1
"Downdoors!" Upon hearing these words, the Canadians ran down the ramps of their ships and lowered themselves into the English Channel, making their way to the shore as quickly as possible.1 The Normandy Campaign had officially begun. The invasion of Normandy was an allied offensive attack launched on Germany during World War II. The intent of the allied countries was to defeat the Germans who had occupied Normandy, continue to advance into
Paris, and liberate North West Europe. The major allied countries involved in this assault were
Britain, the United States, and most notably, Canada. The allies codenamed this attack Operation
"Overlord". This was the first major Canadian operation since the complete failure of Dieppe in
1942. Luckily, the Canadians had learned from their last major offensive attack and would not make the same mistakes again. This failure benefited the Canadians as it taught them what not to do in future battles. Canadian General Henry Crerar believed that Normandy would have been a disaster if it weren't for the lessons gained from their experience at Dieppe. He stated, "Among those lessons: don't assault a fortified fort; rather, attack on the beaches, give infantry support and plan it all down to the last hand grenade".2 This is exactly what the Canadians did in
Normandy during the summer of 1944.
The question remains, were the Canadians successful in Normandy? A definition of the word "success" must first be established. The Oxford dictionary describes it as "an event that accomplishes its intended purpose". Other definitions include "The achievement of something desired, planned, or attempted" and "a favourable or desired outcome". Of all of these general definitions of success, not one of them fails to apply to the Canadian performance in Normandy,
France during the Second World War. The Canadians were successful in Normandy because of
1 Cyril Crain, Landing At Juno Beach
Falaise Gap.
The success of the Canadians throughout the Normandy Campaign has been an ongoing debate since the battles occurred. To this day, historians continue to analyze the performance of the troops and commanders, as well as the strategies and tactics employed in the campaign.
Scholars present different points of view ranging from failure to success as well as a variety of factors to take into consideration when studying the degrees of effectiveness in the Canadian divisions.
C.P. Stacey is the official military historian for Canada during World War II. He offered two different viewpoints, one as part of an analysis of D-Day, and the other, specifically focused on the battle of the Falaise Gap. In The Canadian Army, 1939-45, Stacey regarded the Canadian performance on the Normandy beaches as exceptional saying:
Let no one think, however, that the Normandy landing was a cheap or an easy victory. It was an extraordinary military performance. The legendary fortified line upon which a most ingenious and painstaking enemy had lavished so much art during the years of his occupation of France was broken and reduced to nullity in the short hours of a summer morning.3
As for the Canadian performance in Falaise, Stacey drew a different conclusion. He was clear in pointing out the failure of the Canadian army during the battle of the Falaise Gap. He narrowed this down to a lack of training for Canadian troops, as well as a number of missed opportunities by the Canadian divisions. Stacey claims that had the Canadians not been so overcautious the destruction of the German army would have been much quicker and more
3 C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-45 (Ottawa, 1948) p.179. 3 effective. "The Canadians were overcautious, they failed to maintain the momentum of the attacks and were too easily satisfied. The army as a whole failed to make the most of its opportunities, especially in August, when the capture of Falaise was long delayed".4
Reminiscent of Stacey, former Canadian solider and historian, John English's account of
Normandy revolved around the failure of the Canadians. English, however, did not blame their failure on troops or missed opportunities, but rather the inexperience and incompetence of their divisional commanders both on the battlefield and during training. As written in The Canadian
Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command, English stated:
In very large measure, responsibility for the relatively lackluster showing of Canadian arms in Normandy must be laid at the feet of the division commanders. Clearly, neither Keller or Foulkes were as tactically competent as Simonds. The available evidence plainly suggests that the 'hard-fisted' Keller experienced serious personal and command failings in leading the 3rd Division.5
He regarded Guy Simonds highly, although was quick to note that he was not enough to compensate for the countless shortcomings among the divisional commanders. "Unfortunately,
Simonds stood alone. Too little staff or tactical depth existed either above or below to adequately support him"6. Furthermore, English asserts the commanders' lack of training as a significant cause of their failure. "From virtually the beginning, serious inadequacies at the high-command level undermined Canadian training efforts in Britain. McNaughton proved incapable of training his division commanders who, in turn, failed to train their own brigades and units"7.
4 C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign (Ottawa, 1960) p.276. 5 John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command (New York, 1991) p.306. 6 Ibid., pg.313. 7 Ibid., p.311. 4
Echoing Stacey and English, Russell Hart and Martin Van Crevald concluded that the failure of the Canadians was due to a lack of inexperience in both their troops and commanders. These conclusions were all drawn when comparing the Canadians to other allied armies and the
German army. Author of The Second World War: Northwest Europe, Russell Hart believed the
Canadians were the least successful of the allied armies, comparing them to the United States who "demonstrated an ability to learn quickly". He said the British and especially Canadian armies "were poorly trained, badly led, and slow to learn."8 Secondly, Military historian and theorist, van Crevald believed "The Germans had greater fighting power due to morale, unit cohesion and resilience. The Canadians were tired, the poor, the huddled masses, commanded by officers who were less than mediocre."9
Military historian, Terry Copp expresses a more optimistic view of the Canadian army in
Normandy. He advocates that they were extremely successful during the Normandy Campaign.
In Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, Copp declares "The defeat and near destruction of two German armies in just seventy-six days was one of the most remarkable military victories in the Second World War"10. Moreover, he contrasts the Canadians with the other armies involved and concludes "Their performance at both the tactical and operational level was far from perfect but it compares favourably with that of any other army in Normandy"11.
Additionally, Copp claims that the facts regarding their training period and ineffective operations are often exaggerated and not entirely truthful. "Earlier accounts of the pre-invasion training
8 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto, 2003) p.13. 9 Martin Van Crevald, Fighting Power. German and U.S. Performance, 1939-1945 (New York, 1982) p.122. 10 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto, 2003) p.13. 11 Ibid. 5 period and previous discussions of Anglo-Canadian battle doctrine were based on assumptions about inadequate performance in Normandy"12.
Ultimately many historians make the mistake of comparing the Canadian forces to the
German army. The fact is the Canadians were launched into a war that the Germans had been preparing for since 1933. In war, success should be measured by an army's ability to complete their ultimate goal with the least amount of casualties along the way. The Canadians mobilized and did the best they could under the circumstances. Despite their obvious military inferiority, they overcome insurmountable odds and defeated the enemy in Normandy, ultimately liberating
North West Europe.
"They sailed in under the cover of darkness to smash down the walls of 'Fortress
13 Europe'". D-Day occurred on June 6, 1944. This marks the day when allied troops landed on the beaches of Normandy, commencing Operation "Overlord" with the overall goal to liberate
North West Europe. The allies had been preparing since 1942 and now was the time to show off their hard work. Britain, the United States, and Canada were all fighting on their respective beaches. The 3rd Canadian Division was assigned to Juno Beach, in addition to the other
Canadians fighting under Britain on Gold and Sword Beach. Over 14,000 Canadians landed on
Juno beach, including soldiers, navy, and airmen. The area allocated to them stretched five miles from the coastal towns of St.Aubin-sur-Mer to Courseulles-sur-Mer. The original objective for the Canadian forces on D-Day was to reach Caen, a strategic location imperative for the allies to gain if they were to be victorious in Normandy.
12 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto, 2003) p.13. 13 CBC News Archive, D-Day: Canadians Target Juno Beach
The initial planning of the allied invasion of Normandy began as early as 1942. By 1943, after Dwight Eisenhower was appointed the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, the detailed planning of the landings were announced. Eisenhower gave Juno Beach to the 3rd Canadian
Army. Upon receiving this news, the Canadians commenced a series of intense training for nearly one year prior to the offensive attack. They trained in Eastern Canada before being relocated to England and Scotland. Historian C.P. Stacey said:
The training of the 3rd Canadian Division began with preliminary work in combined operations at the Divisions' stations in Southern England, followed by advanced training at Combined Training Centres in Scotland. In the autumn of 1943 the Division returned to the Channel coast for large-scale exercises with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force.14
This intense training prepared the Canadians for combat against the extremely well- trained Germans. It gave many inexperienced soldiers a chance to become well-acquainted with the tactics and strategies used in war, as well as the physical fitness required. Additionally, experienced Canadian leaders and troops who had fought in the Italian Campaign were brought in to share their knowledge with the soldiers in training. "Many officers who had proved themselves in the Italian fighting came back to give the benefit of their battle wisdom to the unblooded formations in England."15 This training period undoubtedly aided the Canadians in their victory on D-Day.
Many historians believe the Canadians were not successful in Normandy due to the inferiority of their troops. This often leads scholars to believe that their training period was inadequate. C.P. Stacey asserts, "The Canadians had probably not got as much out of our long
14 C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-45 (Ottawa, 1948) p.171. 15 Ibid., p.173. 7 training as we might have".16 What needs to be recognized, however, is that many Canadians had never fought in a war before. This was their first experience in live combat. Furthermore, as
Copp states "Earlier accounts of the pre-invasion training period and previous discussions of
Anglo-Canadian battle doctrine were based on assumptions about inadequate performance in
Normandy".17 As Copp implies, negative opinions regarding the Canadians training period are not based on fact, but rather are false theories made by historians trying to understand the large disparity in skill between the Canadians and the Germans. It is unreasonable to compare the two armies and then assert that because one was superior, the other was unsuccessful, especially considering that Hitler had been preparing for a war long before the allies. Military conscription was introduced in Germany in 1935, giving Nazi soldiers the advantage of a much longer training period. Despite the many doubts about Canadian training, the facts regarding the success of the Canadians in Normandy are evident. They destroyed the enemy on D-Day and continued to do so for the next two and a half months of the campaign.
When the fighting on the beaches began, the Canadians showed exceptional military strength and courage. Initially, the Canadians overcame some of the harshest conditions of all the beaches. Upon reaching the shore, the obstacle they faced was getting past the seawall which was twice the height of the one at Omaha Beach. "Juno Beach was arguably the most heavily- fortified of the five invasion beaches".18 The Canadians faced machine-gun nests, pillboxes, and other concrete fortifications. "They had to overcome numerous steel and wooden obstacles which were placed out on the tidal part of the beach and which were covered at high tide to trap landing
16 C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign (Ottawa, 1960) p.271. 17 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto, 2003) p.31. 18 Canada at War, Canadians on D-Day: June 6, 1944
Wilhelm Richter. At Richter's disposal were eleven heavy batteries of 155mm guns and nine medium batteries of 75mm guns.21 The German's weaponry was much higher quality than anything the Canadians had in their artillery.
Several historians argue that due to the severe number of casualties in the Canadian sector on D-Day that it was not a success. Over 14,000 Canadians stormed Juno beach on June
6th and they suffered 1,204 casualties. The losses on Juno Beach were the 2nd highest of all the allied beaches, accounting for 20% of the total allied casualties. This number is actually quite few considering the circumstances. The allies were on the offensive, already leaving them at a disadvantage, in addition the Canadians specifically faced the highest sea wall and some of the fiercest fortifications of all the beaches. "Our losses on D Day, this great assault undertaken with so many doubts and fears, were inevitably considerable; and yet, in all the circumstances, it must be said that they were gratifyingly few".22 When comparing Canadian casualties to that of the
Germans on Juno Beach you can see a large difference. German killing units were decimated, while the majority of the 3rd Canadian Division marched on and fought much longer in
Normandy.
Despite the setbacks the Canadians faced, three hours into the battle Hitler's Atlantic
Wall had been broken. This enabled allied forces to advance further into Normandy and launch attacks into occupied Europe. Canadian military historian C.P. Stacey said, "The legendary
19 J.L. Granatstein, Battle Lines: Eyewitness Accounts from Canada’s Military History (Toronto, 2004) p.333. 20 Lance Goddard, D-Day: Juno Beach, Canada’s 24 Hours of Destiny (Toronto, 2004) p.221. 21 D.W. Lane, Juno Beach - The Canadians On D-Day
Canadian forces stood eight kilometers into France, farther than any other allied division.
Historian Mark Zuehlke stated "At D-Day's end, the Canadians, who had landed on Juno Beach, were six miles inland — the deepest penetration achieved by Allied forces on this infamous day".24 Canadian forces had made it all the way to the Caen-Bayeux highway, just south of
Caen. Some scholars argue the Canadians were not successful on D-Day as they failed to meet their ultimate objective of reaching Caen. However, due to the conditions on the beaches it was impossible for the Canadians, or any other allied division to advance to Caen. To begin with, it was over-confident to assume that any allied army would be able to cover nearly eleven miles in just one day. "The objectives prescribed for D Day were ambitious. The plan required the
Canadians, and the divisions on either flank, to get about ten miles inland by nightfall".25 The
Canadians had accomplished more than any other allied force on this infamous day and in regards to Caen, it was captured seven weeks later on July 28, 1944.
Overall, the Canadians were successful in Normandy because of their determination on
D-Day. They put their full efforts into the planning of the battle, the training period, and their physical performance on the beaches. They overcame extremely tough resistance and defeated the Germans. They fought hard and bravely on the beaches of Juno, Gold, and Sword and these
23 C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-45 (Ottawa, 1948) p.179/180. 24 Mark Zuehlke, Holding Juno (Vancouver, 2005) p.442. 25 C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-45 (Ottawa, 1948) p.178/179. 10 performances will never be forgotten. As British historian John Keegan said, "It was an accomplishment in which the whole nation could take considerable pride".26
The Canadians were successful in Normandy because of their aptitude in overcoming the terrain. They dealt with challenging terrain all throughout the Normandy campaign. The landscape in Normandy varies greatly from region to region. It includes hills, flat fields, bocage, forests, and old houses. These imposed natural difficulties on the Canadian soldiers, especially given their offensive position; however, the Canadians did a tremendous job of conquering this clear disadvantage.
The Canadian sector fought on open flat fields stretching from Caen to Paris that without doubt favored a defensive position. As soon as they exposed themselves to the land, they were at immediate risk of being shot at by the German army. "The infantry were extremely vulnerable to mortar, artillery, machine gun, and small arms fire the minute they left their slit trenches and expose themselves in open ground".27 The Germans on the other hand, could conceal themselves very effectively in the Caen plains due to their vast knowledge of the land. This made it extremely difficult for the Canadians to advance further towards Paris as the flat expanse of ground made it nearly impossible not to be effortlessly spotted by the enemy. In Victory at
Falaise, Denis Whitaker writes:
The gently rolling countryside south of Caen, with its network of fortified villages, was the worst possible country for Allied armour. It was actually flatter than the desert in that 'there were few bumps or depressions where a tank could
26 John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy (New York, 1982) p.164. 27 Robert Cotey, The Battles for Verrieres Ridge (Waterloo, 2000) p.74. 11
take a hull down position and provide covering fire'.28
In addition, the inferior military equipment, especially tanks, became a large impediment to the Canadian army due to the terrain in Normandy. The Germans were fighting with Tiger and
Panther tanks. The average tank used by the Canadians was the Sherman 74. This tank had an armour penetration of 60mm at 1,000 yards. The average German tanks used, the Tiger I and
Tiger II had armour penetrations at 1,000 yards of 102mm and 158mm respectively. The Tiger I and Tiger II's were both 100mm wide or more at the front, and 80mm wide on the side.29
Therefore the Sherman tanks used by the Canadians had to be much closer to the German tanks to inflict damage than the Germans had to be to the Canadian tanks. Historian Robert Cotey said,
"Shermans were no match for the German tanks and anti-tank guns. If they were hit they were usually knocked out so it made it very difficult to use them in open country".30 The mediocrity of the Sherman tanks combined with the flat, open terrain made it much more difficult to advance towards the Germans, an action necessary to inflict damage, without being seen. This dilemma forced Simonds and the other commanders to come up with creative operations to work around the unfavourable terrain. The Canadians ability to devise and carry out plans taking these circumstances into consideration demonstrates their success.
To combat the strategic problem posed by the terrain, Canadian commanders had to develop inventive plans using the resources at their disposal. Ordinarily, the ground conditions only allowed them to move at night when they would be less visible to German forces. Operation
"Totalize" was launched at night for this exact reason. Immediately following that, Simonds started planning for Operation "Tractable" in which he was much more resourceful. This was
28 Denis Whitaker Victory at Falaise (Toronto, 2000) p.310. 29 Robert Cotey, The Battles for Verrieres Ridge (Waterloo, 2000) p.4. 30 Ibid., p.6. 12 launched during the day because he created a man-made smokescreen to prevent the Germans from seeing them. Canadian historian John English said:
Fortunately, the Anglo-Canadians possessed in their artillery a powerful means for dealing with prepared enemy defenses. By bringing massive fire and smoke to bear, it countered Panther and Tiger tank superiority and the power of German mobile and entrenched antitank guns.31
Historian C.P. Stacey argues that the Canadians had many missed opportunities in
Normandy and if they had acted sooner, could have ended the campaign early and captured more
Germans.
The Canadians were overcautious, they failed to maintain the momentum of the attacks and were too easily satisfied. The army as a whole failed to make the most of its opportunities, especially in August, when the capture of Falaise was long delayed.32
This fails to take into account the terrain they were dealing with. The Canadian and
British sectors both faced flat, open fields for the majority of their time in Normandy. To successfully deal with these ground conditions, the officers often had to improvise using the resources at their disposal. This inevitably resulted in a longer period of time to create effective operations, however, does not prove that the Canadians were unsuccessful. The fact is the
Canadians were successful because of both their soldiers and commanders ability to adapt to the conditions. Under the circumstances posed by the terrain, the two and a half months it took for the Canadians to conquer Normandy was actually not long at all.
Furthermore, the Canadian divisions in Normandy had to overcome obstacles posed by the natural factors which lent itself well to concealing the Germans. In particular, the Canadians
31 John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command (New York, 1991) p.312. 32 C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign (Ottawa, 1960) p.276. 13 faced bocage, trees, hills, and villages. The bocage, located south of Caen, consisted of thick, tangled shrubbery which acted as a natural fortification. This was ideal for the German position.
With ease, they could conceal their military equipment in the bocage, predominantly tanks, which resulted in an unsuspected attack for the Canadians. Additionally, man-made bocage was used by the Germans. They would purposely destroy buildings in villages to produce concrete bocage, making it more difficult for the Canadian army to advance. Also, there were often pathways lined with trees which worked in the enemy's favour. They could use these sheltered pathways to transfer supplies and men. Next, the hills in Normandy, mainly around the region of
Falaise, made it much harder for the Canadians to defeat the Germans. The Germans were dug in on these hills, along with their far-ranging tanks. In reference to Falaise, J.L. Granatstein wrote,
"The southwest part of the town is high and there the Germans had considerable heavy artillery".33 Lastly, the houses and buildings in the villages of Normandy worked to the advantage of the Germans as it gave them a higher vantage point to see incoming attacks. It also supplied them with another form of shelter to conceal themselves and their weapons. "The towns are also ideal for placing infantry because they have more protection if they take cover in the houses".34 All of these natural fortifications the Canadians came into contact with during the
Normandy Campaign highlight their success as they were able to overcome them and still defeat the Germans.
Overall, the Canadians were successful in Normandy due to their ability to overcome the unfavorable terrain. They faced a clear disadvantage considering they were on the offensive against an enemy who had spent the past decade preparing for this war. The German troops were well-acquainted with the land; they knew its strengths and weaknesses. This allowed them to use
33 J.L. Granatstein, Battle Lines: Eyewitness Accounts from Canada’s Military History (Toronto, 2004) p.353. 34 Robert Cotey, The Battles for Verrieres Ridge (Waterloo, 2000) p.6. 14 the terrain to their advantage through concealing weapons in houses and bocage, forming transportation routes using the narrow tree-lined passageways, and securing positions uphill making it easier to defend. "The Canadians were on the offensive fighting a well dug-in enemy in an area that made movement in the open virtually impossible."35 The Canadian divisions adapted to the terrain and learned how to work around it effectively, while still completing the task at hand. Regardless of the ground, the Canadians were successful in Normandy. They reached their ultimate objective of liberating North West Europe which is an even greater success due to the adverse terrain. It shows the unwillingness of the Canadians to give up against all odds. They prevailed through the obstacles posed by the terrain time and time again, never giving up against an utterly superior enemy.
Lastly, the Canadians ability to close the Falaise Gap showcased their success in
Normandy. The Canadians officially closed the Falaise pocket, a task allocated primarily to them, by meeting up with the Americans on August 21, 1944. Their objective was to meet the
American troops at Argentan, thereby closing the "gap" or "pocket", and encircling the German army. This would, in turn, directly allow the allied forces to move towards the Seine and liberate
Paris. Operation "Tractable", launched by the Canadians, was the last battle of Falaise resulting in the obliteration of German forces, effectively bringing the Normandy Campaign to an end.
"At 1142 hours on August 14th one of the most remarkable assault operations of the
Second World War began".36 Operation "Tractable" was the second operation launched by
General Guy Simonds in the Canadians attempt to reach Falaise. Due to the ground conditions, the Canadians had to improvise using the resources that were available to them. This operation
35 Robert Cotey, The Battles for Verrieres Ridge (Waterloo, 2000) p.74. 36 Terry Copp, The Canadian Battlefields in Normandy: A Visitor’s Guide (Waterloo, 2004) p.105. 15 was a revision of "Totalize", using smoke as a cover instead of darkness. "Two densely packed columns of armoured vehicles moved forward adding clouds of dust to the extensive smoke screen".37 In regards to this operation, historians argue that the capture of Falaise by the
Canadians was long delayed.38 However, it was impossible for the Canadians to capture Falaise in a shorter period of time due to the natural setbacks they faced. The terrain was a large challenge and Simonds required time to plan his second operation following "Totalize". Military historian Terry Copp states, "'Tractable' was an operation of considerable complexity requiring time to organize and re-deploy the troops. It could not be launched before August 14".39
Moreover, John English asserts that the Canadians failed in Normandy directly due to the lack of effective commanders present in the Canadian army, stating "At best, Simonds's immediate subordinates were mediocre performers. Even at brigade level, with the possible exception of Foster, a lack of tactical judgement was often evident".40 This opinion, however, fails to explain the correlation between the below average officers and the limited success of the
Canadians. Despite a lack of skill evident in the lower level Canadian commanders, Guy
Simonds, and the rest of the Canadian soldiers more than made up for this inadequacy through their success and commitment to defeating the German army. Guy Simonds was the officer who commanded the II Canadian Corps during WWII. He was regarded highly as he was extremely experienced and knowledgeable about effective war strategies and tactics. Simonds implemented four operations for the Canadian army during a five week period in Normandy. British
Commander, Bernard Montgomery called Simonds the "only general fit to hold high command
37 Terry Copp, Maple Leaf Route: Falaise (Ontario, 1983) p.112. 38 C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign (Ottawa, 1960) p.276. 39 Terry Copp, The Canadian Battlefields in Normandy: A Visitor’s Guide (Waterloo, 2004) p.101. 40 John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command (New York, 1991) p.307. 16 in war".41 Additionally, British historian Max Hastings referred to him as "One of the outstanding Allied corps commanders in Europe, a dour, direct officer who brought unusual imagination to bear on every operational plan for which he was responsible".42 The lack of effective Canadian commanders evident in Normandy did not hinder their performance, nor did it prevent them from achieving success.
Furthermore, the success of the Canadians can be seen through the desperation of the
German army during the final days of fighting in Falaise. The Germans had accepted their defeat and following this, abandoned all planned operations and started escaping any way they could.
Throughout the last few days in particular, their desperation was evident due to the fact that they were no longer waiting for nightfall, but trying to break free in broad daylight. "The German withdrawal through the Gap had assumed the aspect of desperation. The enemy's dire circumstances were driving him to attempt something which our superiority in the air had not allowed him to think of for months past: mass road movement in daylight".43 The Canadians took advantage of this and began a series of bombing campaigns against the Germans to prevent them from escaping. "During these bright summer days our fighter-bombers struck at the packed roads hour after hour, turning the whole area of the Gap into a gigantic shambles; while our artillery, moving up within range, poured thousands of shells into the killing-ground."44
Irreversible damage from the bombings was inflicted particularly on German transport vehicles.45
41 J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto, 2005) p.146. 42 Max Hastings, Overlord D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (London, 1985) p.348. 43 C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-45 (Ottawa, 1948) p.204. 44 Ibid. 45 Terry Copp, Maple Leaf Route: Falaise (Ontario, 1983) p.124. 17
By August 21st, the Canadians had killed over 10,000 German troops and had captured
50,000 more. In addition, "Uncounted thousands of other Germans had met death in the blind and desperate combats of these days of slaughter".46 Amidst this large number were a corps commander and two divisional commanders which would take a serious toll on the German
Army in the future. Canadian Major Arthur Currie was even awarded the Victoria Cross for his exceptional effort in St.Lambert-sur-Dives, which alone resulted in the capture of 2,000 Germans in the Falaise gap. Further proof of their desperation and acceptance of defeat is evident in the materials which were left behind. They abandoned tanks, weapons, horses, and vehicles. In The
Canadian Army 1939-45 C.P. Stacey asserts:
Masses of destroyed or abandoned tanks, lorries and cars blocked the roads and filled the ditches; while some 8,000 dead horses, which had drawn the vehicles of the German infantry division, lay offending in the air. In the carnage of the Pocket and the Gap at least eight German divisions had been destroyed, and about twice as many more had suffered crippling losses.47 Despite this success with the German army, many Germans did manage to escape taking various pieces of military equipment with them. "British investigators nevertheless reached the conclusion that, taking the campaign as a hole, the Germans probably got a little more than half of their motor transport away to the north".48 The escape of some Germans was inevitable because of their battle superiority; however, this does not establish that the Canadians were unsuccessful. The Canadians came into contact with some of the most highly-trained fighting divisions in the German army, most notably the 12th SS and the 21st SS Panzer Divisions. The
12th SS led by Colonel Kurt Meyer, was particularly formidable with an army of over 20,000
46 C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-45 (Ottawa, 1948) p.206. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., p.208. 18
Hitler Youth and 150 tanks.49 They accomplished their goal of closing the gap, capturing thousands of Germans which crippled the Nazi Army significantly in the war. Their outstanding ability to close the Falaise Gap, despite the vast difference in expertise between the two militaries, further demonstrates the success of the Canadians.
Overall, the Canadians were successful in Normandy as the goal of closing the Falaise gap was accomplished. The allies were victorious in Falaise as a result of the Canadians. The damage inflicted on Germany during the Battle of Falaise rendered them much less capable and effective for the remainder of the war. The staggering number of men who were captured and killed, in addition to the mass amounts of equipment left behind, resulted in the weakening of a once formidable enemy. The Canadians were primarily responsible for the second largest defeat for Germany in all of World War II.
Taking the campaign as a whole, the Canadians were successful in Normandy because of their efforts on D-Day, their aptitude in overcoming the terrain, and their ability to close the
Falaise Gap. First, the Canadians stormed Juno Beach, the beach that was allocated solely to them. Within hours, the German forces on Juno were decimated and they had already begun their advance further in Normandy. By nightfall, the Canadians had reached the Caen-Bayeux highway, equating to eight kilometers inland. They had gotten deeper into Normandy than any other allied divisions and secured a crucial spot for the allies to continue their takeover of enemy-occupied Europe. Second, the Canadians quickly and effectively adapted to the adverse terrain in Normandy. The ground conditions, combined with their offensive position and their
49 D.W. Lane, Juno Beach - The Canadians On D-Day
Germans. The Canadian army, however, was resourceful and conquered this obstacle through inventive operations. They managed to work around the landscape and overpower the German army, first at the coastal towns of Juno Beach, next at Caen, and then finally at Falaise. Lastly, the Canadian division was primarily responsible for closing the Falaise Gap and encircling the
Germans. This task was successfully accomplished. Under the leadership of the very skilled and capable officer, Guy Simonds, the Canadians launched Operation "Tractable". This operation resulted in the death of 10,000 Germans and the capturing of an additional 50,000. Large amounts of German tanks, horses, trucks, and other military equipment were captured as well.
The Canadians were responsible for the second largest German defeat in all of the Second World
War.
The Canadians in Normandy were successful. Their endurance and courage resulted in the largest allied victory in World War II, directly leading to the liberation of North West Europe and the eventual collapse of Nazi Germany. As Terry Copp states, "What we do know is that
Canadian soldiers, sailors, and airmen made a vital contribution to the defeat of Hitler and the liberation of Europe".50 The Canadians conquered insurmountable odds through the course of the
Normandy Campaign. They were faced with some of the fiercest fighting present among all of the allies, they were given immense responsibility, and they exceeded expectations. An army and nation of people once viewed as weak and insignificant became the driving force behind the largest offensive attack in history. William Lyon Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister of Canada
50 Terry Copp, The Canadian Battlefields in Normandy: A Visitor’s Guide (Waterloo, 2004) p.8. 20 during World War II, stated on June 6, 1944, "Let the hearts of all in Canada today be filled with silent prayer for the success of our own".51 These prayers paid off.
51 CBC News Archive, D-Day: Canadians Target Juno Beach
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