter 2.2. Features of the impact of persistent violence: the example of Potiskum. 275 Cf. according to Open Doors field research. See also the following quote: “In March [2014], a Judicial Commission of Inquiry that the [Nasarawa] State government set up to look into a previous crisis reported that more than 534 people were killed in communal clashes in the ten months from December 2012 to September 2013” in in article ‘Nigeria: Pulling the Root of Crises in Nasarawa State’, in Daily Trust magazine, 28 August 2014; see link: http://allafrica.com/stories/201408281419.html

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CAN church groups : The Christian Association of Nigeria is divided into five church groups. They are: • Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria ( CSN ) is made up of the Catholic Church in Nigeria. • Christian Council of Nigeria ( CCN ) is made up of Anglican, Methodist, Baptist Churches, Four Square, Presbyterian, Eternal Sacred Order of C & S, Church of the Lord Aladura and other Orthodox Churches. • Christian Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria ( CPFN ) and the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN ) are made up of Pentecostal Churches. • Organization of African Instituted Churches ( OAIC ) is made up of Churches founded by Nigerians (Africans) in Nigeria. • Evangelical Church of West Africa ( ECWA ) with its roots in Northern Nigeria and Tekan ( TEKAN ) is made up of denominations based in Northern Nigeria such as COCIN, HEKAN NKST, Christian Assemblies, LCCN, etc.

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Appendix 8. Affected congregations in Northern Nigeria (2000 – 2014)

Table 1. Affected congregations in Northern Nigeria in the CAN church groups (2000 – 2014) State/ CSN number CSN number of CCN number CCN number CFPN number CFPN number OAIC number OAIC number ECWA –TEKAN ECWA – TEKAN Church of congregations of of of of of of number of number of congregations after violence congregations congregations congregations congregations congregations congregations congregations congregations before since 2014 before after violence before after violence before after violence before after violence violence since violence since since 2014 violence since since 2014 violence since since 2014 violence since since 2014 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 Adamawa 150 110 5, 000 3, 100 108 65 50 35 7, 000 5, 100 Bauchi 106 58 325 225 115 75 65 50 3, 500 3, 100 Benue 300 250 6, 000 5, 800 3, 200 3, 500 300 340 1, 100 900 Borno 210 40 2, 500 200 350 120 150 30 3, 000 500 FCT Abuja 30 35 50 60 250 301 120 150 110 125 Gombe 158 120 2, 000 1, 820 120 145 75 60 2, 500 2, 600 Jigawa 40 35 120 101 30 12 15 10 200 180 Kaduna 300 212 5, 500 5, 200 2, 800 2, 900 3, 500 3, 400 9, 500 8, 200 Kano 180 120 1, 500 1, 450 250 212 250 230 350 300 Katsina 180 210 515 500 190 160 145 155 3, 500 4, 500 Kebbi 170 182 375 401 200 250 80 120 2, 800 2, 900 Kogi 215 230 581 625 1, 200 1, 300 300 333 6, 000 6, 230 Kwara 221 229 610 673 1, 250 1, 400 315 320 6, 100 6, 400 Nasarawa 112 72 745 604 800 570 170 135 1, 400 1, 100 Niger 101 115 434 445 310 270 220 189 3, 100 3, 200 Plateau 215 195 4, 500 4, 400 3, 300 3, 500 300 325 10, 000 11, 000 Sokoto 45 47 250 280 170 150 45 40 150 165 Taraba 51 45 3, 150 3, 050 225 250 200 210 570 459 Yobe 17 5 84 19 20 5 15 3 110 20 Zamfara 15 15 82 85 35 38 17 20 55 70 Totals 2, 816 2, 325 34, 321 29, 038 14, 923 15, 223 6, 332 6, 155 61, 045 57, 049

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Table 2: Affected congregations in northern state (2000 – 2014)

State/ church Total number Total number Increase / decrease Percentage congregations congregations in between 2000 and in 5 CAN 5 CAN groups in 2014 groups in 2000 2014 Adamawa 12, 308 8, 410 -3, 898 -31.7 Bauchi 4, 111 3, 508 -603 -14.7 Benue 10, 900 10, 790 -110 -1.0 Borno 6, 210 890 -5, 320 -85.7 FCT Abuja 560 671 111 19.8 Gombe 4, 853 4, 745 -108 -2.2 Jigawa 405 338 -67 -16.5 Kaduna 21, 600 19, 912 -1, 688 -7.8 Kano 2, 530 2, 312 -218 -5.5 Katsina 4, 530 5, 525 995 23.6 Kebbi 3, 625 3, 853 228 6.2 Kogi 8, 296 8, 718 422 5.1 Kwara 8, 496 9, 022 526 6.2 Nasarawa 3, 227 2, 481 -746 -23.1 Niger 4, 165 4, 219 54 1.3 Plateau 18, 315 19, 420 1, 105 6.0 Sokoto 660 682 22 3.3 Taraba 4, 196 4, 014 -182 -4.3 Yobe 246 52 -194 -78.7 Zamfara 204 228 24 11.8 Totals 119, 437 109, 790 -13, 067 / +3, 487 / 9, -10.9 / +2.9 / 8.0 580

Congregations affected by persistent violence have been closed or abandoned. They have been closed because 276 : • the church building has been destroyed or burned and the members do not come together at an alternative location or joined other congregations; • the local Christian community became too small because many members fled to safer areas • the local Christian community became discouraged and out of fear reduced to small numbers and does not come together anymore; • the pastor left the church because the congregation simple could not pay him any more due to a reduction in membership because its members relocated to safer areas; • in all reasons for a reduction in church members that Christians were killed should not be forgotten. The number of Christians killed is however very small compared to those that fled (see chapter 2.1.2 and 2.1.3).

276 As many northern state governments do not give churches a Certificate of Occupation (CoO) that legalizes the church being built on a specific plot, most northern church buildings are de facto illegal and can easily be demolished or closed in times of tension and conflict.

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According to northern Church leaders the average number of members of a congregation in Northern Nigeria is between 50 and 100. This means that 653,350 to 1,306,700 Christians are affected by the burning, destruction, abandonment or closure of their churches through persistent violence. Although there are different ways Christians are affected, the main feature is that small numbers remain in violent ridden areas and that many flee. Decrease in Adamawa (-31.7), Bauchi (-14.7), Benue (-1.0), Borno (-85.7), Gombe (-2.2), Jigawa (-16.5), Kaduna (-7.8), Kano (-5.5), Nasarawa (-23.1), Taraba (-4.3), Yobe (-78.7) states . A total of 11 states . The decrease in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe is due to Boko Haram violence. Many Christians relocated and nearly all congregations had to close. The decrease is to a lesser extent in Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa and Kano, and is a consequence of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009, the 2011-post-electoral crisis and some present effects of Boko Haram violence. Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba are affected by the Fulani herdsmen attacks. Increase in FCT Abuja (19.8), Katsina (23.6), Kebbi (6.2), Kogi (5.1), Kwara (6.2), Niger (1.3), Plateau (6.0), Sokoto (3.3) and Zamfara (11.8) states. A total of 9 states . The large increase in Abuja is due to the development of FCT as capital and the influx of inhabitants among which are Christians from all over the country. The large increase in Katsina is mainly in ECWA/Tekan churches. This block of churches has had a church planting program for years with substantial growth. Small churches are planted in mostly rural communities and there are lots of national missionaries at work 277 . Growth has been to a lesser extent in the ‘peaceful’ states of Sokoto and Zamfara. The same is true for Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara and Niger. The small growth in Plateau State is due to the violent period 2001 – 2012 with the effect that church planting for safety reasons has been abandoned and outreach to Muslims has more or less stopped. Although conversion and child birth are reasons for church growth, the main reason is the relocation of fleeing Christians to safer areas. The relative small growth of the Celestial Church of Christ (CCoG) can be explained due to the very nature of this denomination, that even one family once relocated can start a new congregation. This is not the same in other denominations where the critical mass opening a new congregation is much higher. CAN church groups : The Christian Association of Nigeria is divided into five church groups. They are: • Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria ( CSN ) is made up of the Catholic Church in Nigeria. • Christian Council of Nigeria ( CCN ) is made up of Anglican, Methodist, Baptist Churches, Four Square, Presbyterian, Eternal Sacred Order of C & S, Church of the Lord Aladura and other Orthodox Churches. • Christian Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria ( CPFN ) and the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN ) are made up of Pentecostal Churches. • Organization of African Instituted Churches ( OAIC ) is made up of Churches founded by Nigerians (Africans) in Nigeria. • Evangelical Church of West Africa ( ECWA ) with its roots in Northern Nigeria and Tekan ( TEKAN ) is made up of denominations based in Northern Nigeria such as COCIN, HKAN NKST, Christian Assemblies, LCCN, etc. Sources : Officers of the Christian Association of Nigeria al different levels in northern states, Church leaders of different denominations, Officers of Christian NGO’s in northern states, Christian civil servants at different levels in northern states, Christians at high positions in northern society (e.g. judges, engineers).

277 According to Open Doors field researchers.

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Appendix 9. Location of the six representative areas Maps of Lassa town, Borno State; Potiscum city, Yobe State; Tudun Wada Dankadai town, Kano State; Wukari town, Taraba State; Tafawa Balewa town, Bauchi State and Jos city, Plateau State. Map 1. Lassa, Askira Uba LGA in Borno State 278

278 Cf. for map: http://nigeriazipcodes.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Borno-State-Postcode-Map.jpg .

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Map 2 Potiskum city, Potiskum Local Government Areas, Borno State 279

279 Cf. for map: http://nigeriazipcodes.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Yobe-state-Postcode-Map.jpg.

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Map 3. Wukari town, Wukari Local Government Area in southern Taraba State 280

280 Cf. for map: http://nigeriazipcodes.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Taraba-State-Postcode-Map.jpg.

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Map 4. Tudun Wada Dankadai town, Tudun Wada Local Government Area in Kano State 281

281 Cf. for map: http://nigeriazipcodes.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Kano-State-Postcode-Map.jpg.

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Map 5. Tafawa Balewa town, Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area in Bauchi State 282

282 Cf. for map: http://nigeriazipcodes.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Bauchi-map.jpg.

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Map 6. Jos city, Jos north Local Government Area in Plateau State 283

283 Cf. for map: http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and- their-local-governments-in-nigeria/.

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Appendix 10. Political and religious affiliation of northern (deputy) governors

Table 1. Political and religious affiliation of northern (deputy) Governors (2011 – 2015) 284

Deputy State Deputy Governor Governor of Governor: State Majority of majority Deputy Political majority States Governor Name Christian Governor: religion in religion in Governor Name Party religion in or Christian or state state state Muslim? Muslim? (Yes/No) (Yes/No) Adamawa Murtala Nyako James Ngilari APC Muslim Christian Christianity No Yes Bauchi Isa Yuguda Sagir A Saleh PDP Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Benue Gabriel Suswam Steven Lawani PDP Christian Christian Christianity Yes Yes Zanna Umar Borno Kashim Shettima Mustapha APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Ibrahim Hassan Gombe Dankwambo Jason Taanda PDP Muslim Christian Islam Yes No Jigawa Sule Lamido Ahmed M Gumel PDP Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Mukhtar Kaduna Ramalan Yero 285 Nuhu Bajoga PDP Muslim Christian Islam Yes No Mohammed Rabiu Abdullahi Kano Kwankwaso Ganduje APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Ibrahim Shehu Abdullahi G Katsina Shema Faskari PDP Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Usman Saidu Nasamu Kebbi Dakingari Ibrahim Aliyu PDP Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Kogi Idris Wada Yomi Awoniyi PDP Muslim Christian Christianity No Yes Abdulfatah Kwara Ahmed Peter Kisira APC Muslim Christian Islam Yes No Umaru Tanko Al- Nasarawa Makura Damishi B. Luka APC Muslim Christian Christianity No Yes Mu'azu Ahmed Musa Niger Babangida Aliyu Ibeto PDP Muslim Muslim Islam Yes No Plateau Jonah Jang Ignatius Longjan PDP Christian Christian Christianity Yes Yes Sokoto Aliyu Wamakko Mukhtar Shagari APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Sani A. Taraba Danbaba Suntai Danladi 286 PDP Christian Muslim Christianity Yes No Yobe Ibrahim Geidam Aliyu Sale APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Abdul-Aziz Yari Zamfara Abubakar Ibrahim Wakkala APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes

284 Source: Open Doors elaboration based on Open Doors field research data. 285 He has been acting governor since his Christian predecessor Patrick Yakowa died in a helicopter crash. Cf. p. 18 in International Crisis Group, op cit. 286 He has been acting governor since his Christian predecessor Danbaba Suntai had an accident in a helicopter crash and was removed from office on medical grounds. Cf. chapter 2.2. under ‘Wukari town’.

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Table 2. Political and religious affiliation of northern (deputy) Governors (2015 – 2019) 287

Deputy Deputy Governor State State Governor of Deputy Governor: Governor Majority of Governor Political majority States Governor Christian : religion in majority Name Party religion Name or Christian state religion in in state Muslim? or state (Yes/No) Muslim? (Yes/No) Bindow Adamawa Jibrilla Martin Babale PDP Muslim Christian Christianity No Yes Mohammed Bauchi Abubakar Nuhu Gidado APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Samuel Benson Benue Ortom Abounou PDP Christian Christian Christianity Yes Yes Kashim Zanna Umar Borno Shettima Mustapha APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Ibrahim Gombe Dankwambo Jason Taanda PDP Muslim Christian Islam Yes No Badaru Ibrahim Jigawa Abubakar Hassan APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Kaduna Nasir Elrufai Bala Bantex APC Muslim Christian Islam Yes No Abdullahi Kano Ganduje Prof Hafizu APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Aminu Bello Mannir Katsina Masari Yakubu APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Samaila Kebbi Atiku Bagudu Yombe PDP Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Kogi Idris Wada Yomi Awoniyi PDP Muslim Christian Christianity No Yes Abdulfatah Kwara Ahmed Peter Kisira APC Muslim Christian Islam Yes No Nasarawa Umar Tanko Silas Ali Agara APC Muslim Christian Christianity No Yes Abubakar Niger Sani Ahmed Ketso APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes No Simon Bako Plateau Lalong Sony Tyoden PDP Christian Christian Christianity Yes Yes Aminu Sokoto Tambuwal Ahmad Aliyu APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Darius Taraba Ishaku 288 Haruna Manu PDP Christian Muslim Christianity Yes No Ibrahim Yobe Geidam Aliyu Sale APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes Abdul-Aziz Ibrahim Zamfara Yari Abubakar Wakkala APC Muslim Muslim Islam Yes Yes

287 Source: Open Doors elaboration based on Open Doors field research data. 288 Sani A. Danladi, acting governor, was defeated in the PDP primaries by Darius Ishaku, who won gubernatorial elections in 2015. An elections tribunal in November 2015 however annulled his victory due to procedural errors and attributed the governorship to Aisha Alhassan, a Muslim woman of the APC. But Ishaku is contesting this ruling in court. Cf. Chapter 2.2 Features of the impact of persistent violence; the Wukari case. See also p. 52-55 in Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (November 2015); op cit. See also MailOnline (2015); op cit.

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Appendix 11. Staff of big media houses in Northern Nigeria (as at 2014)

1. BBC Hausa Service – Staff (as at 2014)289 London based: Director Hausa Service – Mansur Liman Chief Producer – Elhadji Diori Coulibaly Producers 1. Ahmad Abdullahi 2. Aichatou Moussa 290 3. Aliyu Abdullahi Tanko 4. Aminu Abdulkadir 5. Suwaiba Mohammad, Mrs. 6. Jimeh Saleh 7. Abdullahi Tanko Bala Abuja studio : (Abuja based) 1. Abba Katsina 2. Abdou Halilou 3. Aisha Sherif Baffa 4. Badariya Tijjani Kalarawi 5. Bashir Saad Abdullahi 6. Bilkisu Babangida 7. Habiba Adamu 8. Haruna Shehu Tangaza 9. Ibrahim Isa 10. Ibrahim Mijinyawa 11. Ibrahim Shehu Adamu 12. Isa Sanusi 13. Muhammad Annur Muhammad 14. Muhammad Kabir Muhammad 15. Muhammad Shafi’u Abba 16. Nasidi Adamu Yahaya 17. Naziru Mikailu 18. Raliya Zubairu 19. Yusuf Tijjani Independent Staff 1. Sulaiman Ibrahim Katsina (Abuja based)

289 Data provided by Open Doors researchers Nigeria, September 2014. 290 Producers number 2. Aichatou Moussa appeared to be a Christian lady. So the number of Muslims is in reality 36 and the % 97.3%. The number of Christians is 1. (March 2016)

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States correspondents 1. Abdulsalam Ibrahim Ahmed – Enugu 2. Nura Muhammad Ringim – Kaduna 3. Yusuf Ibrahim Yakasai – Kano 4. Ishaq Khalid – Plateau/Bauchi/Gombe 5. Umar Shehu Elleman – Lagos Engineers (Abuja based) 1. Lawal Nuhu Samaila 2. Ahmad Wakili Zaria 3. Abdussalam Usman Abdulkadir Note: All these are Muslims. There are qualified Hausa Christian journalists throughout the area but, they are apparently not given opportunity. 2. Voice of America – Hausa Service Staff (as at 2014)291 Director - Mr. Leo Keyen – Christian Producers (Washington Office) 1. Halima Djimrao Kane – Muslim 2. Sahabo Imam Aliyu – Muslim 3. Ibrahim Alfa Ahmed – Muslim 4. Aliyu Mustapha Sokoto – Muslim 5. Jummai Ali – Muslim 6. Kabiru Fagge – Muslim 7. Bello Habib – Muslim 8. Maryam Dauda – Christian 9. Salihu Garba – Christian 10. Grace Alheri Abdu – Christian 11. Ibrahim Garba – Christian States correspondents (Nigeria) 1. Haruna Dauda Biu – Muslim – Borno 2. Shehu Saleh – Muslim – Abuja 3. Nasiru Adamu El-Hikaya – Muslim – Abuja 4. Murtala Faruk Sanyinna – Muslim – Sokoto 5. Saadat Fawu – Muslim – Gombe 6. Medina Dauda Nadabo – Muslim – Abuja 7. Ladan Ibrahim Ayawa – Muslim – Lagos 8. Nasiru Batsari – Muslim – Minna 9. Iliya Kure – Christian – Kaduna 10. Zainab Babaji – Christian – Jos/Nasarawa/Benue 11. Ibrahim Abdul Azeez – Muslim – Yola Niger Republic 1. Abdullahi Amadu – Muslim

3. Deutsche Welle – Hausa Service Staff (as at 2014) Chief Officer Alhaji Ado Gwadabe - Muslim

291 Data provided by Open Doors researchers Nigeria, September 2014.

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Correspondents: 1. Abdulrahaman Kabir - Muslim 2. Jamilu Sani - Muslim 3. Mansour B. Bello - Muslim 4. Ahmad Tijjani Lawal – Muslim 5. Habou Adi – Muslim 6. Zubair L. Abdurrauf - Muslim 7. Issoufou Mamane – Muslim

4. Radio France International - Hausa Staff (as at 2014) Correspondent (France) 1. Bashir Ibrahim Idris – Muslim

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Appendix 12. Nigerian past and present leaders from 1960 to the present

This table presents an overview of Nigerian past and present leaders and their religious affiliation. There are 16 heads of state of which 7 are Christians and 9 Muslims 292 .

Table 1. Nigerian past and present leaders (1960 – present) Number Name Period Ethnicity/Religion 1 Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa 1960 – 1966 He was the first prime minister of an Balewa independent Nigeria (1957 – 1966) and a Muslim Bageri from Tafawa Balewa in Bauchi State . 2 Chief Benjamin Nnamdi October 1, 1963 – January He was the first president (1963 – 1966) and Azikiwe 16, 1966 is a Christian Igbo from Nnewi in Anambra State. But born in Zunguru, Sokoto State. 3 Major General Johnson January 16, 1966 – July 29, A Christian Igbo from Umuahia in Abia State. Thomas Umunnakwe 1966 Aguiyi Ironsi 4 General Yakubu Gowon August 1, 1966 – July 29, A Christian Ngas (Angas) from Lur, Kanke 1975 Local Government Area of Plateau State. 5 General Murtala Ramat July 29, 1975 – February 13, A Muslim Hausa from Northern Nigeria. Mohammed 1976 6 General Olusegun February 13, 1976 – A Christian Yoruba from Owu, Abeokuta in Aremu Okikiola Matthew October 1, 1979 Ogun State. Obasanjo 7 Shehu Usman Aliyu October 1, 1979 – A Muslim Fulani from Shagari village, Sokoto Shagari December 31, 1983 State . 8 Major-General December 31, 1983 – A Muslim Fulani from Daura, Katsina State. Muhammadu Buhari August 27, 1985 9 General Ibrahim August 27, 1985 – August A Muslim Gwari from Minna, Niger State. Badamasi Babangida 27, 1993 10 Chief Ernest Adegunle August 26, 1993 – A Christian Yoruba from Abeokuta, South- Oladeinde Shonekan November 17, 1993 West Nigeria. 11 General Sani Abacha November 17, 1993 – June A Muslim Kanuri from Kano, Kano State 8, 1998 (family originally from Borno State). 12 General Abdulsalami June 9, 1998 – May 29, A Muslim Hausa from Minna, Niger State. Alhaji Abubakar (rtd.) 1999 13 General (rtd.) Olusegun May 29, 1999 – May 29, A Christian Yoruba from in Ogun State, but Aremu Okikiola Matthew 2007 grew up in Owu, Abeokuta Obasanjo 14 Umaru Musa Yar'Adua 29 May 2007 – 5 May 2010 A Muslim Fulani from Katsina, Katsina State. 15 Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe 9 February 2010 – 29 May A Christian Ijaw from Otueke in Ogbia Local Jonathan 2015 Government Area, Bayelsa State. 16 Major-General May 29, 2015 – present A Muslim Fulani from Daura, Katsina State. Muhammadu Buhari

Note The impression of northern Christians concerning the religious adherence of Nigerian national leaders is that most presidents and military dictators were northern Muslims. As a consequence of that the

292 Cf. article ‘Nigerian past and present leaders from 1960 till present, in Hot Naija News, 28 August 2015; see link: http://hotnaijanews.com/nigerian-past-and-present-leaders-from-1960-till-present . And see article ‘Nigerian Military Heads-fo- state & Civilian Presidents’, in NigerianProfessional.com; see link: http://www.nigerianprofessional.com/heads-of-state.html

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northern Muslim cause was favored which led to their socio-political domination in the northern region and subsequently in the country. If we look at the facts of religious adherence of leaders, however, 7 are Christians and 9 Muslims 293 . But in the twenty year period between the Christian President Obasanjo’s first and second rule (October 1, 1979 – May 29, 1999) all leaders – except the three months of Shonekan – were northern Muslims and among them them Buhari, Bagbangida and Abacha. With Christian President Goodluck Jonathan’s rule since February 9, 2010 northern Christians hoped for a ‘second chance’ after Obasanjo to prevent northern Muslim domination from continuing. The March 28, 2015 election of Muhammed Buchari however aborted such hope. The twenty years of unabated northern Muslim rule during the 2 nd and 3 rd Republic and the period of Military rule (1979 – 1999) favored Muslim dominance in the northern region. Will Buhari’s presidency continue this development again?

293 See Appendix 12. Nigerian past and present leaders (1960 – present).

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Appendix 13. Prominent figures of the northern political and religious elite

Ahmadu Bello (1910 – 1966) was the first prime minister of Northern Nigeria. He was the Sardauna of Sokoto (2 nd after the Sultan) and put great effort into a united and strong Northern region within independent Nigeria. In this respect he gathered large funding from abroad for the promotion of Islam in Nigeria. He was killed in the first 1966 coup that led to the southerner Ironsi military regime. He was a Muslim Fulani from Rabbah, Sokoto State 294 .

Ahmadu Bello 295 Abubakr Gumi (1922 – 1992) was an Islamic scholar and Grand Khadi of Northern Nigeria. He was against Western influences and created the Yan Izala in 1987 to unite Muslims towards a more radical and pure version of Islam. He had the initial support of the Northern elite, but lost much credit in his battle against the Sufi brotherhoods with their – in his view – corrupt version of Islam. The Grand Khadi position was abolished in 1967. He was a Hausa-Fulani Muslim from Gumi, Sokoto State 296 . Ibrahim Babangida (1941 – present) is a retired army general. He was the military ruler from 1985 – 1993 when he was obliged to step down after annulling elections and much subsequent political unrest. Babangida was behind the scenes in many military coups. His regime is known for severe human rights abuses. He is a Gwari Muslim from Minna, Niger State 297 . Sana Abachi (1943 – 1998) was an army general and military ruler from 1993 – 1998. He is known for his brutality and closure of most democratic institutions, but economic growth increased substantially during his reign. He died of a heart attack. Abachi was a Muslim Kanuri from Kano, Kano State.

294 Cf. pp. 14-24 of Kukah, op cit. 295 Cf. article ‘Biography of Ahmadu Bello’, by ChatAfrik network, 4 May 2012; see link: http://chatafrik.com/articles/sports/item/897-biography-of-ahmadu-bello.html?tmpl=component&print=1#.VNt7tE10zcs 296 Cf. Loimejer, op cit. 297 See article Ibrahim Babangida, Head of stte of Nigeria, in Encyclopedia Britannica; see link: http://www.britannica.com/biography/Ibrahim-Babangida

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Ali Modu Sheriff (1956 – present) was a Borno State central senator from 1993 – 1998 and Borno State Governor in 2003 and 2007. He is from a rich business family and owns many companies (e.g. Meroil Organisation and Union Chase). His personality is much discussed, for instance his brother Bagangida is married to Buhari’s daughter Halima, and he is accused by Australian hostage negotiator Steven Davies of being a sponsor of Boko Haram. Sheriff is a Muslim Kanuri from Ngala, Borno State 298 .

Ali Modu Sheriff 299 Muhammadu Buhari (1942 – present) is a politician and retired army general. He participated in the 1966 coup against president Ironsi. He ousted president Shagari in 1983 for reasons of economic mismanagement, corruption and rigged elections, and became the military ruler. Two years later he was ousted for basically the same reasons. He was a candidate in the 2003 and 2007 presidential elections, but was defeated. He contested Goodluck Jonathan in 2011 and was his actual challenger in the March 2015 presidential elections which he won on the opposition APC ticket. Buhari is a Muslim Fulani from Daura, Katsina State and the actual president of Nigeria.300 Sa'adu Abubakar IV (1956 – present) is the 20 th Sultan of Sokoto. He is the spiritual leader of the 70 million Muslims in Nigeria. He is the head of Jama’atu Nasril Islam (Society for the Support of Islam – JNI), and president-general of the Nigerian National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA). He also is the leader of the Sufi Quaridiyya brotherhood and senior [what?] to the emir of Kano, leader of the Tijaniyya brotherhood. Abubakar is consulted by the traditional and political leadership and in all questions concerning religion, governance, and persistent violence. Abubakar is a Muslim Fulani from Sokoto, Sokoto State 301 .

298 See article ‘All You Need To Know About Ali Modu Sheriff’, on Naija.com, 2014; see link: https://www.naij.com/285217-top-7- important-facts-ali-modu-sheriff.html 299 See article ‘ Sheriff: Nigerian ambassador to Chad dismisses ‘false social media reports’, by John Emmanuel, on the Eagle Onloine, 13 September 2014; see link: http://theeagleonline.com.ng/sheriff-nigerian-ambassador-to-chad-dismisses-false-social- media-reports-2 300 See article ‘ Nigeria's Muhammadu Buhari in profile ’, in BBC News, 31 March 2015; see link: http://www.bbc.com/news/world- africa-12890807 . See also article: News about president Muhammad Buhari – biography’, at Naiji.com; see link: https://www.naij.com/tag/muhammadu_buhari.html 301 Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%27adu_Abubakar

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Appendix 14. Overview of percentages Christians, Muslims and ATR in northern states

Table 1. Overview of Christians, Muslims and ATR in northern states in 1952 302 States % Christians % Muslims % ATR Adamawa 3.8 32.9 63.3 Bauchi 1.1 76.3 22.6 Benue 7.1 2.8 90.1 Borno 0.6 80.9 18.5 Gombe 2.5 70.1 27.4 Jigawa 0.4 98.4 1.3 Kaduna 10.2 57.3 32.5 Kano 0.5 97.8 1.7 Katsina 0.3 95.2 4.5 Kebbi 0.3 79.0 20.7 Kogi 18.5 22.5 59.1 Kwara 6.5 63.4 30.1 Nasarawa 7.8 23.4 68.8 Niger 3.5 46.8 49.7 Plateau 11.4 25.5 63.1 Sokoto 0.5 96.3 3.2 Taraba 2.0 19.0 78.0 Yobe 0.5 87.3 12.2 Zamfara 0.5 96.3 3.2 Totals Northern 454,561 12,289,975 4,091,046 303 Nigeria (21.1%) (47.4%) (31.6%) Population 16,835,582 Population 30,403,305 Northern (55.4%) Nigeria (100%) Nigeria

302 Cf. ‘Percentages by Religion of the 1952 and 1963 Populations of Nigeria’s Present 36 States’, Nigeria Research Network (NRN) Background Paper No. 1, by Philip Ostien, January 2012; see link: https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/33732612/percentages-by-religion-of-the-1952-and-1963-populations-of-/7 He adjusted the figures for the 1952 Census to the (in 1999) newly created states. The 1952 census figures were for families however and not for individuals. Ostien solved the problem by assuming that the percentages for households by religion were the same as for individuals by religion and calculated the numbers of adherents per religion out of the total population. 303 The totals are slightly over 100% due to rounding of percentages up a decimal.

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Table 2. Overview of Christians, Muslims and ATR in northern states in 1963 304 States % Christians % Muslims % ATR Adamawa 16.0 34.6 49.4 Bauchi 1.6 83.4 14.9 Benue 53.4 2.8 43.8 Borno 2.7 88.3 8.9 Gombe 6.2 75.0 18.8 Jigawa 0.8 98.0 1.2 Kaduna 25.1 55.7 19.2 Kano 1.1 97.0 1.8 Katsina 0.4 94.6 5.1 Kebbi 0.5 85.5 14.0 Kogi 28.2 37.5 34.2 Kwara 13.6 75.6 10.8 Nasarawa 13.8 30.2 56.0 Niger 4.0 62.4 33.6 Plateau 23.2 26.1 50.7 Sokoto 0.4 98.9 0.7 Taraba 13.7 26.2 60.0 Yobe 1.0 94.8 4.2 Zamfara 0.4 98.9 0.7 Totals Northern 2,880,112 21,342,866 5,540,302 Nigeria (34.3%) (47.2%) (18.5%) Population 29,763,276 Population 54,959,426 Northern (54.2%) Nigeria (100%) Nigeria

304 Ibid.

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Table 3. Overview of Christians, Muslims and ATR in northern states in 2014 305 States % Christians % Muslims % ATR Adamawa 53.6% 46.3% 7.3 Bauchi 25.3% 71.3% 3.4 Benue 81.0% 5.0% 14 Borno 30.0% 65.3% 4.7 Gombe 40.0% 47.2% 12,8 Jigawa 7.0% 92.0% 2 Kaduna 46.7% 46.7% 6.6 Kano 8.3% 90.1% 1.6 Katsina 9.0% 55.2% 35 Kebbi 24.0% 65.5% 10.5 Kogi 51.3% 40.0% 8.7 Kwara 41.7% 52.5% 5.8 Nasarawa 51.7% 35.0% 13.3 Niger 39.0% 60.1% 0.9 Plateau 73.3% 18.0% 8.7 Sokoto 4.3% 95.1% 0.6 Taraba 50.0% 35.0% 15 Yobe 6.7% 86.2% 7.1 Zamfara 2.3% 96.5% 1.2 FCT Abuja 43.3% 45.0% 11.7 Totals Northern 30,665,000 62,431,000 5,213,000 Nigeria (31.2%) (63.5%) (5.3%) Population 98,366,000 Population 183,523,000 (100%) Northern (53.6%) Nigeria Nigeria

305 Cf. Appendix 4. Christian and Muslim populations per Northern state.

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Appendix 15. Summary of attacks on Christians in Northern Nigeria

This table gives the larger picture of incidents of persecution from December 1980 to May 2014 by Open Doors Nigeria. The dates are not precise for the reports were done monthly. They were based upon the consultations of the Public Relations officers of the 19 Northern States and FCT Abuja of the Christian Association of Nigeria, and some Church leaders in various zones. Table 1. Summary of Attacks on Christians in Northern Nigeria 1980 – 2014 S/NO DATE LOCATION NATURE OF INCIDENT 1 December Kano Islamic radicals (Maitatsine group) attacked 18th-20th 1980 Kano State Christians and burnt churches. Over 4,000 Christians were killed and their properties worth millions of naira were lost. 2 October Kaduna, Another Maitatsine riot; over 50 Christians 25th-30th 1982 Kaduna State estimated dead. 3 October 30th 1982 Kano, Kano State 2 Churches burnt to ashes, 6 more destroyed. (Sabon Gari Municipality) 4 April 23rd-28th Bauchi State Maitatsine uprising; more than 100 Christians 1985 (Gombe) lost their lives. 5 March 6th-12th Kaduna State Muslim students attacked Christian students at 1987 (Kafanchan, Kaduna, Zaria) the College of Education in Kafanchan and Christians fought back. The fight later spread to and Katsina in Katsina State other places as indicated in the following incidents. More than 150 churches were burnt and more than 25 Christians killed. 6 1988 Bauchi State: Religious riots in Bauchi State secondary Bauchi, Gombe schools, Muslims students attacked Christian teachers and students in GSS Gombe, GTC Gombe and GSS Bauchi and other secondary schools in Bauchi State. Some of the Christian students were badly wounded. 7 March 8th 1988 Kaduna Polytechnic, Kaduna Kaduna State government destroyed a Christian State chapel in the school under construction. This led to a religious uprising. 8 1988 Kaduna State Benson Omenka, a final year student, was killed (Ahmadu Bello University Zaria) by Muslim students during the elections for the Student Union. Christian students were also at the same occasion stoned, maimed and raped. 9 October 14th-6th Kano State, Kano The Reinhard Bonnke riots: fighting between 1991 Muslims and Christians as Muslim activists rampaged and protested against a planned revival meeting during which a German evangelist, Reinhard Bonnke, was expected to be the guest preacher.

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10 October 1991 Kano, Kano State Muslims held violent demonstrations as a result of evangelist Bonnke’s intended ‘crusade’. In the “Bonnke’s Fracas” as the violence was called some lives were lost and churches/properties destroyed. 11 1991 Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi State Riots began when a Christian butcher, a member of the Sayawa ethnic group in Tafawa Balewa LGA sold meat to a Muslim. Muslims staged a violent demonstration leading to burning down of churches and the loss of lives/properties. 12 April 15th-16th Kaduna State, Zangon Kataf Local What was supposed to be a communal riot 1992 Govt. Area turned into a religious one between Christians and Muslims and spread throughout Kaduna State. Hundreds of people lost their lives and many buildings were burnt. 13 May 18th 1992 Kaduna State: Rev. Tacio Duniya of ECWA church, Rev. Musa Kaduna, Zaria Bakut and a host of others were murdered by apparent Muslim fanatics. 14 30th May 1995 Kano, Two Hausa women who parked their car in front Kano State of an Ibo shop. Two Hausa men subsequent burgled into the car and stole a bag. The Ibo trader notified the culprits to the ladies. The latter reported the burglars to the police, who arrested them. Later however they were released. The two Hausa men later picked a fight with the Ibo. Other Hausa people in the area saw the fight and took over from their brothers, disregarding the reason for the fight. 15 15th May 1992 Zangon -Kataf An incident o ver the location of the Zango Kaduna State market turned into a religious crisis and spilled over into Kaduna city. (Muslim did not like Christians to slaughter porcs and wanted a separate market) 16 17th May 1992 Zangon-Kataf Christians were attacked in various parts of Kaduna State Kaduna city. Both in Zangon-Kataf and Kaduna city. Some lives/properties destroyed. 17 1994 Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi State The appointment of a Muslim Sayawa Commissioner over their Christian Sayawa Commissioner by Gov. Rasaki Raji. The inauguration was funded and organized by Muslims in order to impose him on the local population. The Governor replaced a Christian commissioner with a Muslim. It led to violent demonstration, lives were lost, churches burnt and properties destroyed. 18 4th September 1994 Potiskum, Yobe State Muslims instigated a violent demonstration that led to loss of lives, burning of churches and properties.

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19 1st July 1995 Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi State Apparent pre-meditated attacks by the Hausa- Fulani Muslims of Tafawa Balewa led to the mass killing of Christian Sayawas, and to the burning of churches and houses in some villages. 20 11 th December 1998 Maiduguri, Borno State A protest of Muslims against the government’s decision to allow the teaching of Christian Religious Knowledge (C.R.K) in public schools led to violent demonstrations. Lives were lost, churches were burnt and properties were destroyed. 21 1999 Borno State Religious riots occurred as Borno State government by Christians to the plan of not allowing the teaching of Christian Religious Knowledge in schools. Muslims attacked them on the way to the governor house when they wanted to present their condolences. 22 21st Feb/22 May Kaduna City Shari’a crisis: demonstrations by Christians led 2000 Kaduna State to violent counter-demonstration by Muslims; many lives were lost and churches/properties were destroyed. 23 February 4th-22nd Kaduna State Riots began after a Christian march to oppose 2000 the implementation of Sharia law. Passers-by were killed as they tried to escape from their vehicles. More than 1,000 people died in various clashes. 24 Feb ruary & May Kaduna State Christians in Kaduna city were attacked on two 2000 different occassions as Muslims protested against the delay in the introduction of Sharia in the state. 25 May 16th 2000 Kaduna State Muslim youths destroyed the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA) in Kaduna city. This incident happened only hours after peacekeeping troops left the area. 26 May 25 th 2000 Kaduna State Several days of violence over the introduction of Sharia led to the death of at least 150 people. Homes, shops and churches were also destroyed. 27 September 7 th -9th Gombe State In Bambam, 25 people died as a result of clashes 2000 between Muslims and Christians due to possible implementation of Sharia. Property damaged was estimated in millions of naira. 28 November 2000 Kebbi State Christians showing the Jesu film were warned not to continue showing the film 29 June 2001 Jigawa State 15 churches and 14 pastors’ residences were burned down in Gawaram. A similar attack on 11 churches occurred earlier in the year in Hadejia. 30 5th August 2001 Bauchi State According to the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) Muslim mercenaries have been

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attacking Christians in the Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro areas on two occasions. The attacks left more than 100 dead and 3,000 displaced. 31 7th September 2001 Jos, Plateau State A woman is said to pass through a crowd of Muslim worshippers at Friday prayers in the street. In spite of this being her usual custom, it spilled into a riot. Muslims staged a violent demonstration leading to confrontation between Muslims and Christians.

32 May 2002 Jos, Plateau State Killings took place between the two communities of Muslims and Christians as a result of continuous violence by Muslims. This which led to loss of lives and properties. 33 2nd May 2002 Jos, Plateau State Muslims attacked Christians. Properties were destroyed and people lost their lives. 34 July 2002 Langtang Wase, Riots between Christians and Muslims as a Plateau State result of harboured tension by both Christians and Muslims over previous crisis. Lives were lost and properties destroyed. 35 21st May 2002 Kaduna Metropolis The Miss World crisis at the occasion of the Kaduna State occasion of the Miss World Beauty Contest to be held in Kaduna city, Nigeria. Muslims in Kaduna city staged a violent demonstration that led to the destruction of the office of the Newspaper Thisday and to the loss of lives and properties including churches. 36 May 2002 Zamfara State The whereabouts of two Christians accused with apostasy, converting from Islam to Christianity, is unknown. Lawali Yakubu and Ali Jafaru disappeared after a judge refused to sentence them to death. 37 May –June 2002 Niger State At least 75 Christians were arrested f or opposing the state’s shari’a law. 38 June 6 th 2002 Katsina State A Christian police officer in Katsina city was clubbed to death by a mob of Muslims after being accused of trampling a Koran. The police officer had warned a Muslim preacher to stop inciting violence against Christians. Afraid of being arrested, the preacher fabricated the Koran story to provoke the crowd. 39 September 2002 Kaduna State, Federal Muslim students fought against Christian Government College Zaria students as the Muslim students discovered that a Christian was likely to win the position of president of the Student Union during election. Many were killed and several female students raped. 40 October 31st 2002 Kaduna, Zaria A clash over student elections at the Federal College of Education in Zaria ended in the death of 20 Christian students.

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41 December 2003 Ryom, Plateau State Christians were killed, houses and churches were destroyed, individuals were injured and many other damages were done. 42 April 22nd 2003 Kano State A pastor and 6 of his members were killed in a house fire which was believed to have been started by Muslim militants. 43 April 2004 Yelwa Shendem, 47 Christians were burnt in a church and a lot of Plateau State houses and properties were destroyed. 44 April 2004 Kano State A Muslim reprisal of the many Jos crises: many Christians were killed; their houses and properties were lost. 46 18 th February 2006 Maiduguri, Borno State The Danish Muhammed Cartoon crisis as a result of drawing caricature cartoons of the Prophet. This resulted in a violent demonstration by Muslims in which lives were lost, churches were burnt and lots of properties were destroyed. 56 churches were burnt and 63 Christians killed in an apparent orchestrated attack. 45 22 February 2006 Potiskum, Yobe State The Danish Muhammed Cartoon crisis as a result of drawing caricature cartoons of the Prophet. This resulted in a violent demonstration by Muslims in which lives were lost, churches were burnt and lots of properties were destroyed. 46 September 2006 Jigawa State 26 churches were burnt. 47 September 28th Tudun Wada, Kano State 3 killed, 72 injured, 8 churches burnt. 2007 48 December 2007 Yelwa, Bauchi State 10 Christians killed and 47 injured. 49 May 13 th 2008 Bauchi State, Ningi, Tafawa 6 churches burnt and vandalized. Balewa 50 November 28 th Plateau State Over 100 Christians killed, 71 churches burnt, 2008 1,647 families lost their homes, 535 businesses burnt.

51 28 th November Jos, Plateau State Local government area elections turned into a 2008 religious crisis; lives were lost, properties were damaged and churches were burnt. 52 December 2008 Sokoto State The NCCF (NYSC) bus was burnt. 53 February 21 st 2009 Bauchi State 19 people dead, 12 churches burnt, 50 Christian houses destroyed. 54 29 th July 2009 Borno, Bauchi, Sokoto and A group called Boko Haram killed Christians Adamawa states who refused to denounce Christ; it burnt their churches and attacked the government security operatives. 55 27 th December 2009 Plateau State, Yelwa Muslim burnt the Baptist Church at Yelwa and stabbed some Christians on the street of Jos, city.

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56 29 th December 2009 Bauchi State A group called Kalikato attacked people in Bauchi, leaving 39 people dead and some houses burnt. 57 17 th -21 st January Plateau State Muslims brought terror in 24 communities in 2010 Jos North, Jos South, Barkin Ladi, Mangu, Pankshin, and Dangi. The violence led to numerous deaths and the burning of Christian homes, including Bukuru Market. 58 20 th January 2010 Sokoto State A Christian man was killed in retaliation over the incidents in Jos. 59 22 nd January 2010 Kaduna State Muslims attack Christians at Mararraban Rido (close to NNPC Depot). 60 28 th January – 1st Gombe State Muslims burnt ECWA primary and secondary February 2010 schools at Bolori. They burnt houses belonging to Ibos at Duku, burnt the Yoruba Hall at Jekadafari and also burnt two churches while one of them was also vandalized. 61 February2011 Maiduguri, Borno State Dangerous weapons like rocket launchers, ammunitions, AK 47 rifles, swords, etc. were apprehended by security agents around Maiduguri border with Chad. The weapons were brought in with the intent to destabilize the upcoming election in April 2011. 62 February 2011 Jigawa State A church was burnt down in Jigawa State for yet unknown reasons; the pastor of the church had to wear an imam vestment to escape the jihadists. 63 February 2011 Jos , Plateau State Over 30 people have been killed by the Muslims around Jos in different villages following the attack by Muslims in the area. 64 February 2011 Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi State About 15 people were killed, 50 houses were burnt down by the Muslims in Tafawa Balewa; two churches were destroyed. Among those killed was a pastor of ECWA Church. 65 February 2011 Tafawa Balewa , Bauchi State Boys and Girls secondary schools were closed by Bauchi State government in Tafawa Balewa. Behind it is an apparent plan to ‘frustrate’ the Christian children in their education. The government has already transferred all the Christian children to schools in Muslim areas so that they can be easily monitored. 66 March 2011 Plateau State, Jos, Kai village In Plateau State, 2 Muslim youths who targeted a church with a bomb during a worship service in the Nasarawa Area of Jos died together. Some bombs were picked up by the anti-bomb squad in Domkat Bali area in Jos and Tudun Wada suspected to be planted by the jihadists. 5 people were reportedly killed in Kai village of Plateau State. 67 March 2011 Sokoto State, Sokoto 2 churches were destroyed in Sokoto in the Old

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Airport area. Muslims opposed the existence of the churches in the area that were in no time demolished without any compensation given. A Muslim man apparently defecated on a Qur’an with the intention of causing religious upheaval in the State. The man is presently in the hands of the police and under investigations. 68 March 2011 Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi State About 1,000 aggressive Muslims surrounded some areas in the Tafawa Balewa area of Bauchi State in groups. They were fully armed with sophisticated weapons with the apparent aim of wiping the Christian town of Tafawa Balewa out in the name of jihad. The groups were overpowered by local Christian vigilante groups. 69 March 2011 Kano State In Kano State , the Muslim community claimed land belonging to a church; the believers were threatened to keep their hands off the land or face a heavy attack from the Muslim community. 70 March 2011 Potiskum, Yobe State In Yobe State about 10 Muslim men and women appeared dressed in Christian women and men’s fellowship group uniforms. They were even singing Christian songs, but were apprehended by the police. In the vehicle conveying these fake people guns and ammunitions were discovered. Their planned destination was Jos. Also, after months of hearings in a Sharia court in Potiskum, the judge ruled that some Christian children will be forced to join Islam according to Sharia. The children apparently had a Muslim father. 71 July 2011 Kaduna State, Kaduna Muslim leaders had a meeting in Kaduna city that resulted in getting the attention of the President of Nigeria. Adequate compensation of all Muslims affected by the Jos crisis was requested on behalf of peace and unity in the country. By Christians suspected ulterior motives of the Muslim leaders were intentions to resurrect the spirit of violence in Plateau State. 72 July 2011 Kaduna State, Kaduna The new release of an audio message of a radical imam through cell phones was discovered in the month of July. The message contained a verbal attack on Christians in Kaduna and was an apparent joint effort of Muslim youth in Northern Nigeria. 73 July 2011 Kano State Members of Boko Haram have sent a warning to Kano State government to urge them to release all their members from state prisons. Failure to abide by this call will result in a heavy attack on

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the people of Kano including on Christians.

74 July 2011 Jos city, Plateau State Two bombs exploded in two different areas in Jos. The city that suffered much from ethno- religious unrest was experiencing a gradual return to peace when the bombs exploded. 75 September 2011 Niger State The man behind the manufacturing of explosives for Boko Haram has been apprehended. The factory where the explosives were fabricated was discovered in Niger State. The Nigerians are still waiting to see the outcome of the arrest. 76 September 2011 Zamfara State A group of attackers invaded a village in Zamfara State killing about 17 people, including women and children. The identity of the attackers has still to be uncovered.

77 4th November 2011 Damaturu, Yobe State Boko Haram members launched an attack in Damaturu, Yobe State. They killed 150 people, and 9 churches were heavily demolished. Over 25 widows have been recorded. Many Christians fled the city for fear of more attacks as the sect spokesperson had said so in a threat. 78 November 2011 Kafanchan, Ƙaduna State Over 20 youths were arrested following days of bloodshed in Kafanchan when Muslim youth attacked Christians and over 50 houses were burnt down. A swift intervention of the military deployed from Kaduna city brought the situation under control. A group of Christian youth has publicly vowed to get rid of all the aggressive Muslim youth whenever the soldiers are withdrawn. 79 November 2011 Bogoro Local Government Area , 4 were reported killed in Gargare village , Bauchi State Bogoro LGA, Bauchi State. Fulani Muslims attacked this Christian village, burning houses, killing 4 women, injuring 7 others with deep cuts while other lost complete limbs. 80 January 2012 Yobe State A mass exodus of Christians from Yobe State was recorded following a threat by Islamic militants to annihilate them from the entire state. Hundreds of families had to relocate from their hometowns to neighboring states for safety. 81 January 2012 Kano city, Kano State Over 200 people lost their lives in Kano city when Boko Haram members attacked security agents in the city. 82 January 2012 Gombe State , Gombe Armed gunmen attacked the Deeper Life Bible church in Gombe during a prayer session. They killed 10 people and injured 18. Among the dead was the wife of Pastor Johnson. The church has been under lock and key since then.

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83 January 2012 Tafawa Balewa town; Bauchi Tafawa Balewa town was heavily attacked with State guns and explosives. The attackers were members of Boko Haram. Houses belonging to Christians were torched and many people lost their lives during the attack that took place around 3am. 84 January 2012 Bebeji LGA. of Kano State About 6 Christian brothers were imprisoned as a result of their faith. 85 February 2012 Kogi State A group of armed Islamic militants attacked and bombed Koton Karfe prison in Kogi State thereby freeing all the prisoners. 86 February 2012 Minna city, Niger State In Niger State, precisely Minna, a church was targeted during a worship service by Boko Haram. The bomb exploded and about three people lost their lives; cars belonging to the worshippers were also heavily damaged. 87 February 2012 Gombe city, Gombe State, Boko Haram members engaged in gun battle with security agents in Gombe city. Over 50 bombs exploded, a police station was completely destroyed, policemen were killed and many soldiers were wounded. About 5 civilians lost their lives. 88 February 2012 Maiduguri city, Borno State In Maiduguri many people lost their lives due to a Boko Haram attack at Baga road market. Civilians and a few security agents were affected. The situation in the city is becoming unbearable as killing is taking place on a nearly daily basis. 89 February 2012 Jos city, Plateau State 6 Christians lost their lives when a suicide bomber rammed his vehicle laden with a bomb into the headquarters of the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) in Jos. The explosion detroyed 30 cars. The incident took place after the church had spent seven days of prayer and fasting about the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. 90 March/April 2012 Kaduna, Kaduna State Three newspaper headquarters in Kaduna and Abuja were attacked and bombed by the suicide bombers of the Boko Haram. About 9 people were confirmed dead, the 3 offices were demolished. 91 March/April 2012 Kano State, Kano Christians in Kano at Bayero University Campus were attacked by Boko Haram during their worship service. The attack left 26 Christians dead and over 50 people sustained various degrees of injuries. Among the dead were 2 professors and 5 doctorate degree holders. 92 March/April 2012 Maiduguri, Borno State A church was attacked by Boko Haram on Sunday during a worship service. A pastor who was about to administer Holy Communion was shot along with 3 others.

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93 March/April 2012 Potiskum, Yobe State Boko Haram members attacked a market in Potiskum. They killed over 100 people, 40 cows, and set the market on fire. Some hours later they attacked an ECWA church and set it on fire. 94 March/April 2012 Taraba State Suicide bombers attacked the convoy of the Taraba State Police Commissioner on its way to the office, about 11 people were killed. 95 May 2012 Maiduguri, Borno State 5 Christians were shot by members of Boko Haram. The victims were said to have been attacked in the church premises in the Jerusalem area of Maiduguri. 96 May 2012 Damaturu, Yobe State 3 Christians were shot in Damaturu by members of Boko Haram. 97 May 2012 Taraba State A new list of the churches to be attacked by Boko Haram was released in Taraba State. 98 June 2012 Zaria, Kaduna State 2 churches were attacked in Zaria which led to the death of over 15 people. The churches were heavily destroyed by the explosion for which the Boko Haram claimed responsibility. 99 June 2012 Kaduna State, Kaduna A church in Kaduna was targeted and bombed by a suicide bomber leading to the deaths of over 23 people including children. 100 June 2012 Kaduna State The entire state of Kaduna was plunged into another round of sectarian violence following the bombing of a church. Christian youth put a 24 hrs. curfew for days upon the city. 101 June 2012 Yelwa Kagadama-Bauchi, Bauchi Over 20 people lost their lives during a suicide State bomb attack on a church in Yelwa Kagadama, Bauchi city. Over 30 were hospitalized. 102 July 2012 Maiduguri, Borno State 14 Christians who worked with a construction company in Maiduguri were killed. Their throats were cut while Boko Haram claimed responsibility. 103 July 2012 Plateau State, Barkin Ladi and The fragile peace of Plateau State was tempered Riyom LGAs again as Muslim Fulani and members of Boko Haram attacked over 20 villages of Christian Berom in Barkin Ladi and Riyom LGAs. They killed over 150 people, mostly women, elderly men and children. Houses and churches were destroyed. Among those killed were 50 people who ran to the church for safety but they were trapped in the church and burnt. 104 July 2012 Sokoto State, Sokoto Three police formations were attacked in Sokoto metropolis by members of Boko Haram. 5 people were reportedly killed including police officers. 105 July 2012 Borno State The El-Kanemi of Borno (Shehu or Emir) was attacked during a prayer session together with the Deputy Governor of the State. The teenager

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suicide bomber died at the spot. The Shehu narrowly escaped death. 106 August 2012 Okene, Kogi State 18 people were recorded dead in a Deeper Life Bible church following the attack by Islamic militants during a bible study at around 7:30pm in Okene, Kogi State. 21 people were hospitalized including the wife of the pastor of the church. The local government overseer of the church was among those killed in the church; most of the people remain critically ill in hospital. 107 August 2012 Kaduna State, Kaduna As the Eid (Id-al-fitr) was celebrated by the entire Muslim Umma around the world two Muslim youths heavily laden with explosives died in Kaduna city on their way to launch an attack. The perpetrators, who were on different motorbikes, died instantly as the explosives detonated before they could reach their targets.

108 September 2012 Bauchi State, Bauchi The church in Bauchi lost several prominent men as Boko Haram members attacked Zango area, gunned down 9 people and injured 5. The sudden deaths came as a great shock to the church as it was left to bury the men amidst great pain and mourning. 109 September 2012 Bauchi State, Bauchi The Christians in Bauchi experienced a suicide bombing at St. John’s Catholic church in Bauchi. 4 people lost their lives and over 46 sustained various degrees of injuries. They were treated in hospital. 110 September 2012 Kano State, Kano 2 Christian brothers were shot dead in Kano by Islamic jihadists who insist on cleansing the North of Christians and implementing the full Sharia legal system. 111 September 2012 Gombe State, Gombe Gombe city was shut down as gunmen invaded some of the streets and fired sporadically, killing an unidentified number of men (possibly Boko Haram adherents). 112 October 2012 Saminaka, Kaduna State 5 people were confirmed dead as members of the Boko Haram sect attacked Saminaka town in Kaduna State. Banks were robbed and many wounded.

113 October 2012 Bauchi State, Bauchi A Christian woman was killed in Bauchi when Muslims and Christian youth clashed over a misunderstanding in a local school. The police had to return normalcy in the area. 114 October 2012 Jos, Plateau State Muslims in Jos killed a soldier on his duty post for not supporting them in attacking a Christian community. 115 August 2013 Kano State, Kano About 40 Christians were attacked and killed in

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Kano when suicide bombers invaded the streets of Sabon Gari, a Christian settlement. Over 50 people were hospitalized in different hospitals in the city. 116 August 2013 Bolgang, Magama, Karkashi and 51 Christian men were attacked and killed in Kuka villages in Langtang, South Bolgang, Magama, Karkashi and Kuka villages in area in Plateau State Langtang South area of Plateau State. Their homes were burnt down and the families were left without a place to live. 117 August 2013 Borno State More than 50 youth s killed in Borno State . The youth are commonly known as the Civilian Joint Task Force and are helping the military to identify Boko Haram members. Boko Haram members laid an ambush and killed the youths claiming that the youths are exposing them to military operatives. 118 August 2013 Yobe State 2 Christian villages in Yobe State were attacked. 2 people were killed and several others fled the areas. They were taking refuge in Kukar Gadu which became under threat of attack – Kukar Gadu is mostly a safer area for believers. 119 September 2013 Damaturu–Maiduguri 10 Christian travelers were attacked on their way along the Dramaturg Maiduguri road. The believers were beheaded and their heads put on their chests and lined up by the roadside. 120 September 2013 Yobe State A Christian village was heavily attacked in Yoba State. The Christian men were forcefully gathered and tied with ropes. Some of them escaped with their hands tied, but Pastor Yohana Yahiya and his son were killed. The only church in the village was burnt down and Christian homes were torched with all their food and clothes inside. The widow of the slain pastor is left to cater for the rest of the children, numbering 10. 121 September 2013 Gujba, Yobe State Over 50 students of the College of Agriculture in Guba in Yoba State were attacked in the school and killed by the members of Boko Haram. The students were attacked in the middle of the night in their hostels. There were many Christian children among those affected. 122 September 2013 Maiduguri, Borno State Boko Haram attacked the Nigerian army along the Bag Road to Maiduguri. They killed over 100 soldiers of the Nigerian army and took two armored tanks with them. The action clearly revealed foreign support in the Nigerian insurgency. Efforts to recover and get rid of the sect members are forthcoming. 123 October 2013 Damaturu, Yobe State Over 200 people lost their lives, including security agents, in Dramaturg following an attack carried out by over 100 insurgents. 2 police barracks were attacked and burnt;

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children and women were among those that lost their lives. 124 October 2013 Ƙano State, Kano A group of Sharia Police in Kano tactically arrested 155 believers and accused them of indecent dressing; this according to a church leader in Kano is a deliberate plan to frustrate Christians in the city. 125 February 2014 Adamawa State, Chakawa 52 families were attacked and killed in Chakwal village in Adamawa State. All the victims are Christians. The attack was launched by members of Boko Haram. Hundreds of families were displaced and many houses were also burnt down. 126 February 2014 Adamawa State, Izghe In Inge village 106 people were killed by Boko Haram insurgents. Most of the houses were burnt down. Schools and churches were also destroyed during the attack. 127 February 2014 Yobe State, Buniyadi In the Federal Government College of Hunyadi, Yoba State, about 100 students were killed when the school was attacked in the night. 128 February 2014 Yobe State, Zalidva A Christian village, Sabin Grain Saliva, was completely burnt down. 4 churches were destroyed completely and no single person lives in the village anymore. An unconfirmed number of people lost their lives during the attack. 129 February 2014 Maiduguri, Borno State 25 Christian students were attacked in a school in GU bio; all the victims were admitted to the hospital in Maiduguri. 130 February 2014 Kaduna State, Kaura More than 140 families were displaced by an unknown gunman in Kauri local Government Area of Kaduna State; 16 people lost their lives during the attack. 131 February 2014 Wase, Plateau State In Wise Local Government Area more than 30 people lost their lives during unrest between Christians and Muslims. 132 February 2014 Gero Area of Jos, Plateau State 9 people lost their lives in Geri area of Jos, the Plateau State capital; this incident threatened the nascent peace in the state capital. 133 March 2014 Maiduguri, Borno State Hundreds of Boko Haram members attacked military barracks in Maiduguri; over 300 people, including BH members, civilians and the security agents, lost their lives. 134 March 2014 Maiduguri, Borno State A suicide bomber detonated twin bombs in a busy marketplace. About 50 people lost their lives including women and children. The suicide bomber had come in an open pick-up van loaded with firewood. 13 5 March 2014 Ƙaura, Kaduna State 148 Christians were killed in their sleep when over 100 armed Fulani herdsmen invaded

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Bonding village in Manchu, Kauri Local Government Area of Kaduna State. Over 600 houses were destroyed, 4 churches were burnt and about 1,000 families were displaced and now live in an IDP camp. 136 March 2014 Ƙatsina, Zamfara State 120 people were killed by unidentified gunmen who invaded villages in Katina and Samara states. The residents of the areas suspect Fulani herdsmen are the culprits. 137 March 2014 Wase town , Plateau State Over 20 people were killed in Wise town when Muslims attacked worshippers during a Sunday worship service. 138 March 2014 Barkin Accha in Jos, Plateau State Daughters of a pastor were raped by Fulani herdsmen jihadists in Barking Ache in Jos; the women are receiving treatment. 139 May 2014 Abuja city, Abuja LCT An unconfirmed number of people died following a suicide attack in Abuja where a bomb exploded near the very spot where about 150 people died in the Nyanja blast in April. 140 May 2014 Madagali town, Adamawa State The town of Malayali was attacked by the members of Boko Haram during which 4 soldiers were killed and their station destroyed. Malayali is in Adamawa State; the venue of the attack is not far from Chakwal where Christian worshippers were killed during a Sunday worship service. 141 May 2014 Jos, Plateau State More than 200 people lost their lives in a twin bomb blast that rocked Jos terminus market. The bombing was an apparent calculated plan to target Christians as most of the Muslims vacated their shops an hour before the blast. The Church has recorded a great loss. The bombing did not come as a surprise as the leader of Boko Haram in one of his speeches said that it will attack Jos to kill Christians. 142 May 2014 Gujba town, Yobe State 3 churches were burnt down and 40 lost their lives in Guba town following a midnight attack launched by Boko Haram sect members. All the Christians in the area have vacated the villages around the town for fear of more attacks. 143 May 2014 Kano State, Kano A suicide bomber launched an attack in the Sabon Gari Christian area of Kano State. He killed however few people as the bomber was on his way to the target spot when his bomb exploded. 144 May 2014 Kachia, Kaduna State In Kachia area of Kaduna State churches were destroyed by Muslims following a clash between Christian and Muslim youth. This was during a Muslim protest at the site of a church not far from the mosque. An unconfirmed number of people lost their lives.

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Appendix 16. Christians killed by targeted violence a. Double counting In having a closer look at the ‘double counting’ in the Nigeria Watch (NW) database, we were able to count the exact number of non-natural death for religious related violence between 2006 and 2014. The number that appears is 24,764. And if we apply the percentages for Christians killed by religious related violence we find the numbers of 7,726 for Christians killed at random (31.2%) and 10,202 for Christians killed by targeting (41.2%). The round figures according to the arguments in the chapter given are 8,500 (at random) and 11,000 (by targeting).

Table 1.Distribution of non-natural deaths over northern states due to religious related violence (2006-2014) 16000 13976 14000

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000 2292 1828 1590 2000 618 600 959 816 654 227 248 103 62 9 151 60 158 31 341 41 0

b. Rounding up The reasons for rounding up the figures are in summary on page 21. The most important but more comprehensive are:

- the NW figures for cattle grazing/land issues (respectively 611 and 2,190 – see Table 5. Page 17) are too low due to insufficient recording

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In articles by NW researchers it is stated that “…violence from cattle rearing is not well reported… and that ‘…Land conflicts tend to be underreported…” 306 . So the figures for cattle grazing/land issues should be much higher.

- the percentage for Christians targeted by Fulani herdsmen related violence is a conservative 70%

This statement comes from Appendix 5.2. page 111 where reference is made to research of Adamu and Ben into the targeting of Christian communities in Middle Belt states by Fulani herdsmen attacks 307 . Southern Kaduna was partly researched, but in Benue the percentage of Christian victims was 88%, in Taraba 70% and in Nasarawa 75%. In a case study about Taraba State they found out that between 2013 -2015, 1,478 Christians were killed by Fulani herdsmen attacks in the southern and central senatorial zones of Taraba State 308 . So if we assume the impact of the Fulani herdsmen attacks upon Christian communities in Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa and southern Kaduna in the same period to be the same, the total number could well arrive at (4.5 x 1,478 = 6,651 309 ) 6,500 Christians killed by targeted violence ! Because of these reasons the figures for Christians killed at random and by targeting should be substantial more than the 7,726 and 10,202. Round figures make them to a defendable 8,500 (at random) and 11,000 (by targeting).

We conclude with the 11,000 number of Christians killed by targeting as we earlier rejected the NW statement that Christians are killed at random. This figure is till very close to the 11,500 Christians killed by targeting due to religious related violence on page 21 of this report.

c. Political issues have often religious causes The total number of non-natural death in the NW database is over 997 incidents between 2006 and 2014. Of these incidents 586 (58.8%) have religious and political causes at the same time. This percentage would be up to 75 (72.8%) if the 140 incidents with causes of cattle grazing/land issues would be considered – as it is our understanding 310 - to also have religious and political causes. This is an important endorsement of our understanding that many political issues have a religious cause at the same time.

Edited March 2016

306 Cf. NW’s admission of this on respectively page 3 in Philip Olayoku, op cit. and on page 10 in Conroy, Stone, op cit. 307 Cf. Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (November 2015); op cit. 308 Cf. Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (March 2015); op cit. 309 In an email of 16 March 2016 Abdulbarkindo says that the high intensity of the killing of Christians by Fulani herdsmen seems to be in: Plateau, Taraba, Benue and southern Kaduna. Medium-level killings of Christians by Fulani herdsmen are in Adamawa, Abuja, Niger, Bauchi, Gombe, Borno, Yobe (in addition to Boko Haram killings) and other north-western states. 310 See supporting arguments in Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (March 2015); op cit.

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