CTC Sentinel 1(5)

APRIL 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 5 COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT CTC Sentinel OBJECTIVE . RELEVANT . RIGOROUS Contents General (R) John P. Abizaid INTRODUCTION Joins Editorial Board 1 General (R) John P. Abizaid Joins Editorial Board the combating Abizaid studied at the University of Jordan By Erich Marquardt Terrorism Center is in Amman on an Olmsted scholarship, a pleased to announce military award offered to only a handful REPORTS that General (R) of young Army officers each year. 1 Al-Qaìda in Yemen’s 2008 Campaign John P. Abizaid Additionally, he holds a master’s degree By Gregory D. Johnsen has joined the CTC in Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard 5 The LIFG’s Current Role in the Sentinel’s Editorial University. Abizaid is widely considered to Global Jihad Board. Abizaid, who be an expert in the field of Middle Eastern By Alison Pargeter recently became the affairs. 7 Al-Qaìda’s Finances: Evidence of Distinguished Chair Organizational Decline? of the Combating His experience and knowledge of the region By Matthew Levitt Terrorism Center, retired from the United makes him a valuable addition to the CTC 10 The UK’s Experience in Counter- States Army in May 2007 after 34 years of Sentinel’s Editorial Board. Radicalization active service. By James Brandon Erich Marquardt 12 AQIM’s Expanding Internationalist After graduating from the United States Editor-in-Chief, CTC Sentinel Agenda Military Academy at West Point, Abizaid By Andrew Black rose from infantry platoon leader to 14 Nanomanagement: A Challenge to become, at that time, the youngest four- Those Combating Terrorism star general in the Army. At the time of REPORTS By Major Tommy Sowers, U.S. Army his retirement he was the longest-serving Al-Qaìda in Yemen’s 16 After Action Report: Politics 101 for commander of United States Central 2008 Campaign Small Units in Counter-Insurgency Command. As commander of Central By Major Jeremy Gwinn, U.S. Army Command, Abizaid oversaw 250,000 U.S. By Gregory D. Johnsen troops in a 27-country region. 19 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity following the dramatic escape of 23 al- 25 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts During his distinguished career, he Qaìda suspects from a Political Security commanded units at every level, serving prison in Sanaà in early February 2006, in the combat zones of Grenada, Lebanon, there has been a fear that Yemen could Kurdistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan once again become an active theater of and Iraq. Units under his command have operations for Islamic militants. That included the 1st Infantry Division, a brigade fear has now been realized. During the in the 82nd Airborne Division, and two past few months, al-Qaìda in Yemen has About the CTC Sentinel Ranger companies. Abizaid worked on the embarked on an aggressive propaganda The Combating Terrorism Center is an Joint Staff three times, the last as director. campaign that has been accompanied by independent educational and research From 1997-1999, Abizaid served as the 66th a series of equally aggressive attacks. institution based in the Department of Social commandant of cadets at West Point. Sciences at the United States Military Academy, Tourist convoys, army checkpoints, oil fields, the U.S. Embassy and most recently West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses Abizaid is highly decorated and has been a housing compound for foreigners have the Center’s global network of scholars and awarded the Defense Distinguished Service all been targeted as part of the group’s practitioners in order to understand and Medal, the Army Distinguished Service stated goal to “expel the unbelievers from confront contemporary threats posed by Medal, Legion of Merit and the Bronze the Arabian Peninsula.”1 terrorism and other forms of political violence. Star. He also holds military honors from countries such as Germany, Poland, France, Romania, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Australia 1 This phrase has appeared at the top of all four state- The views expressed in this report are those of and Egypt. ments released by The Soldier’s Brigade of Yemen on the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, February 24, 2008, March 21, 2008, March 30, 2008 the Department of the Army, or any other agency and April 7, 2008. All statements were accessed via the of the U.S. Government. al-Ikhlas website. 1 APRIL 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 5 Given Yemen’s reputation for violence and The United States has failed to understand to Washington, President Salih made the journalistic clichés that accompany the situation in which President Àli sure the United States knew what side his nearly every English report of a country Àbdullah Salih’s regime sees itself, country was on. Yemen followed Salih’s teeming with guns and its importance as and instead of helping to ensure regime words with actions, arresting anyone it Usama bin Ladin’s “ancestral homeland,” stability it has seemed more eager to suspected of harboring sympathy for al- it may seem that this latest series of threaten the country for perceived Qaìda. It also worked hand-in-hand with attacks is merely a continuation of the betrayals such as the Jamal al-Badawi U.S. intelligence services, coordinating past. This, however, is not the case. case.3 Both countries have also failed to the November 2002 strike on al-Qaìda’s Al-Qaìda in Yemen took a major step understand that Yemen is witnessing head in Yemen, Àli Qa’id al-Harithi, forward in January 2008 with the which was conducted by an unmanned publication of the first issue of its online “In retrospect, however, CIA drone. Yet this represented the journal Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of zenith of U.S.-Yemeni cooperation, as Battles), which articulated in bold, broad al-Ahdal’s capture marked a Pentagon leak, intended for domestic strokes the group’s new strategy. Instead the end of the first phase of political consumption, destroyed the cover of the large, one-time attacks favored by story on which both countries had agreed. the previous generation, this group under the war against al-Qaìda Salih paid a high price domestically for the leadership of Nasir al-Wahayshi has in Yemen.” allowing the United States to carry out an initiated a policy of constant offense attack in Yemen, and it took more than a consisting of small, continual attacks. year for the government to publicly admit Al-Qaìda in Yemen seems to understand that it had authorized Washington to act. that there is no one knockout blow that something both new and dangerous. Al- The United States was still paying the will force Westerners out of Yemen and Qaìda in Yemen was defeated by the price for hubris a year later in November bring the government to its knees, but close cooperation of the United States 2003, when Yemen captured Muhammad rather that it must maintain a constant and Yemen during the first phase of the Hamdi al-Ahdal, al-Harithi’s replacement, barrage of activity. war (2000-2003), but it learned from the at a wedding in Sanaà. Instead of being loss. Now, while al-Qaìda in Yemen has granted direct access to the prisoner, U.S. The Mistakes adapted to the changing environment, officials were forced to work through The past four months should not have both the United States and Yemen appear intermediaries. come as a surprise to close observers ready to fight what it was instead of what of the situation in Yemen, as the group it has become. In retrospect, however, al-Ahdal’s has grown increasingly bolder and more capture marked the end of the first phase active since it was reorganized by al- The First and Second Phases of the war against al-Qaìda in Yemen. Wahayshi. The latest attacks illustrate In the immediate aftermath of the With most of the suspected militants the dangers of lapsed vigilance of which September 11 attacks, Yemen, like many either in jail or drawn to the fighting in both the U.S. and Yemeni governments countries, was eager to appease the United Iraq, al-Qaìda faded into the background are guilty. It also demonstrates the fallacy States. It had unpleasant memories of alongside a host of other more pressing of attempting to isolate counter-terrorism the last time it thwarted U.S. policy and concerns faced by Yemen. For Yemen, from other U.S. policy objectives; this can was eager to avoid repeating the same al-Qaìda and Islamic militancy has be done on a spreadsheet, but not always mistakes.4 During a November 2001 visit always been largely a Western problem in the minds of foreign counterparts. that affects the country indirectly, but is lish language reporting on the country was focused on nowhere near as pressing as a religious There is also a lesson on the dangers of al-Qaìda attacks against foreigners, the majority of the uprising among Zaydis in the north or negligence. Yemen is quickly becoming Arabic reporting on Yemen focused on protests in the economic woes that exacerbate tensions a failed state. It is running out of oil and south. between the north and the south. These recently it has increased production in an 3 The United States withheld aid to Yemen once it be- latter two issues are security challenges attempt to ease budget shortfalls. Yet, it came public knowledge that Jamal al-Badawi was free. It that directly threaten the survival of is only borrowing against its future, and is likely that the public nature of U.S. disapproval was a the regime, while al-Qaìda, at least in even this is not sufficient.

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