MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Polish Coal Sector: Beginning of a Phase- out Era?

Master's Thesis

ANEŽKA KONVALINOVÁ

Supervisor: doc. Mgr. Filip Cernoch, PhD.

Department of International Relations and European Studies International Relations and Energy Security Studies

Brno 2020/2021

FSS

POLISH COAL SECTOR: BEGINNING OF A PHASE-OUT ERA?

Bibliographic Record

Author: Anežka Konvalinová Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of International Relations and Euro­ pean Studies

Title of Thesis: Polish Coal Sector: Beginning of a Phase-out Era? Degree Programme: International Relations and Energy Security Studies

Supervisor: doc. Mgr. Filip Černoch, PhD. Academic Year: 2020/2021

Number of Pages: 63 Keywords: Poland, Coal, Sociotechnical imaginaries, Energy Security, EU. Energy and climate policy

1 POLISH COAL SECTOR: BEGINNING OF A PHASE-OUT ERA?

Abstract

This master's thesis focuses on the latest trends in the Polish energy sec• tor, with particular attention paid to the coal industry. Inspired by (Kuchler & Bridge, 2018), this thesis is a take on the socio-technical im- aginaries concerning coal mining and combustion infrastructure in Po• land. This thesis will recognize the role of historically defined cultural influences in the way the country's energy sector is built and has worked towards contributing to the existing knowledge. Firstly, it will explain how the deteriorating materialities of the mining sector have set current visions of the country's coal future against each other. And secondly, it will also call into question the very notion of a static Polish society that unquestionably and unanimously supports the energy direction that emerged sometime in the communist period.

2 POLISH COAL SECTOR: BEGINNING OF A PHASE-OUT ERA?

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have written the submitted [select type of docu• ment] concerning the topic of Polish Coal Sector: Beginning of a Phase-out Era? independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this thesis have been adequately referenced and are listed in the Bibliography.

In Brno 14th January 2021

Anežka Konvalinová

1

POLISH COAL SECTOR: BEGINNING OF A PHASE-OUT ERA?

Acknowledgements

Throughout the writing of this thesis and my studies, I have received a great deal of support and assistance. I would firstly like to thank my su­ pervisor, doc. Mgr. Filip Černoch, PhD., whose expertise was invaluable in formulating the research and thesis as a whole. Your insightful feed­ back pushed me to sharpen my thinking and elevated my work. I want to thank Mgr. et Mgr. Veronika Zapletalová, PhD., her patience and support, for all the opportunities, and for her immense trust in me; it changed my life completely (Dzi^kuj^ bardzo Kochanie) I would also like to thank my beloved classmates, namely: Karolína, Dária, Sayaly, Sebastián, Michal and Dominik, for their support, love, and all the time spent drinking beer and talking about energy. You have made these last two years unforget­ table. I would also like to thank my family, especially my two sisters Eliška and Libuška, for their support and love. You are always there for me. Finally, I could not have completed this thesis without my friends' support, who were always there to help me and make me happy. More­ over, I would like to give a special shout-out to coffee, beer, and wine - you got me through this as well.

TABLE OF CONTENTS 5

Table of Contents

List of Images 7

List of Terms and Acronyms 8

1 Introduction 11

2 Socio-technical imaginaries 14

3 Methodolody and Data Collection 16

4 Historical Imaginaries 18 4.1 Energy security first 18 4.2 Indigenous is secure 20

5 When materialities clash with ideas 22 5.1 Post-communist challenges 22 5.2 Increasing pressure on Polish coal 24 5.3 Government's response 27 5.4 Coal imported from Russia 28

6 The emergence of new imaginaries 32

6.1 The new order of Polish Energy 32

7 Conclusion and policy implications 37

Bibliography 39

5

LIST OF IMAGES 7

List of Images

Graph 1: Total production of hard coal and lignite 1990-2018 23 Graph 2: Total amount of hard coal imports to Poland 29 Graph 3: Balance of coal imports 30

7 8 LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

List of Terms and Acronyms

EU - European Union UK - The United Kingdom of Great Britain and North ern Ireland

IEA - International Energy Agency

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De velopment

PiS - Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc PGG - Polska Grupa Görnicza SA

EGD - European Green Deal

LNG - Liquefied Natural Gas GHG - Greenhouse gas

C02 - Carbon dioxide

NOx - Nitrogen oxides ETS - Emissions trading system

IED - Industrial Emissions Directive BAT - Best Available Techniques

PGE - Polska Grupa Energetyczna

PGNiG - Polskie Görnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo SA. KGHM - Kombinat Görniczo-Hutniczy Miedzi

PLN - Polish zloty

USD - United States dollar EUR - Euro

SRK - Spölka Restrukturyzacji Kopalh SA

BGK - Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego PZU - Powszechny Zaklad Ubezpieczeh Spölka Akcyjna

8 LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 9

PKO BP - Powszechna Kasa Oszcz^dnosci Bank Polski Spolka Akcyjna PIR - Polskie Inwestycje Rozwojowe

FRP - Funduszu Rozwoju Przedsi^biorczosci

FIPP - Fundusz Inwestycji Polskich Przedsi^biorstw TF Silesia - Towarzystwo Finansowe Silesia

WTO - World Trade Organization

9

INTRODUCTION

1 Introduction

Driven by climate change concerns, the EU is committed to decarboniz• ing its energy mix, with coal being the primary victim of this trend (Eu• ropean Commission, 2010, 2011, 2018, OECD/IEA, 2018). Several Euro• pean countries, such as Denmark, Spain, Austria, and the UK, have al• ready reduced their coal consumption significantly; others have intro• duced plans to do so, including Germany and the Czech Republic—the first and third largest EU consumers of solid fossil fuels. (Eurostat, 2019; IE A, 2017; Sivek et al., 2017). Poland, the second-largest consumer in the European Union, seems to resist this trend. Since 2017, Kozienice, Jaworzno, Opole, Turow, and K^dzierzyn-Kozle power plants have been commissioned to replace the aging infrastructure and keep the coal demand unhindered (Caldecott et al., 2017). State-owned utilities Energa and Enea only recently stopped searching for monetary resources to finish the Ostroleka C plant. Another state-owned company PGE has expanded the Turow mine on the Polish- Czech border to keep it operational until 2044, and the government has publicly supported opening the Zloczew mine to provide new supplies of coal for the EU's largest C02 emitter, the Belchatow power plant (Car• penter, 2020). What motivates Poland to strongly defend the importance of coal, keep money flowing into a new infrastructure, and cement the domestic energy system dependency on this fuel? With painful financial and soci• etal costs of transformation, a significant carbon lock-in is part of the an• swer. However, what is especially typical for Poland is that the situation is exaggerated by the extraordinary level of securitization of coal. The commodity is portrayed as an absolute staple of the domestic energy sec• tor, economy, and country's independence and sovereignly (Kiuila, 2018; Piria etal., 2014; Rentier etal., 2019). No financial, environmental, health, or diplomatic cost seems to be high enough to justify questioning the continuous mining and burning of coal. This is how Poland tradition• ally perceives itself, and this is how the rest of the EU understands Po• land. As a coal obsessed and climate villain country, any chance for de- carbonization and sensible energy policy is suppressed by security con• cerns, geo-politics, and longing for energy autarky. However, analysis of the latest development revealed that this pic• ture might be out-dated, both on a material and ideational level. Poland's

11 INTRODUCTION recent elections (parliamentary and presidential) highlighted the chang• ing narratives of coal's position in the state's energy mix. The dire situa• tion in the Polish coal sector and the increasing external pressure was also reflected in the electoral programs of parties that were traditional supporters of coal (e.g., the ruling PiS party and its candidate for the pres• idential elections, Andrzej Duda). The changing narratives were also re• flected in the Ministry of the Environment's latest government concept, which significantly reduces coal share in the energy mix. A few months ago, the date of Poland's exit from coal was agreed between the most prominent Polish mining firm PGG and the representatives of mining un• ions, all with the involvement of the government (Ministerstwo Klimatu i Srodowiska, 2020.; Jozefiak, 2020.; Jakobik, 2020). A new trend seems to be emerging, with only scanty reflection in academic literature (for the exception see Szulecki, 2020). This thesis focuses on the Polish energy sector's latest develop• ments, with special attention given to the coal industry. Inspired by (Kuchler & Bridge, 2018) work on socio-technical imaginaries surround• ing the infrastructure of coal mining and combustion in Poland, we must acknowledge the importance of historically determined cultural factors in the way the energy sector of the country is constructed. However, we contribute with two essential findings to the existing knowledge. Firstly, we illustrate how the mining sector's worsening materialities put exist• ing visions of the country's coal future against each other. Moreover, we challenge the very idea of static Polish society unquestioningly and uni• formly supporting the energy pathway originating sometime in the com• munist era. Research of this kind has a severe practical impact. Poland is a vital and assertive EU country, purposefully defending its position in any en• ergy or climate-related debate and is an essential part of any orches• trated EU decarbonisation efforts. Ever since the Polish government has used the argument of energy security to water down multiple EU decar• bonisation policies, a practice that culminated in December 2019, when Poland was the only EU member not to sign the European Green Deal (EGD) with its 2050 decarbonisation goals. Through this research, we have looked at whether this trend will be changing. This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 has introduced the theoretical background of sociotech- nical imaginaries. Chapter 3 has presented the methodology.

12 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 4 has presented the historical imaginaries of coal in Poland and has analysed the coal sector. Chapter 5 has taken a look at the materialities that have caused a decline of coal and governmental policies and, most importantly, coal im• ports. Chapter 6 has introduced details about the new emerging material• ities. Chapter 7 forms the conclusion and has discussed policy implica• tions.

13 SOCIO-TECHNICAL IMAGINÄRES

2 Socio-technical imaginaries

The theoretical concept of sociotechnical imaginaries attracts interest in being a useful way to frame, analyse, and assess science and technology's co-production with political power. This framework has been built upon Jasanoff and Kim's (2009, 2015) works. They see imaginaries as "collec• tively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of de• sirable futures, animated by understandings of forms of social life and so• cial order attainable through, and of, advances in science and technology" (Jasanoff, 2015). An imaginary represents the visions, symbols, and cor• related feelings that people have about specific issues. They highlight ac• tion and performance with materialization through technology (Sova- cool and Hess, 2017). They are useful analytical tools for researchers, as they have practical material outcomes, influencing behaviour, feelings of individual and collective identity, and the developing narratives, policy, and institutions. Having these qualities is crucial to understanding the policy process and collective futures within a particular national context as they more clearly serve descriptive or justificatory purposes (Sova- cool and Hess, 2017; Jasanoff, 2015). Jasanoff and Kim's research (2015) emphasized the capacity of so• ciotechnical systems and showed how the "power to imagine futures" is intently linked with a nation's role in stabilizing energy concepts and overseeing the resources required to accomplish them. The concept showcases how technological and political order is co-produced in dis• tinctive ways (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009: 124). Authors stressed that any national debate strengthens "patterns of public reason, evidence produc• tion and knowledge uptake that constitute a nation's political culture" (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009: 140). Studying imaginaries entails being attentive to how they can link the past and the future, enable or restrict actions in space, and being/getting accustomed to ways of thinking about possible future worlds (Jasanoff, 2015). The intensity of imaginaries is so significant that they can guide and facilitate activities across the techno-epistemic systems, set up key political choices, legitimize new interests in science and innovation, ad• vance specific improvement pathways, and even legitimize the conside• ration or rejection of specific entertainers in the dynamic procedure (Ja• sanoff, 2015). Imaginaries, in this way, are never unbiased constructs;

14 SOCIO-TECHNICAL IMAGINÄRES they are confined in a certain way, with certain angles included and di• fferent perspectives forgot about (Ibid.). A developing number of researchers have utilized the idea of sociotech- nical imaginaries to examine visions of future energy systems and energy transitions (see, e.g., Ballo, 2015; Bowman, 2015; Delina, 2018; Felt, 2015; Mutter, 2019; Sovacool and Hess, 2017; Tozer and Klenk, 2019). Ballo (2015), for example, examined collective techno-scientific vi• sions for a Smart Grid in Norway and illustrated how these top-down im• aginary frames the public as energy consumers. Levidow and Papaioan- nou (2014), on the other hand, explored the role of UK governmental bodies and policy agendas in promoting a sustainable biomass-based en• ergy future. Authors have emphasized the transnational institutional framework. Delina (2018) critically employed, defined, and compared the dominant and resistant imaginaries in the current production of Thailand's energy future. Smith and Tidwell (2016) examined how local imaginaries can in some cases be characterized as "bounded," or imagi• naries that develop from non-expert visions at a local level lacking the political power to impact the national imaginary. Kuchler and Bridge (2018) analysed the sociotechnical imaginaries and materialities in the context of Poland's coal-based infrastructures for power generation. The authors explained how current political efforts to reframe coal and secure its future in Poland are drawn selectively upon a sociotechnical imaginary of coal-fuelled national modernization. Tid• well and Tidwell (2018) argued that sociotechnical imaginaries need a new methodological framework for designing research "in order to ex• amine the collective values of citizens as they live their daily lives, rather than focusing on experts and the state in order to understand the shared moral, material, and scientific goals of a society" (Tidwell and Tidewell, 2018). The authors highlighted the problem that imaginaries often de• fine the narrative of elites and groups involved in energy rather than so• ciety. This research report's contribution has been to draw on this body of literature and has explained how local and national governmental im• aginaries interact with competing imaginaries.

15 METHODOLODY AND DATA COLLECTION

3 Methodolody and Data Collection

In determining core energy sociotechnical imaginaries in Poland, we an• alysed the following sources through this research: official state docu• ments, in-depth semi-structured interviews, and Polish media. The official state documents have been studied as they present a com• plete set of official strategies defining Poland's energy policy, expressing state vision, objectives, and interests in this sector. The state documents analyzed include: • The National Energy Policy until 2030 (Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030 roku) • Program for Polish mining sector (Program dla sektora gornictwa w^gla kamiennego w Polsce) • Energy Security and Environment Strategy (Strategia Bezpieczehstwo Energetyczne I Srodowisko) • A draft of the Energy Policy of Poland until 2040 (Projekt polityki energetycznej Polski do 2040 r.)1 • National energy and climate plan for 2021-2030 (Krajowy plan energetyczny i klimatyczny na lata 2021-2030) The methodology of this report includes detailed interviews of nine experts from various fields ranging from state institutions and ENGOs to academia to evaluate the role of coal in Polish energy policy. Most re• spondents have had the opportunity to shape Polish energy policy ac• tively, and therefore their opinions are highly valued. The interviews were conducted in November 2019. Each interview consisted of open- ended questions. The interviews were recorded and coded to mine for core topics. As they and their positions are embedded in this paper, the resource persons were anonymized. Further, as a supplement to the analysis of the official statements, the secondary sources included communique, press releases, and official speeches. These textual sources were selected using keywords as coal (w^giel), energy policy (Polityka energetyczna), energy security (bezpieczehstwo energetyczne), and coal sector (sektor w^glowy). The

1 In September 2020 was published A new draft of the Polish Energy Policy until 2040 by the Ministry of Climate and Environment, which updates the version of a draft published in 2019, and therefore authors used also this recent draft in their analysis.

16 METHODOLODY AND DATA COLLECTION inclusion of these sources throws further light upon how Polish decision• makers perceive coal in Polish energy security. This research has used Jasanoff (2015) as its base and studied the imag- inaries along with the primary and secondary data collected and ana• lysed during the period of the research.

17 HISTORICAL IMAGINÄRES

4 Historical Imaginaries

The primary and secondary sources helped reconstruct two essential im• aginaries which have traditionally guided Polish society regarding coal usage, (see, e.g., Kuchler and Bridge, 2018; Rentier, Lelieveldt and Kra• mer, 2019; Wynn and Coghe, 2017). Both these imaginaries are insepa• rably interconnected and interdependent to create an epic story of Polish coal identity.

4.1 Energy security first

Poland's strong national and security-oriented culture is rooted in its ge• opolitical history. Located between Russia and Germany, modern Polish history is a tale of a country's endeavour to defend its freedom and sov• ereignty from its neighbours' aggression. In the seventeenth century, Po• land's territories were split multiple times between three European su• perpowers, Prussia, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Poland state disap• peared for 123 years. Pole's dreams and political aspirations of inde• pendence resonated/could be seen in the works of its contemporaries, such as famous poet Adam Mickiewicz or diplomat Adam Jerzy Czar- toryski. The First World War (1914-1918) gave Poland a chance to reclaim its desired freedom, and on 11th November 1918, an independent Second Polish Republic was restored. However, this idyllic state ended on 1st September 1939, when Nazi Germany attacked Poland and started Se• cond World War (1939-1945). Shortly after, the Soviet Union launched an unexpected attack, and the Polish nation was once again divided between its troublesome neighbours. The country's unimaginable suffe• ring is illustrated by the fact that Poland endured massive human losses during WWII from all countries involved, amounting to around 16-17% of the population (Kesternich et al., 2012). After World War II ended in 1945, Poland fell under Soviet control, and the communist People's Re• public of Poland was established as a Soviet satellite state (see, e.g., Cza- putowicz and Wojciuk, 2017; Davies, 2005; Longhurst and Zaborowski, 2007). Finally, the dynamic changes in the international environment in 1989 brought on the independence and establishment of a democratic

18 HISTORICAL IMAGINÄRES

Polish state (Czaputowicz and Wojciuk, 2017; Davies, 2005; Longhurst and Zaborowski, 2007). This repetitive sequence of failures to secure the Polish independ• ence offered birth to a highly distinctive strategic culture, with a diverse understanding of concepts of sovereignty, statehood, and security, and a strong focus on territorial defense and inherent insecurity and vulnera• bility to external aggression. After establishing the Third Republic in 1990, the Polish foreign policy has been guided by the imperative of preservation and maintenance of independence and sovereignly. As for• mer Prime Minister of Poland Jerzy Buzek stated, "The repeated attempts to dispel the ill fortunes this country has been dogged by since the 17th century and has been the sense and essence of recent Polish history" (Jerzy Buzek, 1999). It is thus, no surprise that the fundamental objective of the Polish energy policy is to provide security, with competitiveness, economic ef• ficiency, and environmental concerns being secondary. Furthermore, without any doubt, it is the state which is bound to provide this security. This is clearly expressed in both the strategic documents of the country and the statements of its representatives. Strategic state energy documents such as the National Energy Policy until 2030, Program for the Polish mining sector, Energy Security and Environment Strategy, a draft of the Energy Policy of Poland until 2040, and National energy and climate plan for 2021-2030 highlight the energy security as a critical pillar of the energy policy of Poland. Energy security in these documents is mentioned on average, around 50 times/per doc• ument. This narrative is supported and nurtured on every governmental level. "Energy security is essential today; it is almost as important as mili• tary security," emphasized Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki recently (Morawiecki, 2019). Along the same lines, former Prime Minister Beata Szydlo (2015 - 2017) stated, "Economy, development, security, family - these are the pil• lars of a safe, modern Poland that will be an example for others. There will be no rapid development of Poland without energy security" (Premier Beata Szydlo, 2016). Such a stance was also shared by former Prime Minister Donald Tusk (2007 - 2014), who in the lastyear in the office claimed, "The events in Ukraine have shown that energy security in Europe and the energy

19 HISTORICAL IMAGINÄRES independence of Europe are the foundation of our security understood as a whole." (Tusk, 2014).

4.2 Indigenous is secure

Poland's complicated history indicates an ever-present endeavour to be as independent from foreign supplies as possible, especially considering Russian commodities. Since the end of the Cold War, Poland has seen its dependency on Russian energy resources as problematic and has openly acknowledged them as a weapon in Russia's hands (Hogselius, 2013, pp. 212-216). This approach accelerated with the implementation of economic projects such as Nord Stream I and II northern pipelines, which can be perceived through historical lenses as cooperation between Russia and Germany, excluding Poland's participation. Poland sees this infrastruc• ture designed to bring natural gas from Russia to Germany along the bot• tom of the Baltic Sea as a direct threat to Europe's energy security (Bochkarev, 2020; Claybrook, 2018; Nord Stream AG, 2020; Ruszel & Podmiotko, 2019). According to Warsaw, the pipeline will also strengthen Gazprom's already dominant market position. Therefore, Po• land has consistently opposed building both the first and the second Nord Stream (Bouzarovski & Konieczny, 2010; Wiech, 2018; Weiner, 2019). Since the January 2009 Russian- Ukrainian gas crisis, Poland has also undertaken steps to diversify its gas supplies, perceiving diversifi• cation as a crucial means of enhancing the security of supply and decre• asing dependence on Russian gas imports (Bouzarovski & Konieczny, 2010; Pasten & Santamarina, 2012; Weiner, 2019). Therefore, Poland focused on several supply-related steps to help the state wean from dependency on Russian- sourced natural gas. The country invested in a new liquefied natural gas terminal at the port of Swinoujscie, through which gas supplies come from the US, Qatar, and other countries (Shotter, 2019). As a result, the Polish government pro• claimed the phase-out of Russian natural gas by 2022 (DiChristopher, 2018), as the LNG terminal's regasification capacity is scheduled to be expanded by 2021 (Polskie LNG, 2018). The Baltic Pipe Project has been forced as another strategic gas infrastructure project built to create a new gas supply corridor in the European market. These two projects'

20 HISTORICAL IMAGINÄRES salience was highly emphasized during interviews at the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, where respondents marked these projects as the corner• stone for Polish security efforts (NEP 2030, 2009; Ruszel & Podmiotko, 2019; INT4). This short discussion of natural gas diversification efforts illustrated the country's emphasis on a minimalization of import needs and, conse• quently, on maximal usage of indigenous sources, which is primarily coal in the Polish case. Poland's position on energy security openly favors do• mestic coal and biomass reserves to cover energy demand to ensure the security of supply and lower import dependence. The National Energy Policy that has been in force since 2009 explic• itly states, "The state's energy policy assumes the use of coal as the main fuel for power engineering to guarantee an adequate level of energy secu• rity" (NEP 2030, 2009, pp. 10). One of the latest strategic documents (Draft of the Energy Policy of Poland until 2040, 2018, pp.3) reempha- sizes this approach, "Poland aims to cover its demand for capacity with domestic resources. The national deposits of coal will be the key element of Poland's energy security and the energy mix's foundation. The increase in demand will be covered by sources other than conventional coal-based ca• pacities". Multiple Polish decision-makers have confirmed this position in re• cent years. "Coal is our stabilizer and guarantor of energy security for our energy sector," claimed Minister of Energy Tchorzewski in 2019 (Tchorzewski, 2019). Even Secretary of State at the Ministry of Energy Tobiszowski has said, "Coal is of special importance to us because this do• mestic raw material covers about 85% of electricity demand and about 70% demand of net heat. This makes Poland one of the most stable coun• tries of the European Union in terms of energy security" (Tobiszowski, 2016). Lastly, Polish President Andrzej Duda commented, "Poland must maintain and strengthen its energy sovereignty and science as Poland has several universities which deal with extraction and exploitation of coal. Po• land should build its mining industry. These are great tasks for the future, but first of all, you need a plan for mining, for the whole industry, honest and reliable" (Duda, 2015).

21 WHEN MATERIALITIES CLASH WITH IDEAS

5 When materialities clash with ideas

Both imaginaries emphasize energy security and the importance of in• digenous resources, directly articulating discourse, and influencing deci• sion-making. In the following section, however, a post-communist devel• opment of the Polish energy sector has been illustrated to show the in• teraction between imaginaries, described above, and coal materialities.

5.1 Post-communist challenges

The transformation of the country after 1989, which included the re• placement of central planning with a free market economy, hit the Polish coal industry hard. The highly inefficient and uncompetitive sector un• derwent radical, often very painful, modernization (see, e.g., Karbownik and Bijahska, 2000; Korski, Tobor-Osadnik, and Wyganowska, 2016). Rationalization of the production processes resulted in drastic unem• ployment, a drop from 388,000 workers in 1990 to 98,000 workers in 2015 (Szpor & Ziolkowska, 2018). Of the 70 collieries functioning in 1990, 30 were closed in the next ten years and another ten by 2014. In 2016, several more mines were scheduled to be shut down due to a ne• gotiation between the European Commission and the Polish government (Szpor and Ziolkowska, 2018). Production of lignite fell from 69.4 mt in the record year of 1991 to 58.6 mt in 2018, while hard coal plummeted from 147.5 mt in the record year 1990 to 63.4 mt in 2018.

22 WHEN MATERIALITIES CLASH WITH IDEAS

Graph 1 Total production of hard coal and lignite 1990-2018 120,00%

20,00%

0,00%

of? oP>V J? J> # # # # ^° c^A # <# 4> ^ ^ c£ c}?

^—Production of hard coal [1990 = 100%] ^—Production of lignite [1990 = 100%]

Source: Authors' graph based on Eurostat data

Despite modernization efforts, the Polish coal sector has not been able to overcome some structural challenges. While transformation improved efficiency indicators and the average production per worker per day in• creased, production costs are still comparatively high (Dias and Gonza• lez, 2018; Dubihski and Turek, 2017). Polish mines' common depth has increased from around 500 m in 1989 to 750 m in 2015. In some cases, miners go as deep as 1050 m. This is considerably more than the stand• ard depth of about 400-500 m for the world's largest producer, China (Barteczko & Lewis, 2016). Deeper pits mean more time, energy, and risks involved in the extraction, thus driving up prices. Overall produc• tivity continues to lag behind the global competition, such as Indonesia, Australia, Russia, Colombia, and South Africa. As a result, Polish hard coal is produced at the cost of about $70 to $80 per ton, while global produc• ers, including Russia, can deliver to Poland for about $60 per ton (Grygiel, 2020). This prevailing lack of competitiveness was ruthlessly exposed by the global coal market's collapse, with prices in continuous decline be• tween 2011 and 2016. Coal producers worldwide tried to reduce their prices by reducing production costs through increases in production vol• ume. A surplus of coal flooded the markets in a short time, causing

23 WHEN MATERIALITIES CLASH WITH IDEAS further price drop (Ministerstwo Aktywow Pahstwowych, 2018a). Euro• pean coal prices dropped from $122 to $57 per ton in 2015, driving the Polish hard coal sector into significant financial losses (IEA, 2016). Com• menting on the particular case of once again indebted Kompania W^glowa in 2016, a major Polish coal mining company, former Deputy Environment Minister Michal Wilczynski summarized the troubled situ• ation as follows, "It is too late to rescue it. Poland's coal mines will not be effective, no matter how deep the cost cuts are, because of geology. Reject• ing the global trends would take us back to the Communist era with an isolated economy" (Barteczko & Lewis, 2016). This situation is further exacerbated by the concurrent tightening of EU environmental regula• tions.

5.2 Increasing pressure on Polish coal

In recent years, we can observe ever-increasing international pressure on Poland, which implies Polish coal. One of these pressures is increasing environmental requirements and pressure to switch to low-carbon en• ergy. As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol and an EU Member State, Po• land is obliged to reduce its GHG emissions and increase clean energy sources in the energy mix. While the Polish Kyoto promises are readily fulfilled, the Polish coal sector is encountering severe pains with a range of more restrictive policies and recommendations from the EU. One of them is that under the European Commission suggested climate goals for Europe in 2030 under the umbrella of "Europe's Energy System Trans• forming" industry and electricity sectors of the EU will need to cut emis• sions collectively by 43% when compared with 2005, at an annual ratio of 2.2% (European Commision, 2015) Secondly, it also introduced new laws for 'clean energy for all Euro• peans,' where state aid will no longer apply to power generation plants emitting more than 550 kg/MWh of C02 (European Commission, 2016a). This denotes that approximately 28 gigawatts of Poland's existing power output would lose access to subsidies and unable to meet this emissions threshold (PKEE, 2016). Thirdly, a more rigorous threshold of NOx emissions for hard coal and lignite combustion, from 190 to 175 mg/Nm3, for current power sta• tions (European Commission, 2016b) is needed in the recent Best Avai• lable Technology (BAT). The conclusion that can be drawn is a case for

24 WHEN MATERIALITIES CLASH WITH IDEAS setting permit requirements in new industrial installations under the In• dustrial Emissions Directive (IED). The fourth argument is that the Polish coal-fired power stations have recently been cut off under the EU Carbon Trading Scheme (ETS) from the Modernization Fund (European Council, 2017). Environmental criteria resulting from the EU membership are being struggled with the country's aging electricity system. It is around 40 years of the hard-coal power plant's average length of some plant units installed in the 1960s (Berkenkamp et al., 2016). Significant clusters mustbe substituted or up• graded for an out-dated and obsolete power generating facility. In Po• land, 17 power plant plants (2.4 GW input) currently run under IED for a limited time and are expected to close by 2023(Ibid.); and by 2050, there will be a withdrawal of over 30 power generation plants of a total capa• city of almost 22 GW to replace old infrastructure with efficient genera• tion, significant investments are required in the power sector. During negotiations, Poland argued and continuously emphasized a just energy transition and the fact that the pace of achieving neutrality mustbe differentiated depending on individual countries' economic de• velopment (Landemard, 2019; Report z Biznesalert, 2020). It can be said that Poland's attitude towards environmental pres• sures from the EU can be summed up by a sentence from the current Pre• sident, Andrzej Duda (2018), "that use of that coal for the sake of energy security does not clash with climate protection." However, this can no lon• ger be perceived as the case. Polish policy has gradually changed its stance against coal transition and is beginning to perceive this trend as inevitable. However, the Polish coal sector appears to be changing not only due to the international climate obligations but mainly due to deteriorating mining and market conditions in the coal sector, resulting in the Polish coal sector is in a dire financial situation. A fundamental problem for the Polish mining industry is the very low output and the associated unit labour costs. Hard coal output by Polish mines has been steadily declining since 2012. At that time, 79 mil• lion tons of hard coal was extracted, while in 2019, the output was only 61.6 million tons, which means a decrease of over 22% in just seven years. Despite the steady decline in production which has already be• come an evident trend from 2017, an increase in employment in the min• ing sector has been recorded - from 82,700people (2017) up to 82,8001ast year (2019). Of course, this is not much compared to, for

25 WHEN MATERIALITIES CLASH WITH IDEAS example, in 2012, when over 113,000 people were employed in the min• ing industry. However, this is the first time in more than a decade that employment in the mining industry is starting to rise, not fall and all this with a noticeable drop in mining efficiency. It must be mentioned that such a tendency is understandable in the mining sector - currently used hard coal deposits are depleting rapidly, it is necessary to go deeper and further, which has generated higher extraction costs and requires more employment. (Bukowski et al., 2015; Dziduch, 2020; Tabaka - Analiza Bizblog.pl, 2020) As imported coal's low price, it is more profitable to import it than to extract it in Poland. The European hard coal price index (sold in the ports of Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp) fell to around $55 per ton in 2019, as compared to nearly $100 in 2018. In Western Europe, so little was paid for the last time in the fall of 2016. Meanwhile, in Poland, ac• cording to the data from the Industrial Development Agency (Agencji Rozwoju Przemyshi), hard coal sold to Polish power plants and com• bined heat and power plants were the most expensive in last six years. Power plants paid for it on average about PLN 256 / t, and heat plants nearly PLN 308 /1. (Agencja Rozwoju Przemyshi SA, 2020) The cheapest coal is imported from South Africa, where a ton costs only PLN 239. Coal from Colombia is slightly more expensive and costs about PLN 278 per ton. In turn, Poland pays about PLN 303 for the raw material imported from Russia. These imports are still noticeably cheaper than in any PGG mine. Poland gets the cheapest PLN 412 per ton for coal in Bogdanka, PLN 460, and Tauron Wydobycie, PLN 442. (Tabaka, 2020; Derski, 2019) Even if we look at the price of fine coal, we will still be too far from the imported rates of ordinary coal in terms of price. Thus, Polish coal has recently become more expensive than im• ported coal, even including the costs of unloading at the Coal Terminal in Gdansk and transport by rail further into the country. Therefore, Poland's galloping extraction costs and the world's low coal prices have caused a decline in coal demand and increased coal im• ports' role. Polish coal cannot compete with better and cheaper foreign coal. Polish coal is also in competition with emerging resources, espe• cially RES, which are not as heavy a financial burden as the coal sector (Oksihska, 2018).

26 WHEN MATERIALITIES CLASH WITH IDEAS

5.3 Government's response

Successive Polish governments responded with an increased effort to shield the domestic industry from external economic and environmental pressures by subsidizing coal domestically. Multiple measures were taken to save the coal mining industry, in particular (though not exclu• sively) Kompania W^glowa, the then largest European coal producer which has been on the verge ofbankruptcy since 2013. The EU competi• tion rules (Articles 107-108, specified in Council Decision 787/2010/E.U.) allow governments to use public money in the coal in• dustry almost exclusively to close mines and to limit the social and envi• ronmental impacts of such closures (Staviczky, Nicolaides, Mott, & Rausing, 2015). The Polish government has spent more than a decade bending this rule and using state resources (whether directly or via com• panies such as Enera, Energa, Tauro, PGE, PGNiG, Telekomunikacja Pol- ska, KGHM, Ruch, ZA Pulawy, Ciech, and Huta tab^dy) to keep uncom• petitive mines producing, to the considerable (albeit mostly toothless) consternation of the European Commission (Derski, 2015). The example of the Brzeszcze mine, one of the least profitable of Kompania W^glowa, illustrates this approach. The mine was transferred to SRK, a state re• structuring company. After receiving around 19-23.9 million EUR in sub• sidies (later returned), the non-prospective mine was sold for 1 PLN (0.20 EUR) to already indebted energy utility Tauron (also partly state- owned) to be kept open. Tauron agreed to this transaction following some personnel changes in its supervisory board, initiated by the gov• ernment. The mine has been a significant burden for the company ever since (Zasuh, 2015a, 2015d, 2015c). Tauron was not the only company to face such pressure from the government. The government changed the status of PGE, Energa, and Enea between 2016 and 2017 to include the obligation to "implementthe tasks related to guaranteeing the energy security of the Republic of Po• land" (Szulecki, 2020). Such action, blurring the boundaries between profit-oriented stock-listed companies and state enterprises which all- owedthe government to compel managers to act in discord with private stakeholders' financial interests, EU liberalization principles, and the Po• lish Code of Commercial Societies (Szulecki, 2020). The constant effort of mining labor unions and the government to rescue the industry by interlocking it with power companies through the

27 WHEN MATERIALITIES CLASH WITH IDEAS process so enthusiastically labelled "vertical integration" Was consid­ ered highly controversial. Mergers of state-owned mining and electricity companies would allow the former to dissolve financial losses in the larger entities while the latter would be forced to accept unnecessarily large supplies of expensive domestic coal. The government repeatedly adopted this approach between 2014 and 2015, usually followed by a drop in utilities' market value (Shveda, 2015; Wieczerzak-Krusiňska, 2015). Failing such unification effort, the government resorted to more subtle tools, such as incentivizing utilities to buy unnecessarily high reserves of coal regardless of physical storage capacity (about 145.5 mln EUR from PGE and 119.6 mln EUR from W^glokoks, Tauron, and EC Elcho in 2014 only) and directly lending money to Kompania Weglova to contribute to its restructuring (Zasuň, 2014d, 2014b, 2014c, 2015e). Desperate to save the mines, the govern­ ment urged the Material Reserves Agency to increase the stock of its coal reserves, incentivized state banks and institutions to step in and provide capital with very relaxed repayment policies and tolerated dumping practices of selling domestic coal to foreign markets below production costs (Piszczatowska, 2014; Zasuň, 2014a, 2015b, 2016). When all these measures failed, the government launched the ex­ tremely complicated endeavour of restructuring Kompania W^glowa, firstly via cooperation with state-owned W^glokoks and then, when that failed, by transferring its assets into the newly created Polska Grupa Weglowa. Predictably, multiple State Treasury companies with or with­ out a relationship to the coal industry (PGE, Energa, Enea, PGNiG, W^glokoks), banks (BKG, PZU, PKO BP), and other state-owned financial vehicles (PIR, FRP, FIPP, TF Silesia) assisted (or were considered to as­ sist) heavily in this effort. While providing enough capital to improve the company's financial stability without systemic changes in the mines' productivity and employment policy, PGG once again faces bankruptcy. In 2019 alone its economic losses reached 99 bn EUR (Derski 2015; Zasuň 2015a, 2015b, 2017, 2020).

5.4 Coal imported from Russia

The growing disparity between global and domestic coal prices, com­ bined with the Polish energy sector's limited flexibility to use alternative fuels for producing heat and electricity began to incentivize coal imports.

28 WHEN MATERIALITIES CLASH WITH IDEAS

In 2007-2011, the volume of imported coal increased almost 3-fold from 5.7 to 15 million tons. This increase in import volume primarily con­ cerned steam coal. During the same period, imports of coking coal fluc­ tuated between 2.2 and 3.5 million tons. From 2012 to2014, the volume of imports remained stable at 10-10.5 million tons. In 2015, coal imports decreased slightly to 8.2 million tons and remained stable at 8.3 million tons in 2016. Coal imports more than doubled over the next two years, reaching 19.7 million tons in 2018 (Ministerstwo Aktywow Parist- wowych, 2018a).

GRAPH 2 - TOTAL AMOUNT OF HARD COAL IMPORTS TO POLAND

o

o

I 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 YEARS Source: Authors' graph based on Program dla sektora gornictwa w^gla kamiennego w Polsce /Eurostat

What is even more interesting is that Russia is the primary source of these imports and of those 19.7 million tons imported in 2018, about 13 million tons came from its neighbour. Russia also accounted for a signif­ icant majority of imports in previous years (see Graph 3). These imports cost Polish companies about $282 million in 2016, almost $500 million in 2017, and about $1 billion in 2018, thus worsening the country's bal­ ance of payments (Zasuň, 2019).

29 WHEN MATERIALITIES CLASH WITH IDEAS

GRAPH 3 - BALANCE OF COAL IMPORTS

• Imports in total (Mt) • Import from Russia (Mt]

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 YEARS

Source:Authors' graph based on Program die sektora górnictwa/wysokienapiecie.pl/ Eurostat

The reasons for importing Russian coal are both economic and technical. Imported coal is cheaper and of better quality. It also has a lower sulfur content, which makes it especially important, almost essential, both for household heating and for the communal heating sector, whereas do­ mestic coal usage would require expensive desulphurization systems to meet EU regulations. For the Polish government, this situation repre­ sents an embarrassing inconvenience. Before the 2015 Polish parliamen­ tary election, due to the increasing imported amounts, then opposition politicians of the Law and Justice (PiS) party felt compelled to express the importance of limiting these imports, either via a direct ban or an import duty. Given that both Poland and Russia are members of the WTO and the EU has no common import duty on third world countries, the idea of im­ posing environmental and pollution standards for coal consumed in hou­ seholds, schools, and hospitals, where Russian coal is primarily used, emerged as the only possible legal measure. However, the effort to intro­ duce these restrictions failed after the government realized there was no combination of limits on sulphur, ash, nitrogenous oxides, and mercury that would support a preference for Polish coal over Russian (Zasuň

30 WHEN MATERIALITIES CLASH WITH IDEAS

2014h, 2014a, 2014g). With imports peaking in 2018, miners' protests became more intense, with workers blaming imports for the domestic mining sectors' bleak situation and trains transporting Russian coal being blockaded. Deputy Prime Minister Jacek Sasin announced that state-owned companies would stop buying Russian coal to calm the situ­ ation, "If we were notEU members, we could introduce an embargo," clai­ med Sasin, explaining why a complete import ban was not possible, "Yet now we can only act in agreement with the entire EU, and there is no poli­ tical will for this" (Baca-Pogorzelska, 2020; Baca-Pogorzelska & Potocki, 2019; Zasuň, 2019). The story of Russian coal gets even more complicated. Since 2017, journalists like Karolina Baca-Pogorzelska and Michal Potocki, building on laborious and potentially dangerous research, published a series of articles providing credible circumstantial evidence that a portion of Polish imports was being supplied from the occupied Donbas region of Ukraine. Between 2014 and 2017, anthracite (hard coal of highest calo­ rific content) mines in the Donbas and Luhansk regions were seized by separatists. Since then, the commodity has been transported to Russia from where it is assumed to be exported to foreign markets with a Rus­ sian certificate of origin. Anthracite is not used in the Polish energy sec­ tor directly but rather in metallurgy, chemical processes, and water treatment. According to the journalists, between March 2017 and Sep­ tember 2018, 304,000 tons of anthracite from this region was sentto Po­ land (Baca-Pogorzelska & Potocki, 2018, 2019).

31 THE EMERGENCE OF NEW IMAGINÄRES

6 The emergence of new imaginaries

The circumstance detailed above all seems to contradict the Polish gov• ernment's long-term position and rhetoric, which has historically identi• fied coal with its independence and energy security. While the govern• mental-industrial complex, a term used by Kacper Szulecki to describe a very close connection of both in the energy sector, is a dominant driving force of the Polish energy strategy. Multiple domestic actors have ques• tioned this pathway (Szulecki, 2018b), from the growing renewable en• ergy industry (see Szulecki, 2020a) and environmental and public policy NGOs to energy utilities and individual political figures. Even the general population's position has become more sensitive to mining and coal-con• suming industries' environmental and financial costs and the rather self- centred mining unions' demands. The following section of the thesis will provide a detailed perspective about the emergence of new imaginaries making appearances in Poland.

6.1 The new order of Polish Energy

An important feature of Polish energy strategy is the state's role that coal exists mainly due to the coal industry's deep incumbency and a support• ive government (see, e.g., Brauers and Oei, 2020). Most coal corporations are state-owned, so the state is directly involved in shaping the sector's future. Another essential characteristic of the Polish coal sector is the trade unions' status and their high involvement in political decisions; making the coal phase-out difficult. This was confirmed, among other things, in the interviews, where respondents pointed out that if the gov• ernment wanted to reduce the coal's role in the energy mix, the govern• ment would lose support and would lose in another election to the Sejm (INT1-7). Therefore, the ruling parties were reluctant to oppose coal for so long and thus, it is interesting to see a shift at the political level, espe• cially when the PiS party, which prides itself on supporting the coal re• gions, is in power. Polish government's main arguments put forward against a coal phase-out are comparable to other countries. They consist of aspects like

32 THE EMERGENCE OF NEW IMAGINÄRES energy security, energy independence apprehensions, concerns of rising energy prices, concerns about renewables' reliability, and the prospect of unemployment in regions mainly dependent on the coal industry. There is a slow but visible process of Poland changing its energy course. Before the 2011 parliamentary elections, in an otherwise scarce example of political consensus, all relevant parties had declared coal as the national energy sector's indisputable future. While this approach was mirrored during the 2015 elections in rhetoric, the winning Law and Jus• tice Party's (PiS) practical steps have questioned this narrative. The vi• sion of the PiS government when they first came to power in 2015 was to transform the coal mining sector. The government had to juggle between environmental pressures and the reconstruction of the coal narrative. The PiS party discourse consisted of promoting clean coal- based technologies to satisfy the demand, and at the same time, meet the environmental obligations. (Parlametarny, 2015; Agencja Rozwoju Prze- mystu, 2015). Coal was framed as an essential commodity for energy se• curity and independence. PiS politicians tried to maintain this narrative even when the realities of Russian imports came to light. Former Minis• ter of Energy Krzysztof Tchórzewski and Deputy Energy Minister Grze- gorz Tobiszowski proposed changing the law to stop the Russian coal im• ports. Both pro-coal ministers highlighted the importance of coal in the country mix and proclaimed that Polish coal production would increase as new CPP would open (see, e.g., Krzysztof Tchórzewski; Wójcik: 2020. Albeit unenthusiastically, the PiS government broke the sacred rule of not touching the mines by closing down big players like Krupinskí, Ma- koszowy, Anna, and others. The administration also partially restruc• tured the whole sector; and held discussions with the European Commis• sion about financing these steps. The 2015-2017 brown-outs, when sup• plies of electricity from the coal-dominated power sector were compro• mised, and spikes in electricity prices in 2018-2019 lent support to these changes, questioning coal's narrative as a reliable and cheap source of energy. During the 2019 elections, a departure from coal, however distant, appeared to have become an accepted reality. Justice and Law Party (PiS) emphasized the necessity of socially sensitive structural reforms of the sector; Civic Platform targeted "eliminating coal from the energy sector until 2040"; the Polish People's Party spoke of moving away from coal, mostly Russian, to renewables; and the Democratic Left Alliance

33 THE EMERGENCE OF NEW IMAGINÄRES announced "the end of coal domination" by 2035(Koalicja Obywatelska, 2019; PSL, 2019; Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, 2019). The shift in the political environment after the 2019 elections is ev• ident, especially in combination with the Ministry of Climate's establish• ment, these developments suggest that changes are coming even in Po• land. However, unfavorable materialities that have been described pre• viously in the report hit the pro-coal supporters, who had to acknowledge the inevitable coal phase-out which is required to take ahead the energy security narrative of the country. Deputy Prime Minister Jacek Sasin, responsible for preparing the strategy for transforming the energy and coal sectors and its implemen• tation and pro-coal supporter, affirmed Polish energy's new direction. He stressed that the plan of changes in the mining sector results from neces• sity, "I am the last person who would like to close mines, but in recent years many things have happened that make us revaluate our view." (Sasin, 2020) The Minister of Climate Michal Kurtyka proposed the new Polish En• ergy Policy until 2040, according to which in 2030, the share of coal in electricity generation will not exceed 56 %. This translates to reduction of coal use in the Polish energy mix and confirms a new emerging narra• tive that the government is trying to form. Giving the new PEP 2040, coal should be used as a stabilizer of the energy mix and as a bridge fuel to help the country to achieve a zero-emission energy system. Minister Kurtyka reaffirmed this new approach in his latest virtual fireside chat in the Atlantic Council, in which he mentioned that Poland's energy se• curity would come from offshore wind powerplants, LNG, and Baltic pipe, and a new nuclear power plant (Kurtyka,2020). The new emerging political discourse was somewhat confirmed when the government adopted an agreement with PGG miners, and con• sequently, the trade unions, which provides for the closure of Polish mines by 2049 (PGG, 2020). Representatives of the largest mining com• pany PGG are currently participating in work on the draft of Social Agree• ment, which is to clarify the provisions of the agreement on the princi• ples and pace of transformation of the coal sector, signed in September 2020. However, the possibility of subsidizing the mining industry must be agreed upon by the European Commission, with which Poland has re• cently started working talks on this matter (Energetyka24,2020). Polska Grupa Gornicza is the largest hard coal producer in the EU, employing approx. 40,000people. If the Group's transformation

34 THE EMERGENCE OF NEW IMAGINÄRES proceeds according to the schedule outlined in the social agreement, in 2030, the company may employ approx. 27,000 people, almost half as today, with the annual extraction of fewer than 18.5 million tons of coal2 (Ibid.). It has become apparent that the changes are visible even outside the governmental level. Poland's biggest energy firms (PGE and Tauron) are taking part in the new direction of Polish energy sector. Apart from PGG, Tauron Polska Energia SA, the second biggest energy holding company in Poland, has implemented a so-called new Green Strategy. The strategy implemented since June 2019 provides an increase of 65% share of zero- emission sources in the Group's generation mix by 2030. Investments in renewable energy sources and replacing the exhausting conventional sources with modern ones will allow the Group's emissions to be re• duced by over 20% by 2025 and by over 50% by 2030. By 2025, Tauron intends to have over 1,000 MW of installed capacity in onshore wind tur• bines. The company currently has nine farms where 182 wind turbines produce electricity with a total capacity of 380.75 MW. Lastyear, Tauron doubled its wind capacity by acquiring five wind farms in northern Po• land (wnp.pl, 2020). Tauron also built on the former Jaworzno I Power Plant, a photovoltaic farm with a capacity of 5 MWs. Ultimately, under the Tauron PV program, it is to launch similar installations on its terri• tory with a total capacity of 150 MW (wnp.pl, 2020a). The following years and decades will be marked by the Polish econ• omy's transformation towards a low-carbon economy. The changes will be based on the energy sector's transition to renewable energy sources (RES). In this context, PGE came with the ambitious plan to have all op• erations entirely neutral to the environment by 2050. Until 2030, PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna will spend PLN 75 billion on transformation, half of which will develop renewable energy sources, including onshore and offshore wind farms, solar power plants, and energy storage sup• porting them which will increase the share of green energy in the gener• ation structure to 50%, and in the middle of the century, it promises to provide customers with energy only from RES (Gajowiecki - PGE, 2020). It is important to note that Poland does not have a long green move• ment tradition as the movements have historically been small and held very little importance. The local environmental movement focused more on reducing pollution than coal, mainly due to domestic heating's path

2 PGG mines produced approximately 29.5 million tons of coal lastyear

35 THE EMERGENCE OF NEW IMAGINÄRES dependency. Nevertheless, the Polish local climate movements are get• ting stronger and are challenging the nation's addiction to coal. In recent years, the state of Polish climate advocacy has changed entirely and rap• idly. New movements like Extinction Rebellion Poland and Youth Climate Strike have burst on the Polish political scene, surprising the administra• tion with their capacity to organize large-scale mass mobilizations. In 2019 1.5-degree report of the inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change published in October lastyear can be perceived as one of the trig• gers. "After the IPCC report, all the movements just bloomed. Earth Strike, Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion, all started at the same time." (Czerniawska, 2020). As the organizer of the Polish climate camp stated, "The climate cri• sis is very dire, and the Polish movement is emerging late so we must pro• liferate. To do that, we cooperated with the German and Czech movements, but we have also cut our path." (Sadkowska, 2018). The wider public is also more inclined to phase-out coal as public opinion polls suggest as they show enormous social support for Poland's exit from coal. This support was rising systematically-from 69% in 2018 to 76% in 2019. According to the new Kantar report, 76% of Polish citi• zens want Poland to have no coal in 2030 (Kantar, 2019). These new emerging visions are challenging the static pro-coal per• ception and advert to the brand-new era of the Polish energy sector.

36 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

7 Conclusion and policy implications

This thesis has focused on the latest trends and developments in the Polish energy sector. It has considered what motivates Poland to persist in vigorously defending the importance of coal. Poland's coal is usually portrayed as an essential commodity of the domestic energy sector, economy, and country's independence and sovereignly. However, this thesis has also illustrated the mining sector's worsening materialities that changed the coal's visions in the future of the country's energy sys• tem. This research has thrown light upon the two critical imaginaries with historically driven Polish culture in coal use through the interviews conducted and contemporary literature available about the topic. Both these imaginaries are inseparably interlinked and help each construct an epic tale of Polish carbon identity. First historical imaginary is deeply embedded in the complicated Polish history - as the Polish energy policy's fundamental objective is to provide security. The second historical imaginary is the use of domestic raw material to achieve energy security and resource independence in the global energy market. Both these imaginaries have stressed energy stability and the importance of indigenous resources that directly inter• pret discourse and influence decision-making. However, this thesis has also discussed the Polish energy market's post-communist development to demonstrate the interaction between the imaginaries and the coal ma• terialities. Problems and worsening conditions of the Polish coal sector have been depicted in detail. These materialities seem to contradict the Polish government's long-term position and rhetoric, which has historically identified coal with its independence and energy security. A new emerg• ing narrative involving coal has been presented through this research which showcases the current government's shifting is framework of en• ergy security on different energy commodities and the changing coal per• ception as a bridge fuel to help the country's transformation to zero- emission energy. The reduction of coal will be replaced by natural gas from the Baltic pipe and LNG terminal. Moreover, Poland's first nuclear power plant's construction is planned. It is non-Russian gas, and nuclear energy reframed to ensure Poland's energy security and sufficient diver• sification of resources concerning emissions' reduction.

37 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Poland is often seen as a coal country that treats coal as a domestic treasure that it will never get rid of. This narrative has long been sup• ported by historical sociotechnical imaginaries, which framed coal as a means of national security against Russia and an economic prosperity and development source. As an EU member, this narrative has long been promoted in the decarbonization debates. It is precisely because of the energy security, that Poland has not supported significant EU decarbon- ization efforts, such as the EGD. However, recent internal and other ex• ternal pressures caused a start-up change in the Polish energy sector. This change has had a substantial practical impact across the EU. The need for energy security is profoundly rooted in the Polish en• ergy and foreign policies. There can be no reform without changing the perception that a safe and affordable energy supply is possible without (a great deal of) coal - immensely when domestic renewables often im• prove energy security. Through the course of this research, it has been observed that the Polish government uses natural gas as the new emerg• ing alternative to coal and thus, could frame Poland's future as a gas hub. This would also guarantee diversification and security and affordable en• ergy expenses for the citizens. The intense focus should be put on the EU's influence as an external driver coercing the Polish coal industry. The EU should use its power to ensure that Poland can invest the needed financial means to transition to a zero-emission energy system. Poland could wean itself from coal if there are enough funds from the Just Transition Fund. Poland's energy system's new direction could limit its impact on the climate, the environ• ment, and the health of the citizens; simultaneously, providing energy se• curity and increase the economy's competitiveness.

38 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

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52 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

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Zientara, P. 2007. How Trade Unions Are a Roadblock to Poland's Econo• mic Renaissance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.l468-0270.2007.00709.x

Zientara, P. 2009. Restructuring the Coal Mining Industry: Unionism, Conflict, and Cooperation: Evidence from Poland. Eastern European Eco• nomics^! pp. 41-59. doi: 10.2753/EEE0012-8775470103

Personal Interviews at the Instytut Energetyki Warsaw, Ministry of For• eign Affairs, OSW, November 2019.

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