UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

UNIVERSITY OF

DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY

COMMANDER IN THE SHADOW

AIR VICE MARSHAL W.D. BOSTOCK 1942 - 1945

DAVID JOSEPH WILSON

STUDENT NUMBER 9196522

A SUB-THESIS PREPARED US PARTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES

FEBRUARY 1997 1 hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contams no material published or written by another person nor

material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other

degree or diploma of a university or other institution of higher learning, except where

due acknowledgment is made in the text of the thesis.

David Wilson

/Z Februarv 1997 ABSTRACT

The operational units of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in the South West

Pacific Area from 1942 until 1945 were under the control of the Commander-in-Chief,

South West Pacific Area, Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur delegated control of the Allied Air Forces to his Air Commander firstly General George H. Brett, then Lieutenant General George C. Kenney. Kenney, in turn established a RAAF organisation within Headquarters Allied Air Force to control all Australian operational activity. This organisation became Headquarters RAAF Command, under the control of

Air Vice Marshal W.D. Bostock.

The Australian Government had agreed to all the operational elements of the

Australian Service to be assigned to the Commander-in-Chief However, administrative control was, in the case of the RAAF, still vested m the Chief of the Air Staff and the

Air Board. This division of responsibility was to be the cause of animosit>' between the

Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal George Jones and the Commanding

RAAF Command, Air Vice Marshal W. D. Bostock, and had the potential to seriously inhibit RAAF operations in the theatre.

This thesis will argue that the attitude of the Chief of the Air Staff, and therefore of his Headquarters, was responsible for many of the administrative problems which the operational units had to face. The Chief of the Air Staff did not recognise the right of the Commander, Allied Air Force, to establish RAAF Command and initiated administrative procedures and organisations which filtered mfonnation to and from

RAAF Command. The Chief of the Air Staff also interpreted the pressure being placed on him by the Air Officer Commanding RAAF Command as a direct threat to his, and the 's authority. The high level consideration of this matter is discussed and it will be evident that the Australian Government was inept in handling the situation and overly sensitive to the opinions of the Commander-in Chief.

Air Vice-Marshal Bostock had operational control of all units based in Australia and, in 1944 and later, those in Papua , Bougainville and Borneo. His responsibilities covered anti-submarine patrols, convoy escort duties, air defence of vital Australian areas, aggressive operations from the Darwin area, and the planning and controlling of Australian offensive operations against Borneo. To undertake these duties, he was given control of Australian, New Zealand, Dutch and, from time to time,

American air resources. The responsibilities covered, taking the example of Royal Air

Force wartime organisation, elements of Coastal, and Fighter Commands, as well as that of a Tactical Air Force (each of which were commanded by an officer of equivalent rank, but only responsible only for his specific command) in an area larger than the whole European theatre.

To be the successful commander he was, Bostock gained the respect of his

American and New Zealand peers. He had to react within the somewhat restricted policy of the Australian Government, as well as fight a continual battle for resources with Air Force Headquarters to enable him to undertake his operational commitments.

Truly, Bostock worked in the shadow of the Commander, Allied Air Forces, the ineptitude of his political masters and the potentially destructive animosity and operational ignorance of the Chief of the Air Staff CONTENTS

Chapter Page

1. The Road to ComiTiand 1

2. The Battle for Authority 7

3. Conflict Between RAAF Command and RAAF 27 Headquarters

4. RAAF Command Operations 38

5. Bostock as a Commander 1942 - 1945 46

Appendix Air Vice Marshal Bostock to the 57 Air Board. 12 December 1942

Appendix 2. Air Vice Marshal Jones to Mmister 60 for Air. 16 December 1942

Appendix 3. RAAF Command Operational 64 Instruction No. 164/44. 16 December 1944

Appendix 4. Air Staff Policy Directive. 27 67 December 1944

Bibliography 69 Commander in the Shadow 1

Chapter 1

The Road to Command

William Dowling Bostock was bom at on 5 February 1892. Prior to joining the

2nd Signal Troop, Australian Imperial Force on 23 November 1914, he completed a two

and a half year apprenticeship as a radio telegraphist with the Marconi Company. After

service at Anzac Cove, from where he was evacuated due to sickness on 28 August

1915, Bostock was promoted to the rank of Sergeant on 1 April 1916. On 13 January

1917 he was accepted as a student pilot at No.3 School of Military Aeronautics, Royal

Flying , Aboukir. After discharge from the Australian Imperial Force on 14 April

1917 he was appointed a (on probation) in the

(Special Reserve).' Bostock served between 1 February 1917 and 31 August 1919, on

active service m France from 20 February 1918^ with 48 Squadron flying Bristol

Fighters. The squadron was involved in heavy fighting at the Somme where, foregoing

long range reconnaissance patrols, it flew in support of the hard pressed troops. ' On 15

April 1918, Bostock was awarded the Belgium Croix-de-Guerre.^

Bostock joined the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) as a on 14

September 1921. After completing training at Flying Training School (FTS), Point

Cook, Victoria, he was posted to 3 Squadron on 1 January 1922, before returning to

FTS on 1 July. While serving at FTS Bostock was twice promoted: to

on 31 March 1923 and exactly four years later. He assumed command

of the unit on 22 April 1924 and attended the 1926 - 1927 Staff College

' Soldier Career Management Agency, Service Documents, 540 Sergeant William Dowling Bostock ^ Career Brief, Personal file. Air Vice Marshal W D. Bostock [RAAF Historical] (Hereafter Personal File) An Illmtrated Encyclopedia of Aircraft, Orbis Publishing Ltd, London ND. p.3 756 "" Career Brief, Personal File Commander in the Shadow 2

Course at Andover." One mcidenl which look place during his service in England indicates his individuality. When chastised in writing by the Commandant in regard to doing his own gardening and sending his daughter to the "wTong ^ school, Bostock allegedly replied 'noted and ignored.'^' The directing staff assessed Bostock as having 'a reser\'ed demeanour covering a thoughtful and practical mind...Although lacking in personality and presence, he has marked individuality, a clear head, and plent>' of ideas and originality.' Staff college gave him the opportunit>' to develop the full range of comm.unications skills. A.lthough assessed as father !ack[ing] in [a] sense of hum.our and [as] not [being] ver}' sociable , he worked hard and conscientiously to gam an overall assessment as a reliable and capable officer.' More importantly, Bostock was exposed to noted theorists and practitioners in his profession. There is no reason to doubt that the 1926 - 1927 Course was not addressed by m.en of similar stature - Air

Marshal Sir John Salmond, Air Vice Marshal H.R.M. Brooke-Popham. and j .F.C. Fuller, for example - as was the subsequent year's course. ^

Bostock assumed the appointment as Director of Training at Air Force

Headquarters on 2 December 1929. He sen/ed until 24 Novemiber 1931 when he took over command of 3 Squadron at Richmond, New South Wales, from Squadron Leader

A.H. Cobby. Bostock was promoted to the rank of on 1 July 1934 and combined the functions of squadron commander and officer commanding RAAF

Base Richmond from 20 March 1933 until 19 April 1936.

Career Brief, Personal File C D. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother. Allen and IJnwin, Sydney 1991. p 90 Report on William DoM'ling Bostock, Staff College. Andover, Hants. England 1926-1927 in AWnVI PR 00580 Papers of Air Vice Marshal W.D. Bostock [Hereafter Bostock Papers] Stephens, A. Power Plus Attitude - Ideas, Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921 - 199T Australian Government Publishing Service, , 1992 p 42 Career Brief, Personal File RAAF Historical, Units of the Royal Australian Air Force - A Concise Histoiy. Volume 2 Fighter Units., Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra., 1995. p 6 Career Brief, Personal File Commander in the Shadow 3

Wing Commander Bostock served on the air staff of 1 Group Headquarters,

Royal Air Force, from July 1935 until July 1938. On his return to Air Force

Headquarters, he was appointed Director of Intelligence on 27 August 1938 and promoted to the rank of on I September. Still a Group Captain, Bostock was appointed Deputy Chief of the Air Station 1 September 1939 and attended the

London Defence Conference between 23 October and 20 December 1939 as the air adviser to the Australian overseas mission.'' He was promoted to Acting Air

Commodore rank on 1 June 1940 and to that of substantive Air Vice Marshal on 1

October 1941.''

During this period the hierarchy of the RAAF was in disarray. Air Vice Marshal

Richard Williams had been replaced as Chief of the Air Staff (CAS ) by Air Vice

Marshal S.J. Goble on 28 February 1939. Goble resigned in January 1940 and Air

Commodore W.H. Anderson substituted as CAS until the loan of a Royal Air Force

officer could be negotiated to fill the vacancy. The officer selected was

Sir Charles Burnett.

When Burnett was appointed CAS on 15 February 1940 he inherited a

geographical based organisation designed to enable the Empire Air Training Scheme

(EATS) recruits to be closely supervised and administered. Each Area Headquarters

was also responsible for the protection of vital facilities from air attack, the provision of

sea communications and for the reconnaissance of sea areas and enemy bases for signs

of aggressive activity. The air officer commanding these areas was expected to take

Gillison, D. Royal Austialmu Air Force 1939 - 1942^ , Canberra, 1962. p. 91 ^ ^ Career Brief, Personal File Gillison, op. cit., p 75-78; Coulthard-Clark, op. cit., p 463; Williams, Sir R. These Are Facts - The Autobiography of Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams, KBF, CB, DSO, The Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1977 p 253-257 Gillison, op. cit. . p 90 Commander in the Shadow 4 command of all RAAF units when attack was mimment. The mitial areas established were: Southern (which encompassed all units based in Victoria, Tasmania, South

Australia and the southern Riverina district of New South Wales) and Central with responsibilities for the remainder of New South Wales (except the northern districts).

Western Area was raised in on 1 January 1941 and Northern, covering

Queensland, Northern Territory and Papua on 8 May.'^' When North Western Area

Headquarters became responsible for operations from Darwin and over the north western approaches on 15 January 1942, Northern was renamed North Eastern. To meet the expanded requirement for trainees under EATS, 1 and 2 Training Groups were established to independently control this activity. With the training group headquarters established in and Sydney respectively, it was now possible to disband

Central Area.

This structure remained m place until the arrival of General Douglas Mac Arthur

in Australia on 17 March 1942 and the subsequent inauguration of South West Pacific

Area (SWPA) Command on 18 April. The three officers as his land, air and naval

force commanders were the Australian General Blamey, Lieutenant General George H.

Brett and Vice-Admiral Leary, respectively. The Allied Air Forces South West Pacific

Area (AAFSWPA) was established under to command of Brett on 20 April after he

and Burnett had evolved a plan for an organisation of an integrated air force which

called for a commander of the RAAF to be appointed and the Air Board abolished. This

was a scenario opposed by the Minister for Air, Arthur Drakeford, who did not wish

that the administration of the RAAF should be transferred to an American commander.

16 ibid. p. 92 17 ibid. p311 18 ibid. p 112 19 ibid. p473 20 ibid. p473 Commander in the Shadow S Nor did he favour the recommendation of Burnett that Bostock should be his successor Bostock had become Burnett's 'right hand man,' attending Advisory War Council meetmgs and the 22 October 1940 Defence Conference m Smgapore as the Air Force delegate. On 28 April 1942 the War Cabinet approved the assignment of Australian Forces to MacArthur under, for the Air Force, the following conditions: With all the service squadron there is also assigned RAAF Area Headquarters, Air Combined Headquarters, all Fighter Sector Headquarters, and such Station Headquarters as have been established for the control of RAAF service squadrons. Operational control of the RAAF service squadrons and necessar\' Operational Headquarters as indicated above, is vested in the Commander of the Allied Air Forces. The Australian CAS will be responsible for all matters associated with RAAF personnel, provision and maintenance of aircraft, supply and equipment, works and buildings and training. These functions are not assigned to the Commander-m-Chief. Burnett interpreted the War Cabinet decision as that operational units etc .'and the administration, maintenance and supply organisation to keep the operational units to the maximum efficiency' should also come under Brett's control. Burnett's interpretation was at variance to the wording of the cabinet decision, which prevailed. Bostock was appointed Chief of Staff to Brett on 2 May 1942 and George Jones promoted and appointed as CAS on the 5th. Brett was replaced by Lieutenant General George C. Kenney as Commander AAFSWPA on 4 August 1942. After discussion with his operational commanders and MacArthur, Kenney decided 'to separate the Americans and the Australians' thus

ibid . p93 ibid., p 143 ibid., p 476 ibid. , p 477 ibid., p 477 Gillison, op. cit. p 569; George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, Office of Air Force History Air Force, Washington DC 1987. p 51 27 Kenney, op. cit. p 53 Commander in the Shadow 6 forming USAAC units into a single US Air Force. The Australian operational element of the AAFSWPA was reorganised as RAAF Command and evoked a reaction within

Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ) at Melbourne which was to restrain and frustrate

Bostock m the undertaking of his duties. Commander in the Shadow 7

Chapter 2

The Battle for Authority

On 18 April 1942, all combat units of the Australian defence force were assigned to the

Commander-in-Chief SWPA to be, in the words of the Australian Prime Minister (and

Defence Minister), John Curtin, 'welded into a homogenous force and give the unified

direction which is vital for the achievement of victory.Thus when Kenney, as

MacArthur's air commander decided to reorganise the Allied Air Forces he had the de facto permission of the Australian government to include those RAAF units assigned to

his force. On 4 September 1942 MacArthur vvTote to Curtm outlining the proposal

that It is considered advantageous to exercise control of other squadrons, through

appropriate Area staff, as a single element'.This controlling element was to be

designated '^Coastal Defence Command, Allied Air Forces" and operational control

would be vested m Air Vice Marshal Bostock. Bostock would not be named to

command RAAF units but merely to 'exercise operational control...' of USAAC and

RAAF units which may be assigned to perfomi "a special function.' Significantly,

MacArthur stated that ^he [Bostock] will remain at Headquarters Allied Air Forces,

utilising the operations, intelligence and communications facilities now existing, thus

avoiding duplication.'

Next day Kenney released Headquarters AAFSWPA General Order No. 47. As

this order was to be the basis for much of the ensuing argument on the status of

Bostock, it IS reproduced in full:

DM Horner, High Command - AnsUaha and A Wed Straleg)- 1939 - 1945, Australian War Memorial Canberra, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1982. p 189 MacArthur to Curtin, 4 September 1942. AA MP 1217, Higher Directions of RAAF Following Upon Organisation of United States Fifth Air Force and Estahhshment of RAAF Command September 1942. File No. 1 Box 238; Robertson J & McCarthy J, Austrahan War Stretegy 1939 - 1945 A Documentary History, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1985. p339 ibid., 31 ibid. Commander in the Shadow j

1 The Coastal Command, Allied Air Forces, is hereby constituted. 2. Air Vice-Marshal W.D. Bostock CB QBE, is hereby designated Air Officer Commanding with temporary Headquarters at , Queensland. 3. The Coastal Command, Allied Air Forces, is comprised of all RAAF operational units including operational headquarters, and as such other units of the Allied Air Forces as may be assigned or attached. 4. The Air Officer Commanding, Coastal Command, Allied Air Forces, will exercise operational control over all units assigned or attached. 5. The organisation of Coastal Command, Allied Air Force, within the Allied Air Forces, does not alter the functions and responsibilities of RAAF Headquarters, Melbourne, Victoria (Sgd) George C. Kenney General Commander.

Kenney and Jones had discussed this innovation on 23 August 1942 and the latter had

agreed to the new arrangement but was 'not too keen' on the choice of Bostock to fill

the position.

The CAS's reaction to General Order No 47 was rapid. On 8 September, Jones wrote to Kenney to advise him that he had decided to establish 'certain sections of [Air

Force] Headquarters administrative staff at Brisbane. The unit was commanded by

Group Captain Gerald Packer, who would act as Jones's representative when Jones was not present in Brisbane. Packer was to be given the same access to operational information and operational orders or instructions to RAAF units which required administrative action as that flowing to the CAS under the existing arrangements between the two headquarters. Packer personally delivered this letter to Kenney, who responded on 10 September to advise that T would be pleased if you would deal

32 AWM 3 DRL Air Marshal Sir George Jones Papers [Hereafter Jones Papers]; Robertson & McCarthy, op. cit. p 340 Entry 23 August 1942, George C. Kenney Papers Volume 1 December 8 1941 - August 31 1942. History Office, Boiling AFB [hereafter Kenney Papers] ibid.. Jones to Kenney, 8 September 1942. AA1969/100 RAAF Command Item 320.5C2 RAAF Command Organisation Policy and Responsibility Commander in the Shadow 9 directly with the Air Officer Commanding Coastal Command in all matters relating to the RAAF units and organisation pertaining to the Allied Air Forces.'

Jones's motivation for the raising of RAAF Headquarters Forward Echelon is not defined but it is assumed that it would be for liaison purposes only. Kenney noted on 21 September 1942 that Jones ^questioned my right to create an RAAF organisation

[on 23 August]...and his headquarters has not recognised the new Australian set up.' ^^

Kenney rationalised the decision in that it was the re-organisation of Headquarters

AAFSWPA, not the establishment of a new RAAF formation. By inserting another layer of administration between Bostock and himself, Jones blatantly showed his contempt of the organisation established by Kenney. Bostock had been posted to ''Extra RAAF Staff

n

Allied Air Force Headquarters" on 8 July 1942, and Jones did not recognise Kenney's

view that those RAAF units assigned to the Allied Air Force were a separate Air Force

under his command. If Kenney had accepted that RAAF Headquarters Forward Echelon

could have direct access to the staff of Headquarters AAFSWPA there would be no

requirement for an Air Officer Commanding Coastal Command - Kenney could request

assistance from RAAF Headquarters to enable his operational plans to be fulfilled. For

an officer with Kenney's robust confidence and decisiveness such a situation would

have been anathema. With the Australian commander as a member of his staff, Kenney

could expect, if not demand, rapid response to his orders. Headquarters RAAF Forward

Element was an administrative organisation which, in the words of Air Commodore J.E.

Hewitt, 'ostensibly took the place of the administrative staff that Jones...had denied to

Kenney to Packer, 10 September 1942. ibid. " Entry 21 September 1942 Kenney Papers Career Brief, Personal File Gillison, op. cit. p 571 Commander in the Shadow IQ

Bostock's ...command. In my opmion such a staff formation in Brisbane should have been part of Bostock's headquarters and under his control.

The raising of Forward Echelon RAAF Headquarters on 9 September 1942 would not have made Bostock confident m his own, or his command's, status. RAAF

Organisation Memorandum No. 164 dated 18 September reinforced the separation between administration and operations. In paragraph five the document states that

Coastal Command Allied Air Force 'will not exercise any administrative function in respect of any RAAF Formation or Unit...[that] is exercised by RAAF

Headquarters...This control includes administrative control of Coastal Command,

Allied Air Forces.' The thrust of this memorandum eliminated any responsibility for staff selection, posting and employment of personnel from Bostock and exhibited a lack of appreciation of operational organisation. When the title of "Coastal Command" was varied to "RAAF Command" and promulgated in RAAF Organisational Memorandum

No. 175 on 2 October, the attempt to denigrate command and commander was again evident. The Memorandum states that Tor the time being, all communication from

[RAAF] Headquarters on administrative matters for RAAF Command are to be transmitted to Forward Echelon, RAAF Headquarters.' RAAF Command was denied direct access to RAAF Headquarters staff on matters which could be of vital operational importance. Forward Echelon was to liaise with RAAF Command, but had no executive function and decisions would have to be made within the appropriate directorates of

RAAF Headquarters.

J.E. Hewitt, Adversity in Success, Langate Publishing, South Yarra. 1980. p 40 Gillison, op. cit. p 588 ^^ RAAF Organisation Memorandum No 164 dated 18 September 1942, AA1969/100 RAAF Command item 320.5C2 ibid.. RAAF Organisation Memorandum No 175 dated 2 October 1942 ibid.. Commander in the Shadow I |

In the meantime the Chief of Staff Committee reported on MacArthur's letter of

4 September 1942. Their report of 26 September accepted that RAAF Command should be established along the lines of the Fifth Air Force and that there should be unified operational and administrative control. This control was to be vested in the CAS, under the direction of Allied Air Headquarters and would be normally exercised through the

AOC RAAF Command. Although the Committee recognised that Tf there were a difference of opinion between the operational Commander and the CAS in matters affecting the RAAF only, there would be no one to give an authoritative decision,' no recommendation was made to overcome the imbroglio. The proposal that operational control be vested m the CAS and that this action ^would at the same time preserve the principle of unified control of the RAAF' reflect a totally unrealistic attitude toward the prevailing situation.

Bostock was under no such illusion. In a letter to Jones dated 7 November, he sought clarification of his role and finnly established his personal view :

...The satisfactory discharge of the responsibilities laid upon me by the Commander, Allied Air Forces, is not possible without the complete support of the Air Board, since it is my view that a Commander cannot exercise efficient operational control and direction unless he is accorded a voice in the determination of policies and major matters concerning the organisation, administration, equipment, supply and technical maintenance of his command, [italics added] ...1 do submit that the organisation of the RAAF Command, the responsibilities of the Air Officer Commanding and the relationship of the RAAF Command to the Air Board and to the RAAF as a whole, should be promulgated at the earliest possible date. This is urgently necessary to ensure that subordinate commanders and staff officers throughout the Service may be properly informed and instructed. In the absence of a clear definition by the Air Board, I am severely handicapped because it is frequently made evident to me that the Service as a whole is confused and bewildered. Operational commanders and staff officers of RAAF Headquarters, as well as staff

Report by Chiefs of Staff 26 September 1942 AA MP 1217 Box 238; Robertson & McCarthy, op. cit. p 341 46 ibid.. Commander in the Shadow i 2

officers of my own Headquarters are uncertain of their responsibilities,

their obligation, and the scope of their authority. ^^

Bostock had waited for almost two months after the promulgation of General Order No.

47 before approaching RAAF Headquarters with this request. However, from the evidence of the Chief of Staff Committee report cited above, the CAS was in no position to advise on the status of RAAF Command or its Commander. Jones's antagonism to RAAF Command is manifest m his reply of 20 November 1942 that 'no administrative action has been taken by this Headquarters to form this Command as an

RAAF formation, because the decision was not concurred m by this Headquarters or the

Minister for Air...' and proposed that a new organisation, the Directorate of

Operations, Communications and Intelligence, be established at RAAF Headquarters to meet Kenney's requirements. Jones claimed that this organisation would overcome the administrative difficulties to which Bostock alluded to in his letter of 7 November.

An attempt was made to formalise this organisation with the drafting of Air

Force Confidential Order (AFCO) 391 Organisation of RAAF Operational Control on

5 December 1942. In paragraph four of this document it was presupposed that the

Commander Allied Air Forces would relinquish control of RAAF Command and the staff so released would form the new Directorate at Air Force Headquarters. This staff is to be responsible to the Commander, Allied Air Forces, for operational control only of RAAF units assigned to it by him.' Kenney was not impressed by this development and wrote a personal letter to Bostock advising him that Kenney's Chief of Staff,

Brigadier , had been requested to 'call Jones and tell him that I [Kenney]

Bostock to Jones, 7 November 1942 AAl 969/100 item 320.5C2 Jones to Bostock, 20 November 1942 ibid.. Air Force Confidential Order No. 391 Orgamsation of Royal Australian Air Force Operational Control 5 December 1942. AA MP 1217 Box 238; Robertson & McCarthy, op. cit. p 343 ibid.. ibid.: Gillison, op. cit.. p 591; Jones to Bostock 20 November 1942 AA1969/100 item 320 5C2 Commander in the Shadow 13 want no action taken with his proposal...until I...discuss it with him...It certainly sounds like a screwy idea although if he will appoint you to the job it might work...'

Bostock's response (quoted in full at Appendix 1) is a crucial document. He attacked the draft AFCO 391 in a letter to the Air Board dated 12 December 1942, pointing out that the extant RAAF Command organisation was constituted by Kenney to enable him as Commander Allied Air Forces to control RAAF units assigned to that formation. Bostock argued that a change m government policy or the termination of the war were the only contingencies by which Kenney would visualise a change of organisation.^^ General Order No. 47 was the Headquarters AAFSWPA authority for the

creation of RAAF Command and, as its commander, Bostock was personally responsible to Kenney, not Air Force Headquarters. To fulfil his responsibilities he

required a competent staff to advise him. The proposal put forward under AFCO 391

placed RAAF operations and administration within Air Force Headquarters, but

dissolved a Headquarters AAFSWPA organisation. Kenney would loose his direct

access to, and control of, his RAAF operational commander. Paragraph 5 of the draft

AFCO raised another issue: the legality or propriety of the requirement for The RAAF

Staff, Allied Air Forces...to offer advice to RAAF Headquarters on all matters affecting

operations, and...to give its views and relevant information on such matters as may be

requested by RAAF Headquarters from time to time.'^"^ This is curious when one

considers that Advanced Echelon RAAF Headquarters had been established to liaise

with Headquarters AAFSWPA on operational matters and Kenney had directed that the

former should contact Bostock, who was privy to this information and in a position to

Kenney to Bostock circa 29 November 1942 AA MP 1217, Box 238 Bostock to Air Board 12 December 1942 AA] 969/] 00 Item 320 5C2; AA MP ] 2 ] 7 Box 238; Robertson & McCarthy, op. cit. p 344 Air Force Confidential Order No, 391 AA MP 1217 Box 238 Commander in the Shadow 14 advice RAAF Headquarters. One can only agree with Bostock's judgement that the draft was at least 'badly drafted.' ^^

Jones took umbrage at Bostock's letter, minuting Minister for Air Drakeford on

16 December and ultimately called for Bostock to 'be relieved of his present appointment and posted to some other appointment where his well known ability can be used to advantage but in which he will not be able to further friction between the different sections of the Service and our Allies.This document bears close scrutiny and IS printed in full at Appendix 2. Jones manoeuvres Bostock into the position of

scapegoat for the current situation; an authoritarian trait in his 'propensity to blame

others for his own shortcomings.' ^^ This document is a watershed in the controversy

and highlights the basic difference between the two men. Jones had a pedantic

understanding of organisation and a myopic approach to operational realities and a

certain insecurity of his own position of authority. Bostock, on the other hand, was self

confident and clear m his position withm the Allied Air Force hierarchy and exhibited a

far wider vision on operational matters.

On 28 December 1942 Bostock left Brisbane for Canberra to participate in

discussion related to the RAAF Command issue with the Prime Minister, Minister for

Air and CAS, and returned on the 31 st. As a result of these discussions the Defence

Committee met in Melbourne on 7 January 1943 at the request of the Prime Minister to

'consider in consultation the view of Air Vice-Marshal Jones and Air Vice-Marshal

Bostock in respect of the nature and extent of the powers of RAAF Command. .On 3

January Bostock prepared a paper from his perspective, describing how the

-- Bostock to Air Board 12 December 1942 AA1969/100 item 320.5C2, AA MP 12178 Box 238 Jones to Drakeford 16 December 1942 Jones Papers; Robertson & McCarthy, op. cit.. p 345 ^^ N Dixon, On the Psychology ofMihtaiy Incompetence^ Jonathan Cape, London, 1988. p 272 ^^ RAAF Command Unit History Record entry 28 December 1942. RAAF Historical Microfilm No. 112 Defence Committee Agendum No. 2/1943 7 January 1943, A5954/1 Item 2/6 Commander in the Shadow 15

Commander, Allied Air Forces (General Kenney) would issue the Air Officer

Commanding RAAF Command operational directives, expecting that the latter would have the means of obtaining the logistic and administrative support to enable the directives to be fulfilled. Having no administrative control, Bostock could only request the required support from Air Force Headquarters. Therefore, normal administrative matters related to operations could only be made good if requests could be transmogrified into orders by Air Force Headquarters. Similarly, an essential two way dialogue to enable long term administrative and operational planning was imperative.

Bostock reiterated his argument of 7 November 1942 that 'no commander can exercise efficient operational control and direction of a fighting force unless he is in a position also to direct within the framework of the broad policies of superior authority, all matters concerning the organisation, administration, equipment, supply and technical maintenance relating to his Command.' He blatantly stated that 'it is therefore necessary that the Air Board should establish RAAF Command Headquarters as a

RAAF Unit and delegate the administrative authority necessary to the Commander to enable him to develop the maximum fighting efficiency of the Command.'

The Defence Committee (Admiral Sir Guy Royle, Chief of the Naval Staff;

Lieutenant General J. Northcott, Chief of the General Staff; Jones and A.J.L. Wilson,

Assistant Secretary - Department of Defence) identified some merit m Bostock's proposal. It agreed with the Chiefs of Staff Committee's expression on 26 September

1942 that the RAAF should be under unitary control. Being aware of a review of the

Army Command organisation which 'may have a bearing upon a parallel re- organisation of the RAAF,' and pending this review, the Defence Committee

Paper prepared by Bostock dated 3 January 1943 ibid.; AA 1969/100 Item 320 5C2. ibid.. ^^ Minute by Defence Committee of meeting held on 7 January 1943 ibid.. Commander in the Shadow 16 recommended that RAAF Command be established as a RAAF Unit and that the Air Oftlcer Commanding would retain his extant operational responsibilities. He would not assume responsibility for operational administrative requirements, but the CAS was to consider measures to ensure they were met, including the provision of suitable staff to advise the Air Officer Commanding RAAF Command. The latter was, m turn, to fully inform the CAS of his administrative requirements. Similarly, the CAS was to acquaint the Air Officer Commanding RAALF Command of proposed changes m organisation and administration which would affect the latter. Bostock had flown from Brisbane to Melbourne to attend this meeting, ^^ and agreed with the recommendations of the Defence Committee. He was concerned at the tardiness of Air Force Headquarters and wrote to Kenney on 10 March that, 'as far as [he] was aware' no action had been taken to action the Defence Committee recommendations. Therefore, 'under the existing circumstances which circumscribe the scope of my authority...! am unable to ensure the development of the maximum fighting efficiency of my Command' RAAF Headquarters Office Memorandum No. 46, Channel of Communication was issued on 15 March 1943 ordering that, with the exception of operational and intelligence signals, 'all direct communications between RAAF Headquarters and RAAF Command will cease.' All correspondence was to be addressed to Forward Echelon RAAF Headquarters, with a copy enclosed for forwarding to RAAF Command. Next day a signal was sent ^^ to all Air Officer's Commanding by the CAS, and through

^^ RAAF Command Unit History Record entry 7 January 1943 Defence Committee Agendum No 2/1943 7 January 1943 AA5954/1 Item 2/6; AA1969/100 Item 320.5C2 ^^ Bostock to Kenney 10 March 1943 AA1969/100 item 320 5C2 ^^ ibid.. ^^ RAAF Headquarters Office Memorandum No .446 Channel of Communication 15 March 1943 ^^ ibid.Signa. l FE/0116 AA1969/100 Item 320.5B2 Higher Organisation of the RAAF Commander in the Shadow 17

Forward Echelon RAAF Headquarters to RAAF Command. On 17 March the Senior

Admmistrative Officer of RAAF Command, Group Captain Gordon Grant, vented his spleen to his commander. He stated that one of his approved duties was 'the collection and collation of admmistrative, maintenance and supply information...and presentation of these matters as scrupulously reliable documents upon which operations may be planned.' - a function which had been clearly defined by Bostock and confirmed by Air

Force Headquarters. This new procedure initiated by the CAS prevented Grant from obtaining timely data from Area Headquarters and the propensity to undertake operational planning based on inaccurate and/or outdated infonnation could have, in

Grant's view, serious repercussions. Bostock agreed. In his subsequent signal to

Forward Echelon, Bostock stated that he considered that the order imposes unnecessary restrictions [on] my command, [and, bluntly] request cancellation.' ^^ A negative response was achieved, but not directly from Jones. On 23 March the Commanding

Officer Forward Echelon, Group Captain Packer signalled Bostock, by implication passing the decision of higher authority, as follows:

i am to advise that information on the various matters referred to in Forward Echelon Signal...is already available at Forward Echelon.

Further direct returns to you would be an unnecessary duplication.

Bostock wrote again to Kenney on 19 March 1943 reiterating the concern he had presented to Forward Echelon, adding that he wished to report 'that the appointment of

Air Officer Commanding RAAF Command is rapidly becoming impracticable and untenable.Kenney's Chief of Staff, Donald Wilson, immediately brought the matter to the attention of General Mac Arthur.

Grant to Bostock 17 March 1943 ibid. RAAF Command signal K624 17 March 1943 ibid, ^^ Packer to Bostock 23 March 1943 ibid. Bostock to Kenney 19 March 1943 A5954/1 Item 2/6; A1969/100 Item 320.5C2 Commander in the Shadow I {

Air Force Confidential Order A44, Organisation of Royal Australian Air Force -

Operational Control, promulgated on 27 March 1943, adhered to the recommendations of the Defence Committee meeting of 7 January. ^^ However, events previously described indicate that the CAS had his own perception regarding division of responsibilities. By April, Jones's attitude toward Bostock was verging on paranoia.

When he wrote to Frederick Shedden on 30 March he was of the opinion that the current dispute was a clash of personalities and wills. Moreover, he implied that

Bostock had another agenda. Jones claims that he had Bostock's 'word for it that if he

[Bostock] were given the position of Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, RAAF

Command would immediately disappear and RAAF Headquarters would be re-united, with the possible exception that a training command would be set up.'^"^ Bostock consistently requested that he be given the authority to fully administer RAAF

Command and RAAF operations, thus nurturing the operational capacity of his command. On 15 April 1943 Jones wrote to the Secretary of the Air Board, who had requested a brief statement on the non co-operation of Bostock, enumerating incidents which had occurred since the Defence Committee meeting of 7 January and closing his argument with a veiled threat - that 'the situation can only be remedied by disciplining officers who adopt a non co-operative and disloyal attitude to the Headquarters of their

Service.' ^^

A less controversial method of solving the problem was to move Bostock from his appointment, and the Air Board decided upon this approach. Air Commodore J.E.

Hewitt was to replace Bostock, who would become Air Officer Commanding North

Western Area - an appointment subservient to Hewitt. Kenney has recorded that on 6

^^ Air Force Confidential Order No A24 Organisation of Royal Australian Air Force dated 27 March 1943 AA1969/100 item 320.5B2 ^^ Jones to Shedden 30 March 1943 Jones Papers Jones to Secretary Air Board 15 April 1943 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 19 April 1943 he had a telegram from Jones advising him of this action. He telephoned Jones, adamant that Bostock 'would continue to head the RAAF Command under me with jurisdiction over all Australian combat air units [and if Jones] did not agree to this a wire would go to Canberra on the subject.' ^^ Kenney claimed that Jones 'shut up on the Bostock deal.' ^^ He signalled the Air Board on 7 April expressing his 'greatest

^ "78 surprise', pointed out that such a drastic step was not one to be taken unilaterally, and suggested that the order be recalled. Two days later, Drakeford directed that all action on the matter be held in abeyance until the concurrence of the Minister for Defence had been received. Next day, Drakeford advised Jones that all action on the postings was deferred. Curtin, aware that changes of command of this nature required consultation between the Australian and American Governments, did not support the proposal. Jones had not wholly discounted posting action. On 22 April he signalled to Drakeford that Kenney had raised the matter of a training appointment for Bostock and that 'this could be arranged. My impression is C-in-C will probably accept Kenney's view.' Kenney makes no reference to such an approach in his papers and his autobiography is silent on the proposal. Given that he had categorically opposed the transfer of Bostock from his command only two weeks earlier, Jones must have misinterpreted the conversation A frustrated Bostock approached Kenney on 29 September 1943, reiterating that he felt that the fighting efficiency of his command was 'below that w^hich you may reasonably expect' ^^ and followed this with a direct approach to Minister for Defence

76 Entry 6 April 1943 Kenney Papers ibid.. ^^ Kenney to Air Board, 7 April 1943. Jones Papers Drakeford to Jones 9 April 1943, Jones to Drakeford 10 April 1943 ibid. , Air War Against Japan 1939 - 1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 1968 p 16 ^^ Jones to Drakeford 22 April 1943 Jones Papers Bostock to Kenney 29 September 1943 A1196/2 Item 36/501/396; A1969/100 Item 320 5C2. Commander in the Shadow 20

John Curtin on 2 February 1944. Curtin responded on the same day that the matter should be discussed with Drakeford. In his signal to Drakeford of 3 February Bostock repeated the problem of lack of co-operation between Air Force Headquarters and

RAAF Command and sought an urgent meeting. Drakeford requested more detail.

Bostock responded on 5 February that the matters to be discussed were 'so voluminous

and intimate, 1 would hesitate to attempt to reduce them to writing.From Bostock's

perspective, the matter was so serious that he had written to MacArthur, through

General Kenney, asking the Commander-in-Chief to 'relieve me of my present

o 1

appointment...' MacArthur's response was ambivalent: ' 1 recommend that the Prime

Minister personally review the situation as a matter of urgency. I shall take no action on or

Bostock's application until I know his views.'

The meeting between the triumvirate of the RAAF took place in Melbourne on 8

February 1944 and ended in stalemate. Jones and Bostock agreed only that the basic

organisation of the RAAF was unsound. The argument on both sides was based on

Bostock's perception that he was denied the administrative support to enable him to

carry out his responsibilities to the Commander, Allied Air Force. Jones categorically

denied this allegation, and interpreted Bostock's motivation as an attempt to control the

Air Force. ^^ Drakeford drafted a five page report which was forwarded to Curtin on 16

February. After raising the propriety of Bostock having approached Curtin through

MacArthur, Drakeford was unable to accept the necessity of such an approach, and

informed Bostock that 'where differences anse insofar as the RAAF is concerned , he is

^^ Bostock to Drakeford 5 February 1944 AWM PR 00580 Papers of Air Vice Marshal W D Bostock [Hereafter Bostock Papers] ^^ ibid.. MacArthur to Shedden 5 February 1944 ibid.; AA MP 1217, Box 238; Robertson & McCarthy, op. cit. p 351. ^^ Notes on Conference between the Minister for Air, CAS and AOC RAAF Command, concerning RAAF organisation 5 2 44 Bostock Papers . Commander in the Shadow 21 at liberty to approach me direct...He recommended four courses of action. Firstly,

RAAF Command should be merged into the RAAF; secondly, Bostock would be appointed to command the new Northern Command, the units of which would, in effect form the RAAF Field Force'; thirdly, the CAS, with his Headquarters m Brisbane, would be the direct link between the RAAF and Allied Air Forces Headquarters and, lastly, that the Deputy CAS at RAAF Headquarters Melbourne would substitute for the

CAS at Advisory War Council, War Cabinet and other committees when that officer was absent on duty. ^^

Recognising that Bostock, the senior officer of the two Air Vice Marshals, would be placed m a subordinate status to Jones, Curtm did not accede to Drakeford's recommendation. His solution was to again seek a suitable officer for appointment as

Air Officer Commanding RAAF. War Cabinet approved the appointment of Air

Marshal Sir Keith Park RAF as CAS on 4 August but this did not meet the approbation of MacArthur. On 30 September 1944 his assessment of the problem of divided command and control of the RAAF was that 'nothing serious had, however, resulted, and he felt that any differences that had existed m the past were now quiet...[and]...considered it no longer necessary to bring a senior RAF Officer to

Australia.'

Urgent operational commitments demanded a resolution of command problems before the War Cabinet and Commander-m-Chief negotiations were finalised. On 7

March 1944, Bostock was ordered by Kenney to take command of the air defence of

Western Australia as a result of a US Navy submarine having sighted suspected

Japanese battleships north of Lombok which may have entered the Indian Ocean to

^^ Drakeford to Curtin 16 February 1944 A5954/1 Item 1604/10 ibid.. Paper Higher Organisation of RAAF dated 2 7 October 1944 KA\ 969/100/6 Item 319/10 Pt 1 Robertson & McCaarthy, op. cit. p 355 Commander in the Shadow 22

ultimately threaten Fremantle.'" The Allies were planning vital operations along the

north coast of New Guinea, culminating in the landing at Aitape on 22 April 1944 and

at Hollandia. With these operational developments firmly in mind, Bostock wrote to

Drakeford on 22 March 1944 seeking clarification of the areas of responsibility raised

at the 8 February meeting. An exasperated Drakeford replied on 30 March. He desired

that complete discussions between Bostock and Jones be arranged at the earliest

possible date, leaving no doubt of his intentions:

At that meeting, your requirements as AOC RAAF Command, for

operational purposes are to be clearly stated, to ensure that the RAAF

administrative authorities will be aware of the full details and, after

discussion, can take whatever steps are agreed as necessary to meet those

requirements as promptly as possible, in accordance with spirit and the

substance of the co-operation which, on behalf of the Government, I have

extended to Lieutenant-General Kenney, as Commanding General, Allied

Air Forces.

1 desire to be furnished with a report signed by the CAS and

yourself as early as possible after your discussion.

The meeting between Jones and Bostock occurred m Melbourne on 10 April

1944 and Jones forwarded a report of the meeting to the Minister on the following day.

By so doing Bostock claimed, in a letter to Drakeford on 15 April, that Jones had 'failed

to observe the tenns of a clearly stated verbal agreement' in that he would forward a

draft of what would be a joint report to him [Bostock] before forwarding it to the

Minister. Bostock referred to the report as submitted as 'misleading' and 'offering bad

Odgers, op. cit. p 136 ibid., p 209 Drakeford to Bostock 30 March 1944 Bostock Papers Bostock to Drakeford 15 April 1944 Jones Papers; Robertson & McCarthy op. cit.. p 352 Commander in the Shadow 23 advice^ and was 'very sensible of the embarrassing position in which you are placed by contradictory advice and I assure you that 1 deeply regret the necessity for it. However, while the unhelpful attitude of Air-Vice Marshal Jones persists toward RAAF

Command, I can see no hope of a solution'/^' to the problem of divided operational and administrative control of the Air Force. Jones's reaction was predictable. In his response to Drakeford on 26 April, he found Bostock's epistle as 'not only unnecessarily offensive but is highly defamatory of me in my personal capacity, as well as in the way of my office and professional ability and repute.' Jones, in requesting that

Drakeford express his confidence in him as the CAS and advise Bostock accordingly again shows traits of insecurity. His threat ^o initiate such Service of other action as may be necessary to refute the imputations which have been made against my personal integrity and my professional ability and reputation' may be interpreted as manipulative and ill conceived.

No further action was taken until the Defence Committee again discussed the future disposition and functions of RAAF Command on 2 March 1945. ^^ The Minister for Air proposed that RAAF Command should be moved to New Guinea and control, both administratively and operationally, RAAF units outside Australia and the operational units based at Darwin. RAAF Command would be directed by the

Commander Allied Air Forces, as would RAAF Headquarters with regard to operational activities based in the remainder of mainland Australia. After its reaffirmation of the need to uniteRAAF administrative and operational functions, the Committee assessed that a further review of RAAF organisation should take place after the cessation of

98 current operations and 'further requirements of the force.'

ibid. ^^ Jones to Drakeford 26 April 1944 ibid.; Robertson & McCarthy op. cit. p 352 Defence Committee Agenda No 76/1945 of 2 March 1945 Jones papers ^^ secretary. Defence Committee draft minute 5 March 1945 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 24

The areas of authority of the two officers still remained one of conjecture. On 12

January 1945, Bostock wrote to Jones on the activities of the Directorate of Operational

Requirements which had been established in RAAF Headquarters. He alleged that the

Directorate had 'progressively attempted to exercise improper control over the operational efficiency of RAAF Command.' ^^ Bostock considered that the Directorate was interfering with his prerogatives as the operational commander, and that it was not the authority to give ^sound and balanced opinions on operational matters' m preference to ^accepting my representations.'

Already peeved by the apparently unwarranted intervention of the Directorate of

Operational Requirements in matters he considered to be strictly operational, Bostock's reaction to the duplication of instructions related to Anny Cooperation Wings by RAAF

Headquarter and RAAF Command is understandable. On 16 December 1944 RAAF

Command issued Operational Instruction No 164/1944 Operational Employment and

Operational Control - Army Cooperation Wings. On the 27th, RAAF Headquarters promulgated Air Staff Policy Directive (ASPD) No 19 Army Co-operation Wing.

[ See appendix 3 and 4 respectively.] On 18 January 1945 Bostock sought the

'cancellation forthwith' of ASPD No 19 on the ground that his instruction was the

'authoritative document regarding the operational employment and operational control in Army cooperation wings for all concerned throughout the RAAF' and added impertinently 'that your Headquarters has no authority to issue air staff policy directives dealing with such matters.' Jones replied that ASPD No 19 had been issued by him 'in discharge of my responsibilities for RAAF organisation and policy and after consultation with [RAAF Command] staff and he 'took strong exception to the

^^ Bostock to Jones 12 January 1945 ibid RAAF Command Operational Instruction No 164 1944 Operaiional Employment and Operational Control - Army Cooperation Wings of 16 December 1944, Air Staff Policy Directive No. 19 dated 19 December 1944 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 25 insubordinate tone of your signal and your repeated attempts to usurp the authority of this Headquarters. Communications couched in terms such as the one under reply are to cease forthwith.'

Bostock was unrepentant. On the 20th he again signalled Jones as follows:

A886. For CAS from AOC. I also have responsibilities. You do not understand current Allied Air and RAAF Higher Organisation in accordance with which 1 am responsible to Commander Allied Air Forces and not you for the duties of my appointment. Please finally understand that I am not subordinate to you for the discharge of the duties incumbent upon my appointment. I do and will continue to take the strongest exception to your unwarranted and uninformed interference.'^'

On the same day he signalled all Area Commanders that the RAAF Command

operational instruction was the authoritative document. Jones, on 22 January 1945,

signalled the same addressees that ASPD No 19 'applies to all RAAF formations and I hold formation commanders responsible for its implementation.''^' From a perusal of

the text of these documents, one must agree that the content was relevant only to the operational deployment of Army Cooperation Wings. Both instructions are similar in content, but the lack of resolution of the issue of the paramount authority between the two must have caused anxiety among recipients.

On 25 April 1945 RAAF Command despatched signal A 286 advising that under the authority of Allied Air Forces General Order No. 2 Air Vice Marshal Bostock was designated "Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, RAAF Command, AAHQSWPA".

Advanced Headquarters in Manila sought urgent advice concerning the efficacy of this title on 21 May, and Jones responded with alacrity. Next day he advised RAAF

Command that such an action required the approval of the Commonwealth Government

Bostock to Jones 20 January 1945 ibid. RAAF Headquarters signal A443 of 22 January 1945 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 26 and that the designation was 'not approved'. Bostock, on 25 May, argued that as the title "Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief " was bestowed by the Commander, AHied Air Forces, to which RAAF Command was operationally responsible, and that the CAS had no authority to 'countermand the orders of the Commanding General, Allied Air Forces.""" In a personal communication with Kenney, Bostock noted that the CAS 'resents the new title' and continued to state that 'although the CAS may attempt to countermand your orders, 1 have not such temerity.' ^^^ Bostock sought the assistance of the Minister for Defence, but this course of action was countered by Drakeford, who claimed that Bostock had no right of appeal to that authority. On 5 June, Bostock was bluntly advised that it is your duty to comply with the orders of the Air Board which is your superior authority' and that he would immediately take action to advice all concerned that the title "Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief' was not authorised or to be used. Jones considered that the outcome of the affair had 'settled the question of authority.' Given the impasse between to two officers, it is reasonable to assume that had the command situation remained unchanged the conflict between the two men, given their perception and attitude toward RAAF operations, would have prevailed. Only the surrender of Japan on 15 August 1945 prevented further conflict.

103 Barry Commission Exhibits. Text of signals relating to change in designation of AOC RAAF Command to Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief [RAAF Historical] ibid. Bostock to Kenney 30 May 1945 Bostock Papers

107 Barry Commission Exhibits Sir George Jones, From to Air Marshal, Greenhouse Publications, Richmond. 1988. p96 Commander in the Shadow 27

Chapter 3

Conflict between RAAF Command and RAAF Headquarters

For Bostock to meet his responsibilities to his operational commander, Kenney, he required the co-operation of Air Force Headquarters. Bostock's perception that he did not receive the support requested bears analysis.

The first instance to be cited is indicative of Bostock's command style. On 12

December 1942, the Director General Medical Services, Air Vice Marshal Hurley wrote to Bostock to the effect that the Principal Medical Officer, Squadron Leader Reid, was to be part of RAAF Headquarters Forward Echelon staff and not of RAAF Command.

Hurley did not wish to be drawn into any argument on higher Air Force policy and the

bases of co-operation with American forces. His only concern was that know Reid

has been able...to give sound advice on the many important medical aspects which are

involved in any operation in S W Pacific and this should be available at the earliest

planning stage.He advised Bostock to continue to make full use of Reid's advice, as

would Forward Echelon. Bostock's view of his staff is enlightening:

...it is impossible for an AOC personally to think up all the ramifications and questions which should be raised in order that he may formulate inquiries to some other authority. The essential function of a staff officer IS the delve into questions relating to his own particular activities and to bring forward, to his AOC, irregularities and recommendations for improvement. A staff officer in another Headquarters cannot, of course, function m this manner, however willing he may be to make his services available on request.

Despite Hurley's promise that Reid would be available to Bostock on request, the denial

of direct access to an expert staff officer was a situation which Bostock did not favour.

Hurley to Bostock 12 December 1942 AA1969/100 item 320.5C2 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 28

The sinking of the Recma on 11 April 1943, which resulted in the relationship between convoy commanders and captains of escorting aircraft being clanfied, triggered conflicting opinions between RAAF Headquarters and Headquarters RAAF

Command. Under then current arrangements, aircraft captains were prevented from using their initiative to investigate suspicious sightings without the sanction of the

convoy or escorted vessel commander."^' The captain of the Qscoxtmg Anson followed

standard procedure in that, not having sighted a submarine, he did not break wireless

silence to inform the operations room at Southern Area of the incident. He did so when

he landed, one hour and thirty five minutes later. ^''

On 14 May 1943 a conference was held at Navy Office where it was decided

that a Division of Anti Submarine Warfare would be established to co-ordinate anti-

submarine operations and tactics. This was to comprise a officer

as Director, two other navy officers (one of whom would be an anti-submarine

specialist) and representatives of the Commander United States 7th Fleet and RAAF

Command. Vice Admiral A.S Carpender, MacArthur's naval commander, advised

Bostock on 1 June that the appointment of 'a representative of the RAAF Command to

the Anti-Submarine Warfare Division would be welcome.' Bostock agreed. Next day

he took action to formalise the posting of a suitably qualified Wing Commander to his

staff, only to be rebuffed. On 5 June RAAF Command was advised that Wing

Commander Courtney, a members of the CAS's staff at RAAF Headquarters, was to

represent the views of RAAF Command on anti-submarine warfare deliberations. This

situation was totally unacceptable. Brigadier Donald Wilson, Chief of Staff,

' Report to RAAF C 'ommand and Secretary Air Board of the sinking ofSS 'Recina' on 11 April 1943 AA1969/100 item 565.4E pt 1 Odgers, op. cit.. p 142 Vice Admiral A.S, Carpender to Bostock 1 June 1943 A1969/100 Item 565.4E.Pt 2 Air Protection for Shipping. Commander in the Shadow 29

Headquarters Allied Air Force, raised the matter again on 8 June with the reasonable argument that, as RAAF Command was 'charged with anti-submarine activity insofar as it pertains to air forces in this area' ' it was necessary the Commander RAAF

Command should detail a suitably qualified officer from his staff as his representative.

As Bostock did not have an officer of 'suitable rank and experience',^ Wilson

requested that a suitable officer be assigned to RAAF Command 'for this highly

important duty.'

Jones's reply of 15 June 1943 is interesting. He is categorical in his statement

that Wing Commander Courtney had been detailed for the required duty and 'is

available to represent RAAF Command.''The matter now escalated to a higher level.

Kenney responded to Jones on 21 June that 'it is, however, essential that this

officer... should be under the direct command of an organisation within the Allied Air

Forces...the necessity for the appointment of a member of your staff., is another matter,

but such an appointment cannot be considered as filling the need for a representative at

the Allied Air Forces.' Kenney continued to point out that the current arrangement had

already resulted 'in deplorable delay' ' ^^ in the transmission of important information to

Bostock. Jones was pressed for a decision on the matter on 9 July, and finally responded

smugly on the 14th that Courtney had already been made available to RAAF Command

and that formations so advised and that 'Wing Commander Courtney has been

118

instructed accordingly, and so far as I am aware, is already employed on this duty.'

Liaison had been effected between the two headquarters - Flight Lieutenant E. Cock of

RAAF Command was corresponding with Courtney - but it remains that, as late as 9

Brigadier General Donald Wilson to Jones, 8 June 1943 ibid. ibid. ibid. ''^ Jones to Wilson 15 June 1943 ibid '' ^ Kenney to Jones 21 June 1943 ibid. '' ^ Jones to Kenney 14 July 1943 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 30

September Wing Commander Courtney was still being referred to as the RAAF

Command representative at the Division of Anti-Submarine Warfare. Bostock was to complain to Kenney on 3 December 1943 that the lack of direct access to the Director

Anti-Submarine Warfare was one of the 'biggest handicaps under which we are

working.'

Another area of contention was the appointment of unit and formation

commanders. On 10 August 1942, Bostock as Chief of Staff to Headquarters

AAFSWPA, had gained the agreement of Jones to the principle that 'reference should

be made to this headquarters [HQ AAFSWPA] before postings are made affecting

commander of units under the operational control of this Headquarters and staff officer

of the Headquarters and Area Headquarters.Air Force Headquarters did, on the

whole, follow this procedure and RAAF Command did accede to the choice of officers

and appointments. However, there were occasions of friction between the RAAF

Command and RAAF Headquarters on the posting of commanders to units and

formations. On 24 February 1943 Bostock, when asked if he had any objection to the

posting of a Wing Commander Cumow as Senior Administrative Staff Officer to North

Eastern Area, immediately replied that he was 'strongly averse' ^^^ to the appointment.

Two days later Bostock was advised that his objection had been perfunctorily dismissed

and that the RAAF Headquarters was 'with regret, unable to alter [the] posting.'

Another appointment which may have operational repercussions was that of

Squadron Leader R.S. McDonald from 12 Squadron to be Commanding Officer of 452

ibid. Bostock to Jones 8 August 1942, Jones to Bostock 10 August 1942 AA1969/100 Item 200.32A Pt 3 Personnel -Changes in Command and Appointments - RAAF Bostock to Group Captain Gibson 24 February 1943 AA1969/100 Item 200.32 A Personnel - Changes in Commands and Appointments RAAF Signal PZ451 RAAF Headquarters to RAAF Command of 26 February 1943 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 31

Squadron. The latter was operating Spitfire aircraft in the defence of Darwin,and 12

Squadron flew Vengeance dive from their base at Batchelor, south of Darwin, on shipping escort and air-sea rescue search and rescue missions. ^^^ On 17 March 1943

RAAF Command suggested that Flight Lieutenant C. Wawn be considered for the appointment, as it was considered that an officer of 'greater and more recent experience...should be given command...particularly in [the] present situation.This recommendation was rejected on 20 March 1943; McDonald had been appointed to

command on the previous day. McDonald was personally successful as a commander,

shooting down two enemy bombers, one on 20 June and the other on the 30th. RAAF

Command had, based on the experience and merit of the two contenders, identified an

officer it considered would be suitable for an important operational appointment. Its

representations had been overruled. A study of the relevant files show that the

recommendations of the posting authority at Air Force Headquarters prevailed in the

majority of cases, and that any disputes were settled m favour of that Headquarters.

This was most apparent with the relief of Group Captain A.L. Walters from the

command of No. 72 Wing at Merauke by Group Captain W.L. Hely during May 1944.

The Director of Postings, Air Force Headquarters, had visited RAAF Command on 22

April. Bostock had informed him that Hely was 'unsuited' for the command of the

Wing on ground that he was 'unco-operative and therefore unlikely to work

harmoniously with the Allied Services at Merauke.' ^^^ Bostock appears to have

expressed a personal view as no confirmation 'could be obtained from records and

RAAF Historical, Units of the Royal Australian Air Force - a Concise History. Volume 2, Fighter Units, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1995. p 12] RAAF Historical Units of the Royal Austrahan Air force - a Concise History. Vohime 3. Bomber Units Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1995. p 35-6 RAAF Command to Forward Echelon 17 March 1943 AA1969/100 item 200.32A ' Units of the RAAF Vohime 2 p 121 AA1969/I00item200.32APt3 Commander in the Shadow 32 reports from other officers.' The posting decision stood. North Eastern Area was

advised of the change of command on 29 April 1944 ; RAAF Command was not

advised of this action. Bostock could reasonably expect that, as he had opposed the

appointment of Hely, he would have been advised officially of the outcome of his

representation and complained to Forward Echelon RAAF Headquarters on 2 May that

he had not been advised of the official promulgation of the posting . The Air Member

for Personnel, Air Vice Marshal W.A. Anderson, responded on behalf of the Air Board

on 27 May. The last sentence of his reply is the most important:

The decision as to whether an officer is suitable for an appointment or not must, of course, eventually rest with the Headquarters, where all records etc. are available.

This headquarters was RAAF Headquarters. The statement implies that the opinion of

RAAF Command would not rate highly in any consideration for promotion or

appointment of officers to operational or staff duties.

Bostock's response of 30 May 1944 does him no credit. He makes an accusation

based on 'a responsible officer at RAAF Headquarters' that cronyism was rife in the

Directorate of Postings. Such an attitude, if allowed to influence operational postings

could lead to inefficiency and the 'avoidable loss of life and equipment.' He advocated

that, as 'an operational commander really begins to rely on his unit commanders and

staff officers after about 12 months experience in their respective appointments', no

fixed term of appointment be made. Anderson responded on 15 August. Efficiency and

suitability, he agreed, should be the determining factors in the filling of appointments .

He would consider the extension of tours to longer than twelve months, but 'thought

that an experienced commander should be able to place full reliance [on members of his

Air Board to Bostock 27 May 1943 ibid, ibid, ibid. Bostock to RAAF Headquarters (Forward Echelon) 30 May 1944 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 33

Staff) earlier than twelve months.' Bostock would be informed of postings prior to the event 'unless exceptional circumstances should make this course impossible.' On 15

November, Bostock again forwarded his view that suitability be the exclusive criterion for posting to operational fomation, ' but this matter was not resolved.

Another factor was that of logistic support. After its formation on 26 February

1943, 83 Squadron operated the Australian built Boomerang fighter from Strathpme,

Queensland, tasked with the protection of the Brisbane area. ' By November ten aircraft were unserviceable due to the inability of the supply organisation to fill demands for spare parts. RAAF Headquarters had advised that no stocks were available or that none were 'available for distribution.''^^ In an attempt to ensure that the squadron would be fully serviceable by 8 December, the Senior Administrative Staff

Officer, RAAF Command, after consultation with Group Captain Murdoch, his contemporary in Eastern Area Headquarters, instructed a members of his staff.

Squadron Leader Church, and the Engineering Officer from 83 Squadron to fly to

Fisherman's Bend, Melbourne. En route the two officers landed at Mascot, Sydney and contacted the Eastern Area Equipment Officer, Squadron Leader Hurstwaite, who claimed that all the 83 Squadron spares were held a No. 8 Stores Depot, Macrossan, and had been delivered to the Squadron. On 1 December, the duo flew to Fisherman's Bend where they met the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC) liaison officer. Flight

Lieutenant Lipset. Although no stock were held, the General Production Manager of

CAC arranged for the required spare parts to be obtained off the production line. Parts obtained were loaded on the aircraft for return to Brisbane.

ibid, ibid. ' I Jniis of the RAAF Vol 2 p 83 ' Report on visit to RAAF Headquarters and CAC by SO Admin 4 and Engineer Officer 83 Squadron 29 November 1943, AAl 969/100 item 319.1 Q Pt 2 Reports on Visits to Units by Staff Officers - RAAF Command Commander in the Shadow 34

Church proceeded to No. 1 Stores Depot at Sandridge. After explaining his problem to the Commanding Officer, Group Captain J.F.S. Murray and the Senior

Stores Officer, Church was given free access to obtain equipment. While in the dispatch section It was noted that 83 Squadron spares previously demanded were awaiting dispatch. However, as a result of an instruction from RAAF Headquarters dated 25

November 1943 'some were consigned to Batchelor and not Strathpine.''^^ (Strathpme

is in close proximity to Brisbane, Queensland; Batchelor an airfield approximately 40

miles south of Darwin, Northern Territory.)

On 19 Apnl 1944 Bostock raised the matter of RAAF Command Directives,

which he considered would be ^authoritative and paramount.' As such they would

supersede relevant Air Board or other order made by RAAF Headquarters on the subject

matter. Interpreting this action as an attempt to erode the status of the Air Board and

himself, Jones responded on 4 May 1944 to the effect that 'exercising the operational

control over certain units does not extend the right to issue such units statements of Air

Force policy whether on operational matters or otherwise.' This was the prerogative

of the Air Board, and RAAF Command's proposal to issue policy directives on

operational matter was not approved.

Bostock approached Kenney for support on 11 May, basing his case on the

power delegated to him under General Order No. 47. Colonel R.E. Beebe, Kenney's

Chief of Staff at Headquarters AAFSWPA replied that he agreed with the Jones's

contention that the policy directives that Bostock contemplated were ones which 'are

more properly issued by RAAF Headquarters.' Beebe did advise Bostock that 'this

Headquarters will support the issuance of operational directives from your Headquarters

^^^ ibid. Bostock to Jones 19 April 1944 AA1969/100 item 300.4V1 RAAh Command - Policy Directives Jones to Forward Echelon 4 May 1944 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 35 which concern the application of RAAF and organisations to carry out operational instructions from this Headquarters. These may be issued in the form of operational instructions or as standing operating procedures...Bostock acquiesced and authorised the issue of Operational Directives (OPD) between June 1944 and July 1945.

The topics addressed were :

OPD No 1 - Introduction of RAAF Command Policy Directives; OPD No 2 - Organisation of RAAF Command; OPD No 3 - Planning and Execution of Mobile Operations ; OPD No 4 - Operational Security; OPD No 5 - Organisation and Employment of Air Liaison Units; OPD No 6 - Chemical Warfare Policy; and OPD No 7 - The Organisation and Policy of the Intelligence Branch

within the Royal Australian Air Force.

Another area where RAAF Command and Air Force Headquarters differed was the matter of war training. On 4 March 1944, Jones advised Kenney that he agreed to the premise advocated by Brigadier Wilson that 'RAAF Command be charged with the responsibility for the co-ordination and supervision of war training of those units under the operational control of the Allied Air Forces.' Prior to this agreement there had been debate on what could be encompassed by 'war training'. For example, when notification of the appointment of Flight Lieutenant G.A. Cooper to command the newly formed 80 Squadron at Townsville was received by RAAF Command on 7

September 1943, the suggestion was made that he be attached to 76 Squadron in New

Guinea 'to obtain operational experience.' The attachment was to commence about a fortnight after his assumption of command on 10 September. Such timing would enable the new commander to settle into his appointment, assess his staff and organise a training regime before gaining current operational experience. On 4 October, RAAF

Col R E. Beebe to Bostock 30 May 1944 ibid, ibid. Wilson to Jones 14 February 1944 AA1969/100 item 320,5C2 Signal P324 RAAF Command to RAAF HQ (Forward Echelon) 7 September 1943 AAl 969/100 item 200.32A Pt 2 Commander in the Shadow 35

Headquarters Forward Echelon forwarded the text of a signal from North Eastern Area calling for the cancellation of the attachment. On 30 September the CAS had directed that the squadron was to form and tram with all possible dispatch. RAAF Command responded on 8 October to the effect that, as the attachment was 'a war training commitment', the attachment would stand. RAAF Headquarters confimied that Cooper was to be attached to 76 Squadron from 20 October until 14 November for flying duties.

The direct intervention of Jones m this matter was unwarranted and intruded into the responsibilities of Bostock as the operational commander.

Despite Jones agreement with Kenney of 4 March 1944 that RAAF Command was responsible for war training of squadron assigned to AAFSWPA,''^'^ the matter of aircrew and aircraft reinforcement pools was another matter of contention. An aircraft reinforcement pool was established at 15 Aircraft Repair Depot during November 1943.

The issue of RAAF Organisation Memorandum No. 414 on 17 January 1944 formalised this arrangement but also laid down that 'aircrew will be held at a totally different unit - the Reserve Personnel PooF^'^^ and not able to operate their own aircraft.

RAAF Command wrote to RAAF Headquarter Forward Echelon on 10 March 1944 suggesting that pools comprising both aircrew and aircraft should be established in operational Areas, where the aircrew could utilise the aircraft to facilitate the maintenance and honing of flying skills and 'training toward fighting pitch' The dichotomy between retaining fully serviceable aircraft for the rapid replacement of operational wastage at squadrons and the ability of aircrew to maintain their flying skills and develop current operational techniques was not resolved. The aircrew were in

^^^ RAAF Headquarters to 80 Squadron 14 October 1943 ibid. Jones to Kenney 4 March 1944 AAl 1969/100 item 320.5C2 Units of the RAAF Volume 7 Maintenance Units, p 34 146 Organisation Memorandum No. 3 79 Aircraft in Reinforcement Pool AA1969/100 item 320.5C2 AOC RAAF Command to RAAFHQ (Forward Echelon) 10 March 1944 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 37 limbo; they were fully qualified but operationally inexperienced. As Bostock noted in a letter to Drakeford on 15 April 1944 'the disturbing fact that the RAAF operational casualty rate is approximately double that of the Fifth Air Force [and many factors contribute to this, not least of which is] the standard of training and the fitness for operational conditions of aircrews on their initial introduction to combat flying...no provision is made to keep pilots and other aircrew members 'in practice" during the period - which may be many weeks - between leaving the operational training unit and their first combat tlight.'*'^^ The Commanding Officer of No. 5 Army Co-operation

Squadron had voiced a similar opinion on the subject of manning policy to a member of

Bostock's operational staff during a visit to North West Area during November 1943 which was reported in the following terms:

He considered that the majority of new pilots arriving in the squadron were below the average as pilots. He also stated that very few Anny Co- operation pilots returned for a second tour with an Arniy Co-operation squadron, with the result that Nos. 4 and 5 Squadrons are continually battling with inexperienced personnel...

Singularly, the matters raised above would not have caused insurmountable problems for either Headquarters. However, the perpetual and public attempts by both to exert authority over the other brought no repute to either.

Bostock to Drakeford 15 April 1944 Jones Papers Report of 'Ops 6' Visit to North east and North West Areas 12th-19 November 1943 AA1969/100 item319.1QPt2 Commander in the Shadow 38

Chapter 4

RAAF Command Operations

With the authority of Headquarters AAFSWPA General Order No. 62 dated 8

November 1942, RAAF Command was assigned operational control of units covering the 'the whole of the Australian mainland including Tasmania and the Islands controlled by the Queensland Government in the Torres Strait.'Bostock was responsible for the aerial defence of vital areas such as the Newcastle-Sydney-

Wollongong industrial area, the protection of shipping off the Australian coast and for defensive/offensive operations from bases in the Northern Territory. Space does not enable an m-depth assessment of operations to be attempted; rather, salient areas concerning shipping protection and operations from North West Area will be highlighted.

Convoy escort duties and anti-submarine patrols undertaken by the RAAF were of importance m keeping the shipping lanes open. Japanese and German submarines claimed their first success on 18 January 1943, when the US tanker Mohiluhe was badly damaged by torpedoes and recorded their last on 18 February 1945 when the Peter

Sylvester was sunk by U-862 820 miles south of Fremantle. In this period 151,000 tons of shipping had been sunk off the Australian coast, with the loss of 654 lives. ^^^ In

April 1943, Bostock controlled 17 Squadrons equipped with numerous aircraft types to counter the submarine menace and the threat of Japanese attacks from aircraft carriers.

Four were located in North Eastern, seven in Eastern, two m Southern and four in

Western Area. Of these, two were equipped with Beaufort aircraft, one with Seagull

' Document 8 October 1942 AA1969/100 item 320.5C2 RAAF (\mmiand Orgawsation Policy and Respomihility Odgers. op. cit.. p 143 D Jenkins. Battle Surface - Japan's Submarine War Against Australia 1942 -44, Random House, Sydney. 1992 p 287 Commander in the Shadow 39 amphibians, two with Catalma flying boats, one with Hudson and three with Anson aircraft. The remainder were equipped with Wirraway training/general purpose aircraft,, Kittyhaw^k and Boomerang fighters. With the Catalma flying boats being utilised for mining and bombing strikes to the north of Australia, Bostock could deploy six squadron (three of which were "reserve") on anti-submarine patrols around the

Australian coastline.

The procedure to call for the employment of "reserve" squadrons was promulgated on 17 October 1942. RAAF Command was to request that RAAF

Headquarters make them available for operations. The latter Headquarters would place them under the operational control of the relevant Area Headquarters and instruct the

Training Groups to that effect. ' This course of action was required as "reserve" squadrons were normally based on service flying training schools, who supplied aircrews from among its instructors or graduated aircrew. This situation was eased when 67 Squadron (in Southern Area), 71 and 73 Squadrons (in Eastern Area) were raised as separate Air Force squadrons in January and July 1942.'^^

As the RAAF Command organisation was superimposed on the existing Area

Headquarters system, control was indirect. On 17 January 1943, Headquarters

AAFSWPA outlined arrangements where Area Headquarters would arrange air support for naval operations with their Navy counterparts. On 25 November 1943 Kenney sought advice from Bostock and Whitehead on recommendations to improve the system, bearing in mind that it was 'not considered possible to secure additional units for anti-submarine work [as such a squadron] would be substituted for a combat heavy

^ Odgers, op, cit . p 141 RAAF Headquarters to RAAF Command 17 October 1942 AAl 969/100 item 322.172B Employment of Resen^e Squadrons - Policy ' Units of the RAAF Volume 4 Ps 85,88,90. Beebe to CO RAAF Headquarters Forward Echelon 17 January 1943 AAl969/100 item 565.4E Commander in the Shadow 40 bomber squadron.' Bostock recommended that close escorts of convoys be provided

in areas where submarine attacks were considered 'probable' durmg daylight hours, that

Air-to-Surface Vessel (ASV) radar equipped aircraft be utilised for night searches 'of

the area through which friendly shipping is advancing' and that searches to exhaustion

by day and night be undertaken following submarine sightings.'"^ This instruction was

promulgated as Operational Instruction No. 138 on 4 December. Navy responded two

days later, with an awareness of the political sensitivity of the issue, that Navy was

'concerned at the possibility of seamen strikes in consequence of the [decision made by

the Navy to] abolish convoys south of the 32nd parallel.' Bostock immediately ordered

relative Area Headquarters to discuss with the Naval Officer m Charge of the area to

ensure that aircraft patrolled these shipping lanes to avoid possible trade union

1

action.

The problem was not only related to industrial relations. On 9 December 1943

Headquarters Western Area estimated that, as most west bound shipping was routed

north of 32 degrees south, it would be beyond the capacity of the sole anti-submarine

dedicated squadron in the west to provide an efficient escort. RAAF Command reacted

on 14 December, pointing out that the co-operation of the US Navy Catalina unit should

be requested. The US Navy was 'unable to assist'so Western Area requested that

Operational Instruction No. 138 be made non-applicable to that area, or that aircraft

numbers be increased to meet its requirements. On 18 December a compromise was

reached. Operational Instruction No. 140 superseded No 138, effectively acceding to

Western Area's original request and placing the responsibility for escort duties on the

Kenney to General Whitehead and Bostock 25 November 1943 AAl 969/100 item 565 4E pt 3 ^^^ Bostock to Kenney 3 December 1943 ibid. RAAF Command to Eastern and Southern Area 6 December 1943 ibid. Western Area to RAAF Command circa 16 December 1943 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 41

Area Commander and the Naval Officer m Charge. It was a practical solution which comprehended both the likely threat and the resources of the Area Commander.

Rostock's attempt to increase the strength of his anti-submarine squadrons in

1943 was to no avail. The number of Beaufort aircraft produced was not sufficient to enable an extra squadron to be reequipped with the type during 1944.^^^ However,

RAAF Headquarters authorised the use of ASV radar equipped Beauforts from Nos 1 and 3 operational training units at Baimsdale and Nowra to cover convoys between

Newcastle and Gabo Island 'where possible as part of training exercises.Eastern

Area assessed that such an imposition would detract from training and duly advised

RAAF Headquarters on 8 February 1944. On the same day. Southern Area advised

RAAF Command that No. 1 Operational Training Unit had a limited number of aircraft available, but that that operations would have to fit into normal training activity. Two days later RAAF Command was advised that no aircraft were available at Nowra for anti-submarme operations. Between May 1942 and the end of the War, six inexperienced or partly trained crews of No 1 Operational Training Unit were attributed as "missing whilst undertaking seaward patrols"m an attempt to stretch already slender resources.

The lack of anti-submarme resources available to Bostock and the problems of augmenting them is well illustrated by the reaction to the request made by the Deputy

Chief of the Naval Staff (DCNS) on 30 April 1943. Due to the current concentration of enemy submarines on the east coast, the DCNS requested that all aircraft flying over the

165 sea be armed and be prepared to take offensive action against enemy submarines.

Operational Instruction No. 140 dated 18 December 1943 ibid. RAAF Headquarters to RAAF Command Circa 6 February 1944 AA1969/100 item 565.4E pt 1 RAAF Headquarters to RAAF Command 8 February 1944 ibid. ^^^ J. Prendergast RAAFBairmdale Baimsdale, 1992. pp 71 -82 DCNS to DCAS 30 April 1943 AA1969/100 item 565.4E pt 1 Commander in the Shadow 42

RAAF Headquarters passed the request to RAAF Command who agreed to the request, advismg No. 2 Traming Group, North Eastern and Southern Area of the procedures to be followed on 27 May. Group Captam A.M. Murdoch replied to the Air Board that he was doubtful whether successful attacks would be carried out due to the lack of briefing facilities at 'maintenance group aerodromes''^'^and thus Allied submarines operation off the coast would placed m danger. Murdoch's concern was taken into consideration and when Operational Instruction No 142 was issued on 27 December 1943 it provided that

operational aircraft would be armed and that all pilots undertaking travel flights routed

along the coastline would be instructed to report submarine sightings immediately.

To undertake successful anti-submarine patrols required constant liaison and

discussion between Area Commanders, Naval Officers in Command of Areas, RAAF

Headquarters and the United States Navy. Standard procedures were modified as a

result of bitter experience. The protection of maritime trade was a vital, yet thankless,

task. RAAF Command, utilising under trained aircrew and unsuitable aircraft, released

units of the 5th Air Force for action against the Japanese, but it is debateable whether

the interests of the RAAF were well served by doing so.

The anti-submarine aerial campaign was not pursued with any conviction.

However, the campaign which Bostock controlled and based m North Western Area had

strategic importance. The campaign is of interest in that it shows the attributes of the

offensive and involved American, Dutch, British and Australian units, all under the

control of RAAF Command. In addition to protecting military facilities in the Northern

Territory, appropriate strike units were to support Allied operations in New Guinea.

USAAC bomber units operated in North Western Area from 31 October 1942, when B-

Eastern Area to Air Board, copied to RAAF Command 17 December 1943 AA1969/100 item 565.4E pt 3 Odgers, op. cit. p 111 Commander in the Shadow 43

26 Marauder aircraft of the 22 Bombardment Group arrived, and included B-24

Liberators of the 319th Bombardment Squadron based at Fenton at the end of January

1943. These aircraft were to make concentrated attacks on shipping and stores at

Ambon, the naval base at Halong and aircraft and aerodromes at Laha. Bostock was anxious to utilise the B-24's in concentrations of at least six aircraft and was advised by the Air Vice Marshal Cole, the Air Officer Commanding North Western Area on 9

April that the 319th 'are doing excellent work and show high fighting spirit.Such was not the case with another national units operating in the area. Bostock's Senior Air

Staff Officer, Group Captain Gibson visited North Western Area between 22 January and 5 February 1943. In his report Gibson was critical of'No. 18 Squadron [which] is in a poor state owing to turret unserviceability [and] was not impressed with the spirit of

No. 18 Squadron...The Squadron seemed slovenly and their efforts generally on operations had been half-hearted and remarkably lacking in determination to close the target...'Therefore Bostock was faced with varied operational problems ranging from the motivation of 18 Squadron to arranging for facilities to be made available for sophisticated heavy bombers and planning an offensive campaign with the resources he had available in North Western Area.

An example of aggressive planning was Operational Instruction No 22/1944 issued on 3 March 1944, in which Bostock directed Headquarters North Western Area to create a 'task force for offensive operations.''^' The task force was to support amphibious operations by Allied forces against Tanimbar and Kai Islands, and would

.^r Officer Commanding North Western Area to AOC RAAF Command 3 1 October 1942 AA1969/100 item 320.5K3 Allied Air Force Units Under RAAF Conti'ol Bladin to Bostock 9 April 1943 ibid. Group Captain Gibson SASO Report of Operational Units and Areas (with Ops I) between 22 January and 5 February 194S 14 February 1943 AA1969/100 item 319. IQ Pt 1 Reports on Visits to Units by Staff Officers - RAAF Command Operational Instruction No 22 1944 to Headquarters North Western Area 3 March 1944 AAl 969/100 item 320.5K7 Composition and Integration of Offensive Wing in North Western Area. Commander in the Shadow 44 comprise two RAAF fighter wings (complete with ancillary units) and units allotted from the US 5th Air Force.The attitude of Kenney to this proposal is enlightening.

On 31 March he noted that he:

saw General MacArthur... and told him that the RAAF was serious in regard their planning of an operation against the eastern end of Timor and an alternative operation to capture Kai, and I asked him to see that Blamey took the contemplated operation in the Arafura Sea more seriously. Blamey seem to think that the show is off I told the General that I want to have the thing planned so that if any leaks come out and the Japs get wind of the show they may move forces into the NEI and therefore divert them from northwestern New Guinea...

From the American view, operations from North Western Area were subsidiary to the mam thrust along the northern cost of New Guinea. Further confirmation can be found m Kenney's entry in his personal papers of 3 September 1944, ordering RAAF

Command to undertake heavy bomber operations against Haroehoe, Liang and Laha 'to take these airdromes out and keep them taken out...in order to protect the left flank of

Fifth Air Force.'

However, the planning exercise for the Arafura Sea proposal was excellent experience for the major event planned and undertaken by RAAF Command - the

'Oboe' series of operations. On 10 February 1945 Kenney agreed to 'turn over to the

RAAF the air job for any operations south of the Philippines, to put Bostock in charge, support to come from the 13th in case it was needed.The aim of the Oboe series of operations was to 'seize Java, destroy enemy forces in NEI, reestablish the NEI

Government m its capital, and establish a base for subsequent operations against

Japanese forces throughout the area.''^^ Although six Oboe operations were envisaged

ibid. ' ^^ Entry 31 March 1944 Kenney papers Entry 3 September 1944 Item 730.161 5th Air Force June 1942 - April 1944. US Air Force Historical Research Centre, ' Entry 10 February 1945 Kenney papers G. Waters, Ohoe Air Operations Over Borneo 1945^ Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra 1995. p 7 Commander in the Shadow 45 initially, only three were actually brought to fruition - Oboe One, the landing at

Tarakan, Oboe two, the landing at and Oboe Six, . There was some doubt as to whether any of the Oboe operations would proceed - Kenney, on 27

February 1945 is ^sure that the Joint Chiefs will cancel Oboe.' Kenney was mistaken, and the Tarakan landing took place on 1 May 1945 . Air support was supplied by the RAAF 1st Tactical Air Force, 13th Air Force and heavy bomber units for North

Western and Western Areas. Two of these squadrons did not meet their commitments on 1 May due to aircraft being withdrawn for scheduled maintenance. The state of the airfield at Tarakan varied planning for the scheduled landing at Labuan (Oboe 6) on

10 June. For this operation, Bostock again had control of 1st Tactical Air Force and directed 13th Air Force but the unavailability of the airfield at Tarakan required RAAF aircraft to operate from Sanga Sanga in the Philippines. The last of the senes of operations was Oboe 2, the landing at Balikpapan, on 1 July.

Waters is critical of the 'casualness' of planning for the Tarakan operation, but concedes that the subsequent operations were 'executed flawlessly.Bostock and his staff undertook planning in a difficult environment - the so called 'Morotai Mutiny' erupted just prior to the operations - and liaised successfully with the American 13th

Air Force as well as coordinating the activities of RAAF units based in North Western and Western areas.

Entry 27 February 1945 Kenney papers Waters, op. cit . p 20

ibid., p 78 ibid , p 151 Commander in the Shadow 46

Chapter 5

Bostock as a Commander 1942 - 1945

His presence at Staff College in 1926-1927 had developed Bostock intellectually, and

he is one of the few RAAF officers who made public utterances regarding air power between the wars. On 7 June 1933, the Australian Engineer published a paper which he

presented to the Aeronautical Engineering Branch of the Sydney Division of the

Institute of Engineers. He expressed the view that 'British Air Strategists believe that an

air force can make a direct contribution [to bring pressure to bear upon the enemy people as to induce them to force their Government to sue for peace]. The doctrine

postulates the bomb as the first weapon of air warfare.' The defence of Australia hinged

on ensuring that 'the focal point of [the enemy's] sea communications [are] impassable and his advance untenable' which could only be guaranteed by a mobile air striking

force of torpedo bombers deployed along a well planned system of operational bases.

His views on air power were to remain basically unchanged, and he had the opportunity to gain first hand experience with the nascent development of the Royal Air Force when he served with the Air Staff, 1 Group Headquarters Royal Air Force from 27 July 1936 until July 1938. Comment in his annual confidential report for 1937 is consistently

'above the average'; an 'efficient staff officer who is thorough m all his undertakings.

He has a sound knowledge of the operational requirements of light bomber squadrons'

182

Air Force Confidential Order No. 374, issued on 2 December 1942 was the basis for operational deployment by the RAAF, advocating the formation of mobile operational groups to provide an offensive capability as the strategic situation

Squadron Leader Bostock, 'The Work of the Royal Australian Air Force.' A paper to the Aeronautical Engineering Branch of the Sydney Division of the Institute of Engineers at Science House published in The Australian Engineer, 7 June 1933 Bostock Papers ^^^ Royal Air Force Annual Confidential Report (OlFicers) for 1937 Personal file Commander in the Shadow 47 1 S3 warranted. In a paper on the subject dated 11 September, Bostock emphasised the requirement for operational bases to be provided 'so that operational units can be readily concentrated as a balanced force' to meet any threat. He also identified the squadron as being the basic tactical unit, but recognised that such a unit should be

'mobile on wings,' capable of being 'lifted by its own aircraft or m specific air transport provided for a specific move...so that it can move from one base to another and operate from there with the minimum of delay.Mobility and the balance of forces was the essence of the campaign m the South West Pacific Area.

An example of Rostock's recognition of this fact and his belief that the RAAF organisation should refiect the concept is his attitude toward developments in New

Guinea during December 1942. On 15 December AFHQ issued a signal which divorced the administrative responsibility of 9 Operational Group from North Eastern Area.

Bostock was perturbed at the 'rooting of Nine Group to New Guinea by placing all ground facilities and fixed units under the Group for detailed administration', and suggested that the 'status of twenty one Base Wmg be upgraded to a new Area.''^^ In a letter to the Secretary of the Air Board on 16 February 1943, Bostock further pressed his case, advocating that 9 Operational Group should be retained as a 'highly mobile formation, of a purely tactical character, capable of rapid movement from one Area to another without disturbance of the organisation of either the Group or the Area concerned.' This recognised the provisions of AFCO No 374 and his view was vindicated. On 11 April 1944, 9 (Operational Group) was renamed "Northern

' ^^ Air Force Confidential Order No 3 74 dated 2 December ] 942 AA1969/100 Item 210 4D Duties and Responsibilities - Area Air (\mmianders and Staff Officers Bostock to Secretary Air Board 11 September 1942 AA1969/100 item 320.5B4 Pt 1 Organisation of RAAF for Operations RAAF Command Signal A734 dated 22 December 1942 AA1969/100 item 320.5B2 '^^ Bostock to Secretary Air Board 16 February 1943 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 48 Command" and 10 (Operational Group) was separated from that command on 1 July IS8 and renamed '1st Tactical Air Force, RAAF" on 25 October. There is no doubt that Bostock learned from experience and had a clear vision of his operational role. In his long battle with Jones he sought the necessary organisation to make his units self sufficient and mobile. In Operational Directive No. 2 Planning and Execution of Mobile Operations - lUAF Command ^xoducQd m late 1944, he had modified his stance regarding the basic tactical unit in that he now recognises the 'basic formation of the organisation is the completely integrated wing, consisting of wang headquarters, three or more squadrons, medical clearing station, air stores park, repair and salvage unit, operational base unit and, m fighter wings a mobile fighter control unit with seven associated radar stations' and reiterated that units were to be transportable on wings (as against mobile on wheels).There are marked similarities between this concept and the mobile task force envisaged in Plan "D" for a post war Air Force which was endorsed by the Government in July 1947. Bostock was also an advocate of the functional command system, which was introduced by Jones's successor. Air Marshal Sir , in 1954.'"^^ Air Vice Marshal Bostock drew his authority to command from Headquarters AAFSWPA General Order No 47 and the unstinting support of Lieutenant General . The relationship between the two men is critical in understanding the pressures which were placed on Bostock. Kenney would have been aware of the

^^^ RAAF Headquarters Organisation Memorandum No 462 dated 11 April 1944; Odgers, op. cit.. p 200 188 Odgers op. cit. p 242 189 ibid., p 298 190 Operational Policy Directive No. 3 Planning and Execution of Mobile Operations - RAAE Command kA\969lm item 300.4V 1 A Stephens, Going Solo - The Royal Australian Air Eorce, 1946 - 1971, Australian 192 Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 1995, p 30 ff 193 ibid, p 66 ibid., p 76 Commander in the Shadow 49

assessment of Bostock by his predecessor: 'a very poor personality...grumpy and

discontented. He is rather arbitrary in his opmions...The situation regarding Bostock

must be watched carefully and any advice or suggestions offered must be given most

careful consideration as they may appear O.K. on the surface and still have something

underneath which may cause trouble.'^'^^ Kenney's initial impression of Bostock agreed

with Brett's assessment of gruffness, but Kenney identified other attributes. Bostock, he

wrote, impressed me as being honest and I believed that if he would work with me at

all, he would be loyal to me.'*'^^ Kenney admired men of action and decision. There is

one episode which would have brought Bostock into favour - the Quinan affair.

On 23 November 1942 RAAF Command received a signal from No. 4 Squadron,

which was operating Wirraway aircraft on Anny Co-operation duties over Buna, New

Guinea, to the effect that Fifth Air Force had placed restrictions on transit routes to and

from the area of operations and laid down certain operational procedures to be

followed. If not adhered to, there was a possibility that the Wirraway aircraft would be

misidentified as Japanese Zero fighters and shot down. The squadron commander.

Squadron Leader G.J. Quman disagreed with the restrictions and requested advice.

Bostock, following Quman's advice, signalled Kenney in New Guinea that the

conditions imposed increase hazards to Wirraways and are unacceptable. Unless

Wirraways can expect protection and not repeat not threat from Fifth Air Force must

recommend withdrawal of 4 Squadron.Kenney responded with background to the dispute. A conference to discuss the problem was held at New Guinea Force

Headquarters on 23 November. An incapacitated Quinan was represented by Flight

Lieutenant Marr. Marr discussed the result of the conference with his commander, who

General Brett, personal notes on Australian officers Kenney papers Kenney, op. cit.. p 33 Bostock to Kenney 24 November 1942 AA1969/100 item 320.2W No. 4 Squadron Operational Conditions Investigation November 1942 Commander in the Shadow 50

immediately signalled Bostock. A peeved Kenney exerted his authority by statmg that

like all other units in this theatre [4 Squadron] will abide by the operational

instructions and rules laid down by competent authority for the orderly conduct and

proper control of air operations. If it does not do its part the remedy is not to withdraw

the squadron but to withdraw the squadron commander who is responsible for the

needless waste of my time and yours to say nothing of the time spent in discussion of

the matter by already busy members of the New Guinea Force and my staffBostock

reacted on the 26th, ordering Quinan to hand over command to Flight Lieutenant Marr

and assume command of No. 5 (Anny Co-operation) Squadron at Toolgoolawah,

Queensland . The matter was reviewed by Air Commodore Cobby, the Air Officer

Commanding North Eastern Area, who reported that Quinan had acted in the interest of

the service but that he 'lacked tact in the manner of his handling of the matter. That he

198

was ill and in some physical distress may have contributed...' Bostock agreed with

Cobby and noted that in these circumstances no good purpose would be served by

pursuing the matter...no censure was implied ... and it is desired to confirm that such is

still the case.'''^'^

Bostock had been placed in a position where the future of a capable officer was

in the balance, and his own working relationship with his commander jeopardised. His

personal action regarding Quinan was swift and decisive enabling that officer to regain

dignity and stature. Bostock had reacted on the advice of his subordinate officer and

was 'bawled' out by Kenney as a result. The situation may have escalated as Kenney

recorded on 25 November that 'Blamey [was] sore at Quinan and ready to make an

Kenney to Bostock 25 November 1942 ibid. Cobby to Bostock 30 November 1942 ibid ''''' Bostock to Air Board 7 December 1942 ibid. Commander in the Shadow 51 issue of the matter when Bostock's return radio of apology and assurance that he would carry out my words, came in...We have ^ Air Force now.'^^^^

Kenney, havmg selected his commanders and staff officers, gave and expected

unstmting loyalty. This is most apparent in the early stages of the Jones/Bostock

imbroglio and there is more than a hint that Kenney considered Jones's interference in the organisation of Headquarters AAFSWPA as being outside Jones's authority. Kenney

saw the organisation of AAFSWPA as his responsibility. His ego, arrogance and

stubbornness did not suffer interference. Hence his comment of 21 September 1942 that

Jones was advised that Kenney 'could organise the Allied Air Forces any way I wanted

to...''^'^ The most important factor in Kenney's support of Bostock is that the former

respected Bostock's professionalism and would not have delegated the control of

operations of Australian, 13th Air Force and Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF)

units south of the Philippines if he had not done so. On 11 February 1945 Air Vice

Marshal Issett, Chief of Staff of the RNZAF, showed similar regard for Bostock when he agreed to the ceding of operational control of New Zealand forces at Bougainville to the Australian commander.

In his autobiography. Air Marshal Jones is critical of Bostock for not being

'willing to promote the Australian cause' regarding the RAAF taking its place in the

liberation of the Philippines. On 14 September 1944, Beebe had advised Bostock that

'one RAAF fighter Wing and an Army Co-operation Squadron are the only units currently scheduled to be employed in the Philippine Islands,' due to RAAF Command accepting responsibility for operations in New Guinea. Beebe, however, indicated that the RAAF would be involved in 'separate drives...against Borneo and the Netherlands

Entry 25 November 1942 Kenney papers Entry 21 September 1942 ibid. Entry 11 February 1945 ibid. Jones, op. cit. . p 93 Commander in the Shadow 52

East Indies...' Such a plan would make an active operational command of the RAAF located in Western New Guinea and Darwin highly desirable.Bostock wrote to

Beebe on 21 September with ^regret to note that you are contemplating taking forward only No. 78 Wing and No. 4 Tactical reconnaissance Squadron into the Philippines' and requested that Beebe 'examine every possible means by which No. 10 Operational

Group can go forward into the Philippines with 5th Air Force as an integrated group...He recommended that this deployment be recommended to Kenney, but was advised by Beebe that the Australian units were removed from Philippine planning due to 'lack of aerodrome space and suitability of existing dromes for P-38 operations.

Bostock pressed the matter during personal discussions with Kenney at Hollandia, but was advised on 27 September that 'the RAAF would have to take over from Noemfoor east and that we [Unites States Army Air Force] could not take them into the

Philippines'^^^^ However, one cannot overcome a suspicion that the divided control of the RAAF was another consideration. As early as 15 March, an exasperated Kenney had written to Jones regarding operational control of Australian units:

This Headquarters is well aware of the limitations of the Air Officer Commanding, RAAF Command, to provide certain communications, operational facilities, maintenance of airdromes, etc...This Headquarters will require the Air Officer Commanding RAAF Command to perform certain operational tasks with the intention that the means to carry out these commitments must be arranged for the Air Officer Commanding RAAF Command... If it is impracticable for your [RAAF] Headquarters to give effect to the wishes of the Commander, Allied Air Forces, this Headquarters will expect to be informed fully in order that substitutive arrangements can be effected... [ italics added] ^^^

Beebe to Bostock 14 September 1944 AA1969/100 item 320.5B4 pt 1 Bostock to Beebe 21 September 1944 ibid. Beebe to Bostock 21 September 1944 ibid. Entry 27 September 1944 Kenney papers Kenney to Jones 15 March 1944 AA1969/100 item 320.5B2 Commander in the Shadow 53

Bostock, in his relations with Kenney, was subject to Australian Government policy. On 14 September 1944 he requested guidance from the Prime Minister concerning ^principles to be observed' when discussing the disposition and employment of RAAF forces, and was advised that as RAAF operational units were assigned to the Commander-in-Chief South West Pacific Area, their employment was the decision of that officer. Bostock therefore had no latitude for negotiation with

Kenney. The Prime Minister directed Bostock that 'the first requirement is adequate air support for Australian land forces by the Allied Air Forces 'and that this should be supplied by the RAAF 'to the greatest extent practicable within our resources'. To meet future plans, the 1st Tactical Air Force should remain as an integrated formation'; however, if this was not possible 'every effort should be made to ensure that the RAAF is represented with the Allied Air Forces by individual wings, or even separate squadrons, m the advance against Japan m the South West Pacific Area.'"'^ Bostock faithfully adhered to his Government's instructions regarding the employment and disposition of his forces. In this context it is important to record that, when requested by the Commander-m-Chief, specialist Wireless Intercept units and Airfield Construction

Squadrons of the RAAF participated in Philippine landings.

Bostock had a clear perception of Government policy and was respected by his

American peers. However, his relationship with Air Vice Marshal Jones did nothing to ease his command responsibilities. This is due to the perception of the latter that the Air

Board and the CAS, due to his position as chairman of the Board, was the superior authority in the Air Force. '"Air Vice Marshal Hartnell differs, arguing that the Air

Board was a 'statutory body, but not charged, in the Air Force Act, with any authority'

Meeting between Prime Minister, Acting Secretary Department of Defence and Bostock, 14 September 1944 AA1969/100 item 320.5C2 ibid. Jones, op. cit.. p 96 Commander in the Shadow 54

and that it was an assumption that the CAS commanded the Air Force. Indeed, he is at pains to establish that lawful commands could only be issued by virtue of rank and not appointment at the highest levels of the RAAF.' Thus Jones commanded, not because he was CAS, but simply because he was senior in rank to his subordinates - except Bostock, who had seniority at the same level.

Bostock never sought, as Jones argued, command of the RAAF. Bostock is consistent in his requests for administrative and logistic support to enable him to undertake operations for which he was responsible to the Commander, Allied Air

Forces, and in this he often sought the establishment of a balanced organisation of administrative, maintenance, service and operational units or the co-operation, not full control, of logistic units. This is the basis of the feud between the two men - Jones's insecurity regarding his own authority and his inability to comprehend the intricacies of operations and the administrative and logistic support required to undertake them efficiently. Bostock's concept was that logistics and administrative resources were vital for operations and that appropriate resources must be under the command and control of the operational commander. One example of Jones's myopic view is his reaction to

Allied Air Forces General Order No. 25 of 9 September 1943. Jones responded to

Kenney on 24 September by noting that a number of Repair and Salvage Units and

Torpedo Maintenance Units had been assigned to RAAF Command and pointing out that, as they were an 'essential' part of the RAAF supply and maintenance system, they were outside the responsibility of RAAF Command. How a torpedo maintenance unit could be seen as essential to the logistic system of the RAAF is not explained, although it is a valid suggestion that such a unit would be vital to a torpedo bomber

Hartnell G. The Problem of Command w the Australian Defence Force Environment, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra , 1983 p 64 ibid., p 77 Jones to Kenney 24 September 1943 AA1969/100 item 320.5C2 Commander in the Shadow 55 squadron operating against enemy shipping of the New Guinea coast, and should be

under the same command structure as its client unit.

Any study of Air Vice Marshal Bostock as a commander has been distorted by

his dispute with Air Vice Marshal Jones. Bostock was loyal to his Government and to

his superior, Kenney. He also had the fortitude to fight against attempts to deny him

operational resources. His aim was to give his men the best equipment and training

possible, arguing from a professional, if frustrated, view. There is no doubt that Bostock

was often less than respectful in his correspondence. That this conflict between the two

RAAF leaders should have gained such notoriety is unfortunate. Bostock's stature has

been belittled due to much uninformed speculation and anecdotal references to the

affair, as Bostock's record is solid, if not brilliant. The pinnacle of his career was the

planning and control of aerial operations related to the landings in Borneo, which

showed his ability to coordinate and control three - Dutch, Australian and American -

national forces. General Kenney, his mentor, wrote a letter of commendation to Prime

Minister Curtin of 17 November 1945 which shows the respect in which Bostock was

held by Kenney personally:

1. I wish to express my commendation of Air Vice-Marshal William D. Bostock, C.B., O.B.E., for his exemplary accomplishments first as my Chief of Staff of the Allied Air Forces from August 4, 1942 to September 5, 1942, and then as Air Officer Commanding, Royal Australian Air Force Command, Allied Air Forces, until September 2, 1945 2. In planning, directing, and coordinating the operations of air units of Australian, New Zealand, and the Netherlands, and, from time to time, certain American units as well. Air Vice-Marshal Bostock showed himself to be an outstanding executive and commander. Charged with the air defence of Australia during a most critical stage of the war in the Pacific, he played a key part those operations which saved Australia and wrested air superiority from the Japanese. As the scene of operations moved north to New Guinea and then to the Netherlands East Indies, organisations under his command struck devastating blows at Japanese oil centres, harbour facilities, airdromes, and other military targets in an area which ranged from Java and Borneo to New Britain and New Ireland. Commander in the Shadow 55

3 Air Vice-Marshal Bostock made an outstanding and major contribution to the final success of Allied arms in the war against the Japanese. He has rendered truly distinguished service not only to his own but also to the Allied nations. '''

The Japanese surrendered on 15 August 1945. RAAF Command was disbanded with obscene alacrity on 2 September 1945. ^^^ Bostock wrote to the Air Board on 26

September, voicing his opinion that he could be 'of considerable value to the RAAF in a training appointment.'''^ His request went unheeded. On 12 January 1946 the Air Board sought the approval of the Minister for the retirement of certain senior officers from the

Service; the case of Bostock, the reason for his fall from grace shows the hand of his nemesis. Included in the justification for his dismissal was that '...having regard for his rank and example, his conduct gave rise to serious dissension in the Service with consequent lowering of prestige, morale and discipline generally. His proved inability to work in hamiony with his superior authorities, and his lack of balance and appreciation of his responsibilities, make his continued employment in posts commensurate with his rank highly undesirable'' He was retired from the Service on 19 April 1946."

Air Vice Marshal W.D. Bostock, throughout his career as the senior operational commander of the RAAF, was in the shadow of the brilliant American, General

Kenney, and the ineffectual political and professional leadership of the wartime RAAF.

The blatant antagonism between Bostock and Jones does neither credit; however, it has clouded the fact that Bostock was a capable and effective air commander.

^^^ Kenney to Prime Minister 17 November 1945 AA816/1 Item 66/301/] 77A RAAF Command Unit Histoiy record entry 2 September 1945 Bostock to Air Board 26 September 1945 Bostock Papers Ministerial File No. 67, Proposal to Retire Certain Senior Members of RAAF. Minute, Air Board to Minister for Air dated 12 January 1946 [RAAF Historical] Career Brief Personal File Commander in the Shadow 57

APPENDIX 1

RAAF COMMAND ALLIED AIR FORCES

Letter RAAF 1269

Courier Mail

FileN. 320.9Z Brisbane

12th December, 1942

Secretary

AIR BOARD

Victoria Barracks

Melbourne. S.C. 1 (Copy to Commander, Allied Air Forces)

A.F.C.O. 391 dated 5th December, 1942, reflects a confusion of ideas, misinterprets Allied Air Forces General Order No. 47, fails to enunciate the responsibilities of the Air Officer Commanding R.A.A.F. Command and misrepresents the functions of the R.A.A.F. Command Headquarters Staff.

2. Allied Air Forces General Order No. 47 constituted the Coastal Command by the aggregation of R.A.A.F. operational units into an integrated formation. The order the designated the Air Officer Commanding and specifically charged this officer with responsibility for the exercise of command. The name "Coastal Command " was later altered to "R.A.A.F. Command" without change. The Commander, Allied Air Forces constituted the R.A.A.F. Command to facilitate the operational control of the Air

Officer Commanding, on whom he has placed, as an individual, the responsibility of command. It is clear, therefore , that the statement in para: 3 of A.F.C.O. 391 is incomplete and inaccurate, since the Command, as such, cannot exercise operational Commander in the Shadow 58 control over itself, but must be provided with a Commander. The Commander must, intum, set up a Headquarters and be provided with an appropriate staff.

3. The action taken by the Commander, Allied Air Forces, reflects the organisation he has decided to adopt. A change of Government Policy, or the termination of the War, are the only contingencies which he visualises as requiring a change of organisation.

The statements in para: 4 of A.F.C.O. 391 that the organisation was intended as a

^lemporary measure" is therefore misleading. Further, any intentions regarding future reorganisation are irrelevant and certainly should not be permitted to influence the methods to be adopted now to implements the organisation of then R.A.A.F. for war, as required by the Commander, Allied Air Forces.

4. Para. 5 of A.F.C.O. 391 is unintelligible on close examination. The staff of

R.A.A.F. Command Headquarters is , of course, directly responsible to the Air Officer

Commanding and not the Commander, Allied Air Forces. R.A.A.F. units are not assigned to the staff, but to R.A.A.F. Command as a formation. The formation is in turn commanded by the Air Officer Commanding and it is the sole function of the staff of

R.A.A.F. Command Headquarters to advise the Air Officer Commanding, who, as an individual, is responsible to the Commander, Allied Air Forces. Similarly, it is ridiculous to require the staff to offer advice to RAAF Headquarters; this duty can only be carried out by the Air Officer Commanding (after taking advice of his staff)on whom responsibility rests to obtain the administrative services necessary to carry out orders of the Commander, Allied Air Forces.

5. The apparently deliberate omission of all mention or reference in A.F.C.O. 391 to the Air Officer Commanding R.A.A.F. Command, has resulted in presenting a picture of a complicated and impractical organisation for which there is no justification. The presentation of the Air Officer Commanding the correct perspective immediately Commander in the Shadow 59 simplifies the organisation which then assumes a practical, orthodox and efficient aspect.

6. It is submitted that as A.F.C.O. 391 is badly drafted, misleading and likely to

add to the already dangerous state of confusion now existing throughout the R.A.A.F. it

should be withdrawn and a more suitable order published as early as possible.

(Signed) W.D. Bostock

Air Vice-Marshal

AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

R.A.A.F. COMMAND, ALLIED AIR

FORCES Commander in the Shadow 60

APPENDIX 2

Melbourne

MINISTER

It is desired to draw your attention to the memorandum received from Air Vice-

Marshal W.D. Bostock dated 12th December, 1942... You will see that this officer

refers to an A.F.C.O. No 391/1942 (copy...attached) in terms which I consider cannot be

overlooked. The A.F.C.O. referred to was issued after much thought, and owing to the

difficulties involved had to be restricted to bare essentials. It is strictly in accordance

with the terms of the agreement between the Commonwealth Government and General

MacArthur by which the operational control of certain R.A.A.F. squadrons was assigned

to the C-in-C.

2. The basis of Air Vice Marshal Bostock's case is that the command of R.A.A.F.

operational units was assigned to him by the Commander, Allied Air Forces. This, of

course, is unacceptable because the operational control only, as apart from disciplinary

control, has been assigned to General Kenney, and manifestly he is unable to assign

powers which he himself does not possess. This, incidentally, is made clear in

paragraphs 4 and 5 of General Kenney's General Order No. 47 of the 5th September,

1942.

3. The submission of a memorandum such as that under reference by a senior

officer to the Headquarters of his Service can only be regarded as a very serious matter,

indicating unwillingness to co-operate within the terms of the organisation laid down by

competent authority.

4 Since his appointment a Chief of Staff to the Commander, Allied Air Forces, Air

Vice-Marshal Bostock has consistently endeavoured to obtain control of certain aspects

of administration and organisation of the R.A.A.F, and has shown great resentment Commander in the Shadow 6' when his efforts in this direction have been checked. He has allowed his attitude to be

known widely throughout the Service, and the effect of this on discipline in now assuming serious proportions.

5 As you are aware, on the separation of the 5th Air Force and R.A.A.F. Command

staff from what was formerly Combined Staff of Allied Air Headquarters, 1 represented

that the R.A.A.F. operations and administrative staff should be re-united. Air Vice-

Marshal Bostock bitterly opposed this, and for the sake of harmony the matter was not

pressed.

6. In order to achieve the maximum degree of co-operation Forward Echelon of

our Headquarters administrative staff was established at Brisbane, and I have no reason

to believe that the Service has suffered to any great extent because of the continuance of

separate control of operations and administration. This result has been achieved,

however, m spite of the attitude of our operations staff in Brisbane, which has not

always been co-operative.

7. In view of the position which has now arisen, 1 tlnd myself forced to recommend

that Air Vice-Marshal Bostock be relieved of his present appointment, and posted to

some other appointment where his well known ability can be used to advantage but m

which he will not be able to cause further friction between the different sections of the

Service and our Allies.

(Signed) G. Jones

Air Vice-Marshal

CHIEF OF TFfE AIR STAFF

16 December 1942 Commander in the Shadow

A.F.C.O. 391 - ORGANISATION OF ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

(151/2/581 - 5 /12/1942)

1. Effective from 30th April, 1942, Allied Air Headquarters exercised operational

control of the Royal Australian Air Force. Administrative control, however, remained

unchanged. As a consequence, some reorganisation of R.A.A.F. Headquarters was

necessary, and the operational staff were attached to Allied Air Headquarters (A.F.C.O.

65/42 refers)

2 Upon transfer of Allied Air Headquarters to Brisbane, the R.A.A.F. staff

attached for duty was fonned into a separate unit - Extra R.A.A.F. (Staff with Allied Air

Headquarters)" under the direct command of R.A.A.F. Headquarters for administration

and discipline (A.F.C.O. 180/42 refers)

3. By General Order No. 47, dated 5th September, 1942, the Commander, Allied

Air Forces, constituted the Coastal Command, Allied Air Forces, to exercise operational

control of certain R.A.A.F. units, and by General Order No. 53, dated 21st September,

1942, changed the name from Coastal Command to '^R.A.A.F. Command, Allied Air

Forces'\

4 This action was taken by the Commander Allied Air Forces as a temporary

measure to facilitate his operational control of R.A.A.F. operational units assigned to

him. It is intended that, on relinquishment of control by the Commander, Allied Air

Forces, the staff now known as R.A.A.F. Command , Allied Air Forces, shall revert to

R A A.F. Headquarters as Directorates of Operations, Intelligence and Communications

respectively. The staff is therefore being organised on this basis, and appropriate

establishment tables are being issued. Commander in the Shadow ^^

5 This staff is to be responsible to the Commander, Allied Air Forces, for operational control of R.A.A.F. units assigned to it by him. All matters of R.A.A.F. policy, administration, discipline, training, supply and maintenance are the responsibility of R.A.A.F. Headquarters. Nevertheless, the R.A.A.F. staff. Allied Air

Forces, is to offer advice to R.A.A.F. Headquarters on all matters affecting operations, and IS to give its views and relevant information on such matters as may be requested by

R.A.A.F. Headquarters from time to time. Commander in the Shadow ^^^

APPENDIX 3

R.A.A.F COMMAND OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTION NO 164/44 DATED 16

DECEMBER 1944

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL - ARMY

COOPERATION WINGS

1 • Composition To meet Army air cooperation in the field

Not to be employed outside the area of responsibility of the Army formation without the authority of the Air Officer Commanding of the senior R.A.A.F. formation to which the wing is allotted.

Comprises ( with appropriate ancillary units) Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron,

Communications (Local Air Supply) unit. Air Observation Post Flight.

Employment

Tactical Reconnaissance - Tactical reconnaissance;

- Artillery reconnaissancej^

- Contact reconnaissance;

- Tactical photographic reconnaissance;

- Emergency supply dropping;

- Smoke laying; and

- Leading strikes

Not nonnally used in an offensive role, but may carry out offensive action of ordered by

the Air Officer Commanding of Area ( or Tactical Air Force) Such units may be

authorised to engage important targets of opportunity encountered during nonnal

missions

Communications Units

Supplement, but not replacing, existing air transport facilities Commander in the Shadow

Roles

- Local air supply to troops;

- Transport of Army Formation Commander within his

Command;

- Transport for liaison by senior staff officers or liaison

staff;

- Reconnaissance by staff officers; and

- Anti-malanal spraying

Not to be used for conveyance of personnel or material on routes already served by a

courier, or other transport service. Complementary to, but not in replacement of, the

functions of troop carry and transport aircraft.

Air Observation Post Flight

Complementary , but not in replacement if tactical reconnaissance and

communications units

- Observation of ground positions;

- Observation of artiller\' fire;

- Emergency air supply of isolated positions not

accessible to normal supply dropping aeroplanes; and

- Emergency evacuation of line casualties

Detachment of tactical units.

Maintenance and supply limitations will preclude the satisfactory employment of more

than one detachment from each tactical unit of the wing from bases located at distances

beyond the normal range of the type of aircraft concerned Commander in the Shadow

Operational control

Allotted to the Area (or Tactical Air Force) within the area of responsibility of which the wing is to be employed. Air Officer Commanding concerned, is to exercise command ...in all respects. An Air Officer Commanding ...is to meet the Army cooperative requirements within the ability and resources of then wing, of the senior

Army commander operating within... the Air Officer's Commanding area of operational responsibility.

Air Officer Commanding is to delegate the Commanding Officer of the wing

authority to make direct arrangements with the Army commander (or his representative)

of the Army formation with which the wing is detailed to cooperate. The Air Officer

Commanding is further to direct, at his discretion, that the commander of the wing is to

delegate similar authority to each of the commanders of the tactical units...to arrange

direct air cooperation with the Army commander of the force with a unit. . . is detailed to

operated

Army Commander, with the advice of the Commander of the Army cooperation

wine, will normally determine the priorities of tasks to be allotted to each tactical unit

of the wing, within the resources of the umber of sorties available as may be detailed

from time to time by the commander of the Army cooperation wing ( or his authorised

representative). A similar [procedure] will be followed when a tactical unit (or

detachment thereotl if the wing is detailed to cooperate with an Army force.

(Signed) C.D. Candy

Group Captain

for Air Vice Marshal

AOC RAAF Command AAF Commander in the Shadow ^^

APPENDIX 4

AIR STAFF POLICY DIRECTIVE 27 DECEMBER 1944

ARMY CO-OPERATION WING

1. Oriranisation

Army cooperation wings have been formed:

- Headquarters;

- Tactical reconnaissance squadron;

- Air Observation Post Flight;

- Communications unit;

- Operational base unit; and

- other ancillary units as may be allotted from time to

time.

2 Roles of units

The roles of the two additional classes of flying units are complementary to those of tactical reconnaissance and transport squadrons and are not intended to replace our commitment to the Army for tactical reconnaissance, troop carrying and major supply by air. The functions of the new units broadly are:

Air Observation Post Flight - Observation of ground positions;

- Obser\/ation of artillery fire;

- Local communications;

- Emergency air supply; and

- Emergency evacuation of line casualties

Communications units - undertake (beyond the capacity of the Air Observation Post Flight communications and emergency air supply. Commander in the Shadow ^^

3. Operational control

Operational control of Commander-in-Chief South West Pacific Area under the same conditions as other operational wings and squadrons of the R.A.A.F.

4. Relationship with Army formation - policy

Placed under the operational and administrative control of the senior R.A.A.F. formation m the area to which they are operating.

- Officer commanding of Army cooperation wing acts as air adyiser to the Genera!

Officer Commanding of the Army formation, and keeps him informed of the availability of sorties by type. Tasks and priorities as between them. . .are determined by the General Officer Commanding or his authorised representative with the advice of to the officer commanding of the. . . wing or his authorised representative.

- All requests for sorties are made through the Army formation to the officer

commanding wing.

P.M. Bladin

for Air Vice Marshal

Chief of the Air Staff Commander in the Shadow

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Soldier Career Management Agency

Service Documents 540 Sergeant William Dowlmg Bostock

RAAF Historical

Personal file Air Vice Marshal W.D. Bostock

Unit History Record RAAF Command

Barry Commission 1945 Exhibits

Ministerial File No. 67 Proposal to Retire (^ertam Senior Officers of the RAAF

Australian War Memorial

AWM PR 00580 Papers of Air Vice Marshal W.D. Bostock

AWM 3 DRL Air Marshal Sir George Jones Papers

United States Air Force History Office, Boiling Air Force Base

George C. Kenney Papers

United States Air Force Historical Research Centre, Maxwell Air Force Base

730.161 5th Air Force June 1942 - April 1944

Australian Archives

AA MP 1217 Higher Directions of RAAF Following Upon reorganisation of

United States Fifth Air Force and Establishment of RAAF

Command

AA816/1 Item 66/301/177A

AA 1196/2 Item 36/501/396

AA5954/1 Item 2/6

Item 1904/10 Commander in the Shadow 70

AA1969/100 RAAF Command

Item 200.32A Personnel - Changes m Command and

Appomtments - RAAF

Item 210.4D Duties and Responsibilities - Area Air

Commanders and Staff Officers

Item 300.4V 1 RAAF Command - Policy Directives

Item 319.1Q Reports on Visits to Units by Staff Officers -

RAAF Command

Item 320.2W No. 4 Squadron Operational Conditions

Investigation November 1942

Item 320.5B2 Higher Organisation of the RAAF

Item 320.5 B4 Organisation of the RAAF for Operations

Item 320 5C1 Organisation Allied Air Forces

Item 320.5C2 RAAF Command Organisation Policy and

Responsibility

Item 320.5K3 Allied Air Force Units Under RAAF Control

Item 320.5K7 Composition and Integration of Offensive Wing

in North Western Area

SELECTED SECONDARY SOURCES

The bibliography listed below lists all those secondary sources referred to in the text.

There are other biographical, autobiographical and anecdotal references to the

Bostock/Jones situation, but they mainly relate to individual personal incidents and are largely irrelevant to this study. Commander in the Shadow 71

C.D. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Broiher, Allen and Unwin, Sydney. 1991

N. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Jonathan Cape, London. 1988

D. Gillison, Royal Australian Air TOrce J939 - 1942, Australian War Memorial,

Canberra 1962

G. Hartnett, The Problem of ('ommand in the Australian Defence Porce Environment,

The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University,

Canberra, 1983

J.E. Hewitt, Adversity in Success, Langate Publishing, South Yarra, 1980

D.M. Homer, High Command - Australia and Allied Strategy P939 - P)45, Australian

War Memorial, Canberra & George Allen and Unwm, Sydney. 1982

D. Jenkins, Battle Surface - Japan Submarine War Against Australia 1942 - 44,

Random House, Sydney. 1992

Sir George Jones, l^rom Private to Air Marshal, Greenhouse Publications, Richmond,

1988

George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, Office of Air Force History United States

Air Force, Washington Dc. 1987

G. Odgers, Air War Against Japan 1939 - 1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

1968

J. Prendergast, RAAPBatrnsdale, Bairnsdale, 1992

J. Robertson & J. McCarthy; Australian War Strategy 1939 - 1945 A Documentary

History, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia. 1985

A Stephens, Power Plus Attitude - Ideas, Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Australian

Air T'orce 1921 - 1991, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra,

1992 Commander in the Shadow 72

A. Stephens, Going Solo - The Royal Aiistrahan Air Torcc 1946 - 1971 ^ Australian

Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1995

G. Waters, Oboe Air Operaiions Over Borneo 1945, Air Power Studies Centre,

Canberra. 1995

R. Williams, These Are Taefs - The Autobiography of Sir Richard Williams,

Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Ser\'ice,

Canberra, 1977

An Illustrated Tjieyclopedia of Aircraft, Orbis Publishing Ltd, London. N.D.

Units of the Royal Australian Air Torce - A Concise History. Volumes 1- 10. Australian

Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 1995 Academy Library Commander in the shadow: Air Vice Marshal W.D. Bostock, 1942-1945/ thesis 1997 Wilson BARCODE: 428331