Conflict Resolution Or Transformation? an Analysis of The

Conﬂict Resolution or Transformation? An Analysis of the South African and Mozambican Political Settlements

ROBERT B. LLOYD∗ Center for International Studies and Languages, Pepperdine University, 24255 Paciﬁc Coast Highway, Malibu, CA 90263 USA (E-mail: [email protected])

Abstract. How much conflict must be resolved for a political settlement and its implementation to be successful? This article argues that a political settlement must satisfy the combatants’ expectations regarding the resolution of the causes of the conflict. How deeply do these causes need to be resolved for the parties to be satisfied? To answer this question two concepts are introduced: the immediate and underlying causes of a conflict. Immediate causes (grievances) are specific, concrete policies that provoke some subset of a state’s population to rebel against the government. Underlying causes are diverging interests that led to the introduction of these policies that caused the grievances. This article examines the political settlements in South Africa and Mozambique that terminated armed hostilities, overcame the conflict, and opened the door to normal politics. The research indicates that in both cases the political settlement satisfactorily resolved the immediate causes of the conflict. There was greater dissatisfaction in South Africa because the political settlement did not resolve the underlying causes of the conflict. A major reason for this dissatisfaction was that although the electoral outcome gave the ANC strong popular support, the political settlement limited its ability to grapple with root causes. In Mozambique, fears of reigniting another protracted armed confrontation and the close electoral outcome dissuaded either side from addressing the underlying causes of the conflict.

Keywords: conﬂict resolution, conﬂict transformation, expectations, grievances, immediate causes, root causes, satisfaction

A major topic of dispute in the field of conflict resolution is how a negotiated political settlement successfully overcomes a conflict in internationalized civil disputes. Much effort in the field towards understanding what makes the parties to a conflict settle their differences and then stick to their agreements has focused on such factors as the role of third-party mediation, the “ripeness” of the conflict, the constraints and opportunities imposed by the international system, and the (devil is in the) details of the actual agreement

∗ Robert B. Lloyd is Assistant Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International Studies and Languages at Pepperdine University in Malibu, California. He received his Ph.D. from The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. He lived and worked in Africa for ﬁve years with an international nongovernmental organization prior to his doctoral studies. 304 ROBERT B. LLOYD

This debate over “success” relates to an even deeper question. How much resolution is sufficient for a conflict to be placed on the “conflict-free” side of the ledger? Hampson (1996: 23) argues that, at a minimum, a successful settlement includes ending violence, abiding by the terms of the agreements, and establishing institutions to resolve conflict on an ongoing basis. This definition provides a minimum threshold to a successful settlement, but does not stipulate either how much resolution is necessary to arrive at this lowest limit, if this lowest level is sustainable in the long run, or what constitutes the upper limit.1 The discussion of the boundaries of a successful settlement is more than simply theoretical. At stake is the practical question of whether negotiations should focus on the conflict’s immediate or root causes. Conflict resolution researchers have been divided on precisely this issue (see Kriesberg 1997: 64). Two schools of thought exist, reflecting different disciplinary assumptions and methodological approaches. The first approach, often called the Social-Psychological, argues that conflict resolution should focus on the root causes, and not simply treat its visible symptoms. John Burton (1990), for example, insists that to ignore underlying causes, which include basic human needs, dooms settlements to break down. Lederach (1995: 14–19) argues that a conflict must be transformed. A conflict will essentially disappear, he asserts, only after the needs and interests of the parties in conflict are legitimized and the relationships are restructured towards increased equality and justice. Kelman argues for the inclusion of psychological factors such as fear in the generation and escalation of conflict (Kelman 1997). Finally, many researchers with this approach explicitly critique the emphasis by international relations scholars on the role of power in conflict resolution (e.g. Avruch 1998: 23–56). Negotiations, they think, should be directed toward the most radical of resolutions, “replac- ing conflict with positive relationships, such as satisfaction, cooperation, empathy, and interdependence between parties” (Zartman 1997: 11). An alternative approach, in the political realist tradition of international relations (see, for example, Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979), contends that violent conflict has often resulted from the desire of states to maintain, defend, and extend their interests in an international environment that possesses at best a weak overarching legal system to resolve disputes. Given this international environment, states employ power to achieve their goals, which at times has resulted in violent inter- and intrastate conflicts. There- fore, the use and abuse of sovereign power and the existence of power asymmetry between contending parties are built directly into the conflict resolution process (Zartman, Deng et al. 1996). With respect to the psychological dynamics of conflict resolution, the realist responds that human needs CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR TRANSFORMATION? 305 are insatiable and changeable, but divergent interests are more clearly determined and negotiated (Zartman 1997: 13). Negotiations, according to analysts such as Touval and Zartman, will be more fruitful if they are directed toward agreement on specific issues rather than root causes. These two approaches to conflict resolution may be reconciled in part by sequencing the steps in the process of resolving the conflict.2 Negotiations may first focus on specific and concrete grievances, leaving the more difficult and deeper issues for later. An example of this approach was the Dayton Accords that ended the fighting in Bosnia. Richard Holbrooke, the Amer- ican negotiator, was criticized for not having dealt with the root problems of the Bosnian crisis. Nevertheless, the Dayton Accords stopped the fighting, lowered the number of fatalities, and enabled attention to be turned to the deeper, structural aspects of the conflict. Two objections, however, may be raised to this incremental approach. First, failure to address root causes early in the negotiating process may actually undermine progress in tackling immediate grievances. Second, once the conflict is off the television screen there may be little incentive for third parties to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict. Either way, failure to resolve the underlying grievances might lead to renewed fighting. Both approaches agree that the goal of a negotiated political settlement is to move the disputing parties steadily from the battleground to the ballot box, eventually arriving at “normal politics” – an ongoing institutional method of resolving intrastate political conflict through negotiation and compromise. This article examines the role of grievances, satisfaction,andexpectations to answer the question of how deeply the negotiations should aim to resolve the conflict and thus lay the basis for normal politics. Incorporating expectations into the conflict resolution process allows one method of understanding how much conflict resolution is enough. Licklider (1999: 27) argues that the one of the keys to a successful settlement “seems to be what the parties expect to happen in the future.” By examining the political settlements in Mozambique and South Africa this article shows how expectations affected both the extent to which the conflict was resolved and the stability of the post-settlement phase of the conflict.

Grievances and Satisfaction

Grievances are the most readily apparent causes of a conflict. A grievance is a cause of distress that is felt to justify complaints or resistance. Grievances may be immediate (also called precipitating). These grievances are concrete and specific, and must be present for a conflict to arise. While immediate grievances are specific injustices, root causes, in contrast, refer to the struggle 306 ROBERT B. LLOYD for power among competing groups to counteract perceived or actual threats to group interests. A competitive struggle for power may or may not lead to grievances – it depends upon how it is handled. If a party perceives this competition as unjust, then it will attempt to right the wrong. The resolution of the conflict then depends ultimately on the parties’ satisfaction that the causes of a conflict have been resolved. The concept of satisfaction is the key to understanding the resolution of an armed conflict. Since negotiation necessarily requires compromise, then a negotiated political settlement inevitably means that some or all of the underlying causes of a conflict are left untouched. If so, can any such political settlement ever be termed “successful”?

Expectations

The short answer is that the parties’ satisfaction with a political settlement, and ultimately with its durability, depends on how the settlement met their expectations concerning the resolution of these grievances. Expectations are the anticipation of something considered reasonable or due. If there is a marked mismatch between expectations and achievements, the likelihood of a successful settlement is greatly diminished. The importance of expectations in conflict has long been noted. In Gurr’s (1970) theory of relative deprivation, unmet expectations play a central role in explaining political violence. Conflict resolution is a dynamic process. Early in a conflict, the parties’ expectations for the resolution of a grievance may be extremely high. As the conflict turns violent, expectations may fall, especially if the crisis is prolonged. The sudden possibility of a settlement may cause parties’ expectations for the resolution of a grievance to increase dramatically. A resolution will not occur, however, unless all the parties are satisfied with the way the political settlement handles these expectations. The dynamic nature of expectations plays a critical role in how the conflict is resolved. First, a successful political settlement may not only have to satisfy the expectations of the opposition for the redress of immediate grievances, but also determine if these expectations include the resolution of the conflict’s root causes. Second, since expectations change over time, an agreement that would have been accepted at one point in the conflict may not be accepted at another. Third, people’s expectations may be met regarding the agreement, but not its implementation. In brief, overcoming a conflict may be seen as a successful process of converging expectations among the disputing parties on how to resolve the outstanding grievances. CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR TRANSFORMATION? 307

Resolving Conﬂict: A Structured, Focused Case Comparison

This article examines the South African and Mozambican settlements of the mid-1990s to determine the degree to which conflict was resolved, the role played by expectations, and whether a failure to resolve the root causes dooms the settlement. The time is especially propitious to examine these two settlements. First, both these political settlements terminated armed hostilities and opened the door to normal politics. Second, five years have passed since each country experienced elections that were the climax of the negotiated settlements. Third, each country has now progressed through two election cycles in which the former combatants fought through the ballot box and one party accepted defeat without resorting to violence. Therefore, the settlements appear to have been durable. The methodological approach employed is what Stern and Druckman (2000: 33–63) term a “structured, focused case comparison,” which differs from the more traditional case study approach in that a theoretically explicit framework guides the selection of key questions and variables prior to the research of the cases. This helps overcome some of the deficiencies – notably, noncomparability across cases – of the case study approach and aids in accumulating knowledge. Mozambique and South Africa were selected because they meet three criteria. First, both states were in the process of collapsing during the armed confrontation, making it urgent to overcome the conflict if utter disaster were to be avoided. Second, both states were undergoing conflicts that had a number of common features, and, at various points, were linked. Third, both countries resolved their armed confrontations through negotiated settlements. The sources of data for this article include public opinion polls, personal interviews, and content analysis of political documents.3

The South African Conﬂict

Three critical phases marked the South African conflict prior to its settlement in 1994. The first was the founding in 1912 of the South African Native National Conference, which in 1923 became the African National Congress (ANC). These and other opposition organizations began articulating their demands. Most of these were relatively modest demands to repeal several discriminatory laws enacted by the Dutch colonial government. Expectations were to resolve a few specific grievances, not overthrow the government. The post-World War II period saw dramatic changes in South African politics as decolonization swept the African continent. Expectations for radical change developed. The ANC and other African, Indian, and so- 308 ROBERT B. LLOYD called Coloured opposition movements grew increasingly dissatisfied with the response of successive South African governments to resolution of specific grievances, and they began to mobilize. The second phase arrived after the Sharpville massacre and the banning of the ANC. At this point, the ANC concluded that nonviolent protest would not accomplish its ends. By the mid-1960s, this mobilization had changed to guerrilla insurgency. The third phase in the conflict occurred late in the 1980s and early 1990s when it became clear to many that the armed struggle had reached a stalemate.4 Aging ANC leaders saw new challengers to its leadership of the opposition movement. The disintegration of the Soviet Union reduced material and ideological support for the ANC. Among whites, growing wear- iness of the economic, political, and social costs of the conflict increased pressure on the government to negotiate. Diplomatic efforts of the United States facilitated this ripening moment by mediating the conflicts in states neighboring South Africa. The Namibian and Angolan settlements helped develop trust among leaders in Southern Africa and reduce regional tension. With the path now clear, between 1990 and 1994 South Africans turned their attention to negotiating a settlement to resolve the conflicts that had long divided the country. This brief review illustrates that the expectations of opposition movements fluctuated widely over how to resolve the conflict. To understand how the settlement satisfactorily resolved these dynamic expectations over the grievances, it is first necessary to examine the nature of these opposition grievances. Then it is possible to assess whether the South African settlement resolved the immediate or root grievances.

Opposition Grievances

What expectations caused South Africans to be dissatisfied with their government’s policies regarding opposition groups prior to negotiations of 1990– 1994? This question is answered through polls regarding South African expectations and grievances, in-depth interviews of selected South Africans, and content analysis from 1986–1996 issues of Democracy in Action,an influential bimonthly journal that acted as a forum for debates over the nature of the South African conflict. Taken together, these data give a clear picture of the grievances and expectations underlying the conflict just prior to negotiations.5 A number of organizations polled South Africans throughout the 1980s and 1990s regarding their satisfaction with the general political situation in the country.6 These polls of both black and white South Africans presented very high levels of dissatisfaction prior to President DeKlerk’s speech in CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR TRANSFORMATION? 309

February 1990 that announced the beginning of negotiations. In 1987, for example, two-thirds of black respondents indicated dissatisfaction with the political situation. Among whites, the rate of dissatisfaction was lower, but still approached 50 percent. Significantly, both blacks and whites became increasingly dissatisfied after a negotiated settlement became a real possibility. For example, by July 1993, 75 percent of urban blacks and 84 percent of urban whites were dissatisfied with the political situation. This discontent was related to soaring levels of political violence in Natal and Witwatersrand.7 South African dissatisfaction with the current political situation, 1986–1993 (in percent)

1986 1987 1992 1993

Whites51395984 Blacks72685575

Source: Complete poll data available at the Center for Sociopoli- tical Analysis, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria. Figures above indicate percent of respondents dissatisfied with the general political situation as of the date of the interview. The polls make it clear that South Africans were dissatisfied with the general political situation – but about what specifically?8 Those interviewed responded with two different types of grievances. Concrete grievances included visible manifestations of apartheid and specific acts of repres- sion necessary to maintain these policies. Common examples included bans against black political organizations, the jailing of Nelson Mandela, lack of black representation in the government, and the lack of the right to vote. Opposition non-elites, the major constituency for the ANC, focused on better housing, greater employment opportunities, and government services such as roads, electricity, and schools.9 Opposition elites, reflecting a higher socioeconomic level, identified a number of more abstract grievances such as apartheid, racial discrimination, lack of respect for human rights, and the lack of a democratic political system. Opposition elites, with the notable exception of the Inkatha Freedom Party, also emphasized the moral and personal failings of the leaders of National Party government. They often expressed critical views of whites in general and the National Party in particular. In short, the conflict happened because the “other side” was composed of “bad” people. Inkatha respondents, while sharing many of the grievances of the ANC, tended to see the National Party less as morally deficient and more as simply inept and bound by fear. Given the testimony of those opposed to the National Party, is it possible to identify a single underlying or root cause to the South African conflict? Taken 310 ROBERT B. LLOYD together, the responses indicate that the underlying cause of the conflict was an economic inequality between whites and blacks, and a perceived blocking of opportunity to achieve such equality. One could argue, taking the study of cause and effect one level deeper, that the underlying cause was a fundamental lack of respect for South Africans who differed racially and culturally from the Afrikaner. Practically, the deeper issue was the refusal of the National Party to expand the political and economic system sufficiently to allow other groups enough influence to overcome Afrikaner rule. Thus, opposition to Afrikaner rule contained both substantive and procedural root grievances.

Satisfaction with the Agreement

The failure to satisfactorily resolve these grievances had, by the early 1960s, led to an armed confrontation. Since neither side could unilaterally defeat the other, and an escalation of the conflict increased its cost to unacceptable levels for all sides, negotiations became the mutually preferred option available. The steps required to overcome the conflict included establishing a cease- fire, rebuilding sufficient trust among the combatants to allow negotiations, and addressing the grievances through negotiations. To be successful both the agreements and their implementation needed to address these three elements. The ultimate concern is not with the actual details of the settlement, but on people’s satisfaction with them. First, how satisfied were the South Africans with the agreement signed between the government and the opposition (primarily the ANC)? Overall, those interviewed expressed fairly broad and deep support for the negotiated agreement.10 Respondents from the two parties that actually negotiated the agreement – the ANC and the NP – generally continued to support it. The most enthusiastic supporters of the agreement were white liberals and black non-elites. ANC members and their sympathizers were less enthusiastic, primarily because they believed the compromises inhibited the “transformation” (dealing with the root causes of the conflict) of the South African state. They often stated that the creation of a Government of National Unity (GNU), the retention of the white civil servant and security forces in charge of implementing the agreement, the continued practice, in part, of racially- based local government administrations, and increased devolution of power to the provinces had impeded transformation. National Party members expressed satisfaction with the agreements. One National Party member stated that if one compared the final agreement to earlier statements of the ANC (reflecting expectations of an earlier phase of the conflict), then the NP had won more points than it had lost. The most notable, and critical, dissatisfaction with the agreement came from Inkatha CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR TRANSFORMATION? 311

Freedom Party supporters. Their overwhelming procedural and substantive grievances related to the Record of Understanding between the National Party and the ANC, which they perceived as a pact both to exclude the IFP and to refuse to consider speciﬁc concerns related to a lack of recognition for traditional African culture and local government.

Satisfaction with the Implementation

Second, how satisfied were South Africans with the implementation of the agreements? The responses to the questionnaire show that among most respondents, there was a consensus among most interviewed that the parties had largely kept their promises regarding the implementation. The notable exception was Inkatha, whose respondents were aggrieved that, after the elections, the ANC broke an agreement to seek international mediation to the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal.11 Respondents from the National Party, the partner in both agreement and implementation, were not entirely satisfied with the implementation. They were particularly concerned about the ANC’s policy of affirmative action, as well as the installation of ANC administrators whom they viewed as incompetent. They also were angry that the status of Afrikaans was being reduced by ANC policies on English language schooling and broadcasting in Afrikaans. Most ANC supporters expressed satisfaction with the implementation of the agreement. The only discordant note sounded by an ANC respondent concerned crime. One ANC government official in charge of the national police forces stated that it was not easy for leaders of any political party, including the ANC, to control the actions of their forces at the grassroots.12

South African satisfaction with political agreements, implementation, and success in resolving conﬂict (in percent)

Satisfied Mostly satisfied Dissatisfied

Political agreements 45 29 26 Implementation of agreements 57 27 16 Conﬂict successfully resolved? 35 43 22

Source: Personal interviews with South Africans. Figures above represent the percentage response to each survey question. The “dissatisﬁed” percent- ages are signiﬁcantly boosted due to the widespread opposition of Inkatha Freedom Party respondents to the entire political settlement process. 312 ROBERT B. LLOYD

Converging Expectations

To the extent that there was general satisfaction with the agreement and its implementation, how and why did the expectations of all the parties involved in the conflict converge on how to resolve their outstanding differences? First, a careful and systematic examination of three documents produced by the ANC in 1955, 1975, and 1989 indicates how the party’s grievances and expectations changed over the course of the conflict. The Freedom Charter presented the expectations of the ANC for a future South Africa during the conflict’s mobilization phase (1950s). The document was essentially a demand for non-racial democracy, liberty, and individual rights, wrapped in a socialist package.13 ANC expectations regarding the response of the government changed greatly over the next two decades. In 1975 the ANC produced a document entitled Forward to Freedom, which summarized the conflict to date and explained its origins (ANC 1975a, 1975b). The ANC also escalated the level of demands that it thought must be met to resolve the conflict. Its leaders at that point believed the only way to resolve the conflict was by violent confrontation and the complete replacement of South Africa’s political and economic system. The ANC would resolve the root causes of these grievances by introducing a socialist political system established through military victory, as had occurred in Vietnam and Mozambique. By the late 1980s, however, it was clear that political changes were looming in South Africa. The Harare Declaration abandoned the rhetoric of a worker’s state and violent revolution. By agreeing to come to the table, the Harare Declaration signaled that the gap in expectations between the ANC and the National Party over how to resolve the grievances was beginning to narrow significantly (see Kathrada 1990). What evidence is there that this convergence in expectations concerning the resolution of grievances was leading to a political settlement in South Africa? By the late 1980s, for example, nearly 90 percent of blacks surveyed favored negotiations between the National Party government and banned opposition movements such as the ANC. Increased levels of political violence, however, did cause a corresponding decrease in support for negotiations among blacks over the next two years.14 Among whites, despite extraordinary distrust of the ANC, polls showed growing support for negotiations. By 1990, 60 percent of white South Africans favored negotiations, a 50 percent increase in just three years (Human Sciences Research Council 1995–96).These polls show a clear convergence in black and white support for negotiations. CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR TRANSFORMATION? 313

Conﬂict Management, Resolution, or Transformation?

After the negotiations to which both sides ultimately agreed, two critical questions remain. First, to what degree was the conflict resolved? Did the political settlement resolve the immediate grievances or the root causes? Second, are South Africans satisfied with the degree to which the conflict has been resolved? All respondents interviewed affirmed that the agreement and its implementation had resolved many of the immediate causes of the conflict.15 First and foremost, the conflict over an Afrikaner-ruled, apartheid state was resolved. Second, as an ANC government official pointed out, the settlement also determined who would govern South Africa, i.e., the ANC. But many of those interviewed thought that although the political settlement had resolved the immediate causes of the conflict, its underlying causes had not been resolved.16 While for most respondents, this still meant that the conflict had been overcome, the interviews revealed two important expectations in this regard. First, that the root causes of the conflict would be addressed, and that the ANC-led government was the mechanism to achieve this end. The black elites interviewed frequently mentioned that need for “transformation” in South Africa, which is the term for a set of policies designed to achieve a deeper resolution of the conflict. The arrival to power of an ANC-led government provided the opportunity to resolve these root causes. Three policies attempted to meet some of these expectations. The first policy aimed to reduce economic inequalities in housing and boost employment. The Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) was designed as a policy framework and program that “must go beyond the [Freedom] Charter to an actual program of government” (Mandela 1994b). The RDP was a classic Keynesian program of economic stimulus by government spending on housing and other infrastruc- ture improvements for black South Africans. The second policy designed to deal with the underlying causes of the conflict was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The ANC supported the TRC so that “the task of healing the wounds of the past” would pave the way for the implementation of one of the principles of the Freedom Charter: “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white.”. The TRC was a mechanism intended to uncover activities of all parties in the past as a way to understand the hidden truths of the apartheid era, and to set the stage for forgiveness and healing. Nelson Mandela, aiming directly at the root causes of the conflict, stated: “True reconciliation ...has to be based on the creation of a truly democratic, non-racial, and non-sexist society so that everything that leads to racial and ethnic tension in our society is done away with” (ANC 1996). 314 ROBERT B. LLOYD

The third policy designed to redress grievances related to employment. Affirmative action – the term is an American import – programs were designed to expand opportunities for blacks and address decades of injustice in hiring practices.17 How successful were these three policies in resolving the root causes of the conflict? After two years, the RDP was quietly shelved, and some of the spending was transferred to other programs. Nevertheless, the failure of the RDP indicated that South African expectations for resolving both the immediate and underlying causes of the conflict could not be met solely through increased government spending. The success of the TRC in meeting expectations to develop an accounting for the past is as yet unknown. The Inkatha Freedom Party and National Party argued that since the commission was stacked with ANC supporters, its investigation into past atrocities by all sides in the conflict would be biased. Regarding affirmative action, widespread black support for this policy suggests that this may be one of the more successful policies designed to deal with the root causes of the conflict. The policy is not cost free, and criticisms of the policy are similar to those leveled against affirmative action in the United States. In the South African case, the conflict was overcome by the resolution of the immediate grievances. The compromises necessary to achieve this settlement, however, proved a source of frustration to the newly elected ANC government. Due to the overwhelming electoral mandate in the April 1994 elections, the ANC possessed the power to press forward on addressing the root causes. Various aspects of these policies provoked negative responses by those who were not supporters of the ANC. Yet the attempt to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict did not cause a resumption of hostilities for two reasons. First, there was popular satisfaction with the ANC and its policies to resolve the immediate grievances. Simply tackling these immediate grievances was a huge task. Second, the political settlement imposed clear and often unavoidable constraints on the ANC’s ability to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict.

The Mozambican Conﬂict

Mozambique is the second case for understanding how much conflict must be resolved for a settlement to be durable. Mozambique provides many of the ingredients needed to study conflict resolution, particularly in developing countries. Political cleavages based on ideology, ethnicity, and region are all present in one country. The experiences of the country differ in three significant ways from those of neighboring South Africa. First, Mozambique is a classic case of CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR TRANSFORMATION? 315 decolonization. Second, while South Africa is the richest and most industrialized country on the African continent, Mozambique is one of its poorest and least industrialized. Third, the negotiated settlement in Mozambique was achieved through outside mediation while South Africans negotiated their own settlement. This section examines the grievances, expectations, and satisfaction of Mozambicans during the political settlement process. Why were Mozambicans dissatisfied with the government? Were they satisfied that the negotiated agreements, and their subsequent implementation, resolved the grievances that provoked their earlier dissatisfaction? Did their expectations on how best to resolve these grievances change over the course of settlement?18 In comparison to South Africa, Mozambique’s conflict has not received as much popular and academic attention. Portugal was the political metropole of Mozambique, but the country clearly lies within the economic orbit of South Africa. In 1962, several small political groups opposed to Portuguese rule merged under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane to form the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo). Guerrilla attacks staged from neighboring Tanzania began soon after. In 1974, the Portuguese military, mired in three independence movements in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, staged a coup in Lisbon in April 1974. The new left-wing military government quickly turned the government of Mozambique over to a Frelimo-led transitional government in September 1974. The events of the next three years proved crucial for Mozambique’s economic and political future. In March 1976 Frelimo blocked white-ruled and land-locked Rhodesia’s access to the sea through the Mozambican port of Beira and allowed black guerrilla groups to use Mozambique as a safe haven for attacks against Rhodesia. The Rhodesian government responded by forming the Mozambican National Resistance (later known as Renamo from its Portuguese acronym Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) in 1977 to attack Zimbabwean guerrillas within Mozambique and thus raise the cost to the Frelimo government of its support for the Zimbabweans. Mozambicans disenchanted with the Frelimo government were the source of early recruits for Renamo. Also in 1977, Frelimo proclaimed itself committed to Marxist- Leninist principles, declared itself the sole legal party, and established Mozambique as a People’s Republic. In 1980 Rhodesia became the independent country of Zimbabwe, and the South African government became the patron of Renamo. Now based in South Africa, Renamo became much more effective militarily. Faced with severe political and economic hardship, and the growing success of the 316 ROBERT B. LLOYD

Renamo rebels, Mozambique signed the Nkomati non-aggression accord with South Africa in 1984. Although Mozambique adhered to its part of the agreement by not allowing its territory to become a guerrilla base for the African National Congress, elements of the South African government continued to support Renamo. Frelimo made a number of political and economic reforms over the next several years that met many of the demands of Renamo, but the government still refused to recognize the rebel movement. Civil war continued, and in the deepening military stalemate Renamo lacked the means or the will to capture the provincial capitals and Maputo. For its part, the government could not dislodge the movement from its control of the countryside. In July 1990, the first direct talks between Renamo and Frelimo began. In 1992, Mozambique began to suffer from the effects of the worst drought in over a century. The effect of the drought was to move the conflict from a bearable to a hurting stalemate. On 4 October 1992, Joaquim Chissano, President of Mozambique, and Afonso Dhlakama, President of Renamo, met in Rome and signed the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique (GPA), which formally ended sixteen years of armed conflict in the country. In October 1994, Mozambique held its first ever multiparty elections. The elections were an important milestone on the road from violent conflict to normal politics (see Lloyd 1995: 152–155). The electoral support achieved by each party provides a clear picture of Mozambicans’ satisfaction with the way each proposed to resolve the grievances that had led to the conflict. Mozambican voters gave a clear victory to Frelimo President Joaquim Chissano and his party. Chissano won 53.3 percent of the presidential vote. Frelimo did not fare as well in the legislative elections, but still won an outright majority of the legislative Assembly (129 out of 250 seats) based on 43.33 percent of the national vote. Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama came in second, receiving 33.73 percent of the presidential vote. Renamo fared better than its leader, receiving 37.78 percent of the votes, which gave it 112 seats in the Assembly. Although Frelimo won the elections, Renamo’s strong electoral support upset many of the analyses that had identified Renamo as an organization that was externally (South African) backed and enjoyed little or no internal support. Renamo won five of Mozambique’s ten provinces, including the two most populous and economically important, Zambezia and Nampula. CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR TRANSFORMATION? 317

Opposition Grievances

The election results suggest that the conflict was fueled by a number of internal sources of dissatisfaction. These grievances include regionalism (a strong north-south division), ethnicity (opposition to the dominant Shangaan tribe), ideology (modernization vs. traditional African ways), and land ownership (Soviet-style villagization and collectivization policies vs. tribal chief and shaman leadership). In particular, Frelimo did not fully understand the depth of popular grievances over policies that politically disenfranchised local traditional leaders and transferred land ownership from them to the state. Given the testimony of those interviewed, previous academic research, and the election results, what were the immediate and underlying causes of the conflict? The immediate grievances were the political disenfranchisement of traditional leaders, disputes over property rights (mostly over land), the disparate regional economic impact (favoring the south at the expense of central Mozambique) that specific Frelimo policies had created, and a lack of tolerance by the Frelimo government for any opposition to its policies. Two underlying causes of the conflict may be identified. The first was rivalry between competing groups. Whether this group identity was based more on regional or ethnic affiliation depended on the particular group in question. Opposition from Shona speakers, for example, had a strong ethnic component. For other groups, opposition seemed more based on sectionalism than ethnicity. The second underlying cause of the conflict relates to the ideological clash between modernism and traditionalism.19 Renamo discerned the grievances of its rural, traditional, constituency over the modernist policies Frelimo had begun implementing after independence (see Roesch 1992a, 1992b). These groups may have initially supported Frelimo, but the failure of its policies to provide clear benefits to the people combined with the increasingly authoritarian actions of the government to enforce the policies led to even greater support for traditional ways, which had at least worked.20

Satisfaction with the Agreement and Implementation

What agreements constituted the political settlement in Mozambique? What problems did these agreements address? Finally, were people satisfied with these agreements? It is clear in hindsight that the political settlement deci- sively shifted the conflict from armed confrontation to nonviolent political dialogue, marking the end of the conflict. What in the negotiated settlement made people sufficiently satisfied that the political settlement worked? 318 ROBERT B. LLOYD

A Frelimo government official reflected the views of many when he said that he was satisfied with the agreements because they accommodated different ethnic groups in the country. Renamo leaders and their followers, for their part, stated that the agreements ended the war, delivered free and fair elections, and provided political space for all Mozambicans.21 Almost all of those interviewed stated that the implementation delivered peace and democracy to the country. The only major discordant note was Frelimo’s anger at the international community for providing a “trust fund” for opposition political parties. This fund provided Renamo with additional resources to contest the government.

Mozambican satisfaction with political agreements, implementation, and success in resolving conﬂict (in percent)

Satisfied Mostly satisfied Dissatisfied

Political agreements 69 24 7 Implementation of agreements 66 17 17 Conﬂict successfully resolved? 60 33 7

Source: Personal interviews with Mozambicans. Figures above represent the percentage response to each survey question.

Conﬂict Management, Resolution, or Transformation?

To what degree was the conflict resolved? The major procedural grievance that had been resolved was access to the political system by political parties other than Frelimo. Early in the negotiation process, the Frelimo government attempted to undercut the support of Renamo by acceding to its demands while still refusing to negotiate with the opposition movement. The settlement eventually met all of Renamo’s demands for a multiparty state, the end of the Marxist-Leninist political and economic system, and the inclusion of more traditional political and religious authorities. Many of those interviewed, however, thought that the political settlement had resolved only incompletely the immediate causes of the conflict. One unresolved immediate grievance is land distribution. In addition, a number of those interviewed believed that specific grievances over process had not been resolved. In the new political system Renamo, and especially Dhlakama, did not have power commensurate with its electoral mandate. The political settlement also attempted to defuse some of the underlying causes of the conflict such as regional and ethnic rivalry. During the process of the political settlement, Frelimo attempted to widen its party to include non- Southerners. Several respondents said that some of the underlying causes of CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR TRANSFORMATION? 319 the conflict – a lack of political freedom and rights – had been only partially addressed. The political settlement in Mozambique clearly ended armed hostilities.22 Even a cursory examination of Mozambique’s political landscape shows an enormous difference as a result of the political settlement. If one sees the preemptive moves by Frelimo to address popular grievances as the prologue to the political settlement, then almost all the immediate grievances were resolved. The political settlement itself resolved the major outstanding grievance of access to the political system. Thus, the settlement’s resolution of the immediate causes of the conflict was sufficient to establish normal politics.

Resolve Immediate or Root Causes?

The examination of the civil conflicts in South Africa and Mozambique demonstrates that, in both cases, the political settlement resolved grievances sufficiently to satisfy the majority of respondents. Though the precise details of the political settlement processes differed, each country negotiated a political settlement to end an armed confrontation, established the constitutional basis for a new polity, held elections, and formed a new and more popularly legitimate government. The settlements were durable enough to undergo two voting cycles, avoiding the “vote once” failure of many settlements. The question remains, however: Must a negotiated political settlement resolve the immediate or underlying causes, or both, for the conflict to be overcome? The responses of South Africans and Mozambicans in polls, interviews, and elections reveal crucial differences in the parties’ expectations for the degree to which the conflict needed to be resolved for them to be satisfied with the settlement. Overall, South Africans preferred to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict and Mozambicans the immediate causes. There are several reasons for this divergence in expectations. First, Mozambique and South Africa experienced different levels of relative deprivation. The intensity and geographical extent of the armed confrontation in Mozambique was far greater than in neighboring South Africa. Furthermore, all Mozambicans experienced the devastating impact of the civil war. Not surprisingly, Mozambicans showed enormous degrees of satisfaction with the political settlement process that ended an expensive, violent, and long-standing civil conflict. In South Africa, the violence was at a lower level and confined to certain areas of the country. Opposition movements in South Africa also had much higher aspirations, summed up as complete equality with white South Africans. These higher aspirations help explain why the South African opposition wished to resolve the conflict at a deeper level. 320 ROBERT B. LLOYD

Second, the perception of blame played a major role in the degree to which the grievances were resolved. “Blame” for the conflict was apportioned differently in each country. Consequently, satisfaction with the outcomes of the political settlement – and the degree to which the conflict was resolved – depended on support for the grievances of the opposition. The Mozambicans interviewed tended to blame both sides equally for the conflict. In South Africa, by contrast, nearly all respondents blamed the National Party. This affected the legitimacy of the negotiating parties. The ANC and other black opposition parties were widely perceived as champions of legitimate grievances held by a majority of the South African population. South Africa’s Nelson Mandela enjoyed enormous prestige as the leader of the ANC. Many South Africans undoubtedly voted for the ANC simply because Mandela was its leader. Many Mozambicans, in contrast, questioned the legitimacy of both Renamo and Frelimo. Third, and critical, is the post-election balance of contesting powers. The differing degrees to which the conflict was resolved in Mozambique and South Africa were strongly affected by the parties’ assessment of the likely post-electoral outcome. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress won the election by a three-to-one margin over the National Party. Furthermore, after the elections the ANC government gained control over the military. This reduced the likelihood of whites contesting the election. In Mozambique, the outcome of the election was always more uncer- tain. Frelimo was fairly confident it would win, but likely did not expect a landslide. There was also the fear that a Frelimo electoral victory would cause Renamo to return to the bush to fight. This had happened just a few months earlier in Angola when the rebel leader Jonas Savimbi refused to accept the election results that showed him in second place to the Angolan president. The tenuous nature of the agreement, and the desire not to air dirty laundry, led both Renamo and Frelimo to seal their records during negotiations. South Africa, its post-electoral power and legitimacy more firmly established, desired to investigate the apartheid era more completely. The differing expectations of Mozambicans and South Africans over the degree to which the grievances should be resolved were most evident in their answers to the final question of the survey questionnaire: Has the conflict been resolved? In Mozambique, most respondents stated that the conflict was over. Mozambicans were satisfied with the resolution of the grievances and its outcome: peace. In South Africa, the answers were notably more tentative on both the resolution of the crisis and the conflict. Many South Africans would have preferred a political settlement that dealt with underlying causes, but the political compromises prevented them from achieving this goal. CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR TRANSFORMATION? 321

A number of unresolved tensions continue to exist since the political settlement was implemented. First, in both Mozambique and South Africa, the clash continues between modernism and traditional African thought and practices. Renamo and Inkatha, drawing leaders and supporters from a traditional constituency, would prefer greater decentralization to institutionalize and enhance their power. Second, South Africa continues to experience conﬂict between whites and blacks due to the large relative discrepancy in economic resources and the continued presence of a disproportionate number of whites in political and economic positions of power.

Policy Implications

There are a number of policy implications for this research. First, in both cases outside mediation contributed to the success of the political settlement process. In South Africa, various individuals helped break negotiating dead- locks. In Mozambique, outsiders maintained the country on economic life support while the political treatment was administered. Second, negotiators must pay close attention to both immediate grievances and root causes, the changing expectations of the disputing parties, and their satisfaction both with the settlement and its implementation. At each step in the political settlement people must be satisfied that their grievances are being resolved. Failure ensure the confidence of parties’ at each step may doom a settlement to a relapse of fighting. Third, the constituency of a party and its leaders may have different expectations regarding the degree to which the conflict must be resolved for satisfaction to occur. The surveys in Mozambique and South Africa showed a consistent pattern: rank-and-file members of a political movement desired resolution of the immediate causes of the conflict whereas the leadership preferred that the underlying causes of the conflict be resolved. This article argues that successful political settlements – those that end civil conflicts – occur for specific reasons. Assuming the combatants in a civil conflict are in an unbearable mutually hurting stalemate, then a political settlement will be successful if the parties are satisfied with the way the settlement meets people’s expectations regarding the resolution of the grievances that provoked the fighting.

Conﬂict Resolution, not Transformation

After examining the cases of Mozambique and South Africa, it is clear that a negotiated political settlement must resolve the immediate causes of the 322 ROBERT B. LLOYD conflict. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that a negotiated political settlement – because it involves compromise – will be less likely to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict.23 Even where the post-electoral outcome strongly favored one party, the compromises limited the ability of the party to resolve the root causes to its total satisfaction. For example, the negotiated agreements did not give the new ANC-led government absolute power to restructure society to the extent desired by many who had been opposed to the National Party government. The underlying cause of the conflict was identified as inequality between blacks and whites. The South African opposition, in particular, aspired to substantial changes in political and economic institutions. The impact of the various attempts to resolve the underlying causes exacerbated the already wide political cleavages between the two sides in the conflict. The South African case suggests that post-election attempts to resolve the conflict’s root causes are difficult. The likelihood of success is lower if the attempt is not perceived as fair by all parties to the conflict, was not part of the original agreements, and threatens the interests of those who no longer are in government but who retain substantial power. Thus, the transformation of a conflict by tackling its root causes is a Herculean task. Divergent interests, differing perceptions and definitions of justice, and unhealed wounds remain. In the case of societal conflict, the potential is great for making things worse by stirring up raw emotions and painful memories, and for acting without a grasp of complex politics and cultural differences. This does not necessarily negate the value of a negotiated intervention, but cautions that unless expectations are also harmonized over how the root causes are to be resolved, such a transformation will inflict additional injury on a wound that is beginning to heal. The examples of South Africa and Mozambique suggest that the resolution of specific grievances will lead to the institutionalization of ongoing conflict within normal politics. Such an approach also may provide the best opportunity to deal later with the root causes. This will happen if the parties continue to be dissatisfied with the settlement, but coexist within a political system where a measure of trust of one another and commit- ment to a democratic system have been established. The South Africa case in particular strongly suggests, however, that the nature of the compromise settlement itself precludes a deep resolution, even if the party desiring a deeper resolution enjoys considerable legitimacy and electoral support. Therefore, neither the South African nor Mozambican case lends any support to the Burton and Azar hypothesis that a settlement is doomed to failure unless the root causes are addressed and transformed. It has been over five years since elections ratified the negotiated political settlement. Both CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR TRANSFORMATION? 323 countries have recently experienced a second election that was contested and accepted by the defeated party. While South Africa has made a few attempts to resolve some deeper causes of the conflict, in neither country is there any evidence that a return to violent conflict is even a remote possibility. Mozambique, in contrast to South Africa, aimed for a more modest resolution of the conflict, and was much happier with the results.

Notes

1. Christopher Mitchell (1989: 32) argues that success is inherently relative precisely because the settlement is a compromise both in its agreement and its implementation. 2. Louis Kriesberg (1997: 67) argues that the two approaches are sometimes complementary as seen in conflicts – like Mozambique – where Track II diplomacy has paved the way for later official diplomatic efforts. 3. Compared with Mozambique, South Africa has an abundance of scientific polls, pertinent documents, and available research on the conflict. Consequently, the section on Mozambique leans almost exclusively on the results of personal interviews. 4. According to Vincent Maphai (1992) of the Human Sciences Research Council, the existence of a stalemate was not universally perceived. Within the ANC and among its critics there were serious doubts about whether or not the National Party still had the upper hand due to its control over the state, especially the military. 5. A total of thirty-nine South Africans from Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Cape Town were interviewed in January and February 1997. The survey instrument elicited responses regarding satisfaction over the government’s handling of the conflict, expectations about the agreement and its implementation, and perceptions on whether or not the conflict was over. South Africans representing most major segments of the population were interviewed, although the sample was biased towards elites, i.e., opinion-makers and the very well-informed and influential. 6. The South African polls were conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council’s Center for Sociopolitical Analysis, Monitor Publications, Indicator SA, and the South African Chamber of Business. 7. Human Sciences Research Council’s Center for Sociopolitical Analysis. The polls from March 1986 to July 1993 were conducted among blacks and whites in metropolitan areas via door-to-door and telephone interviews. Pollsters asked respondents how satisfied they were with the current political situation in South Africa. 8. The survey question asked whether the respondent, prior to negotiations, was satisfied with the response of the National Party to the demands of the opposition organizations. 9. The opposition non-elites were interviewed in the black township of Tembisa near Johannesburg, and reflected a cross-section of South Africa’s African language groups. 10. The question asked whether the respondent was satisfied with the agreement negotiated between the National Party and the ANC and other opposition groups. 11. The last-minute mediation of the Kenyan Washington Okumu that brought the agreement between the ANC and Inkatha is covered in Michael Cassidy (1995). 12. The respondent gave an explanation for why violence was so difficult to contain. First, leaders sometimes preferred not to investigate the reports of unauthorized action because of the consequences. Second, the switch from combat to negotiations left many of the 324 ROBERT B. LLOYD

former warriors adrift. No longer heroes central to the task of victory, they had become marginal actors. Interview with Azhar Cachalia in Pretoria, 22 January 1997. 13. Just after being unbanned, the ANC produced The Road to Peace: Resource Material on Negotiations (ANC 1990) that gives an excellent overview of how the negotiations relate to the Freedom Charter. 14. Other HSRC-sponsored polls of blacks indicate that they blamed the government for the increases in political violence. This was especially true after the February 1990 speech. Violence spread to the greater Johannesburg-Pretoria area, and many believed that government security forces, in cahoots with Inkatha supporters, were attempting to use violence to weaken the ANC. 15. The last question of the survey instrument asked the respondents: Did the political settlement process – including both the settlement and its implementation – completely resolve the conflict? 16. Alex Borraine (1994), reflecting on the April 1994 elections, opined that the conflict in South Africa was over. Of special interest was his view that the underlying causes of the conflict had been partly resolved (inequality), but that the immediate grievances (housing and education) were seen as unresolved. 17. President Mandela defended affirmative action during his opening speech to the South African Parliament. “After years of neglect and exclusion, any other course of action would be disastrous.” (Cape Argus, 13 February 1997). 18. Information on Mozambique’s conflict – in marked contrast to South Africa – is notable in its absence. Thus, this section depends more heavily on the personal interviews (thirty) and the researcher’s greater familiarity with Mozambique than with the polling data. One poll that was available examined Mozambican expectations, but had some methodological shortcomings that limited its usefulness: (Instituto de Comunicação Social 1996). 19. Renamo leader Dhlakama has been quoted as saying: “They wanted to do away with our traditions – something not even the colonialists did.” A.E.A.M. Thomashausen (1987). 20. The purpose of this section is not to assign blame for the civil conflict, but to assess internally generated grievances that Renamo used to gain support. The external sources of the conflict, Rhodesia and South Africa, are well known. Major contributors for this section on internally generated grievances include Young (1990), Hall (1990), Crocker (1992), Finnegan (1992) and Minter (1994). 21. Of those interviewed, eleven were classified as elite, which in the case of Mozambique meant having some education, some facility with Portuguese, and some influence on public opinion. The political affiliation of the respondents was diverse, but about a third claimed to support Frelimo. Most of the non-elites were interviewed by a Mozambican in a local Mozambican language rather than in Portuguese, removing any possible concern of being interviewed by a foreigner. 22. Interviews with Mozambican political, civil service, and military leaders confirmed that Frelimo did not know its own troop strength. Estimates for Renamo were likewise unclear. The author estimates that Renamo troop strength grew from approximately 2,000 in 1979 to around 20,000 in 1986, where it eventually stabilized. By 1995, after the first year of demobilization, Renamo troop strength had dropped to less than 2,000, and these had been incorporated into the new military. 23. This conclusion stands in stark contrast to the work of Lederach and others in the conflict transformation approach. Both the political realists and the social-psychologists would agree that the political settlements did not resolve the root causes. The evidence suggests resolving the immediate causes was sufficient to end the violent conflict and establish an CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR TRANSFORMATION? 325

institutional basis for normal politics because the expectations of the two sides over the conﬂict’s resolution had converged.

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