Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb

Home , Al Jawf Governorate, Dammaj, Hashemites, Haydan District, Saada, Saada Governorate

YEMEN: DEFUSING THE SAADA TIME BOMB

Middle East Report N°86 – 27 May 2009

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... i

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 2

II. ROOTS OF WAR...... 5 A. WHO ARE THE HUTHIS?...... 5 B. A BROKEN EQUILIBRIUM ...... 6 C. A CRISIS WITHIN ZAYDISM...... 7

III. COMPETING NARRATIVES...... 10 A. THE STATE’S NARRATIVE ...... 10 B. THE HUTHI AND ZAYDI REVIVALIST NARRATIVE...... 12

IV. A METASTASISING CONFLICT...... 13 A. ACCUMULATING GRIEVANCES AND GROWING TRIBAL INVOLVEMENT...... 13 B. A WAR OF SUCCESSION? ...... 15 C. RISE OF A WAR ECONOMY ...... 15 D. PERCEIVED FOREIGN MEDDLING ...... 17 E. WESTERN SILENCE ...... 18

V. MEDIATION ATTEMPTS ...... 19 A. TRIBAL AND POLITICAL MEDIATION COMMITTEES...... 19 B. QATAR’S MEDIATION ...... 21 C. RECONSTRUCTION COMMITTEES...... 22

VI. BUILDING A LASTING PEACE ...... 25 A. BRIDGING THE SECTARIAN GAP...... 25 B. REINTEGRATING THE HUTHIS INTO POLITICS...... 25 C. ENCOURAGING CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES ...... 26 D. A NEW INTERNATIONAL ROLE...... 27

VII. CONCLUSION...... 28 APPENDICES A. MAP OF YEMEN ...... 29 B. YEMEN WITH GOVERNORATES AND CITIES ...... 30 C. SAADA GOVERNORATE DISTRICTS MAP ...... 31 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...... 32 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA...... 33 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES...... 35

Middle East Report N°86 27 May 2009

YEMEN: DEFUSING THE SAADA TIME BOMB

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Away from media headlines, a war has been raging on than to the Twelver Shiism predominant in Iran and and off in Yemen’s northern governorate of Saada Iraq – and Shafei Sunnism. since 2004, flaring up in adjacent regions and, in 2008, reaching the outskirts of the capital, Sanaa. The con- The war expanded because it became a microcosm of flict, which has brought about extensive destruction, pits a series of latent religious, social, political and economic a rebel group, known generically as the Huthis, against tensions. It can be traced to the decline of the social government forces. Today’s truce is fragile and risks stratum led by Hashemites, who claim descent from being short-lived. A breakdown would threaten Yemen’s the Prophet Muhammad, and legitimised by Zaydism; stability, already under severe duress due to the global lack of investment in Zaydi strongholds like Saada; economic meltdown, depleting national resources, re- failed management of religious pluralism; permeabil- newed tensions between the country’s northern elites ity to external influences and the emergence of new and populations in the south and the threat from vio- political and religious actors, particularly Salafis. It lent groups with varied links to al-Qaeda. Nor would has variously and at times simultaneously taken the the impact necessarily be contained within national shape of a sectarian, political or tribal conflict, rooted borders. The country should use its traditional instru- in historical grievances and endemic underdevelop- ments – social and religious tolerance, cooptation of ment. It also has been shaped by the regional confron- adversaries – to forge a more inclusive compact that tation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. reduces sectarian stigmatisation and absorbs the Huthis. International actors – principally Gulf states and the The 1962 revolution ended the imamate that Zaydi West – should use their leverage and the promise of Hashemites ruled for over 1,000 years and overturned reconstruction assistance to press both government a social order with which they had been intimately and rebels to compromise. associated. During the civil war that followed, Saada was the main opposition stronghold. Since then, the After two decades of relative stability that confounded region has been largely ignored and marginalised. The foreign diplomats and analysts alike, the convergence religious dimension, long successfully managed, has of economic, political and secessionist challenges are resurfaced. Although differing on a number of theo- testing the regime’s coping capacity. The Saada con- logical and political issues, Zaydism and Shafeism are flict might not be the most covered internationally, relatively close within the doctrinal spectrum. Over the but it carries grave risks for Yemen’s political, sectar- last several decades, the gulf further narrowed, thanks ian and social equilibrium. partly to state educational efforts, and Yemen enjoyed cross-sectarian harmony. But a core of Zaydi revival- The war began as a quasi-police operation to arrest a ists remained, including the Huthis, who fought to former parliament member, Husein al-Huthi. Over five retain Zaydism’s theology and symbolic rituals. Their rounds, it has grown several-fold and become increas- cause was energised by the spread of Salafi influence, ingly complex and multilayered. As mutual grievances mainly from Saudi Arabia, and their sense that Zaydism accumulated and casualties mounted, the conflict was besieged. Some former rulers and Zaydi revival- metastasised, bringing in ever-growing numbers of ists view the republic as fundamentally anti-Hashemite actors, including local tribes and other members of and anti-Zaydi. the Saada population, covering a widening area and involving foreign actors under the backdrop of a regional There is a foreign dimension too, though it is hard to cold war. It has violated two fundamental pillars of evaluate. As the government accuses the rebels of Yemen’s stability: a political formula premised on alignment with Iran and of loyalty to the Lebanese Hiz- power-sharing and the gradual convergence of the bollah, Huthi leaders denounce its alignment with the two principal sectarian identities, Zaydism – a form of U.S. They also claim Saudi interference, in particular Shiism that in rites and practices is closer to Sunnism funding of government and local tribes. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page ii

If history has left scars, the war aggravated them. The and, most importantly, pledge reconstruction assistance destruction of entire villages and infrastructure by army as an incentive for peace. In duration and intensity, shelling, air bombardment and indiscriminate military destruction, casualties, sectarian stigmatisation and and police violence exacerbated grievances among regional dimension, the Saada conflict stands apart from not only Hashemites generally and Zaydi revivalists other violent episodes in Yemen. It will need more in particular but, more broadly, civilians in all north- than run-of-the-mill domestic and international efforts ern governorates. The rebels fuel anger by brutal acts, to end it. looting and kidnapping. Growing involvement of tribal militias beside government or rebel forces further in- RECOMMENDATIONS flames the conflict and contributes to its endurance. Competing tribes and their leaders vie for positions and resources; as some groups are marginalised, others To the Government of Yemen and rebel leaders: receive government help in exchange for fighting the 1. Take immediate steps to prevent renewed warfare insurgents. by: The conflict has become self-perpetuating, giving rise a) engaging in direct talks; to a war economy as tribes, army officers and state b) agreeing to a mediation and reconstruction officials have seized the opportunity to control the committee comprising government officials, porous border with Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea coast- rebel representatives and international actors line. Tribal leaders and senior officials have amassed (such as donor governments and international military hardware and profit from illegal sales of army organisations); stockpiles. Continued operations have justified increased military budgets without government or independent c) assisting in the safe return of those displaced oversight. As competition over resources intensified, during the war; and the benefits of war exceeded its drawbacks – at least d) granting access to war-affected regions to dip- for the elites involved. lomats, journalists, and humanitarian and human rights organisations. With only some exceptions, the international community has not recognised the Saada conflict’s destabilis- To the Government of Yemen: ing potential or pressured the government to shift course. That is partly related to the West’s single-minded 2. Address population and rebel grievances by: focus on Yemen’s struggle with al-Qaeda and the regime’s adroit portrayal of the Huthis as a subset of a) conducting a damage survey in war-affected the so-called war on terror. It also is related to the areas with the assistance of independent national regime’s denial of access to Saada to many if not most and international experts to facilitate compen- governments and humanitarian agencies. sation and reconstruction; b) jump-starting development in Saada gover- Fighting ebbed as the government announced a uni- norate and other war-affected zones; lateral ceasefire in July 2008. But it is far more likely a pause than an end. Observers and actors alike expect c) halting recruitment and deployment of tribal new violence; early months of this year already have or other militias; and witnessed recurrent localised fighting. There is no clear d) releasing persons detained in the context of the agreement between parties, accumulated grievances war, declaring an amnesty for insurgents and remain largely unaddressed, tensions run high, skirmishes halting summary detentions of journalists, persist and few principal belligerents appear willing to human rights activists and independent re- compromise. Internal mediation has repeatedly failed, searchers. as did Qatar’s well-intentioned endeavour. 3. Reduce sectarian and other social tensions by: But renewed war is not preordained. Local, national a) promoting and facilitating inter-sectarian dia- and international actors can do much to set the stage logue and exchange, including by fostering for durable peace. There is every reason to proactively Zaydi participation in public debate; and intervene before more damage is done and to build on core Yemeni assets: a tradition of compromise b) condemning the stigmatisation of the Hashe- between political, social and religious groups and the mite identity and facilitating the entry of quali- state’s tendency to coopt ex-foes. International help fied Hashemites into state institutions. should be multilateral, involving Western and regional countries ready to exert diplomatic pressure, mediate Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page iii

To rebel leaders: To Western donor governments:

4. Release government soldiers and other persons 9. Pressure both sides to end the conflict and par- detained in the context of the war. ticipate in mediation efforts. 5. Articulate political demands and publish a politi- 10. Insist on full access to war-affected regions for dip- cal program as a step toward becoming a political lomats, journalists, and humanitarian and human movement or party. rights organisations. 6. Endorse clearly government sovereignty in Saada 11. Pledge reconstruction assistance for the develop- governorate and other districts with a rebel pres- ment of Saada governorate as an incentive to ence. reach a durable peace agreement.

To civil society organisations: To regional countries:

7. Support and participate in mediation, damage- 12. Pledge diplomatic support as well as development assessment and reconstruction efforts in war-affected and reconstruction assistance to war-affected areas. regions. 13. Condemn and refrain from any military or financial 8. Promote dialogue between the government and assistance to parties in conflict, including tribes insurgent leaders. or armed militias. Sanaa/Brussels, 27 May 2009

Middle East Report N°86 27 May 2009

YEMEN: DEFUSING THE SAADA TIME BOMB

I. INTRODUCTION The rebel movement, first headed by Husein al-Huthi, a former parliament member, and, after his death, by his kin, is part of a larger, highly diverse Zaydi reviv- 2 Over the past two decades, diplomats and analysts alist group. Members of the Huthi family claim direct regularly have described Yemen as on the verge of descent from the Prophet Muhammad and thus con- 3 explosion. To their surprise, the country for the most sider themselves sayyids or Hashemites. Until the part has remained stable, avoiding large-scale violence 1962 revolution in North Yemen that ended the Zaydi and managing multiple crises at once, including unifi- imamate and led to the establishment of a republic, cation of North and South in 1990, reabsorption of Hashemites had dominated both political and religious around one quarter of the workforce when Yemeni spheres; during that period, North Yemen’s rulers 4 migrant workers faced eviction from Gulf states in (imams) were exclusively Hashemite. Today, the 1991, the former South Yemen’s secession attempt in demoted Huthi family purports to defend Zaydi iden- 1994 and, since 2000, the battle against al-Qaeda and tity from dilution in a wider Sunni Islamic identity; it its affiliates. also mobilises support through an anti-U.S, anti-Israel and, at times, anti-Jewish platform. The government That era appears to be drawing to a close. Yemen currently confronts simultaneous political and social crises made all the more serious by the global financial meltdown. Increasing domestic repression under cover 2 Zaydism is a branch of Shiism distinct from Jaafarism of an anti-terrorism campaign reflects growing state (Twelver Shiism, which dominates in contemporary Iran, insecurity; meanwhile, massive protests are occurring Iraq and Bahrain and is present in, inter alia, Lebanon and in what once was South Yemen, where secessionist Saudi Arabia). Zaydism first took root in Mesopotamia and sentiment is on the rise.1 Finally, there is the Saada Central Asia in 740 but gradually moved south, where it reached Yemen. The sect’s religious elites claim descent conflict, which the government has been singularly from the Prophet Muhammad and ruled North Yemeni ter- unable to end. Each of these developments is a reason ritory under the imamate until the 1962 revolution. Since then, for worry in a country that, a mere decade ago, was Zaydism has been in crisis. Zaydis reportedly represent ap- engaged in a promising and remarkable democratisa- proximately one third of Yemen’s estimated 25 million tion process. Of all, the Saada war between the army citizens, the majority of whom are Shafeis, ie, members of and a rebel group calling itself the Believing Youth (alone of the four traditional schools of Sunni jurisprudence Shabab al-Mumin) is the most dangerous and deadly. (madhhab), which is also dominant in, for example, Egypt. Zaydis are based in the north-western highlands, with their A mountainous governorate in north-western Yemen main strongholds in Saada, Hajja and Dhamar, as well as Yemen’s capital, Sanaa. that borders Saudi Arabia, Saada has been the scene 3 of a brutal armed conflict since June 2004 that has Hashemites are descendants of the Prophet’s clan; members resulted in thousands of casualties and enormous of the Huthi family hail from a different branch than the contemporary Jordanian royal family. Not all Yemeni Hashe- destruction. The war has the potential to spread to sur- mites are Zaydis; indeed, some are Sunni. That said, through- rounding regions, particularly Amran, al-Jawf, Marib out this report and unless otherwise specified, the term and Hajja. Hashemite will refer only to its Zaydi members. 4 North and South Yemen united on 22 May 1990 to form the Republic of Yemen. Until then, the two entities’ trajectories had remained separate. The North, which comprises roughly 1 As protests grew more intense, security forces responded three quarters of the population, achieved formal independ- with greater repression. In April 2009, protests in Radfan led ence in 1918 following the Ottoman Empire’s demise. It was to the deaths of eight people. Rising tensions led the govern- ruled by Zaydi imams until the 1962 revolution, which gave ment to temporarily close seven newspapers, including the rise to the Yemen Arab Republic. The South, colonised by popular al-Ayyam daily. See The New York Times, 4 May Great Britain since 1838, gained independence in 1967. In 2009, and Stephen Day, “Updating Yemeni national unity: 1970 it became the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Could lingering regional divisions bring down the regime?”, a socialist state and Soviet ally. See Paul Dresch, A History Middle East Journal, vol. 62, no. 3 (2008). of Modern Yemen (Cambridge, 2000). Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 3

accuses it of receiving Iranian support and seeking to in a 26 June 2004 open letter in which he asserted restore the imamate, though there is no hard evidence. loyalty to the president and the republic. He claimed his differences stemmed solely from the government’s The conflict reportedly was triggered when, in January pro-U.S. stance and Saudi policy in Yemen.9 Follow- 2003, Believing Youth militants shouted “God is great! ing al-Huthi’s death, the government declared a uni- Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse upon the lateral end to the fighting. However, most issues were Jews! Victory to Islam!”5 in a Saada mosque in Presi- left unresolved, including both longstanding griev- dent Ali Abdallah Salih’s presence.6 After failed rec- ances and newly created ones, such as prisoners held onciliation attempts between Salih and Husein al- by both sides. Huthi as well as continued demonstrations – including in the capital city’s Grand Mosque – the government The second round, which took place between March in June 2004 sought to arrest al-Huthi in his strong- and May 2005, began with a series of accusations and hold in Saada’s Haydan district. Fighting ensued, per- counter-accusations. The government charged Husein’s sisting until security forces killed al-Huthi on 10 Sep- father, Badr al-Din al-Huthi, and Abdallah al-Ruzami, tember 2004.7 a former parliament member, of seeking to resume the insurgency. Badr al-Din criticised Salih’s unwilling- That death did not end the conflict. Instead, the war ness to end the conflict and argued that Husein’s experienced four additional rounds, each centred in objective merely had been to defend Islam.10 Salih Saada governorate, more intense than its predecessor accused the opposition and particularly its two Zaydi- and with low-level fighting continuing in between. based parties, al-Haqq (of which Husein al-Huthi and Most affected was Haydan district, southwest of Saada Abdallah al-Ruzami were former members) and the city. Some zones remained under rebel control even Union of Popular Forces (Ittihad al-Qiwa al-Shaab- after the fifth round. iya), of supporting the rebels.11 The government began portraying the Huthis as terrorists responsible for During the first round, which lasted from 18 June to small-scale attacks against officials and soldiers in 10 September 2004, fighting took place chiefly in the Sanaa and claimed they had planned to kidnap foreign Marran Mountains, around 30km south west of Saada ambassadors.12 The ensuing clashes were heaviest city, where Husein al-Huthi had taken refuge. From north and west of Saada, in Majz, Sahar and Baqim the outset, the government and its media accused the districts, where the rebels found support, and moun- Believing Youth of allegiance to the Lebanon-based tainous terrain slowed the army’s advance. movement Hizbollah and Iran and of aiming to restore 8 the Zaydi imamate. Al-Huthi denied the allegations Although the government claimed victory and announced an end to operations in May 2005, low-intensity fighting continued. This eventually prompted a third round, 5 “Allahu akbar! Al-mawt li-Amrika! Al-mawt li-Israil! Al- which raged from late 2005 until early 2006. It started laana ala al-yahud! Al-nasr lil-Islam!” On the slogans and as a confrontation between pro-government tribesmen their origin, see Al-Balagh (Sanaa weekly of Zaydi orienta- (some belonging to Sheikh Abdallah al-Awjari’s Ham- tion), 10 March 2009. dan tribe) and tribal fighters supporting the rebels, 6 Crisis Group interview, official of the ruling General Peo- suggesting that tribal feuds gradually were growing in ple’s Congress (GPC) and member of the Consultative Coun- importance. The fighting also saw the emergence of cil (Majlis al-Shura, second legislative chamber, whose mem- Husein al-Huthi’s brothers, Abd-al-Malik and Yahya, bers are appointed by the president), Sanaa, 12 January as new rebel leaders.13 The government faced strong 2009. In a July 2004 speech, President Salih explained that while the slogans themselves were not a problem, insofar as pressure to settle the conflict before the September 2006 he also frequently criticised U.S. and Israeli foreign policies, presidential and local elections, even if only tempo- they harmed national interests. 26 September (Sanaa weekly published by the armed forces), 15 July 2004. 7 Iris Glosemeyer, “Local Conflict, Global Spin: An Upris- 9 In July, Huthi leaders accused the Saudi air force of bombing in the Yemeni Highlands”, Middle East Report, no. 232 ing villages to support the Yemeni army, a charge Riyadh (September 2004). denied. Andrew McGregor, “Shi’ite Insurgency in Yemen: 8 Crisis Group interview, Rashad al-Alimi, vice-prime min- Iranian Intervention or Mountain Revolt?”, Terrorism ister for security and defence and former interior minister Monitor, vol. 2, no. 16 (August 2004). (until 2008), Sanaa, 11 January 2009. President Salih accused 10 Al-Wasat (Sanaa weekly), 9 March 2005. the rebels of raising Hizbollah’s yellow flag rather than 11 Al-Ahram Weekly (Egyptian weekly), 19 May 2005. Yemen’s republican one. Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: 12 Crisis Group interview, Rashad al-Alimi, vice-prime min- Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen (Chicago, 2008), ister for security and defence, Sanaa, 11 January 2009. pp. 153-157. Official media levied similar accusations. See 13 Yahya al-Huthi is also a parliament member from the rul- Shaun Overton, “Understanding the Second Houthi Rebellion ing General People’s Congress (GPC). He was a mediator in Yemen”, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 3, no. 12 (June 2005). during the war’s first round. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 4

rarily. It released prisoners (including one of Husein Fighting may have stopped, but it is far more likely a al-Huthi’s other brothers), and the president named a pause than an end. Actors on all sides expect violence new Saada governor, Yahya al-Shami, considered more to resume and a sixth round to begin in coming weeks accommodating than his predecessor. These steps, which or months. Since March 2009, tensions have been indicated government willingness to find a peaceful mounting and clashes repeatedly have occurred be- solution, led to the conflict’s temporary suspension. tween army and rebels. There is no clear agreement between the parties, accumulated grievances remain According to the government and its tribal allies, the largely unaddressed, skirmishes persist,17 and few of the fourth round (February-June 2007) was sparked by principal belligerents appear willing to compromise.18 Huthi threats against the al-Salem Jewish community in Saada, an allegation the Huthis deny.14 Fighting While the war by and large is localised and at compara- picked up and spread to different districts, including tively low levels, important spikes of violence have outside Saada governorate, as the government sought occurred, including air bombardments. Videos released new recruits and encouraged involvement by tribes- on the internet by the rebels and human rights organi- men and militants from other regions. sations suggest widespread destruction of homes, schools and mosques. International human rights organisations The round ended with the help of Qatari mediation. have noted with alarm the existence of a dire humani- During a May 2007 visit to Yemen, Hamad bin Khalifa tarian situation that includes high numbers of inter- Al Thani, the Emir of Qatar, pledged his country’s nally displaced – some 130,000 by mid-2008, although financial support for the reconstruction of much of most are likely to have returned to their villages after Saada governorate if the parties ended the war. On 16 the July ceasefire – as well as indiscriminate, extraju- June, government and rebels reached a ceasefire. De- dicial detentions, especially of Hashemites and people spite sporadic clashes, they signed a formal agreement from Saada.19 Government officials deny their forces in Doha on 2 February 2008. target civilians or forcibly displace them based on ethnic, tribal or religious background.20 Others say the It was not to last. The government accused Huthi rebels, too, are guilty of human rights violations, in- militants of violating the agreement by two violent cluding use of child soldiers.21 Unless corrective action 15 attacks, though Huthis rejected the claim. Fighting is taken rapidly, a sixth and more deadly round is likely. spread to the Bani Hushaysh area, north of Sanaa, where it drew in the Republican Guards headed by the president’s son, Ahmad Ali Salih. Heavy fighting also occurred in Saada city and in the northern part of 17 Amran governorate. Militias affiliated with the Hashid For example, six soldiers were killed in clashes with Huthi militants in Ghamir district (45km west of Saada city) in tribal confederation fought alongside the national army, early March 2009. Sahwa.net (information website of the both allegedly financed by Saudi Arabia. On 17 July Al-Islah party), 8 March 2009. Information on such clashes, 2008, the 30th anniversary of his rule, the president which have been frequent even in times of “peace”, is announced a unilateral ceasefire which is variously scarce and often confusing due to a dearth of independent attributed to his fear that the situation could spin out reporting. The identity of those involved and their links to of control, domestic mediation or heightened U.S. and either government or rebels is uncertain. Both sides at EU criticism of the humanitarian situation in Saada times have claimed that tribal feuds in fact were related to governorate.16 the Saada conflict. 18 Crisis Group interviews, Sanaa, January-March 2009. A Zaydi scholar said, “the state wants war and so do the Huthis”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 17 January 2009. 19 “Invisible Civilians: The Challenge of Humanitarian Access in Yemen’s Forgotten War”, Human Rights Watch, Novem- 14 Al-Quds al-Arabi (pan-Arab daily published in London), ber 2008, www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/11/18/invisible- 22 January 2007, and Marib Press (independent informa- civilians-0. tion website), 25 January 2007. 20 Crisis Group interview, Ali al-Anissi, director of the Bu- 15 Al-Thawri (Yemeni Socialist Party weekly), 31 July 2008. reau of National Security and presidential office, Sanaa, 14 The first was the April 2008 assassination of Salih al- January 2009. Hindi, a GPC parliament member from Saada governorate. 21 Crisis Group interviews, Uthman al-Majali, GPC parlia- Al-Jazeera International website, 19 April 2008. The second ment member from Saada governorate, Sanaa, 12 January was the 2 May attack against Saada’s Bin Salman Mosque, 2009; representative of international humanitarian NGO, which killed eighteen people, including six military offi- Paris, 28 January 2009. Underage recruitment by the govern- cers. Al-Wasat, 7 May 2008. ment is standard practice, and the military allegedly has 16 Crisis Group interviews, civil society activist, Sanaa, 8 used child soldiers during the Saada war. It is unclear January 2009; Zaydi scholar, Sanaa, 17 January 2009; and whether the rebels have also done so. See “Child Soldiers Western diplomat, Sanaa, January 2009. Global Report 2008”, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Sol- Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 5

23 II. ROOTS OF WAR he was in rebellion. Over time, however, the Huthi leadership’s position evolved toward unambiguous opposition.24 After the 2008 ceasefire, it openly sought 25 The Saada war is a multilayered confrontation that the “demise of Ali Abdallah Salih’s regime”. More has evolved significantly since 2004. It can be traced importantly, there is no evidence that the so-called back to the decline of the social stratum led by rebels possess a centralised command-and-control struc- Hashemites and legitimised by Zaydism (a branch of ture, coherent ideology or political program. Some Shiism), failed management of religious pluralism, groups fighting the government, though referred to as lack of investment in Zaydi strongholds like Saada Huthis, appear motivated by multiple, mostly non- after 1962, permeability to external influences and the ideological factors having little in common with the emergence of new political and religious actors, in leadership’s proclaimed grievances. The May 2008 particular Salafis. As a result, it has variously and at fighting in Bani Hushaysh, a mere twenty kilometres times simultaneously taken the shape of a sectarian, north of Sanaa, is an apt illustration. Depicted by both political or tribal conflict, rooted in historical griev- government and Huthi leadership as a rebel offensive, ances and endemic under-development. It also has been the events arguably were more akin to a local land ownership conflict between tribesmen and a promi- shaped by a regional cold war between Saudi Arabia 26 and Iran. nent military figure.

From a distance, the war looks like an internal armed According to an independent observer, insurgents can conflict between a national army and an insurgent group, be divided into four groups: a minority embracing a but battle lines are far more fluid. The army report- clear, well-articulated ideology, maintaining symbolic edly has been supported by tribal or Islamist militias, or political ties with Iran and rallying around anti- particularly during the fourth and fifth rounds. More- Western slogans; a small but distinct set seeking to over, some suggest that the war also reflects a power defend Zaydi and Hashemite identity; groups of armed struggle within the ruling elite, with different compo- men with purely financial motivations; and a majority, tribesmen defending their families and villages nents vying for Salih’s succession and using one side 27 or the other to bolster their position.22 against state violence.

By the same token, the Huthi-led group’s goals are not easily grasped. When the war began, Husein al-Huthi A. WHO ARE THE HUTHIS? repeatedly expressed allegiance to the state, denying Like the vast majority of the northern highlands population, including the president, Huthis are Zaydis. Unlike most, they are revivalists, who believe that Zaydi identity is threatened by a dominant Sunni or even Wah- diers. While the government has tried to maintain an information blackout throughout the war, its efforts began to fal- ter during the fourth and fifth rounds. News started to filter out owing to visits by local and international human rights 23 See François Burgat, “Le Yémen après le 11 septembre and humanitarian organisations and the rebels’ improved 2001: entre construction de l’Etat et rétrécissement du communications (via an internet website in Cairo, Al-Minbar champ politique”, Critique internationale, no. 32 (2006). In al-Akhbari al-Yamani, often inaccessible in Yemen due to an interview, Husein al-Huthi said, “I do not work against censorship but which militants occasionally can overcome, you [ie, the president]; I appreciate you and what you do and direct contacts with independent journalists in Sanaa). tremendously, but what I do is my solemn national duty For example, Human Rights Watch published two reports against the enemy of Islam and the community … America in late 2008, “Disappearances and Arbitrary Arrests in the and Israel. I am by your side, so do not listen to hypocrites Armed Conflict with Huthi Rebels in Yemen” and “Invisi- and provocateurs and trust that I am more sincere and hon- ble Civilians: The Challenge of Humanitarian Access in est to you than they are”. Yemen Times (Sanaa bi-weekly), Yemen’s Forgotten War”. The full scale of the violence and 28 June 2004. its impact remain unclear, however. Total casualties (civil- 24 After Husein’s death, his father refused to say whether ian, rebel and military) are subject to much conjecture by President Salih’s rule was legitimate. Al-Wasat, 9 March local journalists and civil society. The government has re- 2005; and Sarah Philips, “Cracks in the Yemeni System”, sponded to charges of human rights violations by express- Middle East Report Online (2005). ing willingness to cooperate with local and foreign organi- 25 Crisis Group telephone interview, Yahya al-Huthi, exiled sations, releasing prisoners and claiming progress in ad- parliament member and co-leader of the rebellion, Berlin, 3 dressing the issues – but not by providing access to areas of February 2009. fighting. 26 Al-Sharea (Sanaa independent weekly), 7 June 2008. 22 Crisis Group interview, independent journalist, Sanaa, 5 27 Crisis Group interview, Samy Ghalib, editor in chief of January 2009. President Salih has been in power since 1978. al-Nida independent weekly, Sanaa, 8 January 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 6

habi identity.28 Badr al-Din al-Huthi, Husein’s father Saada governorate, were elected to parliament as al- and a famous Saada cleric, advocated revivalism since Haqq members and served single four-year terms. From the 1970s and published numerous treatises denounc- 1997 onwards, Husein al-Huthi focused his activities ing Wahhabism. Other family members followed suit on the Believing Youth in Saada. At the time, he by opening religious teaching institutes, writing books enjoyed the government’s acquiescence and arguably and proselytising. even support,30 as it sought to counter the prolifera- tion in the Saada region of Salafi groups tied to Saudi The Huthi family also are Hashemites, which means Arabia.31 they do not derive their legitimacy from affiliation with any particular tribe. Hashemites are said to have arrived in Yemen only after Islam’s advent, mediating B. A BROKEN EQUILIBRIUM between local tribes; as relative latecomers, their claim to an authentic Yemeni identity sometimes is con- One of the most remarkable features of Yemen’s post- tested, though Zaydi Hashemites ruled parts or all of unification political system32 has been its capacity to Yemen for over 1,000 years, until the September 1962 integrate a broad spectrum of various and often com- demise of the North Yemen imamate.29 The country peting actors. The feature is a legacy of the 1960s civil then began to be dominated by individuals and groups war and the realisation that the republic’s survival of tribal origin, many of whom hailed from Zaydi re- depends on power-sharing and compromise. Accord- gions. Most Hashemites adapted to the new regime, ingly, successive governments used co-optation as a many directly supporting it and accepting their own primary guarantor of regime stability. While neither political decline. A minority sought exile, particularly dissidence nor repression has ever been wholly absent, in Saudi Arabia and the UK. Yemen on the whole has been spared massive blood- shed or open warfare. Skirmishes between the national With unification of North and South Yemen in 1990 army and tribal groups might be frequent, often deadly and the subsequent emergence of a multiparty system, and sometimes prolonged. Yet, such conflicts typically Zaydi revivalists found new means of political expression. The creation of the al-Haqq party and of the Be- lieving Youth, an al-Haqq offshoot set up in the mid- 1990s, reflected new Zaydi dynamism. During Yemen’s 30 Zaydi revivalist groups, including al-Huthi’s organiza- first multiparty elections in 1993, Husein al-Huthi and tion, the Believing Youth, reportedly received state funding. Abdallah al-Ruzami, a tribesman who also came from Crisis Group interview, Islamist opposition figure, Sanaa, 10 January 2009; see also Abdallah al-Sanaani, Al-harb fi Saada min awwal siha ila akhir talqa (Cairo, 2005), pp. 34-35. According to a senior ruling party official, funding 28 Wahhabism – itself a controversial term – emerged in the was designed to thwart the influence of other Islamist mid-eighteenth century in what became Saudi Arabia. It is groups in the Saada region, notably the Salafis/Wahhabis, based on a strict interpretation of the Hanbali school of ju- who had connections with Saudi Arabia and called for a risprudence that emphasises the unity of God (tawhid) and strict reform of Islam that many felt was alien to Yemeni rejects the Hashemites’ claim to power. Salafism is a Sunni history and culture: “The government felt the danger of movement that seeks to revive “original” Islam, drawing on Wahhabism spreading, so in the 1980s and 90s it supported the so-called pious ancestors (salaf al-salih). It emerged in Zaydi groups, including the Huthis. However, it failed to the second half of the twentieth century and is character- control these groups’ platform”. Crisis Group interview, ised in religious matters by a desire to transcend the four GPC official and Consultative Council member, Sanaa, 12 traditional Sunni schools of jurisprudence (Shafeism, Hana- January 2009. If true, the claim would be consistent with fism, Hanbalism and Malikism) and politically by a distrust the government’s strategy and record of coopting religious of party politics and stigmatisation of Shiite Islam. While and tribal groups. The Huthi leadership responded: “They not automatically violent, certain fringes of the wider Salafi are lies, accusations uttered by Wahhabis. We have never movement, labelled jihadi, have influenced al-Qaeda-type received any weapons or money from the government”. groups. See Crisis Group Middle East and North Africa Re- Crisis Group telephone interview, Yahya al-Huthi, Berlin, port N°37, Understanding Islamism, 2 March 2005, pp. 13-14; 3 February 2009. Laurent Bonnefoy, “Deconstructing Salafism in Yemen”, 31 For a discussion of the Yemeni Salafis’ links to Saudi CTC Sentinel, vol. 2, no. 2, February 2009; and Crisis Group Arabia, see Laurent Bonnefoy “Salafism in Yemen; A Saud- Middle East Report N°31, Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: isation?”, in Madawi al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom Without Who are the Islamists?, 21 September 2004, p. 1. Borders: Saudi Expansion in the World (London, 2008), 29 In 1926, Imam Yahya (the religious and political ruler pp. 245-262. since 1904) established the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of 32 During the socialist era in South Yemen (1970-1990), Yemen and proclaimed himself king (malik). Subsequently, state-society relations differed markedly from those in the particularly during the civil war that followed the 1962 re- North,as they were shaped by an ideology that sought to publican revolution, the imam’s supporters were labelled transform society and break traditional influences, whether royalists. tribal or religious. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 7

tend to be resolved through co-optation, including in within the wider Sunni and Shiite doctrinal spectrums. the army, in which many once rebellious tribal sheikhs Over the last several decades, the gulf between Zaydis become officers. and Shafeis has narrowed further, partly due to state actions, notably in education. The government raised Peripheral governorates such as Marib, al-Jawf, Shabwa the profile of prominent Zaydi historical figures who and Saada, where tribes continue to play a central role favoured “Sunnification”.36 Today only a minority of and the state is virtually absent, unable to provide se- Zaydis define themselves specifically as Shiites; indi- curity, infrastructure or public services, have long been viduals (including President Salih and most elite mem- loci of grievance and dissent. Local tribes routinely bers, whether from the ruling GPC or the al-Islah party, kidnap citizens and foreigners to press the government the Muslim Brotherhood’s Yemeni branch) may be to release detained family members or build roads and labelled Zaydis due to geographic and sectarian origin, hospitals. Protection granted by unruly tribes to persons but this is a secondary aspect of their identity. In effect, accused of crimes or links to terrorist organisations they have been assimilated in a broader non-sectarian often trigger police or military operations, as do conflicts Islamic arena as the identities gradually converged. connected to compensation over land or blood feuds.33 However, all these appear to be integral and accepted Most Zaydis have abandoned Shiite trappings, and most parts of Yemen’s political equation rather than threats Shafeis refrain from stigmatising Zaydism; many pray to it. in each other’s mosques.37 Ali al-Anissi, head of the Bureau of National Security, an institution created in the Even during the 1994 war between the Northern army framework of the post-9/11 anti-terror campaign, summed and Southern secessionists, civilian casualties were kept this up: “Zaydism is a Shiite strain within Sunni Islam, low, and many secessionist leaders were later integrated and Shafeism is a Sunni strain within Shiite Islam”.38 into the state apparatus. Some even became close presidential advisors. Likewise, in combating al-Qaeda- Although such a consensual identity is increasingly affiliated groups, the government has often privileged prevalent, it is not all-encompassing. Salafis, who dialogue over suppression and co-opted many, offer- emerged in the early 1980s and maintain ties to Saudi ing money and jobs in exchange for their promise to Arabia, continue to stigmatise Zaydis, highlighting their abandon violence against the state.34 alleged links to Jaafarism (the dominant Shiite sect in Iran and Iraq).39 In turn, Zaydi revivalists, including the Huthis, cling to Zaydism’s theological and sym- C. A CRISIS WITHIN ZAYDISM bolic characteristics and expressly reject what they consider Wahhabi or Salafi predominance.40 The 1962 revolution that brought republicans to power also triggered a profound religious, social and political restructuring, upending an order with which Zay- Zaydis argue that hadith that appear inconsistent with the dism long had been associated. Quran and are not supported by revealed verses should be discarded, even though they might be considered authentic Although the vast majority of its citizens are Arab (sahih) by Sunni jurisprudence. Furthermore, Zaydism puts Muslims, Yemeni society is pluralistic. The two prin- particular emphasis on Hashemites’ political, social and cipal religious sects are Zaydi Shiism and Shafei Sun- religious roles and on the importance of the Imam as ruler nism. Although differing on a number of theological of the polity – interpretations most Shafeis contest. 36 and political issues,35 both are deemed relatively close A notable example is Muhammad al-Shawkani. See Ber- nard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkânî (Cambridge, 2003). 37 Laurent Bonnefoy, “Les identités religieuses contempo- 33 See Crisis Group Middle East Report N°8, Yemen: Cop- raines au Yémen: convergence, résistances et instrumenta- ing with Terrorism and Violence in a Fragile State, 8 Janu- lisations”, Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditer- ary 2003, pp. 19-20; The New York Times, 20 December ranée, no. 121-122 (2008). 2001; and Yemen Times, 24 December 2001. 38 Crisis Group interview, Ali al-Anissi, Sanaa, 14 January 34 This equilibrium was under intense pressure and criti- 2009. cised by some of Yemen’s allies after the 11 September 39 Zaydism differs from Jaafarism in terms of jurisprudence 2001 attacks. In February 2006, U.S. President George W. and institutional organisation. For example, Zaydism does Bush reportedly wrote to President Salih to express disap- not have a clergy or give the same political and symbolic pointment over the government’s lack of investment in the importance to Ali, Husein and Hasan as Jaafaris. Zaydis only global “war on terror” and questioned its sincerity. Andrew recognise the first five Imams; Jaafaris recognise twelve McGregor, “Stand-off in Yemen: the al-Zindani Case”, Ter- (hence “Twelver Shiites”) and await the reappearance of the rorism Focus, vol. 3, no. 9 (March 2006). twelfth “hidden” Imam. 35 For example, interpretations on the importance of the hadith 40 Crisis Group interview, Zaydi scholar, Sanaa, 11 January (collection of the Prophet’s words and deeds) diverge. Most 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 8

The crisis in Zaydism is not religious alone; it also has Zaydis also complained of state neglect of their strong- a socio-political dimension. Until the 1962 advent of holds, peripheral regions where, as an observer put it, the republic, a Zaydi-based social stratification pre- “people know the republic solely through missiles and vailed in the northern highlands, premised on division tanks”.43 Saada remained on the margins, largely between Zaydi Hashemites, qadis (administrative judges), ignored by the government and developing solely thanks tribesmen and ahl al-thulth (third people), such as to commerce with neighbouring Saudi Arabia on the butchers or barbers, who perform jobs considered vile one hand and the fertility of its land on the other. In inasmuch as they involve contact with organic sub- the early 1990s, a Zaydi intellectual recalled that the stances. only hospital in Saada at the time had been built with Saudi money and that the city had waited more than The republic denounced such classification and prom- twenty years after the revolution to be visited by a ised equality to all. Coming up through military ranks, North Yemeni president.44 Alienated from a state that tribesmen and qadis from the Zaydi highlands allied deprived them of their former status and failed to attend themselves with elites and intellectuals from the Shafei to their region’s security or economic development, lowlands to become the new ruling group. Resistance some Zaydi revivalists – notably the Huthis – emerged by Saudi-financed royalists who backed the imamate as key regime opponents. from their strongholds near Marib, Hajja and Saada lasted for more than seven years before the state pre- Zaydi revivalist opposition to the regime was embold- vailed. Saudi support was motivated less by religion ened by several other factors. The imamate’s fall had (Zaydism stands in direct contradiction to Salafi/Wah- left the religious group in deep crisis, as its scholars habism) than by politics: the Saudi monarchy preferred faced the difficult task of reviving their legitimacy in the Zaydi monarchy over the emergence of an Egyp- the absence of an imam.45 Doctrinal adaptation was tian-backed North Yemeni republic. facilitated by the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran that provided Shiites throughout the Muslim world with a This history left scars. Among former rulers and Zaydi positive model; at the same time, Yemeni Zaydis saw revivalists, the republic is widely viewed as funda- the rise of a new generation of scholars and militants mentally anti-Hashemite and anti-Zaydi. Even though who were not as marked by the civil war’s legacy. many of their successors are of Zaydi origin, they are Scholars established Zaydi teaching institutes, mainly suspected of ignoring their origins and paradoxically in Sanaa and Saada, and publishers released new edi- of succumbing to a Saudi-backed Salafi/Wahhabi in- tions of Zaydi treatises. fluence that developed since the 1970s. To that extent, the Saada war can be seen as an extension of a proc- The founding of al-Haqq and the reactivation of the ess that began with the 1962 revolution41 and saw the Union of Popular Forces provided revivalists with decline of a social group of which the Huthi family means of political expression. In the 1990s, prominent were members.42 al-Haqq-affiliated Zaydi scholars signed a manifesto arguing that the ruler or imam no longer needed to be a Hashemite. Badr al-Din al-Huthi and other leading Saada-based scholars dissented and split. Husein al- 41 A Zaydi (albeit non-Hashemite) scholar who was detained Huthi and others46 created the Believing Youth, seek- during the Saada war said of the conflict’s origins: “The ing to revive Zaydi activism through education and people now ruling Yemen continue to have a problem with proselytising. the former Hashemite rulers. There is a kind of racism at play. They seem to consider that the preceding 1,200 years Zaydi revival around Saada also came as a reaction to were all wrong and negative. Today it seems as though it the spread of Salafism, spearheaded by Muqbil al- would be impossible for a Hashemite to become president or even prime minister. Even to become a low-level minis- Wadii, a Saudi-educated Saada cleric. In the late 1970s, ter, he would have to demonstrate again and again his loy- after his expulsion from Saudi Arabia as a result of alty to the president and ruling party”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 11 January 2009. President Salih expressly denied an anti-Hashemite or anti-Zaydi bias. In a May 2007 socio-politique contemporain”, Chroniques yéménites, no.15 address to religious scholars of various backgrounds, he (2008). said the state was neutral and respected all identities and 43 Al-Nida (Sanaa independent weekly), 30 March 2005. sects. Al-Thawra (official Sanaa daily), 15 May 2007. 44 Muhammad al-Saidi, Saada limadha? (Beirut, undated). 42 See Gabriele Vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in 45 Gabriele Vom Bruck, “Being a Zaydi in the absence of an Yemen: Ruling Families in Transition (New York, 2005). Imam”, in Rémy Leveau, Franck Mermier and Udo Stein- This is not to suggest that Huthis represent either Zaydism bach, eds., Le Yémen contemporain (Paris, 1999). or Hashemites, or that the latter unanimously support or 46 These included Abd-al-Karim Jadban, Muhammad Azzan sympathise with the rebels. See, eg, Samy Dorlian, “Les and Salih Habra. Crisis Group interview, Hasan Zayd, al- reformulations identitaires du zaydisme dans leur contexte Haqq secretary general, Sanaa, 9 January 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 9

political activities, al-Wadii established his own insti- ruling elite. Moreover, as the war progressed, stigma- tute, Dar al-Hadith, in Dammaj, on Saada’s outskirts. tisation of Hashemites and Zaydis worsened; during It grew rapidly, educating thousands of Yemeni and the fifth round, Hashemite family members were arbi- foreign students and spawned other such institutes trarily detained.51 The wife of a young Hashemite who throughout the country. Fierce competition with Zay- was arrested in Sanaa in 2008 and remained in deten- dis ensued, provoking what a Western scholar described tion without trial in April 2009, said, “only non- as a “clash of fundamentalisms”.47 In the early 1990s, Hashemites are allowed to criticise the war in Saada. Zaydi scholars issued pamphlets denouncing Salafi If you are a Hashemite and a Zaydi and you are “intrusion” in Zaydism’s cradle and blaming Saudi against it, you face immediate arrest”.52 Arabia for aggressively exporting Wahhabism.48 Ex- plaining why the Huthis set up the Believing Youth, Yahya al-Huthi said:

Our main reason for action is to fight Wahhabism. There has been a cultural and intellectual war between Zaydism and Wahhabism since the revolution in the 1960s. The Yemeni government is looking for financial help from Saudi Arabia and so in exchange it has favoured the spread of Wahha- bism.49

Anti-Zaydi and anti-Hashemite prejudice, especially among certain Sunni Islamist intellectuals (Salafis and Muslim Brothers), is particularly worrying. It both threatens the growing convergence between sectarian identities50 and undermines post-civil war reconciliation efforts. The January 2003 death in a car accident – viewed by some as suspect – of Yahya al-Mutawak- kil, a former interior minister and prominent politician, left the Hashemites without representation among the

47 Shelagh Weir, “Clash of Fundamentalisms”, Middle East Report, no. 204 (1997). 48 Amin Abu Zayd, Al-wahhabiyya wa khataruha ala mus- taqbal al-Yaman al-siyasi (Beirut, 1991). 49 Crisis Group telephone interview, Yahya al-Huthi, Ber- lin, 3 February 2009. 50 The Salafist monthly magazine al-Muntada published several articles targeting Zaydism. One, which focused on the “second Huthi rebellion”, was entitled “So that we do not forget: the secret plans to spread the Iranian revolution”. In the same issue, Abd-al-Aziz al-Dubaii wrote: “If the armed forces have a great role to play in eradicating the Huthi se- dition (fitna), the intellectual forces must eradicate its roots”. Al-Muntada, April 2005. In 2008 the Salafist al-Kalima al- Tayyiba Centre issued a pamphlet entitled “Zaydism in Yemen: An Open Discussion”, which focused on Zaydism’s theological errors and proximity to Twelver Shiites. See Muham- mad bin Muhammad al-Mahdi, “Al-Zaydiyya fi al-Yaman: Hiwar Maftuh”, Sanaa, 2008. In 2007, Islamist intellectuals, including Abd-al-Fattah al-Batul, adviser to the governor of Ibb, established the Nashwan bin Said al-Himyari Centre, which has highlighted the Zaydi Imamate’s “treachery”. Ahmad Muhammad al-Hadiri, Tarikh al-aimma al-hada- wiya fi al-Yaman: al-fikr wa al-tatbiq (Sanaa, 2007). Nash- 51 Crisis Group interview, human rights activist, Sanaa, 5 wan bin Said al-Himyari was a twelfth century Yemeni January 2009. poet known for his anti-Hashemite positions. Samy Dorlian, 52 Crisis Group interview, wife of detained person, Sanaa, 20 “Les reformulations identitaires”, op. cit., pp. 167-168. January 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 10

56 III. COMPETING NARRATIVES felt they had enough power to rise up (khuruj) against the central state and declare the president unfit for power”.57 In turn, the army purportedly was com- Government and rebels have starkly different narra- pelled to wage a defensive war on the state’s behalf. tives about the war, the former highlighting the rebel- Rashad al-Alimi, vice-prime minister in charge of se- lion’s ideological dimensions and alleged ties to Iran, curity and defence, explained: “No government wants the latter stressing the state’s purported anti-Zaydi bias, war and ours, like any other, wants its citizens to live in the threat of Saudi-backed Wahhabism and the dan- peace. Since 2004, there have been various efforts and 53 as many as seven or eight mediation committees, but gers of U.S. involvement in the Middle East. By 58 contrast, more nuanced accounts that could improve these all failed. Military action was a last resort”. understanding of why the conflict broke out and per- sists have not garnered much attention. As described by the government, the Huthis have been spreading a fundamentalist religious creed, reflecting a shift from moderate Zaydism to Jaafarism (Twelver A. THE STATE’S NARRATIVE Shiism). Ali al-Anissi, head of the Bureau of National Security, said, “Husein al-Huthi and Abdallah al- From the conflict’s inception, the government has sought Ruzami imported a lot of festivals and practices coming from Twelver Shias, and this has provoked ten- to discredit the rebels domestically and rally Western 59 support. It has depicted the Believing Youth as a fun- sion”. Most recently, in March 2009, Abd-al-Malik damentalist religious group and as having provoked al-Huthi used the occasion of the Prophet’s birthday the war to undermine the state and restore the Zaydi imamate;54 portrayed the Saada conflict as a subset of the Bush administration’s global war on terror; and 56 Use of the term khuruj (literally: “coming out”) is not in- accused the rebels of loyalty to Iran. nocent. Zaydism explicitly endorses revolt against oppres- sive rulers (khuruj ala al-hakim al-dhalim). During the A government official charted the rebels’ transforma- imamate’s millennium-long history, revolt was a legitimate tion from defenders of Zaydi identity to anti-state in- means for Hashemites to gain power. By invoking this con- surgents as follows: cept, the government sought to underscore the rebel’s purported goal of restoring the imamate. 57 Crisis Group interview, GPC official and member of the The Believing Youth came into the picture as an Consultative Council, Sanaa, 12 January 2009. According to anti-Salafi group. Gradually, it deepened its politi- a senior government official, “it is evident that the rebels cal involvement and took advantage of the interna- are well organised and well trained and have the capacity to tional situation to mobilise support. The government confront the military”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 7 intervened to stop some demonstrations because January 2009. they were illegal. The conflict escalated when the 58 Crisis Group interview, Rashad al-Alimi, vice-prime min- Believing Youth asked people in Saada to stop ister for security and defence, Sanaa, 11 January 2009. 59 paying taxes and started interfering in government Crisis Group interview, Ali al-Anissi, Sanaa, 14 January affairs.55 2009. Among these rituals, the annual Ghadir Khumm festival has particular symbolic significance. Held each year Under this view, the Huthis triggered the conflict. In on the eighteenth day of the Islamic calendar’s month of Dhu al-Hija, it is the subject of considerable controversy be- the words of a former minister and ruling party Con- tween Sunnis and Shiites. It celebrates Ali’s supposed des- sultative Council member, “at one point, the Huthis ignation as the Prophet’s authentic successor and thus rejects the legitimacy of Abu Bakr, the first caliph Sunnis recognise. It thus could be seen as reaffirming the Hashe- mites’ claim to power, as Ali was the Prophet’s son-in-law, 53 While there are inconsistencies in both narratives, they from whom they claim descent, while Abu Bakr was only a do not reflect conflicting political agendas such as between companion of the Prophet. The celebration was abandoned “hawks” and “doves”. They appear to be a function of in- after the revolution but reemerged in the 1990s amid Zaydi formation scarcity and opacity as well as a plurality of voices. revivalism. Since 2004, the authorities have repeatedly On the government’s side, the absence of accurate data sought to ban what some described as a “festival of Huthi could be explained by the fact the war was long managed sympathisers” (see Laurent Bonnefoy, “Les relations re- exclusively by the military, with many senior officials ex- ligieuses transnationales entre le Yémen et l’Arabie Saou- cluded from decision making. Crisis Group interview, Na- dite: Un salafisme importé?”, PhD dissertation, Paris, 2007, bil al-Sufi, journalist and editor-in-chief of the independent p. 356, quoting a district security head in Lahj governorate) Abwab (monthly magazine), Sanaa, 4 January 2009. or a celebration of Hashemite rule tantamount to “an asser- 54 See, eg, Yemen Times, 28 June 2004. tion of the Huthis’ rejection of democracy”. Crisis Group 55 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, Sanaa, interview, Rashad al-Alimi, vice-prime minister for secu- 7 January 2009. rity and defence, Sanaa, 11 January 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 11

(mawlid al-nabawi, a controversial celebration criti- or to attacks carried out against targets outside the cised by many Sunni scholars) to mobilise his support- immediate Saada war theatre.66 ers.60 Pointing at such events, critics accuse the Huthis of sectarianism and undermining national unity.61 In Finally, the government has accused the rebels of the words of a ruling party member who emphasised receiving foreign backing. While top officials, such as his own Zaydi Hashemite identity, “Husein al-Huthi the president, have been reluctant to formally finger hijacked Zaydism just like Osama bin Laden hijacked the Islamic Republic, and although it maintains dip- Islam”.62 The Huthis also have been criticised for lomatic relations, regularly hosts Iranian officials and 67 seeking to enforce new, more rigid social rules in areas even asserts full support for its nuclear program, under their control, such as Saada.63 Yemen has strongly insinuated Iranian complicity with the rebels. In the words of one official: To bolster its international case, the government labelled the rebels as terrorists, accusing them of preparing The Believing Youth started their activities under attacks against Western interests, planning to kidnap different names in the 1980s in the context of the foreign diplomats, spraying acid on unveiled women, Iranian revolution. They were trained in Iran dur- poisoning water reserves, murdering officials and ing the Ayatollah Khomeini’s era with the objec- bombing public places; several, including a journalist tive of spreading the revolution. Between that time and editor, have been put on trial on charges of plot- and 2004, the Huthis prepared themselves to launch ting such acts. Some were sent to the special criminal operations against the state.68 court set up to deal with terrorists in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks.64 The government report- In 2005, a special criminal court sentenced two Zaydi edly claimed to have asked the UN to place the Believ- clerics, Yahya al-Daylami and Muhammad Muftah, to ing Youth on its list of terrorist organisations65 but death and eight years in prison, respectively, for main- apparently never formally conveyed the demand. Accu- taining contacts with Iran, supporting the rebels and 69 sations aside, there is no evidence linking the Huthis aiming to topple the regime. to terrorist groups operating in Yemen, such as al-Qaeda, The government has yet to support these allegations with hard evidence,70 and in 2009 President Salih played down the role of external actors.71 Tempering its accusation, the government now claims that funding could

60 Al-Diyar (Sanaa independent weekly), 15 March 2009. 61 Crisis Group interview, Ali al-Anissi, Sanaa, 14 January 2009. 66 Western diplomats in particular express scepticism. As 62 Crisis Group interview, intellectual and member of the one put it, “there is no evidence of attempts by the Huthis General People’s Congress, Sanaa, 13 January 2009. to carry out terrorist operations against Western interests”. 63 An international NGO country director said, “the Huthis Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 12 January 2009. have imposed very strict rules in the regions they control. 67 Saba News (official Yemeni news agency), 14 May 2009. For example, they ban male teachers in girls’ schools. As a 68 Crisis Group interview, Rashad al-Alimi, vice-prime min- result, girls can no longer study”, since there are few fe- ister for security and defence, Sanaa, 11 January 2009. male teachers. However, “at the same time, they appear to 69 Both were freed by President Salih in a May 2006 am- play a positive role in resolving longstanding local conflicts. nesty but remained under judicial and police pressure, fac- Through such actions, they gain the community’s trust”. ing possible rearrest. Muhammad Muftah was detained again Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 13 January 2009. in May 2008 after criticising military operations in Saada 64 Crisis Group interview, human rights activist, 5 January in the Yemeni press and was released a few months later. 2009. See also Almotamar.net (General People’s Congress Crisis Group interview, Zaydi scholar, Sanaa, 11 January 2009. information website), 14 June 2007; “Yemen”, Amnesty 70 In January 2009, the interior ministry gave Crisis Group International annual report 2007. In June 2008, a special reports purporting to document Iranian financial, ideologi- court sentenced Abd-al-Karim al-Khaywani, former editor- cal and logistical support. However, the reports (labelled in-chief of al-Shura weekly (mouthpiece of the Union of “top secret”, sirri lil-ghaya) raised more questions than they Popular Forces, a Zaydi party) and a journalist well-known answered. Accusations were not adequately sourced and for criticising the government, to six years in prison for rebel often came from unidentified institutions. Overall, the evi- ties. Al-Khaywani, who earlier had been imprisoned for dence appeared incomplete and biased. writing about the Saada war, was released by presidential 71 When asked about Iran, Salih downplayed the role of ex- order in September 2008. In January 2009, a court confirmed ternal actors and acknowledged that Libya and Iran, like his sentence but he remained free. News Yemen (independ- Qatar, had sought to mediate. He denied involvement by ent information website), 31 January 2009. President Salih Lebanon’s Hizbollah, while intimating that connections might cancelled the sentence two months later. exist between the Huthis and the Lebanese movement and 65 Crisis Group interview, Rashad al-Alimi, vice-prime min- that certain military skills might have been transferred from ister for security and defence, Sanaa, 11 January 2009. Lebanon to Yemen. Al-Hayat, 28 March 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 12

be channelled through religious or economic actors critical of the rebels’ resort to violence,77 it is united rather than transferred directly from Iranian diplomats in its view that the government is wrongly targeting to rebel leaders. Ali al-Anissi argued: the Zaydis as a whole. An al-Haqq party leader said, “the Huthis are just a label. The government’s true Despite their denial and the fact they say that they targets are Zaydis”.78 Like the government, Zaydis claim are against foreign intervention, the Iranians fund self-defence. A Zaydi scholar said: the Huthis, for example through hawzas72 and chari- ties. Furthermore, presenters of Iranian radio and As people, as a community, as a tradition, we [Zaydi television programs call for support for the Huthis Hashemites] have been targeted in a very violent and refer to them as Twelver Shiites. way. We have been prevented from exercising our rights. We have been deprived of jobs and education. Yet, he added, “Iranians are not arming the Huthis. The Our schools and institutes were shut down. Such weapons they use are Yemeni. Most actually come from oppression has convinced many to defend them- fighters [government soldiers and allied militia mem- selves.79 bers] who fought against the socialists during the 1994 war and then sold them”.73 Denying any political agenda, Zaydis accuse the government of being motivated by ideology and historical Opposition politicians question claims that Iran is pro- resentment. As explained by a Zaydi intellectual and viding the rebels with either financial or weapons sup- founder of a Sanaa research institute, “the Huthis have 74 port, while Huthis themselves have rejected outright no agenda whatsoever. They never articulated any 75 any suggestion of collusion with Tehran. Western and conditions for peace other than to be left in peace – other diplomats based in Sanaa on the whole agree, not to be attacked and not to have their villages while conceding some non-governmental Iranian actors bombed”.80 A journalist affiliated with the opposition could be involved. Summing up a more general view, Yemeni Socialist Party pointed to the fact that one Western diplomat said, “there is no clear evidence of Iranian involvement but small signs of a role by Whenever the state declared an end to the fighting, Iranian charitable organisations. Overall, however, the the Huthis immediately stopped. They respected conflict appears chiefly fuelled by internal grievances”.76 the decision and only responded when the army attacked them. Husein al-Huthi had no plans of any kind. It is the government and the army which, B. THE HUTHI AND ZAYDI REVIVALIST through their mistakes, wrongdoing and violence, NARRATIVE gave rise to the rebellion.81

The Huthi and Zaydi revivalist narrative directly con- In a mirror image of the government’s assertion of tradicts the government’s. Although voiced by people Iranian links, the rebels and their allies contend the with different agendas and positions, some highly authorities are acting on behalf of foreign powers, notably Saudi Arabia and the U.S.,82 and accuse Riyadh

77 Crisis Group interview, Zaydi scholar, Sanaa, 17 January 72 Hawzas are prestigious Shiite religious seminaries. 2009. 73 Crisis Group interview, Ali al-Anissi, Sanaa, 14 January 78 Crisis Group interview, Hasan Zayd, al-Haqq general 2009. secretary, Sanaa, 9 January 2009. 74 Crisis Group interview, Hasan Zayd, secretary general of 79 Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 14 January 2009. A Sanaa- al-Haqq party, Sanaa, 2 January 2009. based human rights activist who has defended persons im- 75 In Yahya al-Huthi’s words, “Iran plays no role whatso- prisoned in the context of the Saada war complained: “I am ever. It is only Westerners, Saudis and the Yemeni govern- secular but the political situation has led me to take a closer ment that accuse it of involvement. In fact, we do not need look at my origins, which are Zaydi and Hashemite. Once, the Iranians in any way, as Zaydis have their own symbols, when I handed my passport to an immigration officer at the references and reasons to fight, and these are sufficient to airport, he asked me whether I was a Hashemite, as if it wage the rebellion”. Crisis Group telephone interview, Ber- was legal to question my origins, as if the law demanded it lin, 3 February 2009. and favoured such discrimination”. Crisis Group interview, 76 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Sanaa, January Sanaa, January 2009. 2009. An Arab ambassador added: “Although there might 80 Crisis Group interview, Zaydi intellectual, Sanaa, 14 not be any financial support coming directly from the Iranian January 2009. state, foreign money is reaching the rebels. Iranian compa- 81 Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 17 January 2009. nies invest in local Yemeni companies, and the money is 82 Crisis Group telephone interview, Yahya al-Huthi, Berlin, then channelled to the Huthis, via local families”. Crisis 3 February 2009. While the government has come under Group interview, Arab diplomat, Sanaa, January 2009. pressure from the U.S. and European governments for in- Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 13

of targeting them as Hashemites. Many claim that IV. A METASTASISING CONFLICT Riyadh provides the government with weapons and en- courages it to pursue the fight. In the words of a Zaydi scholar, “Saudi Arabia is scared of the Hashemites. Neither narrative addresses the conflict in all its com- They are the only group that could directly compete plexity; in particular, both ignore non-ideological 83 with the Saudi royal family”. factors that explain its onset and persistence: the accu- mulation of mutual grievances, including among civilians; growing tribalisation, shifting internal power balances and the emergence of a war economy.

A. ACCUMULATING GRIEVANCES AND GROWING TRIBAL INVOLVEMENT

The destruction of villages and infrastructure by army shelling, air bombardment and indiscriminate military and police violence84 has amplified grievances among not only Hashemites generally and Zaydi revivalists in particular but, more broadly, civilians in all northern governorates (Saada, al-Jawf, Amran and Hajja). Even many who originally did not sympathise with Husein al-Huthi sided with the rebels, in some instances taking up arms in solidarity with fellow villagers, rela- tives or tribesmen harmed in the fighting. A parliamentarian said, “the Huthis are getting stronger and stronger with each round. Renewed fighting will only increase the rebels’ influence and broaden the combat zone”.85 A General People’s Congress member of the Consul- tative Council echoed this: “The Huthis seem to have a lot of followers, not for religious reasons but because the population feels discriminated against and excluded consistent anti-terror policies – releasing prisoners suspected from development policies. Unfortunately, the destruc- of involvement in attacks, lenient sentences, concealing in- tion of villages has not helped fight that impression”.86 telligence from foreign investigators (for example, FBI agents looking into the 2000 attack against the USS Cole) – it has Likewise, the rebels have helped fuel anger, engaging faced no direct or public criticism for conduct in Saada, de- in brutal acts, looting and kidnapping, including of spite the deadly nature of the conflict and its threat to soldiers and allied tribesmen,87 even as they adamantly Yemen’s stability. The rebels see Western governments as complicit in government behaviour. Ibid. Another Zaydi religious figure contended: “If there is a will to stop the war, there will be a solution. But the government wants the 84 The scale of the destruction is gradually being documented war to continue in order to continue receiving financial sup- by the state-controlled Saada reconstruction fund, but the port from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”. Crisis Group in- data remains subject to manipulation. terview, Zaydi scholar, Sanaa, 11 January 2009. Rebel claims 85 Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 5 January 2009. of Western support have bolstered the Believing Youth’s 86 Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 12 January 2009. popularity and enabled Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi to pose as a 87 Husein al-Huthi’s death in September 2004 reportedly true defender of Yemen’s Islamic identity. See, eg, Al-Diyar, led to the ascent of a less compromising generation of rebel 4 January 2009. In mid-January 2009, during the Gaza war, leaders and militants. Crisis Group interview, civil society Huthi leaders organised large demonstrations in support of activist, Sanaa, 8 January 2009. Rebel violence was high- Gazans, denouncing Israel and the U.S. They analogised lighted by foreigners living in Saada: “We trusted Husein the Gaza siege to the blockade they claim is imposed on al-Huthi and knew that he would not attack foreigners, but Saada governorate residents. Al-Diyar, 18 January 2009. we now feel less confident with the new, more ideological, 83 Crisis Group interview, Zaydi scholar, Sanaa, 11 January militants”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 18 January 2009. 2009. By portraying the fight as against Saudi and Wahhabi A humanitarian worker said, “Lack of access to the field is encroachment, the Huthis have also sought to buttress their not solely due to government policies. We have been ex- Yemeni credentials, which some contest due to their Hashe- periencing problems in some of the areas controlled by the mite lineage. The claim is at least somewhat undermined rebels as well. The Huthis are seen by the population as by the fact that Zaydi royalists received massive Saudi very brutal. They intimidate people they consider neutral, support during the 1960s post-revolutionary civil war. including through kidnapping”. Crisis Group interview, Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 14

deny resorting to arbitrary violence.88 The presence of These along with other incidents reflect how tribal thousands of displaced persons long after the conclu- vendettas (thar) have become a new, critical variable sion of the fifth round89 suggests persisting problems, in the conflict. Government officials express alarm including damage to homes and fear of retaliation by that tribal warfare may be taking on a life of its own.94 either rebels, groups sympathising with them or pro- government tribes.90 The conflict’s tribalisation has mixed implications. On the one hand, it could signal a lessening of ideological Driven by group solidarity, growing involvement of or religious motivations. Muhammad Thabit, execu- tribal militias alongside government or rebel forces tive director of the Saada reconstruction fund, noted: has further inflamed the conflict and contributed to its endurance. By some accounts, the war has turned into Skirmishes might continue despite the ceasefire, but a tribal conflict between the pro-government Hashid they are between tribes. The situation in Saada is and pro-rebel Bakil confederations, the north Yemeni now similar to that in other parts of Yemen. The highlands’ two largest.91 In December 2008, skirmishes problem is that whenever fighting occurs between between tribes belonging to the two confederations two tribes around Saada, the media tend to describe threatened a new round of fighting,92 as did January it as between Huthis and government, based on 2009 tribal clashes in Amran governorate, south of politics or religion and amounting to a ceasefire Saada, and al-Jawf governorate, east of Saada. Rebels breach. It is none of the above.95 and others claim the Hashid set up checkpoints targeting Huthis and their supporters and aimed, apparently, On the other hand, in Yemen’s predominantly tribal at pressuring the government to adopt a harder stance.93 society, the war’s “tribalisation” means it is spreading far beyond its original reach. Competing tribes and tribal leaders vie for new positions to expand their power; as some groups are marginalised, others receive gov- country representative of international humanitarian NGO, 96 Sanaa, 5 January 2009. ernment help in exchange for fighting the insurgents. 88 “The Huthis have never exercised violence against neutral people; they have only attacked people who were supporting the government and collaborating with the army”. geted pro-Huthi tribes, they likely also were intended to en- Crisis Group interview, Zaydi scholar, Sanaa, 11 January courage the government to harden its policy. A foreign de- 2009. velopment expert in Saada governorate explained the com- 89 In January 2009, the World Food Programme claimed to plexity of the Hashid’s role: “Members of the Hashid con- have provided aid to 7,500 people in camps in al-Dhahir federation own a lot of land in the Saada region but do not and Sahar districts. Saada Update bi-weekly newsletter, originate from there; their base is around Hajja, a less fertile January 2009. This is only a partial view of the affected area. region. During the war, the Huthis destroyed some farms The total number of displaced people at the time almost owned by Hashid members, including the farm of Sheikh certainly was higher. Abdallah al-Ahmar [the Hashid’s former paramount chief 90 Crisis Group interview, international humanitarian NGO and speaker of parliament]. The Hashid were fighting on the official, Paris, 28 January 2009. government’s side. However, since the end of the war they 91 Crisis Group interview, independent journalist, Sanaa, 8 have felt abandoned, as they got nothing in return. So they January 2009. The notion that the Saada conflict has be- started setting up checkpoints, seizing cars on the road and come a war between the Hashid and Bakil tribal confedera- kidnapping people from Saada to pressure the government”. tions was rejected by a Bakil leader, who indicated his tribe Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 4 January 2009. Uthman al- sided with the government. Crisis Group interview, parlia- Majali, a ruling party parliamentarian from Saada said, “by ment member from Saada, Sanaa, 14 January 2009. While cutting the road to Saada the Hashid are pushing the gov- the Hashid confederation appears centralised, particularly ernment to take a tougher stance toward the Huthis, who under the authority of Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar (until his have taken hostages from Hashid tribes. The government death in December 2007), the Bakil confederation is larger currently does not want to put too much pressure on the and more loosely structured. As a result, Bakil-associated Huthis in order to preserve the fragile peace”. Crisis Group tribes have tended to take different positions in the conflict. interview, Sanaa, 12 January 2009. 92 Al-Usbua (independent Sanaa weekly), 4 December 2008. 94 Crisis Group interview, Ali al-Anissi, Sanaa, 14 January 93 Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi accused the al-Usaymat (an im- 2009. portant tribe in the Hashid confederation) of imposing an 95 Crisis Group interview, Muhammad Thabit, executive embargo on Saada via checkpoints that barred supplies and director, Saada reconstruction fund, Sanaa, 21 March 2009. prevented free movement. Al-Ilaf (independent Sanaa weekly), 96 This strategy generated considerable instability within 6 January 2009; Crisis Group interview, resident of Razih tribes, with junior members seizing the opportunity to replace district in Saada governorate, Sanaa, 5 January 2009. A Saada more senior and traditional sheikhs. Crisis Group interview, tribal sheikh involved in successive mediations claimed the independent journalist, Sanaa, 14 March 2009. During the Hashid had taken more than 50 hostages in January 2009 successive rounds, fears that the government would expro- alone. Crisis Group interview, tribal sheikh from Saada gov- priate land in Saada to establish a military base further height- ernorate, Sanaa, 9 January 2009. While these checkpoints tar- ened tensions. The government used the expropriation threat Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 15

Nor is the original conflict being replaced by a tribal President Salih and his son as more pragmatic leaders, war; rather, the latter is supplementing the former and able to bring the war to a peaceful end, while Ali Muhsin complicating resolution of both. Indeed, the size of the is portrayed as mismanaging the counter-insurgency. affected area, number of participating tribes and in- Failed operations, rebel ambushes and internal mis- volvement of the army and other state agents distinguish communications that led the army to strike its own this from the myriad of tribal conflicts that regularly positions prompted rumours of dissent within the mili- occur and ordinarily would be solved through tradi- tary command.102 In the words of a Western diplomat, tional, tribal law.97 the war is a “poisoned chalice given to Ali Muhsin”.103

The existence of internal leadership rivalry is widely B. A WAR OF SUCCESSION? accepted as fact by Yemenis, though it remains very poorly documented. Many believe it helped fuel the war, With President Salih in his late sixties and in power as various groups within the regime sought to use the since 1978, the succession question increasingly has Saada conflict to their advantage. In particular, observ- become a matter of public debate. Although the presi- ers and activists who participated in mediation efforts dent widely is believed to be grooming his son, Ahmad claim that such competition obstructed their work, as Ali Salih, head of both the Special Forces and the one faction undermined another, the result being in- Republican Guards, the emergence of a hereditary re- coherence on the government’s part.104 public is not unanimously endorsed by the ruling elite. According to some Yemeni analysts, the issue could be one of the drivers of the Saada war, described by C. RISE OF A WAR ECONOMY an Islamist intellectual as “a game inside the house” – ie, a war driven in part by competition between ruling The conflict has given rise to a war economy that, in factions.98 turn, helps ensure its perpetuation. For various tribes, army officers and state officials, the war has trans- Among those considered critical of dynastic succession lated into the ability to control the porous border with is Major-General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, commander of Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea coastline; tribal leaders the first armoured battalion in charge of the north west as well as high-ranking officials have amassed mili- region and, as such, responsible for military operations tary hardware; and the same groups profit from illegal in Saada since 2004. Although not appearing to have sales from army stockpiles. At the same time, contin- a direct claim to presidential power, Ali Muhsin (some- ued operations have justified increased military budgets times wrongly labelled the president’s half-brother – without government or independent oversight. Com- the two men come from the same village) is said to petition over such resources has been intense.105 have been at odds with the president’s son99 and to have mobilised certain tribes and Islamist militias, jihadis included, to support the military in the war. According to a Zaydi scholar, the “war strengthened him and the role of Wahhabis inside the state”.100 Group interview, independent journalist, Sanaa, January 2009. Others maintain that the war is being used by the 102 president to undermine Ali Muhsin. Units under his Crisis group interview, country director, international command have engaged in disproportionate and indis- humanitarian NGO, Sanaa, 13 January 2009. 103 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Sanaa, January criminate use of force, earning him the nickname “Ali 101 2009. According to some, army incompetence has jeopard- Katyusha”. Accurate or not, the depiction helps cast ised Ali Muhsin’s position. Al-Masdar (independent Sanaa weekly), 15 August 2008. Munir al-Mawri, a well-known Washington-based Yemeni journalist, reported that Ali Muhsin received threats and that plans existed to eliminate to induce tribes to support the army. Crisis Group interview, him physically or at least weaken him politically. Yemen international development expert, Sanaa, 4 January 2009. Press (information website), 28 July 2008. The May 2008 97 Paul Dresch, Rules of Barat: Texts and Translations of attack on the Bin Salman Mosque in Saada governorate, Tribal Documents from Yemen (Sanaa, 2006). which reportedly targeted Askar Zuail, one of Ali Muhsin’s 98 Crisis Group interview, Islamist intellectual and journal- close aides, although blamed on the rebels, is viewed by ist, Sanaa, 19 December 2008. some as another indicator of internal leadership tensions. 99 Gregory Johnsen, “The Resiliency of Yemen’s Aden- 104 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Sanaa, 8 Abyan Army”, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 4, no.14 (July 2006). January 2009. See also below, section V.A. 100 Crisis Group interview, Zaydi scholar, Sanaa, January 2009. 105 A tribal sheikh said, “The war has become a war over 101 This nickname clearly refers to the notorious former Iraqi resources”. Crisis Group interview, tribal sheikh from Saada minister of defence, “Ali Kimiyawi” (Chemical Ali). Crisis governorate, Sanaa, 9 January 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 16

Saada governorate’s location on the Saudi border and Armed militias more akin to mercenaries have been Red Sea coast makes it potentially of great economic another of the war’s by-products, with recurring alle- interest. Due both to the paucity of state investment in gations that the government has paid tribes or even this mountainous and relatively remote region and to jihadi groups to assist in the fighting.112 Recruitment its independent tribal culture, smuggling is a major of militiamen expanded the pool of potential war economic activity and source of income. For decades, beneficiaries, increasing the incentive to prolong the trafficking of qat,106 drugs, weapons and people into fight as well as its geographic scope. Moreover, money Saudi Arabia has yielded substantial profit.107 The allocated to fund militias allegedly often ends up in Saudi border is largely unguarded, making cross- the pockets of the sheikhs who lead them. Such prac- border trade a critical revenue generator and one of tices, although widely acknowledged to remain un- the war’s unspoken stakes.108 Several prominent Saada proven, are said to be widespread. An independent tribal sheikhs are considered to be the country’s most journalist claimed: important weapons dealers, enjoying regional as well as international connections; this, in the words of a Government officials and army officers contact cer- Western diplomat, “means they have an interest in the tain tribal sheikhs from the Hashid confederation war’s continuation”.109 and ask them to set up militias with, say, 1,000 fighters and pay them accordingly. The sheikhs In addition, lack of oversight in the context of an ex- would then mobilise a much lower number and panding military budget has encouraged corruption and keep the rest of the money.113 fostered trafficking inside the military. Throughout the war, army leaders routinely demanded additional weapons; although some were used against insurgents, a significant proportion was diverted to regional (par- The supply line to the rebels was confirmed by different 110 ticularly Somali) and local markets. Many weapons actors, including some affiliated with the ruling party. Crisis ultimately found their way to the rebels they were in- Group interview, General People’s Congress member of tended to combat. An opposition parliament member Consultative Council, Sanaa, 12 January 2009. Yahya al- said, “the Huthis collect money from sympathisers as Huthi acknowledged that the insurgents had bought some well as local merchants and then buy their weapons weapons from army officers but claimed they had mostly directly from the army. This is one of the war’s true stolen them from army warehouses or captured them in bat- paradoxes”.111 tle. Crisis Group telephone interview, Berlin, 3 February 2009. 112 The issue is highly sensitive. When, in June 2007, the independent weekly Al-Sharea published a special report on militias, the government prosecuted three editors and journalists for “disseminating information liable to under- 106 Qat is a mildly narcotic leaf chewed daily, often in mine army morale”. Reporters Sans Frontières, November lengthy sessions, by a large segment of the population. Ses- 2007. In May 2009, the court had yet to pass sentence. One sions have become major social events and a strong symbol article highlighted the process and networks through which of national identity. Daniel Martin Varisco, “On the Mean- tribal groups from the Hashid confederation were induced ing of Chewing: The Significance of Qat (Catha edulis) in to fight for the government. Al-Sharea, 2 June 2007. Another the Yemen Arab Republic”, International Journal of Mid- claimed that the army was mobilising al-Qaeda-linked ji- dle East Studies, no. 21 (1986). hadi militants. Al-Sharea, 9 June 2007. Journalists have long 107 The town of al-Talh, some 20km west of Saada city, re- maintained that jihadis had joined regular army troops. The portedly hosted Yemen’s single largest open arms market media accusations remain unproven. until the authorities shut it down in 2007. Crisis Group in- 113 Crisis Group interview, independent journalist, Sanaa, 8 terview, Ali al-Anissi, Sanaa, 14 January 2009. Business is January 2009. Others have reported that some tribes com- likely to continue, although less conspicuously. mand stipends from both government and rebels. Crisis 108 In 1934, a brief war opposed the North Yemeni imamate Group interview, civil engineer based in Saada until 2007, to the young Saudi kingdom. The latter prevailed, gaining Sanaa, 4 January 2009. The militia issue gained particular control of three southern provinces. The disputed border prominence during the war’s fifth round in 2008, when finally was demarcated in June 2000, but the agreement Hashid tribal leaders – notably Husein al-Ahmar (a parlia- delineated only part of the border which has remained highly ment member, seen as a key Saudi ally) promised to raise a porous. Saudi Arabia frequently ignores Yemeni sovereignty, 20,000-strong “popular army” to fight the rebels. Yemen funding Yemeni tribes and granting special Saudi passports Times, 10 July 2008. According to several analysts, the to Yemeni citizens living close to the border in a bid to en- government had asked Riyadh to fund the militia, which sure their loyalty. also benefited from help from Islamists such as Abd-al- 109 Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, January 2009. Majid al-Zindani. (He established the al-Iman religious 110 Crisis Group interview, Yemeni journalist, Paris, 5 March university in 1993 after years in Saudi Arabia, is an impor- 2009. tant member of the al-Islah party, apparent leader of its 111 Crisis Group interview, Aydarus al-Naqib, Yemeni So- radical Muslim Brother wing and rumoured to maintain cialist Party parliament member, Sanaa, 21 January 2009. links to international jihadi networks.) See Gregory Johnsen, Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 17

Ultimately, in the words of a Zaydi intellectual who Saudi Arabia ultimately helped scuttle.117 Libya is belongs to the ruling party, “the war has created numer- alleged to have supported the rebels.118 ous interests that have extended a culture of war. We must find ways of spreading a culture of peace”.114 As seen, officials point to purported Iranian financial, military and political aid to the rebels,119 while others suggest possible rebel training in Iran.120 Support from Jaafari and Zaydi communities outside Yemen, notably in Iran, also has been suggested, including by in- D. PERCEIVED FOREIGN MEDDLING dependent observers.121 Although an Iranian role can- not be excluded, it is not self-evident. With the 1979 Both difficult to prove and hard to dispel, the percep- Islamic revolution, a number of Zaydi intellectuals have tion of direct third party involvement is commonplace. been drawn to Iran’s revolutionary ideology; likewise, Much speculation has revolved around a purported Lebanon’s Hizbollah and its leaders enjoy widespread Saudi-Iranian proxy war waged on Yemeni soil. Since support, even beyond Zaydi revivalist circles. From 1979, competition between Riyadh and Tehran has Tehran’s perspective, moreover, a Shiite rebellion along become a defining regional dynamic.115 Most mani- Saudi Arabia’s borders is strategically beneficial. Still, fest during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war (when Saudi serious theological differences between Zaydism and Arabia and other Gulf states bankrolled Iraq), it has Jaafarism and the persistent Arab-Persian divide have been aggravated of late by real or perceived Iranian limited Iran’s influence. ascendancy in Lebanon and the Palestinian arena as well as by alleged Shiite irredentism in Saudi Ara- Huthi leaders and others claim Saudi interference, under- bia’s Eastern Province and throughout the Gulf.116 scoring in particular supposed funding of government The Saada war, with its underlying albeit largely mis- and local tribes during the fourth round in an effort to leading Sunni/Shiite dimension, has become part of undermine Qatari mediation.122 Many further assert this narrative of geopolitical and sectarian rivalry. Other that, during the fifth round, Riyadh bankrolled tribal parties also have sought a role. In 2007, Qatar carried groups, mainly those connected with the Hashid con- out mediation efforts that, according to many analysts, federation.123 The Kingdom denies any participation in the conflict,124 and its critics have not offered con-

117 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Sanaa, 8 January 2009; Western diplomat, Sanaa, January 2009; tribal “Profile of Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani”, Terrorism sheikh from Saada governorate and member of mediation Monitor, vol. 4, no. 7 (2006). According to some reports, committees in 2004, 2005 and 2006, Sanaa, 9 January 2009. President Salih was fearful the government could lose con- 118 The government claimed Libya helped the rebels during trol and changed his mind, deciding to end the war. This is the fourth round but subsequently dropped the accusation. said to have angered tribal elements and potential militia- Yemeni officials did not mention Libya during a series of men, who had been promised salaries. Crisis Group inter- interviews conducted for this report in early 2009. view, Hasan Zayd, secretary general of al-Haqq party, 119 Crisis Group interview, Rashad al-Alimi, vice-prime Sanaa, 9 January 2009. Feelings of neglect were not limited minister for security and defence, Sanaa, 11 January 2009. to mercenaries ready to join the “popular army”. Aydarus 120 Al-Hayat (pan-Arab daily), 26 March 2009. al-Naqib, an opposition parliament member from the south- 121 During the second round, supreme Shiite religious leader ern region of Yafea, claimed: “More than twenty soldiers Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a declaration from from my own district have died since the beginning of the Najaf accusing the Yemeni government of racial discrimi- war. Neither army soldiers nor volunteers fighting along- nation. News Yemen, 7 May 2005; and Crisis Group interview, side the army have received proper treatment. The families tribal sheikh from Saada governorate, Sanaa, 9 January 2009. of those who were injured or killed did not receive any 122 According to a Consultative Council member from the compensation and often were informed very late of what ruling party, “while the Saudis had been very cautious until had happened. This inevitably created new tensions”. Crisis then, not wanting to get involved in the Saada issue, Qatar’s Group interview, Aydarus al-Naqib, Yemeni Socialist Party intervention infuriated them. This is when they became parliament member, Sanaa, 21 January 2009. more massively involved and started satisfying our finan- 114 Crisis Group interview, intellectual and member of the cial needs”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 12 January 2009. General People’s Congress, Sanaa, 13 January 2009. 123 An opposition leader accused Saudi Arabia of seeking to 115 See, eg, Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, Iran, Saudi Arabia “destabilise the country”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 9 and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition (1968-1971) January 2009. (London, 2004). 124 Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Yemen explicitly denied 116 Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious his country’s involvement: “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Political Networks in the Gulf (London, 2008). views the Saada conflict as an internal one and therefore Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 18

125 vincing proof. That said, a Saudi role would hardly E. WESTERN SILENCE be surprising, given shared borders and Riyadh’s long tradition of intervention in Yemeni politics through If regional meddling is a possibility, Western silence has tribal, religious and economic channels as well as been a certainty, with much the same result: allowing through direct and official funding of the state budget. the war to fester, intensify and spread. An internal Referring to this age-old pattern, a foreign analyst 126 conflict that, with adequate outside pressure, could coined the phrase “riyalpolitik”. have been resolved is now threatening to destabilise an already fragile and vulnerable state that the U.S. and In reality, this role is more complex and nuanced than others have identified as an important battleground in the rebels typically assert. For instance, it has not been their fight against jihadi Islamism. driven by anti-Zaydi or Hashemite animus. Indeed, there is reason to believe that early on certain elements Such passivity has several explanations. First is the in Riyadh indirectly supported the Huthis, as the King- paucity of information and inadequate, at times con- dom hosted members of the Zaydi elite who fled after 127 tradictory, communications from the rebels that have the 1962 republican revolution. Instead, as histori- obscured the war’s scale and impact. Diplomats, jour- cally has been the case, a variety of Saudi actors (the nalists, researchers and NGOs, whether Yemeni or for- government, religious institutions, security apparatus, eign, have had little to no access to Saada and sur- tribes, opposition groups and businessmen) pursue di- rounding areas as a result of official restrictions; they vergent, at times competing agendas in neighbouring have thus been unable to assess the level of destruc- Yemen, funding tribal, religious or military segments tion or interview victims.128 By the same token, the of society. Some see an interest in undermining gov- rebels’ poor communications and lack of an articu- ernment control, preventing Yemen from becoming a lated agenda have hampered information-gathering. regional rival or following the lead of tribal allies who resent domination from the centre. Others believe in Western attitudes have also been shaped by the rebels’ the need to bolster the government, fearful that Yemen’s anti-U.S. and anti-Israel rhetoric which, coupled with instability ultimately will spill over into the Kingdom. vague and ill-defined demands, has alienated governments that might otherwise empathise with their suf- fering.129 Yemeni authorities have skilfully portrayed the conflict as part of the broader war on terrorism, thereby tapping into U.S. and European post-11 Septem- ber anxiety to combat potential Islamist foes. Criti- cised in the West for its tendency to co-opt rather than confront jihadi militants, Sanaa had good reason to does not intervene”. Crisis Group interview, Ambassador demonstrate its disposition to fight terrorist groups Ali Hamdan, Sanaa, 13 January 2009. even if – or perhaps especially because – the “Huthi 125 At best, accusations are backed by hearsay. Referring to terrorists” were an isolated, grievance-based group an alleged Saudi role during the fifth round, for example, a detached from any al-Qaeda-type network and repre- Zaydi scholar asserted: “Some people inside the ministry of sented a group, Zaydi Hashemites, that already had lost defence told me that Saudi Arabia was paying as much as 130 $10 million each week. The money went to tribal leaders, out in the 1962 revolution. At the same time, Western the army and people inside the ministry”. Crisis Group in- governments also might have feared that pressure risked terview, Zaydi scholar, Sanaa, January 2009. 126 The riyal is the Saudi currency. Gregory Gause, Saudi- Yemeni Relations. Domestic Structures and Foreign Influ- ence (New York, 1990), p. 112. 127 Hasan Zayd of the al-Haqq party said, “there has been 128 Crisis Group’s January 2009 request to the interior min- no external support for the Huthis. The movement has been istry for permission to travel to Saada has remained unan- locally financed, except during the second and third rounds, swered. More troubling, in April 2009, Crisis Group’s con- when Zaydis in Saudi Arabia sent money with the Saudi sultant who did field work for this report and has worked in government’s agreement. The latter’s position is ambigu- Yemen since 2001 was barred from re-entry at Sanaa air- ous. It has successively supported both sides, not for strictly port. Security officials took a draft of the report. Yemeni ideological reasons but because it wants war and instability authorities have not responded to multiple requests for an in Yemen”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 9 January 2009. explanation. A Saada sheikh claimed that Saudi Arabia had supported 129 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Sanaa, Janu- the rebels during the first round with food: “This was ary 2009. linked to the fact that the tribe of Abdallah al-Ruzami, one 130 Ludmila du Bouchet, “The State, Political Islam and Vio- of the main Huthi leaders, straddles the border and there- lence: The Reconfiguration of Yemeni Politics since 9/11”, fore is half Yemeni and half Saudi”. Crisis Group inter- in Amélie Blom, Laetitia Bucaille and Luis Martinez, eds., view, Sanaa, 9 January 2009. The Enigma of Islamist Violence (London, 2007), p. 144. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 19

weakening a government already facing multiple chal- V. MEDIATION ATTEMPTS lenges, including al-Qaeda and a sinking economy.131

The conflict gradually attracted greater, but still insuf- Efforts to end the war have taken on numerous forms. ficient, attention, primarily thanks to efforts by humani- 132 The government gave a green light to various media- tarian aid agencies. Independent journalists, Western tion committees consisting of tribal, religious and po- diplomats and international humanitarian workers litical leaders; Libya and especially Qatar intervened; believe that the resulting international pressure, albeit 133 and the government set up groups to survey damage, belated, contributed to the July 2008 ceasefire. The assess costs and launch reconstruction. Each failed. It U.S. and EU request early that month for improved is important to understand why. combat zone access for international NGOs and UN agencies signalled growing concern and heightened 134 pressure on the parties. Likewise, once the ceasefire A. TRIBAL AND POLITICAL MEDIATION was in place, the donor community enjoyed leverage, COMMITTEES as the government sought reconstruction funding.135 All of this makes the relative lack of global interest dur- From the outset, and to its credit, the government pur- ing the war’s early years – when the conflict, arguably, sued an authentically Yemeni negotiated solution.136 could have been halted in its tracks – the more regret- Before, during and after each round of fighting, it table. established indigenous mediation committees, building on the country’s tradition of dialogue between competing individuals and groups.137 Ultimately, insufficient political will on both sides undid the committees’ work.

Mediation efforts took off in early 2004, as tensions rose between Husein al-Huthi and the government. Local informal efforts were reminiscent of traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms between tribes that his- torically were conducted by Hashemites who, as out- siders, were deemed independent – even though, this time, the Hashemites were party to the conflict.138 In June 2004, the government set up a committee comprising a mix of local and national figures, several close to al-Huthi.139 In parallel, a civil society initia-

136 In a senior government official’s words, “by favouring 131 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist and media- mediation, the president wanted to show there is no mili- tion committee member in 2004, Sanaa, 8 January 2009. tary solution to the conflict”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 132 Examples include circulation of the Saada Update bi- 7 January 2009. weekly newsletter by the World Food Programme to all 137 It is difficult to determine precisely how many mediation Yemen-based UN agencies and NGOs; the International committees have been active since 2004, a symptom of Committee of the Red Cross’s programs in Saada gover- their decentralised nature. Some received their mandate di- norate beginning with the fourth round; creation of an rectly from the president; others acted on their own initia- emergency response group in 2008 to coordinate local and tive. The overall number ranges from five (Crisis Group international NGO action; and, more generally, growing interview, Ali al-Anissi, director of the Bureau of National involvement of international humanitarian organisations since Security and presidential office, Sanaa, 14 January 2009) to 2007. Crisis Group interview, international humanitarian “seven or eight” (Crisis Group interview, Rashad al-Alimi, NGO country director, Sanaa, 13 January 2009. During the vice-prime minister for security and defence, Sanaa, 11 fifth round in 2008, Human Rights Watch sent two separate January 2009). missions to Yemen to assess the situation after the July 138 Steven Caton, Yemeni Chronicle: An Anthropology of ceasefire. War and Mediation (New York, 2005). 133 Crisis Group interview, General People’s Congress ex- 139 These included his brother Yahya, also a member of par- ecutive, Sanaa, 20 January 2009. liament; Muhammad al-Mansur, a prominent Zaydi scholar 134 Crisis Group interview, EU member state diplomat, Sanaa, and al-Haqq party member; and Abd-al-Karim Jadban, a 10 January 2009. parliament member for the ruling party and a founder of the 135 Crisis Group interview, Western development official, Believing Youth. Crisis Group interview, tribal sheikh from Sanaa, 6 January 2009. Saada governorate, Sanaa, 9 January 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 20

tive endorsed by the president gathered leading figures The government took other steps, alongside mediation, from the ruling and opposition parties. According to to appease the situation. In September 2005, on the participants, the initiatives foundered essentially due revolution’s 43rd anniversary, President Salih announced to lack of coordination – and consensus – between compensation payments to the Hamid al-Din family, government and army. Access to Saada was unsafe whose three successive Zaydi imams (Yahya, Ahmad and, just as mediators were scheduled to meet with and Muhammad al-Badr) had ruled North Yemen Husein al-Huthi, the army began shelling rebel positions until the 1962 revolution.146 In 2006 the appointment (see below), arguably in order to scuttle the effort.140 of Yahya al-Shami, a Hashemite, as Saada governor, replacing the more hardline Yahya al-Amri,147 and the The government established similar political commit- pardon and release of prisoners all were intended to tees during subsequent rounds, each with a different support mediation efforts. makeup – and each with a similar fate. They faced multiple challenges, for example absence of telephone There are many possible explanations for the failure communications with the rebel leadership after secu- of non-military attempts. According to some, commit- rity forces cut the lines.141 They were complemented tee participants were too overtly political, lacked local by local committees comprising tribal and religious roots, nurtured preconceived ideas about the actors or elements, which loosely coordinated their work with lacked sufficient knowledge about the Saada region.148 the more political track.142 Arguably the most serious impediment was that both A third type of committee, spearheaded by Judge mediation efforts and steps announced by the govern- Hamoud al-Hitar, aimed at opening a dialogue with ment to calm the situation were either undermined by detained Believing Youth militants and convincing them accompanying repressive measures or, more simply, there was no religious basis for taking arms against the not implemented at all.149 This partly resulted from government. In line with government policy, it lumped competing approaches between the political leadership together Huthi-led rebels and al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadis. and army command. According to a Zaydi scholar who The committee was viewed in a somewhat positive participated in unofficial mediation efforts, “when the light both domestically and internationally as an origi- president called for mediation, the army did not always nal means of fighting terrorism.143 Al-Hitar claimed cooperate. Mediation efforts would have succeeded success, estimating that half those involved were con- had there been a consensus between the politicians and vinced to halt their violent activity,144 although figures the army. Instead, they were sabotaged by disagree- are unverifiable. However, the U.S. and many ana- ment”.150 This claim was supported by different par- lysts ultimately were more sceptical, arguing that a ticipants and independent observers. Another mediator number of militants involved in the process continued offered an example of government branches working to fight, notably by going to Iraq.145 The project was at cross-purposes: discarded in April 2007 after al-Hitar was named minister of religious endowments (awqaf) and the regime altered its anti-terror policy, opting for more forceful repression.

146 Al-Thawra, 26 September 2005. 147 Yahya al-Shami was replaced in April 2007, allegedly because he was too soft toward the rebels. Two sons are said to have been briefly imprisoned for rebel ties during the 140 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist and media- fifth round. Crisis Group interview, Hasan Zayd, al-Haqq tion committee member in 2004, Sanaa, 8 January 2009. secretary general, Sanaa, 9 January 2009. 141 News Yemen, 15 February 2007. 148 Crisis Group interview, Zaydi intellectual, Sanaa, 14 Janu- 142 During the fifth round, tribal sheikhs from Saada had ary 2009. Faiz al-Awjari, a tribal sheikh from Saada and some success, reportedly dissuading the president from cre- ruling party parliamentarian said, “participation in the po- ating a “popular army” and persuading him a ceasefire was litical mediation committees by people from all parts of the possible. Crisis Group interview, journalist affiliated with country actually broadened the war and turned it into a big the Yemeni Socialist Party, Sanaa, 17 January 2009. affair. Things could have been solved locally. The opposi- 143 See Laurent Bonnefoy, “Yemen’s nervous balancing act”, tion used this war as a way to put pressure on the ruling Le Monde diplomatique, October 2006. party”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 12 January 2009. 144 Yemen Observer (Sanaa weekly), 4 June 2008. 149 For example, only 70 of the 500 prisoners whose release 145 Chris Boucek, Shazadi Beg and John Borgan, “Opening was announced in September 2007 appear to have been ef- Up the Jihadi Debate: Yemen’s Committee for Dialogue”, fectively freed at the time. Crisis Group interview, human in Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism rights activist, Sanaa, 5 January 2009. Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (New 150 Crisis Group interview, Zaydi intellectual, Sanaa, 14 Janu- York, 2009). ary 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 21

The president asked us to go to Saada. We had The most significant mediation initiative came from arranged a meeting with Husein al-Huthi to discuss Qatar, part of its broader conflict resolution strategy ways of resolving the conflict. A helicopter was that has included Lebanon, Palestine and Sudan.157 The ready to take us. Just as we were about to leave, effort apparently began during a May 2007 visit to army forces close to where we were located started Yemen by Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. Accord- bombing Huthi positions, so it had to be cancelled. ing to reports, he sent a foreign ministry team to Saada I think their real objective was to undermine along with government-appointed Yemeni mediators mediation attempts, to show that the only effective to meet the rebel leadership. Yahya al-Huthi also response to the Huthis was a military one.151 travelled to Qatar to convey the rebels’ demands. The result was the 16 June 2007 joint ceasefire announce- The committees’ work was further hampered by the ment, based on a list of general principles that rearrest of a number of Zaydi intellectuals, journalists mained secret until the rebels released it almost a year and former committee members, including Abd-al- later.158 These included, inter alia, an agreement by Karim al-Khaywani (in 2005 and 2008), Yahya al- the rebels to relinquish their positions and lay down Daylami (2005), Muhammad Luqman (2005) and heavy arms and government commitment to declare Muhammad Muftah (2005). They were either detained an amnesty and launch Qatari-supported reconstruc- without trial or sentenced to lengthy prison terms by a tion projects in Saada. The government also was to set special criminal court in proceedings deemed unfair up another committee comprising Yemenis from both by Amnesty International.152 Purported repressive sides as well as Qataris who would seek to reach a peace actions by security forces in Saada also are said to have agreement. played a negative role.153 The arrest and imprison- ment of important mediators such as Abdallah Husein On 1 February 2008, the two sides met in Doha to sign al-Muayyad, a Saada cleric, and Salih al-Wajaman, a a peace accord.159 Although violence never ceased, even tribal sheikh also from Saada, validated the view among after the ceasefire agreement,160 expectations soared, many that the army, if not the government as a whole, particularly in terms of Qatari funding and, in the sub- was intent on disrupting conciliation efforts.154 sequent period, both sides took tangible steps toward implementation.161 At the core of the agreement was

B. QATAR’S MEDIATION

157 Several regional governments were involved in efforts The New York Times, 9 July 2008. 158 The rebels revealed the text in late March 2008, when to end fighting, at times in response to the Yemeni tensions in the war zone threatened to undermine the ac- government’s request. During the third round, it report- cord. Al-Sharea, 22 March 2008. edly asked Libya for help, though relations gradually 159 The rebels were represented by Yahya al-Huthi and their soured as the government accused Tripoli of support- spokesman Salih Habra; the government sent Abd-al-Karim ing the rebels.155 Saudi Arabia also is said to have dis- al-Iryani, a former prime minister and political adviser to creetly intervened to settle conflicts between various President Salih, and Gen. Ali Muhsin. Hamad Bin Jasim Al tribes with which it was allied and which were fight- Thani, Qatar’s prime minister, signed for his government. ing one another in the context of the Saada war.156 Terms of the accord included a halt in effect to all military operations, release of all prisoners within a month from February 2008, exile to Qatar of Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi, Abd-al-Karim al-Huthi (another of Husein’s brothers and a 151 Crisis Group interview, opposition party mediation com- rebel leader) and Abdallah al-Ruzami (who refused to leave mittee member, Sanaa, 8 January 2009. Yemen, alleging tensions on the ground) and establishment 152 “Yemen”, Amnesty International, report for 2006, pub- of reconstruction and compensation committees. Al-Sharea, lished May 2007. 22 March 2008. 153 Crisis Group interview, Zaydi scholar, Sanaa, January 2009. 160 On 15 July, a convoy carrying three Qatari mediators and 154 Crisis Group interview, human rights activist, Sanaa, 20 Yemeni parliament and consultative council members came January 2009. “Disappearances and Arbitrary Arrests in the under rebel fire near the town of al-Talh in Sahar district. Armed Conflict with Huthi Rebels in Yemen”, Human Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi condemned the attack and denied Rights Watch report, October 2008. any involvement; the government claimed it had been planned 155 In May 2007, Yemen recalled its ambassadors to Iran and carried out by al-Huthi supporters. News Yemen, 16 and Libya for consultation. Yemen Times, 14 May 2007; July 2007. Four days before signing the Doha agreement, however, it has yet to produce evidence of Libyan med- Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi accused government forces of shell- dling. An apparent cause of irritation was Yahya al-Huthi’s ing his positions in Haydan district, threatening the peace intermittent presence in Libya and Tripoli’s refusal to ex- accord. Al-Nida, 30 January 2008. tradite him. Almotamar.net, 16 February 2007. 161 Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi declared that the rebels had handed 156 Crisis Group interview, tribal sheikh from Saada, Sanaa, over 72 prisoners (officers and persons who had fought 9 January 2009. alongside the armed forces). Al-Sharea, 14 July 2007. The Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 22

Qatar’s pledge to finance reconstruction and launch its promises”169 to normalise the situation in Saada and major development projects in Saada, possibly to the stop harassing its people. Rebel leaders also mentioned tune of $300 million-$500 million, although figures the arrest by security forces of a mediator representing were never released.162 the Huthis and accused media outlets close to the army of organising a campaign against the Doha agreement.170 Optimism was short-lived. Renewed heavy fighting soon rendered the peace accord obsolete. Whereas the A second complicating factor was competition between rebels continued to press for its implementation even Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Since Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa after Qatar disengaged,163 the government claimed it Al Thani acceded to power in 1995, Doha has forged had lived up to its commitments, the rebels had not and an independent foreign policy, mediating regional con- thus Qatar’s intervention no longer was needed.164 In flicts, developing commercial partnerships with both March 2009, President Salih confirmed that Qatar’s Iran and Israel and publicly criticising Saudi policy at mediation had failed. He suggested that Doha unin- Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council meetings. tentionally had enabled the rebels to believe they were In so doing, it provoked Riyadh’s ire, and tensions be- “equal to the state” because they were negotiating tween the small emirate and large monarchy grew directly with the government.165 apace.171 Creation of the Al-Jazeera news channel in 1997 and its frequent attacks against the Saudi ruling The Qatari effort broke down for several reasons. First family proved another major irritant.172 Qatari media- was the absence of an effective follow-up mechanism tion in Saada – a region that borders Saudi Arabia – to monitor implementation and adjudicate disputes. In appears to have prompted Riyadh to pour money into a way, the initiative essentially amounted to throwing the Yemeni military and allied tribes. At the same money at a problem, hoping it would disappear. Yem- time, Saudi media portrayed the Qatari intercession as eni members of the implementation committee met guided by Iran, suggesting that its timing reflected a with rebel leaders but made little progress because joint bid to save the rebels from looming defeat.173 they operated in a vacuum; there were no regular contacts between signatories and Qatari officials and no formal mechanism to address disagreements.166 C. RECONSTRUCTION COMMITTEES

Disagreements abounded over the extent to which the In the words of a parliament member, “without compen- parties implemented the accord, with each side blam- sation and reconstruction, the war will never stop”.174 167 ing the other for the breakdown. The government Accordingly, less than a week after he officially “ended” claimed that rebel commander Abdallah al-Ruzami the war on 17 July 2008, President Salih created the had “refused to come down from the mountains, as Saada Committee for Peace and Reconstruction. In 168 stipulated in the peace deal”, while the rebels con- parallel, he formed a local committee comprising tended that “the Yemeni government did not respect notable Saada figures, such as Faris Manaa (a tribal sheikh, prominent businessman and brother of Hasan government launched a damage assessment of public and private properties in six Saada districts. The reconstruction committee was headed by Saada’s governor, Mutahhar al- 169 Crisis Group telephone interview, Yahya al-Huthi, Ber- Masri. IRIN News, 11 November 2007. lin, 3 February 2009. Local government supporters also 162 Crisis Group interview, Aydarus al-Naqib, Yemeni So- claimed Qatar’s payments to local tribes and armed groups cialist Party parliament member, Sanaa, 21 January 2009. amounted to indirect rebel funding, tainting Doha’s role in The contribution was part of a wider effort by the newly their eyes. “Qatar paid important sums of money as gifts to established Qatar Foundation for Development, which at rebels. People were unhappy with this, and it led to the the time promised to undertake infrastructure and devel- failure of the Doha accord”. Crisis Group interview, Faiz opment projects outside Saada governorate as well. 26 Sep- al-Awjari, parliament member from Saada governorate for tember, 21 June 2007. the General Congress Party, Sanaa, 12 January 2009. 163 News Yemen, 19 July 2008. 170 Yemen Times, 24 April 2008. For criticism of the Qatari 164 Crisis Group interview, Zaydi intellectual, Sanaa, 14 mediation, see Al-Shumua (Sanaa independent weekly), 20 January 2009. and 27 April 2008. 165 Al-Hayat, 26 March 2009. 171 See John Peterson, “Qatar and the World: Branding for a 166 Uthman al-Majali, a ruling party parliamentarian, said, Micro-State”, Middle East Journal, vol. 60, no. 4 (2006). “Qatar tried to mediate, but they didn’t really know what 172 See Mamoun Fandy, (Un)Civil War of Words: Media was happening in Saada”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 12 and Politics in the Arab World (Westport, 2007); and The January 2009. New York Times, 4 January 2008. 167 Al-Sharea, 10 May 2008. 173 Ukaz (Saudi daily), 23 August 2007. 168 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, Sanaa, 174 Crisis Group interview, Aydarus al-Naqib, Yemeni So- 7 January 2009. cialist Party parliament member, Sanaa, 21 January 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 23

Manaa, Saada’s governor) and members of elected and international NGOs carried out a joint rapid-needs local councils. The presence in both committees of assessment in August-September 2008, covering a individuals perceived as close to the rebels, such as range of sectors (including sanitation, health, educa- Sheikh Ali Nassir al-Qirsha, mollified Huthi leaders.175 tion and civilian protection) and budgeting $4.6 mil- The committees appeared to work cooperatively and lion to various implementing agencies to deal with the were given access to a $55 million special fund under emergency between October and December 2008.181 the prime minister’s authority – a sum far less than The Qatari Red Crescent Society, as well as the presi- anticipated or needed, but a start nonetheless.176 Their dentially-established Salih foundation, distributed goods goal was to survey the destruction, start reconstruction to refugees, while Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières, and dispense compensation in war-affected areas.177 Médecins du Monde, the International Committee of They also were mandated to solve disputes between the Red Cross and Islamic Relief pursued their own the various parties. relief programs, including in zones that remained under rebel control.182 The government encouraged By late December 2008, the committees reportedly had displaced persons to go home, providing cash incen- completed 80 per cent of the survey in the affected dis- tives, transportation, food and other commodities to tricts; they assessed that 7,180 houses, 1,412 farms, families willing to return to their villages,183 albeit 267 mosques, 94 schools, eight medical centres, four with mixed results.184 police stations, three court buildings, three other government facilities and two religious centres had been Although reconstruction officially is proceeding apace,185 destroyed in the fighting or by air bombardments.178 it faces severe challenges that could jeopardise efforts By mid-March 2009, the government claimed it has to avert another round of warfare. Funding became an rebuilt 960 private homes during the first reconstruc- issue immediately after the fifth round in the context tion phase (focusing on Sahar and Razih districts)179 of the global economic meltdown and plummeting oil and completed the damage survey in Harf Sufyan and prices that forced the government to revise its already Bani Hushaysh.180 approved 2009 budget.186 In response, Sanaa appealed to the international community for financial support. Local and international organisations simultaneously A senior government official said, “there is no external launched a humanitarian assistance drive in Saada im- solution to the conflict, and the reconstruction commit- mediately after the end of the fifth round. UN agencies tees must address the main grievances. But the government needs resources to fulfil its commitments”.187

Although officials met with Western governments in 175 Crisis Group interview, Hasan Zayd, secretary general of al-Haqq party, Sanaa, 9 January 2009. 176 Nabil al-Shayban, a planning ministry official, said, “as 181 Crisis Group interview, international development worker, an initial requirement the reconstruction fund would need Sanaa, 9 January 2009. $190 million for immediate needs. The government has 182 Crisis Group interview, country director, international contributed $55 million. The rest will need to be provided humanitarian NGO, Sanaa, 4 January 2009. by the donor community”. IRIN News, 18 September 2008. 183 World Food Programme, bi-weekly report on Saada emer- The planning ministry also projected that the plan should gency operation, 30 August 2008. be completed with a four-year (2009-2012) special devel- 184 Many displaced persons balked either because their origi- opment effort in Saada costing an additional $500 million. nal areas of residence had been mined or out of fear of in- Al-Nida, 12 November 2008. surgent reprisals for allegedly supporting the government. 177 Crisis Group interview, Rashad al-Alimi, vice-prime min- Crisis Group interviews, international development expert, ister for security and defence, Sanaa, 11 March 2009. The Sanaa, 4 January 2009; tribal sheikh from Saada governorate, committees’ work and creation of the fund were designed Sanaa, 9 January 2009. The question of the internally dis- to avoid the experience of a previous reconstruction effort. placed has continued to vex the government and relief In November 2007, a committee surveyed damage in nine agencies. Crisis Group interview, international humanitar- of Saada’s fifteen districts. According to Rashad al-Alimi, ian NGO official, Paris, 28 January 2009. much of the money allocated to residents ended up in rebel 185 26 September, 27 November 2008. hands and was used to rearm. “This time the people are 186 In the six months following the 17 July 2008 ceasefire, given 25 per cent of the sum needed to rebuild their homes. oil prices dropped precipitously. Parliament approved the Only once they have started, they receive the rest of the 2009 budget on the basis of $93 per barrel; between Janu- money”. Crisis Group interview, Faiz al-Awjari, parliament ary and May 2009, the price of a barrel remained at an member from Saada governorate for the General Congress average of around $50. In response, the government an- Party, Sanaa, 12 January 2009. nounced it would cut spending (excluding public sector 178 Saba News, 23 December 2008. salaries) by half. Oil revenues are around 70 per cent of the 179 Saba News, 15 March 2009. government’s overall income. Crisis Group interview, West- 180 Crisis Group interview, Muhammad Thabit, executive ern diplomat, Sanaa, January 2009. director, Saada reconstruction fund, Sanaa, 21 March 2009. 187 Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 7 January 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 24

the weeks following the proclaimed end to fighting, the mittee members has been less smooth.193 Yahya al-Huthi donor community was cautious. In the words of a dip- has accused both governmental and local reconstruc- lomat from an important donor country: tion committees of lying about their objectives as well as spying on the Huthis and their sympathisers. More- There is a consensus in the international community over, he said, “the government is using the commit- that we should wait for guarantees before launch- tees to convince foreigners that it is taking positive ing development projects in Saada. No one will steps”.194 Others echoed al-Huthi’s message.195 As a invest in that region unless there is a guarantee that result, relief officials assert, the national reconstruc- war will not resume. This is a way to put pressure tion fund has been unable to fully assess the damage on the government and elicit information on the in Huthi-controlled regions – reportedly those that 188 reconstruction and conciliation process. suffered most from bombardments and fighting.196 Another diplomat explained that Western governments would be reluctant to financially back a government- controlled fund meant to repair what government forces themselves had destroyed and were likely to destroy again if another round erupted, unless conditions on the ground stabilised.189

Persistent instability in the affected regions is another factor hindering reconstruction efforts. Since the July 2008 ceasefire, Saada governorate remains unstable principally due to skirmishes between pro-Huthi and pro-government tribal groups. In particular, the latter accuse the committees of bias, and, in retaliation, members of aggrieved tribes block roads and attack rival tribes. Regime hardliners who oppose reconciliation also criticise the committees’ work and take steps to undermine them.190 They might well be behind the forced resignation in mid-November 2008 of Abd-al- Qadir Hilal as minister of local administration and head of the national reconstruction committee. Security officials had accused Hilal of excessive leniency toward 191 the rebels. For several independent observers, this 193 Crisis Group interview, international humanitarian NGO was another sign of regime division and hesitation to 192 official, Paris, 28 January 2008. end the war. Under his replacement as reconstruc- 194 Crisis Group telephone interview, Yahya al-Huthi, Ber- tion committee head, Abd-al-Aziz Dhahab, the com- lin, 3 February 2009. mittee has lost dynamism and much of the credit it 195 An opposition figure asserted: “The government agreed previously had gained. to have pro-Huthi individuals on the reconstruction committees only because it wanted the Huthis to believe that it The Huthi leadership likewise has displayed ambiva- genuinely has the will to end the war, while in fact it does lence toward the reconstruction committees. Although not”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, 9 January 2009. 196 international NGOs and UN agencies have been able Crisis Group interview, international humanitarian NGO to carry out programs in war-affected zones without country representative, Sanaa, 13 January 2009. The claim apparent difficulty, access by national fund and com- reconstruction fund officials have had no access to rebel- controlled zones was contested by the fund’s executive director: “We work with everyone. We do not care if they are Huthis or with the government. The fund’s role is not political. We treat all Yemeni citizens equally. We only carry 188 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Sanaa, 14 out a technical evaluation and then we give people whose January 2009. property has been destroyed a cheque so that they can buy 189 Ibid. what they need to rebuild their house or farm. Frankly, 190 Crisis Group interview, Nabil al-Sufi, independent jour- there is no ban on our reconstruction work by the Huthis. nalist, editor in chief of Abwab monthly magazine, Sanaa, 4 We work wherever we want. If Yahya al-Huthi, who is January 2009. abroad, criticises us and accuses us, it is because he does 191 Al-Hayat, 16 November 2008. not know what we are doing exactly, how many houses 192 Crisis Group interview, Nabil al-Sufi, independent jour- have already been rebuilt and how much progress we have nalist, editor in chief of Abwab monthly magazine, Sanaa, 4 made with the population”. Crisis Group interview, Mu- January 2009. hammad Thabit, Sanaa, 21 March 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 25

VI. BUILDING A LASTING PEACE to more systematically integrate Zaydis and Hashe- mites into the political system. It also should discourage media outlets from fanning social or religious Belligerents as well as independent observers agree on prejudice. Finally, it ought to take steps to ensure rep- one thing: under current conditions, a sixth round is resentation of Hashemites and Zaydi revivalist figures only a matter of time. The prospect of parliamentary in higher government and ruling party circles. elections in April 2009 was cause for some relief; many observers believed the government would wish to Although Zaydi revivalist fears of Salafi or Wahhabi avoid renewed confrontation ahead of polling. On 22 attempts to eradicate them are exaggerated, they con- February, however, President Salih and the opposition tain a kernel of truth and have led to a self-defence jointly announced a two-year postponement of the vote, reflex. For the state, the appropriate response should removing a possible obstacle to war.197 Fears height- be not exclusion and repression but accommodation ened as rumours swirled of a $1 billion arms deal with and inclusion. This would entail a concerted effort to Russia which, if true, would reinvigorate the army.198 stress positive aspects and contributions to Yemeni At the same time, Huthi leaders demonstrated their identity of Zaydi and Hashemite histories as well as to ability to mobilise large numbers. During the January incorporate Zaydi religious interpretations in textbooks. Gaza war, they staged anti-Israel demonstrations in Public radio and television might, for example, regularly Saada replete with the Believing Youth’s standard broadcast conferences or sermons by Zaydi scholars, report their views and even encourage cross-sectarian slogans. On the Prophet’s birthday in March, rebels 203 organised a rally reportedly attended by tens of thou- conferences and ecumenical sermons. sands and at which Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi denounced Yemen’s alliance with the U.S., warning the govern- B. REINTEGRATING THE HUTHIS ment it would lose if it were to launch an attack.199 INTO POLITICS Also in March, rebel spokesman Salih Habra declared that “the war is in no one’s interest” but went on to Five years into the conflict, it remains difficult to iden- accuse the government of preparing a sixth round.200 tify the rebels’ objectives. Huthi leaders never spelled Two weeks later the army’s official media outlet re- them out clearly, often limiting themselves to rejecting ferred to the Huthis as a “seditionist and subversive government claims. Failure to articulate a coherent group” and charged them with pursuing “terrorist political platform has encouraged rumours of secret activities” and “oppressing communities and house- political and sectarian projects as well as of foreign holds”.201 Serious skirmishes broke out in early April manipulation. If they are to facilitate resolution of this between rebels and army units in Saada’s Ghamir and conflict, the rebels will have to cogently list their griev- Razih districts202 and persisted for weeks. Each party ances – Saada’s underdevelopment and exclusion; promptly accused the other of violating the peace stigmatisation of Zaydi and Hashemite identities; agreement. Several steps are required to forestall re- detention and disappearance of Huthi fighters and allied newed war. political figures and intellectuals; and governmental failure to fully compensate war victims – and demands.204

A. BRIDGING THE SECTARIAN GAP

The portrayal of Huthi militants, both in the media 203 President Salih’s position is ambivalent. Although nomi- and official discourse, as agents of a wider Shiite con- nally a Zaydi, he built a large mosque, inaugurated in No- spiracy to take over the country is largely unfounded vember 2008, that uses the Sunni call to prayer (adhan), and – in the context of deepening regional sectarian not the Zaydi one. Of the three clerics he appointed to it – polarisation – dangerous. Instead, the state should re- from different religious branches – none was associated with new efforts undertaken by the republic in the late 1960s Zaydism. Crisis Group interview, official, religious endowments ministry, Sanaa, 21 March 2009. The mosque administration has repeatedly invited Zaydi clerics to deliver the Friday sermon, an initiative that deserves praise and 197 Al-Hayat, 26 February 2009. emulation in other mosques. Crisis Group interview, intel- 198 Reuters, 28 February 2009. The army denied the ru- lectual and GPC member, Sanaa, January 2009. mour. 26 September, 26 February 2009. 204 Rebels took tentative steps in this direction in 2007, es- 199 Marib Press, 10 March 2009. tablishing the Minbar website. Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi and 200 Ishtiraki.net (Yemeni Socialist Party information web- Salih Habra now send frequent assessments to Sanaa-based site), 15 March 2009. journalists of the situation in Saada governorate and giving 201 26 September, 2 April 2009. names and casualty estimates. Crisis Group interview, in- 202 News Yemen, 2 April 2009. dependent journalist, Sanaa, 8 January 2009. These steps Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 26

More broadly, a key to lasting peace likely will be the Rebel leaders might favour an alternative scenario Huthi movement’s normalisation as a political party, a under which they would focus on Zaydi religious Zaydi revivalist religious-cultural movement, or both. activities, assuming tolerance of religious diversity by Such reintegration of former dissidents into state struc- the state and other religious actors, particularly Salafi tures is not unprecedented. Both the 1960s civil war groups. In a way, this would be a throwback to the 1990s, and the 1994 war of secession witnessed similar out- when the Believing Youth ran successful summer edu- comes with the progressive co-optation of many rebel cational activities and when inter-sectarian tensions leaders in state institutions. Indeed, an array of gov- were less prominent.209 Tentative steps in this direc- ernment and opposition actors have advocated the tion could be under way. According to a journalist: insurgents’ transformation into a political party, an option Salih himself said he favoured.205 Likewise, Since Ramadan [September] 2008, the Huthis have Ali al-Anissi, head of the Bureau of National Security shifted from violence to social, cultural and reli- and director of the presidential office, claimed that the gious actions, even as they focus on foreign policy Huthis’ conversion into a political party was a pre- issues. This trend mainly is the work of Abd-al- condition for peace, provided the party respected the Malik al-Huthi, however; we do not yet know the constitution and was not based on discrimination other leaders’ positions.210 against other sects.206 In the words of a well-informed journalist: C. ENCOURAGING CIVIL SOCIETY The Huthis actually are a political party but one INITIATIVES that refuses to recognise itself as such. They represent a force and a lot of people. They have follow- Muted reactions from civil society, the opposition and ers not just in Saada but in many other governorates. media have been an important and unfortunate feature It is therefore necessary for them to establish them- of the Saada war from the start. Criticism and in-depth selves as an institutionalised political structure.207 analysis of the belligerents’ actions have remained rare, in part due to the information vacuum, in part due to So far, Huthi leaders have balked. The same journalist fear of state repression. Public reaction also has been explained: low-key, a possible reflection of the government’s successful stigmatisation of Huthis as criminals and ter- Their point is that political parties have failed and rorists.211 that current conditions do not allow for free and fair competition. Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi explicitly There have been some notable exceptions. Early in the rejected the idea because he wants the war to re- war, Zaydi-affiliated organisations documented and main a war of self-defence. He said that if he were denounced war-related human rights violations in Saada to articulate a political platform, people would despite government pressure on its members.212 More 208 start fighting to defend it – something he rejects.

left the party to found his own movement. Samy Dorlian, “Les reformulations identitaires du zaydisme dans leur con- are insufficient, however, as they lack coherence and docu- texte sociopolitique contemporain”, Chroniques Yéménites, mentation and are far from constituting a political platform. no. 15 (2008), p. 164. 205 Al-Hayat, 28 March 2009. 209 Bernard Haykel, “A Zaydi revival?”, Yemen Update, no. 206 Crisis Group interview, Ali al-Anissi, Sanaa, 14 January 36 (1995). 2009. 210 Crisis Group interview, Nabil al-Sufi, independent jour- 207 Crisis Group interview, Yemeni Socialist Party-affiliated nalist, chief editor, Abwab monthly, Sanaa, 4 January 2009. journalist, Sanaa, 17 January 2009. 211 The government’s war blackout has meant media cover- 208 Ibid. Yahya al-Huthi argues that the political system’s age and public debate based on partial information and un- shortcomings are the primary obstacle to the Huthis’ trans- verified rumours. Examples of unsubstantiated (at times formation: “We had the experience of the al-Haqq party absurd) assertions abound. On 21 April 2005, al-Shumua, a when we worked within its framework in the early 1990s. It Sanaa weekly close to some army officers, portrayed Huthi was useless. No one wanted to listen to us. The government militants as agents of international freemasonry; conversely, tried to manipulate us, especially when it named Ahmad al- rumours have spread alleging massive al-Qaeda involve- Shami as minister of religious endowments in 1997. So we ment with army forces since the beginning of the fourth decided to become independent and reject the party system, round in 2007. and we set up the Believing Youth”. Crisis Group telephone 212 This was the case in particular of the Yemeni Organisa- interview, Berlin, 3 February 2009. In 1997, the nomina- tion for the Defence of Democratic Rights and Liberties. It tion of Ahmad al-Shami, secretary general of the al-Haqq was created in 1993 by Muhammad Abd-al-Malik al-Muta- party, as religious endowments minister was criticised by wakkil, a renowned intellectual of Hashemite background Believing Youth leaders, including Husein al-Huthi, who and a political science professor at Sanaa University. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 27

recently, in 2007, a group of Yemeni organisations set diplomatic support as a means of nudging the parties up “Together against the Saada War”; they chose as back to the negotiating table. The last point is of particu- their director a non-Zaydi intellectual, Abu Bakr al- lar importance: donor countries should hold out the Saqqaf, to discourage the notion that it supported the promise of long-term development aid to neglected rebels.213 Activists have met with government officials, regions such as Saada as an incentive to end the war.218 staged sit-ins in front of parliament and the presidency building and called for the release of detainees.214 In How aid is structured also matters. Support should be 2008, various NGOs convened conferences to draw allocated to specific reconstruction projects jointly iden- attention and discuss issues related to the war.215 tified by the government, rebels and members of civil society; this should be preceded by an independent None of these efforts have effectively challenged official survey of destruction and casualties. For both tasks, discourse or affected public debate; they remain mar- an inclusive mediation and reconstruction committee ginal – tolerated but ineffectual and, indeed, tolerated ought to be established comprising representatives because ineffectual. That is not a reason to abandon of the government, rebel movement, civil society and them, for they hold a key to improving public infor- international donor community. Priority development mation, debunking myths on both sides and building projects – health, education, water sanitation and trans- confidence between belligerents by establishing forums portation – should be aimed at improving civilian lives. for open expression and debate. Local, non-affiliated Longer-term development could be supported by incen- organisations also could help provide credible assess- tives for private investment, notably in the labour- ments of destruction and casualties and assist in re- intensive agricultural sector. Although the promise of construction projects,216 thus enhancing their credibil- assistance for the most part should encourage the par- ity in rebel and international eyes.217 ties to reach a durable settlement, some funding could begin immediately, both to alleviate hardships and to demonstrate concretely the benefits that can accrue D. A NEW INTERNATIONAL ROLE with enhanced stability.

International efforts essentially have been of two types: Regionally, there are lessons to be learned from the regional intervention (at times well-intentioned but well-meaning Qatari experience. Because it ran afoul unable to solve the conflict) and humanitarian (chiefly of Saudi Arabia’s perceived interests, some inside the by UN agencies and international humanitarian organi- Kingdom’s leadership allegedly undermined the effort sations). A more positive, political and proactive inter- – even though this imperilled Yemen’s stability, and national role is important. This will require a change all Arabian peninsula states have an interest in such in outlook on the nature of the war and a more acute stability given large Yemeni migrant communities in understanding of the dangers it poses. their midst and potential spillover effects from the country’s disintegration. The early 2009 merger of al- Working with regional actors (notably Gulf Cooperation Qaeda’s Saudi and Yemeni branches (giving rise to Council members) and existing Yemeni mediation and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, whose leaders are reconstruction committees, Western governments should consider several steps: pressing the government to end its information blackout and lift its ban on access to 218 war-affected areas by media, independent researchers, Muhammad Thabit, head of the Saada reconstruction human rights organisations and most humanitarian fund, asserted: “In early 2009, Great Britain and Italy both announced aid reaching a total of $7 million, but it is in- agencies; pushing the Huthi leadership to articulate tended primarily for food distribution and to answer other practical demands; indicating backing for a negotiated urgent needs. This is not the main problem in Saada right settlement; and pledging reconstruction assistance and now. Refugees have returned to their villages, and commu- nal solidarity is playing a big role in addressing urgent needs. What the people really need is reconstruction and 213 Crisis Group interview, human rights activist, Sanaa, 20 development. Satisfying urgent needs is important, but it January 2009. will not solve the conflict in the long term”. Crisis Group 214 Sawt al-Shura (Sanaa Zaydi weekly), 1 December 2008. interview, Sanaa, 21 March 2009. Donors have been wary 215 For example, on 28 June 2008, the NGO Muntada Hiwar of infusing additional resources for lack of certainty that, organised a conference on possible solutions for Saada; on Salih’s pronouncements notwithstanding, the war truly is 19 August the independent English-language Yemen Times over. A major donor country representative said, “additional organised a conference on detainees and the disappeared. money could be made available to support projects linked 216 Crisis Group interview, international development ex- to water, health and education once we get the sense that a pert, Sanaa, 4 January 2009. political process between the government and the Huthis 217 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Sanaa, January has been launched”. Crisis Group interview, Western dip- 2009. lomat, Sanaa, 14 January 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 28

in hiding in Yemen) is yet another indication of the VII. CONCLUSION interdependence of regional security.219 Gulf countries ought to act collectively, most likely via the Gulf Co- operation Council, of which Yemen aspires to be a Since unification of North and South in May 1990, 220 member. As in the case of Western governments, its Yemen has been confronted with serious challenges intervention should aim at fostering an environment that have undermined the state’s capacity to govern. favourable to negotiations by encouraging dialogue while While a failed-state scenario is much feared and often backing reconstruction, reconciliation and develop- discussed,222 including by Yemeni officials,223 the re- 221 ment. gime so far has preserved both its rule and the country’s overall stability. The Saada war potentially is of a different sort for – together with other negative trends, including the economic crisis, resource depletion (of both oil and water) and renewed and rising resentment among residents of the former South Yemen – it threatens the state’s capacity to cope and survive.

The Saada war has long been ignored by civil society, the opposition, general public and international community. Yet, the officially-declared peace notwithstanding, the situation remains extremely fragile. Under- lying grievances remain unaddressed. The roots of the conflict – social, political and religious – should be tackled head-on by all.

Primary responsibility falls on local actors, whether independent or associated with either the government or the rebels. They are the ones who must take the steps to lessen sectarian tensions, help reabsorb the alienated Huthis, release war-related prisoners and stop playing the dangerous card of tribal allegiances. But the international community also has a significant role to play. This it can do by using its political leverage and the promise of increased aid for reconstruction and development in order to promote an environment more conducive to sustained peace.

Sanaa/Brussels, 27 May 2009

219 Al-Jazeera International website, 28 January 2009. 220 Crisis Group interview, Arab diplomat, Sanaa, January 2009. Debate around Yemen’s integration in the Gulf Co- operation Council (GCC) has been ongoing for years. Ku- wait and Saudi Arabia traditionally opposed it in apparent retaliation for Yemen’s refusal during the 1990-1991 Gulf War to condemn Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Since 2007, however, their positions appear to have evolved, and the secretariat and member states now seem to support Yemen’s integration. Such a move would not become effective until 2017, however, and is contingent on structural political and 222 Jeremy Sharp, “Where is the stability tipping point?”, economic reforms by the government. Gregory Johnsen, Arab Reform Bulletin, July 2008. “Yemen: Empty Economic Reforms Slow Bid to Join the 223 For instance, in March 2009, Abd-al-Karim al-Arhabi, GCC”, Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 1 (2007). Yemen’s vice-prime minister and planning minister, asserted 221 Amounts officially deemed necessary for Saada’s recon- that if Yemen was to escape a Somalia-like fate, it needed struction and development ($700 million for 2009-2012, greater international involvement: “Look at the Somalis – a according to the Yemeni government) are not particularly few million people, and they are creating problems for the significant and, in a civil society activist’s words, “repre- world. Yemenis are 24 million, and they are tough warriors. sent mere pocket change for the Gulf states”. Crisis Group And they have nothing to lose, like the Somalis”. Agence interview, Sanaa, 8 January 2009. France-Presse, 13 March 2009. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 29

APPENDIX A

MAP OF YEMEN

Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 30

APPENDIX B

MAP OF YEMEN WITH GOVERNORATES AND CITIES

Produced by Crisis Group Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 31

APPENDIX C

SAADA GOVERNORATE DISTRICTS MAP

Produced by Crisis Group Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 32

APPENDIX D

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde- Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda and pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma/ some 130 staff members on five continents, working Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Teams of political analysts are located within or close by Russia (North Caucasus), Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine; in countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf violent conflict. Based on information and assessments States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi from the field, it produces analytical reports containing Arabia, Syria and Yemen; and in Latin America and the practical recommendations targeted at key international Caribbean, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, and Venezuela. a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governmental departments and agencies currently Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed provide funding: Australian Agency for International De- widely by email and made available simultaneously on the velopment, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry with governments and those who influence them, including of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate Agency, Canadian International Development and Re- support for its policy prescriptions. search Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Dan- The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent ish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of For- figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business eign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign the reports and recommendations to the attention of Office, Irish Aid, Japan International Cooperation Agency, senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg Ministry of co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Development, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Affairs, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Department for International Develop- Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, ment, United Kingdom Economic and Social Research with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it Council, U.S. Agency for International Development. is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one in London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing. Foundation and private sector donors, providing annual The organisation currently operates nine regional offices support and/or contributing to Crisis Group’s Securing (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, the Future Fund, include the Better World Fund, Carnegie Nairobi, Pristina and Tbilisi) and has local field represen- Corporation of New York, William & Flora Hewlett Foun- tation in eighteen additional locations (Abuja, Baku, Bang- dation, Humanity United, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Jewish kok, Beirut, Cairo, Colombo, Damascus, Dili, Jerusalem, World Watch, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Ouagadougou, Port-au-Prince, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Open Pretoria, Sarajevo, Seoul and Tehran). Crisis Group cur- Society Institute, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Radcliffe rently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefeller Brothers across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Fund and VIVA Trust. Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, May 2009 Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 33

APPENDIX E

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2006

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT Gaza’s Unfinished Business, Middle East Report N°85, 23 April 2009 (also available in Hebrew) Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration, Middle East Report N°49, 18 January 2006 (also available in Arabic NORTH AFRICA and Hebrew) Political Transition in Mauritania: Assessment and Horizons, Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Middle East/North Africa Report N°53, 24 April 2006 (only Brink, Middle East Report N°54, 13 June 2006 (also available available in French) in Arabic) Egypt’s Sinai Question, Middle East/North Africa Report N°61, Israel/Palestine/Lebanon: Climbing Out of the Abyss, Middle 30 January 2007 (also available in Arabic) East Report N°57, 25 July 2006 (also available in Arabic) Western Sahara: The Cost of the Conflict, Middle East/North The Arab-Israeli Conflict: To Reach a Lasting Peace, Middle Africa Report N°65, 11 June 2007 (also available in Arabic East Report N°58, 5 October 2006 and French) Israel/Hizbollah/Lebanon: Avoiding Renewed Conflict, Middle Western Sahara: Out of the Impasse, Middle East/North Africa East Report N°59, 1 November 2006 (also available in Arabic Report N°66, 11 June 2007 (also available in Arabic and French) and French) Egypt’s Muslim Brothers: Confrontation or Integration?, Lebanon at a Tripwire, Middle East Briefing N°20, 21 December Middle East/North Africa Report N°76, 18 June 2008 (also 2006 (also available in Arabic and Farsi) available in Arabic) After Mecca: Engaging Hamas, Middle East Report N°62, 28 February 2007 (also available in Arabic) IRAQ/IRAN/GULF Restarting Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, Middle East Report N°63, 10 April 2007 (also available in Arabic) In their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, Middle East Report N°50, 15 February 2006 (also available in Arabic) After Gaza, Middle East Report N°68, 2 August 2007 (also available in Arabic) Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse?, Middle East Report N°51, 23 February 2006 (also available in Arabic) Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis, Middle East Report N°69, 10 October 2007 (also available in Arabic and French) The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict, Middle East Report N°52, 27 February 2006 (also available in Arabic) The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Annapolis and After, Middle East Briefing N°22, 20 November 2007 (also available in Arabic) Iraq’s Muqtada Al-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabiliser?, Middle East Report N°55, 11 July 2006 (also available in Arabic) Inside Gaza: The Challenge of Clans and Families, Middle East Report N°71, 20 December 2007 Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle over Kirkuk, Middle East Report N°56, 18 July 2006 (also available in Arabic and Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas, Middle East Report Kurdish) N°73, 19 March 2008 (also available in Arabic) After Baker-Hamilton: What to Do in Iraq, Middle East Report Lebanon: Hizbollah’s Weapons Turn Inward, Middle East N°60, 18 December 2006 (also available in Arabic and Farsi) Briefing N°23, 15 May 2008 (also available in Arabic) Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous Presidency, Middle East The New Lebanese Equation: The Christians’ Central Role, Briefing N°21, 6 February 2007 (also available in Arabic and Farsi) Middle East Report N°78, 15 July 2008 (also available in French) Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis, Middle East Ruling Palestine II: The West Bank Model?, Middle East Report N°64, 19 April 2007 (also available in Arabic) Report N°79, 17 July 2008 (also available in Arabic) Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra, Middle East Round Two in Gaza, Middle East Briefing N°24, 11 Septem- Report N°67, 25 June 2007 (also available in Arabic) ber 2008 (also available in Arabic) Shiite Politics in Iraq: The Role of the Supreme Council, Middle Palestine Divided, Middle East Briefing N°25, 17 December East Report N°70, 15 November 2007 (also available in Arabic) 2008 (also available in Arabic) Iraq’s Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge, Middle East Ending the War in Gaza, Middle East Briefing N°26, 05 Report N°72, 7 February 2008 (also available in Arabic) January 2009 (also available in Arabic and Hebrew) Iraq after the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape, Middle Engaging Syria? Lessons from the French Experience, Mid- East Report N°74, 30 April 2008 (also available in Arabic) dle East Briefing N°27, 15 January 2009 (also available in Arabic and French) Iraq after the Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy, Middle East Report N°75, 30 April 2008 (also available in Engaging Syria? U.S. Constraints and Opportunities, Middle Arabic) East Report N°83, 11 February 2009 (also available in Arabic) Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Nurturing Instability: Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Lebanon, Middle East Report N°77, 10 July 2008 (also avail- Camps, Middle East Report N°84, 19 February 2009 (also able in Arabic) available in Arabic and Hebrew) Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 34

Oil for Soil: Toward a Grand Bargain on Iraq and the OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS Kurds, Middle East Report N°80, 28 October 2008 (also available in Arabic and Kurdish) For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on: Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation?, Middle  Africa East Report N°81, 13 November 2008 (also available in Ara-  Asia bic, Kurdish and Turkish)  Europe Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes, Middle East Report  Latin America and Caribbean N°82, 27 January 2009 (also available in Arabic)  Middle East and North Africa  Thematic Issues  CrisisWatch please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 35

APPENDIX F

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Co-Chairs HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal Swanee Hunt Lord (Christopher) Patten Former Ambassador of the Kingdom of Former U.S. Ambassador to Austria; Chair, Former European Commissioner for Exter- Saudi Arabia to the U.S. The Initiative for Inclusive Security and nal Relations, Governor of Hong Kong and Kofi Annan President, Hunt Alternatives Fund UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of Oxford Former Secretary-General of the United Anwar Ibrahim University Nations; Nobel Peace Prize (2001) Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia Thomas R Pickering Louise Arbour Mo Ibrahim Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, Former UN High Commissioner for Human Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and Nige- Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the Interna- Foundation; Founder, Celtel International ria; Vice Chairman of Hills & Company tional Criminal Tribunals for the former Asma Jahangir

Yugoslavia and for Rwanda UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of President & CEO Richard Armitage Religion or Belief; Chairperson, Human Gareth Evans Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Rights Commission of Pakistan Former Foreign Minister of Australia James V. Kimsey Lord (Paddy) Ashdown Founder and Chairman Emeritus of Executive Committee Former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Leader of the Liberal De- America Online, Inc. (AOL) Morton Abramowitz mocrats, UK Wim Kok Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Ambassador to Turkey Shlomo Ben-Ami Former Foreign Minister of Israel Aleksander Kwaśniewski Emma Bonino* Former President of Poland Former Italian Minister of International Lakhdar Brahimi Trade and European Affairs and European Former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary- Ricardo Lagos Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid General and Foreign Minister of Algeria Former President of Chile Cheryl Carolus Zbigniew Brzezinski Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Former South African High Commissioner Former U.S. National Security Advisor to Former International Secretary of International to the UK and Secretary General of the ANC the President PEN; Novelist and journalist, U.S. Maria Livanos Cattaui Kim Campbell Jessica Tuchman Mathews Member of the Board, Petroplus, Former Prime Minister of Canada President, Carnegie Endowment for Inter- Switzerland Naresh Chandra national Peace, U.S. Yoichi Funabashi Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and Moisés Naím Editor-in-Chief & Columnist, The Asahi Ambassador to the U.S. Former Venezuelan Minister of Trade and Shimbun, Japan Joaquim Alberto Chissano Industry; Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy Frank Giustra Former President of Mozambique Ayo Obe Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada Wesley Clark Chair, Board of Trustees, Goree Institute, Senegal Stephen Solarz Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Christine Ockrent Former U.S. Congressman Pat Cox CEO, French TV and Radio World Services George Soros Former President of the European Parliament Victor Pinchuk Chairman, Open Society Institute Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Founder of EastOne and Victor Pinchuk Pär Stenbäck Former Foreign Minister of Denmark Foundation Former Foreign Minister of Finland Mark Eyskens Fidel V. Ramos *Vice Chair Former Prime Minister of Belgium Former President of Philippines Güler Sabancı Other Board Members Joschka Fischer Former Foreign Minister of Germany Chairperson, Sabancı Holding, Turkey Adnan Abu-Odeh Yegor Gaidar Ghassan Salamé Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah Former Prime Minister of Russia Former Lebanese Minister of Culture; II and to King Hussein, and Jordan Perma- Professor, Sciences Po, Paris nent Representative to the UN Carla Hills Thorvald Stoltenberg Kenneth Adelman Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and U.S. Former Foreign Minister of Norway Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of Trade Representative the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Lena Hjelm-Wallén Ernesto Zedillo Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Affairs Minister of Sweden Center for the Study of Globalization Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page 36

PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL Crisis Group’s President’s Council is a distinguished group of major individual and corporate donors providing essential support, time and expertise to Crisis Group in delivering its core mission. BHP Billiton Frederick Iseman Ian Telfer Canaccord Adams Limited George Landegger Guy Ullens de Schooten Alan Griffiths Ford Nicholson Neil Woodyer Iara Lee & George Gund III Royal Bank of Scotland Don Xia Foundation StatoilHydro ASA Frank Holmes

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises significant individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis. Rita E. Hauser David Brown Amed Khan Anna Luisa Ponti & Geoffrey Hoguet (Co-Chair) John Chapman Chester Zelmira Koch Elliott Kulick Michael Riordan Chevron Scott Lawlor (Co-Chair) Tilleke & Gibbins Richard Cooper Jean Manas Hamza al Kholi Vale Neil & Sandy DeFeo Marco Marazzi Anglo American PLC VIVATrust APCO Worldwide Inc. John Ehara McKinsey & Company Yapı Merkezi Seth Ginns Najib Mikati Construction and Equinox Partners Industry Inc. Eleanor Holtzman Harriet Mouchly-Weiss Ed Bachrach Shinji Yazaki Patrick Benzie Joseph Hotung Yves Oltramare Stanley Bergman & Khaled Juffali Donald Pels and Wendy Keys Edward Bergman H.J. Keilman Harry Bookey & George Kellner Pamela Bass-Bookey

SENIOR ADVISERS Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time (to the extent consistent with any other office they may be holding at the time). Martti Ahtisaari Mong Joon Chung Barbara McDougall Douglas Schoen (Chairman Emeritus) Gianfranco Dell’Alba Matthew McHugh Christian Schwarz- George Mitchell Jacques Delors Nobuo Matsunaga Schilling (Chairman Emeritus) Alain Destexhe Miklós Németh Michael Sohlman Hushang Ansary Mou-Shih Ding Timothy Ong William O. Taylor Ersin Arıoğlu Gernot Erler Olara Otunnu Leo Tindemans Óscar Arias Marika Fahlén Shimon Peres Ed van Thijn Diego Arria Stanley Fischer Surin Pitsuwan Simone Veil Zainab Bangura Malcolm Fraser Cyril Ramaphosa Shirley Williams Christoph Bertram I.K. Gujral George Robertson Grigory Yavlinski Alan Blinken Max Jakobson Michel Rocard Uta Zapf Jorge Castañeda Todung Mulya Lubis Volker Rühe Eugene Chien Allan J. MacEachen Mohamed Sahnoun Victor Chu Graça Machel Salim A. Salim