YEMEN: DEFUSING THE SAADA TIME BOMB Middle East Report N°86 – 27 May 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 2 II. ROOTS OF WAR.............................................................................................................. 5 A. WHO ARE THE HUTHIS?...............................................................................................................5 B. A BROKEN EQUILIBRIUM .............................................................................................................6 C. A CRISIS WITHIN ZAYDISM..........................................................................................................7 III. COMPETING NARRATIVES....................................................................................... 10 A. THE STATE’S NARRATIVE ..........................................................................................................10 B. THE HUTHI AND ZAYDI REVIVALIST NARRATIVE.......................................................................12 IV. A METASTASISING CONFLICT................................................................................ 13 A. ACCUMULATING GRIEVANCES AND GROWING TRIBAL INVOLVEMENT......................................13 B. A WAR OF SUCCESSION? ...........................................................................................................15 C. RISE OF A WAR ECONOMY .........................................................................................................15 D. PERCEIVED FOREIGN MEDDLING ...............................................................................................17 E. WESTERN SILENCE ....................................................................................................................18 V. MEDIATION ATTEMPTS ............................................................................................ 19 A. TRIBAL AND POLITICAL MEDIATION COMMITTEES....................................................................19 B. QATAR’S MEDIATION ................................................................................................................21 C. RECONSTRUCTION COMMITTEES................................................................................................22 VI. BUILDING A LASTING PEACE ................................................................................. 25 A. BRIDGING THE SECTARIAN GAP.................................................................................................25 B. REINTEGRATING THE HUTHIS INTO POLITICS.............................................................................25 C. ENCOURAGING CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES ..............................................................................26 D. A NEW INTERNATIONAL ROLE...................................................................................................27 VII. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 28 APPENDICES A. MAP OF YEMEN ...............................................................................................................................29 B. YEMEN WITH GOVERNORATES AND CITIES ......................................................................................30 C. SAADA GOVERNORATE DISTRICTS MAP ..........................................................................................31 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................32 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.............................33 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................35 Middle East Report N°86 27 May 2009 YEMEN: DEFUSING THE SAADA TIME BOMB EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Away from media headlines, a war has been raging on than to the Twelver Shiism predominant in Iran and and off in Yemen’s northern governorate of Saada Iraq – and Shafei Sunnism. since 2004, flaring up in adjacent regions and, in 2008, reaching the outskirts of the capital, Sanaa. The con- The war expanded because it became a microcosm of flict, which has brought about extensive destruction, pits a series of latent religious, social, political and economic a rebel group, known generically as the Huthis, against tensions. It can be traced to the decline of the social government forces. Today’s truce is fragile and risks stratum led by Hashemites, who claim descent from being short-lived. A breakdown would threaten Yemen’s the Prophet Muhammad, and legitimised by Zaydism; stability, already under severe duress due to the global lack of investment in Zaydi strongholds like Saada; economic meltdown, depleting national resources, re- failed management of religious pluralism; permeabil- newed tensions between the country’s northern elites ity to external influences and the emergence of new and populations in the south and the threat from vio- political and religious actors, particularly Salafis. It lent groups with varied links to al-Qaeda. Nor would has variously and at times simultaneously taken the the impact necessarily be contained within national shape of a sectarian, political or tribal conflict, rooted borders. The country should use its traditional instru- in historical grievances and endemic underdevelop- ments – social and religious tolerance, cooptation of ment. It also has been shaped by the regional confron- adversaries – to forge a more inclusive compact that tation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. reduces sectarian stigmatisation and absorbs the Huthis. International actors – principally Gulf states and the The 1962 revolution ended the imamate that Zaydi West – should use their leverage and the promise of Hashemites ruled for over 1,000 years and overturned reconstruction assistance to press both government a social order with which they had been intimately and rebels to compromise. associated. During the civil war that followed, Saada was the main opposition stronghold. Since then, the After two decades of relative stability that confounded region has been largely ignored and marginalised. The foreign diplomats and analysts alike, the convergence religious dimension, long successfully managed, has of economic, political and secessionist challenges are resurfaced. Although differing on a number of theo- testing the regime’s coping capacity. The Saada con- logical and political issues, Zaydism and Shafeism are flict might not be the most covered internationally, relatively close within the doctrinal spectrum. Over the but it carries grave risks for Yemen’s political, sectar- last several decades, the gulf further narrowed, thanks ian and social equilibrium. partly to state educational efforts, and Yemen enjoyed cross-sectarian harmony. But a core of Zaydi revival- The war began as a quasi-police operation to arrest a ists remained, including the Huthis, who fought to former parliament member, Husein al-Huthi. Over five retain Zaydism’s theology and symbolic rituals. Their rounds, it has grown several-fold and become increas- cause was energised by the spread of Salafi influence, ingly complex and multilayered. As mutual grievances mainly from Saudi Arabia, and their sense that Zaydism accumulated and casualties mounted, the conflict was besieged. Some former rulers and Zaydi revival- metastasised, bringing in ever-growing numbers of ists view the republic as fundamentally anti-Hashemite actors, including local tribes and other members of and anti-Zaydi. the Saada population, covering a widening area and involving foreign actors under the backdrop of a regional There is a foreign dimension too, though it is hard to cold war. It has violated two fundamental pillars of evaluate. As the government accuses the rebels of Yemen’s stability: a political formula premised on alignment with Iran and of loyalty to the Lebanese Hiz- power-sharing and the gradual convergence of the bollah, Huthi leaders denounce its alignment with the two principal sectarian identities, Zaydism – a form of U.S. They also claim Saudi interference, in particular Shiism that in rites and practices is closer to Sunnism funding of government and local tribes. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb Crisis Group Middle East Report N°86, 27 May 2009 Page ii If history has left scars, the war aggravated them. The and, most importantly, pledge reconstruction assistance destruction of entire villages and infrastructure by army as an incentive for peace. In duration and intensity, shelling, air bombardment and indiscriminate military destruction, casualties, sectarian stigmatisation and and police violence exacerbated grievances among regional dimension, the Saada conflict stands apart from not only Hashemites generally and Zaydi revivalists other violent episodes in Yemen. It will need more in particular but, more broadly, civilians in all north- than run-of-the-mill domestic and international efforts ern governorates. The rebels fuel anger by brutal acts, to end it. looting and kidnapping. Growing involvement of tribal militias beside government or rebel forces further in- RECOMMENDATIONS flames the conflict and contributes to its endurance. Competing tribes and their leaders vie for positions and resources; as some groups are marginalised, others To the Government