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Increm ental decision-making: U.S. m ilitary presence in the TriHian Ocean, 1977—1981

Hahn, Kâth Dennis, Ph.D.

The American Univeisity, 1989

UMI 300 N. Zeeb R4 Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INCREMENTAL DECISIONMAKING:

O.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, 1977-1981

by Keith Dennis Hêüin submitted to the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

Committee:Signatur

Chairman:

Dean of the School

Date5 it i V 7

1989 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 MS'S"

TEE AMRBICAE DHIVERSITY LIBRARY

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INCREMENTAL DECISIONMAKING t

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, 1977-1981

by

Keith Dennis Hahn

ABSTRACT

Since the mid-1970s, U.S. decisionmakers have often

focused their attention on events in the northwestern

Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. During the four year

period between early 1977 and early 1981, which roughly

corresponded to the Carter Administration, U.S. responses

to a series of crises and conflicts determined the nature

of subsequent U.S. policy toward the region.

At the outset of his administration. President Carter

sought to minimize the confrontational relationship between

the United States and the Soviet Union by proposing that

both countries lower their military presence in the Indian

Ocean. Between his initial proposal to "demilitarize" the

Indian Ocean in 1977 and his declaration that the region

was "vital" to the U.S. in 1980, President Carter made a

number of incremental decisions which facilitated a

significant shift in policy, including the sale of arms to

Somalia and North Yemen, the formation of the Rapid

11

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Deployment Joint Task Force, negotiations for access to

regional port and air facilities, and efforts to include

U.S. allies in responses to regional crises.

This study uses open source literature, declassified

documents and a measure of deductive, as well as inductive

reasoning, to trace the evolution of U.S. policy toward the

region through the Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Talks, the

Somali/Ethiopian conflict of 1977-1978, the Yemen "crisis"

of 1978, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan to identify those incremental steps that led to

the declaration of the Carter Doctrine. It also poses

three questions that decisionmakers might ask — the

incremental, sequential, and analytical questions — during

an extended series of crises to best apply the incremental

approach to decisionmaking.

The study concludes that incremental decisionmaking is

not only inevitable during an extended crisis, but in many

respects it is also desireable. The Carter

Administration's transition from arms control to a major

military presence in the Indian Ocean provides several

examples of both the advantages and the hazards associated

with the incremental approach to decisionmaking.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. VITAE

Commander Keith D. Hahn was born in Van Nuys,

California on October 23, 1948. He graduated from Franklin

and Marshall College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania (1970) with

a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science and from the

University of Texas - Arlington (1971) with a Master of Arts

degree in Government. He entered the U.S. Navy through the

Aviation Officer Candidate Program and received his wings in

Corpus Christi, Texas in April 1973.

He was initally assigned to Training Squadron TWENTY-

EIGHT as an Instructor Pilot until 1975 when he reported to

Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO in Barbers Point, Hawaii. During

this tour of duty he deployed to Japan and the Philippines,

with two extended detachments to Guam and one to Diego

Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territories, where he served as

Assistant Officer-in-Charge and Air Intelligence Officer.

In October 1978 he reported to the Chief of Naval

Operations Strategy and Concepts Group where he served as

Indian Ocean and Middle East strategist, representing the

Navy on Joint Staff, Department of Defense, and Interagency

studies and crisis action groups.

IV

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He was selected to be a Federal Executive Fellow in

August 1980 and assigned to the American Enterprise

Institute for Public Policy Research where he instituted a

series of seminars with top defense officials and edited a

book entitled National Securitiy Policy in Perspective. He

reported to the staff of the Commander of Carrier Group

THREE in Alameda, California in December 1981 where he

served as Aide/Flag Secretary, and deployed to the Northern

and Western Pacific and Indian Oceans onboard the OSS

ENTERPRISE.

In September 1983 He was assigned to Patrol Squadron

FIFTY at NAS Moffett Field, California, deploying to Japan

and Diego Garcia. He reported to Patrol Squadron THIRTY-ONE

as Executive Officer in January 1986 and subsequently to

Patrol Squadron FORTY as Executive Officer. He assumed

command of Patrol Squadron FORTY in October 1987, making two

additional deployments to Japan.

Commander Hahn is currently the Assistant for Long

Range Planning on the Chief of Naval Operations Executive

Panel in Washington D.C.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE

In October 1975, I reported to my first operational

aviation squadron, which was then deployed to Okinawa,

Japan. Within a week of my arrival in Japan, I found

myself on an airplane bound for the island of Diego Garcia

in the Indian Ocean. Like many Americans, I had paid

little attention to either the political or the

geographical environment in the Indian Ocean. Over the

next three years, however, I had the opportunity to visit

the region on several occasions, including an extended stay

in Bandar Abbas, Iran.

In 1978, I was transferred to the Chief of Naval

Operations Strategy and Concept Group in Washington, D.C.

where, by virtue of being the only officer in the group

with operational experience in the Indian Ocean, I was

assigned responsibility for issues involving the employment

of U.S. naval forces in the region. Within months, if not

weeks, the series of crises described herein began to

increasingly focus the attention of the Administration, and

by extension, the U.S. Navy chain of command, on the

region.

At the time, it seemed ironic that the U.S. and the

vi

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Soviet Union were negotiating a limit on the presence of

their respective naval forces in the Indian Ocean precisely

at the moment when the West (as a result of the growing

impact of the OPEC cartel) was becoming more vulnerable to

oil supply^disruptions, and this source of oil was

increasingly a factor in national security calculations of

the U.S. and its allies. At the same time, the Soviet

Union was expending considerable effort and resources to

gain a political and military foothold in the region.

Among the files that I inherited from my predecessor

were the minutes of the Indian Ocean Arms Limitations Talks

which, needless to say, were viewed with some suspicion by

the Navy hierarchy. Despite an auspicious beginning.

President Carter decided in 1978 to forgo further talks on

the subject because Soviet naval operations in support of

the Soviet Union's political activities in the Horn of

Africa in 1977 and 1978 suggested that there was no common

understanding as to how the Indian Ocean Arms Limitation

Talks would actually affect the behavior of the United

States and the Soviet Union in the region.

For the next two years, as a relatively junior

participant, I was able to observe the process of policy

formulation toward the region at the U.S. Navy, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and, on several occasions, the interagency

and National Security Council level. Like many other

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observers of the decisionmaking process, I was struck by

the seemingly ad hoc method by which many important

decisions were made. In the turmoil and the immediacy of

the situation, however, I was unable to envision suitable

alternative methods of decisionmaking.

I was subsequently awarded a Federal Executive

Fellowship to the American Enterprise Institute for Public

Policy Research where I had the good fortune to work with

Dr. Lawrence J. Korb and, later upon his departure from the

State Department, Harold Saunders. Through this

fellowship, I was also able to gain access to many of the

senior policymakers of the Carter Administration and to

work closely with many members of the incoming Reagan

Administration.

Subsequent tours of duty have taken me to virtually

all of the countries of the northwest Indian Ocean

including Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Oman, Saudi Arabia,

Bahrain, and Pakistan. My experience in this region

reinforced my belief in the importance of geography as a

determining element in international politics. It is not

surprising that geopolitics, the relation of international

political power to geography, has received scant attention

after World War II, in part because it had exerted an undue

influence under the leadership of the German geopolitician.

General Haushofer, on the power calculations and foreign

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policies of the Nazi regime. Moreover, the advent of

intercontinental ballistic missiles convinced some analysts

that geography had lost the relevance that it formerly had

to the relationship between states. It has been argued

that this was especially so in the case of the Soviet Union

and the United States because a strategic nuclear exchange

would be largely independent of geography.

However, it seemed to me that geography and its

influence on inter-state relations had undergone a

resurgence of sorts in recent years. In 1977 Colin Gray's

The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era explored the often

overlooked relation of geographic setting and physical

power to international politics with a view towards setting

the national security policy of the U.S. in a global

framework.

The experience of the Carter Administration,

therefore, somewhat reinforced my natural "geopolitical"

predilections as a naval officer. In the broadest sense,

the evolution of the Carter Doctrine may be a unique case

study of the formulation of U.S. national security policy

in a regional context, without the associated "historical

baggage" of the long-standing superpower relationships in

Europe and Northeast Asia.

To a large extent, I based this study on my

professional association with the problems of naval

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operations in the Indian Ocean. Unfortunately the

negotiating records of the Indian Ocean Arms Limitations

Talks, the Joint Staff Memoranda dealing with the

establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force, and the

records of negotiations for access to regional bases remain

under the protection of Executive Order 12356 — National

Security Information, April 2, 1982. Many of these

documents are noted for future research when

declassification time constraints have been met.

Hence, my research focused on the small portion of

documents that I was able to have declassified, interviews

with members of the Carter Administration who were involved

with policymaking, and open source literature tempered by a

measure of inductive as well as deductive reasoning.

Nonetheless, this dissertation represents the framework and

substance of what is available and, therefore, is

conclusive for the time being. What precludes this study

from being complete are those documents which cannot be

used due to security classification. Moreover, the loyalty

and discretion of individuals who have served their

government also locks further information in their minds

and private papers. Even though this study is concerned

with both historical reporting and analysis of national

security policy, I do not believe that these shortcomings

distort the thrust or findings of the dissertation.

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I am particularly indebted to Cyrus Vance, Leslie

Gelb, and Gary Sick for graciously taking time from their

busy professional lives to discuss their experiences with

me and suggesting various sources of information and

avenues of approach. Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, DSN

(ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations, shared his

thoughts and recollections of events during this period

with me on short notice when duty took me to Hawaii. More

recently, Robert Murray has assisted in filling in areas

for which there were no historical records. Without the

assistance and role model provided by Admiral William

Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would not

have been able to pursue my doctorate.

Professor Duncan Clarke has directed my work

throughout and offered constructive criticism in matters of

both substance and style. More importantly, his support

throughout this extended undertaking and his understanding

of the unique aspects of the military profession has been

instrumental in my academic experience. Dr. Dan Haendel,

who first piqued my interest in the study of decisionmaking

theory, has been an a constant source of information and

inspiration over the years. I am also indebted to Dr.

Robert Litwak who took time out from an extremely busy

schedule to provide an invaluable perspective on my

research.

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Finally, I owe the largest debt of thanks to my wife.

Sue, who, in addition to serving as a sounding board and

monitor for this whole undertaking, has endured and

sometimes even enjoyed the vagaries of Navy life. It is to

her that I dedicate this work.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT ...... ii

VITAE ...... iv

PREFACE ...... vi

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

The Central Hypothesis ...... 4

Terms of Reference ...... 9

A p p r o a c h ...... 14

II. THE ENVIRONMENT: THE OTHER SIDE

OF THE WORLD ...... 19

The Area Defined ...... 20

A Common Maritime History ...... 22

Economic, Political, and Military

E v o l u t i o n ...... 30

III. THE CONTEXT: QUESTIONS DECISIONMAKERS

MIGHT A S K ...... 39

Incrementalism: A Necessary Evil? ...... 41

The Incremental Question ...... 46

The Sequential Question ...... 49

xiii

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IV. INITIAL STEPS: ARMS CONTROL

IN THE INDIAN O C E A N ...... T ...... 56

Early Arms Control Initiatives ...... 57

Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation . . . 72

The Foreign Policy Apparatus ...... 77

Geopolitics and Military Bases ...... 80

Making New Friends in S o m a l i a ...... 84

Soviet Intervention in the Ogaden ...... 88

The Soviets Move to a New B a s e ...... 93

V. INITIAL COMMITMENT; SELLING ARMS IN THE INDIAN

OCEAN ...... 101

Ethiopia Takes the Offensive...... 102

Differences of Opinion ...... 105

Initial U.S. Military Response ...... 115

The Soviets React ...... 121

VI. A NON-CRISIS: THE SHADOW WAR IN THE YEMENS . 129

From the Horn to the Peninsula ...... 130

Yemeni Internal Politics ...... 137

Reports and R u m o r s ...... 148

The Pentagon's Response ...... 160

An Uneasy Truce on the Arabian Peninsula . 174

VII. A PILLAR COLLAPSES: THE SEARCH FOR

REGIONAL BASES ...... 180

xiv

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Arms Sales to an A l l y ...... 182

Different Perspectives ...... 186

In Search of S u p p o r t ...... 189

Diego Garcia: In the Middle

of the Indian O c e a n ...... 198

Berbera: On the Gulf of Ad e n ...... 204

Masirah: In the Gulf of Om a n ...... 208

Mombasa : Access to the Cape R o u t e ...... 213

Bahrain: Home to the Middle East Force . . 217

A Demonstration of Strategic Capability . . 219

The Fifth Fleet ...... 222

1979: A Year of C r i s i s ...... 226

Continuous Carrier Presence ...... 229

VIII. THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: A NEW O.S. SECURITY

FRAMEWORK ...... 233

An Ambivalent Relationship ...... 234

Reaching a Consensus ...... 239

The Trigger is Pulled ...... 245

The Range of U.S. Responses ...... 249

A Regional Security Framework ...... 254

A Long Term Commitment ...... 270

IX. CONCLUSION: CONSTRUCTIVE INCREMENTALISM . . . 271

A Rigorous Reappraisal ...... 272

The Sequence of the Resp o n s e ...... 276

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The Target of the Response ...... 280

The Enunciation of a Policy ...... 283

Living with Incrementalism ...... 285

Interests Over Ideals ...... 292

Geopolitical Imperatives ...... 296

APPENDIX ...... 307

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 318

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Between early 1977 and early 1981, U.S. policymakers

focused their attention on a series of crises on the

littoral of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Their

responses to these events led to the commitment of a large

number of U.S. troops and military assets to this troubled

area. While most of this period coincided with the Carter

Administration, conflict has continued in this region and

the decisions which were made during this period have had

long term implications for U.S. foreign policy and the

employment of military forces.

President Jimmy Carter came to office in January 1977

with the conviction that U.S.-Soviet tensions could be

relieved in many areas of the world, including the Indian

Ocean. Within a few months of his inauguration, however,

the Indian Ocean Arms Limitations Talks were suspended,

despite the fact that their successful completion had been

one of Carter's campaign pledges. At that time the United

States had three surface combatant ships in the Persian

Gulf, approximately sixty support personnel in Bahrain, and

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some four hundred construction and communication personnel

on the island of Diego Garcia.

By 1980, when President Carter declared the Persian

Gulf to be an area that was "vital" to the D.S.,^ there

were over two thousand personnel at Diego Garcia in support

of two or three carrier battle groups,^ a marine amphibious

battalion, and periodic deployments of tactical aircraft

squadrons into the region. In addition, the U.S. had

initiated — and in some cases completed — negotiations

for "access" to facilities in Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and

Egypt, and was developing a Rapid Deployment Force

specifically structured to respond to contingencies in this

region.

This rapid increase in the U.S. military presence

(accompanied by increased diplomatic interest) in the

region was the result of responses to a number of events,

such as the Somali/Ethiopian conflict, the Yemen crisis of

1978/1979, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan. None of these crises, when studied

^ U.S., President, "The State of the Union: An Address Delivered Before a Joint Session, of Congress, January 23, 1980," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 28 January 1980, p. 122. In political/military terms, an area considered vital is one which the U.S. would go to war to protect.

^ A carrier battle group usually consists of an aircraft carrier, two cruisers, three to four destroyers or frigates, a submarine, and a resupply ship.

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separately, can provide a full explanation for the reversal

of U.S. policy from one of negotiated military withdrawal

to one of military commitment. When these crises are

viewed in their entirety, however, several trends emerge

which help explain the nature of subsequent U.S. foreign

policy toward, and military posture in, this region.

While there is seldom a complete break with the

policies of the previous administration, the Ford-Carter

transition witnessed a more dramatic change of policy than

most and therefore provides a convenient stepping off point

for this study. To be sure, the deployment of military

forces to political "hot spots" is not something that

originated with the Carter White House. Successive U.S.

administrations have often used military show of force as

a foreign policy tool, however Carter had campaigned

specifically on a platform that emphasized diplomatic and

economic, rather than military, solutions to foreign policy

problems. As events unfolded in the Indian Ocean/Persian

Gulf region, however, he quickly undertook the buildup of

U.S. military forces. Although the crises which arose in

this region were among the first encountered by the Carter

Administration, the failure of earlier diplomatic and

economic initiatives in other regions of the world possibly

precluded the use of these initiatives in the Indian

Ocean/Persian Gulf.

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The focus of this study is largely limited to the

military responses taken by the Carter Administration to

events in this region. Where applicable, diplomatic and

economic initiatives are also addressed, however, the

incremental nature of the U.S. response to the series of

crises which took place in the Indian Ocean and Persian

Gulf is best seen by the quantitative and qualitative

increases in U.S. military forces in the region. At issue

here is not whether military forces should be used to

signal U.S. policy in various circumstances, but rather the

nature of their employment.

The foreign policy that evolved from the incremental

decisionmaking process of the Carter Administration was a

key issue in the 1980 presidential election. Although all

presidential candidates agreed not to debate U.S. policy

toward Iran while U.S. embassy personnel were held captive,

the Iranian hostage situation and the extended crisis in

this region unquestionably contributed to Carter's defeat

in 1980.

The Central Hypothesis

A large body of literature has evolved which seeks to

explain how and why people in key foreign policy positions

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go about making decisions.^ Many decisionmaking analysts

have acknowledged the incremental nature of decisionmaking.

To be sure, the study of incremental decisionmaking is not

unique to the field of international relations. Many of

the seminal works in the area are from the fields of

economics and psychology and are still widely read. The

pioneering works of Braybrooke and Lindblom, Graham

Allison, and others focused attention on policymakers

during crisis, as opposed to noncrisis, situations. This

study continues in that tradition, but more importantly, it

also seeks to offer an understanding of the dilemmas which

decisionmakers face during an extended series of crises.

The central hypothesis presented here is that the

formulation of a nation's foreign policy toward another

nation, group of nations, or region is often more the

incremental result of a series of minor and unrelated

decisions than it is a response to a specific event. In

other words, the Weltanschauung of the decisionmaker may

have little to do with the foreign policy which evolves

from his decisions. Even when there are overriding themes

which a nation's decisionmakers perceive to be motivating

forces behind their actions, there may be little

relationship between the actions undertaken in response to

^ See Appendix A for a review of literature dealing with decisionmaking during crisis situations.

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an event and those specific themes.

There are a number of related problems which face

decisionmakers during extended crises. For example, when

consecutive events occur within the same geographic region,

the decisionmaker may perceive a broader relationship among

them. In this case, there may be a tendency to try to

formulate an even broader policy to encompass all of the

events. The policy which emerges in response to

geographically proximate events (which may or may not be

similar in other respects) may be either so vague as to be

of little utility, or may be inappropriate to one or both

events. At the same time, a foreign policy response

determined after one event, but not enunciated until after

a second event, may confuse other nations as to the object

of the decisionmaker's policy and cause considerable

domestic confusion. In many respects, therefore, the

formulation of a nation’s foreign policy toward a specific

region might be defined as a cumulative process that has

some degree of time lag built into it.

Rather than attempting to focus on a specific event

(in a series of events occurring in a region) which might

determine a nation's foreign policy toward a region, it

might be more useful to seek out the common elements in the

decisionmaker's responses to a series of events. As events

unfold, options may be narrowed by the response taken to

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the preceding events. During these evolutions the

decisionmaker may be reluctant to reexamine his basic

assumptions in light of previous events, thereby depriving

himself of several potentially useful options.

Forces such as bureaucratic politics, cognitive

processes, systemic, and societal factors may weigh heavily

in initial policy decisionmaking, but they may play less of

a role in subsequent decisions when policy options have

been narrowed by preceding events. Again, the preceding

events may or may not have been related to the current

crisis.

Finally, the policymaker must also deal with the

global nature of superpower confrontation which may place

even the most remote and mundane conflict into a larger

context. In other words, some events which influence a

nation's foreign policy are outside the control of national

decisionmakers. Obviously, each event in a multievent

series should be viewed on its own merits and in its own

context, but this is not often the case in foreign policy

decisionmaking.

This investigation of the evolution of O.S. military

presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region during

the Carter Administration is undertaken because it raises a

number of these important issues. To be sure, the issue of

O.S. military presence in this region remains a timely one.

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as does the larger underlying question - how is policy

formulated during an extended crisis? This investigation

also addresses the more practical problem of determining

just how and when a policy is formulated. In other words,

in a long chain of events, some related and some not, when,

why, and in response to what, is a particular policy

formulated?

A necessary first step in such an investigation is to

determine what constitutes "policy formulation," as opposed

to policy enunciation and policy execution. Once the point

of policy formulation can be determined during an extended

crisis, it is important to determine the stimulus to which

the decisionmaker is responding and the target to which his

response is addressed. Finally, the impact of the

perception of a "crisis atmosphere" on policy formulation

and execution must be addressed.

Implicit in this study is the belief that

investigations of this nature can improve understanding of

the decisionmaking process. Whether an improved

understanding of these processes can have an impact on

subsequent decisions is a more difficult question. It is a

long step from diagnosing the illness to knowing the cure.

And often when the cure is discovered, the illness has

changed in the interim. This quandary is one of the roots

of decisionmaking analysis.

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By asking three questions (which will be discussed in

greater detail in Chapter III), decisionmakers might

determine whether, and to what extent, an incremental

approach limits their foreign policy alternatives, as well

as how this tendency might be minimized during extended

foreign policy crises.

The first question is the most general and easiest to

understand. The incremental question asks what decisions

or responses brought the policymaker to this point in the

crisis, and what policies form the basis for the currently

contemplated response? The incremental question suggests

that a nation's foreign policy toward a specific region may

be the result of the cumulation of decisions made to

specific events or crises rather than a comprehensive

policy that takes into account larger and longer-term

aspects of that nation's interests in the region.

The sequential question asks which specific crisis,

in a series of crises, is the contemplated policy

responding to? It asks whether a foreign policy response

to a particular crisis situation (in a series of crises)

may be a response to a previous, and not necessarily

related, crisis situation. In the series of crises

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investigated here, the focus is on the use of military

power as a tool of foreign policy. Thus, by determining

the precedent for the use of a given form or level of

military power in response to a crisis, it may be

determined that, in an evolution that extends over several

events, the military response to a crisis is often the

response that had been proposed for a previous, and not

necessarily related, crisis.

Finally, the analytical question asks whether the

contemplated response by the decisionmaker addresses the

specific crisis or is it directed at a larger issue or

relationship? In other words, is there a tendency for a

decisionmaker to attribute responsibility for a crisis to

the same foreign policy factors or actors that were

involved in a previous event or crisis that recently

occurred in a given region? If so, such perceptions can

further complicate the formulation of a viable foreign

policy in a region by making that policy dependent upon

events which are not directly applicable to the goals and

needs of the decisionmaker.

All three of these questions - the incremental,

sequential, and analytical - if answered, may help explain

how the decisionmaking process during an extended crisis

moves from an environment over which the policymaker can

maintain some control to one that is, to a significant

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degree, primarily responsive to external events. It may be

argued that the incremental process is, by its very nature,

greatly dependent on events external to the central area.

At the same time, however, there may be times in the

foreign policy debate when significant changes in direction

can be made. It may well be that the only way that a

decisionmaker can avoid the dynamics of incrementalism is

to force a break in the chain of events - making a

political leap or break with the past, such as Sadat did in

his historic visit to Jerusalem prior to the Camp David

Accords.

This study is primarily concerned with the

decisionmaking processes of the United States. While a

complete understanding of the foreign policy decisionmaking

processes of the Soviet Union, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and

other countries would certainly contribute significantly to

a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of this

period, such an investigation is clearly beyond the scope

of this study. Countries neighboring the region in

conflict, as well as domestic politics, have an impact on

foreign policy, but domestic issues will only be discussed

when they have a major impact on the decisionmaker.

The methodological approaches most frequently applied

to decisionmaking in International Relations are the

"historical" method and the "case study" method. This

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Study incorporates both of these methods. It is a case

study of the entire range of regional events during the

1977-81 period in that it investigates the responses of a

limited number of people to several crises. It is a

historical study in that it employs the collection,

evaluation, verification, and synthesis of data. This data

comes from primary sources such as my own observations as a

working level participant in the subject under

investigation and interviews with participants in the

decisionmaking process, and from secondary sources such as

newspapers, magazines and journals, archival search using

the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

A significant problem area in a study which attempts

to synthesize a wide number of approaches and concepts is

the need to specify precise meanings for key terms and,

more broadly, to clearly delineate the exact decisionmaking

approaches which are to be applied. Although a large

number of terms are used in this study, only two require

immediate definition: "foreign policy" and "crisis."

"Foreign policy" refers to the "activities by government

officials which influence ... either events abroad or

relationships between Americans and citizens of other

countries, especially relations between the U.S. government

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and other governments.This definition is meant to

include what may also be referred to as national security

policy and international economic policy. For the purposes

of this investigation, U.S. foreign policy toward the

Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf will tentatively be identified as

including (but not limited to) the desire to maintain; (1)

access to regional resources; (2) security of air and sea

routes through the region; and (3) a favorable military

balance between the U.S. and the D.S.S.R.^ A "crisis"

situation is said to exist whenever "a conflict reaches a

level of hostility at which the use of large scale force

seems imminent or at least highly probable to the

decisionmakers concerned.

Focusing on the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region

during this period provides a convenient context for an

investigation of a decisionmaking approach. Since the U.S.

had very little military involvement and relatively limited

political experience in this region prior to this chain of

^ I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy; The Politics of Organizational Reform (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 5.

^ U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p. 85.

^ Hanspeter Neuhold, "Principles and Implementation of Crisis Management: Lessons from the Past," Daniel Frei, ed., International Crises and Crisis Management: An East- West Symposium (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 4.

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events, the new Carter Administration was not as committed

to existing relations in the region as it might have been

in other areas of the world. Unlike in Europe and

Northeast Asia, the Carter Administration had the

opportunity at several junctures to either set limits on

U.S. military presence in this region or to continue with

an expensive and controversial expansion of U.S. forces.

Approach

This study consists of nine chapters, including the

introduction and the conclusion. It is necessary at the

outset to establish the historical context of interregional

relations and U.S. foreign policy toward this region.

Equally important is an understanding of the role that

other major powers such as Great Britain, France, and the

Soviet Union have played in the history of these countries.

Events in the region are not discussed in chronological

order, but rather in subsets of crises. This approach is

necessary to attribute policy responses to specific crises.

Chapter II, therefore, provides a description of the

historical bonds and animosities of this region, as well as

its geographic characteristics and its socio-cultural

similarities and differences. As is often the case in

regional conflicts, decisionmakers tend to minimize the

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regional differences and stress the common characteristics

in an attempt to formulate foreign policy. This provides a

backdrop for future discussions.

Chapter III reviews the theoretical constructs of

incremental decisionmaking provided in the form of three

questions. It discusses how these processes affected

foreign policy during the Carter Administration. The

forces identified in this discussion will be referred to in

specific applications in later chapters. First, an effort

will be made to identify the components of U.S. policy

toward the region to answer the incremental question.

Second, an attempt will be made to identify the specific

crisis that is targeted by the policy response to answer

the sequential question.

Having identified the appropriate crisis, the target

of the responses will be determined in an effort to answer

the analytical question. At issue is whether a specific

response was meant for a domestic, bilateral, regional,

and/or international audience and how was it tailored to

serve this purpose. Was the most current event the target

of a specific response? Finally, was the decisionmaker’s

response directed at the actual crisis (i.e., a tribal

conflict) or to some broader perceived crisis (i.e., Soviet

aggression)?

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Chapters IV and V look at the Carter Administration's

first foray into regional politics - the Somali-Ethiopian

conflict - in terms of the theoretical construct provided

in chapter III. Two chapters are devoted to this crisis

because it provides a unique exêunple of a rapid change in

direction in U.S. foreign policy. Within two years of

Carter's assuming office, U.S. foreign policy had shifted

from one of active, open, and friendly support of Ethiopia

to one of military confrontation. At the same time,

Somalia and the U.S. established and expanded military and

diplomatic relations. The U.S. and the Soviet Union, in

effect, changed partners in the conflict, but the music

remained the same. The Somali-Ethiopian conflict,

therefore, is also broken into two chapters to describe

U.S. (and to some extent, Soviet) foreign policy with each

of its allies.

Chapter VI investigates what some might call either a

"low level crisis" or a "noncrisis." Although it received

little media attention, the conflict between North and

South Yemen elicited a significant response from the U.S.

Known in the press as the "shadow war," this crisis would

have held little interest for the U.S. had it not occurred

during roughly the same time period and in the same

geographic region as the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. South

Yemen had long since aligned itself with the Soviet Union

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and maintained a strategic position astride the entrance to

the Red Sea and North Arabian Sea, while North Yemen was

nonaligned. South Yemen's threat to North Yemen was

perceived by O.S. policymakers as a threat to another

regional ally, Saudi Arabia, which was having troubles of

its own.

Chapter VII assesses the effects of the Iranian

Revolution on the decisions to increase the U.S. military

presence in the region. Much has been written about the

U.S. experience in Iran. Indeed, discussions of this

debacle form the largest portion of the memoirs of

President Carter and officials of his Administration. No

attempt is made here to expand upon these and other works.

Rather, the focus will be on when, and in response to what

specific events, military forces were employed. The common

perception is that changes in the size and composition of

U.S. military forces in the region were direct responses to

events in Iran. In fact, only minor (incremental, if you

will) changes resulted from these events. Events in Iran

occurred concurrently with crises elsewhere in the region

and made it difficult to determine the precise object of

the U.S. military response.

Chapter VIII discusses the impact of the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan on U.S. foreign policy toward the

region - again focusing on the increase of the U.S.

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military presence in the region. Although the invasion of

Afghanistan was probably the most blatant use of Soviet

conventional military force outside of Eastern Europe in

the post World War II era, it elicited perhaps the smallest

incremental change in O.S. military presence in the region.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marks the height of U.S.

military presence in the region and provides a convenient

point to conclude the case study. This chapter also looks

at the limitations of military presence as a foreign policy

tool. At what point, for example, does a change in the

number of military forces in an area mark a change in

policy. How can a military response to a regional conflict

escalate that conflict into an international crisis?

The concluding chapter will deal with the realities

of incrementalism in the decisionmaking process. Is this

process inevitable? Are there better ways to employ

incrementalism? The incremental approach to decisionmaking

employed by the Carter Administration in determining U.S.

policy in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf was not unique.

The use of this approach has been, and remains, a common

practice. If the incremental, the sequential, and the

analytical questions are understood and employed by the

policymaker, he may be better able to use the incremental

approach to decisionmaking during an extended crisis.

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THE ENVIRONMENT: THE OTHER SIDE OF TEE WORLD

Events in the Middle East and Southwest Asia occupied

a prominent position in U.S. foreign policy throughout the

Carter presidency. Jimmy Carter considered the Camp David

Accords to be his major foreign policy success and the

Iranian Hostage Crisis his most significant s e t b a c k . ^

Heretofore, the littoral of the Indian and the Persian Gulf

had been of concern mainly in economic (i.e. oil embargo),

rather than political/military, terms to policymakers.

While regional wars or political upheavals had occasionally

focused attention on individual countries in the region in

the past (particularly Iran in the post-World War II era),

the level of U.S. involvement, specifically military

involvement, in the region during the Carter Administration

was unprecedented.

Because this region had not historically occupied a

position in the mainstream of U.S. political or strategic

® Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 4.

19

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thinking, it was necessary for decisionmakers to develop a

new frame of reference with which to deal with the series

of events which occurred between 1977 and 1981. At the

outset of his administration. President Carter identified

the Indian Ocean as a region wherein neither superpower had

"critical interests" and which provided an excellent

opportunity to set a new example for O.S.-Soviet

cooperation in the Third World (to be discussed in greater

detail in Chapter IV). But events in the region undermined

these hopes from the outset. Within two years, Zbigniew

Brzezinski voiced the view of the Carter Administration

when he referred to the "Arc of Crisis" which extended from

Somalia to Pakistan and which straddled some of the most

strategic waterways in the world.?

By defining this area under review in terms of its

common coastlines, this study has a marked maritime

perspective. As will be seen, however, proximity to these

bodies of water was a primary reason that events in these

countries became important to major world powers.

The Area Defined

It is essential at the outset to clearly define the

^ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), p. 316.

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geographical area under investigation. Reference has been

made to events or crises that occurred in the "Indian Ocean

and Persian Gulf region," but the Indian Ocean is a very

large area -the world's third largest ocean. It touches

three continents and thirty-two countries. During the

Carter Administration (more specifically, from early 1977

to early 1981) the focus of U.S. foreign policy in the

region was on the northwestern Indian Ocean, the North

Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Persian Gulf. The

countries which bordered these waters (with the addition of

landlocked Afghanistan) formed a theater in which a number

of seemingly interconnected crises occurred.

The region is further defined as that area north of

Tanzania, east of Sudan, south of Egypt, and west of

Pakistan. This is done specifically to exclude a detailed

discussion of the Arab-Israeli and the Indo-Pakistani

conflicts. While these conflicts played an important role

in the formulation of U.S. policy in this region, they will

only be discussed to the extent that they had an impact on

deliberations in the Carter Administration concerning the

area more narrowly defined above.

To appreciate the political environment facing U.S.

policymakers in this region, it is necessary to understand

that the four year period under investigation here is but a

brief, albeit turbulent, part of a long history of

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conflict. Many, if not most, of the crises in this region

arose from historical animosities or long term developments

whose roots are beyond the scope of this investigation.^

These animosities are discussed only to the extent that

they aid in the discussion of incremental policy

formulation. Where necessary, a broader historical context

will be provided, but this discussion will be limited to

the post-World War II period that marked the

decolonialization process and the rise of U.S. and Soviet

influence in this region.

A Common Maritime History

The cultural and political composition of the

countries of this region varies widely. They do not share

either common colonial experiences or religious

convictions. The differences between Sunni and Shiite

Moslems are perhaps as marked as those between Christian

Ethiopians and Moslem Somalis. They do, however, share a

maritime border and a maritime history. This study does

® For a better appreciation of the political dynamics *n the Indian Ocean - focusing on the period since World War II - see: Ranjan Gupta, The Indian Ocean: A Political Geography (New Delhi: Marwah Publications, 1979); Auguste Toussaaint, History of the Indian Ocean (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); and Ferenc A. Valli, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: The Balance of Power (New York: The Free Press, 1976).

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not address in depth the area's climatological

characteristics (except where they influence decisions by

U.S. policymakers), natural resources (except to note

significant petroleum assets), or ecological problems,

minerals, and fishing.

While the Indian Ocean is the major maritime body in

this region, it will be discussed mostly in terms of its

subsets and connecting bodies of water. Three geographical

subsets of the northwestern Indian Ocean were of particular

importance to Carter Administration decisionmakers: the Red

Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Persian Gulf. Each plays a

prominent role in international trade and the area's

economy, and each has been affected by the series of events

that unfolded during the 1977-1988 period.

The Red Sea was transformed into a major military and

commercial waterway by the construction of the Suez Canal.

The closure of the canal from 1967 to 1975 and subsequent

attempts to control international shipping through straits

at either end of the Red Sea demonstrated the vulnerability

of this waterway, as well as the economic importance of

canal traffic to the Red Sea countries. Trade between the

Indian Ocean and Western Europe is more economical and

efficient due to the Suez Canal. At the same time, without

the tanker traffic through the Red Sea enroute Europe,

local shipping - mostly tramp cargo carriers serving

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secondary ports, some smaller tanker traffic from the Gulf

of Suez, and Moslem pilgrim traffic to the port of Jiddah -

would not support the port facilities and towns that border

the Red Sea.

Trade route considerations aside, the Red Sea is of

relatively minor economic or political importance to either

the O.S. or the Soviet Onion. Geographically the Red Sea

occupies a deep trough, part of the Great Rift Valley which

extends southward through East Africa. Backed by

mountainous desert and bordered in many places by coral

reefs, the Red Sea sometimes has air temperatures over 100

degrees P. - the highest known of any water surface other

than the Persian Gulf - and the air is always humid.

Past Arab threats and attempts to block Israeli

shipping through the Strait of Tiran and Bab el Mandeb (at

each end of the Red Sea) have raised international concern

over sovereignty and rights of passage in this region.

Both straits contain the overlapping territorial seas

claimed by bordering states. The Bab el Mandeb ("Gate of

Tears") connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and the

Strait of Tiran connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of

Aqaba, which falls entirely within the territorial seas

claimed by two of its bordering states - Jordan and

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Israel.9

Israel's only southern port and Jordan's only port

lie at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. Following the

conclusion of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement, Israel

maintained that the rules of innocent passage apply to the

Strait of Tiran. The Arab nations contended, however, that

the agreement did not end the state of belligerency and

that passage through the strait by Israel-bound vessels was

therefore not innocent. Furthermore, Egypt claimed that

Israeli occupation of the territory at the head of the Gulf

of Aqaba was illegal and that the Gulf, in fact,

constituted a "closed Arab Sea."^® The impact of these

various closures was not lost on the Carter Administration

when they considered the impact of the various crises on

shipping traffic which had to pass through other choke

points bordering belligerent countries that might also

become vulnerable to unilateral declarations.

In 1953 Egypt instituted a blockade of Israeli

shipping through the Strait of Tiran. Israel invaded the

Sinai during the 1956 War, occupied Jazirat Tiran, and

Egypt and Saudi Arabia also border the Gulf of Aqaba, but only claim a three-mile territorial border. Jordan and Israel have both claimed sovereignty over the entire Gulf.

O.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Indian Ocean Atlas, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 29.

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destroyed Egyptian gun en^lacements on Ras Nasrani. After

Israel's withdrawal, trade moved freely through the strait

for ten years under the supervision of the United Nations.

In May 1967 Egypt ordered the withdrawal of O.N. forces

from the Sinai, moved guns back to Ras Nasrani, and

announced the mining of the strait. The June 1967 War

followed, and Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula.

Although the Strait of Tiran has remained open since that

time, it is clear that the continued use of this waterway

during regional hostilities is problematic.^^

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.)

also threatened to close the Bab el Mandeb to Israeli

shipping in 1967. In June 1971 a Palestinian guerrilla

group, operating a bazooka-equipped speedboat from P.D.R.Y.

territory, attacked and inflicted minor damage on a

Liberian-flag tanker bound for Israel from Iran.^^ Egypt

blockaded the Bab el Mandeb for several months during the

Although not a signatory of the International Convention of the Law of the Sea, the U.S. has traditionally recognized the right of innocent passage through all straits proposed in the Conventions covenants. On July 2, 1976, the U.S. specifically cited the right of innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran (Ocean Policy News, August 1986, Council on Ocean Law, Washington, D.C. (Xerox), p. 7). The Camp David Accords later contained provisions in which Egypt and Israel recognized the right of innocent passage through these waterways (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 351).

U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Indian Ocean Atlas, p. 29.

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October 1973 War. Although no further attempts have been

made to close this strait, the ease with which the 12-

kilometer wide shipping channel must be considered by

policymakers and military planners. The proximity of the

Soviet-supported states of P.D.R.Y. and Ethiopia make any

O.S. presence in this strait extremely vulnerable.

The other major body of water adjoining the Indian

Ocean - the Persian Gulf - was the focus of much of the

political/military planning during the Carter

Administration. For political and military planning

purposes addressed in later chapter, it is important to

know the geographical and climatological conditions on the

Arabian peninsula. The lands surrounding the Persian Gulf

are arid. Fresh water enters the Gulf only from the Shatt

al Arab, which, in turn, receives the combined flow of the

Tigris, Euphrates, and Karum Rivers. Even with this flow,

the waters of the Gulf would dry up through evaporation

were they not continually replenished by Indian Ocean water

moving through the Strait of Hormuz. There are hundreds of

small islands in the Persian Gulf, its shoreline is fringed

in many places by coral reefs and sandbars, and mudflats;

and shallow water along the southern coast makes nearshore

navigation extremely hazardous.

D.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, O.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p. 8.

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Unusually high summer temperatures, combined with

high relative humidity, make the Persian Gulf littoral a

difficult operating environment for military forces. Air

temperatures over the Gulf exceed 100 degrees F. during the

day in June, July, and August and fall only to the low 80's

at night. The humidity is relatively high during this

period because of rapid evaporation from the warm Gulf

waters. The dew point - tne temperature at which water

vapor in the air condenses - exceeds 27 degrees C. about 10

percent of the time in midsummer. Under these conditions

the body's cooling mechanism is disrupted; the body sweats,

but the sweat does not evaporate, and thus cool, and any

strenuous activity increases the danger of heatstroke.

During the coolest months, December through February, the

relative humidity is actually higher than in summer but the

climate is more pleasant since the temperature does not

rise above the low 70's during the day and often falls

below 59 at night. Most of the limited rainfall occurs

during the winter season, ranging from a 3 inch annual

average on Bahrain to 10 inches at Bushehr, Iran.

Environmental conditions played a direct role in the

planning options and force structure of U.S. military

forces for this region.

There are few good natural harbors in the Indian

Ocean, particularly in the Persian Gulf. In general.

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Indian Ocean shorelines are regular and have few

indentations or promontories that afford protection from

adverse weather and sea conditions. Silting channels and

off-shore bars obstruct navigation and limit use of ports

established on some of the larger rivers. Many of the

ports currently being developed are expensive and ambitious

projects, funded by petroleum wealth, but the limited dock

and anchorage areas in these ports during between 1977 and

1981 were factors in the long delays that were experienced

in the transshipment of goods into and out of the region.

Ports currently under construction and nearing

completion are designed primarily to facilitate the

transport of petroleum or to circumvent physical

restrictions such as shallow depths or silting. Dubai is

the most important commercial center for today's dhow and

smaller tanker trade, and the Persian Gulf terminals at

Doha, Bahrain, and Jubail are the main focus of activity

for larger tanker traffic.

Until the early 1970's these ports were small, quiet

places that reflected the Persian Gulf's position as a

backwater of the Indian Ocean. The development of the

petroleum fields brought drastic changes to the ports and

their hinterlands. Some entirely new ports have been built

to serve the giant oil tankers. The oil economy has made

supertankers a common sight in the region, and prosperity

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has changed many of the ports to bustling overcrowded trade

centers.

Persian Gulf ports are of two kinds, specialized

petroleum handling terminals and general cargo ports. Many

of the petroleum ports are loading facilities situated far

out in the Gulf where the water is deep enough to

accommodate tankers with capacities up to 500,000 dwt.

Nearly all of the cargo ports have completed or are

undergoing some expansion. Those in Iran, Iraq, and Saudi

Arabia have been severely overburdened in recent years.

Rapid economic development increased imports to these

countries an average of 75 percent during the 1975-1980

timeframe, and the offloading delays averaged 90 to 120

days in 1 9 7 9 . The congestion has been relieved only by

additional transportation facilities and the "end" of the

petroleum crisis.

Economic, Political, and

Military Evolution

The northwest Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf is

noted for its major export - petroleum. Other than the

well-known efforts of littoral countries in forming the

Alvin J. Cottrell, Sea Power and Strategy in the Indian Ocean (London; Sage Publications, 1981), p. 24.

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Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with

other oil exporting countries, there has been no other

major attempt at close economic association by the

countries of this region. Intra-area trade accounts for

less than a quarter of the Indian Ocean total. Most cargo

shipped from Indian Ocean ports is destined for other parts

of the world, and most of the tonnage discharged at these

ports originates outside the area.

Other exports consist mainly of raw materials, while

imports are mainly manufactured goods and grain. This

pattern reflects the low level of industrial development of

Indian Ocean countries compared to their principal trading

partners - Western Europe, Japan, and the United States.

This pattern has also not gone unnoticed by regional

countries. Those that can afford it have made significant

investments in "turn-key factories," which produce finished

products, in an effort to modernize the economic basis of

their societies. For the foreseeable future, however,

petroleum will remain the most significant export from the

Indian Ocean area, both in value and in tonnage. The

foreign trade of the six area members of OPEC - Saudi

Arabia, Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and

Kuwait - is valued at 26 percent of the area total. Most

of the oil is shipped to Western Europe and Japan - Japan's

share representing more than a third of her total imports.

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Lesser amounts of oil to go to Australia and the United States.

Traditionally, there has been little political unity

within the northwestern Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf, and

throughout history no single indigenous power has been able

to dominate the region. Even in the late 19th century when

Great Britain, through its position in India and its

control of all the approaches to the ocean, had turned the

Indian Ocean into a virtual British lake, patterns of trade

and cultural interchange radiated between the colonies and

the imperial powers, but seldom from one colony to another.

The colonial era lasted from the arrival of the

Portuguese in the Indian Ocean in 1497 to the end of World

War II. Only the Ethiopians and the Iranians managed to

retain a large degree of independence during the centuries

of colonial rule. Many Asian and African states became

independent as the European powers withdrew after 1945.

With independence, however, came rivalries and occasional

hostilities between (among others) India and Pakistan, Iran

and Iraq, and Ethiopia and Somalia. Additionally, most of

the new nations were forced to concentrate on internal

problems, particularly on economic development and

political unity; there was little time to locus on regional

^5 U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Indian Ocean Atlas, p. 20.

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relationships. The limited pre-1970 literature on the

Indian Ocean area illustrates the general tendency to view

its nations and peoples more as parts of other areas (Sub-

Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South or Southeast Asia)

than as a single geographic region with unique and unifying

characteristics.

In the post-World War II period, the Indian Ocean

achieved increased strategic significance, in large part as

a result of the increasing dependence of many developed

countries on Persian Gulf petroleum. Keeping the sea lanes

open for the transport of oil became vital to Western

Europe and Japan, and therefore of increasing importance to

the United States. The Persian Gulf area accounts for an

estimated two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves and

supplies more than half of the world’s oil requirements.

With the aforementioned closure of the Suez Canal in

1967, oil transportation between the Persian Gulf and

Western Europe had to be rerouted along the ancient trade

routes running south through the Indian Ocean and around

the Cape of Good Hope. The closure of the Suez Canal

accelerated the use of Very Large Cargo Containers (VLCC)

and Ultra Large Cargo Containers (ULCC) tankers during the

following years. These ships are so large that they were

unable to pass through the canal when it was reopened in

^5 Cottrell, Sea Power, p. 75.

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1975. The reopening of the canal was of considerable

significance to the Indian Ocean region, however, because

it made possible far more rapid transfer of naval

combatants from European waters to the Indian Ocean.

A British announcement in 1968 that only token forces

would remain east of Suez after 1971 was followed by

increased Soviet and U.S. activity in the area. A Soviet

naval task force entered the Indian Ocean in 1968 for the

first time, and Soviet naval units have been stationed in

the Gulf of Aden almost continuously since that date.

Chapters IV and V will discuss how the Soviets attained

facilities for their exclusive use at Socotra Island near

the Horn of Africa by the P.D.R.Y. and at Dahalak in

Ethiopia.

The U.S. Navy has maintained a small Middle East

Force, homeported in the Persian Gulf at Bahrain, since

1949. Prior to 1977, naval task forces had been detached

from the Seventh Fleet for brief cruises into the Indian

Ocean on several occasions. The U.S. had also built a

small naval communications and naval support facility on

the island of Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean

Territory (BIOT). A 1966 agreement (the Radford-Collins

Agreement) between Great Britain and the United States made

the island available to both countries for military

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purposes for a period of 50 years.In July 1975 the

United States Congress approved plans to expand the Diego

Garcia facility to provide logistical and operational

support to U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean.The proposed

expansion was criticized by several governments in the

area, most strongly by India, Mauritius, and M a d a g a s c a r

Britain and France no longer maintain major military

forces in the area but do retain access to some

strategically important facilities. Great Britain, in

addition to possession of Diego Garcia, routinely used

airfields at Salalah and Masirah in Oman until 1976, and

maintained an RAF staging base on Gan in the Maldives until

March 1976.

France has kept a small naval squadron in the Indian

Ocean and a major base at Djibouti (the former French

Territory of Afars and Issas).^® Independence was granted

to Djibouti in 1979 but the French have retained their

access to their former Navy and French Foreign Legion

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Interests in, and Policies Toward, The Persian Gulf, 1980, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, p. 410.

^5 Ibid., p. 96.

Ibid., p. 68. The establishment and expansion of a U.S. military facility at Diego Garcia will be discussed in Chapter VII.

The French naval forces in the Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN) usually consist of a flagship (a converted oiler) and two frigates.

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facilities. The island of Reunion in the southern Indian

Ocean remains a part of the French interior department.

Access to military facilities in the region by

outside countries has been by no means assured, however.

In December 1971 the United Nations General Assembly, by a

vote of 61 to 0 with 55 abstentions, adopted a resolution

proposed by Sri Lanka declaring the Indian Ocean to be a

"zone of peace." The resolution had two provisions. The

first called on the major military powers to consult with

Indian Ocean littoral states in order to halt escalation of

military forces in the area and to eliminate from the

Indian Ocean "all bases, military installations, logistical

supply facilities, nuclear weapons, and weapons of mass

destructions...conceived in the context of great power

rivalry." The second provision called for consultations

among littoral and hinterland states, permanent members of

the U.N. Security Council, and other major maritime nations

to ensure that warships and military aircraft would not use

the Indian Ocean in any manner which threatened the

littoral and hinterland states. Subject to these

restrictions and to the principles of international law,

"the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the

vessels of all nations in unaffected.

United Nations, General Assembly, 22nd Session, 13 December 1971, Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Resolution, (R/014).

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Resolutions relating to the "zone of peace" were

passed at succeeding sessions of the General Assembly by

similarly overwhelming votes but, in each case, with a

significant number of abstentions, the latter including all

of the permanent members of the Security Council except

China. The United States' position, supported by many

other maritime powers, was that it is inappropriate for a

regional group of states to establish a special regime over

a portion of the high seas, that the declaration is in

violation of existing international law, and that it is

incompatible with Washington's traditional position on

freedom of the seas.^2

Perhaps the primary significance of the action taken

in New York in 1971 is the fact that 13 Indian Ocean states

combined to sponsor a regional resolution. Of the 27

nations in the area who were members of the United Nations

in 1971, only 6 abstained on the vote. In subsequent years

the number decreased, until in 1974 and 1975 there were no

abstentions from the area.

Until the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and rise of a

secular Iranian state, the states in the region were

experimenting with new ideas to establish closer relations.

The Shah of Iran had suggested an Indian Ocean Common

U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Indian Ocean Atlas, p. 24.

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Market and Security Group to include the littoral states

along the northern shore of the Indian Ocean from Iran to

Singapore, with possible eventual extension to Australia.

The effort to increase solidarity among the nations of the

Persian Gulf continues under the aegis of the Gulf

Cooperative Council. The continuing conflicts between

Somalia and Ethiopia, North and South Yemen, and Iran and

Iraq, however, do not bode well for greater regional

cooperation in the near future.

Beginning in 1977, the United States found itself

faced with a series of events and conflicts in this region

which threatened its perceived regional, and to some extent

worldwide, interests. The Somali/Ethiopian conflict in the

Ogaden Desert resulted in a significant realignment of

alliances in the Horn of Africa and provided the initial

foray of the Carter Administration into a decisionmaking

process which eventually resulted in the Carter Doctrine.

The dynamics of the U.S. decisionmaking process

during an extended crisis and the ways in which President

Carter fashioned short-term responses into a broader, long-

range policy are instrumental in understanding the U.S.

experience in this region of the world. The next chapter

investigates the constraints placed upon the decisionmaker

during an extended crisis and provides the context for the

subsequent case study.

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THE CONTEXT: QUESTIONS DECISIONMAKERS MIGHT ASK

One aspect of the decisionmaking process noted in the

Carter Administration's formulation of U.S. policy toward

the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region was incrementalism.

In his memoirs, Brzezinski notes that "...a number of

incremental decisions were made regarding preparations for

prepositioning of military stockpiles, holding of joint

exercises with some of the friendly countries in the

region, and enhancing U.S. naval/air deployments in the

area ... that gradually generated bureaucratic momendum,

with the NSC staff in firm control.^3

While not unique to the Carter Administration, or

even to foreign policymaking within this Administration,

incrementalism may have played a significant role in the

eventual structure of U.S. foreign policy toward this

region. Before discussing the role that incrementalism

played in the Carter Administration's experience in the

Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, this chapter will define the

Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 447.

39

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incremental approach to decisionmaking and suggest three

"types” of questions which a decisionmaker might ask

himself when faced with a crisis.

Some of the earlier works in the field of

decisionmaking analysis focused on crises with relatively

short timeframes, such as the Cuban Missile C r i s i s . ^ 4

Others concentrated on single issues over a longer period

of time, such as the nuclear sharing proposals from 1956 to

1964.25 The experience of the United States in the Indian

Ocean from 1977 to 1981 provides an opportunity to study

how decisions are made covering several crises over an

extended period, focusing on the manner in which Carter

Administration policymakers limited their policy options,

either consciously or unconsciously.

The process of incremental decisionmaking might be

visualized as a building process in which adjustments to

existing policies are made either by narrowing options

(i.e., building on previous decisions), expanding the range

of decision possibilities, or some combination of the two.

The incremental approach described in this study generally

24 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).

25 John E. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974). See Appendix A for additional information on studies dealing with decisionmaking during crises.

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assumes that options are narrowed by basing decisions on

previous decisions.

Faced with an extended crisis in the Indian

Ocean/Persian Gulf region. President Carter had several

opportunities to review the results of his previous

decisions and adjust his future policies accordingly.

Before reviewing these opportunities, however, it is first

necessary to understand what incrementalism is and what

might be done to minimize its shortcomings while maximizing

its merits.

Incrementalism; A Necessary Evil?

Incrementalism is perhaps the most easily understood

approach to decisionmaking. John Steinbruner refers to

incrementalism as the "evolutionary process whereby output

in each successive time period represents only a small

change from the previous time period..."2® On the other

hand, in one hypothetical "ideal" decisionmaking process;

(1) the policymaker pursues an agreed upon set of values;

(2) the aims of the policy are clearly formulated before a

choice is made between various policies; (3) the

policymaker attempts a comprehensive overview of policy

problems and alternative policies; (4) coordination of

25 Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision, p. 81.

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policy is made the explicit function of the policymaker;

and (5) the analyst is comprehensive in considering all

variables and values.2? This ideal, however, fails to

provide a method for selecting which aspects of the problem

to analyze when mental "overload" on the decisionmaker

requires that some options be abandoned. Furthermore, it

is not adapted to the recpairements of crisis (and many

noncrisis) situations, such as the lack of information and

the costliness of analysis in terms of time and resources,

David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom focused on the

analysis of decisions that effected small or incremental

change but were not guided by a high level of

understanding. In their view, incremental decisions are

made through small moves on particular problems rather than

through a comprehensive reform program. "It (the

incremental process) is also endless; it takes the form of

an indefinite sequence of policy moves. Moreover, it is

exploratory in that the goals of policy-making continue to

change as new experience with policy throws new light on

what is possible and desirable."2®

2^ Jan Tinbergen, Economic Policy; Principles and Design (Amsterdam; North Holland Publishing Company, 1956), p. 8.

28 David Braybrook and Charles E. Lindblom, Strategy of Decision (New York; Free Press, 1963), p. 64.

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In his discussion of the Organizational Process

Model, Allison notes how incrementalism facilitates what

would otherwise be an overwhelming budgetary process: (1)

organizational budgets change incrementally by using last

year's budget as a base and making minor adjustments; (2)

organizational priorities, perceptions, and issues remain

relatively stable, but; (3) organizational procedures and

repertoires change incrementally; and (4) any new activity

is usually only a marginal adaption of an existing

p r o g r a m . 29 When translated to the individual level,

Allison's analysis closely parallels the concept of

incrementalism in that minor adjustments are made and

applied to the new situation based on the policy developed

in response to the last crisis, but the underlying

priorities and perceptions of the decisionmaker remain the

same.

When faced with a situation which requires timely

action, the decisionmaker may make an incremental move in

the desired direction without taking upon himself the

difficulties of finding a solution. At the same time, he

may disregard many other possible moves because they are

too costly (in time, energy, or money) to examine. He also

may not fully investigate all of the consequences of his

move since, if it fails or is encounters unanticipated

29 Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 91.

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adverse consequences, he may believe that he can address

the resulting problem with his next move.

Incremental decisions may be necessitated by the

difficulty in determining the underlying issues at stake in

a policy decision. As Destler points out, "issues

generally arise not all at once or once and for all, but

bit by bit. So while bureaucrats may be thinking in terms

of the larger question, battles tend to be fought over how

to handle today's problem.. . Therefore, a commitment to

incremental change is not surprising since nonincremental

alternatives (i.e. radical departures from current

policies) usually do not lie within the range of options

available to the policymaker, and even when they are, such

radical options are instinctively avoided.

To ensure that he maximizes the benefits of

incremental decisionmaking, the policymaker should justify

each step in a foreign policy evolution on the basis of

some overall strategy. Watched closely by politically

astute journalists and a broad domestic and international

audience, the policymaker must not appear to be making

contradictory decisions, but, rather, orderly and rational

calculations. He may attempt to maintain the appearance of

consistency and to package policies in a manner in which

Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy, p. 59.

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the maximum domestic political support for a proposal even

if it does not precisely reflect the reasoning which leads

to the decision.

The policymaker who pursues an incremental approach

to decisionmaking during a crisis situation, therefore,

omits from his analysis nonincremental policies, many

important consequences of a given policy, and objectives

that are not attainable by present or potential means. He

does this for many obvious reasons, one of which might be

the stress placed on him by possible threats to his values,

the element of surprise, the requirement for a quick

decision, or the lack of sufficient information.

However, the policymaker who pursues an exclusively

"crisis reaction" foreign policy is usually unable to place

events in a larger context or to anticipate broader trends

in foreign affairs. In an effort, therefore, to find a

middle ground between a purely ad hoc approach and a

preprogrammed course of decisionmaking, policymakers might

ask themselves three questions as events unfold during an

extended crisis: What decisions or responses brought us to

this point in the crisis? What, specifically, am I

responding to? Will my contemplated response address this

specific crisis or is it directed at a larger issue or

George Hirsch, "Multiple Criteria Decision-Making; Theory and Application," European Journal of Operational Research 3 (1981): 309-310.

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relationship?

The Incremental Question

The policymaker must be able to recognize both the

tendency to make incremental decisions as well as the

likely impact of that process on resulting policies. By

reviewing the premises upon which he bases his decision,

the policymaker can maximize the positive aspects of the

incremental approach while avoiding its drawbacks.

When formulating a policy in a crisis situation, the

incremental decisionmaker seeks consistency with previous

policies, thereby simplifying his decision process to the

mere addition or minor modification of current plans and

avoiding any major threats to his own psychological

stability and the stability of his foreign policy. The

incremental question that should be asked - What previous

decisions form the basis of the current crisis response? -

requires an appreciation of the decisionmaker's need to

pare down large amounts of information.

Alexander George points out that "(t)he very

processes of perception, cognition, calculation, and choice

are subject to inherent limits. The mind cannot perform

without structuring reality, thereby often oversimplifying

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or distorting it."52 Thus, not only may the decisionmaker

unconsciously limit the information and permutations

involved in making a decision, he may consciously ignore,

discount, deny, forget, or misinterpret information

presented to him in order to avoid having to make any

adjustments to his p o l i c y . 53

To better understand the decisionmaker's information

filtration process, picture an inverted pyramid, where a

single policy or decision forms the base. Based on that

decision, subsequent decisions form the next tier, each

providing justification for seemingly related issues. As

decisions build upon decisions, they diverge further from

both the original policy and from each other so that at

some point they may no longer rationally follow from the

original policy. An ideal decisionmaking scheme, on the

other hand, might be pictured as a pyramid in which a

decision is refined (rather than expanded upon) from a

broad base of previous decisions.

Incremental changes can be either a change of degree

or a change in character. One of the subtleties of the

incremental approach is that changes in degree and changes

in character are often very similar. At what point, for

33 Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 19.

53 Ibid.

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example, does an incremental increase in the number of

troops deployed to a region become a change in the

character of the military presence in that region.

When asking the incremental question during a crisis

situation, the policymaker should — again ideally — first

express the values and interests which are threatened by

the crisis and then delineate the range of options that are

available. While this approach to decisionmaking is

intuitively attractive, it is often difficult to find

genuine alternative options for any of several reasons.

The decisionmaker must also consider the problems which

arise in the implementation of various options. And,

retrospectively, the policymaker should ideally learn from

the experiences gained during the decisionmaking p r o c e s s . 54

To keep the positive aspects of the incremental

approach without incurring the disadvantages inherent in

the process, the decisionmaker must recognize that this

approach may be only a short term "fix" for a crisis

situation. At the first opportunity, he should investigate

the full range of policy options available in light of the

new information and environment. Second, a policymaker can

best make valid incremental corrections to an existing

policy only if he establishes some criteria (presumable

54 Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 171.

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basic values and beliefs) against which to judge the

results that have emerged from previous incremental

adjustments. Finally, incrementalism is an ongoing

approach and requires that the policymaker continue to make

the necessary adjustments to his p o l i c y . 55

When confronted with a crisis requiring a decision,

therefore, the policymaker need not despair of the fact

that he is making an incremental, rather than a sweeping,

change to policy. He must recognize, however, that the

luxury of an immediate incremental decision carries with it

the responsibility for more systematic reflection at a

later date. As long as the policymaker can determine the

basis upon which he is making his decision - the underlying

policy which is being incrementally changed - he has

answered the incremental question and can focus on the

sequence of events as they occur.

The Sequential Question

While it may be relatively easy to identify an

incremental decision during a single, discrete crisis, it

becomes more difficult to do so during a series of closely

related crises. The question that the policymaker must ask

55 Peter F. Drucker, The Effective Executive (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 96.

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himself during such a series of crises - the sequential

question - is whether the proposed incremental policy

response is appropriate for the current crisis or is it

suited more for an earlier crisis (or a concurrent but

unrelated crisis).

Having determined the origins of the current policy

and recognizing that it is, at best, an interim measure,

the decisionmaker must ensure that the policy he has

adopted responds to the appropriate crisis. The timing and

the target of the response, therefore, should become the

focus of the policymaker's attention. The response must be

perceived to be commensurate with, and directly related to,

the incident in question. A response that is formulated

for one crisis and applied to another crisis in the region,

for example, might be counterproductive.

When operating under both uncertainty and time

constraints, the incremental approach buys much needed time

for the analysis of the more difficult aspects of the

crisis. By asking the sequential question, the policymaker

may also be able to determine the order in which to deal

with the various crises in a region. If he is fortunate he

will respond to the first crisis in such a way that another

crisis in the region will also be solved. At a minimum, he

will avoid confusion as to who or to what event the

response is targeted.

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By answering the sequential question, the policymaker

also provides an incremental input into the policy base

which he will use to address subsequent crises. Once an

acceptable policy is determined for one crisis, it may be

added to the repertoire of responses for subsequent crises

since it has probably attained some level of consensus. It

is important, however, that the policymaker ask the

incremental question again with each subsequent crisis to

ensure that the policy being pursued is applicable to the

current crisis.

Not only should the policymaker ensure that he is

addressing his response to the proper crisis, he should

also identify the component parts of the crisis and address

those parts in order of his own priorities, thus begging

the question of how the policymaker assigns priorities in

crisis situations. Of particular concern is the

perspective from which the policymaker views the crisis.

To place events in the proper perspective, therefore, he

needs to ask the analytical question.

The Analytical Question

The analytical question asks whether the

decisionmaker's contemplated response addresses the current

crisis or is a response to a perceived larger issue or

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relationship. The policymaker's most recent experience

will certainly play a significant role in his decisions

concerning the current crisis.5® if a certain policy

response (or policy tool such as military forces) has

recently been effective, that response stands a greater

chance of being used again, even when there may be strong

indications that the response does not apply to the new

crisis situation.

Efforts by decisionmakers to minimize the

inconsistency in their decisions over extended periods,

therefore, focus attention on their perception of causality

- by which is meant the tendency of the decisionmaker to

relate an event to a specific source. The strength of the

policymaker's beliefs often depends more upon the

perception of causality than to any direct evidence of a

connection. In asking the analytical question the

decisionmaker seeks to determine whether these perceptions

are more acute in periods of crisis or in periods of

noncrisis, when there is less stress on a timely response

and more opportunity to study other options.

Crisis situations often result in "value extension"

wherein personal and political values become wrapped up in

perceived national interests and "intrude into the

motivations and incentives of the decisionmaker and his

55 George, Presidential Decisionmaking, p. 75.

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a d v i s e r s . "5^ During a crisis, a decisionmaker may tend to

identify as a possible source for the crisis that which is

foremost among his own personal concerns, but which may not

be related to the current situation. The "Soviet threat"

is a common example of a perceived underlying cause of

instability. However, "(t)he question of the level of

costs and risks that would be commensurate with what is

thought to be at stake is left unanswered. And, as a

result, policymakers tend to drift into an open-ended

commitment of incremental a c t i o n s . "58

George defines a high quality decision as "one in

which the president correctly weighs the national interest

in a particular situation and chooses a policy or an option

that is most likely to achieve national interest at

acceptable cost and r i s k . "59 when asking the analytic

question, therefore, the policymaker should not only ensure

that his response is addressed to the proper threat, but

also that the costs (political or economic) are

commensurate with the criticality of that threat.

The policymaker who has come to grips with the

necessity of pursuing an incremental approach to

Ralph L. Keeney and Howard Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives; Preferences and Value Tradeoff (New York: Wiley, 1976), p. 312.

58 George, Presidential Decisionmaking, p. 235.

59 Ibid., p. 3.

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decisionmaking during crisis situations, therefore, must

also recognized the need to continually focus on the

procedures involved. Rather than bemoaning the incremental

nature of his policy, he should recognize that

circumstances, values, and alternative policies change

constantly. He should know that an attempt "to solve a

problem is to run the risk of achieving tomorrow a solution

to yesterday's problem."40 Finally, he should recognize

that his decisions are merely part of a continuing problem­

solving process, itself fluid in nature, and ensure that

the results of his policies adequately meet the near-term

crisis without violating his long-term goals.

This discussion suggests that a policymaker can

successfully employ the incremental approach to

decisionmaking if he: routinely reviews the basic policy

which is being changed; ensures that the policy response is

appropriate for the current crisis; and that he responds to

the actual, as opposed to the perceived, threat.

The policies that the Carter Administration pursued

in response to events in this region displayed many of the

elements of incremental decisionmaking. After these events

are related in the following chapters, the incremental,

sequential, and analytical questions will be reviewed to

48 Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision, p, 121.

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policymakers were able to successful employ the incremental

approach.

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INITIAL STEPS: ARMS CONTROL IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

President Carter assumed office on January 20, 1977

after campaigning on a platform that included seeking a

broad improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. He attached

great importance to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

(SALT) and to reactivating the Mutual Balanced Force

Reduction (MBPR) talks in Vienna. He also pressed his

advisors to develop new arms control initiatives to engage

the Soviet leadership in a deeper, more broadly based

dialogue.41 While President Carter was pursuing these

initiatives, events in the Horn of Africa were to have a

significant impact on the subsec[uent formulation of U.S.

foreign policy.

The first experience of the Carter Administration in

the region, indeed one of the first foreign policy issues

the Administration faced, did not bode well for the new

president. This chapter discusses the Carter

Administration’s early efforts at arms control in the

Indian Ocean and the Somali-Ethiopian conflict of 1977-78

41 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 217.

56

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(the Ogaden War), which led the Administration to suspend

the Indian Ocean Arms Limitations Talks and marked a

significant change in the regional role of the United

States.

The geographical locus of the Somali-Ethiopian

conflict — the Horn of Africa — is important because it

partly explains the disproportionate amount of attention

that the U.S. and the Soviet Union paid to this conflict.

As economic units, the countries of the Horn (Somalia,

Ethiopia, and Djibouti) rank among the world's poorest.

But standing astride vital Persian Gulf tanker routes and

as connecting landmasses between the Middle East and

Africa, this region assumes considerable strategic

significance.

Early Arms Control Initiatives

Following his inauguration and at the recommendation

of his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski,

Carter sent a personal letter to Soviet Premier Brezhnev on

January 26, 1977 in which he stressed that it was his "goal

to improve relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of

reciprocity, mutual respect and benefit."4% The president

met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin for the first

42 Ibid.

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time on February 1, 1977, to underscore some of the points

he had made in this letter. Among other things, the two

discussed O.S.-Soviet reciprocal restraint in crisis areas,

as well as the mutual reduction of insecurity and

uncertainty with regard to each state's intentions and

capabilities. During the course of the meeting Dobrynin

probed Carter for his position on a variety of topics

including the Indian O c e a n . 43 As a result of this meeting

and Brezhnev's response of February 4 to the President's

letter. Carter directed Vance and Brzezinski to draft a

response on February 7 which would be "personal and

specific, including particular comments on ... a

demilitarized Indian O c e a n . "44

The Indian Ocean appeared attractive as an initial

area of arms control for the Carter Administration for

several reasons. The region was far removed,

geographically, from the European theater where a majority

of ongoing arms control initiatives were focused. It was

also relatively free from negotiating difficulties

associated with the strategic nuclear relationship between

the U.S. and the Soviet Union, although subsequent

discussions did address this area. Finally, there was

2 Ibid., p. 152. See also Henry S. Bradsher, "Can the Militarization of the Indian Ocean Be Reversed," The Washington Star, 17 March 1977, p. 3:1.

44ibid., p. 153.

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growing support for some type of superpower disengagement

in the Indian Ocean among regional countries.*5

This was the first time that Vance became aware of

Carter's intention to pursue the Indian Ocean o p t i o n . *6

That same day, Fred S. Hoffman, the Associated Press

correspondent for the Pentagon, wrote an article that

contained the first public reference to Carter's Indian

Ocean plans. The article remarked that Carter himself

raised the idea of Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks in the

context of discussion issues bearing on the size of the

defense budget. Hoffman reported that a memorandum had

been circulated to Cabinet and NSC officials listing a

range of subjects, among them Indian Ocean naval arms

control, requiring the preparation of position papers for

submission to the President.

One month later, on March 9, 1977, Carter announced

in a press conference that he had "proposed that the Indian

Richard N. Haass, "Arms Control at Sea; The United States and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, 1977-78," Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation; Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York; Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 534.

4® Interview with Captain Gary Sick, USN (Ret), Staff (Middle East and North Africa), National Security Council (1976-1981). San Francisco; October, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as Sick).

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Ocean be completely demilitarized. "47 Qne week later on

March 17 he revised his goal downward in an address before

the United Nations General Assembly, when he declared that

"(the United States) will seek to establish Soviet

willingness to reach an agreement ... on mutual military

restraint in the Indian O c e a n . " 4 8 Though Carter’s earlier

call for "demilitarization" and his subsequent goal of

"restraint" raised some questions as to the real intent of

his policy for the Indian Ocean, these statements were

significant because they furnished an insight into the

scope of his Administration’s approach to both national

security policy and arms control and signalled a change in

U.S. foreign policy for the Indian Ocean region. Carter

raised the subject again during his opening statement at

his March 24, 1977, news conference.49

Though the rhetoric framing the issue was somewhat

different from that of the President's, the Soviet

government accepted Carter's challenge that very day.

Speaking in Tanzania, Soviet president, Nikolai V. Podgorny

4^ U.S., President, "The President's News Conference of March 9, 1977," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 14 March 1977, p. 334.

48 See "Transcript of President's Address at U.N. on Peace, Economy, and Human Rights," The New York Times, 18 March 1977, p. 10.

49 U.S., President, "The President's News Conference of March 24, 1977," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 28 March 1977, p. 440.

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indicated that the Soviet Union was "willing to open talks

with the United States and other concerned nations on the

question of declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace."

Podgorny dampened hopes for a quick resolution, however,

when he argued that "the key question" in preserving peace

in the area was "the elimination of imperialist bases."^0

Nonetheless, Carter's policy pronouncements came as a

surprise to many government officials. Military officers

in the Department of Defense (DOD), for example, knew of no

Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) ordering a study of

the question of arms limitations - naval or otherwise - in

the Indian Ocean.

Vance carried Carter's proposal to Moscow in March

1977 when he discussed the Carter Administration's SALT II

proposals with the Soviet leadership. During the second

meeting between Vance and Gromyko on the afternoon of March

28, 1977, the two men agreed to set up bilateral working

groups to examine Indian Ocean naval arms control as well

John Darnton, "Podgorny, in Zanzibar, Welcomes Parley with U.S. on Indian Ocean," The New York Times, 25 March 1977, p. 4:3.

Rear Admiral Robert J. Hanks, USN (Ret.), "The Indian Ocean Negotiations: Rocks and Shoals," Strategic Review 6 (Winter 1978): 18. Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM) were used by the White House to direct reviews and analyses to be undertaken by departments or agencies. For a copy of the Presidential Directive (PD) establishing PRMs, see Robert Hunter, Presidential Control of Foreign Policy (New York; Praeger, 1982), pp. 103-104.

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as a number of other matters concerning the limitation of

armaments. These other proposals included a comprehensive

nuclear test ban treaty, discussions addressing chemical

weapons, an agreement providing for prior notification of

missile firings, an anti-satellite weapons agreement, the

entire issue of civil defense, a radiological weapons

treaty, a discussion of limiting conventional arms

transfers to Third World countries, and steps to strengthen

the Non-Proliferation Treaty.^2

The Carter SALT proposals called for "deep cuts" in

the strategic forces of both states, with Soviet forces

taking the larger share. On March 30, Brezhnev abruptly

rejected not only the "deep cuts" proposal but also

Carter’s backup approach that accepted the Vladivostok

ceilings and deferred the cruise missile and BACKFIRE

bomber issues. Hence, the bilateral working groups that

were agreed upon were the only tangible results of the

Moscow talks.

^ Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices; Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 53-54. Testimony before Congress suggests that the Indian Ocean negotiations were of a lower priority than most of Carter's other arms control initiatives. See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on the Armed Services, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy, Designation of Panels Concerning Arms Control and Disarmament, Hearings, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978, p. 11.

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The United States proposed to establish a bilateral

working group on the Indian Ocean and the Soviet Union

accepted the offer before any comprehensive interagency

review of the problems at hand took place. Carter did not

issue PRM/NSC-25 on the subject of arms control in the

Indian Ocean until April 7, 1977.53 in accordance with the

organizational framework of the Carter National Security

Council (which will be discussed briefly later in this

chapter), the review process was in the hands of the

Special Coordination Committee (SCC) - a committee which

had been tasked with decisions regarding intelligence

policy, arms control, and crisis management.5^ As

Assistant for National Security Affairs, Brzezinski chaired

the SCC.

Brzezinski appointed an ad hoc working group to

examine the issue of Indian Ocean arms control and prepare

a range of alternative negotiating strategies for

consideration by the SCC. In addition to members from the

National Security Council, this interagency group consisted

of staff members from the Departments of Defense and State,

ACDA, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs

Lawrence J. Korb, "National Security Organization and Process in the Carter Administration,” Sam C. Sarkesian, ed.. Defense Policy and the Presidency; Carter's First Years (Boulder; Westview Press, 1979), p. 123.

54 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 59.

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of Staff. The working group completed its task of

developing various options late in the spring of 1977.55

The SCC first addressed the question of the Indian Ocean

talks in May 1977.56

Carter announced his policy initiatives on the Indian

Ocean prior to subjecting that policy to the scrutiny of

his own National Security Council apparatus and the policy

review process outlined b e l o w . 5? Available evidence

suggests that the SCC meeting in May 1977 left unresolved

the decision as to what the ultimate negotiating objective

of the United States should be. It did, however, recommend

to Carter that the U.S. delegation to the first round of

55 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on the Armed Services, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy, Panel on Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation, Indian Ocean Arms Limitations and Multilateral Cooperation on Restraining Conventional Arms Transfers, Hearings, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978, p.6 (hereinafter referred to as Indian Ocean Arms Limitations, 1978).

56 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 174.

5^ Leslie Gelb contends that this was not the case. He argued that Carter simply announced a long-term objective (i.e. demilitarization) without committing the U.S. Government to negotiation. See Indian Ocean Arms Limitations, 1978, p. 10; interview with Leslie Gelb, Former Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as Gelb). See also Richard N. Haass, "Arms Control at Sea: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, 1977-78," Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 528.

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talks adopt an exploratory posture to gauge the Soviet

Union's position on the subject.5® This was a prudent

approach since it had the advantage of not only determining

the level of seriousness of the Soviet Union on the

question but also gauging the range and depth of the issues

that the Soviet Union would raise. These objectives could

be accomplished in the context of demonstrating Carter’s

interest in a meaningful give and take on the issue of arms

control while, at the same time, providing the U.S. with an

opportunity to see if there was any hope for progress on

Indian Ocean arms control.

Carter did, however, indicate the framework within

which Paul Warnke (Director of the Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency) tested Mendelevich during the first

round. Speaking to the press on the very same day that the

talks began in Moscow, Carter explained his views on the

demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. He said that:

"Our basic hope is that we can stabilize the status quo in the Indian Ocean and refrain from any further escalations.... Our first hope, and without delay, is that we might prevent any further build-up of military presence in the Indian Ocean: later prior notification of any military movements there, and perhaps later on, some reduction in the present level of military

58 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 174-175; see also U.S., Department of State, Transcript of Daily News Briefing, Monday, October 3, 1977 (DPC 194), p. A2 (Mimeo) (hereinafter referred to as DPC 194).

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presence, which is fairly low at this time."59

Thus Carter's original objective of demilitarization had

shifted to one of stabilization of the U.S. and Soviet

presence in the region by the time of the first round of

the talks.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union generally

agreed on the issues involved in the negotiations during

the first round even though there was disagreement on the

substantive aspects of the questions themselves.5® it is

perhaps for this reason that Warnke remarked, at the

conclusion of this round of negotiations, there were "good

expectations of reaching some sort of constructive

result."51 The two sides agreed to meet again in late

September 1977. Warnke reported his impressions of this

first round of talks to Carter on July 11, 1 9 7 8 .°2

The working group and the SCC met again during the

summer to assess the results of the first round of talks

and to develop a strategy for the second round. Carter

59 U.S., Department of State, United States Information Agency, Office of Policy and Plans, "Infoguide: Indian Ocean Arms Limitations," (No. 77-26) (Washington: July 26, 1977), p.2 (hereinafter referred to as Infoguide 77-26).

60 Sick

51 Infoguide 77-26, p. 1.

52 U.S., President, "Digest of Other White House Announcements," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 18 July 1977, p. 1017.

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must have believed that the Soviet Onion was serious about

negotiating an arms control agreement for the Indian Ocean

because, by September 1977, the United States was ready to

move forward with a proposal for a mutual declaration of

restraint.53 This confirms that the SCC refined the U.S.

goal in the talks to one of stabilizing the U.S. and Soviet

military presence in the region.

Mendelevich and his delegation arrived in Washington

on Sunday, September 25, 1977, for the second round of the

talks. He and Warnke again met privately at 6:00 p.m. on

that same evening.54 Leslie Gelb, Director of the State

Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, replaced

Reginald Bartholomew as deputy head of the U.S. delegation.

It is clear that the basic negotiating objective of the

United States was to stabilize the military presence of the

two superpowers in the Indian Ocean. Four days after the

end of the second round of talks. Carter himself re­

emphasized this objective in an address to the U.N. General

Assembly on October 4, 1977. The President explained that;

53 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 174.

54 U.S., Department of State, 1977 State Cite 224734; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 192217Z Sep 77 (Subject: U.S.-USSR Indian Ocean Talks) (hereinafter referred to as State Cite 224734). Department of State messages are referenced by a six digit Message Reference Number (MRN) and are available at the Foreign Affairs Information Center of the State Department, Washington, D.C. For individuals with access to unclassified military messages, the date/time group is also provided.

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"In the Indian Ocean area, neither (the O.S.) nor the Soviet Union has a large military presence, nor is there a rapidly mounting competition between (them). Restraint in the area may well begin with a mutual effort to stabilize our presence and to avoid an escalation in military competition. Then both sides can consider how our military activities in the Indian Ocean might be even further r e d u c e d . "65

There is also evidence to suggest that, if successful

in stabilizing their presence, the superpowers would have

considered reducing it. In welcoming the Mauritian Prime

Minister to New Delhi on November 2, 1977, Prime Minister

Desai of India noted the announcement that the United

States and the Soviet Union had commenced talks on naval

arms limitations in the region. Desai remarked that when

both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had agreed on no

increase in their base structure or force levels in the

area, their next objective was to lessen their presence

every year thereafter until it disappeared. Moreover,

Desai confirmed that the Soviet Union was keeping him

advised on the status of the t a l k s . 56 The State Department

55 U.S., President, "Address Before the General Assembly, 4 October 1977," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 10 October 1977, pp. 1475-1476. See also "U.S. Sees Progress in Talks with Soviets on Indian Ocean," The Washington Post, 4 October 1977, p. 11.

55 U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information, "Excerpts from Desai's Press Conference of 27 October 1977," FBIS Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa (hereinafter referred to as FBIS:ME/NA), 28 October 1977, p. S-1: See also "Indian and Mauritian Premiers Speak at Banquet," FBIS:ME/NA, 2 November 1977, p. S-1; and "U.S.S.R. Envoy to Indian Ocean Talks Arrives in New Delhi," FBIS:ME/NA, 17 January 1978, p. S-2; DPC 194, p.

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and ACDA supported this approach as a long-term negotiating

objective for the talks.5?

At first the USSR probably opposed the stabilization

concept, because it allowed the U.S. the flexibility to

deploy carrier-based aircraft to the region if necessary.

However, by the second round of talks, in the fall of 1977,

the Soviet Union was ready to accept several elements of

the freeze. At the U.N., the Soviet delegation indicated

that a provisional agreement "freezing" the military

activities in the area, if reached, should be followed by

talks on a drastic reduction of military activities there,

including the dismantling of foreign b a s e s . 58

The two delegations met in Berne, Switzerland, from

December 5-10, 1977 for the third round of talks, and again

A3. In addition a State Department press spokesman commented on December 22, 1977, that the U.S. was aiming to "first stabilize the United States and Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean." He went on to say that once this agreement had been reached "the United States is prepared... to consider mutual reductions in forces in the Indian Ocean." See U.S., Department of State, 1977 State Cite 307163; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 240417Z Dec 77 Subject: U.S.-Soviet Indian Ocean Talks).

5^ Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 175.

58 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Year Book 1979 (Stockholm: Almgvist and Wiksell, for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1979), p. 501.: Richard Burt, "U.S. Is Hopeful on Indian Ocean Talks with Soviets," The New York Times, 20 November 1977, p. 4.; Henry S. Bradsher, "Indian Ocean Buildup Halted by U.S., Soviets," The Washington Star, 3 October 1977, p. 4.

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in Berne from February 7-21, 1978, with plenary sessions on

February 7,9,14,and 17 at the Soviet E m b a s s y . 5® Prior to

that session and because of its context in his overall arms

control policy. Carter addressed the Indian Ocean talks in

his State of the Union message on January 10, 1978. He

explained that:

"...the fundamental purpose of our arms limitation efforts is to promote our own national security and to strengthen international stability.... In the Indian Ocean, where neither we nor the Soviet Union has yet deployed military power on a large scale, we are working for an agreement to prevent a major military competition.

Additional evidence supporting this position was found in

the statement by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown that

"... (the U.S.}...hope(s) to achieve stability at the

levels that prevailed during recent years.However,

because of the increasing involvement of Soviet and Cuban

forces in the Horn of Africa and the related buildup of

Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean, Carter

approved a recommendation of the SCC on January 24, 1978,

59 U.S., Department of State, 1978 State Cite 007443; SECSTATE WASH DC msg 111929Z Jan 78 (Subject: U.S.-USSR Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks).

^9 U.S., President, "The State of the Union: An Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 10 January 1978," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 20 January 1978, p. 122.

U.S., Department of Defense, Department of Defense Annual Report— Fiscal Year 1980 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 43.

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that Warnke should deliver a protest to Mendelevich

regarding the negative implications of the Soviet actions

on the negotiations at their first private meeting in Berne in February.72

During a press conference on February 10, 1978, Vance

was the first Carter Administration official to publicly

suggest a linkage of the talks with events in the Horn of

A f r i c a . 7 3 Having received no positive reply to these

protests. Carter decided not to schedule any more rounds of

negotiations because Soviet naval operations in support of

their political activities in the Horn of Africa in early

1978 had suggested that there was no common understanding

on how a stabilization agreement would actually affect the

behavior of the United States and the Soviet U n i o n . 7 4

Although there were several attempts by the Soviet Union to

remove this linkage and get the talks going again by

72 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 175.

73 See U.S., Department of State, "The Secretary's News Conference, February 10, 1978," The Department of State Bulletin, March 1978, pp. 13-16.

74 Indian Ocean Arms Limitations, 1978, p. 7; see also U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Armed Services, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy, Panel on Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation, Indian Ocean Arms Limitations and Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation, Report, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978, pp. 3-4 (hereinafter referred to as Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Report); "U.S. Decides to Stall Parley with Moscow on the Indian Ocean," The New York Times, 8 February 1978, p. 8.

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lobbying with the littoral nations of the Indian Ocean to

exert pressure on the U.S. to resume the talks and by

direct approaches to the U.S. Government, these efforts

produced no immediate r e s u l t s . 75

In less than a year, therefore. President Carter's

efforts to stabilize U.S.-Soviet military competition in

the Indian Ocean had stalled. An understanding of specific

events in the Horn of Africa and the Administration's

responses is needed to appreciate why President Carter

abandoned his initial efforts.

Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation

The Soviets and the Somalis had signed a twenty year

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1974 by which the

Soviets gained permission to build a port, a communications

station, an airfield, and a missile storage and handling

facility at Berbera on the northern coast of Somalia. In

return, the Somalis received military equipment and

training. Somalia has traditionally claimed areas

75 See "Soviet Negotiator on Indian Ocean Arrives in Colombo," U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Translations on Law of the Sea, JPRS 70818 (Washington; March 22, 1978), p. 21; "France Seen as Increasing Its Presence in the Indian Ocean," U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Translations on the Law of the Sea, JPRS 70824 (Washington; March 23, 1978), P. 34; and "Feud in Administration Said to Endanger Talks on Arms Sales Pact," The New York Times, 20 December 1978, p. 12.

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inhabited by ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia's Ogaden Desert,

Kenya's Northern Frontier District, and Djibouti (then the

French Territory of Afars and I s s a s ) . ^ ®

A second significant step was taken by Somalia in

1975 when it joined the Arab League. Although non-Arab,

the Somalis are predominantly Muslim and the resulting

formation of an "Arab Option" was later to have a

significant impact on Somalia's ability to wage war on

Ethiopia. At the same time, American relations with an

increasingly radical regime in Ethiopia were rapidly

deteriorating. Emperor Haile Selassie had been replaced by

a revolutionary military government (the Provisional

Military Administrative Council (PMC)) in 1974, and by 1976

the PMC had made it very difficult for the U.S. government

to justify its support of Ethiopia in light of the PMC's

repressive policies and large arms requirements.

By December 1976 the United States had cancelled its

military grant assistance program to Ethiopia. The Soviet

Union quickly responded by signing a 100 million dollar

arms agreement with Addis A b a b a . 77 while it was a limited

76 The seven stars on the Somali flag represent the seven regions of northeastern Africa that are considered ethnic Somali. Unfortunately for her neighbors, several of these stars represent lands granted to other countries during post-colonial negotiations.

77 Colin Legum and Bill Lee, The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis (New York: Africans Publishing Co., 1979), p. 31.

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agreement which only supplied second-line equipment like T-

34 tanks, it marked the displacement of the O.S. as

Ethiopia's principal arms supplier in the spring of 1977.7®

Thus, at the time of Carter's inauguration, the role of the

United States in this region was already markedly degraded.

The Somali/Ethiopian conflict, while significant in

itself, took on even greater inertance when placed in the

context of other events in the region - many of which will

be described later. The expansion of Soviet influence in

South Yemen and Ethiopia with the aid of Cuban troops

alarmed not only U.S. policymakers, but also leaders in

friendly regional countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia,

Sudan, and Iran. The general perception was that the

Soviets were attempting to increase their influence in

Angola through the use of Cuban forces and Soviet

advisors.79

Despite President Carter's comments to the press and

the United Nations General Assembly concerning the mutual

lack of commitments in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. and the

Soviet Union would probably have maintained some level of

military presence in the Indian ocean, even in the absence

of instability and geopolitical significance. The Soviets

78 Ibid., p. 403.

79 Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinan, "American Policy Options in Iran and the Persian Gulf," Foreign Policy and Defense Review 2 (1979): 20.

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might maintain such a presence, for example, in light of

the strategic threat that would be posed to Soviet

territory if O.S. SSBNs were deployed in this region.®®

While the Soviets have often expressed fears about a

possible U.S. strategic threat from the Indian Ocean, they

did not upgrade significantly the very limited ASW

capabilities of the forces they maintain in the area until

early 1979.®^ Nor, at that time, had any large-scale

Soviet ASW exercises been reported in the region. This,

however, did not rule out an interest, on their part, in

receiving formal guarantees regarding the deployment of

O.S. strategic forces there.®2

For both the O.S. and the Soviet Union, however, a

naval presence in the Indian Ocean was sought more for its

diplomatic than for its strategic benefits. This is a

region in which both superpowers have acquired important

state interests. The U.S. interest lies in maintaining

open sea lanes for the transport of petroleum. For the

Soviet Union, the shortest sea route open year-round

®® This argument was first presented in Geoffrey Jukes, "The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy," Adelphi Papers 87 (May 1972); 21.

®^ James M. McConnell, "The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean," Soviet Naval Developments, Michael McGwire, ed., (New York; Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 389-406.

®2 William F. Hickman, "Soviet Naval Policy in the Indian Ocean," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 105 (August 1979); 44.

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between the USSR's European and Pacific ports runs through

these waters. The near continuous Soviet naval presence at

one of the two points of entry into the Indian Ocean

signalled their interest in keeping these sea lanes open.

Indeed, their sensitivity on this point was apparent in

their sharp negative reaction toward the so-called "Arab

Lake" security plan (discussed later) that surfaced in

early 1977.

Chapter VI will cover the negotiations surrounding,

and the importance placed on, access to bases in the

region. It is sufficient to point out that during the

initial portion of the Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Talks

(lOALT), in the spring of 1977, access to the Somali

facilities had become even more important. The dismantling

of what the Soviets called the U.S. "base" on Diego Garcia

had long been a major Soviet objective in the Indian

Ocean.®® Although the Soviets never equated their

facilities in Berbera with the U.S. facilities at Diego

Garcia, they nevertheless could easily have realized that

they would have little left with which to bargain should

they lose access to Berbera. When viewed in the context of

other Soviet diplomatic setbacks in the region, therefore,

the Somali/Ethiopian conflict complicated U.S.-Soviet

relations at a critical time.

®® Pravda, 12 June 1971, p.2.

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The Foreign Policy Apparatus

Beginning with the Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Talks

and continuing until the close of the Carter

Administration, Indian Ocean regional security issues were

a major focus of National Security Council deliberations.

Part of the Carter Administration's National Security

Council structure has been mentioned - the SCC. It is also

necessary to understand the other major components of the

NSC s t r u c t u r e . ®4 The formal structure that Carter

developed (in conjunction with his National Security

Advisor) to formulate and coordinate foreign policy

remained reasonably constant throughout most of his term.®®

® A more detailed account of the formal structure established by the Carter Administration can be found in (inter alia) Robert Hunter, Presidential Control of Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 105-108 (including a copy of Presidential Directive/NSC 2 that outlines the National Security Council System in Appendix B.); Duncan L. Clarke, "Integrating Arms Control, Defense, and Foreign Policy in the Executive Branch of the O.S. Government," Hans G. Branch and Duncan L. Clarke, eds.. Decision Making for Arms Limitations: Assessments and Prospects (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1983), pp. 3-36; George, Presidential Decisionmaking, pp. 159-162; Lawrence J. Korb, "National Security Organization and Process in the Carter Administration," Sam C. Sarkesian, ed.. Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Years (Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press, 1979), pp. 111-137; Dom Bonafede, "Brzezinski - Stepping Out of His Backstage Role," National Journal, October 15, 1977, pp. 1596-1601.

®5 Korb, "National Security Organization and Process," p. 117.

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Carter augmented this formal decisionmaking structure with

informal meetings, such as the "Friday breakfasts attended

by the President, Brown, Vance, Brzezinski and often Jody

Powell."®5

The formal work of the NSC was organized around two

committees. The Policy Review Committee (PRC) was

designed, at least initially, to deal primarily with issues

of a long term nature. The chairman of the PRC (usually

the Secretary of State) was identified in a Presidential

Review Memorandum (which also defined the problem and set a

"suspense" (due) date). PRC working groups were usually

established under the aegis of one of the chairman's

subordinates (i.e., the State Department's Director of the

Bureau of Political-Military A f f a i r s ) . ®7

The second NSC committee was the aforementioned

Special Coordination Committee (SCC). This group addressed

short term or more specific issues, including sensitive

intelligence and covert activity, the development of O.S.

policy on arms control, and crisis management. SCC

®5 Clarke, "Integrating Arms Control, Defense, and Foreign Policy," p. 8. The Friday breakfasts were "useful, but they were inadequate substitutes for regularized interdepartmental processing of national security matters. Meetings among the principals included few, if any, of their staff, and notes were rarely taken, thereby hindering agreement on what had transpired and follow- through by the staffs."

®7 Korb, "National Security Organization and Process," p. 119

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meetings were chaired by the National Security Advisor and,

as a result, reflected Brzezinski*s perspective more often

than did PRC meetings.®®

A Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) could be

requested by any very senior official in the national

security bureaucracy, but President Carter had to approve

its issuance.®9 As a result, obtaining a PRM was usually

long process, requiring extensive coordination among

departments. In many cases, "Mini-SCC" or "Mini— PRC"

meetings were held on less important or more immediate

issues and involved second echelon administrators such as

deputy secretaries or under secretaries of the departments.

These meetings might result in a formal recommendation for

a subsequent PRC or SCC meeting.5® The PRC or the SCC

could, in turn, recommend that the President issue a

Presidential Directive (PD) or, more often, they would

simply report to the President on possible policies to be

pursued.

The formal Presidential Directive (PD) — official

U.S. "policy" — would be sent to the appropriate

departments once the President decided upon a course of

®® Ibid., p. 117.

®® Ibid., p. 119.

5® Dom Bonafede, "Brzezinski - Stepping Out of His Backstage Role," National Journal, October 15, 1977, p. 1599.

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action. The PRM system was developed the purpose of:

"...engaging Carter's principal associates, on the Cabinet level, in an ongoing process of discussion and debate. It was, to be sure, time-consuming, but it also meant that any decision that went up to the President had been fully vetted. During the early phases of the Carter Administration, the PRC met more frequently, usually under Vance's chairmanship. In time, however, the SCC became more active. I used the SCC to try to shape our policy toward the Persian Gulf..."91

One of the first SCC meetings to be held, in May 1977, was

the aforementioned meeting to address proposals for the

Indian Ocean Arms Limitations Talks and the possible

demilitarization of the area.

Geopolitics and Military Bases

The issue of bases or "access" to bases in the Indian

Ocean was a major point of contention between the U.S. and

the Soviet Union during the Indian Ocean Arms Limitation

Talks (lOALT). For the U.S., the trade of a communications

station in the middle of the Indian Ocean for a Soviet

guarantee to remove its forces from more strategically

located facilities in the Horn of Africa might have been an

attractive proposal. For the Soviets, the possibility that

access to bases other than the increasingly tenuous Somali

facilities would be readily available must have appeared

91 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 66.

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dim on the eve of the lOALT. In return for their support,

the Soviets may have hoped for eventual access to the

Ethiopian ports of Assab and Massawa, but even in normal

times these Red Sea ports are congested in comparison to

the Somali port of Berbera. After June 1977, when

insurgents cut the railroad line between Addis Ababa and

Djibouti (which handles over 60 percent of Ethiopia's

overseas trade), congestion at Assab became much worse.

And by the spring of 1977, if not earlier, it was clear

that these ports might soon be put under siege by Eritrean

guerrillas.92

By early 1977, the U.S. had made significant progress

toward normalizing relations with Egypt and Sudan, while

(as has been noted) the Soviet Union's Middle East position

was becoming increasingly difficult. Moscow blamed the

U.S. and Saudi Arabia for its problems with Egypt, and the

Mideast in general, and resented what it saw as U.S.

efforts, in cooperation with Saudi Arabia, to displace them

in Egypt. In reaction to Sadat's cancellation of the

Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the

Soviets charged that "...Sadat's decision to abrogate the

Soviet-Egyptian agreement Ccime immediately following the

U.S. pledge to render economic assistance to Egypt— and

92 Legum and Lee, Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis, p. 9.

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following Anwar Al-Sadat's visit to Saudi Arabia where he

secured a pledge for aid...."92

A long-standing Saudi effort to transform the Red Sea

into an "Arab Lake" was perhaps a matter of more concern to

the Soviets than to the U.S. A conference of Arab states

on Red Sea security was held at Taiz, North Yemen in March

1977 to discuss this issue. When the U.S. and the Soviet

Union later shifted "alliances" in the Horn of Africa, they

also shifted their support for both the "Arab Lake" concept

and for the Eritrean Liberation Movement. In fact, the

U.S. opted for neutrality in both of these issues.

Conservative Arab support for the once favored Eritrean

liberation groups and other Ethiopian opposition forces,

however, was now seen by the Soviets as part of a design to

establish a string of anti-Soviet states on the Red Sea.

The Soviets abandoned their former Eritrean allies on March

9, 1977, endorsing the Ethiopian "nine-point policy

decision" for settling the dispute in the "administrative

region (sic) of Eritrea" in June 1976. They declared that:

"...the (Eritrean) dispute is the result of the domestic policy of the defunct imperial regime, and the old regime had tried to destroy the national heritage of the People of Eritrea.... However, the present changes in Ethiopia have created the necessary prerequisites for a just settlement of this

92 Moscow Radio, 15 March 1976, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service Daily Report - Soviet Union (hereinafter referred to as FBlSrSU), 16 March 1976, p. FI.

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dispute...."94

The Soviet Union also recognized the geopolitical

importance of this region. It ranked fifth in overall use

of the Suez Canal in 1976.95 The relatively high

proportion of Soviet merchant fleet engaged in using the

Canal (574 of 1700 Soviet ships in 1977) indicated the

economic importance of the Canal and the Red Sea to their trade.96

In what was perhaps an effort to take part in the

ongoing Middle East peace process, therefore, a Soviet

official reportedly met with Sadat and the Saudi Arabian

ambassador in Cairo in March 1978 "on a proposal to barter

Soviet disengagement in eastern Africa against a great

Soviet contribution to the search for a Middle East peace

settlement."97 Meanwhile, the perception in the U.S. and

94 Colin Legum and Bill Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1975), p. 7.

99 Yearly Report, 1976, Suez Canal Authority, (Cairo: for the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1976), p. 99 (hereinafter referred to as Suez Canal Yearly Report); Also Monthly Report, December 1978, Suez Canal Authority (Cairo, for the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1978), p. 43.

96 Yearly Report, 1977, Suez Canal Authority (Cairo: for the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1977), p. 172; See also Michael A. Davidchik and Robert B. Mahoney, Jr., "Soviet Civil Fleets and the Third World," Brad Dismukes and James McConnell, Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 318.

97 Rome ANSA, 22 March 1978, FBIS:ME/NA, 23 March 1978, p. D6.

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abroad was that U.S. difficulties in dealing with the

Soviets in this region through diplomatic and economic

channels, made the West's access to Mideast oil seem less

secure. As a result of perceived Soviet successes in the

Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region (Ethiopia, South

Yemen, and Afghanistan), regional allies began to doubt

U.S. reliability in crisis situations. As one Saudi deputy

minister later put it: "Why is the United States stepping

from one fiasco to another? In Ethiopia, in Somalia, in

Afghanistan, the United States has left the field to the

Russians without as much as an attempt to stop them."®®

Making New Friends in Somalia

In short, in the first six months in office, the

Carter Administration was encountering a rapidly changing

political environment in the Horn of Africa. In February

1977, the same month the pro-Soviet Mengistu Haile Mariam

emerged as Ethiopia's new leader, the Kremlin proposed a

federation between Somalia and Ethiopia. The Soviets

offered "...economic support for ambitious domestic

programs plus military assistance in furthering ambitions

and stilling fears only if the parties (Somalia and

9® Center for Naval Analysis, Professional Paper 285, "Superpower Security Interests in the Indian Ocean Area," Richard Remnek, June 1980, p. 12.

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Ethiopia) would compromise their differences, not simply by

pretending they did not exist, but rather through a

creative political act that would reduce the political and

psychological significance of the existing state

boundaries."99 However, Siad Barre insisted that Somali

irredentist claims be satisfied first, leading the Soviets

to move their support to Ethiopia.^9®

Ethiopia announced the closure of the Kagnew

Communications Station and other U.S. facilities in April.

Although this action followed close upon an American

decision to reduce its military advisory group and to close

the Kagnew facility, it is unlikely that Mengistu would

have made such a decision without the prospect of increased

Soviet aid. By May, Mengistu had signed a declaration for

the "foundations for friendship and cooperation" with the

Soviet U n i o n . 191 it is interesting to note, however, that

the Soviets confined the "contractual" relationship with

Ethiopia to a declaration, a level lower than the Soviet-

Somali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. 192

99 Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm (New York: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1979), p. 123.

190 Ibid.

191 Tass, FBIS;SU, 8 May 1977, pp. H8-H9.

192 Peter Osmos, "Ethiopia Forms Alliance with Soviets, Capping Visit," The Washington Post, 7 May 1977, p. A9.

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The Somali disenchantment with the Soviets left an

opportunity to restore U.S. influence in the Horn. After

Brezhnev's rejection of his arms limitation proposals in

April, President Carter reportedly instructed Vice

President Hondale to "tell Cy (Vance) and Zbig (Brzezinski)

that I want them to move in every possible way to get

Somalia to be our f r i e n d . "193 in June, Carter said that

U.S. policy was to be one of "aggressively challenging, in

a peaceful way of course, the Soviet Union and others for

influence in the areas of the world that we feel are

crucial to us now, or potentially c r u c i a l . "194 On July 1,

Secretary of State Vance said that the United States "will

consider sympathetically appeals for assistance from states

which are threatened by a buildup of foreign military

equipment and advisers on their borders, in the Horn and

elsewhere in Africa."19®

The escalation of the conflict had begun in February

1977, when approximately 1000 Somali troops raided the

Ogaden region of southeastern Ethiopia. As noted earlier,

Somalia had always claimed large tracts of the Ogaden

193 Drew Middleton, "Soviet Navy Widens Indian Ocean Power," The New York Times, 22 April 1979, p. 15.

194 U.S., Department of State, 1977 State Cite 146566; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 232030Z Jun 77 (Subject: White House Statements on Indian Ocean Working Group Talks).

195 D.S., Department of State, 1977 State Cite 150020; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 051310Z Jul 77.

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desert as part of "Greater Somalia." As noted by Colin

Legum and Bill Lee;

"...the struggle to achieve their national goal (the retrieval of the Ogaden province of Ethiopia) is the key to any proper understanding of the policies of Mogadishu. Although there have been a number of major changes in their governments since independence, and while successive governments' tactics and alliances have undergone considerable change, this basic national objective never altered."i®*

With arms supplied by the Soviet Union, the Somalis

apparently decided the time was right to test Ethiopian

defenses. By July 1977, Western Somali Liberation Front

(WSLF) guerrillas, with the aid of regular Somali forces,

had captured three major military outposts in the Ogaden

Desert. Somali officials admitted that Somali troops on

leave had been allowed to "volunteer" to join the

guerrillas and "to defend what many of them regard as their

homeland from Ethiopian a t t a c k . "^97

While he was anxious to exercise influence in the

region. President Carter made it clear from the outset of

his administration that he was opposed to the massive and

indiscriminate transfer of military supplies to Third World

countries. The United States, therefore, was firmly

opposed to the transmission of weapons to the Somalis from

even third parties (i.e. Saudi Arabia) as long as Somali

^96 Legum and Lee, Conflict in the Horn, p. 31.

^97 Winston Taylor, "Somali Liberation Front Counters in the Ogaden," London Financial Times, 26 July 1977, p. 1.

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armed forces remained in the Ogaden. This decision to

withhold arms and supplies from Somalia as long as it was

the aggressor in the Ogaden was only made public after Siad

Barre had condemned the U.S. for failing to meet its

commitments.

Soviet Intervention in the Ogaden

Meanwhile, the strain in Soviet-Somali relations was

reflected in the frequency of Soviet use of Somali naval

facilities. By September 1977, use of Somali ports by

Soviet ships was down dramatically. Soviet port visits to

Aden, on the other hand, went up. Their ships ceased

visiting Somali ports altogether in mid-October. In that

month, an AMUR-class repair ship, which had been at Berbera

for over a year, moved its operations to Aden. In short,

the loss of Berbera was eventually cushioned by South

Yemen's agreement to allow the Soviets limited use of naval

and air facilities at A d e n . ^ 9 9

In hopes of securing arms aid from the West, the

Somalis claimed that a Soviet-inspired Cuban/Ethiopian

^98 Parer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa, p. 6.

^99center for Naval Analysis, Memorandum (CNA) 78- 1550,08, "Somalia and the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron: or the Importance of Using and Losing Berbera," Richard Remnek, 14 November 1978, p. 21.

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invasion of Somalia was imminent.In a gesture that

significantly improved its image in the West, Mogadiscio

permitted the West Germans to rescue a Lufthansa jet that

had been skyjacked by Palestinians to Somalia. On November

13, Siad Barre abrogated the 1974 Soviet-Somali Treaty of

Friendship and Cooperation, expelled Soviet advisers,

revoked Soviet use of Somali military facilities, reduced

Soviet diplomatic representation in Mogadiscio, and severed

relations with Cuba.^^

The Somali decision to expel the Soviets from their

country came close on the heels of another setback to

Soviet Middle East policy. Sadat's decision to go to

Jerusalem at that time dashed Moscow's hopes of playing a

central role in a Middle East peace agreement. It also

rendered superfluous the Vance-Gromyko agreement on October

1 to reconvene the Geneva Conference by December, which the

Soviet Onion co-chaired with the United States. While the

U.S. and its allies were trying to distance themselves from

Somali irredentist claims to Ethiopia, the Soviets were

attempting to find a middle ground with its two allies.

Although the Soviets (and the Cubans) probably had drafted

contingency plans, the final decision to become directly

^^9 O.S., Department of State, 1977 Mogadiscio Cite 192401; AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO msg 141105Z Nov 77.

m David A. Andelman, "Indian Ocean - Arms Race Focal Point," The New York Times, 14 November 1977, p. 1.

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involved does not seem to have been made until after the

Somali action against Ethiopia. Only after Barre's

decision did Moscow directly accuse Somalia of aggression

against Ethiopia. For the time being, however, the Soviets

maintained that the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and the

deterioration of Soviet-Somali relations were the result of

actions of "reactionary" Arab and "imperialist" states.

On November 13, there were still 1,678 Soviet

advisers in Somalia, representing implicitly the Kremlin's

interest in the country, particularly their interest in

preserving their access to Somali naval and air

facilities.It does not seem likely that the Soviets

would have left so many potential "hostages" if they had

already decided to intervene. Only after the expulsion of

the Soviet advisors in mid-November did Vasiley I. Petrov,

Deputy Commander in Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, arrive

in Ethiopia to direct the war against the S o m a l i s . ^^4

Sometime in early May, 1977 the Soviets decided to

intervene in the Ogaden War with Cuban troops. It was not

^^2 Moscow Radio, 28 October 1977, FBISiSU, 31 October 1977, p. H4.

James E. Dougherty, The Horn of Africa; A Map of Political-Strategic Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1982), p. 32: See also Newsweek, 13 February 1978, p. 48.

^^4 Geoffrey Godsell, "U.S., Soviets Vie for Horn of Africa Influence," The Washington Star, 17 January 1978, p. 2.

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until November, however, that they undertook a massive air

and sealift to support their Ethiopian ally. It was this

later massive transfusion of arms and supplies into the

Horn of Africa that first mobilized the Carter

Administration.^^® For the Soviets, this large-scale air

and sealift was quite demanding, more for political than

for technical reasons. Most of the states that Soviet

transport planes overflew either directly supported (with

supplies and advisers) or were sympathetic to the Somalis

during the conflict.In order to airlift material to

Ethiopia, the Soviets found it necessary to employ a wide

variety of flight routes, to abuse the Montreux

Convention's provision for overflights through Turkish air

corridors, and to engage widely in such subterfuges as

listing false final destinations (usually Aden, which

served as a major transshipment point for material to

Ethiopia). One occasion the Soviets substituted military

transports for the civilian aircraft for which overflight

permission had been g r a n t e d . ^^7

^^9 Michael Moodie and Alvin J. Cottrell, Geopolitics and Maritime Power (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 72.

^^9 Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan all supported Somalia at the outset of the conflict.

^^7 Philip Towle, Naval Power in the Indian Ocean: Threats, Bluffs and Fantasies (Canberra: The Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1979), p. 11.

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To protect this sealift, the Soviets also increased

the number of their naval units to the highest level ever

maintained in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, they did so

after they had lost their access to Berbera - a feat that

suggests that the Soviet Navy did not find extensive access

to shore-based facilities necessary in the performance of

even some of its more demanding peacetime missions. Saudi

Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Sudan, and North Yemen urged

Washington to counter Soviet influence in the Horn by

supporting Somalia. In July, the United States along with

France and Britain agreed to supply Somalia with "defensive

weapons."11® In addition. Mideast states like Egypt, Iran,

and Pakistan agreed to extend some arms aid to the Somalis

and the Saudis agreed to finance all Somali arms

purchases.119 In return, the Somalis agreed not to press

their claims to Djibouti and Northern Kenya.

Following the initial Somali invasion of Ethiopian

positions in the Ogaden, the Soviets had tried to maintain

a middle position between its two "socialists" allies.

Moscow was anxious to maintain its connection with Somalia

and its access to its military facilities at Berbera. They

11® Richard Haass, "Naval Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean," Survival 20 (March/April 1978): 52.

119 K.P. Misra, "Developments in the Indian Ocean Area: The Littoral Response," International Studies 19 (January-March 1977): 19.

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continued to supply Somalia with "non-essential" military

items not yet delivered under existing agreements -

presumably some spare parts, light arms, and ammunition.

As the hostilities continued, the United States, for

its part, reacted to the Somali invasion in a predictable

way. Along with Britain and France, the U.S. decided in

early August to ensure that no offensive arms were sold to

S o m a l i a . 120 Thus, Arab supporters could not purchase the

heavy equipment Somalia needed for its offensive on the

open market. The Somalis had refrained from severing their

connections with Moscow to ensure a supply of this

equipment, but following their successes in the Ogaden in

August, the Soviet Union cut off its pipeline of military

supplies.

The Soviets Move to a New Base

It takes approximately three weeks with normal

transit speeds of 10-12 knots to sail to the Gulf of Aden

from Vladivostok (a distance of 6700 nautical miles), and

nearly two weeks from Subic Bay. Prior to obtaining

extensive access to the Somali port of Berbera in 1972, the

120 O.S.. Deoartment of State, 1977 Mogadiscio Cite 192401; AMEMBASSY"MOGADISCIO msg 151105Z Nov 77; See also Jim Hoagland, "U.S., France Spurn Somalia's Plea for Urgent Arms Aid," The Washington Post, 1 September 1977, p. A25.

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length o£ Soviet combatant deployments in the Indian Ocean

was roughly five months. On the other hand, other than the

Middle East Force ships, the U.S. naval combatants spent an

average of two to three months in the Indian Ocean.

Warships thus wasted a high proportion of their total

deployment time in transit. By lengthening those

deployments by access to shore facilities, both the U.S.

and the Soviets could reduce the pool of ships needed to

keep the same number of units continuously onstation. In

fact, after the Soviets gained unrestricted access to

Berbera in 1972, they increased the number of units in the

region as well as significantly lengthening their

deployment times.

The longer ships are deployed, the greater are their

need for logistic support and maintenance. With the great

distances involved in the Indian Ocean, therefore, it is

important to have access to local ports, where supplies can

be obtained and repairs made that cannot be done

satisfactorily at sea. But the value of local shore-based

support is not limited to port access. In 1972 Somalia

became the second Third World country after Egypt, to grant

the USSR access to extensive facilities ashore. Soviet

access privileges included the exclusive use of a long-

range communications station and the rights to stage

periodic maritime reconnaissance flights from Somali

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airfields. There were some limitations placed on Soviet

use of these facilities, but what access privileges they

did enjoy were important. The periodic staging from Somali

airfields of 11-38 MAY Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) and Tu-

95 BEAR D maritime reconnaissance aircraft gave the Soviets

ASW coverage and greatly expanded and improved their aerial

reconnaissance of the Indian O c e a n . ^^l

As will be noted in Chapter VII when investigating

U.S. efforts to obtain similar access rights to facilities

in the region, facilities ashore do not come easy. Access

privileges tend to compromise the sovereignty of the host

nation and subject it to negative publicity over Soviet (or

U.S.) "bases." For example, Somalia's sovereign control

over these facilities was called into question when the

team of experts led by Senator Dewey F. Bartlett was barred

from entering the Berbera communications station in July

1975. Even though a high-ranking Somali officer (Colonel

Suleiman, the head of the Somali secret police and

President Siad Barre's son-in-law) had requested the Somali

guards to allow the Bartlett delegation to enter the

installation, the request was evidently overruled by a

^21 strategic Survey, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 60.

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Soviet officer inside the facility.

What the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron (SOVINDRON)

eventually got to use as a main support base in the Red Sea

after their expulsion from Somali was the island of Dahalak

belonging to Ethiopia. At that time the prospects did not

appear favorable for Soviet naval access to Aden, which,

with its large bunkering facilities, repair yards, and

cooler temperatures, is a far better harbor than Berbera.

Soviet warships had never enjoyed the same degree of access

to Aden as to Berbera. With the improvement in 1976 of

South Yemen's relations with Saudi Arabia, which has

persistently sought to reduce the Soviet presence in the

area, the prospects for access seemed even worse. The

Soviet Union later obtained important access privileges in

the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY),

apparently including staging rights for maritime

reconnaissance aircraft.During the period under

review, however, the U.S. had little reason to believe that

the Soviets could replace Somali facilities so easily.

The Soviets reacted quickly to their expulsion from

^22 Q,s., Congress, Senate, Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia, Report of Senator Bartlett to the Committee on Armed Services, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 89.

Alvin J. Cottrell and Walter F. Hahn, Naval Race or Arms Control in the Indian Ocean; Some Problems in Negotiating Naval Limitations (New York; National Strategy Information Center, 1978), p. 17.

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Somalia. The Soviet airlift to Ethiopia, signaling a more

active role for Moscow in the struggle, began at the end of

November. U.S. and allied forces in the Northern Arabian

Sea during this timeframe were substantial, but they were

participating in an exercise - MIDLINK 77 - CENTO'S annual

Indian Ocean exercise. President Carter made no indication

of their presence being applied to the political situation

emerging in the Horn or the massive Soviet airlift that was

being conducted. The timing of the airlift, however,

probably reflected Soviet concern regarding potential Ü.S.

counteraction. The airlift did not begin until after naval

forces of the U.S., Great Britain, and others participating

in MIDLINK-77 dispersed at the end of November as

s c h e d u l e d .124

Initially, amid mounting evidence of growing Soviet-

sponsored involvement, Vance had chaired a PRC meeting in

late summer, 1977 to discuss ongoing tensions in the

region. The committee recommended to the President that

the U.S. accelerate efforts to provide support to Sudan and

Kenya, and attempt to get as many regional states as

possible to condemn the Soviet and Cuban presence in the

area. This was the last PRC meeting which directly

124 Cottrell and Hahn, Naval Race or Arms Control, p. 23.

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addressed the Somali-Ethiopian c o n f l i c t . 125 Thereafter it

took on a "crisis" nature and became the subject of

numerous SCC meetings.

On December 13 there was a mini-SCC on Soviet

Ethiopian airlifts into the r e g i o n . 12® At this juncture

the United States could have signalled its concern about

Soviet presence in the Horn, but for reasons to be

discussed later, it chose to remove the very forces which

were most appropriate for the situation. The Soviets

abandoned their previous policy of seeking a political

solution between Somalia and Ethiopia. Instead of merely

supplying the Ethiopians with enough military equipment to

pressure the Somalis on the battlefield and force

Mogadiscio to seek a political settlement, the Soviets and

the Cubans continued to help the Ethiopians secure a quick

and decisive victory.

By intervening on the side of the victims of Somali

aggression, the Soviets could hope to be seen as defenders

of international law and the Organization of African

Unity's principle of the sanctity of African borders, thus

winning approval from several black African s t a t e s . ^27

^25 Korb, "National Security Organization and Process," p. 122.

^26 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 179.

127 Parer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa, p. 140.

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Also, they might demonstrate to Saudi Arabia and like-

minded Middle East states that they could not be excluded

from the Red Sea in particular and that it was dangerous to

oppose Soviet interests in the Mideast in g e n e r a l . 128 g y

pursuing this policy in the Horn, however, they

considerably lessened the chances of concluding the Indian

Ocean Arms Limitation Treaty. For various reasons

(including the events in Yemen and Iran), the U.S. no

longer wished to pursue these talks, although there was

continued progress on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

(SALT).

The U.S. for its part passed up an opportunity to

utilize its naval presence in the region in a subtle way by

merely extending onstation its forces already in the

region. Diplomatically the U.S. was in a precarious

position since a potential regional ally, Somalia, was the

aggressor in this conflict. The United States was growing

more concerned about Soviet intervention in the area of the

world that President Carter would eventually label as

"crucial." However, as long as the Somalis were on the

wrong side of the border, Washington saw itself as unable

to do much to help Mogadiscio.

“22 Drew Middleton, "Soviet Navy Widens Indian Ocean Power, The New York Times, 22 April 1979, p. 15.

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In retrospect, the failure of the Carter

Administration to follow through on the Indian Ocean Arms

Limitations Talks probably served to better prepare the

O.S. to respond to events that were about to unfold

elsewhere in the region. As Richard Haass noted:

"An arms control arrangement of the sort envisioned by the Carter Administration would have limited U.S. ability to maintain peacetime presence and severely reduced U.S. capacity to introduce and support augmented forces in changed circumstances or crises - all in a part of the world where the USSR enjoyed decided geographic advantages and where a number of local states possessed the strength to jeopardize U.S. interests."129

Given the active involvement of the Soviet Union in

the region, however, the Carter Administration was unable

to assume a passive role in the Somali/Ethiopian conflict.

The next chapter, therefore, describes how the

Administration sought to minimize Soviet influence in the

Horn of Africa while maintaining its commitment to limit

the sale of arms to Third World countries.

129 Haass, "Arms Control at Sea," p. 534.

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INITIAL COMMITMENT: SELLING ARMS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

As President Carter began his second year in office,

he faced a deteriorating situation in the Horn of Africa.

While he had not violated his pledge to refrain from

supplying arms to Third World belligerents, the Soviets had

just completed a massive airlift of arms to Ethiopia. The

U.S. had made low key efforts to influence the Somalis, but

the crisis would worsen before President Carter would make

a public commitment to one of the belligerents.

Until this juncture, the U.S. had remained relatively

aloof from the conflict. The momentum of Carter's election

and his commitment to a "new" foreign policy, had precluded

any U.S. effort to actively support an aggressor nation.

Until late 1977, U.S. policy decisions had been based, to a

substantial degree, on the broad precepts laid out during

the extended election campaign. Administration

policymakers now had to decide whether to adhere to these

precepts or to respond to the immediate crisis and

reevaluate their policies. They chose the later

alternative.

101

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Ethiopia Takes the Offensive

Despite Somalia's diplomatic action against the

Soviets, the O.S. remained unwilling to supply Mogadiscio

with offensive arms. Therefore, Siad Barre looked

elsewhere for the weapons needed to fight the war. Having

urged the Somalis to expel the Soviets, the Saudis provided

extensive financial and diplomatic support to Siad. They

also shipped French tanks and other arms to the Somalis

through the Saudi Red Sea port of Jidda. With Saudi money,

the Somalis were able to buy weapons on the international

arms market. Siad Barre also succeeded in obtaining arms

from Pakistan which was, for its part, anxious to get more

Arab financial aid. The Italian Government, concerned

about its relations with the Arabs, agreed to sell small

arms to the Somali "police." Moreover, the West Germans,

apparently grateful for Somali aid in ending an October

hijacking of a Lufthansa jet to Mogadiscio, gave the

Somalis $12 million in unrestricted aid. The West Germans

also flew some arms to the Somalis, Egypt and Iraq provided

Soviet equipment and spare parts, and Iran and Egypt sent

ships loaded with military equipment.^®®

Besides arms aid, several other Middle Eastern states

^99 Towle, Naval Power in the Indian Ocean, p. 96.

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gave security assurances to Somalia. The Shah warned on

January 1 that "Iran will not remain indifferent in the

face of any ... aggression against the recognized borders

of Somalia.Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-

Faisal, on a visit to Iran, announced on January 15, that

Saudi Arabia "will certainly go to the help of Somalia if

it becomes a target of foreign aggression.Egyptian

President Sadat told two American Congressmen in December

that Egypt and Sudan would each send an armored brigade to

Somalia if events warranted such action. He also told them

that he had discussed Soviet involvement in the Horn with

Prime Minister Begin during his visit to Jerusalem, and

Begin admitted Israeli support for Ethiopia but shared

Sadat’s worries about Russian intervention in the area.^®^

While it did not oppose the aid provided by other

western and regional countries, the U.S. stuck to its arms

ban on Somalia. As will be seen, however, failure to take

expedient steps early in the conflict in this region would

later require more extensive military measures.

Arab Report and Record, 1-14 January 1978, p. 19.

122 "Excerpts from Prince Saud al-Faisal's Press Conference on 15 January 1978," FBIS:ME/NA, 18 January 1978, p. A-3.

123 u,s.. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, War in the Horn of Africa; A Firsthand Report on the Challenges for United States Policy, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978, pp. 39-42.

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Furthermore, the U.S. position on arms aid to Somalia made

it difficult for other countries to supply military

equipment to Mogadiscio. The U.S. refused to permit third

countries to transfer American weapons to Somalia. On

February 11, Secretary Vance indicated to U.S. allies and

others that Washington intended to actively enforce the ban

by warning that the "U.S. policy has been and continues to

be that we will not give military supplies to either

Somalia or Ethiopia so long as the conflict in the Ogaden

continues. We have asked the Ethiopians for further

information on the alleged American-made weapons

captured...which we are currently checking out to determine

possible origin."194

Without U.S. arms the Somalis were in trouble and

would have to rely mainly on their own resources. On

January 22, 1978 the Somalis launched their last offensive

of the war. The Ethiopians were prepared. With Soviet

direction and Cuban support, the Ethiopians stopped the

Somali advance on the 22nd and counterattacked on the 23rd.

By February 9, the Cubans and Ethiopians had cleared the

Somalis from the Harar and Diredawa areas. The Somalis

fell back on defenses in the mountains around Jijiga. In

mid-February, the Soviet-directed Cuban and Ethiopian

forces launched an offensive that by early March drove the

194 Vance, Hard Choices, p. 85.

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Somalis from Jijiga and the surrounding mountains. Somali

troops began fleeing for the border as Cuban and Ethiopian

forces reoccupied the rest of the Ogaden.

Differences of Opinion

Events in the Horn of Africa, and the firm stand that

President Carter initially took in response to them, were

the catalyst for some of the earliest bureaucratic

conflicts between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the

National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Vance

viewed U.S. relations with countries in this region in

terms of their diplomatic significance to larger issues.

Taking the "high road," Vance believed that "... if we

became too closely linked with Somalia while it was

involved in a blatant invasion of the Ogaden we would find

ourselves inadvertently on the wrong side of one of

Africa's most cherished principles - territorial integrity

of the postcolonial states."^95 Brzezinski, on the other

hand, was: "...becoming increasingly concerned over the

longer-term implications of the Soviet strategic buildup

and jy the growing Soviet-Cuban military penetration of the

Horn of Africa."196

195 Ibid., p. 73.

196 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 177.

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The Carter Administration, therefore, found itself in

an uncomfortable position. By virtue of the growing Soviet

support of Ethiopia, the U.S. faced the possibility of

being without influence on the Horn of Africa. Somali

requests for U.S. assistance in its efforts to "liberate"

the Ogaden, and concomitant calls by U.S. regional allies

to make positive efforts to restore balance in the region

forced policymakers to seek immediate measures. Hence, the

geopolitical considerations which argued that the U.S.

should maintain "influence" in this region were weighed

against some of the goals that President Carter had set for

his presidency.

The Carter Administration was certainly not unaware

of the need to place regional disputes in a broader focus.

Early in the Administration, Samuel Huntington was

commissioned to study the relative military, political,

economic, and ideological strengths of both the U.S. and

the Soviet systems of government. Among his many

observations, Huntington noted the need for the U.S. to

improve its ability to meet the Soviet military challenge,

and specified the Persian Gulf as an area in which a

military conflict would be most difficult to s u p p o r t . ^37

This document formed the basis of Presidential Review

^ Interview with Cyrus Vance, U.S. Secretary of State (January 1977-April 1980), Washington, D.C.: October 23, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as Vance).

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Memorandum 10 (PRM-10) which, in turn, had a significant

impact on O.S. foreign policy decisionmaking at virtually

all levels of government. It strengthened the hand of

those who wanted to meet the Soviet challenge on every

front, particularly in the military area. For Brzezinski

it:

"...provided the intellectual underpinnings for my own predisposition in favor of an activist, assertive, and historically optimistic policy of detente. Such a policy, however, had to be based on adequate military power, and hence its concomitant had to be a deliberate decision to reverse the military trends of the proceeding decade.

The guidance for implementation of the concepts

contained in PRM-10 was found in Presidential Directive 18

(PD-18) signed on August 24, 1977. Both of these documents

were highly classified and closely held, but "pirated"

copies could be found in many safes around Washington. As

might be expected with such an important document, there

was a bitter interagency dispute over its implications.

The State Department preferred to see in PRM-10 implicit

support for the campaign platform of Jimmy Carter - namely

to maintain strategic forces sufficient for an assured

destruction capability and to reduce conventional forces in

Europe and Korea. The Department of Defense and several

members of the NSC saw in PRM-10 the acknowledgement of a

growing worldwide Soviet threat, particularly in the

Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 177.

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Northwest Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

While still classified, according to Brzezinski, PD-

18 directed that "...we maintain a posture of 'essential

equivalence;' that we reaffirm our NATO strategy, namely a

forward defense in Europe, and the maintaining of a

'deployment force of light divisions with strategic

mobility' for global contingencies, particularly in the

Persian Gulf region and Korea.Forged early in the

Carter Administration, PD-18 thus reflected what were

perceived to be the major issues facing the O.S. - the NATO

alliance and our commitments to Korea and Japan. The major

importance of the document, however, will be seen in its

application to events in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

By late February, Washington became increasingly

concerned that the Ethiopians might pursue their offensive

beyond the Somali border and occupy Somali territory. Such

an action might have led to an indefinite Ethiopian

occupation of Somali territory and a possible further

extension of Soviet influence in the region. In the

beginning of February, discussions in the Administration

centered on how the United States would react to such a

situation. The advisability of providing arms to the

Somalis or to Middle East countries like Egypt, Sudan,

Saudi Arabia, or Iran that came to their aid was discussed.

139 Ibid.

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Additional aid to Somalia from Western Europe was dependent

upon some indication of O.S. support.1^® O.S.

decisionmakers also considered the advisability of sending

a naval task force to the Indian Ocean.1*1

In the meantime, the O.S. continued to seek

assurances that the Ethiopians would not invade.

Accordingly, on February 10, Vance announced that the

Soviets had assured him that the Ethiopians would not cross

the Somali border. However, Vance warned that:

"We believe it is fundamental that there be a recognition and a respect by all parties of internationally recognized borders.... We will continue our present course of action with respect to not supplying arms to either side but if there were a crossing of borders, it would present a different situation and we would have to consider it t h e n . "142

Despite Soviet pledges, Washington remained concerned that

the Ethiopians might, nonetheless, cross the border into

Somalia. On February 17, a O.S. official arrived in Addis

Ababa to seek additional guarantees.1^3 The Administration

announced on the 21st that Mengistu had given his "personal

140 Sick.

141 Ibid.; See also Elizabeth Drew, "Brzezinski," New Yorker, 1 May 1979, pp. 115-116.

142 O.S. Department of State. "The Secretary On the Horn of Africa," The State Department Bulletin, March 1978, p. 27; See also Graham Hovey, "Soviet Assures O.S., Ethiopians Will Stop at Somalia's Border," The New York Times, 11 February, 1978, p. 1.

143 Cottrell and Hahn, Naval Race or Arms Control, p. 29.

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assurances." As a gesture of good will, the O.S. lifted

the embargo on the export of $1.1 million worth of trucks

and "non-lethal" spare parts to Ethiopia.1^4

The initial efforts of the Carter Administration,

therefore, were to provide political and economic responses

to the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. President Carter,

however, was not content with Soviet and Ethiopian

assurances alone. There was growing concern in the

Administration over the level of Soviet military support to

the Ethiopians. As will be seen, the Administration

expressed its opposition to the Soviet intervention by

suggesting linkages between detente and events in the Horn.

To deprive the Ethiopians of any excuse to pursue the

Somalis across the border in "hot pursuit," the U.S. also

sought to persuade Siad Barre to announce the withdrawal of

Somali forces from the Ogaden.145

As Somali resistance collapsed in late February and

early March, Washington publicly warned the Soviets in

strong terms to limit the struggle and to refrain from

144 "Supplies for Ethiopia Withheld by U.S.," The New York Times, 23 February 1978, p. A14.

14^ James Mayall, "The Battle for the Horn: Somali Irredentism and International Diplomacy," The World Today 23 (September 1978): 339.

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exploiting future regional conflicts.146 on February 24,

Brzezinski revealed the extent of Soviet involvement by

announcing that the Cuban military force in Ethiopia

numbered between 10,000 and 11,000 men (double the previous

week's estimate) and that Ethiopian forces were being

directed by the Soviet General P e t r o v . 1 4 7

Although the U.S. had previously suspended the Indian Ocean

Arms Limitations Talks (lOALT), a State Department

announcement on February 25, 1978, set the stage for

linking detente and the Ogaden War more closely:

"It is evident that the character of our general relations also depends upon restraint and constructive efforts to help resolve local conflicts such as the Horn of Africa. Intervention in this tragically embattled area by the continued shipment of weapons and military personnel, some of them involved in combat roles, inevitably widens and intensifies hostilities and raises the general level of tension in the world."148

The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) quickly

became the focus of Administration efforts to link events

in the Horn of Africa and wider U.S.-Soviet relations. On

146 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 127; See also Graham Hovey, "Brzezinski Asserts That Soviet General Leads Ethiopia Units," The New York Times, 25 February 1978, p. 1 .

147 Graham Hovey, "Brzezinski Asserts That Soviet General Leads Ethiopia Units," The New York Times, 25 February 1978, p. 1.

14® U.S., Department of State, Transcript of Daily News Briefing, February 25, 1978, (DPC 72), Washington, D.C.: February 26, 1978 (Mimeo).

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March 2, Brzezinski said that Soviet military actions in

Ethiopia inevitably affected the atmosphere of the talks as

well as obtaining Senate approval of the resulting accords:

"We are not imposing linkages, but linkages may be imposed

by unwarranted exploitation of local conflicts for larger

international p u r p o s e s . "149 on the same day. President

Carter, in an appearance before the National Press Club,

warned that if the Soviet Union continued its military

involvement in the Horn, it "...would lessen the confidence

of the American people in the word and peaceful intentions

of the Soviet Union, would make it more difficult to ratify

a SALT agreement or a comprehensive (nuclear) test ban

agreement if concluded and therefore the two are linked

because of actions by the Soviets. We won’t initiate the

linkage."130 Further into the conflict, the President,

speaking at Wake Forest University on March 17, warned the

Soviets that their "ominous inclination...to intervene in

local conflicts..." would imperil detente.131

149 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 131; See also Richard Burt, "Brzezinski Sees Ethiopia Issue Slowing Arms Talks," The New York Times, 2 March 1978, p. A6.

130 O.S., President, "The President's Address to the National Press Club of March 2, 1978," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 8 March 1978, p. 237.

131 U.S., President, "The President's Address at Wake Forest University, March 17, 1978," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 22 March 1978; See also "Excerpts From Carter’s Speech on Defense Policy and on Soviet Ties,' The New York Times, 18 March 1978, p. 9.

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Intense pressure was applied on Siad Barre to give up

the struggle, in the hope that a Somali announcement of a

withdrawal might deprive the Ethiopians and their allies of

an excuse to invade Somali territory. It might also

encourage the withdrawal of foreign forces from

Ethiopia.132 on March 9, President Carter announced at a

televised news conference:

"Last night I was informed by President Siad Barre of Somalia that he was agreeing to withdraw his forces from the Ogaden - the occupied areas of Ethiopia. And just the last few minutes he confirmed his commitment to me with a public statement.... The United States looks forward to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the two countries - Ethiopia and Somalia - at an early date."

Later in the news conference. Carter responded

somewhat positively to a question regarding arms aid to

Somalia:

"We notified Somalia many months ago that there would be no consideration on our part for defensive arms of any kind. I think it would require a tangible demonstration of the carrying out of this commitment on the part of the Somalians and also a renewed commitment not to dishonor the international boundaries of either Ethiopia or Kenya before we would be willing to discuss with them economic aid or defensive arms supplies." 33

132 sick.

133 O.S., President, "Presidential News Conference of March 9, 1978," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 15 March 1978; See also Graham Hovey, "Somalia to Pull Out of Ethiopia, Carter Reports, Opening the Way for Soviet and Cuba to Withdraw," The New York Times, 10 March 1978, p. Al.

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If the Somalis withdrew, therefore, arms for Somalia's

defense would be forthcoming - albeit under strict

conditions. Carter's response suggests an effort to warn

the Soviets to restrain the Ethiopians from violating

Somalia's territorial integrity and indicates the growing

perception among Administration policymakers that the

Soviets were not actively disengaging in the region.

The use of military force to signal O.S. concern in

the region was initially suggested in policy discussions by

Brzezinski. 134 while Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance all

refer to this initial discussion in terms of the issue of

l i n k a g e , 135 is also important because it marks the first

consideration of what would eventually become the primary

policy response to events in this region.

Zbigniew Brzezinski noted a linkage between events in

the Horn and O.S.-Soviet relations worldwide, when he

stated approximately one year after the Carter inauguration

that he was "...particularly troubled by the potential

Soviet success in the Horn of Africa: first because it

would demonstrate to all concerned that the Soviet Onion

has the will and capacity to assert itself in the Third

World; second, because it would encourage Libya, Algeria,

134 Vance.

135 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 190; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 187; and Vance, Hard Choices, p. 237.

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and Cuba to act even more aggressively."136

Initial O.S. Military Response

Less than one week after the State Department had

mentioned a possible linkage between Soviet activities in

the Horn and the SALT negotiations, O.S. naval movements

also reflected a change in Administration attitudes. On

March 3, the KITTY HAWK Carrier Battle Group, which had

been held in the South China Sea throughout this period,

was ordered to sail within five days to a holding point off

Singapore for a possible deployment to the Indian Ocean.

In addition, on March 10, the frigate OSS JOLIOS FORER was

directed to remain within 12 hours of Berbera, Somalia for

a possible port call in the event Somalia was invaded. To

help determine whether or not the border was being

respected, O.S. aircraft began conducting reconnaissance

flights over Somalia and Ethiopia on March 12.13? Thus,

the O.S. seemingly readied itself to take political-

military measures to underscore its commitment to Somalia's

territorial integrity.

136 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 187.

137 Center for Naval Analysis, Research Memorandum 85- 71, "O.S. Naval Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1976-1984," John D. Perse (hereinafter referred to as CNA Memorandum 85-71), August 1985, p. 14.

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When Carter spoke at Wake Forest University on 17

March, he had also stressed U.S. determination to respond

to threats to American interests and values. In a speech

that already indicated a change in tone. Carter said that

"(a)rms control agreements are a major goal as instruments

to our national security, but this will be possible only if

we maintain appropriate military force levels."138 por the

first time Carter was indicating that he might undertake a

military buildup in the region in response to Soviet

actions.

The Soviet concern about a potential U.S. reaction to

their intervention probably encouraged the Kremlin to

somewhat limit the struggle and their participation in it.

As noted earlier, for example, the Soviet airlift to

Ethiopia was timed to begin after U.S. naval units were

expected to leave the Arabian Sea. Again, when the USS

TRUETT augmented the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) via the

Suez Canal in early February, it prompted the Soviets to

inquire further about the possibility of U.S. military

support for Somalia.13^ Even the Pentagon’s announcement

138 O.S., President, "The President's Address at Wake Forest University, March 17, 1978," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 22 March 1978, pp. 188-189.

13^ The Assistant Naval Attache to Moscow, a Commander from the Navy's Intelligence community, was asked by his Indian counterpart about U.S. intentions to supply arms to Somalia. Admiral Hayward, then Chief of Naval Operations, notes that the Indian military was known by U.S. officers in the Soviet Union to be a conduit for Soviet enquires.

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on February 21 that a four ship U.S. task force had entered

the Indian Ocean on a routine deployment drew quick

criticism from the Soviets.1®®

The Soviets were also concerned that U.S. carrier

movements in the Pacific in late February presaged a

carrier deployment to the Indian Ocean. The U.S. carrier

KITTY HAWK, which had been conducting exercises with the

USS MIDWAY off Okinawa, Japan on February 17, arrived off

the West coast of Luzon in the Philippines on February

21.131 On February 23, the Soviet press, perhaps

demonstrating the Kremlin's confusion concerning these

movements, made a vague reference to the MIDWAY and KITTY

HAWK in an article entitled "Gunboat Diplomacy in the Red

Sea," and denounced "...the Pentagon strategists' dangerous

show of military force in the Red S e a . " 1 3 2 in the wake of

the Somali defeat and vague American warnings regarding

detente and SALT, U.S. naval movements must have concerned

Interview with Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.), Former Chief of Naval Operations, Honolulu, Hawaii: September 15, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as Hayward).

130 Moscow Radio, 22 February 1978, FBIS:SU, 24 February 1978, p. HI.

131 CNA Memorandum 85-71, p. 14.

132 2a Rubeshom, 23 February 1978, FBIS:SU, 2 March 1978, p. B6.

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Upon the Somali withdrawal, the USS KITTY HAWK left

Subic Bay, Philippines on March 9 and arrived off the coast

of Malaysia northeast of Singapore on March 13. On the

same day, a ten-ship British Task Group led by the cruiser

HMS TIGER entered the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Straits.

At that time, the French helicopter carrier JEANNE D'ARC

and the destroyer FORBIN were making a port call at

Singapore before entering the Indian O c e a n . 134

Furthermore, on March 13, the USS FOX left the four other

ships in its task group (OUELLET, STEIN, and HASSAYAHPA) in

the vicinity of Port Louis, Mauritius and headed toward the

Gulf of Aden to replace the TRUETT.13® All in all, the

U.S. and its allies had a formidable force in the region.

The Soviets were acutely aware of U.S. naval

movements in the Western Pacific and the U.S. naval

presence in the Indian Ocean. In particular, the Soviets

133 The Soviets also demonstrated some interest in British and French naval movements in the apparent belief that they might be coordinated with those by the U.S. Both the British and the French naval attaches to Washington were queried by the Soviet attache as to the duration of the "joint Indian Ocean exercise." Conversation with Commander Guy Dur, French Navy during U.S. Navy-French Navy Bilateral Discussions on South Atlantic/Indian Ocean Reconnaissance on 12 April 1979.

134 CNA Memorandum 85-71, p. 15.

133 Captain James F. Kelly, Jr., USN, "Naval Deployments in the Indian Ocean," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 109 (May 1983): 178.

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were sensitive to the U.S. carrier's movement toward

Singapore. Such movements bad presaged crisis-related

deployments to the Indian Ocean in the Indo-Pakistani War

in 1971 and the Arab-Israeli October War in 1973.136 gy

March 9, the Soviet oiler CHELYSUKIN was stationed in a

surveillance patrol off Diego Garcia, perhaps to evaluate

U.S. reaction to the Somali defeat. It was also in a good

position to intercept the USS FOX which was in the vicinity

of Rodrigues Island. On March 11, the Soviets gave the

Turkish government the required eight day advance

notification that the Kashin class STROGIY would transit

the Dardanelles on March 19.13?

The STROGIY unexpectedly left the Black Sea with the

aircraft carrier KIEV. While there was some speculation

that the KIEV'S movements might be related to events in the

Horn, the KIEV did not go to the Horn, but lingered in the

eastern Mediterranean.13® As will be seen in Chapter VI,

133 Stephen E. Roberts, "Superpower Naval Confrontations," in Brad Dismukes and James McConnell, eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979 ), pp. 183-191 and p. 207.

137 U.S., Department of State, 1978 State Cite 031721; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 131031Z Mar 78 (Subject: Soviet Naval Movements).

13® Center for Naval Analysis, Research Contribution 429, "Naval Crisis Management, Vol III, Appendix B, Soviet Naval Crisis Actions, 1967-79" (hereinafter referred to as CNA Research Contribution 429), S.S. Roberts, May 1980, p. B-44.

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after the O.S. deployed the CONSTELLATION to the Gulf of

Aden during events in the Yemens in 1979, the Kiev-class

carrier MINSK, which was scheduled to transit to the Soviet

Union's Pacific fleet, operated for a time in the Gulf of

Aden thousands of miles out of its way.139 Thus, it is

possible to speculate that the KIEV might have entered the

Indian Ocean if the KITTY HAWK had been sent to the Horn.

The STROGIY had just left the Red Sea via the Suez

Canal in late January, 1978, after being replaced by two

Soviet Riga class frigates, which, with their shallower

drafts and guns and fire control systems, were probably

more suited for SOVINDRON's operational requirements at

that time.170 The STROGIY's unexpected return to the Red

Sea on March 24 suggests a Soviet reaction to U.S. naval

movements - either the FOX or perhaps the KITTY HAWK.

However, it seems likely that the KITTY HAWK represented

Moscow's main concern since the Soviets usually counter

aircraft carriers with cruise missile submarines and, on

March 16, a Soviet Juliet-class submarine had left

Vladivostok under tow for the Indian Ocean.171

139 Ibid.

170 Ibid., p. B-46. The Riga class frigates' main mission was probably to protect supply ships shuttling between Aden and Ethiopia from Somali gunboat attacks from Berbera.

171 Ibid., p. B-47.

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The Soviets React

The Carter Administration was making its initial

foray into politico/military relations with a small,

incremental move. Clearly the Soviets were concerned about

Western naval movements - especially the KITTY HAWK's

movement to Singapore. It is also clear that the

carrier's movement toward the Malacca Straits was intended

as a signal to Moscow, and the Soviets got the message.

They reacted.

Yet the Soviets did not send a full fledged Anti-

Carrier Warfare Group (ACW) to the Indian Ocean as they had

in other crises.172 They augmented their SOVINDRON forces

only with a Juliett class submarine and a destroyer -

although these do constitute the core elements of an ACW

group. Their failure to do more may have reflected their

uncertainty concerning the response of the Carter

Administration, the signal sent by the movements of the

KITTY HAWK, and other Western naval movements. President

Carter decided not to send the KITTY HAWK to the Horn, but

he made it clear that this first increment - the posturing

of an aircraft carrier near the Malacca Straits was only

172 James McConnell, "Rules of the Game," Soviet Naval Diplomacy, p. 244.

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applicable as long as the Ethiopians did not cross the b o r d e r .173

The failure of the Ethiopians to pursue the

retreating Somalis across the border, however, did not

lessen tensions in the Horn. The Ethiopians were soon

accusing Somalia of trying to annex Djibouti and of

conducting renewed guerrilla warfare in the Ogaden.174

Ethiopia feared a Somali takeover of Djibouti -a major

entry port for Ethiopian imports and exports. Throughout

this period, Djibouti's government was dominated by the

ethnically Somali Issa tribe and its security was (and

still is) dependent on French military forces. During the

Ogaden War, U.S. and French naval forces, operating out of

Djibouti, cooperated closely in keeping tabs on Soviet

activities in the Horn. Ethiopia's publicly stated

perception of these U.S. and French activities was that

they represented a potential American, French, and Issa

collusion to turn Djibouti over to Siad Barre as a

consolation prize for losing the Ogaden.17® Thus,

Ethiopia's fears were heightened when President Carter,

173 Emile A. Nakhleh, The Persian Gulf and American Policy (New York; Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 31.

174 Addis Ababa Radio, 18 March 1978, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Daily Report: Subsaharan Africa (hereinafter referred to as FBIS:SSA). 19 March 1978, p. Bl.

175 Ibid.

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good to his word, sent an envoy to Mogadiscio to discuss

arms aid after Somalia's withdrawal from Ogaden. However,

he failed to persuade Barre to renounce Mogadiscio's claims

to a greater Somalia in return for arms.176

Thus, the Carter Administration found itself in the

common, but nonetheless discomforting, position of

supporting a state over which it apparently had little

leverage. At the same time, even the relatively restricted

use of naval forces as a show of power (the frigates

operating near Djibouti) had further alienated the

Ethiopians. The restraint that Carter obviously felt he

had shown by not immediately deploying the KITTY HAWK

Battle Group into the Indian Ocean was not perceived by the

Ethiopians as such.177

Brzezinski cites an SCC meeting in "early 1978" when

he advocated sending this carrier battle group into the

Indian Ocean in reaction to the Soviet deployment of Cubans

to Ethiopia as a turning point in U.S.-Soviet relations -

the point where the Administration abandoned hope of a "new

dialogue" with the Soviets. He noted that he was opposed

by both Vance and Brown. In this case he was also opposed

by the President. In his view, as events in the region

175 John Darnton, "U.S. Team in Somalia to Discuss Arms Aid," The New York Times, 19 March 1978, p. 15.

177 Nakhleh, Persian Gulf and American Policy, p. 42.

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subsequently deteriorated, these same people overreacted -

linking everything to Cuban and Soviet moves in a remote

part of the world.178

Meanwhile, U.S. relations with Ethiopia continued to

deteriorate. On March 22, 1978, the Ethiopian government

charged that "the current attempt by the United States to

search for ways and means of arming Somalia is to prepare

Siad Barre for another war."179 On March 25, they again

claimed that the United States would assist Somalia in

annexing Djibouti.l^^ In response, the Ethiopian Foreign

Ministry sent a delegation to Djibouti on March 30 to "find

ways of strengthening relations between Ethiopia and the

Republic of Djibouti."131

By the end of March, the Mogadiscio-supported Western

Somali Liberation Front had resumed an active guerrilla war

in the Ogaden. On March 30, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry

declared that the "Somali leadership has continued its

policy of invasion and expansionism and has declared

178 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 82.

179 Addis Ababa Radio, 22 March 1978, FBISzSSA, 24 March 1978, p. Bl.

13° Addis Ababa Radio, 25 March 1978, FBISzSSA, 27 March 1978, p. B2.

131 Djibouti Radio, 30 March 1978, FBISzSSA, 31 March 1978, p. Bl.

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genocidal w a r . "132 with Ethiopia edging toward reviewed

hostilities with Somalia, the Soviets showed how they might

have reacted to a O.S. military response these events. On

March 31, the London Daily Telegraph printed an article by

Desmond Wettern which announced that "tomorrow a series of

exercises are to take place off the Horn of Africa

involving British, American, and French warships." Despite

the British task group commander's explanation that such

exercises are "routine" when allied ships operate in the

same vicinity with O.S. ships, Wettern wrote that "they

will serve warning on Moscow that the Western navies are

still able to deploy sizeable naval forces in an area both

of great importance to Russia's expansionist plans and one

remote from Western bases."133

As noted earlier, significant Western naval movements

in the Indian Ocean and the continued presence of the KITTY

HAWK Battle Group in the Gulf of Thailand throughout March

and early April probably concerned the Soviets. On the

same day as the Daily Telegraph's story, TASS denounced

this "show of military might" as fostering Western efforts

"to use the African continent in their strategic plans." In

another statement on March 31, the Soviets claimed that

132 Addis Ababa Radio, 30 March 1978, FBISzSSA, 31 March 1978, p. Bl.

133 Desmond Wettern, "Show of Force Off the Horn," London Daily Telegraph, 31 March 1978, p. 4.

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allied "naval maneuvers" were encouraging the Somali

government in "once again trying to interfere in the

internal affairs of Ethiopia."I®*

This naval "demonstration" (which never took place)

and the Soviet reaction, however, was noted with interest

by the Carter Administration.1®5 By holding the KITTY HAWK

Battle Group on the eastern side of the Malacca Straits,

Carter was trying to signal restraint in hope that the

Soviets would do likewise.1®® The hint was not taken. The

danger associated with this restraint, however, was that it

might have also signalled a reluctance by O.S.

decisionmakers to formulate and pursue a clear policy

towards the region.

The Soviet Onion, for its part, clearly showed what

steps it would take had the O.S. reacted with military

forces in support of Somalia. On March 29 or 30, the

Soviet oiler ILIM transferred its tow of the Juliet

submarine to the AGS MORZHOVETS (an intelligence collection

ship). However, instead of towing the submarine into the

Indian Ocean, the intelligence collector doubled back to

the Gulf of Thailand to monitor the activities of the KITTY

HAWK Battle Group. In the event the KITTY HAWK had moved.

^®4 TASS, 31 March 1978, FBISzSO, 3 April 1978, p. H2.

^®5 Sick.

1®3 Ibid.

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the Soviets had requested Iranian permission to conduct Tu-

95 Bear D flights over the northern Arabian Sea for April 4

and 7. Furthermore, instead of conducting the Soviets'

first operational port call in the Seychelles, the ASVR

TAHAL remained in the Red Sea area to keep tabs on the

British and American ships, after which the TAMAL, joined

by an amphibious ship and a frigate followed the HMS TIGER

Task Group through the Suez C a n a l . i n addition, the

Soviet ships in the Gulf of Aden monitored the exercises of

the French helicopter carrier JEANNE D'ARC and three other

ships on April 10.^®® Thus it is clear that the Soviets

were concerned about allied (and especially American) naval

movements during the first part of April. It is only after

the KITTY HAWK left the Gulf of Thailand and the TIGER left

the Indian Ocean that the Soviets began to reduce their

naval presence in the Horn.

However, the naval demonstration "created" by Desmond

Wettern may have had a positive effect. Ethiopia, which

had appeared to be inching toward war with Somalia,

reluctantly endured the increased guerrilla activity of the

WSLF in the Ogaden. The Ethiopians were also anxious to

undertake operations to pacify the Eritrean rebels.

Nevertheless, such operations would not necessarily rule

3®7 CNA Research Contribution, 429, p. B-49.

3®® Ibid.

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out a punitive expedition against Somalia. However, such

an expedition would have been difficult without Soviet and Cuban support.3-®9

Had the U.S. pursued the alleged "naval

demonstration," there may have been some basis for claiming

a successful (albeit limited) foreign policy victory.

Carter's first use of military forces as a tool of foreign

policy was limited to the mere movement of a carrier battle

group out of port and several hundred miles to the West.

It was, however, an incremental step towards the military

policy to the region which eventually emerged.

Carter had recognized that some U.S. indication of

concern other than public statements had to be given in

order to preclude extensive Soviet influence in the region.

The nature and extent of this U.S. interest was beginning

to take shape. Although Carter had earlier made some

limited diplomatic and economic gestures, this was the

first use of arms sales and the deployment of military

forces in response to events in the region. As crises

unfolded in neighboring countries and as the nature and

extent of U.S. involvement increased, U.S. decisionmakers

would increasingly view policy options in military terms.

^39 Hayward.

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A NON-CRISIS: THE SHADOW WAR IN THE YEMENS

As the relationship between the United States and the

Soviet Union changed from negotiation to confrontation in

the Horn of Africa, events across the Gulf of Aden began to

focus policymakers' attention on another part of the

northwest Indian Ocean, one which historically had been of

comparatively little interest to the U.S. — North and

South Yemen. In another time period, the conflict between

North and South Yemen might have been of less concern.

But, when placed in the context of growing U.S.-Soviet

regional competition, it assumed disproportionate

importance.

The two Yemens are really misnamed. North Yemen (the

Yemen Arab Republic) actually lies west of South Yemen (the

People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). Of the two. South

Yemen is more strategically located, possessing both the

port of Aden astride the Bab el Mandeb and the island of

Socotra off of the Horn of Africa.

Cultural, social, religious, and political

differences between the two countries are not great. The

129

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countries of the southern half of the Arabian Peninsula

maintain ill-defined borders that are sparsely inhabited by

Bedouin tribesmen. This lack of geographically distinct

border areas is matched by the somewhat flexible political

attitudes of the two Yemens. As will be seen, the ease

with which the two Yemens discussed political unification

indicates the absence of strong underlying philosophical,

cultural, or ideological differences.

Historically, Great Britain had been the predominant

foreign influence in both countries until its 1971

withdrawal of forces "west of Aden." The Soviet Union

quickly established a military relationship with South

Yemen following the withdrawal of the British, and

subsequently gained access to important facilities both in

Aden and at the island of Socotra. Beginning in the early

1970's, the U.S. joined France and Great Britain as major

arms suppliers for North Yemen. Military purchases, as

well as most other forms of economic aid to North Yemen,

were facilitated by economic support from Saudi Arabia.

From the Horn to the Peninsula

The alignment of North Yemen with Western nations and

South Yemen with the Soviet Union first became evident on

June 16, 1976 when North Yemen armed forces Chief of Staff

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Colonel Ahmad Al-Ghashmi indicated that North Yemen was

planning to ask the Soviet Onioj to withdraw its military

experts from the country because of the Soviet's failure to

supply them with spare parts for their Soviet-made

w e a p o n s . ^90 One week later, he announced that North Yemen

had decided to equip its armed forces with French and

American arms, adding that Saudi Arabia had already agreed

to pay for much of this equipment

When the United States reached an agreement with Saudi

Arabia on modernizing the Yemen Arab Republic's armed

forces, it implicitly approved of and encouraged Saudi

Arabia's desire to become a leading force in the region of

the Persian Gulf. The United States agreed to sell Saudi

Arabia $138 million of military equipment which would be

delivered to North Yemen and used to organize and equip six

brigade groups of 3000 men each in that country. This

equipment included about 2800 wheeled vehicles ranging from

jeeps to tank transporters, 105 mm howitzers, vulcan air

defense 20 mm guns, 50 caliber machine guns, 81 mm mortars

and the LAW anti-tank weapon. With the exception of the

^90 O.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Trends (hereinafter referred to as FBIS:Trends), 28 June 1976, p. 14.

Ibid., p. 15.

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vulcan system, all weapons were of World War II v i n t a g e .

Saudi Arabia was also buying certain equipment from

the French for Yemen, the Panhard armored car being the

most important item. Not included in the total package for

Yemen were tanks and modern aircraft to replace the aging

T-34 Russian tanks and MIG 17 aircraft, something which the

North Yemen military felt very strongly about. When they

objected to this Saudi financed and managed program which

did not include modern planes and tanks, they were told the

modernization of their air force and of their navy would be

provided for in a second five year plan.^^^ They were also

told the Panhard armored car would be superior to the tank

in the terrain of Yemen and they really did not need tanks.

Meanwhile, South Yemen had begun receiving modern tanks,

planes and naval vessels from its Soviet patron.1^4

The U.S., in agreeing to the role of supplier of

military equipment in support of the Saudi program in

Yemen, had to make some exceptions to its foreign military

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Hearings, U.S. Interest in, and Policy Toward, the Persian Gulf, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980), Hearings, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, pp. 103-104. The LAW is actually a disposable version of the World War II anti-tank bazooka.

Tanks and aircraft are critical prestige items for developing countries.

U.S., Congress, U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, p. 104.

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sales policy. U.S. policy at the time was to follow

through on all sales to insure these weapons are fully

integrated into the recipient country's military

organization and are properly maintained. In many cases

this policy required extensive training in the U.S. of

members of the recipient country's armed forces in the use,

maintenance, and repair of this equipment. Where

necessary, mobile training teams (MTT's) are sent to the

recipient country to work with the military.

At Saudi Arabia's insistence, the U.S. agreed to

abandon this policy in the case of North Yemen, and permit

Saudi Arabia to assume responsibility for all phases of

managing the program. The U.S. Security Assistance effort

in Yemen would serve only a monitoring role. Recognizing

that Saudi Arabia might not be able to manage the program

entirely, given its manpower resources, it was understood

that the U.S. and Jordan would back up Saudi efforts

whenever necessary. Saudi Arabia had agreed to the

establishment of a large Jordanian military training

mission in North Yemen, a mission which reached a high of

about 70 military personnel during the summer of 1977.

Should the Saudis be unable to provide training for the

North Yemeni military within Saudi Arabia, they would be

sent to Jordan for training. Only as a last resort would

Ibid., p. 105.

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Yemeni military personnel be sent to the United States, or

American Military Training Teams be sent to Y e m e n .

As Soviet influence increased in Ethiopia and

declined in North Yemen, relations between the two

neighbors beccune more hostile. On September 4, 1976 North

Yemen's United Nations representative, Mohammed Sallam,

lodged a complaint with the U.N. Security Council that

Ethiopian ships had violated North Yemeni waters and seized

a boat and sailors.These charges were never

substantiated and are suspect in view of the limited

capabilities of the Ethiopian Navy and its other

responsibilities. At worst, it may have been a case of

mistaken identity with Eritrean dhows which move arms up

and down the northern coast of Ethiopia (only 165 nautical

miles from North Yemen).

At the time of the Carter inauguration, therefore.

South Yemen was already closely identified with the Soviet

Union, while North Yemen was "neutral." It surprised the

Administration, therefore, when South Yemen President Salim

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Application of Nuclear Energy, Panel on Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation, Indian Ocean Arms Limitation and Multilateral Cooperation on Restraining Conventional Arms Transfer (hereinafter referred to as Indian Ocean Arms Limitation), Hearings, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978, p. 72.

United Nations, Security Council, 27th Session, Security Council Proceedings, 4 September 1976, p. 107.

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Rubaya Ali and North Yemen president Ibrahim al Hamdi met

on their mutual borders on February 15 and 16, 1977, and

decided to create a joint council consisting of themselves

and several of their closest ministers, to meet every six

months to discuss common concerns.^®® They issued a

communique saying they had decided to proceed with steps

for economic development projects in both countries. The

Washington Post reported that "(d)iplomatic specialists in

Yemeni affairs said they doubt that (the agreement) will

actually result in a merger of the two states..-• Improved

relations between the two Yemens certainly have the support

and probably the active encouragement of Saudi Arabia,

which provides economic aid to both."^®®

To place these events in Yemen in perspective with

other events on the Horn of Africa, five weeks later, on

March 22, President a1-Hamadi met with presidents from

South Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia to refine steps to turn the

Red Sea into an "Arab Lake." As noted earlier, this plan,

which had the support of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, concerned

the Soviets. The Carter Administration, however, was

"ambivalent" about the Arab Lake concept. While opposed to

U.S., Congress, O.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, p. 107.

Thomas Lippman, "Saudi Arabia, Once a Diplomatic Recluse, Turns Activist," The Washington Post, 18 February, 1977, p. A21.

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any restriction on freedom of the seas, they saw this plan

as a possible starting point for discussions concerning

demilitarization of the region.^00

Difficulties between North Yemen and both South Yemen

and Ethiopia became critical at the same time that the

Soviets were solidifying their position in Ethiopia. While

the conflict between the Yemens began to intensify at about

the same time that the Soviets increased their presence in

the Horn of Africa, there is not clear relationship between

these events. However, on April 10 a gunman assassinated

former North Yemeni premier Cadi Abdullah al-Hajari, his

wife, and an embassy minister outside the Royal Lancaster

Hotel in London. While no link was ever established

between the assassin and a foreign country, the former

premier had been a vocal critic of the Soviet presence in

the region and U.S. and allied officials were suspicious of

possible Soviet and Cuban connections.^®^

By early May, 1977, Ethiopia had begun to expel

Yemeni (mostly North Yemeni) citizens after confiscating

their property. Some 20,000 North Yemenis reportedly went

to Ethiopia, mainly in the Eritrean region, immediately

Vance.

201 "Gunman Kills 3 Yemenis, Including Former Premier, Outside a Hotel in London," The New York Times, 11 April 1977, p. 5; Also Sick.

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before and after World War 11.202 Ethiopian decision

to expel these people after almost thirty years was

probably made out of fear that the Yemenis would sympathize

with the Eritreans who were fighting to secede from

Ethiopia. 20,000 refugees added to a country as small and

poor as North Yemen is a considerable strain.

It is difficult to closely track internal events in

North Yemen during this period due to the limited press

coverage accorded this country and the paucity of O.S.

diplomatic and military personnel in country. What can be

determined, however, is that the O.S. and allied positions

in North Yemen improved as the Soviet position

deteriorated. For example, at the same time. North Yemen

was negotiating the procurement of French and U.S. arms, it

was expelling the TASS correspondent in Yemen for alleged

subversive activities.^®^

Yemeni Internal Politics

Although relations between the two Yemens appeared to

be improving during 1977, there was much animosity between

2®2 j.E. Peterson, Yemen; The Search for a Modern State, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 13.

2®2 U.S., Congress, Indian Ocean Arms Limitations, p. 76.

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the leaders of these two countries. On October 8, 1977 Le

Monde reported that the National Democratic Front (N.D.F.),

formed in March 1976 as a result of warming ties between

North and South Yemen, had just made public its political

program for North Yemen. The program denounced Saudi

Arabia's "flagrant intervention" into internal Yemeni

affairs by encouraging, through arms and subsidies, tribal

opposition to the government. It also called for an end to

economic dependence on foreign monopolies and for building

a modern national economy based on scientific planning, and

demanded that political and trade activities be

p e r m i t t e d . 204 The N.D.F., while not recognized by North

Yemeni authorities, was tolerated and found its main

support among independent nationalists, the Baath party,

and several Marxist organizations.

Three days after the N.D.F. announced its platform.

President Ibrahim al-Hamidi and his brother. Lieutenant

Colonel Abdullah Hommamed al-Hamidi were assassinated. As

with most events in the "shadow war," the assassination

remains shrouded in mystery. What is known is that Hamidi

and his brother went to lunch at the home of Lieutenant

Colonel Ahmed Hussein Ghashmi. Afterwards the Hamidis went

"National Democratic Front Outlines Yemen Agenda," Le Monde, 8 October 1977, p. 3, as cited in Deadline Data on Worl5 Affairs, (Greenwich, Connecticut; DMS Inc., 1978), p. 74

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off to indulge in an ancient custom, chewing the leaves of

a bush called Qat - a mild narcotic. About five hours

after they left Ghashmis' house, their bodies were found in

a country house that belonged to the president.20^ Ghashmi

immediately assumed leadership of a three-man governing

council.

Hamidi's strength had been his balance between the

conservative tribesmen who lived on the northern and

eastern boundaries with Saudi Arabia and the radical young

army officers and urban educated men who wanted to

establish a modern centralized state. Although he was

often accused of being a Saudi puppet, he had maintained a

relatively independent stance. He had developed ties with

the Saudis, and their aid had increased so that North Yemen

was even enjoying somewhat of an economic boom. But he had

also made it clear that North Yemen was not a Saudi

s a t e l l i t e . 206 ^e was about to visit South Yemen which

suggests that the negotiations to unite the two Yemens

which had been dragging on for some time, might have been

about to get somewhere.207

On October 16, 1977, Ghashmi narrowly escaped an

205 James Fiener, "Middle East Intrigue," The Los Angeles Times, 16 October 1977, p. 2.

206 "A River Too Far?" The Economist, 8 October 1977, p. 27. 207 Ibid.

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assassination attempt by a subordinate. Major Zaid al-

Kabshi. The Major was summarily tried and executed on the

same d a y . 20® There appeared to be a concerted effort to

destabilize the government of North Yemen. Again, under

other circumstances such instability would be of interest

to U.S. government officials only in as much as it might

endanger American lives in country. Given the small number

of U.S. citizens in North Yemen, the U.S. response would

probably be a temporary evacuation until the crisis

subsided. When coupled with the rapidly changing

environment on the other side of the strategic Bab el

Mandeb, however, these events took on greater interest to

U.S. policymakers.

While U.S. concerns in the region focused on the

Somali/Ethiopian conflict where the Somalis had just broken

with the Soviets and the Soviet airlift to Ethiopia was

underway. North and South Yemen continued their dialogue

on possible reunification (while also attempting to

undermine each other's government). Relations between

North and South Yemen remained calm until June 24, 1978,

when President Al-Ghashmi agreed to meet with a South

Yemeni diplomatic envoy who was to present South Yemen's

response to the latest reunification proposals. The envoy

detonated a satchel full of explosives which killed the

20® Ibid.

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President, the envoy, and two onlookers. Premier Abdul

Aziz Ghani immediately broke off relations with South

Yemen, calling the assassination a "clear conspiracy. "209

Ghashmi was thus the second North Yemeni president to die

in eight months (and the eighth since the seven-year civil

war that occurred after the overthrow of the monarchy in

1962).

Within forty-eight hours of Ghashmi's assassination.

South Yemen's president, Salim Rubaya Ali was deposed by

the South Yemeni military and executed by a firing squad,

along with two other leaders of the ruling National

Liberation F r o n t . 2^0 The deaths of both leaders in such a

short period of time laid to rest any hopes of

reconciliation between the two countries. Indeed, it may

have been their very efforts which led to their demise.

These events led to increased fears of greater Soviet

influence in the region. The man suspected of directing

the killing of both presidents was Abdul Fattah Ismail,

Secretary General of South Yemen's National Front and a

strong supporter of the Soviet Union. It was generally

believed at the time that Ismail planned Ghashmi*s murder

to discredit President Ali, prior to overthrowing the South

26® Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf; Threats from Within (Ottawa; Heath, 1984), p. 177.

210 Ibid., p. 178.

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Yemeni leader and assuming p o w e r . 2 H in so doing, however,

Ismail had alienated most of his external supported. On

July 2, 1978, fifteen Arab League members agreed to impose

a political, economic, and cultural boycott on South Yemen

for complicity in the slaying of President Ghashmi.212

South Yemen responded by charging that North Yemen had

launched an offensive on July 3 into the northwestern

province, occupied two border villages, and shelled

scattered areas in the Baihan region. South Yemen then

called for all "socialist Arab states to repulse North

Yemen's military aggression."21®

In early July the O.S. embassy sent a Country Team

Assessment of the situation to the State Department, in

which it was asserted that, with a minimum of effort by the

U.S., quantities of weapons already purchased for North

Yemen by Saudi Arabia could be shipped by air to Yemen on

an expedited basis, thus significantly improving North

Yemen's defensive posture. Since Saudi Arabia was paying

the bill, the only hurdle was to convince the State

Department of the feasibility of the initiative.

Accordingly, a conference was arranged (with State's

211 Ibid., pp. 180-182.

212 Robert D. Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development, 1962-1986 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 92.

212 Ibid.

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approval) to be held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in late

J u l y . 2 1 4

The embassy team from Sana travelled to Riyadh to

work out the details of these accelerated deliveries with

the U.S. military assistance mission to Saudi Arabia prior

to presenting the concept to the Saudi military. They

arrived to learn that the conference would be attended by a

number of personnel from the Defense Department.21® Their

proposal to improve North Yemen's defense capability had

arrived in Washington at a time when the Carter

Administration was looking for some way to present a

stronger image in the region. North Yemen presented itself

as a likely place for the U.S. to take a stand against

communist encroachment from the Horn of Africa, and had

become the subject of a National Security Council

memorandum.216 As a military member of the Office of the

Secretary of Defense expressed it, "President Carter has to

take a stand somewhere in the region, and he can do it

cheap in Yemen because Saudi Arabia is paying all the

bills. For that reason we should have no trouble getting

214 U.S., Department of State, 1978 Sana Cite 152567; AHEMBASSY SANA 150610Z JUL 78.

216 U.S., Congress, U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, p. 106.

216 Sick.

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this thing approved by C o n g r e s s . "217

After discussions in Riyadh, several members of the

DOD team returned to Sana, including Robert Murray, the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security

Affairs. Murray received the full red carpet treatment by

the North Yemenis upon his arrival. They had concluded

from the large number of diplomatic initiatives undertaken

by State during the past month that Murray was visiting for

the purpose of announcing a new United States-Yemen Arab

Republic bilateral relationship under which the U.S. would

directly supply North Yemen with new arms and equipment.

Clearly this was not the case.21® Murray was not even

authorized to discuss such a relationship with Y.A.R.

officials. During a meeting on the subject, the Y.A.R.

president made himself very clear on this point - he wanted

President Carter to send someone to Yemen who had the

authority to discuss such a relationship.21^

Two weeks later, a joint U.S.- Saudi military

delegation arrived to present the equipment proposal to

217 U.S., Congress, U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, p. 109.

21® Ibid., p. 110; Also, interview with Mr. Robert Murray, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1978-1980, Washington, D.C.: January 20, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as Murray, January 20, 1989).

21^ Murray, January 20, 1989.

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Yemen. Unfortunately, no one had removed the phrase

"supplant the Soviet presence in Yemen” from the document

which was used to get the Saudis to assist in the effort.

South Yemen officials expressed their resentment that the

U.S. dare tell them who their friends would be and not be.

U.S. Administration officials had hoped that the World War

II vintage equipment would get to North Yemen in time for

their September 26 National Day parade and had counted on a

display of this equipment at the parade to signal their

resolve to the Soviets. The next day the North Yemeni

president informed the American embassy that he was not

interested in a program which would accelerate deliveries

of equipment to Yemen which they had already agreed to

receive. What he wanted was a program for the immediate

delivery of modern aircraft, tanks, artillery and rockets

similar to those being delivered to South Yemen by the

Soviets.220

From a Washington perspective. President Carter's

efforts at taking a stand against the Soviets in the region

were "taking a beating."221 During the next month, Saudi

officials worked on the president of North Yemen, finally

convincing him that acceptance of accelerated deliveries of

220 g.g.. Congress, U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, p. 111.

221 Vance.

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the original package of equipment would lead to a follow-

on

package of more modern equipment. Realizing that Saudi

Arabia would not stand for a direct O.S.-North Yemen

relationship to modernize his armed forces, the North

Yemeni president in late September agreed to the original

U.S. p r o p o s a l . 222 This set the wheels in motion for the

air shipment of equipment, the creation of a U.S. office of

security assistance in North Yemen, and the preparation and

submission of Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA's) by

Saudi Arabia to the U.S. for the purchase of F5E aircraft,

M 6 0 tanks, and armored personnel c a r r i e r s . 223

On July 17, 1978, North Yemen's National Assembly

elected Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh president to succeed

Ghashmi. He had been the commander-in-chief of the North

Yemeni armed forces and was selected to prepare the country

for the pending w a r . 224 in light of the Carter

Administration's moves to expedite arms to North Yemen and

condemnation by the Arab League, South Yemen issued a

statement, following a two day emergency meeting of the

222 Thomas L. McNaughter, "Arms and Allies on the Arabian Peninsula," Orbis 28 (Fall 1984): 491. 223 Ibid.

224 s. Mondesir, "Yemen: Pawns and the Superpowers," Arab Report and Record (ARR), 1-15 October 1978, p. 735; See also Martin, Unstable Gulf, p. 179.

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ruling National Front's Central Committee, saying that it

was ready to settle its dispute with North Yemen

peacefully. 225 Low key talks were subsequently undertaken

between the two hostile parties.

These peaceful overtures, however, did not preclude

continued South Yemeni attempts to undermine the North

Yemeni government. Four months later, on October 15, 1978,

bloody fighting broke out in the streets of the North Yemen

capital of Sana following an abortive coup aimed at

overthrowing President Saleh. The coup was allegedly

attempted by four battalions of the fifth infantry brigade

and the military p o l i c e . 22® Twelve days later a military

court sentenced nine officers to death after convicting

them of high treason and of accepting money and arms

through foreign diplomatic sources. The executions were

carried out on the sauae d a y . 227

President Saleh continued to search for malcontents

and other possible participants in the abortive coup to

preclude any other attempts at overthrowing the government.

By November 5, twelve men, including a former minister,

were executed hours after they were convicted of taking

225 Ibid.

226 Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic, p. 96.

227 Ibid.; See also James Gilroy, "Renewed Fighting in Sanaa," South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, 6 November 1978, p. 2.

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part in the October 15 uprising. A thirteenth was given

life imprisonment. This brought to twenty-one the number

of people executed for their alleged involvement in the

attempt to overthrow Saleh. During their trial, four of

the defendants confessed that they had received money and

arms for the attempt from L i b y a . 228

Reports and Rumors

The first weeks of February 1979 were characterized

by an increasing frequency of clashes along the border of

the two Yemens by insurgent forces from both countries

operating against military targets in the region.

President Saleh asked what his American friends would do to

assist North Yemen in opposing this Soviet supported

aggression. 229 During the next three days South Yemeni

officials supplied increasingly grave accounts of a

deteriorating military situation which suggested South

Yemen would soon occupy the southern third of North Yemen.

No one in the Embassy, including the CIA, was able to

confirm these reports, which of course were being relayed

228 Ibid.

229 pj-ed Halliday, "Soviet Relations with South Yemen," in Contemporary Yemen; Politics and Historical Background, ed. B.R. Pridham (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 227.

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to Washington. 238 The Ambassador finally allowed the

military attache to tour the other regions of the country

on 26 February, including a visit to a military camp

located at a critical road junction near the Red Sea. This

camp had reportedly been hit by rocket fire the night of

February 24. Although he was never closer than 30

kilometers from the reported fighting, he did not observe a

single indication of increased military activity or

military traffic which would support reports of serious

fighting in the area. People in the large southern city of

Taiz were going about their business as usual, and no one

seemed to know anything about fighting along the b o r d e r . 231

President Saleh also presented the U.S. ambassador with a

long list of equipment which he needed to turn back the

"Soviet-supported aggression from the s o u t h . "232 The fact

that his list included patrol boats for his navy indicated

that perhaps all was not as was reported along the border

(the fighting was in the mountains not on the coast).

On March 2, 1979, the American embassy decided — in

view of the information they were getting from North Yemeni

officials, the CIA from its sources, and the military

230 o.g.p Congress, U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, p. 112.

221 Ibid.

222 Ibid., p. 113.

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assistance office from North Yemeni military headquarters -

- to relay to Washington accounts of a very serious

situation and make policy recommendations accordingly. 233

There was a significant difference in events and

circumstances being reported by CIA sources and the North

Yemenis, on the one hand, and the actual observations of

the O.S. military attache in country.

The "shadow war" continued to fester for several more

months with reports of political murders, large arms

acquisitions, and border violations. On February 24, 1979,

Arab radio broadcasts and dispatches from the Iraqi News

Agency reported that South Yemeni forces had occupied a

North Yemen village near Qatabah after fighting broke out

along the border between the two c o u n t r i e s . 224

Predictably, each side blamed each other. North Yemen

called for Arab League action and dispatched its foreign

minister to key Arab and European capitals to drum up

support against South Y e m e n . 225 within two days. South

Yemen announced that its forces had taken the town of

Harib, the last major North Yemeni settlement along the

border, after two other important towns had previously been

223 Ibid., p. 114.

224 Robert Litwak, Security in the Persian Gulf: Sources of Interstate Conflict (Montclair, New Jersey; Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1981), p. 83.

225 Ibid.

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taken. Negotiating from a position of strength, on

February 27, 1979, South Yemen said that it was willing to

accept mediation by other Arab nations in the border conflict.22G

On the same day, Saudi Arabia called for an end to

the fighting because it "threatened to extend beyond the

Yemeni borders." The following day (February 28), Saudi

Arabia put its armed forces on a l e r t . 227 clearly the

Saudis felt threatened by the growing Soviet presence in

the area, and a South Yemeni victory, coupled with an

Ethiopian victory on the Horn, greatly alarmed them.

Furthermore, a coup in Afghanistan the previous year had

brought another Soviet-supported leader to power in the

region. With Iran in turmoil, a perceived encirclement of

Saudi Arabia was almost complete.

Saudi concern translated into increased pressure on

the O.S. to provide visible and substantive aid to North

Yemen. On February 28, 1979 the U.S. announced that,

subject to congressional approval, it was immediately

sending $100 million worth of arms to North Yemen, as well

as earmarking an additional $400 million in arms over the

226 Ibid.

227 "Saudi Call for End to Conflict," Christian Science Monitor, 26 February 1979, p. 2, as cited in Deadline Data on World Affairs (Greenwich, Conn: DMS Inc., 1979), p. 76.

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next five y e a r s . 228 Given the general reluctance of

President Carter to introduce U.S. weapons into areas of

conflict in the Third World, this was a significant gesture

of support. Unlike the aid that had been provided earlier

to Somalia, supplies to be sent to North Yemen included

offensive weaponry. Harold Brown stated that "the U.S. is

prepared to defend its vital interests with force if

n e c e s s a r y . "239 The arms deliveries, which were being paid

for by Saudi Arabia, were agreed to some time before, but

in the present circumstances the announcement was meant to

reassure Saudi Arabia which regarded the fighting between

the two Yemens as part of a Soviet-inspired plot to bring

down the pro-Saudi regime in North Yemen.

Despite his previous desires to limit the flow of

arms to Third World belligerents, the Carter Administration

moved quickly to supply the arms requested by North Yemen

and Saudi Arabia. Having established the need for U.S.

military supply support for friendly governments in the

228 O.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Relations Programs, Hearings, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1980, pp. 632-665. The FY 1980 International Military Education and Training (IMET) proposal for North Yemen equalled $600,000 and 33 students, FMS agreements totalled $100 million, and Overseas Military Program Management personnel strengths (i.e., advisors) included 6 military personnel, 2 civilians, and 2 host nationals.

229 U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Information for the Armed Services, "The Secretary’s News Conference of 2 March 1979," (Mimeo) p. 2.

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Somali/Ethiopia conflict, the Administration was more

responsive to requests for aid in the case of the Yemen

conflict. The economics of the two situations were not

much different. In both cases Saudi Arabia was providing

financing. From a moral perspective, however, it was

somewhat easier to justify military support for North Yemen

since South Yemen was the aggressor. As the Yemeni

conflict continued, however, it became apparent that this

military aid was not, by itself, sufficient to ensure

regional stability.

On March 2, two days after the U.S. announcement of

military aid to North Yemen, the two Yemens agreed to a

cease fire. The cease fire lasted one d a y . 240 on March 5,

Arab foreign ministers agreed upon a plan to end fighting

in Yemen by calling for a truce which would be monitored by

members of the Arab League, a mutual withdrawal of forces

from the border areas, and the reopening of unification

talks between the two countries.24^ Despite these

diplomatic moves. President Carter was very concerned about

the status of Yemeni relations.242

240 Litwak, Security in the Gulf, p. 83.

241 McNaughter, "Arms and Allies on the Arabian Peninsula," p. 293.

242 Sick.

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By the end of March the areas of allegedly serious

fighting were visited by members of the Arab League

Military Committee and were debriefed on their observations

of the PDRY withdrawal from North Yemen. The O.S. military

attache also spent considerable time talking with a Yemeni

officer who had participated in the fighting in two areas

along the border. He concluded the situation as presented

by North Yemeni officials was grossly exaggerated. Based

upon information from various sources and his personal

observations, he drafted a list of twelve things which he

believed did not happen, things which the embassy and/or

the CIA reported to Washington as having h a p p e n e d . 243 gig

report had quite an impact when it reached Washington, for

it arrived when the State Department was already under the

gun over policy recommendations they had made on North Yemen.244

In April 1979, analysts at the Defense Intelligence

Agency (DIA) determined that the situation might not be as

serious as depicted by North Yemeni officials.

Accordingly, other methods of intelligence collection were

targeted at the Yemens in an attempt to confirm or deny

observations. By the 2nd of April, DIA had collected and

243 U.S., Congress, U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, p. 115.

244 Ibid.

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processed intelligence and concluded the situation was not

at all serious. This information was presented to the

National Security Council on the second of March by the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He presented the

intelligence information and supposedly said, "I don't care

what State or CIA is reporting on the situation in Yemen.

There is nothing there to get excited o v e r . "245

Fearing a rapid and unfavorable conclusion to the

Yemen border conflict, the Carter Administration decided

that an unequivocal signal had to be sent. To signal O.S.

resolve and concern over South Yemen's drive into North

Yemen, President Carter ordered a carrier task group into

the Arabian S e a . 246 This marked the first time that U.S.

forces were deployed into the region as a direct result of

a crisis. Previous U.S. Navy forces had already been on

patrol in the Indian Ocean when they were used to signal

concern.

At the time of the order to send the carrier task

group into the Arabian Sea, however, the Carter

Administration already had received the conflicting reports

from North Yemen and had reason to believe that the

245 U.S., Congress, U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, p. 116.

246 U.S., President, "The President's News Conference of 26 February 1979," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 2 March 1979, p. 773.

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situation in Yemen was not as dire as North Yemeni

officials would have them believe. These military

measures, including the announced sale of weapons and the

deployment of U.S. military forces, therefore, were

probably driven less by the immediacy of the situation in

Yemen than by a recognition on the part of policymakers

that something more than diplomatic initiatives were

necessary.

The decision to signal resolve through the use of a

carrier task group in the region marked a significant

reversal of thought from the Somali/Ethiopian crisis. The

target of the signal which the Administration was sending

was clearly the Soviet Union. On the same day as the

announcement of a carrier deployment, Secretary of State

Vance sent a note to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin protesting

the presence of Soviet and Cuban military advisers in South

Y e m e n . 2 4 7

To add extra emphasis to the U.S. concern, on March

9, 1978, President Carter invoked emergency powers to speed

delivery of $390 million in armaments to Yemen over the

next two weeks. This was necessitated by the reluctance of

Congress to approve the sale of significant quantities of

armaments to an Arab country during Middle East peace

247 "D.S. and Soviets Increase Indian Ocean Naval Forces," The New York Times, 17 April 1979, p. 5.

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negotiations. On the next day it was announced that the

U.S. was sending two radar reconnaissance planes (AWACS) to

Saudi Arabia to monitor events in the S o u t h . 248 Although

the Carter Administration was quick to point out that the

planes would remain in Saudi airspace, it did not minimize

the fact that U.S. military forces would be ashore in the

region of conflict for the first time during the Carter

presidency.

Once committed to support North Yemen, the Carter

Administration further undertook several major steps to

signal its resolve. On March 12, 1979, Carter approved the

transfer of U.S.-supplied equipment from Jordan and Saudi

Arabia to North Yemen, including fifty armored personnel

carriers. On the same day it was announced that the U.S.

planned to send as many as three hundred military advisers

to North Yemen over the next two to three years to help

train Yemeni forces in the use of U.S. a r m s . 2 4 9 Although

North and South Yemeni forces began a slow and sporadic

disengagement within a few days of these announcements,

U.S. decisionmakers continued with plans to ship the $390

million in armaments to North Yemen.

248 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf (hereinafter referred to as Security Interests in the Persian Gulf, Report, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p. 38.

249 Ibid., p. 39.

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Despite efforts to maintain a North Yemeni government

which was favorably disposed to Saudi Arabia, U.S.

officials were aware that North Yemen was being neutralized

by a militarily more powerful and politically more cohesive

South Y e m e n . 250 At the time of the Arab League mediated

cease fire. North Yemen announced a general amnesty for all

Yemenis who had opposed the government of President Ali

Abdullah Saleh, provided they declare their loyalty and

hand over their arms. An editorial in London's Financial

Times noted that "(t)he amnesty is the most public

admission yet that the National Democratic Front (N.D.F.)

which took over large sections of border territory last

month with the full backing of South Yemen enjoys

significant s u p p o r t . "251 The amnesty, which followed the

release of a number of pro-Irag Baathists arrested after

the coup attempt in October 1978 at the behest of Iraq,

apparently resulted from the recommendations of the Arab

League's Cease Fire Committee.252

On March 31, the presidents of North and South Yemen

signed an agreement under which both countries would

250 Vance; See also Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic,

p . 1 0 0 .

251 "Time for Another Look," Financial Times, 26 March 1979, p. 8, as cited in Deadline Data on World Affairs Greenwich, Conn; DMS Inc., 1979), p. 77.

252 Ibid.

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attempt to work toward unification. The scheme provided

for a national sovereignty council which would be

responsible for foreign affairs, defense, and security.

This council, in turn, would be composed of the presidents

of North and South Yemen, their prime ministers, and three

representatives from both s i d e s . 253 while this plan

certainly appeared equitable, it was clear that such a

council could easily become split.

By this time, arms had begun to arrive in North Yemen

at an ever-increasing rate. By late May a squadron of F-5E

jet fighters arrived from the O.S. To fly these advanced

fighters. North Yemen had to hire twelve Nationalist

Chinese pilots for its air force, thus setting up a

scenario where North Yemeni mercenary pilots (Chinese)

might come into combat with the South Yemeni mercenary

pilots ( C u b a n s ) . 254 This situation extended into virtually

all areas of warfare since neither country had either the

numbers of men or the technical abilities to man modern

warfighting equipment.

As military supplies continued to pour into North

Yemen, senior military leaders grew wary of reunification

efforts underway with South Yemen. On June 21, 1979,

253 U.S., Congress, Security Interests in the Persian G ulf, p. 38.

254 Ibid.

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President Saleh crushed an attempted military coup and

arrested a number of senior army officers, including army

chief of staff Lieutenant Colonel Ali Saleh al Shibah and

the commander of North Yemen's special forces. Lieutenant

Colonel Yahia al-Dnsi.255 The military had traditionally

maintained close ties with Saudi Arabia, and this continued

unrest among its senior officers was a good indication of

Saudi dissatisfaction with the reunification effort.

The Pentagon's Response

As the crisis in Yemen increased in intensity and the

U.S. position in Iran became more perilous, both Brzezinski

and Brown began to press military planners for a timely and

satisfactory response on their directives to form a Rapid

Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). It is commonly

believed that the RDJTF resulted from the Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan in 1980. Chronologically, however, it was

initially conceived at the outset of the Carter

Administration, but not actively pursued until early 1978

in response to events in the Yemens. It will be seen that

Administration officials began to press the military

leadership for a response to earlier directives for such a

force more as an effort to provide an incremental response

255 Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic, p. 101.

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to this "crisis" than as part of a grand design to counter

Soviet aggression in Third World conflicts.

The RDJTF found its genesis in PD-18 on August 24,

1977 when Carter directed the Department of Defense to

provide general purpose forces for use in the defense of

major O.S. and allied interests outside of NATO.256 The

issues accon^nying the establishment of the RDJTF not only

reflected the basic views of the various military services,

but the views of key Carter Administration officials as

well.

The general reluctance of DOD to undertake the

guidance provided by PD-18 was, in some degree, indicative

of the confusion created by administration leadership. Key

to this confusion was a generally perceived desire by

Carter to withdraw U.S. military forces from overseas bases

other than Europe - specifically Korea and Japan. The

uproar created by General Singlaub's resignation/retirement

from his post as Commander U.S. Forces in Korea was but the

tip of the iceberg. Throughout the Administration there

was concern about the effect of the establishment of

"deployable" (as represented by the RDJTF) rather than

"deployed" forces on alliances and defensive

256 John M. Collins, et al. Petroleum Imports from the Persian Gulf; Use of U.S. Armed Force to Ensure Supplies (Washington, D.C.; Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 1980), p. 16.

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Clearly President Carter envisioned a force which was

better equipped to handle Third World contingencies

requiring quick, surgical operations, rather than the

massive mobilization of forces which usually accompanies

the employment of conventionally structured f o r c e s . 258 His

vision of such a force, however, was not shared by several

members of his civilian defense establishment, including

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Appraisal

and Evaluation (PA&E), Paul Wolfowitz. By subjecting the

Rapid Deployment Force concept to almost two years of

evaluation, he effectively kept the program "under

evaluation. "259 when viewed in the context of a general

tendency to decrease both the numbers of military personnel

and to cut back on military construction costs, the

President's guidance in PD-18 could be viewed as a threat

to programs considered vital by military planners. Those

most threatened were obviously the same ones who were the

slowest to take the President's guidance for action.

Leland Ness and Steve Zaloga, Rapid Deployment Force (Greenwich, Connecticut: DMS Market Intelligence, 1980), p. iv. 258 Ibid.

259 Interview with Robert J. Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1978-1980, Washington, D.C.: 27 January 1989 (hereinafter referred to as Murray, 27 January 1989).

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In the Secretary of Defense's Annual Posture

Statement, it was the Consolidated Guidance (CG) portions

that provided the intellectual framework upon which

subsequent chapters of the Posture Statement based their

force requirements and capabilities.250 As such, the CG is

the focus of a great deal of interagency debate. The CG

for the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) for 1980-1985, which

came out on March 7, 1978 included guidance for forces for

non-NATO contingencies as required by PD-18. This, in

itself, was a major victory for the Carter Administration

since several of the military services, specifically the

Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force, wanted to neglect

this aspect of PD-18.251

Only the Army was an early supporter of the RDJTF,

since it saw in this initiative an opportunity to structure

separate forces along the lines of a modified Marine Corps.

To this end, on May 1, the Army included "Heavy/Light

Corps" forces in its portion of the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan (JSCP) for fiscal year 1979. The other

Services continued to "study" the directives contained in

255 In 1981 the Consolidated Guidance was renamed the Defense Guidance. Its format and purpose remain the same.

251 Jeffrey Record, The Rapid Deployment Force and O.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1981), p. 26.

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The bureaucratic inertia that Carter encountered in

DOD compounded the problems he was having with his own

cabinet level advisers and is evidence of the difficulty in

effecting decisive and major changes in defense policy.

The dispersal of authority to numerous semi-autonomous

power centers may often rule out all but an incremental

approach to decisionmaking. In the case of the RDJTF,

Carter was attempting to restructure military forces in

order to support the Administration’s foreign p o l i c y . 2 5 3

Recognizing that there were too many opportunities for the

various Services to slow down or block this initiative

(i.e.. Congress, budget constraints, through conscious

delays for the sake of delay, studies, etc.), Harold Brown

focused his attention on the one Service which had the most

to gain (or the least to lose) from the initiative - the

U.S. Army.254

The Army had perhaps suffered the most from the post-

Vietnam environment in the mid-to-late 1970s. Morale was

low, recruitment was down, and equipment was old and in

poor repair. The prospect of a new type of force, fully

self-contained and encompassing elements of the Navy and

252 Hayward; Also Murray, January 27, 1989.

253 Murray, January 27, 1989.

254 Hayward.

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Air Force, appeared attractive to Army planners.

Encouraged by the Administration's response to its

initiatives in JSCP 1979, the Army expanded its

"Heavy/Light Corps" to become the "Unilateral Corps" in

JSCP 1980.255 The release of this document on April 3,

1979 served as a catalyst for an extensive debate both

within DOD and among the press and "strategic thinkers" as

to the exact role and nature the RDJTF should assume.

The Carter Administration had correctly recognized

that the foreign policy initiatives that it was undertaking

in response to events in the region would require forces in

addition to those already earmarked for NATO and Far

Eastern contingencies. The creation of new forces and

associated equipment at a time when Congress and the

Administration were trying to limit military expenditures

increased the probability that the RDJTF would be drawn

from existing f o r c e s . 256

Various options were discussed for the RDJTF. The

Navy and Marine Corps believed that such a force already

existed in the form of the Marines - self-contained with

air, land, and sea support. The Army supported the

265 UT GEN James F. Hollingsworth, USA (Ret) and MAJ GEN Allen T. Wood, USMC (Ret), "The Light Armored Corps - a Strategic Necessity," Armed Forces Journal 117 (January 1980): 20; See also Juan Cameron, "Our What-If Strategy for Mideast Trouble Spots," Fortune 100 (5 November 1979): 153.

256 Record, The Rapid Deployment Force, p. 55.

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proposal. The Air Force was, at most, ambivalent. The

organizational structure and initial command plan,

therefore, became critical in Administration efforts to

build the consensus necessary to effect the force structure

needed to support its foreign policy initiatives. 25?

From intelligence estimates it was clear that the

Soviet Union could threaten the Persian Gulf or Middle East

without seriously drawing down forces which posed a threat

to Western Europe and the People's Republic of C h i n a . 268

Furthermore, several regional powers had military forces

capable of posing a significant threat to U.S. forces

deployed around the w o r l d . 269 To counter these threats,

the RDJTF would have to be composed of general purpose

forces capable of mounting a war involving not only hostile

local forces, but also Soviet forces. In the event of

Soviet involvement in a regional conflict, DOD postulated

that the following forces would be required: one U.S.

Marine Corps Amphibious Force; two U.S. Army divisions,

including one heavy brigade with appropriate support; four

U.S. Air Force tactical aircraft wings and two airlift

wings; and three U.S. Navy carrier battle groups. This

257 Hayward.

258 Ness and Zaloga, Rapid Deployment Force, p. 1-66.

259 Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here? (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1976), pp. 78-81.

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represented a worst case scenario - the direct involvement

of Soviet forces. For lesser scenarios, involving Third

World forces, forces would be structured according to the threat.270

The existence of these rapid deployment forces

specifically designated, planned, and appropriately

configured for use in likely contingency areas was meant to

have a positive effect on friends and a deterrent effect on

adversaries in crisis situations.271 European and Far

Eastern allies were concerned, however, that any O.S.

military moves in the Indian Ocean would draw down on

forces already committed to those r e g i o n s . 272 in light of

Carter’s pre-election pronouncements that O.S. force

deployments worldwide should be reviewed, these fears

seemed justified. Administration officials argued,

however, that flexible forces, such as the RDJTF, capable

of engaging the Soviet Union in limited non-NATO

contingencies could contribute directly to a NATO conflict

2^5 Record, The Rapid Deployment Force, p. 52.

2^^ U.S., Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, "Remarks on Naval Force Deployments and Strategic Mobility by the Honorable W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense," Fiscal Year 1981 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths (hereinafter referred to as FY81 Budget), Hearings, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., April, 17, 1980, p. 621.

272 Ibid., p. 633.

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by constituting both a mobile threat to worldwide Soviet

interests and a force capable of reinforcing any threatened

region of NATO.273

As Carter became less reluctant to use military

forces as a tool of diplomacy in the Indian Ocean littoral,

the importance of having forces available to use without

drawing down on other commitments assumed greater

importance. The CG for FY 81-86 provided by the Secretary

of Defense on 12 April 1979 was much more specific than

that provided in CG FY 80-85. Specifically, it included

mandatory guidance for developing forces for non-NATO

contingencies, to include the aforementioned four tactical

fighter wings, two Army divisions and one armored brigade,

one Marine amphibious force, and three carrier battle groups.274

The Administration (and DOD internally) was split

regarding the nature of the RDJTF. Brzezinski and

Vance/Muskie were obviously on separate sides of the issue.

273 O.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, "Testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense W. Graham Claytor, Jr.," Hearings, 96th Cong., 2nd sess.. Part 2, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as Hearings), p. 1132.

274 O.S., Congress, "Testimony of the Honorable Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense," March 12, 1980, Hearings, p. 119.

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with Brzezinski favoring the second, expanded RDJTF.275

Internally in DOD the option which featured forces

sufficient to counter a Soviet attack in the Persian Gulf

found its major advocate in Robert Komer, the Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP). The Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Programs, Analysis, and Evaluation

(PA&E), Paul Wolfowitz, however, favored the smaller,

leaner force option. The Services, in turn, were split

with the Navy and Marine Corps siding with PA&E, and the

Army and Air Force supporting USDP.276

On June 22, 1979, Brown sent a memo to the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directing the

resolution of command arrangement problems in the

r e g i o n . 277 on August 29, 1979, General Jones responded

with Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 270-79 (JCSM 270-

79) - a significantly speedy response in light of the

inertia of the previous two years on this issue.

The mission that was identified in the Unified

Command Plan (UCP) for the RDJTF was, inter alia, "...as

directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide for areas

275 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 450.

276 Hayward; Also Murray, January 27, 1989.

277 "The Rapid Deployment Mission," Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, (Mimeo) 4 February 1981, p. 6. Available at the Pentagon Library, Washington, D.C.

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not assigned to another unified command, contingency

planning, joint task force headquarters, and forces for the

conduct of contingency operations." To accommodate the

Administration's need for a "new and more mobile force,"

the JCS directed the establishment of an RDJTF headquarters

"...responsible for planning, jointly training, exercising,

and being prepared to deploy and employ designated forces

of the RDJTF, as directed, to respond to contingencies

threatening O.S. interests anywhere in the wo r l d . "278

Carter now had his force, at least on paper, for

responding to regional crises. Having met Brown's

requirement to "establish" the RDJTF, the JCS now had to

deal with the more difficult issue of determining how such

a force would be employed. The RDJTF as it evolved from

Administration directives had several conceptual and

strategic problems that had to be addressed before these

forces could be utilized. The RDJTF had rapidly increased

size from its conception as a result of the various

Services specifying a minimum fighting force that could

278 O.S., Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Command Plan, 1980, p. 173; See also Barry M. Blechman and William J.Lynn, Toward a More Effective Defense: Report of the Defense Organization Project (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Ballinger, 1985) p 48; Also Record, The Rapid Deployment Force, pp. 66-67.

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maintain its integrity in a crisis s i t u a t i o n . 279 as it

became apparent that the RDJTF would be established, with

or without their active concurrence, the Services came to

view it as a "force builder" - a vehicle by which they

might get additional money or f o r c e s . 280

PD-18 had initially specified that the RDJTF should

be "independent of overseas bases."2®^ As this force

evolved, however, virtually all forces identified for the

RDJTF, except Navy and Marine Corps assets, would require

some degree of shore support. Furthermore, and perhaps

most importantly, the RDJTF being designed would be heavily

dependent on pre-positioning of materials. To compound

this issue, the prepositioned material would also have to

be protected - supposedly by O.S. f o r c e s . 2®2 These

requirements for bases, or at least access to bases,

initiated the concerted diplomatic efforts that will be

discussed in the next chapter.

As events progressed in the region, the Carter

279 News briefing by LT GEN P.X. Kelly, USMC, Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, at the Pentagon, Wednesday June 18, 1980, transcript provided in Ness and Zaloga, Rapid Deployment Force, p. 238.

288 Hayward.

281 U.S., Congress, House, Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense and Readiness, "Statement by GEN Volney F. Warner, USA, Commander in Chief U.S. Readiness Command," FY81 Budget, p. 888.

282 Ibid., p. 890.

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Administration increased its commitment to various regional

nations as a result of the need for host nation support for

the RDJTF. In other words, at a certain point, the use of

military forces was no longer a tool of diplomacy, but

rather diplomacy was used to support military forces. As

will be seen in Chapter VII, this became particularly

evident as events in Iran began to increasingly concern

U.S. policymakers.

On August 13, 1979 the Director of the Joint Staff of

the JCS established a Joint Staff Contingencies Review

Group (CRG) to determine O.S. contingency response

capabilities. The charter of this group was to look at

possible scenarios in which a Rapid Deployment Force might

be used and to recommend the type of forces which might be

required.283 The results of the CRG were sent to CJCS and

on November 15 they were consolidated into JCSM 318-79,

which established the composition of the RDJTF.284

Concurrently, Secretary Brown responded, by memorandum on

October 22, to CJCS concerning command arrangements

outlined in JCSM 270-79. He directed: the establishment of

283 Based on this author's experiences as a participant.

284 While the titles, (as well as most of the contents) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memoranda (JCSM) dealing with this period remain classified as the time of this writing (tentatively available for classification downgrading by the end of 1990), the memoranda numbers are provided for future reference.

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the RDJTF for response to worldwide contingencies; the

focus of initial planning of the RDJTF on Middle East and

African scenarios; and that the RDJTF be in place and ready

to respond by March 1, 1980.285 The military services

responded to this directive with JCSM 334-79 which

established the RDJTF headquarters at MacDill A.F.B.,

Florida on November 29, 1979, although the RDJTF was not

formally established until March 1, 1980.286

Thus, although the RDJTF had been "directed" into

existence at the outset of the Carter Administration, it

was not until November 1979 that it actually existed. By

this time the U.S. had already experienced two unsettling

"crises" in the Indian Ocean and the Administration could

see that events in Iran and Afghanistan were not evolving

as they would like.

The stumbling, arguably, ill-directed manner in which

the RDJTF came into being attracted much criticism.

Jeffrey Record, for example, wrote "...the RDF is little

more than a hodgepodge of improperly equipped and

structured units lumped together under a confused command

apparatus rent by unusually vicious and debilitating inter­

service rivalry for domination of the rapid deployment

285 George C. Wilson, "Outlook Grim in a War for Mideast Oil," The Washington Post, 28 October 1979, p. 3,

286 Record, The Rapid Deployment Force, p. 52.

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m i s s i o n . "287 General perceptions such as this contributed

to the difficulties that the Administration encountered in

first establishing a regional foreign policy and then

finding the tools to implement that policy. As will be

seen in the next chapter, the need for military forces

capable of quickly responding to limited contingencies on

the other side of the world lead the Administration into a

number of other economic and diplomatic initiatives and

decisions which, in turn, had a significant impact on the

U.S. approach to issues in the region. Chronologically,

therefore, the RDJTF emerged from the bureaucratic process

at about the same time that North and South Yemen were

conducting sporadic warfare, Ethiopia and Somalia were at

an uneasy truce, and events in Iran were rapidly unfolding.

An Uneasy Truce on the

Arabian Peninsula

President Carter had made a commitment to the North

Yemenis and he continued to provide significant amounts of

aid throughout his term in office. It was with great

consternation, therefore, that U.S. decisionmakers learned

in November 1979,that the Soviet Union had been quietly

shipping new fighter planes, tanks, and a variety of other

287 Record, The Rapid Deployment Force, p. vii.

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modern military equipment to North Yemen. As the Christian

Science Monitor pointed out, "(this is) the same country

many Americans had been led to believe was, if not pro-

American, then at least anti-Soviet."2®®

In truth. North Yemen had maintained a military

relationship with the Soviet Union for many years.

Administration officials had assumed that North Yemen would

turn to the U.S. and its allies as sole suppliers in light

of its difficulties with the Soviet-supported South. About

all that can honestly be criticized in this case was North

Yemen's failure to fully disclose the extent of its

relationship with the Soviet Union. The new arms deal was

initially rumored to be several times larger than the one

the U.S. had concluded.2®®

When coupled with the ongoing reunification talks

with the South, this new influx of arms into North Yemen

made the Saudis extremely nervous. In Washington it was

initially believed that there had been a breakdown in

intelligence in North Yemen in that there had been no

indication of Soviet negotiations. In fact, the U.S. Army

attache in country had been providing an ongoing commentary

Henry S. Childers, "Soviet Support to Sanaa Continues," Christian Science Monitor, 9 November 1979, p. 2, as cited in Deadline Data on World Affairs (Greenwich, Conn: DMS, Inc., 1980), p. 80.

289 U.S., Congress, U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, p. 116.

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on Soviet/North Yemeni relations.29® m sending arms to

North Yemen, however, the U.S. meant to reassure the Saudis

and, in the context of the time of the fall of the Shah of

Iran, the move had made sense.

Given the number of soldiers and the growing

quantities of weapons possessed by the two Yemens, a

successful reunification might pose a significant threat to

Saudi Arabia and Oman. At the time. North Yemen had some

six million people and about thirty-five thousand soldiers.

Add these to South Yemen's 1.5 million people and twenty

thousand soldiers and provide extensive military training

and equipment, and they would be a powerful force against

Saudi Arabia's six million people and thirty-five thousand

soldiers.291 To further add to the concerns of

decisionmakers, in February 1980 South Yemen signed and

ratified a twenty year treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

with the Soviet Union, which specified that the Soviets

could station up to eighteen thousand soldiers in the country.292

On February 20, 1980 the Saudis finally pulled the

290 Ibid.

U.S., Congress, Security Interests in the Persian Gulf, p. 43; See also Peterson, Yemen: The Search for a Modern State, p. 13.

292 Thomas H. Moorer and Alvin J. Cottrell, "The Search for U.S. Bases in the Indian Ocean: A Last Chance," Strategic Review 8 (Spring 1980): 32.

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purse strings on North Yemen by refusing to renew contracts

for deliveries of U.S. manufactured arms to North Yemen.

By taking the hard line with North Yemen, Saudi Arabia

(with active encouragement from the U.S.) was trying to

persuade them to distance themselves from the S o v i e t s . 293

Although not involved in the threatened aid cutoff, another

key factor in Yemeni-Saudi relations was the approximately

one million North Yemenis who worked abroad, most of them

in Saudi Arabia. They sent home $1.5 billion a year, a

major share of North Yemen's foreign exchange earnings.294

To add weight to their warnings, the Saudis had already

held back on several aid payments, resulting in the late

payment of December and January salaries for North Yemeni

government e m p l o y e e s . 295 clearly these moves by U.S. and

Saudi policymakers ran the risk of turning North Yemen

toward the Soviet Union for military aid, thereby further

increasing Soviet influence in the region.

North Yemen, recognizing its precarious position,

opted to remain with its current partners. Premier Ghani,

on March 18. 1980 said that unity between the two Yemens

293 U.S., Congress, U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, p. 115.

294 U.S., Congress, Security Interests in the Persian G u l f , p. 39.

295 U.S., Congress, U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, p. 115.

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would have to be based on an Islamic system of government.

He stressed that the majority of North Yemen's population

was opposed to communism and that, therefore. North Yemen

would not give cabinet posts to South Yemeni-backed

National Democratic Front. He did state, however, that the

N.D.F. would be allowed to participate in the upcoming elections.296

On March 19 press reports stated that Saudi Arabia

had reached an agreement with North Yemen under which North

Yemen would accept no more Soviet military advisers and

eventually remove the one hundred advisers then estimated

to be there, in return for renewed Saudi financial aid.29?

In truth, however, the North Yemenis continued to play both

ends against the middle.

By early 1980, therefore, the Carter Administration

had been involved with an open conflict on the Horn of

Africa (which continued sporadically) and a major arms

transfer program on the Arabian Peninsula (as a result of

another potential regional conflict). Throughout this

period the political situation across the Persian Gulf in

Iran had steadily deteriorated. These events in Iran now

296 Ian Andersen, "Yemeni Premier Throws Down the Gauntlet," London Times, 19 March 1980, p. 2, as cited in Deadline Data on WorlcT"Affairs (Greenwich, Conn: DMS Inc., 1980), p. 80. 297 Ibid.

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became the primary focus of O.S. policymaker's attention.

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A PILLAR COLLAPSES: THE SEARCH FOR REGIONAL BASES

Throughout the remainder of 1978 and all of 1979,

three events dominated U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean

region. The first was the developing relationship between

Egypt and Israel that led to the Camp David Accords in

September 1978 and, ultimately, to the Egyptian-Israeli

peace treaty of March 1979. The second was the growth of

Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa and on the Arabian

Peninsula. The third event was the collapse of the

monarchy in Iran in February 1979.29®

This chapter describes the Carter Administration’s

response to the fall of the Shah of Iran and the subsequent

deterioration of U.S. relations with that country. The

events in Iran leading to the seizure of the U.S. hostages

in Tehran and the eventual termination of U.S. relations

with Iran are not discussed in the same detail afforded

other crises in the region since these events have been

298 Sick.

180

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well-documented by many books and memoirs.Specific

events are reviewed here only to provide a context for

decisions that shaped U.S. policy toward the region.

The Camp David Accords and the subsequent signing of

the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty had a significant impact

on events in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region. The

continuing Arab-Israeli dispute and broad-based Arab

opposition to the peace treaty affected U.S. relations with

regional Arab countries to varying degrees.^®®

As the arbiter of the Camp David Accords and Israel's

staunchest supporter, the U.S. encountered constant

opposition to its efforts to formulate an effective Indian

Ocean/Persian Gulf policy. For example, the probability of

continuing Arab-Israeli problems made it very difficult to

Memoirs of the major participants in the Carter Administration dealing with the fall of the Shah and the subsequent hostage crisis include: George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: Norton, 1982); Brzezinski, Power and Principle; Carter, Keeping Faith; Warren Christopher, Harold H. Saunders, and Gary Sick, American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis (New York: Yale University Press, 1985); Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); John D. Stempel, Insi5e the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1981); William H. Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: Norton, 1981); and Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices.

R. James Woolsey and Michael Moodie, "Geopolitics and Maritime Power in the Indian Ocean," Conference Report on the Future of Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics and Maritime Power (Washington, D.C.: Center lÉor Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1980), Appendix B, p. 2.

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maintain significant ground forces in the region^®^ - a

problem that, as has been seen, ultimately shaped both the

concept of operations and the force structure of the RDJTF.

It also caused Carter to reexamine his long-term plans for

the U.S. Navy in the region, since most regional countries

preferred that the increase of U.S. military presence in

the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region be in the form of

naval forces.Despite extensive diplomatic efforts, the

lack of progress on the Palestinian question made it

politically unattractive for some moderate Arab states to

publicly approve either the Egyptian/Israeli Treaty or U.S.

presence in the Indian Ocean.

Arms Sales To An Ally

As in the Somali/Ethiopian and the Yemen crises.

President Carter inherited an established close

relationship with the Shah of Iran. The Nixon

Administration had sought to build Iran into one of the

"twin pillars" of security in the region. As a result,

there were already huge amounts of military sales pending

Ibid., p. 4.

U.S., Congress, U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, Harold H. Saunders, "Material Submitted for the Record," p. 33. 303 Ibid.

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or being delivered to Iran by the O.S. before President

Carter took office.

"...American political and military strategy was somewhat like a large and unwieldy ship that required considerable time to be turned about. In 1977, the Carter Administration was dealing with arms deliveries planned for 1981 and beyond - schedules had already been set for the president's entire first term. In addition, as long as the policy seemed to be working - that is, that it had not broken down into crisis - it was bureaucratically difficult to push through any r e v i s i o n s ."304

At the outset of his Administration, President Carter

sought to equitably apply the same review process of arms

sales to all countries that did not maintain defense

treaties with the United States. Despite recent cutbacks

in purchases by Iran in 1977, that country continued to buy

about one-third of all U.S. foreign military sales outside

of NATO and other allied c o u n t r i e s . 305 gy subjecting

Iranian arms purchases to the same scrutiny that all other

Third World arms sales received. President Career

terminated the tacit understanding that earlier

administrations had established with Iran.

The tone that the Carter Administration initially set

for arms sales to the Third World had a considerable impact

on U.S. relations with Iran in the initial years of the

304 Barry Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 190-193.

305 Ibid., p. 196.

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Carter presidency. In May 1977, the new administration

changed arms sales guidelines to place the 'burden of

proof' on those requesting a particular weapons system.306

In other words, Iran now had to show why it required

specific arms.

The convergence of the Carter Administration's

approach to arms control and the Shah's efforts to

significantly upgrade his armed forces led to considerable

debate in Congress about the nature of our relationship

with Iran. In the final analysis, however, it was not easy

for the U.S. to shut off the supply of new weapons systems

since U.S. commitments to Iran "were hard to stop, not

merely because they were inherited, but because they were

part of a process symbolizing the overall relationship."507

By early 1978, however, the Administration's concerns

about arms sales in the region had considerably as a result

of decisions to supply arms to both Somalia and North

Yemen. In fact, the U.S. continued to supply the Shah with

virtually everything he sought except Airborne Warning and

Control aircraft (AWACS), several navy frigates, and the F-

18 aircraft then still under development. The frigates,

however, were subsequently built by West Germany under U.S.

306 Ibid.

Shahram Chubin, Security in the Persian Gulf: The Role of Outside Powers (Totowas, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1982), p. 14.

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auspices and delivered to Iran. The F-18 aircraft was

mired in an internal DOD dispute about its production and

therefore not available in any e v e n t . 308 The AWACS was,

perhaps, the only true point of arms control contention

since at the time it represented the leading of technology

in anti-air warning. The introduction of this platform

into the region would trigger a new level of technology

acquisition competition that the O.S. was not prepared to support.389

By the time the Carter Administration had

incrementally changed its approach to arms transfers to

Somalia in March 1978 and North Yemen in March 1979, the

Iranian situation had deteriorated to the point that it was

clear to U.S. policymakers that further arms sales would be

inadvisable.3^8 The Shah, by this point, also recognized

the need to redirect the huge sums of money spent on

military hardware to the domestic demands of the

Iranians.3^^

Despite the negative impact of the Iranian Revolution

on the Carter Administration, it might be viewed as a

vindication of Carter's arms transfer policy. As Shahram

388 Ibid., p. 196.

389 Hayward.

3^8 Vance, Hard Choices, p. 323.

3^^ Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions, p. 218.

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Chubin points out, "(t)he military supply lever of the O.S.

was thus in practice of limited utility in the

revolutionary period in Iran. In theory access to the

senior military officers should have been a considerable

asset; in practice it proved irrelevant at b e s t . "312

Different Perspectives

Differences of opinion concerning the direction of

U.S. policy toward the region were not confined to the

State Department. The crisis in Iran also brought into

focus the basic conflicts in concepts and attitudes among

senior policymakers in the Carter Administration. First,

there was disagreement as to what the central interests of

the U.S. in the region were. For Brzezinski, as well as

Secretary of Energy (and former Defense Secretary) Jim

Schlesinger and Undersecretary of Defense Charles Duncan,

the concerns were mainly geopolitical - a belief that Iran

was essential in protecting Western access to the petroleum

of the r e g i o n . 3^8

3^3 Chubin, Security in the Persian Gulf, p. 35.

3^3 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 354. Brzezinski points out, however, that divisions in the Administration were not institutionalized or formalized, and that alliances shifted according to issues.

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As events in Iran deteriorated, this group, joined by

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, believed that the O.S.

should become more involved in the events to preclude a

complete collapse. Between November 1978 and November

1979, however, D.S. policymakers were very busy with other

issues such as the Camp David Talks, the SALT negotiations,

secret negotiations with the People's Republic of China,

and a growing crisis in Nicaragua. Brzezinski noted that

policymakers' "... decision-making circuits were heavily

overloaded. "3^4 Gary Sick also writes that this was a

particularly busy time for U.S. policymakers, adding that :

"(a)s an activist and an extraordinarily energetic

president. Carter had in effect generated a series of

'crises' (by his activist style) that were breaking just as

the danger point arrived in I r a n . "3^5 Events in Iran,

therefore, had the dual effect of adding to an already

growing perception of a continuing crisis in the Indian

Ocean/Persian Gulf region, and suffered from being

overshadowed by other crises or concerns in other sections

of the world.

Meanwhile, domestic politics continued to extract

heavy demands on decisionmakers. The annual budget cycle

314 Ibid., p. 358.

315 Gary Sick, All Fall Down; America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York; Random House, 1985), p. 65.

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continued to require extensive energy, particularly from

the Secretary of Defense, who was now in the position of

requesting increased military expenditures from a Congress

that had been elected, as had President Carter, in a post-

Vietnam War election in which debate had focused on the

need to reevaluate O.S. foreign policy and the use of O.S.

military force. The process of moving the O.S. from an

arms control stance in the region to a significant buildup

of military presence required a great deal of explaining on

Capitol Hill.

Throughout 1978 a series of events in Iran indicated

that the Shah was confronted with more than a localized

protest movement. But the day-to-day monitoring of Iranian

events was left to the second tier of decisionmakers,

including Henry Precht at the State Department, Robert

Murray at the Pentagon, and Gary Sick at the NSC. In

addition to the plethora of issues which they had to

routinely address, Vance continued to focus on the SALT II

negotiations and Brzezinski on establishing diplomatic

relations with the People’s Republic of C h i n a . 3 ^ ®

In a January 1, 1978 toast to the Shah, in the

presence of King Hussein of Jordan, President Carter had

commended him on his strong support of democratic

principles and on being "an island of stability in one of

316 Sick.

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the more troubled areas of the w o r l d . "317 Within months

there would be demonstrations that would eventually lead

the Shah to leave Iran on January 16, 1979 for an extended

"vacation" abroad.

In Search of Support

The collapse of the monarchy in Iran demonstrated the

problem of Nixon and Kissinger's "Twin Pillar Policy" which

relied on Iran and Saudi Arabia as the regional powers in

the Indian Ocean. The fundamentalist Islamic revolution

also illustrated the difficulty, and perhaps the futility,

of depending on other countries to look after U.S. "vital

interests" in the Indian Ocean. Although the O.S. had

recently gained a closer strategic relationship with Egypt,

the importance that previous U.S. Administrations had

attached to Iran left U.S. policy without a clear

direction. The seizure of the hostages in Teheran on

November 4, 1979, was the capstone of these events.

As noted in the last chapter, Saudi Arabia emerged as

a dominant factor in U.S. considerations during regional

policy reviews. Although Saudi Arabia privately welcomed

the demonstration of U.S. resolve to resist Soviet

3^7 Robert D. McPaddon, Joseph B. Treaster, and Maurice Carroll, No Hiding Place (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 234.

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aggression in the region, it publicly explained the U.S.

bases would not be w e l c o m e . 3^8 The Saudis made it clear

that a large U.S. ground presence in the region could be

potentially destabilizing both domestically (as in the case

of Iran) and externally (in its relations with other

regional actors). Yet Saudi Arabia was genuinely concerned

about the ability of the United States to deter Soviet

aggression in the region using conventional f o r c e s . 3^8

This Saudi concern was compounded by an increased

Soviet presence in the region. In April 1979, the Soviet

carrier MINSK, the amphibious warfare ship IVAN ROGOV, and

a KARA class guided missile cruiser conducted a

demonstration cruise for South Yemeni officials while

visiting Aden and also visited ports in Mozambique,

Mauritius, and the Seychelles. 330 That same month two

Soviet IL-38 aircraft on open ocean reconnaissance flights

in the Arabian Sea flew so close to USS MIDWAY that

aircraft in its landing pattern had to take emergency

See, for example, Bernard Gwertzman, "Saudis Considering Military Tie to U.S.," The New York Times, 6 February, 1980, p. 1; Richard Halloran, "U.S. Jets Near Gulf Improve War Data," The New York Times, 9 October, 1980, p. 13; Richard Halloran, "Brown Orders a Study of Saudi Request for Equipment to Improve F-15s," The New York Times, 22 October 1980, p. 17.

3^8 Bernard Gwertzman, "Saudis Considering Military Tie to U.S.," The New York Times, 6 February, 1980, p. 1.

330 CNA Research Contribution 429, p. B-45.

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evasive a c t i o n . 321 Soviet access to air and naval

facilities in South Yemen increased following the coup in

June 1979 that brought a pro-Soviet government to power in

that country. In August 1979 a Soviet nuclear powered ECHO

class submarine entered Aden along with a submarine

tender.322 ^s noted earlier, two months later, in October

1979 the Soviet Onion and South Yemen signed a Treaty of

Friendship and Cooperation. By early 1980 the Soviet

Pacific Fleet was maintaining a continuous nuclear

submarine presence in the Indian Ocean as well as enlarging

its conventional submarine presence.323

To address this growing Soviet naval force, the O.S.

had to take into account several factors, especially the

geographic constraints associated with operating in this

region. During the long debate of U.S. presence in the

Indian Ocean in Congress, the academic literature, and the

press, it was commonly noted that the Indian Ocean lay on

the opposite side of the globe from the United States.

Trincomalee in Sri Lanka was exactly 11,500 miles from New

York if measured westward and the same distance from San

Francisco if measured eastward. That very remoteness

32^ Ibid., p. B-46. 322 Ibid.

323 Kelly, "Naval Deployments in the Indian Ocean," pp. 176-177.

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remained a nagging issue in the minds of those who dealt

with the problem of providing a major U.S. military

capability in the Indian Ocean.

The stated U.S. military objectives in the region at

the time included the capability to:

"(1) protect U.S. economic interests in the Persian Gulf region; (2) employ or threaten force in support of U.S. diplomatic objectives in the Middle East; (3) secure the Indian Ocean air and sea routes against harassment or interdiction; (4) intervene in support of other objectives in the littoral; and, related to all of these, (5) balance Soviet forces in the region and attain superiority in a crisis."324

While it is highly doubtful that the U.S. could attain all,

or even most, of these objectives regardless of the level

of military force available in the region, the difficulty

of meeting these objectives without regional bases became

more apparent as the U.S. military presence increased.

There was not, however, general agreement within the

324 o,s.. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations(hereinafter referred to as United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations), Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979, p. 88. These objectives are attributed to Seymour Weiss, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, March 6, 1974, and James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, March 12, 1974, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, "Proposed Expansion of U.S. military facilities in the Indian Ocean, Hearings, February 21, March 6, 12, 14, and 20, 1974, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, p. 25; and U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, "Disapprove construction on the island of Diego Garcia,: Hearings on Senate Resolution 160, June 10, 1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 31.

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Administration or in Congress as to the need or

advisability of establishing a base structure in the

region. From one perspective, the existence of U.S. bases

might enhance the achievement of U.S. political objectives

in countries that depend on the U.S. as a guarantor of

their security. This was particularly true in the Indian

Ocean. A State Department survey cited in testimony before

Congress in 1974, for instance, claimed a favorable

reaction to the U.S. buildup of Diego Garcia on the part of

South Africa, Malawi, Ethiopia, North Yemen, Abu Dhabi,

Pakistan and Singapore. Unfavorable reactions were found

in the cases of Malagasy, India, Sri Lanka, Mauritius,

Malaysia and Australia.325

Shahram Chubin, among others, has argued that the

ability of a U.S. military presence to bring about regional

stability is problematical, at best. While a U.S. military

presence may enhance the visible value of U.S. guarantees

to the few countries that receive pledges of support

against Soviet aggression, many sources of potential

interregional conflict do not, for one reason or another,

lend themselves to the use or threat of U.S. military

325 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Proposed Expansion of Facilities in the Indian Ocean," Testimony of Seymour Weiss, Department of State, 6 March 1974, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, p. 45.

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As late as April 1979, the sentiment in Congress

concerning the utility of U.S. bases in the region was

reserved.

"In the Indian Ocean region therefore the United States has only a limited need of seapower to influence the desired economic and political orientation of littoral states. Moreover, the use of U.S. military power has been increasingly limited by congressional legislation and other domestic political constraints, so that during the immediate future at least its employment can only come about in situations which present grave and clear threats to American interests. The United States does, however, require the ability to bring superior power to bear in the case of threats to U.S. allies or other serious to U.S. interests from the Soviet Union or local powers. These capabilities are not necessarily required in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis, but so long as the U.S.S.R. retains a major presence in the Ocean some degree of regular U.S. military presence is required to give credibility to U.S. capabilities and will to use military power in support of its friends."327

From another perspective an increased U.S. presence

would run counter to the politics of the region given the

prevailing antipathy toward Israel and, as an extension,

that country's principle supporter. Furthermore, a larger

naval presence would not only antagonize regional

countries, but could legitimize further increases in Soviet

forces. Finally, given the modest, nonprovocative nature

of the Soviet military presence in the region, the

326 Chubin, Security in the Persian Gulf, p 114.

327 O.S., Congress, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, p. 101.

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immediate threat to U.S. interests was not self-evident.328

The real utility of military power in securing economic

objectives had not been established, given the ease with

which oil fields and port facilities could be put out of

action during any attempt by an external power to obtain

resources through military means. The carrying out of such

a policy, therefore, would require a considerable shift in

attitudes within the region and the U.S. Congress, as well

as a substantial expansion of U.S. naval capabilities

and/or a realignment of priorities away from the Pacific

and into the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf r e g i o n . 3 2 9

While the U.S. had deployed substantial naval forces

to the region in the past, earlier U.S. military operations

in response to crises had been of relatively short

duration. For example, during the October 1973 Middle East

War the U.S. deployed a task group including the aircraft

carrier HANCOCK into the western Indian Ocean from regular

duty in the Pacific Fleet. Other aircraft carriers rotated

through the region to maintain a continuous presence until

328 Robert J. Pranger, "The Evolving Role of Asia in American Policy," Donald C. Hellmann, ed., South Asia: The Politics of Poverty and Peace: Critical Choices for Americans, Vol XIII (Lexington, Massachusetts : Addison- Wesley, 1976), p. 225.

329 Pranger, "The Evolving Role of Asia in American Policy," p. 225.

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April 1974.330 since the area of conflict was well beyond

the range of the HANCOCK's fighter aircraft flying from the

Northwest Indian Ocean, it is not clear what purpose this

deployment served. It would seem that the force was used

in a vaguely coercive fashion, though a State Department

spokesman took pains to avoid this characterization.331

Thus, the U.S. military had a recent history of

supporting U.S. diplomatic initiatives in the region, but

the most important use of military force now appeared to be

to intervene in support of "other objectives" in the region

to preserve or enhance U.S. interests. For example, in

December 1971, during the Indo-Pakistan War, the U.S.

330 ^ Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, "Diego Garcia 1975: the Debate Over the Base and the Island's Inhabitants," Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, June 5 and November 4, 1975, Testimony of George S. Vest, Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 33.

331 A State Department official identified the mission in the following terms: "... it played the traditional role which military power should play, that of supporting diplomatic initiatives. By this I do not mean to suggest that military power was used to lend coercive force to our diplomacy. Rather our visible military presence in the area demonstrated the importance we attached to our diplomatic objective of bringing the parties together to seek a peaceful resolution of the issues that have produced so much discord and strife in the Middle East." U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Proposed Expansion of U.S. military facilities in the Indian Ocean," Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, February 21, March 6,12,14, and 20, 1974, Statement of Seymour Weiss, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, 6 March 1974, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, p. 25.

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deployed a task force into the Bay of Bengal including the

carrier ENTERPRISE, an amphibious assault ships with a

battalion of Marines, seven destroyers and an oiler. The

general purpose of this deployment apparently was to deter

India from atten^ting the complete dismemberment of

Pakistan.322 There are several other possible explanations

for this deployment, including a possible intent to show

solidarity with China (which backed Pakistan) and to thus

reinforce the ongoing bid for a new O.S.-China relationship.323

Despite a recent history of significant D.S. naval

deployments to the region, in 1979 the D.S. had only two

relatively small military facilities in the Indian Ocean

and a token naval presence in the Persian Gulf. Both of

the Indian Ocean facilities, a small U.S. Air Force

satellite tracking station on Mahe Island in the Republic

of the Seychelles, and the communications, logistics and

airfield facility on Diego Garcia, were acquired following

the British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. The

satellite tracking system on Mahe which the U.S. leased for

$1 million a year also functioned as a communications link

322 Dan Haendel, The Process of Priority Formulation: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p. 262.

322 Ibid., pp. 258-264.

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between Diego Garcia and other U.S. bases.324

Diego Garcia; In the Middle of the Indian Ocean

Located in the only remaining part of the original

British Indian Ocean Territory, the island of Diego Garcia

was the focus of considerable controversy during the mid-

1970's. Since 1975, there had been a concerted effort by

the Department of Defense to expand the base's capabilities

to meet a number of regional support requirements. An

uninhabited island strategically located in the middle of

the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia was viewed as an ideal

location to support an increased U.S. military presence in the region.325

Despite its location, Diego Garcia required extensive

investment to provide the level of support required by U.S.

forces in the region. The large natural harbor required

324 "When a Tiny New Nation is Thrust into a Power Broker's Role," U.S. News and World Report, 13 September, 1976, p. 52.

325 In an action that, to this day, has generated considerable criticism, the British Government, during the mid-1960's, bought the existing plantation's lease-holds and relocated about 1,000 residents of the archipelago to Mauritius. Details of this very complex story are contained in: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, "Diego Garcia, 1975: the Debate Over the Base and the Island's Former Inhabitants," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations, June 5, and November 4, 1975, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1975, pp. 31- 107.

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extensive dredging to provide a protected harbor capable of

containing an aircraft carrier and support ships (i.e., a

carrier task group). Other capabilities on the island

included a highly classified intelligence and

communications facility, a 12,000 foot runway capable of

handling four-engine transports, a fuel storage capacity

for 380,000 barrels of aviation fuel and 320,000 barrels of

fuel oil (enough to supply a carrier task group for about

30 days), and 550 feet of berthing for loading and

unloading fuel.326

While Diego Garcia was not designed for, or ever

used, as a homeport for D.S. naval or air forces, its

capabilities focused attention on the intentions of the

U.S. in the region. The capability to support large

numbers of forces from Diego Garcia in a crisis, while an

issue prior to 1978, became less of an obstacle after the

Iranian Revolution and the continued presence of

326 U.S., Congress, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, p. 96. When briefing the construction program involved in developing Diego Garcia to this level, this author noted to then Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Thomas Hayward, that the size of the island would need to be increased approximately twenty-five percent to accommodate all of the capabilities desired. The landfill required to do this would come from the dredging operations required to deepen the harbor to accommodate a carrier task group. The entire program would cost approximately $1.04 Billion. ADM Hayward responded: "Lieutenant, if I wanted to build an island to support our operations. I ’d certainly build it closer to our area of operations, instead of 2,000 miles away."

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significant U.S. forces in the region.

Distance, however, remained the principal problem

confronting the United States as the Soviet presence in the

Indian Ocean increased and events in the region appeared to

run counter to U.S. interests. While it is an excellent

location for supporting most Indian Ocean operations, Diego

Garcia is 2100 miles from Aden and 2600 miles from

Bahrain - the region where the U.S. most needed a military

presence. Facilities at the port of Mombasa in Kenya were

almost as far away. Australia had offered Cockburn Sound

on its west coast as a base for a U.S. Indian Ocean force,

although operating from Cockburn Sound would be comparable

to staging operations from Subic Bay in the Philippines

(though it would have the advantage of avoiding the

potential choke points of the Malaccan, Lombok, and Sundra

Straits).

To overcome these disadvantages, therefore, the

United States required land-based support facilities to

sustain operations in the northwestern Indian Ocean and the

Persian Gulf. While operational requirements were too

great to be satisfied without such facilities, total

reliance on access to shore facilities that were subject to

the vagaries of regional and domestic politics, such as the

case of Berbera, was equally untenable. The U.S.,

therefore, needed a logistics infrastructure that was both

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shore-based and sea-based, and that had the flexibility to

shift from one to the other when the need arose.

When the U.S. began to seriously consider expanding

its naval presence in the region, Diego Garcia was pivotal

in the options that were available. Once President Carter

made the decisions in early 1978 that led to an increased

naval presence in the Indian Ocean, access to ports and

airfields became a more important factor in both planning

and operational considerations. Nonetheless, the United

States was cautious in its approach to this problem.

In December 1979, the Carter Administration

dispatched a delegation of Defense and State Department

officials to Kenya, Somalia, and Oman to investigate the

possibility of U.S. access to facilities as well as limited

regional security cooperation. As a follow-on to this

visit, U.S. technical inspection teams visited facilities

in these three countries in January 1980. Reginald

Bartholomew, Warnke's deputy at the first session of the

Naval Arms Limitation Talks in June 1977 and Gelb's

successor as Director of the Political-Military Affairs

Bureau of the State Department, headed this delegation.327

327 See Richard Halloran, "Crises Impelling U.S. to Plan Permanent Naval Presence in Indian Ocean," The New York Times, 5 January 1980, p. 3; 1980 State Cite 039151 - SECSTATE WASHDC msg 122244Z Feb 80; George C. Wilson, "Three Nations Said Receptive to U.S. Bases," The Washington Post, 4 January 1980, p. 1.

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Carter confirmed his Administration's interest in such

facilities in a January 7, 1980, interview with television

reporter John Chancellor, though he denied that any

agreement had been worked out.328 Vance also went to great

length to explain that the United States was "not talking

of huge U.S. bases, but the use of facilities that exist in

various countries."329

The significance of the base access issue would later

become evident when President Carter expanded the U.S. Navy

presence in the area to three carrier battle groups in late

January 1980 in response to events in Afghanistan. The

geography of the region created enormous logistics

problems. Students of military affairs often cite the

critical relationship between logistics/resupply and

operational effectiveness. For example, in a superb study

of the historical evolution of logistics, Martin van

Creveld argued that after World War I, as a consequence of

the changing nature of warfare, strategy became an appendix

of logistics.340

338 1980 State Cite 005916; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 082336Z Jan 80 (Subject: U.S. Interest in Indian Ocean Facilities).

339 Richard Halloran, "U.S. Looking to Leasing of Bases for Easier Access to Crisis Areas," The New York Times, 20 January 1980, p. 12.

340 Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 233.

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At the risk of overstating the geopolitical

constraints facing D.S. policymakers, logistics

considerations virtually drove American military policy and

strategy because the geography of the problem imposed

serious constraints on military options available to

policymakers. The principal facility responsible for

logistics support to naval forces in the region was the

D.S. Naval Facility at Subic Bay in the Philippines,341

under joint O.S.-Philippine control since the conclusion of

the U.S.-Philippine base rights treaty in 1979.342 Diego

Garcia was strained to its limits because of its size and

its location 2300 miles from the Strait of Hormuz. The

constraints placed on operations by the length of the

logistic pipeline demonstrated the need for U.S. access to

facilities closer to the Persian Gulf.

In essence, the efforts to attain U.S. access to

regional ports and airfields highlighted the transformation

of President Carter's Indian Ocean policy from one cast in

arms control terms to one which focused on the importance

of base access negotiations. The SCO had completed some

341 See Richard Burt, "Japan Area Loses Its U.S. Carrier to Buildup Near Iran," The New York Times, 20 January 1980, p. 12.

342 O.S., Department of State, "Military Bases in the Philippines: Agreement Amending the Agreement of 14 March 1947, as Amended," TIAS 9224, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1980), V. 30. pt. 1, p. 869, 879-881.

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preliminary work on the problem during the summer and fall

of 1979. At a December 4, 1979 NSC meeting. Carter

instructed Brown and Vance to develop joint initiatives for

approaching Oman, Kenya, and Somalia.343 This sudden

policy reversal marked a recognition of the importance of

the region to U.S. national security interests.344

Berbera - On the Gulf of Aden

The focus of much of the effort to gain regional

access was on Berbera. For almost the entire first half of

1980, the United States negotiated with the Government of

Somalia on the issue. As was noted in Chapter IV, although

the U.S. was prepared to support Somalia as early as 1978

in a limited fashion, including the transfer of defensive

arms, this support was contingent on Somali withdrawal from

the Ogaden. This withdrawal, however, was slow in

343 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 446.

344 This reversal of policy is generally described in; Richard Burt, "How U.S. Strategy Toward the Persian Gulf Region Evolved," The New York Times, 25 January 1980, p. 6; "Have Doctrine, Need Mobility," The Economist, 9-15 February 1980, pp. 22-26; Richard Halloran, "Pentagon Activates Strike Force: Effectiveness Believed Years Away," The New York Times, 19 February, 1980, p. 1; Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 85-88.

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c o m i n g . 345 The House Appropriations Committee had delayed

approval of a $40 million aid package until the President

had provided verified assurance that Somali forces were no

longer engaged in combat with Soviet-backed Ethiopian

troops in the disputed Ogaden region.346

Berbera was attractive for a variety of reasons. In

addition to the port facilities discussed earlier in this

study, the Soviet Union had finished construction of an air

base with a 15,000-foot reinforced concrete runway

southwest of Berbera. Before being expelled by the Somali

government, the Soviets had also completed reinforced

revetments for parking aircraft and were in the process of

erecting hangars and administration buildings. The

potential for such a base, both in terms of tactical and

strategic aircraft, was not lost on U.S. security planners.347

The Carter Administration had made the sale of arms

to Somalia contingent on their withdrawal from the Ogaden.

Having done this, the Somalis expected the U.S. and other

345 Richard Halloran, "U.S. Is Reported to Study Offer of a Somali Base," The New York Times, 23 December 1979, p. 1.

346 Juan de Onis, "U.S. Clears the Way for Delivery of $40 Million in Arms to Somalia," The New York Times, 20 January 1981, p. 18.

347 Graham Hovey, "U.S. Moving Toward Military Ties With Somalia, Recognizing Risks," The New York Times, 10 February 1980, p. 1.

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Western countries to be forthcoming in new military aid.

These expectations increased when U.S. negotiators began

discussing U.S. access to the port and airfield facilities

in Berbera. Somalia, however, was not enthusiastic about

the level of aid initially offered by American negotiators,

estimated at between $35 and $50 million, exclusive of the

costs of improving the port and airfield.3*8

The Somalis opened negotiations for access to these

facilities with an asking price of $2 billion, citing the

heavy drain on their economy brought about by drought, an

influx of refugees, and a growing threat from E t h i o p i a . ^49

The U.S. countered with an offer to furnish $25-$30 million

in aid and to extend credits to purchase defensive military

equipment. U.S. defense officials played down the military

value of the Berbera base once agreements had been

concluded with Oman and Kenya, implying that American

patience was running out and that the U.S. was making its

final offer.350 President Barre decided to reduce his

military activity in the Ogaden and settle for whatever he

could get from Washington - $20 million worth of military

348 Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. to Offer Military Gear to Somalia," The Washington Post, 5 February 1980, p. 1.

349 Michael Getler, "Somalia Asks High Price of U.S. Access to Bases," The Washington Post, 22 April 1980, p. 1.

350 ''D,s, Reassesses Need to Use Somali Bases," The New York Times, 16 July, 1980, p. 14.

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equipment a year for two years and $5 Million in economic

aid, in addition to $77 million in economic and refugee

assistance during the current year and $50 million for

those purposes in 1981.351

The agreement with Somalia for U.S. access to

facilities at Berbera, however, created considerable

controversy in Congress. Members of the Africa

Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, lead

by chairman Stephen Solarz, worried that the Somalis would

resume their war in the Ogaden, despite the assurances that

the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,

Richard Moose, had received from Siad Barre.352

There was also a great deal of skepticism from the

House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations

which cpiestioned the advantages of a ten-year agreement

with Somalia that was subject to cancellation at any time.

One member called the Administration's entire plan for

increasing the American naval and military presence in the

Indian Ocean a "charade ... a game of appearing to counter

Soviet actions in Afghanistan with something that is not

351 Richard Burt, "U.S. and Somalia Expected to Conclude Pact on Bases," The New York Times, 19 August 1980, p. 10; Henry S. Bradsher, "U.S. Concludes Deal to Use Somali Base," The Washington Post, 22 August 1980, p. 2.

352 George C. Wilson, "Panel Cool to Selling Arms to Somalia in Exchange for the Right to Use Ports," The Washington Post, 27 August 1980, p. 1

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going to fool anyone but the American p e o p l e . "353

The sale of arms to Somalia was finally approved,

however, on a year-to-year basis, as long as no Somali

regular forces took part in hostilities in the Ogaden.354

As conditions in the region continued to deteriorate,

however, opposition to the U.S. military use of Berbera

disappeared.

Masirah - In the Gulf of Oman

Oman did not prove as difficult as Somalia in

negotiating access to its facilities at Muscat, Masirah

Island, and the airbase at Thamarit, although these

facilities were probably more important to continued U.S.

Navy operations in the region. Oman and the U.S. signed an

agreement to permit U.S. access to Omani military bases on

353 Juan de Onis, "House Panel Skeptical on U.S. Pact With Somalia," The New York Times, 17 September 1980, p. 3.

354 Juan de Onis, "U.S. Arms Sale to Somalia Is Conditionally Approved," The New York Times, 1 October 1980, p. 2.

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June 4, 1980 after over seven months of negotiations.355

This agreement was critical in enabling the U.S. to support

naval and other forces operating in the Persian Gulf. A

long-time supporter of the U.S.,356 Oman's strategic

location astride the Strait of Hormuz made its support

critical to U.S. operations in the region.

The U.S. was primarily interested in the port

facilities at Muscat, the airstrip on Masirah Island, and

an air base at Thamarit, in the southernmost part of Oman.

Washington was reported willing to offer Oman $100 million

in military and economic aid over a two-year period.357

U.S. forces occasionally used bases in Seeb, near Muscat,

and Thamarit, but the island of Masirah was best situated

to support naval forces in the northern Arabian Sea. While

the agreement provided the U.S. access to these facilities

in circumstances where both countries would benefit, i.e. a

Soviet attack in the region, it remains unclear whether

355 Richard Burt, "Indian Ocean Lands Reported to Agree to U.S. Use of Bases," The New York Times, 12 February 1980, p. 1; Richard Halloran, "Snags Arise in Talks on Access to Bases," The New York Times, 30 March 1980, p. 8.; Richard Burt, "U.S. Wins Bases in Oman and Kenya," The New York Times, 22 April 1980, p. 3; "U.S. Announces Pact with Oman on Access to Air Bases and Port," The New York Times, 6 June 1980, p. 9.

355 ünder the leadership of Sultan Qaboos, in power since 1970, Oman has supported U.S. policies in the Middle East, such as the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty.

357 George Geddes, "U.S. Granted Access to Oman Bases," The Washington Post, 12 February 1980, p. 1.

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these bases would be available to U.S. forces to intervene

in an "intra-Arab conflict were American interests

threatened."358

The Sultan of Oman was willing to grant U.S. access

to these facilities not only because he was disturbed by

Soviet inroads in the region (and later because of the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), but also because he

perceived a serious military threat to Oman from South

Yemen, where the presence of Soviet, Cuban, and East German

military and technical personnel had been steadily

g r o w i n g . 359 The Sultan had long depended upon British

officers to train his military, some of whom were assigned

by the British armed forces and some of whom were under

contract. But the British Government had set a 1983

deadline for the withdrawal of these "seconded" officers

from O m a n . 350

As was the case with U.S. efforts to obtain access to

other regional facilities, the government was generally

agreeable to having the U.S. naval presence in the region

as a counter to both internal and external threats, but it

358 D.S., Congress, "U.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf," p. 16. At the time of this writing, the U.S. still has routine access to facilities at Masirah.

359 James E. Dougherty, The Horn of Africa; A Political-Strategic Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1982), p. 57. 350 Ibid.

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was also reluctant to having a visible D.S. presence in

country. Oman was particularly sensitive to this because

of pressure from other members of the Arab League.351

Therefore, any U.S. presence in Oman was to keep a "low

profile," meaning minimum publicity about U.S. military

activities, the wearing of civilian apparel rather than

uniforms by U.S. military personnel, maximum use of

civilian contractors rather than military personnel, and

conducting military exercises away from populated areas.352

The facility at Masirah Island, while desireable to

both Oman and the U.S. due to its remote location away from

the mainland and any large population centers (being

populated only by Bedouin tribesmen and Omani and British

military personnel), has several drawbacks as a base to

support U.S. military presence in the region. It is over

400 miles from the Strait of Hormuz. It is also virtually

unreachable by ship four months a year, so petroleum, oil

35^ U.S., Congress, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, p. 108.

352 U.S., Congress, "U.S. Security Interests," p. 16; This author spent five weeks in Oman, including one week in Muscat. The restrictions placed on U.S. military personnel in Oman were rigidly adhered to. At the airbase at Seeb, near Muscat, U.S. aircrewmen were taken from their aircraft to their rooms by bus, and not allowed out in public. At Masirah, they were restricted to their quarters or the dining facility. There were no U.S. military forces permanently assigned to either of these bases. All liaison was conducted through British officers "seconded" to the Sultan of Oman, the senior officer being Vice Air Marshall Bennett (RAF).

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and lubricants, and water to support O.S. aircraft, crews,

and ground support, as well as local Omani forces, must be

stored to cover the monsoon season. In addition, Masirah

is extremely vulnerable to air attack. Thus, the total

cost to the O.S. to upgrade this facility to meet the needs

of naval forces in the area, while classified, was

extremely h i g h . 353

In addition to the large sums of money that the U.S.

agreed to invest in the upgrading of Omani bases to support

ongoing U.S. naval operations in the region and to support

potential RDJTF operations, the Carter Administration also

agreed to provide $25 Million of Foreign Military Sales

(FMS) in 1980,354 thus expanding its sales of arms to

another Third World country. Included in the FMS agreement

were several major military items, including: tanks, tank

transporters, side-winder air-to-air missiles, C-130

transports aircraft, TOW antitank launchers and missiles,

155 mm. howitzers, trucks, tank ammunition, and tank-

training teams.355 Furthermore, under the military

contract (MILCON) covering the Masirah Mobilization Camp,

353 Ibid., p. 17. 354 Ibid.

355 U.S., Congress, House, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982 (pt. 3). Hearings and Markup before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1980, p. 82.

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the O.S. was expected to upgrade the runway at Khasab (on

the Musandam peninsula) and to send Corps of Engineers

construction teams to start work on the Masirah

Mobilization Camp project and other projects throughout Ctaan.355

Under the June 1980 agreement, the U.S. was given

access to airfields at Seeb, Thamarit, and Masirah and the

ports of Mina Qabus in Matrah and Mina Raysul in Salalah.

Again in keeping with the general feelings of regional

countries, no U.S. military personnel were to be stationed

in Oman other than those associated with military s a l e s . 35?

Mombasa - Access to the Cape Route

Kenya also proved to be amenable to expanded U.S.

access in the form of the right to stage flights of P-3

patrol and reconnaissance aircraft through Mombasa as well

as an expanded use of the port facilities at Mombasa.358

355 Ibid., p. 84.

357 Henry S. Bradsher, "Oman Grants Wider Facilities to U.S. Military," The Washington Star, 5 June 1980, p. 1.

358 "Kenya Agrees to Expand U.S. Use of Military Bases," The New York Times, 28 June 1980, p. 5. Shortly after President Reagan's inauguration, he submitted a request for almost $1 billion in additional funding for Indian Ocean related operations. These funds included a $106.4 million provision for the improvement of the Egyptian port and military base at Ras Banas on the Red Sea. A lesser amount, $75 million, was earmarked for the refurbishment of the former British base on Masirah Island

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Prior to the O.S.-Kenya Facilities Access agreement of June

26, 1980, Kenya had been the only country on the east

African-Indian Ocean littoral that allowed the U.S.

overflight and landing rights and Navy port calls. As the

U.S. naval presence in the region increased, it became

increasingly more important to find large port facilities

that could handle the upkeep and port calls that the large

U.S. ships required.

The port of Mombasa had been visited by U.S. warships

in the past and, even though it is over 2500 miles from the

Persian Gulf, the U.S. Navy deemed it a suitable port for

repair, resupply, and shore leave for ships operating in

the region. The great distances involved in operations in

the Indian Ocean often resulted in crews being at sea for

off the coast of Oman as well as improvement of the airfield at Seeb. Approximately $24 million was identified for the repair of various facilities at Berbera while the Port of Mombasa was allocated $26 million for dredging. Diego Garcia was also addressed in this funding request. $237.7 million were identified as necessary to complete a variety of projects, including the widening of the air strip and construction of ramps to accommodate B-52 aircraft. See Richard Halloran, "Reagan to Request $38 Billion Increase in Military Outlays," The New York Times, 4 March 1981, p. 1; Richard Halloran, "Reagan Plan Looks to String of Bases in Mideast and Indian Ocean," The New York Times, 12 March 1981, p. 8; Richard Halloran, "U.S. Base in Indian Ocean May Be Enlarged," The New York Times, 6 April, 1980, p. 16.

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periods in excess of 100 d a y s . 359 Mombasa, a resort area

often frequented by European tourists and within reasonable

distance from the Persian Gulf, offered an excellent port

for maintaining an Indian Ocean "presence" while providing

excellent "liberty" for Navy crewmembers.

Despite the strategic advantages offered by the U.S.

gaining access to the port and air base facilities in

Somalia, these facilities caused friction in the U.S.-Kenya

relationship. As mentioned earlier, Somalia maintained

irredentist claims to portions of northern Kenya. To

strengthen its position vis-a-vis Somalia, Kenya developed

strong ties with Sudan and Ethiopia.

The agreement which provided U.S. access to

facilities at Mombasa and, to a more limited extent,

Nairobi provided Kenya with a total of $50 Million in U.S.

economic and food aid and $27 million in foreign military

sales credits over a two year period (1 9 8 0 -8 1 ).370

Although the Kenyans felt that a formal agreement was not

necessary, a formal written pact was accepted by the Kenyan

government at the insistence of the U.S.371 Finally, like

359 Charles W. Corddry, "U.S. Planning Work at Proposed Bases," Baltimore Sun, 3 April 1980, p. 2; "Indian Ocean Fleet is Posing Problems," The New York Times, 15 April 1980, p. 4.

370 Dougherty, The Horn of Africa, p. 56.

371 Ibid.

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other regional countries, Kenya asked that the U.S.

facilities agreement be implemented in a low-profile manner

and with limited permanent U.S. military presence.372

While Mombasa's adjacent port and airfield facilities

clearly enhanced the operational capability of U.S naval

forces operating in the region, it was limited in this

regard since, like Diego Garcia, it is an estimated 4-6

sailing days from the Strait of H o r m u z . 373 Among the

projects that the U.S. undertook to make Mombasa better

able to support possible surge operations involving RDJTF

forces included a $30.2 million port projects, including

$18 million in dredging to deepen the port entrance so that

aircraft carriers could enter 12 months a y e a r . 374

There was no discussion of setting up a base in

Kenya, but facilities for refueling, delivering mail, and

stocking spare parts for U.S. Indian Ocean operations were

to be provided. It was not expected that U.S. military and

Ibid. Unlike the facilities in Oman, the use of Mombasa and Nairobi was on a much more limited basis. Port calls were made approximately once every three months during the 1979-1982 period. U.S. military flights were limited to once per quarter and involved only single P-3 flights that remained only one night. During this author's two extended trips to Mombasa and one extended visit to Nairobi, there was little official interest in the nature and extent of the U.S. presence in the country by the Kenyans.

373 Ibid.

374 Ibid.

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training missions in Kenya would be expanded more than

slightly, although a depot and a hangar were to be built in

the Mombasa area.375 Subsequent visits by the üSS

NASHVILLE and other amphibious ships triggered reports that

the United States planned to engage in landing exercises in

Kenya. These reports were denied by Kenyan officials who

pointed out that the agreements allowed for little more

than the occasional visits by ships and P-3 aircraft

currently being conducted.376 such statements served to

show the extent to which even a friendly country like Kenya

was reluctant to become too closely identified with the

U.S. in the region.

Bahrain; Home to the Middle East Force

The U.S. had maintained a modest (normally three to

four ship) presence in the Persian Gulf since 1949. Before

the British withdrawal from the region, these ships had

operated from Bahrain under informal agreements with the

375 Henry S. Bradsher, "U.S., Kenya in Accord on Allowing Greater Use of Port Facilities," The Washington Star, 28 June 1980, p. 2,

376 Gary Thatcher, "American Ships Test the Water at Indian Ocean Ports," Christian Science Monitor, 7 August, 1980, p. 2.

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United Kingdom.377 After the British withdrawal from

Bahrain, the U.S. concluded an agreement with Bahrain, on

December 23, 1971, for continued use of these facilities.

The cost to the U.S. for this use was $4 million annually.378

When the U.S. provided material support to Israel

during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Bahrain found itself

embarrassed in the Arab world by the fact that it was the

only Arab state which provided an operational base for U.S.

forces. At that time, Bahrain threatened to abrogate the

agreement and/or to raise the rental fee, indicating that

continued use of the facility would depend upon "the United

States attitude toward the Arab cause in the Middle

East."379 While Bahrain was unique in its provision of a

limited base for U.S. forces, the belief that the presence

of U.S. forces ashore in the Middle East might compromise

friendly governments was pervasive throughout the region.

Early in the Carter Administration, on June 28, 1977,

a new agreement between the U.S. and Bahrain was signed

which ceased the "homeporting" of the Middle East Force in

3^^ U.S., Congress, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, p. 112.

3^3 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, "Review of Recent Developments in the Middle East," Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, p. 106.

379 U.S., Congress, U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, p. 112.

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Bahrain, but provided for an Administrative Support Unit to

be stationed in Bahrain to carry out administration

functions, including support of ship and aircraft

visits.380 other provisions of this agreement (which

remains in effect at the time of this writing) placed

additional limitations on operations of U.S forces in

Bahrain. The availability of berthing facilities in

Bahrain, for example, were limited to 120 days per year,

and annual rent for all facilities was established at $2

million, and the lease is renewable a n n u a l l y . 381

A Demonstration of Strategic Capability

Following the seizure of hostages at the American

embassy and amid reports of major Soviet troop movements

along the Iran and Afghanistan borders, on November 23,

1979 the Administration directed the U.S. Air Force to

establish a detachment of four KC-135 tanker aircraft on

Diego Garcia.382 Qn January 21, 1980, B-52 aircraft

operating from Anderson Air Force Base on Guam and in

conjunction with the KC-135 tanker detachment from Diego

380 Ibid.

381 Ibid., p. 114.

382 U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of Naval History, Navy Operational Archives, "Command History, U.S. Naval Support Facility, Diego Garcia, 1979," p. 6.

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Garcia overflew the Soviet Indian Ocean S q u a d r o n . 383

The arrival of B-52 aircraft in the Arabian Sea was

obvious cause for concern by the USSR. Although the

aircraft were reportedly being employed in a maritime

surveillance role as provided for in the 1975 U.S. Navy-

U.S. Air Force Collateral Functions agreement, the

demonstration that U.S. strategic aircraft could be

introduced into the Arabian Sea could not have been lost on

the Soviet U n i o n . 384 The use of aircraft that were

earmarked for a strategic role on a mission that could have

been performed more cheaply by the expanded P-3C ORION

detachment on Diego Garcia suggests that there was more to

this sortie and subsequent ocean surveillance flights by B-

52 aircraft in the Indian O c e a n . 385

The publicity associated with this first B-52 mission

may have been intended to signal that the Soviet troop

383 Ibid.

384 See Richard Halloran, "Carter Sends Bombers Over a Russian Fleet in Display of Strength," The New York Times, 22 January 1980, p. 9; see also U.S. Office ot the Naval Operations and U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Memorandum of Agreement on the Concept of Operations for USAF Forces Collateral Functions Training (Washington, D.C.: September 2, 1975), p. 17.

385 l c d R John R. Thompson, USN, "USN-USAF Interaction for Ocean Surveillance Using Land Based Aircraft," Research Paper, Center for Advanced Research, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: June 1979, p. 50., contains an illuminating breakdown of the comparative costs of flying a typical ocean surveillance mission for the P-3C and B-52D aircraft.

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movements near Afghanistan had escalated the level of U.S.

commitment to the region to the strategic level. But this

is only conjecture. The U.S. decision to employ B-52's in

the region, however, was not a short-term measure. The Air

Force requested some $39 million in March 1981 to construct

the parallel taxiway and parking apron extension to enable

B-52's to operate routinely from Diego G a r c i a . 3 8 5

To support this operational concept, the U.S. also

concluded an agreement with Australia on March 11, 1981

which permitted B-52's to operate from Guam on Indian Ocean

surveillance operations and to land at the Royal Australian

Air Force (RAAF) airfield at Darwin for refueling and crew

rest. Even though the agreement contained a clause that

required the U.S. to obtain Australian agreement prior to

the use of Darwin for any mission other than ocean

surveillance and navigation training, the impact was far-

reaching to say the l e a s t . 38? Australia and the United

385 Richard Halloran, "Reagan to Request $38 Billion Increase in Military Outlays," The New York Times, 4 March 1981, p. 1.

387 "Backfire in Vietnam," Flight International, 28 (March 1981): 894. The agreement contained provisions for the support of a detachment of up to three B-52 and two KC- 135 aircraft as well as the stationing of some 100 U.S. personnel to service the aircraft. See Brigadier General F.W. Speed, "American B-52 Bombers in Australia," The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 17 (January 1982): p. 11. See also Australia, Parliament, Hansard's Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives), New Series, 121 (1981): 664-665; U.S., Department of State, U.S. Embassy Canberra, "U.S.- Australian Agreement on Transit Through Darwin by USAF B-52 Aircraft on Training

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States renewed the agreement in October 1982, and at the

time of this writing, the agreement remains in e f f e c t . 388

The O.S. also considered using the airfield at Berbera to

support B-52 operations in the Indian O c e a n . 3 8 9

The Fifth Fleet

Since the initial use of the USS FOX to signal O.S.

concern over Soviet support of Ethiopia in its conflict

with Somali, there had been little change in U.S. naval

deployment patterns until November 15, 1978, when a surface

battle group comprised of USS STERRET, USS WADDELL, USS

BRADLEY and USNS PASSUMPSIC entered the Indian O c e a n . 390

This deployment was also in response to the worsening

situation in Iran and Soviet troop movements and marked the

beginning of a continuous naval presence in the Indian

O c e a n . 391 Some two months later, on January 7, 1979,

guided missile destroyers USS DECATUR and USS HOEL,

and Sea Surveillance Missions," Press Release (Canberra: March 30, 1981).

388 "Australia Allows U.S. Flights," The New York Times, 17 October 1982, p. 4.

389 O.S., Congress, U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf, 1980, p. 88.

359 Kelley, "Naval Deployments in the Indian Ocean," p. 179.

351 Hayward.

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destroyer USS KIMKAID and the replenishment oiler USS

KANSAS CITY joined this g r o u p . 352

Between the deployment of these two surface combatant

task groups, the Carter Administration had encountered some

confusion concerning the nature of the signals it was

trying to convey in the region. Toward the end of December

1978, the Shah was pondering options for dealing with the

growing unrest in Iran, including the possible use of

military force to quell the disturbances. In preparations

for possible future contingencies in the Indian Ocean, the

carrier CONSTELLATION was ordered to position itself in the

vicinity of Singapore by the Joint Chiefs of S t a f f .353

Possibly indicative of the level of activity during this

period, the president did not know about this naval

movement until he read it in the papers. It seems that a

young sailor on the CONSTELLATION had telephoned his mother

telling her that he was going to the Indian Ocean and that

the information had been picked up by the United P r e s s .354

This episode caused considerable concern at the White House

and in the Defense Department. As Gary Sick points out,

under normal circumstances:

"...presidential approval would have been obtained

352 Kelley, "Naval Deployments in the Indian Ocean," p. 179.

353 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 127. 354 Ibid.

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before ordering a naval movement of that magnitude at such a critical moment. However they (the Joint Chiefs of Staff) considered this only a precautionary move to position the carrier to be able to respond if the situation required. Any subsequent move to the Arabian Sea would have to be considered in light of the situation in the Persian Gulf and the risk that it would be perceived as a U.S. intent to intervene militarily in Iran."395

Armed Iranian rebels attacked the U.S. Embassy in

Teheran on February 14, 1979 - the same day that rebels

killed U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs in Kabul.

One week later, on February 21, the MIDEASTFOR flagship,

USS LA SALLE, and five destroyers from the battle group in

the Indian Ocean evacuated more than 400 persons, including

200 U.S. citizens from the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas

and Chah Bahar.355 Two weeks later on March 8, 1979, the

Defense Department announced that a carrier battle group

led by USS CONSTELLATION had deployed to the Indian Ocean.

In addition, Thomas B. Ross, the Defense spokesman,

explained that STERRETT, WADDELL, and KANSAS CITY had

extended their deployment to the Indian O c e a n .357

355 Ibid.

355 Ibid., p. 128.

357 Brzezinski claims that Carter personally approved this deployment when, by prearrangement with his national security advisor, the President showed up unexpectedly at an seesession and approved the SCC's recommendation to sail CONSTELLATION immediately to the Arabian Sea. See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 447.

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On March 25, 1979, during a routine press briefing at

the Defense Department, Ross made known that a new naval

force, which would be called the Fifth Fleet, was an option

under study by the Carter Administration. He acknowledged

that Carter and his advisors were seeking a larger military

presence in the area and that a Fifth Fleet was "a serious

option" in view of the instability in Iran and Y e m e n . 358

Two weeks later on April 6, 1979, a surface combatant

battle group led by guided missile cruiser USS ENGLAND

entered the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca.

The guided missile destroyer USS ROBISON, destroyer USS

ELIOT, frigate USS DOWNES, and the fast combat support ship

USS CAMDEN accompanied ENGLAND. Thus by early April 1979,

U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean had increased to 15

s h i p s . 359 This marked the highest level of U.S. presence

in the area at any one time since the 1973-74 oil crisis.

By mid-spring of 1979, the Administration's decision

regarding U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean began to

take shape. The decision to sail the CONSTELLATION battle

group to the Arabian Sea and the expansion of U.S.naval

presence in the region gives credence to this

358 "Ü.S. Considering Plan to Create a New Fleet for the Indian Ocean," The New York Times, 9 March 1979, p. 5.

355 1 9 7 9 state Cite 085529; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 061733Z Apr 79 (Subject: Indian Ocean Deployment).

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perception.490 Senior military leaders, however, were

reluctant to create another force specifically structured

for the Indian Ocean. The RDJTF had already earmarked two

carrier battle groups for possible contingencies in the

area. This, coupled with the fact that D.S. Navy forces

were at their lowest number since before World War II (476

ships) made O.S. military officials hesitant to create

another fleet "on paper," since they were unable to meet

their current commitments with the forces available.491

Although nothing came of the discussion of the Fifth Fleet

and the Administration did not choose to draw a carrier

battle group from another theater for permanent assignment

to the region, battle group presence in the region remained

at unprecedented levels.

1979; A Year of Crisis

As noted in the last chapter, on March 11, 1979 an

see meeting was held to discuss the situation in Yemen.

Within days of the reported South Yemeni incursion into

North Yemen, the shortlived Bakhtiar regime in Iran

499 Bernard Weintraub, "Pentagon Is Urging Indian Ocean Fleet," The New York Times, 1 March 1979, p. 14; and Richard Burt, "U.S. Sends Ships to Arabian Sea in Yemen Crisis," The New York Times, 7 March 1979, p. 1.

491 Hayward.

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collapsed. Saudi Arabia was alarmed at the possibility of

expanding Marxist influence on its southern border and

instability across the Persian Gulf and asked the U.S. for

urgent assistance. During March and April 1979, this

request was the subject of numerous crisis meetings that

resulted in the deployment of a carrier task force to the

region, formal warnings to the USSR to restrain their

client, acceleration of U.S. arms deliveries to North

Yemen, and the first deployment of AWACS air defense

aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

These events, combined with the kidnapping and

assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan on

February 14 - the same day as the Iranian attack on the

U.S. embassy in Tehran - generated an atmosphere of

unrelieved crisis throughout 1979 that resulted in a full-

scale reappraisal of U.S. military presence in Southwest

Asia, the reinvigorated planning for the U.S. Rapid

Deployment Joint Task Force, and negotiations for U.S.

access to regional port and airfield facilities.

During this period of crises in Yemen and

Afghanistan, and with the ongoing Arab-Israeli

negotiations, "day-to-day policy on Iran took the form of

small, incremental decisions on such issues as embassy

staffing, the myriad commercial tangles that had to be

unraveled, and local negotiations about embassy

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Once the hostages were seized from the U.S. embassy

in November 1979, however, many military options became

untenable. While the SCC continued to meet almost daily to

review the situation in Iran, the investigation of possible

military options reverted to the Department of Defense,

specifically the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for further

development. A Crisis Action Group was formed to review

possible rescue options and potential retaliatory actions

against Iran such as a blockade of its ports, destroying

Iranian military or economic targets, and encouraging and

aiding dissident groups in Iran.493

During the period immediately following the seizure

of the hostages, several different courses of action were

proposed by the members of the Administration. Despite

Brzezinski*s assertions in his memoirs that Vance was being

consistently overruled by Carter during this p e r i o d , 494

there were only three specific instances of Carter pursuing

options other than those supported by his Secretary of

State. The deployment of a second carrier task force built

402 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 186.

3 Ibid., p. 213. This author was a member of the JCS crisis action group, which consisted of seven officers including then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Policy, VADM William Crowe.

404 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 437.

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around the KITTY HAWK on November 20 to the region was

opposed by Vance, but accepted by Carter. Vance also

opposed the deployment of AWACS aircraft to Egypt on the

grounds that it would interfere with other regional

negotiations.495 The final point of divergence caune on

proposals for a possible hostage rescue mission which

eventually led to Vance’s resignation.495

Continuous Carrier Presence

Until 1979, the customary interval between the

departure of one battle group and the arrival of the next

one in the Indian Ocean had been no less than two months,

with the average nearer to three months. Implementation of

a revised policy was evident on April 14, 1979, when a

carrier battle group built around USS MIDWAY relieved

CONSTELLATION on station in the Indian O c e a n . 497 This

simultaneous replacement of one carrier battle group with

another seemed to signal the Carter Administration's

recognition that it was in the national interest to

demonstrate the ability to project power in the region.

In June 1979, the Administration reviewed the

495 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 238.

495 Vance, Hard Choices, p. 410.

497 CNA Memorandum 85-71, p. 16.

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emerging national security policy when the Policy Review

Committee (PRC) examined the question of U.S. military

posture in the Middle East and South A s i a . 4 9 8 ^he

President approved three of the Committee’s recommendations

concerning the ability of the United States to effectively

project power in the region. The first of Carter's

decisions authorized an increase in the force level of the

U.S. Navy's Middle East Force. The second policy decision

increased the number of deployments of U.S. carrier battle

groups in the Indian Ocean from three to four per year.

Finally, Carter directed the U.S. Air Force to begin a

program of "Demonstration Visits" to selected Arab states,

particularly Oman and several Gulf s h e i k d o m s . 499 Carter

referred to the maritime portions of this decision during

his October 1, 1979, address on the Soviet brigade in Cuba

when he explained that "we have reinforced our naval

presence in the Indian O c e a n . " 4 ^ 9

The seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran on

November 2, 1979 marked another turning point in U.S.

498 Richard Burt, "U.S. Buildup in the Persian Gulf Urged," The New York Times, 28 June 1979, p. 6. 499 Ibid.

419 O.S., President, "Peace and National Security: An Address to the Nation on Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, October 1, 1979," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 8 October 1979, p. 1805.

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Indian Ocean policy. Although the outlines of a strategy

had been identified, including the initial identification

of U.S. forces for the ROJTF, the seizure prompted a

thorough, high level review of U.S. military capabilities

in the region. The sobering conclusion of that review was

that U.S. ability to project military power in the region

was still limited. On November 23, 1979, President Carter

approved an NSC recommendation to deploy an additional

carrier battle group to the Indian Ocean.

Thus, by the end of November 1979, U.S. presence in

the region in response to a continuous string of crises had

increased to 21 ships.In addition, the U.S. had

negotiated access to facilities in Oman, Somalia, and

Kenya, and had made initial arrangements to exercise

strategic forces (B-52's) in the region. One month later

the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

It is difficult to determine whether these measures

were taken in response to the fall of the Shah of Iran or

to the growing instability and Soviet encroachment in

Afghanistan. Since neither President Carter nor his senior

advisors identified the purpose of these "shows of force,"

Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 483. He also approved the movement of additional tanker aircraft to support long range strikes against Iran, and the placement of helicopters at Diego Garcia.

CNA Memorandum 85-71, p. 16.

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there was some confusion, both domestic and foreign, as to

O.S. goals in the region. We will return to this matter in

the final chapter.

These events suggested that a reappraisal of U.S.

national security policy for the region was necessary. The

result was a shift from considering the region as one

suitable for the negotiation of naval arms limitations to

believing it to be part of Brzezinski*s "Arc of Crisis."

This colorful phrase expressed a premise which had been

intuitively recognized for some time - the region that

stretched from North Africa through the Middle East to the

Persian Gulf and thence to the Indian subcontinent was one

of peril for the United States and the Western democracies

because of its instability and insecurity.^13

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979

marked yet another setback for U.S. interests in the

region. Having faced increasing instability along the

northern Indian Ocean littoral for most of his presidency.

President Carter now had to deal with open Soviet

aggression in the region.

^ Robert G. Neumann, "Emerging Security Issues in the 'Arc of Crisis,'" Proceedings of the Seventh Annual National Security Affairs Conference (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1980), p. 245.

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THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: A NEW O.S. "SECURITY FRAMEWORK*

The collapse of the monarchy in Iran in late 1978

signalled the end of a decade of U.S. strategy which had

focused on maintaining stability in the region by promoting

cooperation between key friendly states such as Saudi

Arabia and Iran. The twin pillar policy which had relied

heavily on Iran as a "protector" of American security

interests in the region was now invalid.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan one year later

triggered a major reassessment of both the regional and the

global role of the United States. It challenged the U.S.

to use the new national consensus that resulted from the

shock of the Soviet aggression to create a policy toward

the Soviet Union which would include building the necessary

power to support whatever threat that country might pose.415

414 Sick, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategy," p. 70.

415 Larry A. Niksch, "Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response," (Issue Brief Number IB80006), Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, (Mimeo) 10 January, 1980, p. 22.

233

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The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in

late 1988 and early 1989 marked the end of over nine years

of conflict in that country. The perspective of that

conflict from 1989 is significantly different than it was

from the position of the Carter Administration in 1979. In

1979 the Administration was confronted by a Soviet presence

in the Indian Ocean region which had grown steadily since

1970 and had particularly risen sharply since late 1977.

From one end of the region to the other, the Soviets were

seeking to bolster their »'olitical and military position.

Indira Gandhi’s return to power in India in 1979 produced a

more workable relationship with the dominant power in the

subcontinent. Along the western littoral, the Soviet Union

continued to support the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia

against both Somali forces and Eritrean guerrillas.

Moreover, the Soviet Union had developed a close

relationship with the government of the People's Democratic

Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and secured access to Aden's

superb maritime facilities in the process and maintained a

full-time anchorage on the strategically located island of

Socotra.

An Ambivalent Relationship

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U.S. policy toward Afghanistan had remained basically

unchanged in the post World War II years. Due to

geographic, economic, and political factors, Afghanistan

did not play a large role in U.S. foreign policy in the

region. For the U.S., Afghanistan was of limited direct

interest since it was not an important trading partner, did

not provide a route for U.S. or allied trade, was not a

source of oil or other scarce strategic material, did not

maintain any treaties or defense commitments with the West,

and it did not provide the U.S. with significant defense,

intelligence or scientific facilities.4^® It is even

difficult to make a case for Afghanistan's occupying a

strategic location between Central Asia and the Indian

subcontinent.

Prior to the Soviet invasion, the Carter

Administration treated the Afghan situation in a

restrained, low-key manner despite indications of growing

Soviet influence in that country. The communist coup in

April 1978 showed that there was a great deal of

ambivalence within the Administration about how to deal

with the new Afghan government.4^^ Even after the killing

4^5 Leon Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United States; The Crucial Years," Middle East Journal 35 (Spring 1981): 188.

4^^ Leon B. Poullada, "The Road to Crisis, 1919-1980," in Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited, ed. Rosanne Klass (New York: Freedom House, 1987), p. 56.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 236

of Ambassador Adolf Dubs in February 1979, the U.S.

continued to provide economic aid to the new government,

although it began to wind down both its diplomatic presence

and its aid programs.4^® But as the internecine struggles

for power continued in Afghanistan and U.S. influence

continued to decline, it became increasingly clear that the

Afghan leaders were pro-Soviet and that they were tying

Afghanistan more closely to the Soviet U n i o n .419

The U.S. did, however, maintain certain objectives in

Afghanistan prior to the communist takeover in 1978, not

the least of which was the preservation of Afghanistan's

independence and territorial integrity. Specifically, the

U.S. sought the "creation of a viable political and

economic system, responsive through evolutionary change to

the needs and desires of the people," the prevention of

growing Soviet influence, and the improvement of

Afghanistan's ties with Pakistan and Iran (prior to the

Iranian revolution).420

418 Ibid.

419 Harmon E. Kirby, "U.S. Policy on Afghanistan," in Afghan Alternatives; Issues, Options, and Policies, ed. Ralph H. Magnus (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, Inc., 1985), p. 155.

439 Airgram no. A-71 from Kabul to State, June 26, 1971, p. 1. This airgram contained the Policy Review written by Ambassador Robert Neuman on U.S. interests in Afghanistan, as cited in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Crisis in the Subcontinent: Afghanistan and Pakistan," Hearings, 96th Cong. 1st sess., 1979 (Washington

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To be sure, there were limits to U.S. abilities to

preclude Soviet inroads in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union

was (and remains) Afghanistan's largest trading partner.

Afghanistan owed a great deal of money to the Soviet Union,

its army had traditionally been equipped with Soviet arms,

and its educational system was modelled after and strongly

supported by the S o v i e t s . 431 Thus, while i t may not have

been realistic for the U.S. to hope to woo Afghanistan away

from Soviet influence, it was hoped that the U.S. could at

least exercise a restraining influence of Soviet 422 pressure.

Hopes of restraining Soviet influence in Afghanistan,

however, began to crumble in April 1978 when President

Daoud was overthrown by the two recently united communist

factions, Khalq (led by Nur Mohammad Taraki) and Parcham

(led by Babrak Karmal).433 These events paralleled

indications that the Shah of Iran was not on solid

political footing and that the Yemen were approaching

hostilities.

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 72..

431 Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., "Afghanistan After the 1978 Revolution," Strategic Review 7 (Spring 1979): 57.

433 Ibid., p. 58.

433 Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan Under the Khalq," Problems of Communism, 28 (July-August 1979): 42; see also Niksch, "Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response," p. 2.

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When viewed in an isolated context, the takeover in

Afghanistan would not normally cause considerable concern

in the U.S. In fact, initial U.S. reaction was somewhat

mixed, with many analysts hesitant to immediately classify

the regime as communist despite its composition. 434 The

Carter Administration, however, had been criticized over

its failure to resist Soviet activities in other areas of

the Third World - particularly in the Horn of Africa and

the Arabian Peninsula. In a memorandum to Vance written

after the coup began. Assistant Secretary for Near East

Affairs Harold Saunders warned that "we will have to deal

with the U.S. press and public, (to allay fears) that the

new regime is little more than a Soviet p r o x y . "435 while

he noted that it was too early to tell if the Soviets were

involved in the coup, Saunders stated that "the public and

congress may perceive this as another Soviet victory and

there may be pressure to do something about it."436

To place the crisis in Afghanistan in perspective

with the deterioration of events in Iran, on February 14,

1979, the same day the U.S. embassy was temporarily seized

434 Niksch, "Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response," p. 3.

435 U.S., Department of State, Bureaus of Intelligence and Research, and Near East Affairs, The Coup in Afghanistan, April 27, 1978 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 1.

436 Ibid., p. 2.

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in Teheran, Ambassador Adolph Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul

and taken to a nearby hotel. It is now believed that the

kidnappers were not supported by either the new Afghan

government or by the Soviets, but were rather a dissident

group seeking the release of some political prisoners.

When police stormed the hotel where Dubs was being held,

the ambassador and all of the kidnappers were killed. One

week later, on February 22, the O.S. cut the remainder of

its $20 million 1979 aid commitment and did not replace the

ambassador - in effect, breaking off diplomatic

r e l a t i o n s .437

Reaching a Consensus

In early 1979, the O.S. had a collection of military

assets and bilateral relationships with regional countries,

but these largely resulted from previous policies and "were

not bound together by a strategic concept for the

protection of O.S. regional interests."438 gy the end of

1979, however, well before the Soviet intervention in

Afghanistan, the outlines of a strategy had been developed.

437 Louis Dupree, "Red Flag Over the Hindu Kush, Part IV: Foreign Policy and Economy," American Universities Field Staff Reports, Asia Series, no. 47, June 1980, pp. 2-

438 Sick, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategy," p. 70.

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including initial identification of O.S. forces for a rapid

deployment force, operational planning for an increased

U.S. military presence, and preliminary discussions with

Oman, Kenya, and Somalia about access to facilities. These

efforts provided much of the underlying structure and

planning for the events of the following year.

At this point, the internal debate within the

Administration had focused less on the nature of the threat

in the region and more on the appropriate steps to be taken

to counter this threat. Whereas the role of the Soviet

Union may have been an issue of debate between members of

the Administration in earlier crises, now even Vance and

Marshall Shulman, State's chief Soviet expert, agreed that

the Soviets were actively involved in the unrest in Afghanistan.439

While Vance may have been overly optimistic regarding

the prospects for Soviet-American relations, it must be

noted that he shared this view with Jimmy Carter, at least

during the first two years of the Carter Administration.

Jerel Rosati discusses three schools of thought regarding

the Carter Administration decisionmakers' world view.430

439 Kirby, "U.S. Policy on Afghanistan," pp. 154-155.

430 Jerel A. Rosati, The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community; Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior (Columbia, South Carolina, University of South Carolina Press, 1987), pp.8-11.

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The first school argues that these decisionmakers had no

coherent and consistent image of the international

environment; rather, each presented a unique perspective

from which the President could pick and choose as events

arose. A second school of thought believed that these

decisionmakers did conduct American foreign policy

according to a consistent and coherent worldview, and that

this view remained fairly consistent throughout the

presidency despite alterations necessitated by crises. The

third school insisted that Carter Administration

policymakers always held a common worldview, but that it

changed with time.431

The relationship between Vance and Brzezinski that

emerged early in the Carter Administration seemed to

contradict the position of this last school. Vance points

out that he and Brzezinski had conflicting attitudes toward

the Soviet Onion: "A flaw in our foreign policy during this

period was that it was too narrowly rooted in the concept

of an overarching O.S.-Soviet 'geopolitical' struggle our

national interests encompassed more than O.S.-Soviet relations."432

431 Leslie Gelb argues most strongly for this last view. Gelb.

432 Vance, Hard Choices, p. 27. In an interview for Time magazine Vance discussed the fundamental difference between his view of the Soviets at this time, and Brzezinski's views: "We have differences of view from time to time....A

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Brzezinski, for his part, was less optimistic that

the O.S. and Soviet Onion could find much in common in

light of their significant historical, ideological,

psychological, and geographical differences. In a report

entitled "Strategic Deterioration" submitted to President

Carter one year into the Administration, Brzezinski noted

"...serious dangers on the horizon in O.S.-Soviet relations

(because the Soviet Onion)...demonstrated to all concerned

its will and capacity to assert itself in the Third

W o r l d . "433 other members of the Administration, such as

Harold Brown and Walter Mondale, may have held views which

fell between those held by Vance and those held by

Brzezinski, but they were also less vocal.

The ambivalence about the building Soviet pressure

on, and influence in, Afghanistan again indicated the two

distinct schools of thought in the Administration

concerning Soviet interests and capabilities in the region.

Brzezinski notes that he had voiced his concern over the

Soviet involvement in Afghanistan as indicative of the

different perspective with respect to the Soviet Union is the biggest set of differences. I believe that it is essential we try to find common ground (with the Soviets)....we shouldn't be fearful of everything they do and automatically accept the thesis of the worst- case motivations." Strobe Talbot and Christopher Ogden, "People Want to See Coonskins," Time, 24 April 1978, p. 21.

433 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 187.

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widening role of the Soviets in the entire region. On

December 21, 1979, while much of the attention of the

Administration was focused on events in Iran, Brzezinski

convinced the President that Vance should chair a Policy

Review Committee (PRC) on events in Afghanistan and their

relationship to other Soviet efforts in the region.434

For his part, Vance was reluctant to take any

diplomatic steps against the Soviets at a time when the

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were nearing completion.

He felt that any official U.S. statements concerning Soviet

"encroachment" in Afghanistan would provide support to arms

control opponents in Congress just as SALT reached Capitol Hill for ratification.435

The key player, of course, was the President. Carter

admits that he sometimes seemed to be caught between the

two extremes, unable to decide which of his two principle

foreign policy advisors was correct concerning the true

nature of the Soviets.436 prior to the Soviet invasion he

had relied primarily on the policies and advice of his

Secretary of State.437 gig perception of the role of tl

Soviet Union in events that took place in the region is

434 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 426.

435 Vance.

436 Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 53-54.

437 Sick, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategy," p. 73.

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important, however, because it helps explain how regional

events affected relations between the U.S. and the Soviet

Union in broader areas such as arms control, commodity

sales, and the Olympic geunes.

The Carter Administration faced a dilemma. It would

be subject to criticism if it declared the regime communist

or Soviet supported, since that would attribute another

"victory" in the region to the Soviets. On the other hand,

if it treated the new regime as nonaligned and independent,

regional countries would perceive a diminution in U.S.

support for those subjected to hostile pressure from the

Soviet Union.

Testifying to a congressional committee, Marshall

Shulman indicated the role that the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan played in bringing about a consensus of opinion

in the Carter Administration:

"It is absolutely necessary to indicate to the Soviet Union that the measures that we are now taking indicate the seriousness with which we take this action, that they are not simply going to be forgotten in a month or two....It is not only what is happening on the ground in Afghanistan, but the whole pressure on the area and the apprehensions that are created by the Soviet willingness in this instance to use force on a very large scale in a country outside the Warsaw Pact. ...Their action in Afghanistan...raises questions about whether they feel the same lack of restraint in regard Iran or Pakistan or other countries in the

438 U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, East-West Relations in the Aftermath of Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980,

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The Trigger is Pulled

When asked whether he felt that the Soviets would

respond to any gestures of goodwill on the part of the

United States to remove their troops from Afghanistan,

Carter replied that "my opinion of the Russians has changed

more drastically in the last week than even the previous 2-

1/2 years before that.... This action of the Soviets has

made a more dramatic change in my own opinion of what the

Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they've done in

the previous time I've been in o f f i c e ."439

The Soviet invasion triggered a response from the

Carter Administration that had, to a great extent, been

building for some time. The "trigger theory" argued that

the U.S. response to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan

was disproportionate to the magnitude of the threat to

American i n t e r e s t s . 440 From the Soviet perspective.

pp. 28 and 42, as cited in Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion and the Consequences (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 121.

439 David Binder, "Carter Says Soviet Isn't Telling Facts About Afghan Coup," The New York Times, 1 January 1980, p. 1.

440 Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 191.

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Brzezinski, who was said - "well-known for his extreme

anti-Communism and morbid anti-Sovietism," had succeeded in

advancing a theory which "scared many people in the United

States with its extremism and fanaticism, (and) has

become...Washington's official p o l i c y . "441 Rhetoric aside,

Brzezinski's worldview was, indeed, ascendant.

Discussion within the Administration concerning the

nature of the Soviet regional threat and the appropriate

U.S. response were mooted by the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan on December 25, 1979. On the morning of

December 26, 1979, the PRC meeting that was scheduled to

discuss the situation in Iran was cancelled. Instead, the

see convened in its crisis reaction mode to address both

the Iranian situation and the growing indications of a

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Brzezinski proposed that

the U.S. send a strong message to Brezhnev concerning the

invasion, which included linking Soviet adventurism with

SALT. Both Vance and Warren Christopher remained opposed

to abandoning these lengthy talks which now appeared to be

reaching fruition. The results of the SCC were presented

at a meeting of the full National Security Council on

December 28. As Brzezinski notes:

"The mood was grave, for we all knew that a major watershed had been reached in the American-Soviet relationship. To some, it meant the burial of hope for

441 Izvestia, 11 January 1980, p. 4, FBIS:SU, 14 January 1980, pp. A22-23.

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a wide-ranging American-Soviet accommodation, with SALT as its centerpiece; to the President, it was no doubt a political blow, though it also represented an opportunity for him to demonstrate his genuine toughness; to me, it was a vindication of my concern that the Soviets would be emboldened by our lack of response over Ethiopia."

President Carter sent General Secretary Brezhnev a

message on December 28, 1979 calling for Soviet troops to

withdraw, stating that "...if not corrected, (the troop

presence) could have very serious consequences to United

States-Soviet relations."443 on December 31, Carter

reported that:

"(Brezhnev) claimed that he had been invited by the Afghan government to come in and protect Afghanistan from some outside third-nation threat. This was obviously false because the person that he claimed invited him in. President Amin, was murdered or assassinated after the Soviets pulled their coup. He also claimed that they would remove their forces from Afghanistan as soon as the situation should be stabilized and the outside threat to Afghanistan was e l i m i n a t e d ."444

There was now general agreement among top U.S.

policymakers that the Soviet Union was engaged in a

geopolitical offensive designed to extend its power and

influence throughout the Third World, although there was

442 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 429.

443 Terrence Smith, "Carter Tells Soviet to Pull Its Troops Out of Afghanistan," The New York Times, 30 December 1979, p. 1; See also Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 429, and Poullada, "The Road to Crisis,", p. 59.

444 David Binder, "Carter Says Soviet Isn't Telling Facts About Afghan Coup," The New York Times, 1 January 1980, p. 4.

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still some disagreement as to the proper steps to be taken

in r e a c t i o n . 445 in Afghanistan, the USSR was closer to the

Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean than ever before. By staging

flights from Afghan airfields, it was easier for Soviet

forces to project land-based tactical and strategic air

power towards those areas. This would be important in a

crisis or war in which targets in the Persian Gulf, U.S.

carrier battle groups within range, and major U.S. support

complexes, like Diego Garcia, presumably would be Soviet

targets.

Thus, in Brzezinski's words, the Soviet move into

Afghanistan was "not a local but a strategic c h a l l e n g e . "446

In a series of pronouncements. Carter also placed the

invasion in a strategic perspective:

"...our own nation's security was directly threatened. There is no doubt that the Soviets' move into Afghanistan, if done without adverse consequences, would have resulted in the temptation to move again until they reached warm water supplies.' ...The Soviet Union has altered the strategic situation in that part of the world in a very ominous

45 Alfred L. Monks, The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), p. 32.

446 O.S., House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Report: NATO After Afghanistan, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, p. 7.

447 U.S., President, Presidential Documents (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1980), 16 (14 January 1980): 41.

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fashion.448...It places the Soviets within aircraft striking range of the vital oil resources of the Persian Gulf; it threatens a strategically located country, Pakistan; (and) it poses the prospect of increased Soviet pressure on Iran and on other nations of the Middle East.449

To bolster Carter's apparent affirmation of views

that were also held by Brzezinski, the National Security

Advisor provided the President with notes on the Truman

Doctrine which responded to allegedly similar events in

Europe following World War II, and suggested that Carter

make his speech to Congress on the State of the Union along

these lines. Brzezinski wanted to let the world know that

the U.S. was drawing a line beyond which Soviet expansion

would not be tolerated.450

The Range of U.S. Responses

When the Soviets moved into Afghanistan in late

December 1979, the Carter Administration responded with a

series of actions that had, in many cases, been under

consideration for more than a year. While the invasion

came at a time when the U.S. already had an expanded number

of military units in the region. President Carter

448 Presidential Documents, 16 (28 January 1980): 165.

449 Ibid., p. 185.

450 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 444-445.

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instituted several additional military related steps to

signal U.S. concern. He expressed his determination to

push ahead with plans to strengthen U.S. military

capabilities by boosting the defense budget, creating a

Rapid Deployment Force, installing new missiles in Western

Europe, increasing U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean,

acquiring military facilities in Kenya, Somalia, and Oman,

resuming the canceled aid program to Pakistan, and

instituting draft registration.451

In addition, joint military exercises with Egypt were

held in early January, as another means of demonstrating

U.S. military power in the Middle E a s t . 452 Most, if not

all, of these steps had been planned before the Soviet

invasion, as a result of events in Iran and Yemen.

However, Carter now had greater resolve to see them

through, and Congress was more likely to support h i m . 453

On the other hand. Undersecretary of State for

Political Affairs, David Newsom asserted that the Carter

Doctrine was thrown together hastily and without carefully

U.S., President, "The President's State of the Union Address," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 28 January 1980, ppl 4-5.

452 Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. and Egypt Hold Joint Air Exercises as a Crisis Reaction," The New York Times, 9 January 1980, p. 1.

453 Niksch, "Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response," p. 22.

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Consulting staff experts:

"(The Carter Doctrine)...grew out of last minute pressures for a presidential speech. As far as is known...the Carter Administration... (never) conducted a detailed study of the implications of the policy or its alternatives."4^4

The Carter Administration did not limit its responses

to military options. Economic sanctions included a

reduction in American grain shipments to the Soviet Union.

Only 8 out of the 25 million metric tons ordered that year

would be d e l i v e r e d . 455 The export of high technology and

strategic items to the Soviet Union was prohibited. *56

Soviet fishing in U.S. coastal waters was sharply

curtailed, and the shipment of American phosphates in

exchange for Soviet ammonia was s u s p e n d e d . 457

454 David D. Newsom, "American Engulfed," Foreign Policy, 43 (Summer 1981): 17.

455 Terrence Smith, "Carter Embargoes Technology for Soviets; Limits Fishing Privileges and Sale of Grain in Response to 'Aggression* in Afghanistan," The New York Times, 5 January 1980, pp. 1, 6; A more detailed description of the various sanctions is provided by U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, ^ Assessment of the Afghanistan Sanctions: Implications for Trade and Diplomacy in the 1980's (hereinafter referred to as An Assessment) Report, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, pp. 60-63.

456 Ibid., The New York Times, 5 January 1980, p. 6; and U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, An Assessment, pp. 64-78.

457 U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, An Assessment, pp. 53-64 and 93-94.

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Perhaps the most significant diplomatic move that the

U.S. took in response to the invasion was to redefine its

security relationships, both with regional countries and

with other major world powers. In January 1980, Secretary

of Defense Harold Brown visited China. While the trip had

been planned for some time before the invasion, it took on

new meaning in light of recent Soviet actions. Following

the trip. Brown said that American and Chinese views "are

very closely parallel about the need to strengthen other

nations in the region and each side will take appropriate

action on its own toward that e n d . "458 gg also said that

if other powers "threaten the shared interests of the

United States and China, we can respond with complementary

actions in the field of defense as well as d i p l o m a c y . "459

Clearly a byproduct of the Soviet invasion was the

abandonment of the U.S. "evenhanded approach" to

relationships with the Soviet Union and the People’s

Republic of China. Two months after Brown's visit, in

March 1980, a high-level Chinese delegation visited

Washington to discuss further measures to be adopted in

response to the Soviet invasion.450

458 Pox Butterfield, "Brown Sees a Basis for Chinese Accord," The New York Times, 10 January 1980, p. Al.

459 Ibid., p. A5.

460 "u.g, and China to Consult on Afghan Steps," The New York Times, 15 March 1980, p. 3.

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The invasion of Afghanistan marked the resurgence of

U.S. interest in, and aid to, a key regional country -

Pakistan. With Iran in turmoil and the Soviets

consolidating their control of Afghanistan, Pakistan felt

increasingly isolated.451 The long-running conflict with

India now left Pakistan exposed to potentially hostile

countries on all borders. Despite its poor record on both

human rights and nuclear nonproliferation, the Carter

Administration believed it was important to provide a

visible measure of support to the Pakistanis. 452

Due to budgetary constraints brought about by recent

decisions to rebuild military force levels, expand base

access, and provide foreign military aid to a number of

other regional countries. President Carter proposed an

initial arms package for Pakistan amounting to

approximately $400 m i l l i o n . 453 This aid effort was viewed

by President Zia of Pakistan as insufficient to prepare his

forces to meet the potential threats to his borders. He

451 Niksch, "Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response," p. 15. 452 Ibid.

453 Ibid., pp. 16-17. This aid was to be delivered over a two year period, equally divided between military and economic aid.

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publicly dismissed the U.S. offer as " p e a n u t s . "464 add

moral support to the military aid, therefore, Brzezinski

and Christopher journeyed to Pakistan on February 2-4 1980,

continuing the stream of Carter Administration leaders who

had visited the area in the prior two y e a r s . 4 5 5

A Regional Security Framework

While the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a

catalyst, the outlines of the "new regional security

framework” described by President Carter in his State of

the Union address can be traced to early 1979 when the U.S.

began to negotiate a comprehensive program of access to

base facilities in the region. In his speech, however.

Carter, outlined a doctrine that envisioned much more than

access to bases in the region. What was sought was more of

a regional security framework which demonstrated both the

degree of U.S. concern in the region and a commitment to

454 Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 198. Pakistani leaders also believed that acceptance of the offer would incur too many risks and losses in its standing among nonaligned and Islamic nations. See also Niksch, "Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response," p. 17.

455 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 449. Harold Brown had just recently returned from Saudi Arabia, Cyrus Vance had made two trips to the region since March 1978, and Brzezinski had made two trips in the past year.

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become involved should those commitments be threatened. 456

This concept of a regional security zone was an

attempt to tie together the arms control policies, the

force structure, and the base access issues that had

already been pursued into a more formal system of

agreements with, among others, the Egyptians, the Saudis,

the Pakistanis, and the Turks. As noted earlier, the U.S.

still did not have the military force structure to pose a

credible threat to the Soviets in the region. It can be

argued, however, that the level of forces available for

conflict in the region was not as important as the

commitment to employ force to meet a threat.

Carter's State of the Union speech was primarily

drafted by Brzezinski and contained several of the elements

of a little-noticed speech that Brzezinski had presented on

December 5, 1979 in M o n t r e a l . 457 this speech,

Brzezinski described his vision of a world consisting of

three "strategic zones," in which the Par East and Europe

now also must vie for U.S. strategic interest with what he

termed Southwest Asia, including the Persian Gulf and the

Middle East. He further noted that the new focus on this

region was recognition that the next decade, the 1980's.

455 Sick, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategy," p. 73; also Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 444.

457 Sick, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategy," p. 74.

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would witness continuing world interest in this region of

the w o r l d . 468

Three weeks before the invasion, on December 4, 1979,

the decision had been made to formally seek access to

military facilities in the Indian Ocean. Specifically, the

joint State/Defense negotiations with Oman, Somalia, and

Kenya for contingency arrangements for naval and air basing

facilities and for occasional visits were adopted by the President.469

By the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in

late December 1979, therefore, most of the component parts

of a significant U.S. military presence in the region were

in place, albeit in varying degrees. Throughout 1978 and

1979:

"...a number of incremental decisions were made regarding preparations for prepositioning of military stockpiles, holding of joint exercises with some of the friendly countries in the region, and enhancing U.S. naval/air deployments in the area. All of that gradually generated bureaucratic momentum, with the NSC staff in firm control."4/u

The security framework that President Carter called

for in his State of the Union address, however, did not

receive a very warm response from the countries of the

Persian Gulf and Northern Indian Ocean. Only the President

468 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 443-444

469 Sick.

4^6 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 447.

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of Egypt and the Sultan of Oman endorsed the p r o p o s a l .

The Saudis were perhaps the most concerned country in the

region, with its large non-Saudi population and its

proximity to other upheavals and shared U.S. concerns about

possible Soviet designs on the Gulf area. But they were

reluctant to be seen cooperating too closely with the U.S

because of their commitment to the Palestinian cause and

their opposition to the Camp David agreements.

While all of the Islamic countries in the region

condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and most also

wanted to see a U.S. response to the growing Soviet

influence, they were extremely reluctant to enter into

specific military relationships with the U.S. Both Arab

spokesmen and U.S. State Department personnel felt that the

U.S. military presence in the region should be maintained

"over the horizon" — referring to their preference for

naval airpower and amphibious forces maintained afloat

rather than air and ground forces based ashore in regional

countries.473

471 Dougherty, The Horn of Africa, p. 50.

472 Edward Cody, "Arabs Wary of Carter's Call for Joint Security Links," The Washington Post, 25 January 1980, p. 1.

473 Kenneth H. Bacon and Karen Elliot House, "Broadscale Arming, Subtle Allegiances Form Part of U.S.'s Mideast Security Plan," Wall Street Journal, 25 January 1980, p. 2.

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In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,

the Carter Administration increased the level of naval

presence to three full carrier battle groups centered on

CSS KITTY HAWK, OSS MIDWAY, and USS NIHITZ. On February

13, 1980, DOD spokesman Howard Ross announced an

unprecedented change in U.S. policy. He explained that:

"a four ship an^hibious task force from the Seventh Fleet with an embarked Marine Amphibious Unit, including 1800 Marines, will deploy to the Arabian Sea in mid-March. The Amphibious Task Force is now in the Western Pacific and will conduct exercises there during the next two weeks. It will then proceed to the Arabian Sea to join with the two Carrier Battle Groups operating there."*'*

This force included the helicopter assault ship USS

OKINAWA, dock landing ship USS ALAMO, attack cargo ship USS

MOBILE, and tank landing ship USS SAN BERNADINO. USS

GRIDLEY and USS BARBEY escorted this force into the Indian

Ocean. This was the first time in the history of U.S.

presence in the Indian Ocean that a Marine force of this

size had deployed to that region.*75 it was the first of

four such deployments that saw a Navy-Marine Corps

amphibious capability on station in the northwest quadrant

of the Indian Ocean almost continuously until March

474 U.S., Department of Defense, "Press Conference of 13 February, 1980," (Mimeo) Available at the Pentagon Library, Washington, D.C.; see also unclassified message - SECDEF WASHDC msg 132047Z Feb 80 (Subject: Press Announcement - Indian Ocean Deployment) available at the Naval Archives, Washington Naval District, Washington, D.C. 475 Ibid.

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1981.476 One month later on April 27, 1980, O.S. naval

presence in the Indian Ocean reached a record level of 34

ships with the return of the CONSTELLATION battle g r o u p . 4 7 7

U.S. presence remained at or near this level for the

remainder of 1980 and for two months subsequent to the

release of the U.S. hostages on January 20, 1981. The U.S.

Navy continued to maintain two carrier battle groups in the

Indian Ocean until October 21, 1981, when the force level

dropped to one battle group for the first time since

November 1979. 478

The invasion of Afghanistan created a situation that

brought the issue of allied burden sharing to the fore. It

demonstrated both the capability and intent of the Soviet

Union to use military power against a non-European state in

a manner that posed a threat to Western interests outside

the traditional NATO geographic area of operations.479 The

invasion and the seizure of the hostages created a force

allocation problem for the United States that was also

political in nature.

While the initial response from the NATO allies to

476 Kelly, "Naval Deployments in the Indian Ocean," p. 179.

477 Ibid., p. 180. 478 Ibid.

479 Niksch, "Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response.," p. 8.

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the Soviet invasion was more restrained than the Carter

Administration would have liked, the NATO Council, on

January 1, 1980, agreed with the U.S. representative.

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher on many of the

steps which President Carter would soon announce, including

boycotting the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, stopping wheat

sales, breaking off cultural exchanges, and refusing to

renew commercial credits.480

The dominant political question that confronted the

leadership of the NATO alliance was how the United States

could continue to bear the major burden for the maintenance

of European security while, at the same time, allocating

scarce resources to support crisis management in the

Persian Gulf where European interests were as great as

those of the U.S. while NATO adhered to a Europe-first

policy.481 On February 27, 1979, General Alexander Haig,

USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), warned that:

"Clearly our most important challenge in the period ahead is the necessity to deal with the relationship between events occurring outside NATO's geographic boundaries and the security of the alliance itself. °

480 Ibid., p. 19.

481 Ibid., p. 20.

482 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, "Statement" by General Alexander Haig, USA, Military Posture and Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980 and Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Hearings, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p. 1376.

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Carter, in his State of the Union message on January 23,

1980, warned that the United States could not be expected

to shoulder the entire burden of international security on its own.483

NATO was not pleased with the prospect of U.S. force

redeployments or of having to augment forces to meet NATO

commitments while U.S. forces deployed to the Indian Ocean.

In a speech to the Bundestag in January 1980, Chancellor

Helmut Schmidt of West Germany warned against "unconsidered

talk about a geographical extension of NATO

obligations. "484 The Military Committee of the North

Atlantic Assembly argued in 1980 that:

"When discussing re-establishing an allied naval presence in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis, it should be remembered that naval assets in NATO's current areas of responsibility are already said to be below SACLANT's requirements and national replacement programs do not provide for greater numbers. While the allies will have to cover any gaps left by American redeployments...it is unrealistic to expect a permanent contribution to the Indian Ocean without creating a shortfall elsewhere."485

U.S., President, "The State of the Union: An Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of Congress, January 23, 1980," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, January 28, 1980, p. 197 (hereinafter referred to as State of the Union, 1980).

484 John Vincour, "Schmidt Still Plans Moscow Trip," The New York Times, 18 January 1980, p. 4.

485 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Military Committee, General Report on Alliance Security Issues (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1980) (1980X200 MC(80)8, para 13).

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Nonetheless, in May 1980, NATO agreed to the first phase of

a plan enabling the U.S. to employ forces currently

earmarked for or assigned to NATO for contingencies in the

Persian Gulf.48® Hence, even if only by implication, NATO

tacitly defined a security interest which lay outside its

traditional defense perimeter.

In what certainly was a test of this agreement, there

is evidence that the deployment of several German warships

to the Indian Ocean in 1980 was the result of pressure from

the United States to send naval forces into the region even

if only as a symbolic gesture of recognition of the

importance of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to NATO.

The notion of deploying German forces outside the NATO

geographic area of operations was sensitive and involved

certain constitutional questions within Germany. Indeed,

there was a prohibition in the basic law of the Federal

Republic against permanent deployments of West Germany's

maritime forces in areas such as the Indian Ocean.

Nevertheless, some Christian Democrats in Germany expressed

the opinion that a symbolic West German naval presence in

the Gulf would serve as a valuable gesture of solidarity

toward the United States. They explained that such action

was not inconsistent with German national security policy

6 See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Final Communique Issued by the NATO Defense Planning Committee," NATO Review, June 1980, pp. 31-32.

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in view of West Germany's decision on where its warships

would operate in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea

in support of NATO.487

On several occasions U.S. naval forces tried,

unsuccessfully, to operate with German ships in unplanned

tactical maneuvers, commonly referred to as Passing

Exercises, in both the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean,

but German commanders were careful to avoid the appearance

of being part of a NATO augment to U.S. forces. The German

ships did exercise with French forces in the Mediterranean.

This deployment demonstrated that with more detailed NATO

planning, the Bundesmarine either could provide some units

for an Indo-Pacific contingency or, more preferably, could

deploy a more substantial number of surface combatants to

the Baltic and North Seas thereby releasing the more

experienced U.S. and British forces for duties

e l s e w h e r e . 488 since 1979, Great Britain and Italy have

also contributed directly to the force structure in the

Indian Ocean through the deployment of naval forces to the

67 John Vincour, "Bonn Expects Pressure from Allies to Send Warships to Persian Gulf," The New York Times, 13 October 1980, p. 16.

488 William T. Tow, "U.S. Alliance Policies and Asian Pacific Security: A Trans-Regional Approach," Naval War College Review (September-October 1981): 42.

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region.489 Between March 1978 and September 1980 Great

Britain raised its force level in the Indian Ocean to an

average level of eight ships of the Royal Navy. These

units usually operated in the Gulf of Oman with four on

patrol at any given time.490

Australian cooperation with the United States, both

on a bilateral basis as well as within the framework of

AN2US, increased. At the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the

ANZUS Council in Washington, D.C., on June 7 and 8, 1978,

the Council reviewed the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation

Talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and reiterated

its concern that any Indian Ocean agreement "must not

detract from the ANZUS Alliance."491 At its meeting in

Canberra on July 4 and 5, 1979, the Council noted that the

United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to discuss

the resumption of their bilateral talks on questions

concerning arms limitation measures in the Indian Ocean.

Although the Council expressed its support for mutual

restraint, it did so only so long as any such measures were

489 O.S., Department of Defense, Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense (Washington, D.C.: March 1983), p. 61.

490 Kelly, "Naval Deployments in the Indian Ocean," p. 182.

491 U.S., Department of State, "ANZUS Council Communique," The Department of State Bulletin, July 1978, p. 48.

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"consistent with the security interests of the ANZUS

partners."492 when the Council met in Washington on

February 26 and 27, 1980, it "acknowledged that the

political climate" as a result of the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan was "not conducive to resumption of U.S.-Soviet

talks on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean."493

Despite this cautious rhetoric there was growing

evidence that the Indian Ocean had become part of ANZUS*

sphere of concern. Australia began to step up its maritime

patrols in the Indian Ocean ranging as far as the Bay of

Bengal. It is also significant that RAAF P-3 aircraft

began to use Diego Garcia on an ad hoc basis to support

these reconnaissance flights. Moreover, the airfield on

the Cocos-Keeling Islands took on a new significance in

this regard. In early 1980, Australia and New Zealand

agreed, in discussions with the U.S. under the aegis of the

ANZUS treaty, to expand their respective military roles in

the Indian Ocean. Australia agreed to deploy a battle

group built around HMAS MELBOURNE. Since 1979 a series of

combined exercises nicknamed BEACON COMPASS have been held

in the Indian Ocean with Australian, New Zealand, and

492 O.S., Department of State, "ANZUS Council Communique," The Department of State Bulletin, September 1979, p. 57.

4^3 Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, "Backgrounder No. 223 of February 27, 1980, Annex, p. 3.

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British navies. The U.S. participated in BEACON COMPASS 80

contributing a battle group centered on USS MIDWAY. This

exercise, planned largely by the ANZUS navies, involved 25

ships, 170 aircraft and 18,000 personnel. Its objective

was to demonstrate the continued presence, cooperation and

readiness of allied forces in the Indian Ocean.494

The question of Cockburn Sound arose again when

Defense Minister Kileen again extended an invitation to the

U.S. Navy "to use the facility at HMAS STIRLING" on

Cockburn Sound in Western Australia. He also noted that "a

warm welcome will always await (the U.S. N a v y ) . "495 the

wake of the search for facility access in the Indian Ocean,

the U.S. began to reconsider Cockburn Sound. Speaking

during a visit to Sydney on June 3, 1980, Admiral Robert L.

J. Long, USN, Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC),

commented that :

The U.S. Government is certainly looking at Cockburn Sound as a likely homeport for its carrier forces in the Indian Ocean. We are looking at a number of possibilities, including Singapore. If the U.S. were to establish a homeport at HMAS STIRLING on Cockburn Sound it would involve several thousand families.496

494 1980 State Cite 280482; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 210005Z Oct 80 (Subject: Public Affairs Guidance - Exercise BEACON COMPASS).

495 U.S., Department of State, "ANZUS Council Communique," p. 56.

496 Admiral Discusses Australian Homeport," Adelaide Advertiser, June 3, 1980, p. 1.

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The prospect of U.S. use of Cockburn Sound for

homeporting a carrier battle group (CVBG) became a

political issue shortly after Long's remarks. Speaking at

a press conference in Perth on August 22, the leader of the

Australian Labour Party, William Hayden, stated that "if

the Fraser Government approved the use of Cockburn Sound

for homeporting U.S. ships and a Labour Government gained

power, the approval would be repudiated. "497 The State

Labour Party Conference supported Hayden's views on the

subject and called on the Fraser Government to press for a

resumption of the U.S.-Soviet Indian Ocean Arms Limitation

Talks.498 Though this rhetoric was probably the result of

domestic political infighting, there was some concern that,

should a Labour Government replace Fraser's Conservative

Government which had been in power since 1975, the Labour

Party's left wing would press the new Prime Minister to

depart in some areas from Australia's growing support of

the United S t a t e s . 499

497 1 9 8 0 Perth Cite 0343; AMCONSUL PERTH msg 2503032 Aug 80 (Subject: Opposition Leader States ALP Would Repudiate Any Agreement for US Homeporting in Cockburn Sound).

498 1 9 8 0 Perth Cite 0348; AMCONSUL PERTH msg 270344Z Aug 80 (Subject: State ALP Conference Opposes Permanent Basing of Non Australian Naval Units at Cockburn Sound and Urges Resumption of Indian Ocean Peace Talks).

499 When the Labor Party won the elections in March 1983, Prime Minister Robert Hawke selected Hayden as his Foreign Minister. Hawk, however, reassured the Reagan Administration during a visit to the United States in June

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Conspicuous in its absence is any significant

discussion in this chapter of the political measures that

were taken to gain the release of the U.S. hostages in

Iran. Or, more importantly, the military operation that

sought to free the hostages. As noted earlier, these

efforts are dealt with at great length in other studies.

But, more is^rtantly from the perspective of this paper,

the forces that were en^loyed in these efforts did not

indicate a change in the level or nature of O.S. military

presence in the area. Thus, even though these two events

captured a great deal of attention in the press, they had

relatively minor impact on the nature or the level of U.S.

commitment to the region.

The U.S. response to events in Afghanistan might also

be viewed as an effort to dissuade the Soviets from taking

advantage of the unstable situation in Iran at this time.

Although U.S. hostages were being held by a group of

"students" which nominally had the approval of the

1983 on this matter. Though he acknowledged that there were some in Australia who wanted U.S. bases there closed, he went on to explain that he believed that Australia had:

"... a clear perception of global realities and would regard it an exercise in delusion to think that we can engage in some unilateral process of disarmament and detachment from the alliances of the West."

See Richard Bernstein, "Australia Assures U.S. on Use of Joint Bases," The New York Times, 19 June 1983, p. 15; see also Russell Schneider, "U.S. Will Help Us in Any Regional War," The Australian, 15 June 1983, p. 1.

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Ayatollah Khomeni, the central government and the armed

forces were in a state of flux, with rapid changes in

government and military leaders. By August 1980, the

Soviets were deploying forces on the Iranian border. Iran

and Iraq, meanwhile, were preparing to commence what would

be a long and exhausting w a r . 680 it was in response to the

growing number of air strikes by both Iraqi and Iranian

aircraft against surface shipping in the Gulf that the U.S.

decided in late 1980 to deploy AWAC aircraft to Saudi Arabia.601

At an NSC meeting on September 29, 1980, the

President formally approved the deployment of AWACs

aircraft to Saudi Arabia. More importantly, he also

approved efforts to enlist the assistance of the NATO

allies in U.S. efforts to maintain the freedom of

navigation through the Persian Gulf.602 As part of this

effort, the President sent a letter to French president

Giscard proposing a "joint American-French naval presence

in the Arabian Gulf, to keep the Strait of Hormuz open.

The French agreed and the U.S. proceeded to move more U.S.

navy ships into the Northern Arabian Sea.603

500 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 451.

601 Ibid., p. 453. 602 Ibid. 603 Ibid.

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A Long Term Commitment

By the end of January 1980, one month after the

Soviets moved across the Afghan border, the president had

laid the basis for two types of American responses. One was

a strengthening of the U.S. military position, with help,

where possible, from allies that were far more dependent

upon oil from the Gulf than the O.S. The development of

this response, including increased defense budgets, force

structures (including the RDJTP), bases, and efforts to

work with those allies as well as regional nations, had

largely been pursued before the invasion. The other

response was to penalize the Soviet Onion for its

aggression in hope of deterring it from some future

repetition and thereby instilling confidence among friends

and allies.

Both sets of responses would have a long term impact

not only on U.S. policy toward the Indian Ocean and Persian

Gulf region, but also on U.S.-Soviet relations. The decade

long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the threat to

U.S. and allied shipping resulting from the Iran-Iraq war

would continue to focus U.S. attention on the region, but

the U.S. commitment to the region that emerged over the

four years of the Carter Administration would remain

intact.

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CONCLUSION: CONSTRUCTIVE INCREHENTALISH

On January 23, 1980, Carter delivered the final blow

to any hope of reducing U.S. or Soviet presence in the

Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region in the near future. In

his third State of the Union message, he explained that:

"Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Later that year he argued that:

"Soviet aggression in Afghanistan unless checked confronts all the world with the most serious long-term strategic challenge since the Cold War began. To underestimate the magnitude of that challenge would constitute an historic error...."505

Clearly events in the region had become much more than

peripheral concerns to U.S. policymakers.

This chapter summarizes the incremental responses

that were taken to each crisis to determine how that

process affected U.S. policy in the region. It then offers

664 state of the Union, 1980, p. 197.

665 U.S., Department of State, "U.S. Interests and Ideals," The Department of State Bulletin, June 1980, p. 7.

271

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some suggestions as to how the Carter Administration might

have applied the three questions posed in Chapter III to

this extended crisis. Finally it reviews the geographic

and political constraints that made the formulation of a

policy for this region particularly difficult for O.S.

decisionmakers.

A Rigorous Reappraisal

The most significant change in President Carter's

regional policy was his initial reversal of a commitment to

stop the flow of arms to the Third World. The decision to

provide arms to Somalia marked the first step away from

efforts to limit confrontation with the Soviet Union

worldwide and provided the initial increment of a new U.S.

policy toward the region.

There was little that President Carter could have

done to preclude a Somali/Ethiopian conflict which was

rooted in long-held animosities. The Carter Administration

inherited a deteriorating relationship with a new, Marxist-

oriented Ethiopian government at the same time that the

Soviets were consolidating their relationship with Somalia.

Given the "Twin Pillars" concept of regional security also

inherited from the Nixon Administration, President Carter

viewed "demilitarization" of the region, or at least

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"restraint" on the part of the superpowers in the region,

as a viable policy for the O.S.

Using the commencement of the Indian Ocean Arms

Limitation Talks as a starting point, and the Carter

Doctrine as the ultimate codification of U.S. regional

policy, the first major incremental change was the

provision of arms (mostly defensive) to Somalia. Preceding

this, the decision was made to change arms control efforts

from "demilitarization" to "restraint" in recognition of

the need for some minimum level of U.S military presence in

the region, or at least the ability to move forces into the

region should U.S. interests (i.e., oil supply) be placed

in jeopardy.

The involvement of Soviet and Cuban forces in the

Horn of Africa and a buildup of Soviet naval forces in the

Indian Ocean precipitated debate within the Administration

as to whether to link future arms control to Soviet

behavior in the region. The linkage of arms control

initiatives with Soviet conduct in the Horn thus represents

the first diplomatic effort to deviate from the

Administration's initial goal of regional disengagement.

It was accompanied by considerable discussion of the

appropriateness of linking long-range goals (arms control)

with near-term Soviet actions (military support of

Ethiopia). In this case, the incremental step taken was

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accompanied by careful consideration of both preceding

decisions and possible outcomes. These previous decisions

included the desire for superpower disengagement from Third

World conflicts, the reduction of arms transfers to

belligerents, and the reduction of U.S. and Soviet military

presence in the region.

As the Somali offensive was repulsed in early

February 1978 and the Soviet-supported Ethiopian forces

prepared for a counteroffensive, the Carter Administration

was pressured by both regional friends (such as Saudi

Arabia, Iran, and Egypt) and European allies (such as

Germany) to counter growing Soviet influence on the Horn.

For the first time, the Carter Administration had to weigh

the desirability of maintaining its own influence in the

region against goals that it had set for itself. Continued

Soviet presence in the Horn and a massive supply effort to

counter the Somali invasion of the Ogaden, however,

eventually led the Administration to supply arms, not only

to a Third World country involved in hostilities, but to a

country that was clearly the aggressor in the conflict.

U.S. decisionmakers were very specific about both the

target of their decision — the Soviet Union — and the

issue which had precipitated their decision — the

increasing Soviet/Cuban presence in Ethiopia and the

transfer of large amounts of arms and supplies. At the

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same time, the Administration was careful not to link this

response to regional events or to other arms limitation

negotiations (i.e., SALT II). Thus, it appears that in the

initial incremental step away from rapproachment with the

Soviets and toward commitment in the region, the Carter

Administration pursued a focused response to a specific

event that was also directed toward a discrete audience.

It may also be concluded that the longer term effects of

this decision were addressed and that the basis of new

regional policy, one based on the necessity for responsible

actions on the part of the Soviet Onion, were formed before

the Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Talks were abandoned.

The Carter Doctrine, which emerged some three years

later, poses a dilemma if examined in terms of President

Carter's early calls for a demilitarized zone in the Indian

Ocean. Though Carter and his advisors could not have

reasonably predicted how events would develop, the

political and military realities of the situation in the

Indian Ocean made it difficult to understand how the United

States could have foresworn the option or the ability to

project military power into the region. The Carter

Doctrine eventually recognized this reality. Yet, the

question remains as to how Carter would have handled the

situation had the Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Talks been

carried to some form of successful conclusion. Almost all

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the elements of the Carter Doctrine which were in operation

by the end of 1980 were, in one way or another, issues

during the lOALT.

The Sequence of the Response

As the Somali/Ethiopian conflict moved toward a

standoff (although certainly not a conclusion, since these

two countries remain in conflict today), events elsewhere

in the region soon further contributed to a sense of

crisis. As a result of a series of assassinations and

armed conflict during early and mid 1978, it appeared that

war between North and South Yemen was imminent.

With the Soviets again providing large quantities of

arms to one of the belligerents, the Carter Administration

was faced with the option of supplying arms to North Yemen,

as it was urged to do by the Saudis, or attempting to

reengage the Soviets in arms control negotiations for the

region. There may have also been other options. However,

there is no indication that the Carter Administration

considered a return to lOALT following its decision to

provide arms to the Somalis. The signing of the Soviet-

Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in May 1977,

the conclusion of a similar treaty between South Yemen and

the Soviet Onion in February 1980, and the apparent or

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feared military successes of these two recipients of Soviet

aid concerned other countries in the region. This concern

would certainly have been greater had the O.S. unilaterally

reduced its military presence.

Having previously decided to supply arms to Somalia

only after considerable debate both within the

Administration and in Congress, the Carter Administration

expended relatively little analysis or debate on its

subsequent decision to expedite the delivery of arms to

North Yemen. The subtle shift in the nature of the arms

being transferred to a Third World belligerent also passed

without much notice. North Yemen received arms which were

clearly offensive in nature, as opposed to the defensive

arms that were supplied to the Somalis.

The U.S. also had not pursued an opportunity to use a

naval "show of force" to demonstrate its concern over

Soviet resupply or military presence in Ethiopia, despite

the presence of a carrier battle group in the region. In

the case of the Yemen crisis, however, it deployed a

carrier battle group specifically to demonstrate its

concern (the previous battle group having been in the

region on a scheduled exercise commitment). This marked

the first use of military forces (as opposed to military

arms sales) to indicate U.S. commitment to the region.

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Finally, the Administration stepped up efforts to

structure forces that could respond to contingencies in

distant areas of the world. Despite the general perception

that the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was conceived

and structured primarily in response to Soviet aggression

in Afghanistan, President Carter had actually directed that

this force be structured in the early days of his

Administration. As the Horn of Africa and the Arabian

Peninsula became more unstable, the Administration placed

renewed emphasis on the implementation of these earlier

directives to form the RDJTF.

The O.S. response to the Yemeni "crisis," therefore,

included incremental steps such as the deployment of naval

forces, the sale of offensive weaponry, and the creation of

forces specifically designed to respond rapidly to Third

World conflicts (Low Intensity Conflicts). While this

"crisis" never materialized, perceptions in Washington were

being formed by these and other events, not only on the

Horn of Africa, but also increasingly in Iran, where, by

mid to late 1978, the Shah was being pressured to abdicate

and a growing fundamentalist Islamic revolution that was

hostile to the United States was gaining power.

The sequential question posed in Chapter I asks "to

which specific crisis, in a series of crises, is the

contemplated policy responding." There is some question

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whether U.S. responses to the situation in Yemen — ship

movements, arms sales, and force structure — were meant as

responses to this low level conflict in the Yemens, the now

dormant Somali/Ethiopian conflict, growing unrest in Iran,

or the increasing Soviet presence throughout the region.

The events in Yemen certainly did not warrant either the

level of forces deployed in a carrier battle group or those

envisioned in the RDJTF. The sale of offensive weaponry,

paid for by the Saudis and expedited for delivery without

the normal Congressional review process, did not change the

ongoing nature of the conflict in the Yemens or the level

of Soviet support for South Yemen.

In reviewing the analytical question, which asks

whether the contemplated response by the decisionmaker

addresses the specific crisis at hand or is it directed at

a larger issue, it might be concluded that the target of

these moves — the intended audience — was the Soviet

Union. If so, then the incremental steps taken to convey

U.S. resolve to maintain influence in the region were made

in the absence of a larger framework — a policy that might

have incorporated them in a more coherent and fully-formed

fashion. On the other hand, the target of these

incremental changes might have been the countries of the

region, or perhaps on a grander (and vaguer) scale, world

opinion. It might be argued that, following perceived

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Soviet successes in Angola, Ethiopia, and Yemen, the U.S.

needed to demonstrate a willingness and a capability to

influence events in this region of the world. Again, the

answer to the analytical question was unclear.

The Target of the Response

The fall of the Shah of Iran in late 1978, the

subsequent turmoil in that country, the emergence of a

government hostile to the U.S., the seizure of the U.S.

embassy, and the internment of its occupants all

contributed to a sense of crisis among Administration

decisionmakers. The Administration took a wide range of

diplomatic and economic steps to signal its concern and to

isolate Iran. It continued the military steps that it had

already taken, with U.S. naval forces centered around

carrier battle groups remaining in the region in increased

numbers. Given this now continuous presence of large

numbers of ships, the U.S. began to investigate options for

military base support.

The increased U.S. requirement for access to bases

ceuae at a time when regional countries were becoming

concerned about their ability to counter unrest similar to

that taking place in Iran. The reluctance to become

closely associated with the United States, resulting in

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large measure (but not exclusively) from the ongoing

Arab/Israeli conflict, placed regional countries that were

potential U.S. allies in a precarious position. The U.S.,

for its part, not only sought bases to support its

continued military presence in the region, but also wanted

visible support from regional countries to justify its

presence in the region, both at home and abroad.

The decision to initiate negotiations for access to

facilities in the region was taken, in part, to obtain

visible commitment from those regional countries that were

unofficially requesting an increased U.S. presence in the

Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.^®® The incremental change

to U.S. policy in this case was the supporting structure

required to accommodate the increased number of forces

already operating in the region, as well as the potentially

large number of forces associated with the RDJTF. Thus,

the incremental addition of base access was necessitated by

the decision taken earlier to deploy naval forces to the

region and the renewed effort to build the RDJTF.

The timing of the negotiations for access to regional

facilities, however, might suggest that the U.S. was

responding primarily to the Iranian seizure of U.S.

hostages. In fact, the U.S. military response to the

hostage seizure resulted in little increase in force levels

Hayward.

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or change in the nature of the forces involved in the

region. If the negotiations for access to regional

facilities are viewed merely as an extension of an earlier

U.S. decision to have sufficient forces readily available

to respond to instability in the Horn of Africa or on the

Arabian Peninsula, then these efforts were only an

incremental change necessitated by previous policy

decisions. However, coming at the time of the Iranian

hostage crisis, these negotiations may have appeared to be

more an effort to isolate Iran and to provide the

wherewithal to undertake military operations against that

country.

U.S. actions following the Iranian seizure of U.S.

hostages, therefore, led to confusion both in terms of the

sequential question and the analytical question. As was

noted in the discussions surrounding the formation of the

RDJTF, it was not clear what these forces were structured

to do. The formation of the RDJTF during a time of

relatively low level crises in the Horn of Africa and on

the Arabian Peninsula indicated that it might be intended

to protect U.S interests in lower level conflicts. Later

discussions, however, indicated that it might be structured

to initially engage the Soviet Union anywhere in the world

until such time as larger forces could be brought to bear.

Certainly the Soviet Union must have viewed the U.S.

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efforts to attain access to regional facilities and to

preposition large quantities of military supplies in the

region as part of a U.S. effort to is^rove its military

capability against the Soviet Union's southern flank.

The Enunciation of a Policy

With all of the components of a significant U.S.

presence in the region in place before the Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan, it is not surprising that there was some

confusion as to which actions by the Administration were

directed against the Soviet threat and which were meant to

signal U.S. resolve in other crisis areas. This confusion

was most evident in U.S. efforts to engage its NATO allies

in unified opposition to the Soviet invasion. Since U.S.

naval forces had been in the region for over two years in

response to the crises described herein, some Western

European allies were concerned that by augmenting U.S.

forces they might become associated with the evolving U.S.

policy toward the region.

President Carter's efforts to engage U.S. allies in a

unified front — perhaps even at the risk, albeit a low

one, of general war — was an incremental step that might

have been consistent with previous U.S. decisions, but one

which signalled a significant shift in the nature of U.S.

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policy toward the region and the Soviet Union. The

Europeans were clearly not as ready as President Carter to

tie the Persian Gulf to their "vital interests."

The unanswered question is whether President Carter

really considered the Persian Gulf "vital" enough to risk

direct military conflict with the Soviets as he indicated

in his State of the Union address. Again, as an

incremental step, the inclusion of the Persian Gulf crisis

into the broader context of U.S.-Soviet relations was a

logical extension of steps that the U.S. had already taken

to events in the region. When viewed in isolation,

however, the idea that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

so threatened the national interests of the United States

in the region as to possibly warrant military conflict with

the Soviet Union does not seem credible.

Several other incremental steps taken prior to the

enunciation of the Carter Doctrine were also significant

when viewed out of the context of regional crises. The

discussions with Oman, Somalia, and Kenya for access to

bases are noteworthy in this regard. The establishment of

the KC-135 detachment on Diego Garcia, followed by the open

ocean reconnaissance flight of B-52 aircraft in the Indian

Ocean, was singularly significant. The increased level of

presence generated by the deployment of carrier battle

groups to the region beginning in April 1979 was a portent

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of things to come. However, the Carter Administration made

these decisions concerning the sale of arms, the structure

of forces, and the deployment of forces in response to

specific crises, thereby enabling it to make a marked

change in its foreign policy without appearing inconsistent

with its earlier goals.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the exact

purpose of U.S. forces then in the region was no longer

clear. Events in the Horn had long since simmered down,

the Yemens had maintained an uneasy truce for almost a

year, and there was very little that military power could

do to alter events in Iran (although arguably it might be

used to rescue the hostages or inflict retribution in the

event that they were harmed). If the sequential question

was, therefore, hopelessly confused, the analytical

question was greatly clarified. President Carter made it

clear that the object of U.S. military, economic, and

political initiatives regionally, and now worldwide, was

Soviet aggression.

Living with Incrementalism

Recognizing the potential dangers associated with an

incremental approach to decisionmaking, however, does not

imply that there is a readily available alternative in the

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formulation of a foreign policy, particularly during an

extended series of crises. It is tempting to suggest that

a general regional policy should be announced in broad

terms at the outset and further refined as specific crises

arise. There are, however, several constraints in the

decisionmaking process that preclude such an idealized

procedure.

First, the ability to postulate a general policy,

review its premises, and anticipate all (or even most)

possible outcomes implies an analytical capability that is

simply unavailable to the decisionmaker. This should not,

however, preclude the decisionmaker from setting a general

course which provides sufficient flexibility to respond to

relatively large changes in the international milieu. For

example, it might have been unrealistic for President

Carter to declare a O.S. policy that calls for both

superpower disengagement in the region and a U.S.

commitment to regional security. However, he might have

couched his original goals for regional "restraint" in

terms which stressed a continuing concern for access to the

region's resources and the territorial integrity of the

regional countries.

Second, as subsequent crises emerged in the region, a

prudent review of the incremental process might require the

reappraisal of options that had been previously considered

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but not pursued. For example, the U.S. might have

readdressed the merits of limitations on arms transfers to

the Yemens, despite the failure of similar efforts in the

Horn.

As a corollary to this review of previously

considered options, not all incremental decisions narrow

possible policy options. The decision to vigorously pursue

the RDJTF, for example, provided the Carter Administration

with additional military options for subsequent crises.

Thus, the incremental question — "what decisions brought

me to this point in the evolution?" — might be best

answered by revisiting previously considered options,

including the reappraisal of arms control initiatives, the

use of ground and/or air forces instead of naval forces, or

the submission of conflicts to international arbitration.

The hazards addressed by the sequential question are

very apparent in this review. The use of military force to

signal resolve, in particular, can quickly become

counterproductive, especially if it is not applied in a

timely fashion in response to a specific crisis. The

ambiguity surrounding the presence of U.S. naval forces in

the northern Arabian Sea after February 1979, throughout a

period which encompassed conflict in Yemen, turmoil in

Iran, and an invasion in Afghanistan caused confusion at

home and abroad as to the mission of those forces and the

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nature of O.S. foreign policy. To minimize possible

confusion, therefore, each incremental change to a policy

should, if possible, be identified with a specific event.

This would help to identify either an increment which

achieves a desired result or one that might be

counterproductive to the desired policy.

The implication here is that incremental moves are

necessary during an extended crisis, particularly when

there is a major shift in policy direction involved. In

the case of the Carter Administration's experience in the

Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf, the shift from arms control

proposals to the Carter Doctrine could not have taken place

without the incremental decisions that provided the arms

transfers, forces, and bases to support a declaratory

policy.

In retrospect, therefore, the incremental nature of

the buildup of military forces in the region can, to some

extent, be viewed as a reasonable, even necessary,

precursor to the Carter Doctrine. There is nothing to

indicate, however, that these incremental steps were

systematically made as part of a larger policy. In this

case at least, military force increments preceded political

steps in most crises.

But there were long-term costs associated with the

commitment of O.S. military forces to the region, both

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economically and in terms of the strains placed upon

political relationships with regional countries and, to a

lesser extent, European allies. These costs arguably might

have been minimized by an earlier declaration of U.S.

commitment to regional stability and territorial integrity.

The analytical question contains the most potential

for misunderstanding. Misperceptions can easily arise,

unless the decisionmaker clearly identifies the target of

his policy. This potential is compounded during an

extended crisis in a region. The continuous presence of a

carrier battle group in the northwest Indian Ocean after

mid-1978, became a nonspecific response to events of a

significantly different nature that were occurring in the

region.

An example of a more discrete use of naval forces in

the region might be found in the deployment of the USS

ENTERPRISE battle group into the Indian Ocean on 13-14

December 1971. In this case, countries along the intended

route of the task force were informed in advance of the

ships' movements, so word of the implied American threat

reached New Delhi as early as December 1 1 . The U.S.

announced that the task force was standing by to evacuate

James M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelley, "Super­ power Naval Diplomacy: Lessons of the Indo-Pakistani Crisis 1971," Survival 7 (November-December 1973): 289. See also Haendel, Process of Priority Formulation, pp. 258-264.

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U.S. citizens from Dacca on December 11, but also said that

it might help evacuate Pakistani forces from East Pakistan

after a cease fire.®®® Despite the ongoing nature of the

Indo-Pakistani dispute, these U.S. forces were withdrawn

from the Indian Ocean, without relief, less than one month

later.®®®

As noted in Chapter VII, once Iran seized U.S.

hostages, many of the military options ascribed to U.S.

naval forces in the region became untenable. These forces

were incapable of influencing what was primarily a social

and religious upheaval in Iran, and were arguably

insufficient to conduct significant retaliatory strikes

against Iran in the event that the hostages were harmed.

Similarly, as noted in Chapters VI and VIII, these same

naval forces, augmented by a Marine Amphibious Unit, were

insufficient to counter the large number of Soviet forces

stationed on the northern borders of Iran and Afghanistan.

The efforts of the U.S. to engage our European and

regional allies in a declaratory policy linking their

security with the security of resources from the Persian

Gulf met with, at best, mixed success. By declaring the

security of the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region "vital" to

®®® Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, p. 188.

®®® McConnell and Kelley, "Super-Power Naval Diplomacy," pp. 289-290.

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the U.S., President Carter pressed ahead with his policy

despite the hesitancy of some U.S. European allies (who

arguably had more at stake in the region). During the

Iran-Iraq "Tanker War" (which began in late 1980 and

continued until 1988), the Reagan Administration was more

successful in enlisting the participation of these allies,

including Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and the

Netherlands, in mine sweeping efforts in the Persian Gulf.Sl®

Returning to the central hypothesis postulated in

Chapter I, therefore, it can be concluded that a nation's

foreign policy toward a region is, indeed, more often the

incremental result of a series of decisions than it is a

response to a specific event, and that the Weltanschauung

of the decisionmaker may have little to do with the foreign

policy which emerges from his decisions. However, this

conclusion must be tempered with the acknowledgement that,

in an extended crisis, each event assumes temporary

importance and demands a definitive response. There were

few "minor" or "unrelated" events in the evolution that led

® ® As noted in Chapter VIII, the Carter Administration sought to engage U.S. European allies in the security of the Persian Gulf within the context of the NATO alliance. Although the Reagan Administration sought to obtain some degree of combined command and control of U.S. and European forces operating in the Persian Gulf, it did not press this issue in NATO councils and the European allies avoided any appearance of belonging to a multinational naval force in the region.

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to the Carter Doctrine, at least in the minds of

Administration decisionmakers.

President Carter's initial efforts to "demilitarize"

the Indian Ocean were replaced by the deployment of large

numbers of U.S. military forces to the region, negotiations

for access to regional facilities, and the sale of arms to

regional belligerents without the declaration of a policy

which might have clarified U.S. interests to both regional

and nonregional countries and served as an internal

guideline for U.S. policymakers when determining

appropriate responses to regional events. Furthermore,

this policy was promulgated after the supporting

incremental measures had already been taken. As the

official statement of U.S. policy, the Carter Doctrine was

more ad hoc, a formal legitimization of a pre-existing, de

facto policy, than the declaration of a carefully

engineered framework for U.S. relations with the regional

countries and the Soviet Union.

Interests Over Ideals

The transformation from arms control to military

commitment that took place in a little less than three

years required considerable intellectual effort on the part

of Administration decisionmakers. It is doubtful that such

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a transformation could have taken place had the crises

described herein taken place in a shorter period of time or

at the outset of the Administration. Unfolding over an

extended period of time, however, incremental adjustments

to these crises led to significant change in U.S. policy

toward the region.

Brzezinski, who claims credit for drafting Carter's

State of the Union message,was probably most

comfortable with the transformation, since he maintained a

more suspicious view of Soviet motives worldwide than did,

for example, Cyrus Vance. As noted in the last chapter, he

was increasingly alarmed about the nature of the crises in

the region and the role that the Soviet Union seemed to be

playing in each instance.

Recalling an interview he gave to The Wall Street

Journal on January 15, 1980,®^^ Brzezinski outlined his

view of U.S. policy in the post-World War II era as focused

on "the two central strategic zones - Western Europe and

the Far East." He went on to explain that "a third

strategic zone (had) assumed in recent years vital

importance to the United States and its allies: the region

®^^ Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.444-445.

®^^ See "An Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski," The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 1980, p. 20:3. This idea was expanded upon in Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan, (Boston, Massachusetts: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), pp. 41-52, and in the Executive Summary, p. 253.

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we call Southwest Asia today, including the Persian Gulf

and the Middle East."®^®

Brzezinski explained how the Carter Doctrine was an

expression of the views discussed in the SCC on the need

for a new "regional security freunework" for this zone - a

subject on which Brzezinski had drafted a memorandum to

Carter on January 9, 1980.®^^ Brzezinski noted that

Carter, subsequent to this memo and his State of the Union

speech, had convened the NSC on several occasions and more

than twenty meetings of the SCC had been held to develop

this concept.®^® He later explained that this was a

logical conclusion to his "Arc of Crisis" thesis first

articulated in late 1978 and to his memorandum to Carter on

February 28, 1979 on the Indian Ocean talks. This

memorandum urged Carter to consider a new "security

framework" to reassert U.S. power and influence in the

region and thereby abandon his earlier plans to

demilitarize the Indian Ocean.®^®

®^® Sick, All Fall Down, p. 74.

®^^ Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 444.

®^® Sick, All Fall Down, p. 74.

®^® Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 446-447. There is another possible explanation of Brzezinski's actions. The "Arc of Crisis" and the role in the formulation of the Carter Doctrine could very well have been an exercise in bureaucratic politics designed to help Brzezinski seize the high ground in his differences with Vance over U.S. foreign and national security policy.

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Carter, perhaps more than any other modern American

president, believed deeply in the inertance of dialogue

and mutual accommodation between the United States and the

Soviet Union on fundamental issues of peace and

international security. He was truly prepared to walk the

second mile in pursuit of nonviolent solutions to issues of

East-West competition.®^^ This commitment to nonviolent

solutions included the assumption (one shared by other

presidents as well) that arms control might lead to a

reduction in superpower tension. In his memoirs. Carter

states:

"...as a clear signal that we could make progress together toward peace, I wanted to work with the Soviet leaders to establish strict limits on the permanent deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean...."®^®

As was noted in Chapter IV, Carter's first statement on

"demilitarizing" the Indian Ocean also reflected his belief

that progress on issues of lesser concern in the superpower

relationship could lead to progress in issues that were

central to that relationship.®^®

Yet less than one year after Carter’s proposal, the

United States refused to reschedule any more rounds of

talks. Less than two years after the initial proposal, the

®^^ Sick, All Fall Down, p.73.

®^® Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 217.

®^^ Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 153.

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United States was looking for ways to enhance its presence

in the Indian Ocean. Three years after his inauguration,

the Carter Doctrine had been proclaimed and the United

States Navy was allocating more of its resources to the

Indian Ocean than ever before. This trend seems to have

reflected a certain tension between Carter's strong

commitment to arms control and his growing appreciation

that traditional power politics continued to play a role in

the superpower relationship. Arms control can never be an

acceptable policy option apart from national interests.

President Carter certainly understood this. Still the

President was compelled to make personally difficult

decisions that collectively led him away from an ideally

preferred course of arms control toward policies that were

grounded unambiguously in traditional power politics.

Geopolitical Imperatives

Thus by the end of 1980, the Carter policy for the

Indian Ocean had shifted from one of stabilization cast in

a regional arms control proposal to confrontation built

around an enhanced U.S. military capability in the region.

Although some, including Brzezinski himself, explained this

change in the historical perspective of the Truman

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Doctrine,®^® there is another explanatory factor of

importance: geography.

As a result of the geography of the region and its

effect on the politico-military position of the United

States, geopolitics underwent a resurgence of sorts in U.S.

national security policy for three reasons - all of which

are germane to the Indian Ocean. The first, the West's

growing dependence on imported sources of energy,

especially oil, sensitized policymakers to the realities of

geography. In the past, physical terrain, demographic

characteristics, and boundaries did not play in the

calculations that governed the flow of oil. However,

because of the West's dependence on oil from the Persian

Gulf and the politics of the Indian Ocean region, there was

a growing concern over the stability of Gulf regimes and

the impact of external intervention in the affairs of the

states along the littoral of the northwest quadrant of the

Indian Ocean. As long as there was a requirement for the

oil of the Persian Gulf states, U.S. interest in the region

would continue. As long as that dependence remained, there

would be a close linkage between the energy that the region

provided and the security consequences that it engendered.

® ® Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 444-446; see also Melvyn P. Leffler, "From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmas of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Fall 1983): 245-266.

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The second factor — the growth of Soviet power and

the enhanced capability to project that power beyond the

borders of the Soviet Onion — had invested a hitherto

secondary area of the world (in terms of U.S. political

calculations) with considerable strategic importance.

Defense planners found themselves addressing questions of

distance and climate as the probability of confronting

Soviet forces in the region increased.Moveover,

enduring geopolitical realities played a role here. There

is, arguably, a rough parallel between Russian expansion

into central Asia in the nineteenth century and the Soviet

advance into Afghanistan. To protect its borders, the

Russian Empire had felt it necessary to expand, only to be

confronted with resistance from new forces.

The third element that stimulated the recognition of

geography as a factor in strategic planning was the

perception that the existence of parity between the Soviet

Union and the United States at the strategic level may have

lessened the utility of nuclear weapons. As a consequence,

general purpose forces assumed renewed significance in U.S.

national security policy, particularly in regions such as

the Indian Ocean. Hence, geographic factors had to be

carefully evaluated if these forces were to be employed

Woolsey and Moodie, "Geopolitics and Maritime Power in the Indian Ocean," Appendix B, p. 2.

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effectively. This element is particularly germane to the

sizing of general purpose naval forces since the

composition of these forces is usually estimated by

specifying theaters and missions, by analyzing hypothetical

but plausible naval campaigns, and by determining the

number of theaters to be dealt with simultaneously. The

applicability of this geographic factor was minimized

earlier in the case of the Indian Ocean Arms Limitation

Talks in an effort to engage the Soviet Union in a broadly

based d i a l o g u e , even though it was later a significant

force in the considerations of the United States that led

up to the Carter Doctrine.

These geopolitical considerations affected the

conduct of military operations in the Indian Ocean as well

as the type and quantity of forces assigned to carry them

out. This perception is not new. The shift from wood to

coal and then from coal to oil, for example, each created a

new geopolitical situation for the Royal Navy in the

nineteenth century and generated new operational

requirements as well. Then, just as in 1980, the issue of

logistics loomed large in the calculations of the

respective national security decisionmakers.®^® While the

logistics difficulties in the Indian Ocean (discussed

®®® Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 217-218.

®®® van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 82.

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earlier) created problems for peacetime naval operations,

those problems were not insurmountable.

This study has focused on the employment of O.S.

naval forces in the region. The role of these naval forces

in the Indian Ocean was primarily to influence the

situation on land. The naval operations discussed herein,

therefore, cannot be divorced from the land and air

operations, because events in one milieu strongly influence

operations in the other. Unless a planner deals strictly

with sea control operations, naval operations in the Indian

Ocean must be considered in conjunction with operations

ashore. The air environment is equally important as well

since a case can be made that the party who quickly secures

control of the air in a conflict in the Persian Gulf holds

the key to ultimate success.

The events of 1977 through 1980 in the Indian Ocean

demonstrate that, despite a desire for disengagement in a

regional arms buildup, crises and conflicts would continue

to be part and parcel of the international system and that,

in such cases as the Indian Ocean, distance would

accentuate the United States' inability to maintain

escalation dominance.®®^ Moreover, while the force

Escalation dominance refers to the notion that by virtue of its strategic nuclear superiority, the U.S. could forestall a conventional attack or other action short of a nuclear war.

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required in a crisis situation may largely depend on the

distance between those forces' normal bases and the theater

of operations (with more forces being required to support

more distant operations), the forces available tend to be

inversely proportional to the distance. Therefore,

distance in a purely physical, geographic sense serves as a

modifying factor, and perhaps as an equalizer, in the

application of escalation dominance in a crisis situation.

Once Carter chose to use military forces to signal a

O.S. commitment to regional friends, geography became a

determining factor. The Indian Ocean was a naval theater.

Its overwhelming feature was its distance from the United

States. These two elements dictated that the U.S. military

presence would rely, to a great extent, on its Navy since

only these forces could provide the access and operational

endurance required to support policy across such a broad

reach of geography.

Bases were important because a naval force operating

thousands of miles from its support infrastructure required

a well-developed and integrated system of forward bases,

replenishment sites and repair facilities. U.S. general

purpose forces, particularly conventional naval forces,

have traditionally been employed to signal U.S. interest in

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crisis situations.®®® In the post-World War II era,

carrier battle groups have increasingly been employed in

those areas where the U.S. wished to influence events

without maintaining forces ashore, while retaining access

to the crisis area via the sea.

The issue of bases suggests that location once again

may have entered into the national security calculus of the

superpower much more so than it had in the past. Diego

Garcia, Berbera, and Aden demonstrated that, when there was

no substitute for their capabilities, national interests

took on a situational character. Berbera was important to

the Soviet Union as long as bases in Ethiopia were not

available as an alternative option. Once that option was

available to the Soviet Union, the port and the airfield at

Berbera were no longer critical for support of Soviet naval

forces in the region. Soviet aircraft moved approximately

90 nautical miles to the north to facilities in Aden, South

Yemen, while Soviet ships moved less than 150 nautical

miles to the Ethiopian island of Dhalak. Oman, Kenya, and

Somalia took on an importance in U.S. national security

policy that was hitherto unknown. The islands of the

Indian Ocean such as Diego Garcia, Gan, and Masirah also

assumed enhanced value.

®®® Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War; U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 42.

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The problem of bases is the most striking in terms of

its geographic inqplications of the options pursued by the

Administration in response to crises in the region.

Carter's decision to seek expanded access to support

facilities in the Indian Ocean demonstrates the association

of distance with the effective projection of military

power. The perceptions of O.S. ability to project power

into the region, and in particular into the Persian Gulf,

held by the Carter national security apparatus changed by a

quantum factor in early 1978 and culminated in the search

for access in the Indian Ocean littoral. This set of

events suggests that distance, and its politico-military

implications, may be a matter of perception and these

perceptions may influence the policy options of their

holders. This, in turn, suggests that Carter may have

originally pursued the Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Talks

out of a belief, honest though it was, that the Indian

Ocean could be dissociated from the global political-

military framework and geographically isolated from the

continuing U.S.-Soviet adversarial relationship.

The issue of bases also demonstrates that geographic

interpretations of an issue may change as a result of

relative changes in the military capabilities of

adversaries. The Soviet move from Somalia to Ethiopia

placed the Soviet Navy in an advantageous position to

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interdict any ships that might need to pass through the

Suez Canal and the Red Sea enroute to/from the

Mediterranean. The stationing of small Soviet patrol boats

at Dhalak, coupled with the increasing use of airfields

near Aden and anchorages for major Soviet surface

combatants at Socotra, placed the Soviet Union in a strong

military position in the northwestern Indian Ocean. The

Soviet presence in Afghanistan threatened one of the

premises of the RDJTF - that its principal mission was to

contain a cross-border attack from the north in the Gulf

region. The Soviet air bases in Afghanistan, besides

posing a threat to Pakistan, dictated that RDJTF operations

must also consider a threat axis to the east as well as to

the north.

The policymaking process also had to contend with

other bureaucratic issues that were interwoven into each

incremental decision. For example, the debate in the

Senate concerning construction on Diego Garcia and

negotiations for access to other regional bases was

deceptive if examined only in terms of financial

implications, as the congressional hearings seem to

indicate. These debates were also a manifestation of the

resurgent congressional involvement in the formulation of

foreign policy. The dominant issue was not the expansion

of a naval support facility on a small coral atoll in the

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British Indian Ocean Territory or dredging a port in Kenya,

but a challenge to the direction of U.S. national security

policy for the Indian Ocean region. Although the War

Powers Resolution of 1973 was perhaps the pinnacle of this

debate, the congressional resurgence was manifested in many

other areas: nuclear proliferation, conventional arms

transfers, human rights, and so forth. What this suggests,

of course, is that issues such as base access negotiations

and the structure of the RDJTF were really reflections of

the larger question of policy objectives.

Despite a hopeful beginning, the United States had

decided early on to forego further talks on the subject of

arms control in the Indian Ocean because Soviet politico-

military activity in the Horn of Africa in 1977 and 1978

strongly suggested that there was no common understanding

on how the IGALT would affect the behavior of the U.S. and

the Soviet Union in the region. Three years after Carter's

Indian Ocean arms control initiative, political upheavals

in Iran and Afghanistan, a war between the two Yemens, and

changing alliance patterns in the Horn of Africa combined

to sharpen the West's focus on the region.

In Iran, a fundamentalist Islamic movement dominated

by its anti-Western leader. Ayatollah Khomeini, overthrew

Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The result was that the U.S.

lost its principal partner in Nixon's "Twin Pillar" policy.

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In Ethiopia, a Marxist military government closed U.S.

communications and surveillance facilities at Kagnew

Station and Asmara. Somalia, reacting to the signing of

two separate arms agreements between the Soviet Union and

Ethiopia in December 1976 and May 1977 and trying to get

military assistance from the U.S., expelled its Soviet

military advisers, renounced its Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation with the Soviet Union, and broke off diplomatic

relations with Cuba in November 1977. In Afghanistan, a

Soviet invasion on December 28, 1979, contributed to the

downfall of one pro-Soviet regime and the prompt

installation of another.

Within his first two years in office. President

Carter decided an essentially naval arms control agreement

in the Indian Ocean would not address the broader issue of

Soviet intervention in the region by other military and

political means. The extended series of crises which lead

to a perceived imbalance in U.S.-Soviet relations in the

region required more than short-term and incremental

responses. The Carter Doctrine was a statement of policy

that described how the U.S. would address this imbalance.

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The Study of decisionmaking during crises has been

the focus of extensive academic effort over the last thirty

years. Much of this effort has attempted to quantify

indicators of crisis situations to obtain some predictive

capability. Others have sought to provide a descriptive

framework for the analysis of decisionmaking processes.

This appendix provides a brief review of the decisionmaking

analyses reviewed in preparation for this study.

Literature which seeks to describe or explain the

beginning of crises is comparatively limited. Charles A.

McClelland, Daniel P. Harrison, Wayne R. Martin, Warren R.

Phillips, and Robert A. Young, The Communist Chinese

Performance in Crisis and Noncrisis: Quantitative Studies

of the Taiwan Straits Confrontation, 1950-1964 (China Lake

CA: U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, 1965) developed

quantitative measures of volume and variety of activity to

describe the buildup of the Quemoy and Tachens crises.

Elsewhere, McClelland in "The Beginning, Duration and

Abatement of International Crises: Comparisons in Two

Conflict Arenas," in International Crises: Insights from

Behavioral Research, Charles P. Hermann, ed. (New York:

307

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Free Press, 1972) used the same measures to examine the

beginning and decline of the Berlin and Taiwan crises.

Edward £. Azar in "Conflict Escalation and Conflict

Reduction in an International Crisis: Suez, 1956," in

Journal of Conflict Resolution 16 (June 1972) also used

statistical methods to examine the escalation and de-

escalation phases of the 1956 Suez crisis. Using a social

scientific research design, he reported a symmetry of

actions between the nations in the escalation phases of a

crisis but not during the de-escalation phases, a finding

which suggests that at some point costs of hostile actions

increase to such an intolerable level that they must be

reduced regardless of the other side's actions.

More speculative examinations of the beginning of

crises are Quincy Wright's "The Escalation of International

Conflicts," in Journal of Conflict Resolution 9 (1965) and

Herman Kahn's On Escalation; Metaphors and Scenarios (New

York: Praeger, 1965). Wright attempted to explain the

escalation of conflicts by using perceptual measures of the

costs of conflict, national interest, and vulnerability.

His measures were subjectively derived (they are his own

personal estimates) although he described how more

objective measures might be generated. Kahn also attempted

to elucidate scenarios of possible nuclear crises by

discussing several categories of nuclear crises and the

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boundaries (thresholds) between them. Kahn implied that

future crises will be much different from past ones and

that the most useful methodology is the speculative one.

The area of crisis behavior which has received the most

attention is the behavior of decisionmakers during crisis.

Studies have been made of the perceptions of

decisionmakers, the expressions of hostility by leaders,

the physical effect of crisis on leaders, and the process

of decisionmaking during crisis. Research on U.S. crisis

decisionmaking has been discussed by Christine Candela in

Decisionmaking During Crisis; A Literature Review

(Baltimore: Applied Science and Technology Division, Bendix

Corporation, August 1974).

Early research concerning perceptions of

decisionmakers were descriptive in nature. They addressed

decisionmaker's perceptions of time pressures and

alternatives of action and hostility. Ole R. Holsti in

"Perceptions of Time, Perceptions of Alternatives, and

Patterns of Communication as Factors in Crisis Decision-

Making," Peace Research Society Papers III (1965) and Ole

R. Holsti, R.A. Brody, and R.C. North in "Measuring Affect

and Action in International Reaction Models: Empirical

Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis," Peace Research

Society Papers II (1965) used the concept of perception to

examine the events preceding hostilities in 1914 and the

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Cuban Missile Crisis. They reported that misperception of

adversaries' intention was high in 1914 but quite low in

1962. Using content analysis and financial indicators to

measure perception of conflict, Holsti in Crisis Escalation

and War (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1975)

studied time pressures, perceptions of alternatives,

perceptions of hostility, and definitions of the situation

to describe differences between the 1914 and the Cuban

Missile crises. The Holsti research provides the basic

groundwork for subsequent explanatory work.

Rigorous attempts to use quantitative and

behavioralist approaches to the study of perceptions to

explain behavior can be found in: Dina A. Zinnes "The

Expression and Perception of Hostility in prewar Crisis:

1914," in Quantitative International Politics, J.S. Singer,

ed. (New York: Free Press, 1968); Dina Zinnes, J.L. Zinnes,

and R.D. McClure "Hostility in Diplomatic Communication: A

Study of the 1914 Crisis," in International Crises, C.F.

Hermann, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1972); Holsti, North,

and Brody "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in

Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence,

J.S. Singer, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1968); and David C.

Schwartz "Decision-Making in Historical and Simulated

Crises," in International Crises: Insights from Behavioral

Research, Charles F. Hermann, ed. (New York: Free Press,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 311

1972). Zinnes used the 1914 crisis to test the hypothesis

that perceptions of hostility lead to expressions of

hostility. Zinnes, Zinnes and McClure, in an attempt to

refute the idea that decisionmakers perceive or react

differently in crisis situations than in non-crisis

situations, tried to show that decisionmakers express

hostility in response to perceived hostility (and that

decisionmakers perceive hostility fairly accurately).

Holsti, North, and Brody, show that this connection between

perceptions of hostility and action exists only for

situations of high intensity. Using data from eight major

post-World War II crises, Schwartz tested the same

hypothesis as the Zinnes study.

A very good study was conducted by David M. McCormick

and Michael Champion, Decisions, Events and Perceptions in

International Crises, (Ann Arbor: First Ann Arbor

Corporation, July 1975) which examined 12 international

crises in order to develop procedures for measuring

national leaders' perceptions and use these measures to

explain and predict leaders' behavior in the 1967 and 1973

Middle East crises. The research further attempted to be

comparative and used more objective data (i.e., events) to

validate the content analysis of perceptions.

In an attempt to explain behavior during a crisis, a

great deal of work has been conducted on the decisionmaking

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process and on the behavior of decisionmakers, as in the

studies of Michael Brecher in 'Inputs and Decisions for War

and Peace: The Israel Experience," in International Studies

Quarterly 18 (1974) and J.G. Stein and Michael Brecher in

"Image, Advocacy, and the Analysis of Conflict: An Israeli

Case Study," Journal of International Relations 10 (1976),

for examples. One of the best-known studies, of course, is

Graham T. Allison's Essence of Decision: Explaining the

Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). He

uses three models, the Rational Policy Model, the

Organization Process Model, and the Bureaucratic Politics

Model, to explain behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Another seminal work in the field is John D.

Steinbruner's The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New

Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton, New Jersey:

Princeton University Press, 1974) which used the Analytic,

Cybernetic, and Cognitive paradigms to explain the issue of

nuclear sharing among NATO allies 1956-1964. A third study

employing a similar approach is Dan Haendel's The Process

of Priority Formulation: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Indo-

Pakistani War of 1971 which employs the Rational Man Model,

the Psychological Model, and the Incremental Model. All

three have been discussed at greater length in Chapter III.

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G.E. Snyder in "Crisis Bargaining," in International

Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research, Charles P.

Hermann, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1972) and Abraham R.

Wagner "A Rational Choice Model of Aggression: The Case of

the Six Day War," in Sage International Year book of

Foreign Policy Studies, Patrick J. McGowan, ed (Beverly

Hills: Sage, 1975) both examined crisis decisionmaking in

terms of a rational-actor model. Snyder describes a

preliminary bargaining model of crisis decisionmaking by

using the assignment of utilities, costs, and risks to

various outcomes and actions, and discusses how these

variables can be manipulated by the actors. Wagner

developed a rational-policy model of the Middle East and

discussed how quantitative values could be assigned to each

variable.

Glenn D. Paige in The Korean Decision: June 24-30,

1950 (New York: Free Press, 1968) extended Snyder's

research to the Korean and Cuban crises. An attempt to

test Allison's Organization Process Model rigorously is

found in McCormick and Champion study, noted above. Thomas

C. Wiegele in "Decision-Making in an International Crisis,"

in International Studies Quarterly 17 (1973) attempted to

use Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model of decisionmaking

after adding biological factors such as health, fatigue,

and age, and the concept of stress. A discussion of

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propositions which concern individual and organizational

decisionmaking behavior in crisis can be found in Howard

B.Shapiro and Marcia A. Gilbert Crisis Management:

Psychological and Sociological Factors in Decision Making,

(McLean, Virginia: Human Sciences Research, Inc., 1975).

As mentioned above, most of the research on crisis

has been descriptive in nature. Indeed, some of the

quantitative research is purposely descriptive and makes

little attempt to be explanatory. Another attempt to

describe a crisis quantitatively is Paul Smoker's "A Time-

Series Analysis of Sino-Indian Relations, Journal of

Conflict Resolution XII (June 1976) in which he examined

the Sino-Indian conflict of 1959-1964 by using events data

to generate measures of freedom of decision, interaction

(response to the other side's action within a short period

of time), and reaction (response to the other side’s action

after a longer time lag). These studies, while not

necessarily contributing to the explanatory understanding

of crisis, indicate how quantitative measures of the

behavior of nations can be used to describe particular

crises and represent systematic methods of dealing with

large amounts of information.

For this study, I focused on research on both the

behavior of decisionmakers during crises and on crisis

management, particularly non-quantitative approaches to

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crisis management. Allen R. Ferguson in "Tactics in a

Local Crisis," in International Political Analysis

Readings, David Edwards, ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and

Winston, 1970), Edward L. Morse "Crisis Diplomacy,

Interdependence, and the Politics of International Economic

Relations," in Theory and Policy in International

Relations, Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Oilman, ed.

(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972)2,

Amos Perlmutter "Crisis Management: Kissinger's Middle East

Negotiations (October 1973-June 1974)," in International

Studies Quarterly 19 (September 1975), and L.P. Bloomfield

and A.C. Leiss in Controlling Small Wars, (New York: Knopf,

1969) provide qualitative discussions of the actions of

crisis managers.

Ferguson uses a rational-actor model to examine

tactics during potential crises involving the U.S. and the

Soviet Union, and how these tactics might be used to secure

advantage for one side or to reduce the intensity of the

conflict. Snyder also used a rational-actor model in

viewing crisis management as a bargaining situation. He

discusses the management of the outcomes of crisis through

the manipulation of utilities, costs, and action risks.

Morse, in a discussion mainly about economic crises,

examines the rising economic interdependence of nations and

how this leads to the use of economic tools as manipulables

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in crisis situations. Perlmutter describes recent crisis

management attençts in the Middle East, while Bloomfield

and Leiss examined crisis management from the U.S.

perspective. These studies and, to a lesser degree, those

of Kahn (On Escalation) and Oran R. Young The Politics of

Force (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press)

provided substantive insight into the management of crises.

One of the few studies on crisis management which is

quantitative and explanatory is R.L. Butterworth's Managing

Interstate Conflict, 1945-1974: Date with Synopsis

(Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies,

1976) in which he examined crises and crisis management

since 1945 to determine if these efforts have had any real

effect on crisis abatement, restraint, cessation,

isolation, and settlement. He found that national,

international, and global efforts at crisis management have

been quite successful despite their inability to avert or

reduce crises. Another quantitative study of crisis

management is that of Leo A. Hazelwood and John J. Hayes

Planning for Problems in Crisis Management (Arlington,

Virginia: CACI, 1976). They examined 41 crises to identify

patterns of crisis management problems. These patterns, in

turn, are suggested for use in forecasting to anticipate

crisis management problems in future crises.

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David Braybrook and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy

of Decision; Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (New

York: The Free Press, 1963), while not dealing with

decisionmaking during crisis, noted that incrementalism

becomes more disjointed when decisions are made under the

pressure of deadlines. Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and

Burton Sapin, éd.. Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An

Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York:

The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962) provides several articles

which significantly contributed to the field of

decisionmaking during crises. Finally, Alexander George's

Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The

Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colorado:

Westview Press, 1980) addresses a wide range of non-

quantitative approaches to decisionmaking during crisis,

including psychological, bureaucratic, and systemic

factors.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ARTICLES

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Burt, Richard. "Indian Ocean Lands Reported to Agree to U.S. Use of Bases." The New York Times, 12 February 1980, p. 1.

Burt, Richard. "Brzezinski Sees Ethiopia Issue Slowing Arms Talks." The New York Times, 2 March 1978, p. A6.

Burt, Richard. "U.S. and Somalia Expected to Conclude Pact on Bases." The New York Times, 19 August 1980, p. 10.

Burt, Richard. "U.S. Wins Bases in Oman and Kenya." The New York Times, 22 April 1980, p. 3.

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Burt, Richard. "U.S. Is Hopeful on Indian Ocean Talks with Soviets." The New York Times, 20 November 1977, p. 4.

Burt, Richard. "How U.S. Strategy Toward the Persian Gulf Region Evolved." The New York Times, 25 January 1980, p. 6.

Burt, Richard. "U.S. Buildup in the Persian Gulf Urged." The New York Times, 28 June 1979, p. 6.

Butterfield, Fox. "Brown Sees a Basis for Chinese Accord." The New York Times, 10 January 1980, p. Al.

Cameron, Juan. "Our What-If Strategy for Mideast Trouble Spots." Fortune 5 November 1979, p. 153.

Childers, Henry S. "Soviet Support to Sanaa Continues." Christian Science Monitor, 9 November 1979, p. 2.

Cody, Edward. "Arabs Wary of Carter's Call for Joint Security Links." The Washington Post, 25 January 1980, p. 1.

Corddry, Charles W. "U.S. Planning Work at Proposed Bases." Baltimore Sun, 3 April 1980, p. 2.

Darton, John, "Podgorny, in Zanzibar, Welcomes Parley with U.S. on Indian Ocean." The New York Times, 25 March 1977.

Darnton, John. "U.S. Team in Somalia to Discuss Arms Aid." The New York Times, 19 March 1978, p. 15.

de Onis, Juan. "U.S. Clears the Way for Delivery of $40 Million in Arms to Somalia." The New York Times, 20 January 1981, p. 18.

de Onis, Juan. "House Panel Skeptical on U.S. Pact With Somalia." The New York Times, 17 September 1980, p. 3.

de Onis, Juan. "U.S. Arms Sale to Somalia Is Conditionally Approved." The New York Times, 1 October 1980, p. 2.

Dupree, Louis. "Afghanistan Under the Khalq." Problems of Communism 28 (July-August 1979): 40-63.

Eliot, Theodore L., Jr. "Afghanistan After the 1978 Revolution." Strategic Review 7 (Spring 1979): 46-77.

"Excerpts from Carter's Speech on Defense Policy and on

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Soviet Ties." The New York Times, 18 March 1978, p. 9.

Feiner, James. "Middle East Intrigue." The Lost Angeles Times, 16 October 1977, p. 2.

"Feud in Administration Said to Endanger Talks on Arms Sales Pact." The New York Times, 20 December 1978, p. 12.

"Final Communique Issued by the NATO Defense Planning Committee." NATO Review 28 (June 1980).

Geddes, George. "O.S. Granted Access to Oman Bases." The Washington Post, 12 February 1980, p. 1.

Getler, Michael. "Somalia Asks High Price of O.S. Access to Bases." The Washington Post, 22 April 1980, p. 1.

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Gwertzman, Bernard. "Saudis Considering Military Tie to U.S." The New York Times, 6 February 1980, p. 1.

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Halloran, Richard. "U.S. Jets Near Gulf Improve War Data." The New York Times, 9 October 1980, p. 13.

Halloran, Richard. "U.S. Base in the Indian Ocean May be Enlarged." The New York Times, 6 April 1980, p. 16.

Halloran, Richard. "Brown Orders a Study of Saudi Request for Equipment to Improve F-15s." The New York Times, 22 October 1980, p. 17.

Halloran, Richard. "Crisis Impelling U.S. to Plan Permanent

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Naval Presence in Indian Ocean." The New York Times, 5 January 1980, p. 3.

Halloran, Richard. "Pentagon Activates Strike Force: Effectiveness Believed Years Away." The New York Times, 19 February 1980, p. 1.

Halloran, Richard. "O.S. Is Reported to Study Offer of a Somali Base." The New York Times, 23 December 1979, p. 1.

Halloran, Richard. "Reagan to Request $38 Billion Increase in Military Outlays." The New York Times, 4 March 1981, p. 1.

Halloran, Richard. "O.S. Looking to Leasing of Bases for Easier Access to Crisis Areas." The New York Times, 290 January 1980, p. 12.

Halloran, Richard. "Carter Sends Bombers Over a Russian Fleet in Display of Strength." The New York Times, 22 January 1980, p. 9.

Halloran, Richard. "Reagan Plan Looks to String of Bases in Mideast and Indian Ocean." The New York Times, 12 March 1981, p. 8

Halloran, Richard. "Snags Arise in Talks on Access to Bases." The New York Times, 30 March 1980, p. 8.

Hanks, Robert J. "The Indian Ocean Negotiations: Rocks and Shoals." Strategic Review 6 (Winter 1978): 10-21.

"Have Doctrine, Need Mobility." The Economist, 9-15 February 1980, pp. 22-25.

Hickman, William F. "Soviet Naval Policy in the Indian Ocean." O.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 105 (August 1979): 42-51.

Hirsch, George. "Multiple Criteria Decision-Making : Theory and Application." European Journal of Operational Research 3 (1981): 308-322.

Hoagland, Jim. "O.S., France Spurn Somalia's Plea for Urgent Arms Aid." The Washington Post, 1 September 1977, p. A25.

Hollingsworth, James F., and Wood, Allen T. "The Light Armored Corps - a Strategic Necessity." Armed Forces Journal 117 (January 1980): 17-32.

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Hovey, Graham. "O.S. Moving Toward Military Ties With Somalia, Recognizing Risks." The New York Times, 10 February 1980, p. 1.

Eovey, Graham. "Soviet Assures U.S., Ethiopians Will Stop at Somalia's Border." The New York Times, 11 February 1978, p. 1.

Hovey, Graham. "Brzezinski Asserts That Soviet General Leads Ethiopian Units." The New York Times, 25 February 1978, p. 1.

Hovey, Graham. "Somalia to Pull Out of Ethiopia, Carter Reports, Opening the Way for Soviet and Cuba to Withdraw." The New York Times, 10 March 1978, p. Al.

"Indian Ocean Fleet is Posing Problems." The New York Times, 15 April 1980, p. 4.

Jukes, Geoffrey. "The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy." Aldelphi Papers 87 (May 1972): 1-96.

Kelly, James F., Jr. "Naval Deployments in the Indian Ocean." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 109 (May 1983): 174-189.

"Kenya Agrees to Expand U.S. Use of Military Bases." The New York Times, 28 June 1980, p. 5.

Leffler, Melvyn P. "From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmas of the Cold War." Diplomatic History 7 (Fall 1983): 243-266.

Lippman, Thomas Lippman. "Saudi Arabia, Once a Diplomatic Recluse, Turns Activist." The Washington Post, 18 February 1977, p. A21.

Mayall, James. "The Battle for the Horn: Somali Irredentism and International Diplomacy." The World Today 23 (September 1978): 330-342.

McConnell, James M. and Kelley, Anne M. "Super-Power Naval Diplomacy: Lessons of the Indo-Pakistani Crisis 1971." Survival 7 (November-December 1973), pp. 271- 299.

McNaughter, Thomas L. "Arms and Allies on the Arabian Peninsula." Orbis 28 (Fall 1984): 489-522.

Middleton, Drew. "Soviet Navy Widens Indian Ocean Power."

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The New York Times, 22 April 1979, p. 15.

Misra, K.P. "Developments in the Indian Ocean Area: The Littoral Response." International Studies 19 (January-March 1977): 11-20.

Mondesir, S. "Yemen: Pawns and the Superpowers." Arab Report and Record, 1-15 October 1978.

Moorer, Thomas S., and Cottrell, Alvin J. "The Search for U.S. Bases in the Indian Ocean: A Last Chance." Strategic Review 8 (Spring 1980): 28-36.

"National Democratic Front Outlines Yemen Agenda." Le Monde, 8 October 1977, p. 3.

Newsom, David D. "American Engulfed." Foreign Policy 43 (Summer 1981): 12-39.

Oberdorfer, Don. "U.S. to Offer Military Gear to Somalia." The Washington Post, 5 February 1980, p. 1.

Osmos, Peter. "Ethiopia Forms Alliance with Soviets, Capping Visit." The Washington Post, 7 May 1977, p. A9.

Poullada, Leon. "Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years." Middle East Journal 35 (Spring 1981): 183-198.

Pranger, Robert J., and Tahtinan, Dale R. "American Policy Options in Iran and the Persian Gulf." Foreign Policy and Defense Review 2 (1979): 12-26.

"Saudi Call for End to Conflict." Christian Science Monitor, 26 February 1978, p. 2.

Schneider, Russell. "U.S. Will Help Us in Any Regional War." The Australian, 15 June 1983, p. 1.

Smith, Terrence. "Carter Tells Soviet to Pull Its Troops Out of Afghanistan." The New York Times, 30 December 1979, p. 1.

Smith, Terrence. "Carter Embargoes technology for Soviets; Limits Fishing Privileges and Sale of Grain in Response to 'Aggression' in Afghanistan." The New York Times, 5 January 1980, pp. 1, 6.

Speed, F.W. "American B-52 Bombers in Australia." The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 17 (January 1982): 8-

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"Supplies for Ethiopia Withheld by O.S." The New York Times, 23 February 1978, p. A14.

Talbot, Strobe, and Ogden, Christopher. "People Want to See Coonskins." Time, 24 April 1978, p. 21.

Taylor, Winston. "Somali Liberation Front Counters in the Ogaden." London Financial Times, 26 July 1977, p. 1.

Thatcher, Gary. "American Ships Test the Water at Indian Ocean Ports." Christian Science Monitor, 7 August 1980, p. 2.

"Time for Another Look." Financial Times, 26 March 1979, p. 8.

Tow, William T. "U.S. Alliance Policies and Asian Pacific Security: A Trans-Regional Approach." Naval War College Review 34 (September-October 1981): 42.

"Transcript of President's Address at U.S. on Peace, Economy, and Human Rights." The New York Times, 18 March 1977.

"U.S. Admiral Discusses Australian Homeport." Adelaide Advertiser, 3 June 1980, p. 1.

"U.S. and Soviets Increase Indian Ocean Naval Forces." The New York Times, 17 April 1979, p. 5.

"U.S. Considering Plan to Create a New Fleet for the Indian Ocean." The New York Times, 9 March 1979, p. 5.

"U.S. Decides to Stall Parley with Moscow on the Indian Ocean." The New York Times, 8 February 1978, p. 8.

"U.S. Announces Pact with Oman on Access to Air Bases and Port." The New York Times, 6 June 1980, p. 9.

"U.S. Reassesses Need to Use Somali Bases." The New York Times, 16 July 1980, p. 14.

"U.S. Sees Progress in Talks with Soviets on Indian Ocean." The Washington Post, 4 October 1977.

"U.S. and China to Consult on Afghan Steps." The New York Times, 15 March 1980, p. 3.

Vincour, John. "Schmidt Still Plans Moscow Trip." The New

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York Times, 18 January 1980, p. 4.

Vincour, John. "Bonn Expects Pressure from Allies to Send Warships to Persian Gulf." The New York Times, 13 October 1980. p. 16.

Weintraub, Bernard. "Pentagon Is Urging Indian Ocean Fleet." The New York Times, 1 March 1979, p. 14.

Wettern, Desmond. "Show of Force Off the Horn." London Daily Telegraph, 31 March 1978, p. 4.

"When a Tiny New Nation is Thrust into a Power Broker's Role." U.S. News and World Report, 13 September 1976, p. 52.

Wilson, George C. "Three Nations Said Receptive to U.S. Bases." The Washington Post, 4 January 1980, p. 1.

Wilson, George C. "Panel Cool to Selling Arms to Somalia in Exchange for the Right to Use Ports." The Washington Post, 27 August 1980, p. 1.

Wilson, George C. "Outlook Grim in a War for Mideast Oil." The Washington Post, 28 October 1979, p. 3.

U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Indian Ocean Atlas. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy. Panel on Indian Ocean Forces Limitations and Conventional Arms Transfers Limitations, Indian Ocean Arms Limitations and Multilateral Cooperation on Restraining Conventional Arms Transfers. Hearings, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy. Designation of Panels Concerning Arms Control and Disarmament. Hearings, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Military Posture and Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980 and Department of

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^fenge Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979. Hearings, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979.

O.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982. Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1980.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. NATO After Afghanistan. Report, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980.

O.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. East-West Relations in the Aftermath of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980.

O.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. O.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf. Report, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981.

O.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Crisis in the Subcontinent; Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hearings, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979.

O.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. O.S. Interests in, and Policies Toward, the Persian Gulf, 1980. Hearings. 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980.

O.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. An Assessment of the Afghanistan Sanctions; Implications for Trade and Diplomacy in the 1980*s . Report, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981.

O.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia. Proposed Expansion of O.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean. Hearings, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974.

O.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Review of Recent Developments in the Middle East. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977.

O.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Diego Garcia 1975; The Debate Over the Base and Island's Inhabitants. Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975.

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U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. War in the Horn of Africa; A Firsthand Report on the Challenges for United States Policy, Report, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Relations Programs. Hearings, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1980.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981. Hearings, 96th Cong., 2nd sess.. Part 2, 1980.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Disapproval of Construction on the Island of Diego Garcia. Senate Resolution 160, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Armed Services Committee. Fiscal Year 1981 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths. Hearings, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980,

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia. Report, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations. Hearings, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979.

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. "Excerpts from Prince Saud al-Faisal's Press Conference on 15 January 1978." FBIS Daily Report; Middle East and North Africa, 18 January 1978, p. A- T,

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. "U.S.S.R. Envoy to Indian Ocean Talks Arrives in New Delhi." FBIS Daily Report; Middle East and North Africa, 17 January 1978, p. S-2.

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Rome ANSA, 22 March 1978, FBIS Daily Report; Middle East and North Africa, 23 March 1978.

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U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. "Indian and Mauritian Premiers Speak at Banquet." FBIS Daily Report; Middle East and North Africa, 2 November 1977, p. S-1.

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. "Excerpts from Desai's Press Conference of 27 October 1977." FBIS Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa, 28 October 1977, p. S-1.

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Informât : Service, Trends, 28 June 1976.

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Moscow Radio, 15 March 1976. FBIS Daily Report; Soviet Union, 16 March 1976, p. F-1.

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Moscow Radio, 28 October 1977. FBIS Daily Report; Soviet Union, 31 October 1977, p. 5-4.

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Za Rubeshom, 23 February 1978. FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, ~2 March 1978, p. B-6.

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Izvestia, 11 January 1980. FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, 14 January 1980, pp. A22-23.

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Moscow Radio, 22 February 1978. FBIS Daily Report; Soviet Union, 24 February 1978, p. H-1.

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. TASS, 31 March 1978. FBIS Daily Report; Soviet Union, 3 April 1978, p. H-2.

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Djibouti Radio, 30 March 1978. FBIS Daily Report; Subsaharan Africa, 31 March 1978, p. B-1.

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U.S. Department of Commerce. National Technical Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Addis Ababa Radio, 18 March 1978. FBIS Daily Report: Subsaharan Africa, 19,24,27,and 30 March 1978, p. B- 1.

U.S. Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Office of Naval History. Navy Operational Archives. "Command History, U.S. Naval Support Facility, Diego Garcia, 1979." (Mimeo).

U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Command Plan. 1980.

U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Historical Division, Joint Secretariat. "The Rapid Deployment Mission." (Mimeo).

U.S. Department of Defense. Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense. Washington, D.C.: March 1983.

U.S. Department of Defense. Unclassified message - SECDEF WASHDC msg 132047Z Feb 80 (Subject: Press Announcement - Indian Ocean Deployment). Naval Archives, Washington Naval District, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Department of Defense. Office of Information for the Armed Services. "The Secretary's News Conference of 2 March 1979," (Mimeo).

U.S. Department of Defense. Office of Information for the Armed Services. "Press Conference of 13 February 1980." Pentagon Library. Washington D.C. (Mimeo).

U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Annual Report — Fiscal Year 1980. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979.

U.S. President. "The President's News Conference of 9 March 1977." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 14 March 1977, 328-334.

U.S. President. "The President’s News Conference of 24 March 1977." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 28 March 1977, pp. 439-445.

U.S. President. "Digest of Other White House Announcements." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 18 July 1977, pp. 773-779.

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O.S. President. "Address Before the General Assembly, 4 October 1977." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 10 October 1977, pp. 1469-1477.

O.S. President. "The State of the Onion: An Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 19 January 1978." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 20 January 1978, p. 122.

U.S. President. "The President's Address to the National Press Club of March 2, 1978." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 8 March 1978, pp. 237-239.

U.S. President. "Presidential News Conference of March 9, 1978." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 15 March 1978, p. 13.

U.S. President. "The President's Address at Wake Forest University, March 17, 1978." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 22 March 1978, pp. 188-189.

U.S. President. "The President's News Conference of February 26, 1979." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 2 March 1979, pp. 770-776.

U.S. President. "Peace and National Security: An Address to the Nation on Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, October 1, 1979." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 8 October 1979.

U.S. President. "The President's State of the Union Address." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 2 January 1980.

U.S. President. "The State of the Union: An Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of Congress, January 23, 1980." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 28 January 1980.

U.S. President. Presidential Documents. National Archives and Records Service. Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, 1980.

U.S. Department of State. "The Secretary on the Horn of Africa." The State Department Bulletin. March 1978, p. 27.

U.S. Department of State. "The Secretary's News Conference, February 10, 1978." The Department of State Bulletin, March 1978, pp. 13-16.

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U.S. Department of State. "ANZUS Council Communique." The Department of State Bulletin, July 1978.

U.S. Department of State. "ANZUS Council Communique.” The Department of State Bulletin, September 1979.

U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Interests and Ideals." The Department of State Bulletin, June 1980.

U.S. Department of State. 1978 State Cite 031721; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 131031Z Mar 78 (Subject: Soviet Naval Movements).

U.S. Department of State. 1978 State Cite 007443; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 111929Z Jan 78. (Subject: U.S.-Soviet Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks).

U.S. Department of State. 1977 State Cite 307163; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 240417Z Dec 77. (Subject: U.S.-Soviet Indian Ocean Talks).

U.S. Department of State. 1977 State Cite 146566; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 232039Z Jun 77. (Subject: White House Statements on Indian Ocean Working Group Talks).

U.S. Department of State. 1977 State Cite 150020; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 051310Z Jul 77.

U.S. Department of State. 1979 State Cite 085529; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 061733Z Apr 79 (Subject: Indian Ocean Deployment).

U.S. Department of State. 1980 State Cite 005916; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 082336Z Jan 80 (Subject: U.S. Interest in Indian Ocean Facilities).

U.S. Department of State. 1980 State Cite 039151; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 122244Z Feb 80.

U.S. Department of State. 1980 State Cite 280482; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 210005Z Oct 80 (Subject: Public Affairs Guidance - Exercise BEACON COMPASS).

U.S. Department of State. 1977 State Cite 224734; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 192217Z Sep 77. (Subject: U.S.-USSR Indian Ocean Talks).

U.S. Department of State. 1977 Mogadiscio Cite 192401; AHEMBASSY MOGADISCIO msg 141105Z Nov 77.

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U.S. Department of State. 1977 Mogadiscio Cite 192401; AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO msg 151105Z Nov 77.

O.S. Department of State; 1980 Perth Cite 0348; AMCONSUL PERTH msg 270344Z Aug SO (Subject: State ALP Conference Opposes Permanent Basing of Non Australian Naval Units at Cockburn Sound and Urges Resumption of Indian Ocean Peace Talks).

U.S. Department of State. 1980 Perth Cits 0343; AMCONSUL PERTH msg 250303Z Aug 80 (Subject: Opposition Leader States ALP Would Repudiate Any Agreement for US Homeporting in Cockburn Sound).

U.S. Department of State. 1978 Sana Cite 152567; AMEMBASSY SANA 150610Z Jul 78.

U.S. Department of State. Transcript of Daily News Briefing, Monday, October 3, 1977. (DPC 194), (Mimeo).

U.S. Department of State. Transcript of Daily News Briefing, February 25, 1978 (DPC 72). Washington D.C.: 26 February 1978 (Mimeo).

U.S. Department of State. "Military Bases in the Philippines: Agreement Amending the Agreement of 14 March 1947, as Amended." TIAS 9224. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements. Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1980, Vol 30, pt. 1.

U.S. Department of State. United States Information Agency. Office of Policy and Plans. "Infoguide: Indian Ocean Arms Limitations." (No. 77-26), Washington, D.C.: July 26, 1977.

U.S. Department of State. Bureaus of Intelligence and Research, and Near East Affairs. The Coup in Afghanistan. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978.

MISCELLANEOUS

Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs. "Backgrounder No. 223 of February 27, 1980." Annex.

Australia. Parliament. Hansard's Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates. House of Representatives. New Series, 121 (1981): 664-665.

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Collins, John, et al. Petroleum Imports from the Persian Gulf; Dse of U.S. Armed Force to Ensure Supplies. Washington D.C.: Library oÈ Congress Congressional Research Service, 1980.

Dupree, Louis. "Red Flag Over the Hindu Kush, Part IV; Foreign Policy and Economy." American Universities Field Staff Reports. Asia Series, no. 47. June 1980.

"France Seen as Increasing Its Presence in the Indian Ocean." U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on the Law of the Sea. JPRS 70824. Washington: 23 March 1978, p. 34.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Military Committee. General Report on Alliance Security Issues. Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1980.

Neumann, Robert G. "Emerging Security Issues in the 'Arch of Crisis.'" Proceedings of the Seventh Annual National Security Affairs Conference. Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1980.

NiLsch, Larry A. "Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response.” Issue Brief Number IB80006. Washington D.C.: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, (Mimeo), 10 January 1980.

Ocean Policy News, August 1986. Council on Ocean Law. Washington, D.C. (Mimeo).

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and U.S. Air Force Headquarters. Memorandum of Agreement on the Concept of Operations for USAF Forces Collateral Functions Training. Washington D.C.; 2 September 1975.

Perse, John D. "U.S. Naval Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1976-1984." Research Memorandum 85-71. Center for Naval Analysis, August 1985.

Remnek, Richard. "Somalia and the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron: or the Importance of Using and Losing Berbera." Memorandum (CNA) 78-1550. Center for Naval Analysis, 14 November 1978.

Remnek, Richard. "Superpower Security Interests in the Indian Ocean Area." Professional Paper 285. Center for Naval Analysis, June 1980.

Roberts, S. S. "Naval Crisis Management, Vol III, Appendix

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B, Soviet Naval Crisis Actions, 1967-79." Research Contribution 429. Center for Naval Analysis, May 1980.

"Soviet Negotiator on Indian Ocean Arrives in Colombo." U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on the Law of the Sea. JPRS 80818. Washington: 22 March 1979, p. 21.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. World Armaments and Disarmament; SIPRI Year Book 1979. Stockholm: Almgvist and Wiksell, Stockholm Interna tional Peace Research Institute, 1979.

Strategic Survey. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975.

Suez Canal Authority. Yearly Report, 1976. Cairo: for the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1976, p. 99. Also Yearly Report, 1977, and Monthly Report, December 1978.

Thompson, LCDR John R., USN. "USN-USAP Interaction for Ocean Surveillance Using Land Based Aircraft." Research Paper, Center for Advanced Research. U.S. Naval War College, Newport Rhode Island: June 1979.

United Nations. Security Council. Security Council Proceedings. 27th Session. 4 September 1976.

United Nations. General Assembly. Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Resolution (R/014). 22nd Session, 13 December 1971.

INTERVIEWS

Gelb, Leslie. Former Director of the Bureau of Politico- Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Deputy Head, U.S. Delegation to the Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks. Washington D.C.: 2 August 1983.

Hayward, Admiral Thomas B., USN (Ret.). Former Chief of Naval Operations and Senior U.S. Military Representative on the U.S. Delegation to the first round of Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Talks. Honolulu, Hawaii: 15 September 1983.

Murray, Robert. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1978-1980). Washington D.C.: 20 January 1989 and 27 January 1989.

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Sick, Captain Gary, DSN (Ret.). Staff (Middle East and North Africa), National security Council (1976-1981) San Fransisco: 12 October 1983.

Vance, Cyrus. O.S. Secretary of State (January 1977-April 1980). Washington, D.C.: 23 October 1981.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.