State-Specific Vulnerabilities to Russian Influence: a Case Study of Montenegro

MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH STUDIÍ Katedra politologie

State-Specific Vulnerabilities to Russian Influence: A Case Study of Montenegro

Magisterská práce

Elizabeth Anderson

Vedoucí práce: Dr. Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz UČO: 459085 Obor: Bezpečnostní a strategická studia Imatrikulační ročník: 2017 Brno, 2019

Čestné prohlášení Čestně prohlašuji, že jsem disertační práci s názvem State-Specific Vulnerabilities to Russian Influence: A Case Study of Montenegro vypracovala samostatně a uvedla veškerou použitou literaturu a prameny. V Brně dne 02.01.2019 Elizabeth Anderson

Poděkování Děkuji vedoucímu mé magisterské práce Dr. Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz za odborné vedení, cenné rady a připomínky, které umožnily vznik této práce.

3 Anotace: Tato diplomová práce analyzuje vliv Ruské federace využívající zranitelných míst, která existují v okolních suverénních státech. Černá Hora je zde použita jako případová studie, jež poukazuje na to, jak se pomlouvačné ruské vlivy zaměřují na zranitelnost státu v úsilí šířit chaos, diskreditovat západní instituce jako EU a NATO a přesouvat loajalitu ze Západu směrem k Rusku. Předpokladem této práce je fakt, aby bylo možno zabránit nežádoucímu ruskému vlivu, musí státy znát a následně odstranit svoji zranitelnost. Kvalitativní a kvantitativní výzkumy používané pro vývoj analytického modelu, který je hlavním výsledkem této práce, dokázaly, že nebezpečí spočívá v osmi hlavních kategoriích, ve kterých jsou kritické státy zranitelné: politická, ekonomická, náboženská, společenská, mediální, občansko- společenská, obranná a energetická. Jsou zde zobrazeny nástroje a ukazatele, které může každý stát použít k analýze své vlastní zranitelnosti. Vedle vytvoření tohoto modelu dospěla tato diplomová práce k závěru, že v Černé Hoře existuje velké nebezpečí zranitelnosti téměř na všech společenských úrovních, a to především z důvodu korupčního politického systému, který dovolil ničivým vlivům proniknout dovnitř státu a využít jeho slabých stránek. Rusko zde má potenciál ještě více zvýšit svůj vliv, pokud nebude zranitelnost státu vyřešena. To představuje velké riziko nejen pro Černou Horu, ale i pro oblast západního Balkánu, NATO a EU.

Klíčová slova: ruský vliv, Kreml, zranitelnost, matice, aktivní opatření, dezinformace, Černá Hora, západní Balkán, NATO, EU

Abstract: This diploma thesis analyzes the Russian Federation’s use of influence to exploit the vulnerabilities that exist in external sovereign states. Montenegro is used as a case study to show how malign Russian influences target state vulnerabilities in an effort to spread chaos, discredit Western institutions like the EU and NATO, and shift allegiances away from the West and towards Russia. The premise of this work is that in order to prevent undue Russian influence, states must know and rectify their vulnerabilities. Qualitative and quantitative research designs are applied to develop an analytical model, the main product of this thesis, that consists of the eight major categories where critical state vulnerabilities lie: political, economic, religious, societal, media, civil society, defense, and energy. Tools and indicators are presented that can be used by any state to analyze its own vulnerabilities. In addition to producing the vulnerability model, this thesis concludes that large vulnerabilities exist in Montenegro in nearly all levels of society, largely stemming from a corrupt political system that has allowed destructive influences to permeate and exploit its weaknesses. Russia has the potential to increase its impact even further if the vulnerabilities are not resolved. This poses a major risk not only for Montenegro, but also for the Western Balkan region, NATO, and the EU.

Keywords: Russian influence, Kremlin, vulnerabilities, model, active measures, disinformation, Montenegro, Western Balkans, NATO, EU

4 Table of Contents Chapter Page # 1. Introduction 6 2. Methodology 8 3. Previous Research on Vulnerabilities 11 4. The Contemporary Russian Threat 16 5. Why Montenegro? 27 6. Analysis of Montenegro 31 7. Summary of Delphi Analysis Results 65 8. The Creation of the Vulnerability Model 67

9. Conclusion 68 Exhibit A: Round One Delphi Analysis Questions 71 Exhibit B: Round One Delphi Response Summary 72 Exhibit C: Round Two Delphi Analysis Questions 75 Exhibit D: Round Two and Round Three Delphi Analysis Responses 77 Exhibit E: Vulnerability Model 78 References 87

počet znaků práce (number of characters in the thesis): 151,871

5 “Propaganda, disinformation, subversion, and malign influence have become a peacetime continuation of war by other means.” - Popescu & Zamfir (2018:3)

Chapter 1 : Introduction

As tensions between former Cold War rivals the United States and Russia appear to be growing, countries in the Western Balkans are facing increased pressures to choose sides and further align themselves with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or Russia. The media has jumped on these tensions and frequently alludes to the growing tension between the West1 and its allies on one side, and Russia on the other (Dorell 2018). In the midst of all the rhetoric from both Russian and Western sources, nationalism and fear of the “other” is growing, threatening to bring up ethnic rivalries and re-ignite the tensions that are scarcely buried under the surface in the Western Balkans. Influencing from the shadows and at times visibly from the very middle of all this is Russia. The increasing ferocity of the so-called Russian disinformation machine is thought to be compounding the polarization within nations and geographic regions throughout the world. Russia has infiltrated and is actively influencing the heated discourse, in an effort to drive an even larger wedge in societies than presently exists. New evidence of Russian interference is emerging almost daily, its tentacles reaching into nearly all levels of societies that are in, or desire closer ties to, the West. As such, now is the time to critically analyze how and why Russia is exerting malign influence in other countries. This thesis shall explore that theme and aims to produce meaningful research that will quantify Russian influence in real terms. In order to do so, Montenegro will be used as a case study. Montenegro is a small country of roughly 640,000 citizens located in the Western Balkans. The European Commission (2018) defines the Western Balkans as Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia. All of these countries have historical, cultural, and economic ties to Russia, which makes them particularly susceptible to its influence. With ill-defined borders, weak democratic institutions, and memories of the Yugoslav

1 For purposes of this thesis, the West and Western (collectively, the “Western world”) are defined as the United States, Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Western institutions are those institutions that are based in the West, chiefly the EU and NATO. For more on the definition of West, see Huntington (1996).

6 conflicts of the 1990s still present in the minds of most citizens, this region is constantly at risk of conflicts rekindling and boiling over. Federica Mogherini, the EU’s foreign policy chief, stated that “the Western Balkans [are] these days much more than ever before a region exposed to different layers of challenges and tensions [and] can easily become one of the chessboards where the big power game can be played” (Mogherini 2017). With a few notable exceptions, there has been minimal academic, country- specific research on the implications of Russia’s growing influence in the Western Balkans.2 Despite publicity surrounding high profile Russian influence operations - like the 2016 Montenegrin attempted coup organized by Russian agents, or the 2017 cyber attacks – the true depth of Russian influence in Montenegro and what this means for the country is largely unidentified. This thesis aims to fill that void by providing a thorough picture of Montenegro’s vulnerabilities to Russian influence. It also aims to develop a model that will allow analysts from any country to examine their country’s own vulnerabilities. A major goal of any Russian influence campaign is to target and exploit weaknesses in states. The ultimate goal is to drive a country's ideologies and allegiances away from the West and towards Russia. If a country does not understand its own vulnerabilities to external influence, it is ill prepared to prevent outsiders like Russia from changing it in irreparable ways.

A. Outline of Thesis This thesis is organized into nine chapters. The first chapter contains the introduction and broad outline of this thesis. The second covers methodology, theory, and previous research on state vulnerabilities to external influence. The third contains an overview of previous research on vulnerabilities to Russian influence. The fourth chapter presents a discussion around how to best understand the contemporary Russian threat along and the goals of the Kremlin’s influence operations, tactics, and goals. The fifth chapter offers up an overview of why Montenegro was chosen as the case study for this analysis. The sixth chapter delves into the specific analysis of Montenegro’s vulnerabilities with the seventh continuing the analysis with data from the Delphi analysis. The eighth chapter explains the vulnerability model that was

2 See Bechev (2017) for more information on Russia’s increasing influence in Southeastern Europe and the Western Balkans specifically.

7 created as a result of this research and can be used for an analyst in any country to measure the vulnerabilities that exist to Russian influence. And lastly, the ninth chapter is a brief summary of the research outcomes and conclusions reached through this thesis.

Chapter 2: Theory and Methodology

A. Research Questions

This thesis aims to answer three main research questions:

1. How and why is Russia exerting influence on external sovereign states? 2. What vulnerabilities exist in Montenegro that could be exploited by Russia to destabilize the country and how are these vulnerabilities be exploited by Russia? 3. How should nation-specific vulnerabilities to malign external influence be measured and can a dynamic, replicable model be constructed that measures said vulnerabilities?

The answers to these questions will be explored throughout this thesis and summarized in Chapter 9.

B. Conceptualization Given that no model exists today that is easily replicable to measure a state’s vulnerabilities, one was developed for this thesis using aspects of previous Russian influence indices as a guide. The model that was developed for this thesis takes into account how Russia has exerted its influence in nearly every region of the world, but particularly the Baltics, Caucasus, Black Sea, and Central European regions. These regions have been most aggressively targeted by Russian influence campaigns, therefore, the data is of higher quality and the states have a better understanding of the Russian tactics and patterns. These previous models will be discussed in Chapter 3. The model developed through this thesis contains the following broad categories: Political, Economic, Religious, Civil Society, Military (Security), Societal, Media, and Energy. These categories form the backbone in which this thesis research lies.

C. Level of Analysis The main level of analysis or referent object of this analysis is the state. According to Buzan (1991:66), a state has three main components: a physical base of population and territory, governing institutions of some sort which control the physical base, and the presence of some idea of the state which establishes its authority in the minds of its people. These three components, along with size and sovereignty define what is a state. Every state in the world is vulnerable in some way to military and economic threats, and many states are also vulnerable due to their political insecurity (Buzan 1991:66). The varying components of a state are vulnerable to different things and in different ways, which makes national security difficult (Buzan 1991:67). The calculations that each state must make regarding its national security are unique to the state, given that no two states look exactly the same. Thus, security must be mapped in relation to specific cases, hence specific states, in order to understand both the strength of the state and its particular vulnerabilities (Buzan 1991:67). It is for this reason that analysis of a state makes the most sense when analyzing vulnerabilities to Russian influence. Further, the vulnerabilities that a state has the most power to change are those that occur within its own borders.

D. Case Study Research In a similar vein to Buzan (1991), Ragin (1992) and Van der Heijden (2004) discuss the usefulness of cases study analysis in social sciences research. Ragin states that examination of a larger issue through the lens of a case allows us to “bring operational closure to some problematic relationship between ideas and evidence, between theory and data” (Ragin 1992: 218) According to Van der Heijden (2014: 43), a case is a real-world occurrence of a social phenomenon. The analysis of how Russia conducts influence campaigns has much more depth when viewed with a specific example as opposed to merely theorizing about how it influences. Yin (2014:2) states that case study research is the favored method for answering research questions that are how or why in nature, of which the researcher has little control over events, and where the study is contemporary. He adds to the conceptualization of a case study in the preceding paragraph by describing the methodological characteristics that are features of a case study. Namely that case

9 study inquiry “copes with a technically distinctive situation in which there will be may more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin 2014:17). The reasons that Montenegro was chosen as the case study for this thesis are described in depth in Chapter 5.

E. Research Methods This research is mixed method, consisting of both qualitative and quantitative analysis, and uses theories from security studies and vulnerability analyses from economics, political sciences, conflict theory and psychology to understand Russian influence in sovereign states. These theories will be discussed in Chapter 4.

1. Qualitative Methods The qualitative portion of this thesis featured two main strategies of data collection. The first was through a critical analysis of Russian influence from of primary and secondary sources such as government and strategy documents, newspaper articles, academic journals and books, policy papers, and historical records. The second method was through use of the Delphi method of analysis and personal interviews conducted between October 2018 and January 2019. The Delphi method assesses what “could be” by soliciting the opinions of experts in an attempt to determine potential outcomes and forecast future situations on difficult subjects. It was originally created in the 1950s by the RAND Corporation as a process tool and framework for reaching a consensus on a complex issue.3 It is based on the results of several rounds of questioning which occurs via questionnaires sent to a panel of experts on a particular topic. The anonymous responses are collected, summarized, and distributed to the experts after each round. For the purposes of this paper, the Delphi technique consisted of three rounds of questioning. The first round consisted of ten questions. The second round consisted of ten more questions, which were generated based on responses to the first round of questioning. The third round consisted of all participants being sent a consolidated

3 For more on the Delphi method, see https://www.rand.org/topics/delphi-method.html

10 summary sheet with all responses and being asked to comment on anything they disagreed with. The participants had the opportunity to review all summarized responses from the first two rounds, which were condensed and anonymous. The goal of this process was to come up with the most complete picture of Montenegro’s vulnerabilities, potential for destabilization, and susceptibility to influence operations. The participants in the Delphi process are considered world- renowned experts on Montenegro and the Western Balkans. The panel included former ambassadors and foreign dignitaries from various countries to Montenegro and to NATO, academics, policy experts and fellows from top think tanks in Europe, the US, and in the Balkans, as well as members of civil society in Montenegro. Each expert possesses unique and relevant knowledge of local conditions in Montenegro, and how Montenegro interacts with varying regional players, states and international institutions. The qualitative portions of the research are addressed mainly in Chapters 3 and 4 with the analysis of Russian influence and qualitative aspects of the vulnerabilities in Montenegro.

2. Quantitative Methods The quantitative portions of this thesis also consist of two parts. First, quantitative calculations were derived to determine the greatest vulnerabilities to Montenegro based on the opinions of experts tied to numerical values. Second, a model was developed that contains quantitative measurements of vulnerabilities to measure the degree of a country’s weaknesses. The model was created with the intention of being highly replicable and useful for any analyst in a given country to measure state vulnerabilities to influence by a foreign actor. The categories that were developed for analysis are political, economic, religious, civil society, military (security), societal, media, and energy. The quantitative methods are explored in Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis.

Chapter 3: Previous Research on Vulnerabilities

For purposes of this paper, vulnerabilities are defined broadly as the inherent characteristics of a system that create the potential for harm (Sarewitz et al. 2003: 805). The word vulnerability is used frequently in security analysis, particularly when thinking about conflict potential, but there is no consensus on specific criteria for

11 evaluating and measuring vulnerabilities. Research on vulnerabilities has begun to slowly increase, potentially as a result of a more refined understanding of how malign actors – particularly Russia – have been targeting them within other sovereign states, but is still incomplete. The most comprehensive information on Russia’s modus operandi of targeting vulnerabilities has come from the non-profit sector. So far, the academic community has been lagging behind. This chapter shall present the research to date on how to measure vulnerabilities to Russian influence. Portions of these four studies were expanded and enhanced to make the vulnerability model in Chapter 6 of this thesis.

A. Propaganda Made-To-Measure In 2018, Global Focus published a study on Russia’s practice of targeting vulnerabilities in other states as part of their Global Focus Asymmetric Threats Programme. The study, called “Propaganda Made-to-Measure: How Our Vulnerabilities Facilitate Russian Influence,” focused on the Black Sea region countries of Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova. According to the findings of the Global Focus study, it is critical for each state to understand its vulnerabilities and “respond to the perceived broader legitimacy and institutional gaps that provide the necessary societal fuel for Russian active measures campaigns” (Popescu & Zamfir 2017: 6). The authors designed this study, the first of its kind, to fill a critical gap in propaganda research by focusing on the vulnerabilities that create space for subversion, interference, and aggression to enter the society, as opposed to focusing on the propagandist’s themselves. (Popescu & Zamfir 2017: 7) Their study found Russia attempts to sabotage EU/NATO members and those who desire to pursue that path, through disinformation, clientelism, 4 using rentseeking networks towards state capture,5 economic leverage, and covert ownership through local oligarchs. Russia’s ultimate goal is to “amplify existing fractures to

4 Clientelism is defined by Merriam-Webster as “a political or social system based on the relation of client to patron with the client giving political or financial support to a patron (as in the form of votes) in exchange for some special privilege or benefit.” Merriam- Webster. 2018. “Clientelism.” Merriam-Webster.com. Accessed 01 November 2018 (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/clientelism). 5 Rent-Seeking is defined by Investopedia as “an individual's or entity's use of company, organizational or individual resources to obtain economic gain without reciprocating any benefits to society through wealth creation.” Investopedia. 2018. “Rent-Seeking.” Accessed on 01 December, 2018. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rentseeking.asp

12 reach a tipping point” whereby states turn away from the West and towards Russia, exhibiting Russian ideologies, and becoming reliant on Russia in the process (Popescu & Zamfir 2017: 8). Through this study, a Propaganda Permeability Index was also created. This index measures how permeable a country is to outside influence. They measured along four main domains: Society; Politics; Economics; and Foreign Policy, Security, and Defense (Popescu & Zamfir 2017: 243-244). They surveyed experts in each of the studied countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova) as they believe that experts are more “knowledgeable concerning a country's specific vulnerabilities in each specialized domain than nationally representative samples” (Popescu & Zamfir 2017: 247). While this study does a truly excellent job of highlighting the vulnerabilities in the Black Sea region states that were studied with exceptional detail, it is lacking in terms of creating the model that is replicable. The model that is produced does not go into detail on how to specifically measure vulnerabilities, or precisely what data expert were using when they came to conclusions on the weights of vulnerabilities. As a result, the Propaganda Permeability Index is quite interesting, but it is difficult to understand how to operationalize this model for use in research on another country.

B. Vulnerability Index Another interesting piece of work is the Vulnerability Index created by GLOBESEC with contributions from several prominent Central European NGOs. This study of subversive Russian influence sought to map and compare the vulnerabilities in the Visegrad group. The Visegrad group, more commonly referred to as V4, consists of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The Vulnerability Index was meant to inform decision makers from Central European countries and measures a set of societal and political indicators, opinion poll data, the political landscape, structure of the media, and the state of civil society (Milo & Klingova 2017: 5). As part of the process, expert interviews were conducted via a questionnaire and then assigned values in an attempt to make the vulnerability index comparable within and between countries. The information contained in the study is quite informative and recommendations are solid best practices. However, similar to the Propaganda Permeability Index created by Popescu and Zamfir, the Vulnerability Index does not lay out about how to make the index replicable in other countries or regions. To be fair, the study does not lay this out as a research goal or intention,

13 however, given the wealth of data contained in the report, it would be useful to not only see what experts were asked, but to have the information for analysis on other countries.

C. The Kremlin Influence Index The Kremlin Influence Index is a quantitative tool designed by Detector Media in Ukraine in partnership with European Values in the Czech Republic, Media Development Foundation in Georgia and Political Capital in Hungary (Detector Media 2017: 3). The objective of the index is “to measure the capacity of Russian Federation Government to influence (initiate, change) the processes in the information space (production, exchange and consuming of information) of other countries” (Detector Media 2017: 3). The index is a pilot project that measures Kremlin influence in Ukraine, Czech Republic, Georgia, and Hungary. Informational influence is measured in the following dimensions: political, media, and civil society. Of all the models presented in this section, the Kremlin Influence Index does the best job of describing how to operationalize the model. However, similar to the other models, it also relies solely on expert opinions and questionnaires. This leads to the same potential bias issues as the other studies and does not show where and how to find the information contained in the index on one’s own.

D. Kremlin Playbook One of the best contributions to analyzing vulnerabilities to Russian influence is a 2018 study completed by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) and the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD). The Kremlin Playbook, as it is so aptly named, lays out the varying ways that Russia exerts political and economic influence over Central and Eastern European countries. Through case studies of five countries, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Serbia, and Slovakia, measured from 2004-2014, researchers concluded that a) there is at general decline in governance standards in the region, and b) it can be tied to Russia’s interference and influence there. “Russia has cultivated an opaque network of patronage across the region that it uses to influence and direct decision making [in an] un-virtuous circle of Russian influence…to gain influence [and often control] over critical state institutions, bodies, and the economy…to shape national policies and decisions [in the targeted state(s)]” (Conley et al. 2016: X). The major findings of this research are that Russian influence

14 typically follows two paths, both of which have a goal of manipulating and interfering in a country’s domestic affairs. The first is through exploitation of weaknesses in a country’s economic systems, and the second through actively seeking to destroy democracy from within by pressing on political divides, developing relationships and supporting aspiring opposition leaders and autocrats, influencing political parties particularly nationalists, populists, and anti-EU groups (Conley et al. 2016: XI). Though Russia uses similar tactics in each targeted nation, how they implement theses tactics is different depending on local circumstances. In order to determine Russia’s influence on the economy, the following areas were measured: corporate presence of Russian businesses, Russian direct investment, trade relationships (bilateral accounts balance), private ownership and investments, and the share of Russian business in the overall economy as measured by turnover and assets and employment indicators of Russian owned and controlled businesses (Conley et al. 2016: XI). As stated, the research presented in the Kremlin Playbook is one of the most complete descriptions of Russia’s targeting of vulnerabilities, however, it too has its weaknesses. The main vulnerability measures identified are all in the economic sphere. While this is very useful, and many of the economic measures used in the report are also used in the Vulnerability Model developed for this thesis, it is missing an analysis of many other factors that also have a large impact.

E. Weaknesses of Previous Research The four reports mentioned in this section are all useful, but all suffer from various weaknesses in their ability to be replicated. If a model is to be the most valuable and claims to be replicable to the wider community, it must include measures that can be applied to other case studies, or at least a description to point others in the right direction for their own research. Also, the indices listed all rely on the inputs from experts answering questions and quantify influence. The opinions of experts are extremely valuable, but as the research conducted for this thesis shows (discussed in Chapter 5), experts are not always aligned in terms of the biggest vulnerabilities or their scale and magnitude. Therefore, relying on their opinions alone is limited and creates a potential selection bias. It is due to weaknesses in the

15 currently published models that a new model was developed for this thesis. It aims to be comprehensive and user friendly for analysts in any country to use.6

Chapter 4: The Contemporary Russian Threat

Section 1: The Semantics and Theories of Russian Influence

There are several critical semantic nuances that must be understood when discussing Russian influence. First, two semantic definitions must be established. It is said that ‘the Kremlin is Russia and Russia is the Kremlin.’ Similarly, ‘Putin is the Kremlin and the Kremlin is Putin.’ While this is surely a bit of hyperbole, it nevertheless rings true. Russian President Vladimir Putin has a strong grip on power in the country and is thought to have a hand in nearly all Russian government (Kremlin) initiatives particularly with regard to influence abroad. As a result of the Kremlin being Russia, and Russia being the Kremlin, the words “Kremlin” and “Russia” will be used interchangeably in this thesis, as will the phrases “Russian influence” or “Kremlin influence.” Second, Russia typically exerts itself in ways that upon first glance appear benign or mutually beneficial to all involved. However, history has shown that these deals and contracts are never purely economic (or altruistic) and always entail Russia’s receipt of benefits that are larger than what appear on the surface or is captured in the books. Therefore, throughout this paper, ‘Russian influence' will be used as a blanket term for malign, hostile and opaque influence from Russia. If ever influence described in ways that are known to be beneficial to all involved, it will be highlighted as such.

A. Hard and Soft Power

6 The original intention for this thesis was to use one of these four models and apply them to Montenegro. However, after further exploration, it was determined that the models were either missing essential measures identified in other reports on Russian influence, and/or there was no way to replicate them appropriately based on the information provided. As such, the desire to create a new, more replicable model emerged. Further, all previous models rely on expert opinions for research. Some analysts may not have access to experts, but still want to analyze their country’s vulnerabilities. The vulnerability model developed in this thesis will allow them to do so in ways the other published indices do not.

16 Hard Power and Soft Power are often used to describe Russian influence. Joseph Nye was the first to define these terms. Soft power originally dealt merely with the power of attraction, not of an actor’s actual ability to wield influence (Winnerstig 2014: 15). It if most often used today in the context of Russian influence and describes “the ability of an actor to wield power in a number of non-military, non-traditional ways, such as through disgruntled minority groups, media outlets, the entertainment industry, and the domestic political system of another country” (Winnerstig 2014: 10). Vladimir Putin defined soft power in 2012 as “a complex of tools and methods to achieve foreign policy goals without the use of force, through information and other means of influence” (Nye 2017). Soft power is non-coercive as opposed to hard power, which involves the use of force to get what one wants. Hard power is typically exhibited in the military and economic realms and typically always involves coercion (Kounalakis & Simonyi 2011: 5). It can include bribes and other forms of leverage in additional to traditional displays of physical force. According to Nye, the combination of the two – soft and hard power – is called smart power (Kounalakis & Simonyi 2011: 9). It refers to achieving the sweet spot, so to speak, and means that a state has effectively used both means to achieve its desired end. In Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine, modern warfare is described as entailing “the integrated utilization of military force and forces and resources of a nonmilitary character…[and] the prior implementation of measures of information warfare in order to achieve political objectives without the use of force” (Putin 2014: 4). This Russian definition is pretty similar to the definition of smart power.

B. Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid warfare has often been used, most frequently by the United States, as an umbrella term to refer to the new type of Russia threat facing the West. Hybrid war is described as the “marriage of conventional deterrence and insurgent tactics” (Lanoszka 2016: 175). As has been contemplated by Carl von Clausewitz, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, T. E. Lawrence, Mao Zedong direct, traditional military conflicts typically benefit the strong (Lanoszka 2016: 175-194). The weaker adversary’s level of success is therefore dependent on its ability to use non-traditional, often indirect methods of fighting its opposition. It is postulated that Russia uses hybrid war tactics because it is the weaker force militarily when compared to the

17 United States and NATO. However, there are some problems with this overly simplistic conceptualization. The stronger party in any conflict also employs indirect, non-physical methods of fighting, as has been seen throughout history. When we view the definition provided above of hybrid war as the marriage of conventional deterrence and insurgent tactics in comparison to the definition of war - the military action between states (Rumpt 1938: 1) - it becomes clear that the definition of hybrid war is nonsensical. The term hybrid war is not specific enough to be something outside of the normal tactics of war. War almost always involves some element of deception. We can find an example in nearly every war and conflict going back hundreds of years.7 Given that the nature of war has changed with the advent of new technologies and tactics, it doesn’t make sense to use a designation that really could just be called “war.” Despite the fact that the term is perhaps insufficient, it will be seen a few times in this research as some notable academics have used it to characterize of Russian influence and those works should not be discarded just because hybrid war as a term is inefficient.

C. Hybrid Threats

Another somewhat similar phrase used to describe Russian influence is hybrid threat, sometimes also called hybrid acts. The Hybrid Threats Center of Excellence (Hybrid COE) is an international hub that assists EU and NATO member states and institutions in understanding and defending against hybrid threats. It is based in Helsinki, Finland and defines hybrid threats in the following way:

7 One prominent example is Napoleon, whose tactics could also fall under today’s traditional definition of hybrid war. Napoleon’s military genius was largely a result of his capacity to understand the enemy and apply this intelligence to manipulate the thoughts of his opposition. The Battle of Austerlitz was but just one example of Napoleon’s ability to capitalize on this factor as Napoleon was able to convince Austrian and Russian Allied leaders that he was afraid of going to battle with them, and that he had fewer troops than he did in actuality. The Allies were quickly outwitted by Napoleon’s ability to manipulate them into doing exactly what he wanted them to do resulting in a victory by Napoleon. Clearly Napoleon was not thinking in terms of hybrid war, he was just occupied with winning a war and employed all tactics necessary to do so. If hybrid war can accurately be applied to wars that were won and lost hundreds of years ago, the terms is clearly insufficient to describe the type of conflicts we are facing today.

18 • “Coordinated and synchronized action, that deliberately targets democratic states’ and institutions systemic vulnerabilities, through a wide range of means (political, economic, military, civil, and information).

• Activities that exploit the thresholds of detection and attribution as well as the border between war and peace.

• The aim is to influence different forms of decision making at the local (regional), state, or institutional level to favor and/or gain the agent’s strategic goals while undermining and/or hurting the target” (Hybrid CoE 2018)

Many countries, particularly in Central Europe, have adopted the definition of hybrid threats to be the most accurate depiction of the nature of the Russian threat.8

D. Active Measures

Hybrid threats, influence and interference are all part of Russian active measures. Active measures were and are actions and tools of political warfare conducted by Soviet and then Russian security services in an effort to influence the course of events throughout the world on large and small scales. Their goal is to manipulate the opinions of individuals both abroad and domestically. Active measures have been a major tool in Russia’s playbook since the days of the Soviet Union, where a major role within multiple KGB departments was to cook up and disseminate disinformation. According to retired KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin, “the heart and soul of Soviet intelligence were active measures to weaken the West, drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly NATO, to sow discord among allies, to weaken the United States in the eyes of the people of Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and thus to prepare ground in case the war really occurs. To make America more vulnerable to the anger and distrust of other peoples… not only sponsored and funded, but conducted and manipulated by the KGB….to weaken [the] military, economic and psychological climate in the West” (Kalugin 1998). In this way, active

8 Hybrid Threats can be seen in many current National Security Strategies and publications from governmental security agencies. The most recent being the Czech Republic’s counterintelligence agency, BIS’, annual report found here: https://ww.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocni-zpravy/en/ar2017en.pdf

19 measures (or hybrid threats) are a bit like an insurgency, which is described by David Kilkullen as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control” (Kilkullen 2010:1).

E. Influence and Information Operations

Russia’s active measures have also been described as influence operations or information operations. Influence operations “describe efforts to influence a target audience, whether an individual leader, members of a decision making group, military organizations and personnel, specific population subgroups, or mass publics” (RAND 2009: xi). Stephen Blank, a prominent Russian military scholar defines information operations as tactics that “encompass broad, socio-psychological manipulation” (Blank 2014). As can be seen, all these definitions are relatively similar and are often interchanged. However, in general, information operations are thought to involve more the output of information and influence operations to involve more pushing someone to act in a certain way without the use of force. Russia does not have the vast economic and military resources required for it to be a true global power, nor does it have the resources for a physical war with the United States, NATO, or the EU countries together (Meister 2018: 4). Therefore, instead of ruling by sheer physical power, they must use other tactics to exert influence and tilt the globe in the Russian direction to “increase its weight and authority” in the world (Persson 2014:17). The Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 states that the use of soft power is a way to achieve this end (Persson 2014:17). Russia has been perfecting these tactics since Soviet times. The advent of social media has played into Russia’s hand by making it easy to spread and disseminate disinformation (one of the chief tactics of Russian soft power and influence) cheaply and effectively. Perhaps the best conceptualization of Russian influence is from Sergey Chekinov. Chekinov is the head of the Russian General Staff Academy’s Center for Military-Strategic Research. In 2013 he wrote:

“Asymmetric actions will be used extensively to level off the enemy’s superiority in armed struggle by a combination of political, economic,

20 information, technological, and ecological campaigns in the form of indirect actions and nonmilitary measures. In its new technological format, the indirect action strategy will draw on, above all, a great variety of forms and methods of non-military techniques and non-military measures, including information warfare to neutralize adversary actions without resorting to weapons (through indirect actions), by exercising information superiority, in the first place […] Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the aggressive side will be first to use nonmilitary actions and measures as it plans to attack its victim in a new- generation war. With powerful information technologies at its disposal, the aggressor will make an effort to involve all public institutions in the country it intends to attack, primarily the mass media” (Chekinov 2013)

Russian use of active measures, hostile influence, and asymmetric measures, regardless of the name used to describe it, is not a new phenomenon. Technology has improved, but Russia’s hybrid threat has been around for decades, perhaps even centuries. Merely putting a new name on it does not make it an entirely new phenomenon. Thus, the name use to describe hostile Russian influence is less important than actually understanding what it is. For purposes of this paper, the broad concept will most often be referred to as Russian influence. It is known that the intent is hostile, even if it initially appears benign. It is known to be subversive, in that its true intent is almost always hidden, and it is both a threat and a tactic of war.

Section 2: Understanding Russian Goals

The world according to Russia is black and white, a zero-sum game of winners and losers in international affairs, and Russia doesn’t want to be the loser (Jensen & Doran 2018:8). Russia fundamentally disagrees with the West on what the proper international order should be 9 and interprets any advances by the West (particularly the US or NATO) towards the East as an unwanted encroachment on Russia’s sphere of influence (Jensen & Doran 2018:9). Viewed from the black and white paradigm, it is impossible for countries to remain “neutral” and for decisions to be interpreted as purely economic or political – each state is either with Russia or

9 This disagreement goes back to the end of World War II. For more information on this topic, see Judt, Tony. 2005. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. New York: Penguin Group.

21 against it.10 From the standpoint of Russia, the West clearly against it. Thus Russia has one main objective: to weaken the West and strengthen the Kremlin. If we look at the most recent Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved in 2014, we see that the number one external military threat to Russia is NATO.11 The purpose of Russia’s Military Doctrine is not to be a national security strategy, but rather to send a message to Russia’s allies and adversaries (Oliker 2015). Russia’s doctrine is “primarily a strategy of influence, not brute force…to break the internal coherence of the enemy system” (Conley 2016: X). Russia’s unhappiness with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact12 reverberates today. 13 The combination of the two left Russia without its so-called buffer zone of countries standing between it and the West.

A. Russian Historical Significance

The end of the Cold War marked the first time since the 17th century that Russia truly appeared weak and insignificant on the world stage. In the 17th century, Peter the Great became Imperial Russia’s first tsar and brought modernization, power, education, and prestige to the country (Kort 2008). In the 18th century, Catherine the Great led the country to significant military victories into its Golden Age and recognition as one of Europe’s great powers (Kort 2008). Then, in 1812, Tsar Alexander I defeated Napoleon, leading to the end of the Napoleonic conquests (Kort 2008). From that point on, Russia’s rise to power seemed nearly certain, despite

10 Russia is not the only country that operates in this paradigm. Many have also argued that the US also has this “with us or against us mentality,” and many politicians have famously stated it, notably George W. Bush’s statements on the fight against terrorism. 11 The 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation expressly states, “The main external military risks are: A) build-up of the power potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and vesting NATO with global functions carried out in violation of the rules of international law, bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries near the borders of the Russian Federation, including by further expansion of the alliance” (Putin 2014: 2). 12 The Warsaw Pact was signed in 1955 and was a collective defense treaty between the Soviet Union, Albania, Poland, Romania, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The treaty set up a unified military command and specified that the members would come to the defense of any member attacked by an outside force. For more information see: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_138294.htm 13 It must be noted that prior to the Cold War, and for over a hundred years before this time, Russia was pursuing both expansionist visions as well as being wary of any encroachment on its territories.

22 deepening domestic issues at home. The 19th century ushered in new tsars who introduced further reforms that began industrializing the country. Abroad, Russia competed with the British Empire for power in Central Asia and the Caucasus in what was dubbed the Great Game. Russia was on the rise on the global stage, and even the Russian Revolution of 1917 did not stop it. Then the war periods began. Russia (then the Soviet Union) was a significant force in both World War I and II, despite massive domestic issues at home. Almost immediately after the end of World War II, tensions between the United States and its Allies, and the Soviet Union and its satellites began to rise. The Cold War began. Tensions escalated for the next fifty years, with both sides battling tit-for-tat for control and influence throughout the world. The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Though the West clearly views the collapse of the Soviet Union as a major victory, for Russia it was the ultimate humiliation. Russia’s domestic situation, economy, and international prestige shattered, and the country limped along for the next decade (Rumer 2017). A desire to of restore global balance and right wrongs inflicted on Russia by the West in the 1990s has been at the forefront of Russian minds since Putin came into power on December 31, 1999 (Rumer 2017). Despite initial calls for better relations between the West and Russia, Putin’s mistrust of the West quickly returned, and the two competing ideologies have been on a relative crash-course of escalating tensions for nearly two decades.

B. Opportunism and Chaos According to Galeotti (2017a), there “appears to be no master plan, but rather a broad [Russian] strategy of weakening the European Union and NATO, distancing Europe and the United States from each other, and creating a political and cultural environment more conducive to Moscow and its interests.” Jensen & Doran (2018) argue that Russia’s modern strategic goals are a mix of prometheanism and chaos, with the ultimate goal of creating an environment in which the side that “cope best with chaos wins” (Jensen & Doran 2018: 16). The broad underlying goal is to divide society and poke cleavages of public discontent and distrust wherever they may be found (Kofman and Rojansky 2015). In this way, Russia’s strategy is largely one of opportunism. Though its application has existed for centuries, prometheanism is a strategy originally coined by 20th century Polish statesman Józef Piłsudski. In short, Piłsudski

23 sought to destroy the Soviet Union by fostering nationalism in its republics and amongst ethnic groups by creating divisions and distractions across the empire. The goal was to capitalize on the Soviet Union’s vulnerabilities ultimately destroying it in the process (Turner 2015: 5). Jensen & Doran argue that promethianism is widely applicable today when speaking about the strategy of Russia and define it as “the calculated application of nonlinear statecraft (e.g. the use of disinformation, subversion, etc.) to weaken an opponent by the creation of internal divisions at home and external isolation abroad” (Jensen & Doran 2018: 14). Russia is quite adept at dealing with corruption, chaos, and informal off-the-books methods of achieving a desired end, hence Russia thrives in an environment of “controlled destabilization” (Meister 2018: 4). For Russia “survival is the goal. Chaos is the means” (Jensen & Doran 2018: 11). Similar to how Piłsudski sought to destroy the Soviet Union – by creating divisions within the empire - Russia seeks to destroy the West from within by attacking and exploiting individual countries within the international system.

Section 3: Russia’s Use of Disinformation

“The most powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skillful, and obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable, and conditional.”—Vladimir Lenin (in Abrams 2016: 7).

Though Russia has a certain set of tactics they use to create this corrosive discord and chaos, the particular ways they target each country is different. Russia desires to “reduce the credibility of governments and politicians, to disturb the functioning of democratic institutions or the media, and to discredit Western liberalism in general” (Meister 2018: 17). According to Meiser, Putin’s main objective is to weaken his foreign opponents by undermining the self-confidence they and those they represent feel, thus making the “Russian way” look more favorable (Ibid: 4). Russia can pursue and be quite successful in its goal of weakening the

24 Western liberal order and speeding up its disintegration, but it lacks the policies to create a sustainable alternative system that is more than just disruption (Ibid: 4). Therefore, its long-term viability as an alternative to the Western world order is lacking. Nevertheless, Russia’s goal is not necessarily to create a new world order, but to destroy the one that exists by chipping away at public confidence in institutions that Russia views as under Western control (Kofman and Rojansky 2015). There are a number of ways that Russia typically does this, but disinformation often touches them all. Disinformation is perhaps the most pervasive tactic Russia uses today. Disinformation is defined as “false information deliberately and often covertly spread (as by the planting of rumors) in order to influence public opinion or obscure the truth” (Merriam-Webster 2018). The spreading of disinformation has become one of the most ubiquitous and successful tools Russia uses to influence a society and deliberately confuse and befuddle its populous. New York Times has quite appropriately summarized the key tactics Russia employs in its 7 Commandments of Fake News: Rule 1 - Look for cracks in the target society social - divisions you can exploit, such as economic, social, demographic linguistic, ethnic, regional differences. Emphasize the divisions so people begin to lose trust in each other, then do whatever you can to make it all worse. Rule 2 – Create a lie that is so outrageous, no one could possibly believe that it is made up. Rule 3 – Wrap the lie around a kernel of truth so people think or know that parts of it are true, therefore accept the rest as truth as well. Rule 4 – Conceal your hand. Don’t let it be known that the story came from you. Make it seem as though the story came from somewhere else, not from you by using other entities to publish or be named in it. Unfortunately, people don’t usually search for the origin. Rule 5 – Find a useful idiot. The useful idiot is someone who will unwittingly take the message (disguised of course as coming from the actual source) and push it out to the masses. Rule 6 – If the truth is uncovered, adamantly deny everything. People have a short attention span and will forget about it all relatively quickly.

25 Rule 7 – Play the long game. As pertains to Russia, they are absolutely willing to play a long game, put large resources on things that may not have any impact for a long time. The amalgamation of all these operations over a long period of time will have a detrimental impact much larger than short-term gains (Ellick and Westbrook 2018).

The “absence of immediately visible consequences of Russia’s adversarial activity makes it harder to identify the manipulative agenda behind and might well conceal the fact that Russia is, nevertheless, relentlessly pushing its agenda” (Popescu and Zamfir 2018). Russia targets its disinformation to most effectively hit different cultures, states, regions, and groups of people in ways that will have the biggest impact on them. Thus, the disinformation stories for the Montenegro are completely different than would be disinformation in Germany given that the societies are very distinct. Russia produces different disinformation based on socioeconomic groups (EU vs Disinfo 2018a). They use different channels for different audiences – in some societies, dedicated news outlets exist that are the prominent means of spreading disinformation. In other societies, there is more prevalence in social media (Ibid). Mejias and Vokuev (2017) present a particularly poignant and relevant case that describes how Russia used propaganda and disinformation in Ukraine (Mejias and Vokuev 2017). They found that not only is Russian state-supported media disseminating propaganda, the citizens themselves are the most active in its dissemination. Citizens actively participate in their own disenfranchisement by using social media to generate, consume, or distribute false information, contributing to a new order where disinformation acquires increasing authority (Ibid). Disinformation feeds on emotion. It appeals to the target group it is intending to influence in a way that is intended to elicit some type of emotional reaction regardless of whether the information is factual or not. In this way, according to Jenkins, “warfare today has less to do with what happens on the battlefield and more to do with the manipulation of perceptions” (Jenkins 2016: 2) Typically viewed as tactics separate to disinformation, but sometimes also a part of it, Russia widely uses deflection, outright lies, shaming and blaming. Russia widely uses botnets and trolls to disseminate disinformation unbeknownst to end-users or those who are sharing disinformation on social media. As time goes by, these disinformation networks are becoming more sophisticated and

26 easier to exploit. Most Twitter and Facebook users have no idea that the information they are sharing does not come from a person at all, but from computer programs scheduled to perform tasks on behalf of users or interests that have nothing to do and are complete manipulation and disinformation (Agarwal et al. 2017). This information is twisted and convoluted to portray Russian interests in a positive light. In places like Montenegro, where there is a tendency to side with Russia anyway, Russia’s use of bots and trolls to spread disinformation and increase its influence is particularly dangerous.

CHAPTER 5: Why Montenegro as a Case Study?

Montenegro is also a nation with deeply entrenched historical narratives – a country where historical recollection, folklore, and longstanding family ties drive many present-day thoughts and perspectives. It is one of the only countries in Europe that still actively refers to its tribes. Though also a very Western and modern society, Montenegro also deeply values its traditions, which often muddies the water particularly when it comes to Russia. With a population of a little more than 650,000 citizens, Montenegro is NATO’s newest and smallest member. It joined the Alliance controversially and without a majority of public support in June 2017 (Central Intelligence Agency 2018). Though Montenegro is small, its admission into NATO is viewed to be a big win for the Alliance. The NATO win, however, is not in terms of what Montenegro can provide militarily – it has an army of a mere 2,000 soldiers - but in terms of the message it sends to Russia and other Western Balkan nations. Citizens of Montenegro, on the other hand, do not quite view NATO membership as a big win. According to a public opinion poll conducted in 2017, the population feels quite apprehensive about being a part of NATO with 51% of the population against NATO membership, and only 43% of the population in support of it (Center for Insights in Survey Research 2017). Generally, 54% of the population view the role of NATO in the world as either somewhat negative or negative, versus only 40% who view it as somewhat positive or positive (Ibid). As a point of reference, according to a survey by Pew Research Centre, 61% of people across all other NATO member countries view NATO favorable, including a majority of people in every NATO country with the exception of Spain, Greece, and Turkey (Fagan 2018).

27 Further, roughly 55% of the Montenegrin population believes that “Russia should be considered a partner in European security and brought into European security structures…. keeping Russia out makes us less secure” (Center for Insights in Survey Research 2017: 47). This is despite the fact that Russia has actively sought to disrupt the security situation in the country numerous times. Sixty-eight percent of the population nonetheless view Vladimir Putin favorably (Ibid: 50). According to the mayor of Budva, Montenegro, Dragan Krapovic, “A vast majority (of people) support (sic) Russia, you cannot exclude emotions... Russia supported Montenegro’s independence referendum, and many [Russians] invested money after that. Now they feel cheated” (Sekularac 2017). According to current Montenegrin Prime Minister Dusko Markovic, “the Balkans for centuries has been the scene of a struggle between the West and the East. Like other states in the region, Montenegro has strong links with the East, but in the 2006 we made a key decision that we would like to adopt Western standards and values” (Ibid). From that point on, Montenegro’s political and economic course shifted drastically towards the West. However, this is not always reflected in the views and sympathies of the people, as has been seen in the public opinion data in the preceding paragraph.14 Montenegrins, who regained independence from Serbia in 2006 are often sympathetic to Russia and Russia’s closest Balkan friend, Serbia (CEAS 2017: 137). Montenegro shares close physical, cultural, ideological, and demographic ties to strongly anti-NATO and pro-Russian Serbia. Memories of the April 1999 NATO bombing campaign in Serbia and Montenegro are still fresh in the minds of most. Thus, a large minority of Montenegrin citizens, many who are Serbian themselves, often fall in line with all things Serbian. This is not surprising when one looks at the demographics of Montenegro as well as its complicated history. Based on the most recent census completed in Montenegro (published in 2011) forty-five percent of the population consider themselves Montenegrin. Twenty-nine percent of the population consider themselves Serbian and seventeen percent consider themselves Muslim, Bosniak, or Albanian. The remaining nine percent of the population consists of Croats, Macedonians, Romani, and people from other groups who chose not to

14 Generally, a majority of the population is supportive of EU membership. It is NATO membership that is the issue.

28 identify themselves. With that said, citizenship, ethnicity, and identity in Montenegro, as in all Balkan countries, can a bit muddied. Montenegro was historically a country in which citizenship was passed on through patrilineal descent. This has been the case since the 1928 Citizenship Act in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Therefore, though people may identify themselves as Montenegrin, they may have a mother or other family member that is from Serbia, or another Balkan country, therefore still feel and identify most proudly as “Serbian.” A study on intermarriages in the former Yugoslavia found that of all the main Balkan ethnic groups (Pap and Kitanics 2014),15 Montenegrins had the highest proportion of mixed marriages in the region, with fifteen percent of all Montenegrin marrying Serbs according to the 1981 census. The close ties to Serbia exist not only in familial ties, but also in culture, history, and religion. Montenegro is a predominantly Eastern Orthodox country, with roughly 72% of the country practicing Orthodox Christianity. The Balkan’s Slavic culture and the Orthodox faith means that the "narrative structure [already] tends to favor Russia" in the Balkans and makes it fertile ground for the exercise of Russian soft power (Lutsevych 2016). The relationship between Russia and Montenegro has over three hundred years of history behind it. It is said to have begun in 1711 with Peter the Great’s call for Montenegrins to rise up with him to throw the Ottoman’s out of the Balkans once and for all in exchange for Russian protection. This was the start of diplomatic relations between Russia and Montenegro. Montenegrins are said to have been among the first South Slavs recruited by Russia (Poláčková and Van Duin 2016). However, the relationship between Montenegro and Russia not always harmonious. Russia has shown its willingness to exert both hard and soft power in in the country. The most notable example being the attempted 2016 coup d'état that is thought to been sponsored by the Russian state. The attempted coup, which was both scheduled for and thwarted on October 16, 2016 -the day of the parliamentary elections in Montenegro – was the culmination of nearly a year of protests on and off in Montenegro. It is thought Russia had a hand in stroking tensions leading up to the

15 Main Balkan ethnic groups in this instance means the following: Croatians, Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Hungarians, and Serbians. Note, though Hungary is not considered a Balkan country, it has been considered the “lock and gate between the Balkans and Western Europe” throughout history. In addition, the region of Vojvodina in Serbia has a significant percentage of Hungarians (Pap and Kitanics 2014)

29 parliamentary vote and providing support for the government’s opposition parties and for the protesters themselves. (Both the protests from 2015-2016 and the attempted coup itself will be discussed in greater depth in the Political section, Section 5A.) The goal of the attempted coup was to disrupt the Parliamentary elections, overthrow the pro-Western government and assassinate then prime minister, current president, Đukanović to install a pro-Russian government that would change the country’s pro- Western progression (Balkan Insight 2018). It has been proven by numerous sources and through investigations by Montenegrin authorities along with outside experts that Russia coordinated the planned attack along with Serb nationalists. Russia has repeatedly denied the allegations. The attempted coup “marks the first time Russia has attempted to use violence outside of the former Soviet Union to achieve its political aims” (Bajrović et al. 2018a: 1), hence demonstrating how important Montenegro is to Russia. Russia’s interests in the country are strategic for many reasons. One being the fact that Montenegro is located on the coast and has warm water ports. Russia currently has just four warm-water ports, Sevastopol, St. Petersburg, Murmansk, and Vladivostok. It also has a small naval base in Tartus, Syria. Sevastopol is in the Black Sea, hence one of the major reasons Russia so desperately wanted Crimea. A warm water port is critical for moving goods to and from one’s country and is essential for having proper naval access to waterways that are not frozen in the winter. The desire to have a warm water port in Montenegro was part of Russia’s reasons to prevent Montenegro from joining NATO. After the Tartus base, Sevastopol is Russia’s closest naval base to the Mediterranean, a critical sea for trade. However, its location is far from ideal. Access out of the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean is restricted per the Montreux Convention of 1936 (Marshall 2015: 23). The Montreux Convention of 1936 gave Turkey control of the Straight of Bosporus. Russian commercial and naval ships are allowed to use the straight, but only in limited numbers that are tightly controlled (Ibid: 23). Given that Turkey is also in NATO (and the fact that Turkey and Russia have a competitive relationship on many levels), it is highly doubtful that Russia would be able to use this port during conflict (Ibid: 23). The Skagerrak Straight connects the Baltic Sea to the North Sea and allows access to and from St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, but is controlled by Denmark and Norway, therefore could be shut down in times of conflict as well (Ibid: 23). Thus, it is critical for Russia to have

30 warm water ports that are not under control of NATO members and that could be easily accessed in times of war. The port in Tartus is in the Mediterranean and hence very strategic for Russia. Unfortunately, the port is currently very small and lacks both repair facilities and a command and control center (Delman 2015). However, Russia’s presence in the Syrian conflict is, among other things, largely a function of their desire to maintain a access to the Mediterranean.16 Jeffrey Mankoff, an expert on Russian affairs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies said that “I think Russia does have a bigger geopolitical view of the world, regards the eastern Mediterranean as an area of importance, and [Russia] wants to be sure that it can secure its interests there”(Ibid). The importance of Mediterranean access is also seen in the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020, which talks about the importance of establishing a permanent Russian port in the Mediterranean due to NATO expansion (Ibid). In 2013, Russia made a formal request to use the Port of Bar in Montenegro as its Mediterranean naval logistics base (Sekularac 2017). It is rumored, though not confirmed, that Russia presented a multibillion-euro proposal which would have accounted for approximately half of Montenegro’s GDP. Montenegro, given its desire to continue its course towards full Western integration and under pressure from NATO, rejected the offer (Hand et al. 2018). This further fueled the flames between Montenegro and Russia.

CHAPTER 6 - Analysis of Montenegro

In the sections that follow, the largest vulnerabilities in Montenegro that lend themselves to Russia influence will be analyzed. The section will be structured in the following way. Under each major headline – political, economic, religion, civil society, defense, society in general, media, energy, infrastructure, and judiciary - an analysis of the context and issues will be presented. The main Russian tactics for influence in each area will also be presented. The information presented in these qualitative sections will also be part of the quantitative sections where mathematical indicators will be used to quantify the level of the vulnerability.

16 This is not to minimize the importance of other Russian goals in Syria, such as defeating ISIS, supporting Assad, fighting Islamic extremists there instead of inside Russian territories in the North Caucasus for example, etc.

A. Political Largest vulnerability – corruption and clientelism at all levels of the political system, which make it relatively easy for Russia to exert its influence through a high number of pro-Russian opposition parties it directly and indirectly supports

Montenegro is also a country where the political situation is far from clean. Though it is a parliamentary representative democratic republic on paper, it is far from a democracy. Current president, Milo Đukanović, in a fashion quite similar to Vladimir Putin, has served as Prime Minister or President since 1991 with a few years of “retirement” mixed in. Public opinion polls show that Montenegrins lack faith in their corrupt government, but feel powerless to do anything about it (PASOS 2016). These sentiments coupled with the complex mix of ethnicities and historical perspectives in the country create a situation that is ripe for Russian influence to take hold. Due to the ineffectiveness and inefficiency in the Montenegrin political system, nearly every layer of the political system is primed for Russian influence and interference to deal it a major blow. Montenegro is a multi-party parliamentary representative democratic republic with the prime minister acting as the head of government. Duško Marković has been the prime minister since November 28, 2016. Marković is largely overshadowed by president Milo Đukanović. Đukanović has basically been in power in Montenegro since 1991 when his mentor, Slobodan Milosevic, first appointed him Prime Minister. Since then, he has served as either the president or prime minister of Montenegro for over twenty years with a few very short breaks in between.17 Đukanović’s party, the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), has also been in power since 1990 and has maintained a majority of seats in Parliament since the 1990s. The Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska Partija Socijalista Crne Gore in Montenegrin, abbreviated as DPS) is the predecessor to the League of Communists of Montenegro. The League of Communists of Montenegro was the Montenegrin arm of the League of Communists

17 Đukanović was Prime Minister from 1991-1998, then president from 1998-2002, Prime Minister again from 2003-2006, took 2 years “off” from 2006-2008, and then was again prime minister from 2008-2010, and again from 2012-2016. He was most recently was elected president again and assumed office on May 20, 2018.

32 of Yugoslavia, which was the ruling, party in Yugoslavia from 1945-1990 (Poláčková and Van Duin 2017).18 According to Dzankic (2017), DPS leaders have used populist rhetoric to stay in power and support the clientelistic state system (Džankić and Keil 2017). She states “the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro and Đukanović create a discourse in which the DPS and Đukanović are portrayed as protectors of the Montenegrin nation and the independence of Montenegro” (Ibid). Populism, which is typically understood to mean a strategy use by political parties to mobilize the people against existing “corrupt” elites (Ibid), is an interesting choice by Đukanović given that he is the ultimate elite in the country. According to Dzankic, the populism does not pit the masses against the elites as is typical of populism, but instead pits the groups in opposition to DPS as enemies to DPS (Montenegro) and portrays DPS as the protector of Montenegrin identity (Ibid). Đukanović’s crafty political maneuvering has enabled him and his party to remain in place, consolidate power, and gain a substantial amount of economic and political wealth in the process by framing the opposition and “others” as enemies of the state in order to justify one-party rule by DPS (Ibid). Nationalism in Montenegro proliferated during Yugoslavia’s Milosević years (1980s-2000). Nevertheless, despite the calls for independence from all other Yugoslavian nations, there was no desire for independence in Montenegro. Montenegro was therefore the only state in the former Yugoslavia to forgo independence and remain with Serbia in the early 1990s. After all other states had gained independence; Serbia and Montenegro established the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in April of 1992, in which they were the only two states (Džankić 2010). With Đukanović at the helm, DPS carefully crafted its political game and despite being pro-Milosevic when it was convenient, slowly began distancing themselves from Milosević culminating in a final split in 1997. At this time, DPS also began to shift its orientation to the West and centered its messages towards increased Western integration. The split from Milosević is largely the result of a schism within DPS’s leaders, with the President of Montenegro Momir Bulatović, on one side, who continued to support Milosević; and Đukanović, who was then prime minister on the other (Džankić and Keil 2017). This split resulted a separation of DPS into two entities, DPS and the Socialist People’s Party. These two parties then duked it out for

18 Independence lost and regained: Montenegro’s contested identity and the failure of Yugoslavia (1918-2006) (Poláčková and Van Duin 2017).

33 the next three years with regard to political influence and issues of Montenegrin statehood. DPS began to position itself as the pro-independence party. The Socialist People’s Party held the party line and continued to be staunchly pro-Serbian (or perhaps more appropriately, pro-unification between Serbia and Montenegro) until Milosević was voted out of office in 2000. At that point, the Socialist People’s Party, who had charted their course as one aligned to Serbia and Milosević, more or less lost all its power. DPS became the solo leader of the Montenegrin independence movement and a renewed national identity separate from Serbia. This national identity was one that included people of all ethnicities and sought to pin Montenegro as a multi-cultural state where Bosnians, Croats, Albanians were also included (at least in DPS rhetoric) (Ibid). Nevertheless, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remained an entity until 2006 when finally, after ninety years of wars and foreign occupation, Montenegro regained the independence that it had originally lost in 1918 with the creation of the Yugoslav state (Poláčková and Van Duin 2017). The country’s first independent constitution was approved on October 20, 2007. The constitution established Montenegro as an independent, democratic, and environmentally compliant state of the social justice ruled by law (Montenegroinside.com 2018). There are three branches of government – executive (headed by the Prime Minister), legislative, and judiciary. The Parliament consists of 81 members, who are elected for four-year terms. The president is elected through direct election and serves for a five-year term, which is renewable one time. However, if a state of war is declared, the President may remain in office for as long as the state of war is in place. Nevertheless, while Montenegro has democratic undertones, its state institutions remain weak, fractured, and ineffective. According to the 2018 Freedom House report on Nations in Transit, Montenegro is classified as a semi-democracy with a score of 3.93 on a scale of democracy (1 being the lowest score, 7 being the highest) (FreedomHouse.org. 2018). There are many reasons for this, the most glaring being political elite control of clientelist political systems, high levels of crony capitalism, corruption, lack of strong opposition parties, and the strong influence of Russia. In Montenegro, the issues start at the top, which create large vulnerabilities and illiberal undertones that permeate into nearly all parts of political life. The people also have little faith in their political system. According to a 2015 poll, only 25% of Montenegrins trust in political parties and a majority think their country is headed in

34 the wrong direction (PASOS 2016). The lack of trust in political parties is generally thought to also be a function of the high levels of corruption that exist in the country, along with years of empty promises.

1. Corruption and Clientelism

“The greatest security threat is not Russian tanks or Russian disinformation, it is our own corruption – and the ways Russia seeks to use it.” – Mark Galeotti

Of all the egregious governmental issues in Montenegro, perhaps the most prevalent is corruption. Corruption is “the problem from which all others flow” (Galeotti 2017b). Without corruption, it is difficult to imagine that the same individual and ruling party could remain in power for decades. Đukanović’s crafty political maneuvering has enabled him and his party to consolidate and remain in power, gaining a substantial amount of economic and political wealth in the process. DPS, and therefore both Đukanović and Montenegro, are largely associated with crime, corruption, and nepotism. This association goes back to the early 1990s during the Yugoslav conflicts when it is claimed Đukanović was instrumental in the shadow economy and organized crime, largely through cigarette smuggling and human trafficking (Džankić and Keil 2017). The high level of corruption present in all levels of the Montenegrin government can be used as a tool by Russia to pursue its interests in the country. In addition to weakening the political system in a country, corruption determines investor’s appetites to do business in the country. It naturally dissuades the most efficient investors from investing, but often attracts those with looser morals and codes of conduct who strive for an advantage through corrupt means. Russian investors are thought to largely benefit as a result. Montenegro’s business regulations are complex and not applied on a consistent basis to everyone. Therefore, corruption is one of the main determinants of who gets contracts and business opportunities in the country. It is illegal in the Montenegrin Criminal Code, but really only on paper. The Criminal Code as pertains to corruption is very rarely followed unless it is advantageous to DPS (GAN Business Anti- Corruption Portal 2015). Furthermore, in certain sectors, corruption and gifts are expected (Ibid). Thus, bribery is the norm and way of doing business. According to Transparency International’s Corruption

35 Perception Index, Montenegro ranks number 64 out of 180 countries measured. The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators gives Montenegro of 55.02 rating (on a 0-100 scale) with regard to its control of corruption (Shukla 2014). Corruption in Montenegro is linked to all levels of government. It is so rampant, that it is not only difficult to prevent, but disadvantageous to those in positions of power. There is no real incentive for the government to do anything substantial about corruption outside of providing lip service to their “desires” to stop to. In 2015, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) 19 named Đukanović its 2015 Man of the Year in Organized Crime. The award “acknowledges those who best promote Uncivil Society” (Sullivan 2015). According to the report, Đukanović has “built one of the most dedicated kleptocracies and organized crime havens in the world… nobody outside of Putin has run a state that relies so heavily on corruption, organized crime, and dirty politics” (Ibid). Two of the most well documented corruption cases tied to Đukanović are massive cigarette smuggling operations with the Italian mob and known organized crime rings and his family’s ownership of Prva Bank, Montenegro’s biggest bank. Italian prosecutors have charged that Đukanović was at the top of a massive cigarette smuggling operations, which began in the 1990s and continues today. Đukanović has not denied the claims and has instead said he did what he did to benefit his country’s financial situation.20 Prva Bank was conveniently sold to Đukanović’s brother Aco during the mismanaged privatization push of the 2000s. The bank was then used to hold the state’s money and to launder and loan money for organized crime including a major cocaine cartel (Ibid). In 2008, the bank became insolvent and the Montenegrin government provided it with 44 million euros (MacKean and Jones 2012). Montenegro’s already existing corruption problems are exacerbated by Russian influence. Russia is known to use corruption as a weapon. According to a report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “corruption is the lubricant on which [the] system [of Russian influence on national policies and decisions] operates, concentrating on the exploitation of state resources to further Russia’s networks of influence” (Ellick and Westbrook 2018). Given the level of

19 The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) is an investigative reporting platform for the OCCRP Network, a US-based non-profit media organization Journalism Development Network. 20 For more information on the cigarette smuggling operations, see (ElShamy et al. 2018).

36 Russian investments in Montenegro and proven corruption cases involving Russian nationals, it is a natural conclusion that Russia both influences and benefits through Montenegro’s culture of corruption. A large portion of Montenegro’s coastal properties are owned by Russian businessmen and it is purported that many private loans were provided by the Montenegrin state to companies with Russian ties and interests. The OCCRP report states that since 2006, Đukanović has provided €300 million in state guarantees for loans taken out by private companies with no interest required, of which €184 million was never repaid (Sullivan 2015). Roughly 70% of the unpaid loans were to Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and his KAP aluminum plant, described in detail in Chapter 6, Section H Energy (Ibid). Given Đukanović’s power in the country, if any heads of government entities raise an eyebrow over the government’s handling of any issues, they are immediately fired and replaced with more loyal friends and family members. As a result, nearly all levels of government and all major institutions are run by Đukanović’s loyalists. Clientelism can be defined most simply as the distribution of benefits and material goods in return for electoral support.21 Due to their long reign of power, DPS has been able to install and maintain allies in all the key institutions in the country, and across all branches of government. This impedes the proper functioning of government and ensures that DPS stays in power. The judiciary is one area that has particularly been impacted by clientelism. Not coincidently, judiciary reform is one of the keys for Montenegro’s EU accession that has been highlighted numerous times by the EU. Any case involving a DPS loyalist is quickly dismissed and there is no sense of judicial independence in the country. This is why corruption charges are never really tried in the country.

2. Weak and Fractured Opposition According to the interviews from experts generated through this research, one of the major vulnerabilities in Montenegro is the weakness of opposition parties. This creates vulnerabilities, as there is no true challenger to the ruling party’s power. The lack of a strong opposition, while on one hand potentially decreasing tensions within the society due to political infighting and smear campaigns, harms society overall in

21 Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), Schaffer (2007), Hicken (2011), and Larreguy (2013) among many other, provide in-depth information on clientelism.

37 that there is less of an incentive for the ruling power to behave responsibly. From the perspective of Russian influence, this means that in order to combat the strength of the ruling party, Russia will likely invest more heavily in propping up pro-Russian parties in the country, or perhaps even meddle in the countries elections if it is to have a Russia favorable electoral result. However, given that many Russian investors are currently benefiting from DPS’ reign in power, Russia must be careful not to push too far and risk somehow harming its agents and citizens who are currently benefiting from a relationship with DPS. The comparatively weak opposition increases the odds of crony capitalism, state-capture by elites, and the use of corruption as tool for maintaining power and propping up other supporters – all present in Montenegro. Further, exacerbating the problem is that Montenegrin’s value a strong leader at the top and charismatic personality has always been one of the defining characteristics of its leaders going back hundreds of years (Džankić and Keil 2017). Weak and fractured opposition, however, does not mean that no opposition parties exist. While still significantly lagging behind in the polls, the opposition parties have been gaining some traction. Most worrying is perhaps the most vocal opposition alliance, the Democratic Front. The Democratic Front (DF is “a multi- party alliance of Russophile, Serb nationalist, and anti-Western political parties" (Bajrović et al. 2018a). Though still considered weak in comparison to DPS, the Democratic Front has gotten stronger in the last few years, partially as a result of increased Russian support. As a result of the 2018 election, it now controls 18 of Montenegro’s 81 parliamentary seats. For comparison, DPS has a total of 35 seats. A number of different groups operate under the DF banner. Most importantly, the New Serb Democracy party led by Andrija Mandić and with 8 seats in Parliament, the Democratic People’s Party led by Milan Knezević and with 4 seats in Parliament, and the Movement for Changes Party led by Nebojsa Medojević with 5 seats in Parliament (Ibid). The Worker’s Party, lead by Janko Vučinić also has 1 seat in Parliament. The Yugoslav Community Party and Democratic Serb Party also fall under the DF banner, but do not currently hold any seats in Parliament. Mladen Bojanić was DF’s most recent presidential candidate in the 2018 presidential elections and received roughly 33% of the vote. Many of DF’s leaders have taken trips to Russia and have collaborated with Russia and been supported by it to varying degrees. In June of 2016, Mandić (head of the New Serb Democracy Party) along with leaders from the Democratic People’s

38 Party, the Montenegrin pro-Serbian Socialist People’s Party, and many other pro- Russian parties in the Balkans, traveled to Russia and signed a military cooperation agreement with Putin’s United Russia for the “creation of a militarily neutral territory in the Balkans...[as part of a] reduction of international tensions to form a territory of neutral sovereign states, which would include Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina” (BIRN 2016). This meeting occurred between two significant periods of time in Montenegro’s recent history, both with more or less confirmed Russian influence – the 2015 protests and 2016 attempted coup. In the middle of the protests and the coup, members of the United Russia party visited Montenegro. They met with pro-Russian parties, religious leaders, NGOs, the media, and Russian citizens living in the country (Tomovic 2016). After this April 2016 meeting, tensions in Montenegro increased.

a) October 2015 Protests Large protests organized by Montenegro’s opposition groups began in Podgorida in October 2015. The protests were, at least on the surface, in opposition to corruption and Montenegro’s proposed entry into NATO. They were led by the New Serb Democracy Party’s leader Andrija Mandić. It is believed that Russia had a significant hand in supporting the protests, both financially and through support on social media and in the media. Đukanović tied the protests to “nationalist circles in Serbia and Russia meddling in the country’s internal affairs” (Bechev 2017: 7). The protests grew in strength and intensity, ultimately resulting in a large Pogorica riot on October 24, 2015 and then the October 2016 attempted coup d’état.

b) 2016 Attempted Coup D’état Montenegrin and International officials have asserted that Serbian and Russian nationalists, along with some Montenegrins, conspired to take over parliament during the October 2016 parliamentary elections in a coup d’état. It is largely believed that the coup was a last-ditch effort to prevent Montenegro from joining NATO, however, some also believe that the coup was staged by Đukanović in an effort to maintain power and secure votes. In any case, the plan for the coup was for twenty of the conspirators, dressed in stolen police uniforms, to stand outside the parliament and remain there as the election result – which was to be a DF victory - was declared. Hundreds of supporters who were waiting outside of the parliament

39 would then storm the building, and the “police” were to fire upon them. DF would then call for additional protests to deride “DPS’” attempt to use violence to keep DF’s victory from being realized (Tomovic 2017a). Đukanović, who was then prime minister, was to be assassinated as well. However, the plan was foiled when twenty Montenegrin and Serbian conspirators were arrested the night before the election. It has been reported that Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency alerted Montenegrin security services that 50 Russian Special Forces soldiers entered Montenegro’s Zlatibor region from Serbia on October 15. When they lost contact with arrested individuals, they fled the country (Ibid). Montenegrin Chief Special Prosecutor Milivoje Katnić has also stated that roughly 500 people planned to enter Montenegro and cause violent protests on Podgorica on election day (Guardian, the 2016). According to Montenegrin officials, Serbian nationals planned the coup at the direction of Russian GRU and FSB operatives. The complete plan involved Russian agents, Serbian extremists, and leaders of Montenegro’s Democratic Front (Bajrović et al. 2018: 9). General Bratislav Dikić, former head of Serbia’s gendarmerie was arrested on suspicion of orchestrating the coup. Russian military officer Eduard Shishmakov was also implicated. Aleksandar Sindjelic, a self-identified Serb nationalist, head of the Night Wolves in Montenegro, and key suspect turned witness in the trial, testified that Shishmakov was one of the main financiers of the plot (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2017a). Shishmakov is a known Russian GRU agent who was declared persona non grata and thrown out of Poland in 2014 for alleged involvement in espionage while a deputy military attaché in the Russian embassy in Warsaw (Zaba and Tomovic 2017). It is alleged that he was a main organizer and the financier along with Vladimir Moiseev, whose alias was Vladimir Popov, another Russian GRU agent (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2017b). Sindjelic is said to have worked as the liaison between Shishmakov and Moiseev, and was in charge of recruiting hundreds of local volunteers to participate in the coup (Bajrović et al. 2018). In 2017, the High Court in Podgorica formally charged both Andrija Mandić and Milan Knezević from DF with "preparing a conspiracy against the constitutional order and the security of Montenegro" and an "attempted terrorist act" for their roles in the attempted 2016 coup (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2017a).

40 B. Economic Largest Vulnerability – Poor economic outlook for most citizens, monopolies in the economy and economic wealth in the hands of few, Russian investments and use of financial pressure to wield power and influence

Montenegro’s economy is largely focused on tourism and energy, with a small third focus on agriculture. Its largest trading partner and source of financial assistance is the EU (Lilyanova 2018). According to the European Parliament, Montenegro’s largest economic weaknesses are its high public debt, negative impact on business environments due to competition from the informal economy, and rule of law weaknesses that deter competition and efficient investments, as well as corruption and money laundering that impacts the financial condition of the country as well as political and social (Ibid).

1. EU Accession Montenegro wants to join the EU. According to a December 2018 poll conducted by CEDEM, 63% of participants think that Montenegro should join the EU (CEDEM 2018). It applied for EU membership in 2008 and accession negotiations began in 2012. In addition to Serbia, it is the only other Western Balkan nation that has opened accession negotiations. It is thought to be the frontrunner in the Western Balkans for accession, with a target of 2025 for admittance. In order to be admitted, it must first negotiate 35 accession chapters in various policy fields to bring its legislation up to a level acceptable to the laws governing the EU (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2018c.). Montenegro has opened 32 of the 35 required chapters, however, it has only provisionally closed three. Thus, large legislative and policy gaps exist that must be rectified if Montenegro is to join. It is thought that 2019 will be a milestone, make-or-break year for Montenegro’s EU accession with transitional measures in judiciary and interior affairs chapters needing to be achieved (Velebit 2018). It also has major gaps to fill in media freedom, corruption and organized crime, and the rule of law. The majority of the population in Montenegro desires to join the EU and believes it is a key milestone towards Western integration and economic progress that is critical to the small country’s survival. However, according to interviews conducted for this research, the prospect of Montenegro joining the EU is not very high. Since

41 independence in 2006, Montenegrin’s have charted their course towards the EU. Politicians have sold EU accession to citizens as the goal and path towards economic stability and reward. The issue is that EU accession is looking more and more like a pipe dream to many experts. The EU has voiced increased desires to focus efforts on the Balkans, but due to the growing multitude of internal EU problems, meaningful actions have not measured up to what has been promised to or Montenegro and other Western Balkan countries. This creates a massive vulnerability that Russia and other external players can exploit. As confidence in the EU wanes, disillusioned citizens may begin looking towards other external players to save them as their last resort. According to the interviews and Delphi analysis conducted for this research, Montenegro’s EU accession failure, a general weakening of the EU concept of enlargement, and failure within international institutions are some of the biggest risks for the country as this would lead to frustration of the people and loss of motivation, hence destructive forces could hold more power and look more favorable. The other issue with Montenegro’s joining the EU is that in the West’s haste to counter Russia’s increased influence in the region could lead to settling for mere lip-service to democratic and human rights advances in the country when in reality, nothing changes. In other words, the façade of government reforms to satisfy Western institutions, but “reforms” that are really only cosmetic in nature This fear exists in all the Balkan countries, but particularly in Montenegro where we have already seen many “changes” to satisfy EU requirements, such as anti-corruption legislation, but the legislation is entirely ignored. According to James Sawyer of the Eurasia Group, “the good governance reforms that are supposed in theory to be part of the NATO accession process have largely been cosmetic, while many other important reforms remain to be done” (Sekularac 2017). There are indications and fears that the case with EU accession may be the same as with NATO accession. The promotion of necessary new laws, but with no real change can also lead to disgruntled citizens. Russia is surely aware of this and is likely banking on the fact that the more disenfranchised citizens become with the EU process, the greater the opportunity becomes for Russia to step in and “save” the people from the Montenegro’s faulty Western course.23

23 According to research from the Atlantic Council, despite the fact that the EU has sent roughly 235 million euros to Montenegro over the last 10-12 years, Montenegrins in general do not know that Montenegro currently benefits from EU funds. The EU is the largest

2. Privatization Many of the biggest economic issues in Montenegro can be tied to corruption and mismanagement of public financial resources, which hamstrings the economy and prevents capital from flowing in an efficient manner. Corruption, as discussed in detail in the previous Political section, has been present in Montenegro for decades. However, its biggest economic impacts began to be felt during the Yugoslav Wars when nearly all money coming into the country was through illegal means, then again in beginning in 1999 largely through foreign aid, but again most prominently after 2006 with the privatization push. The issue that privatization brought was largely a result of the governments failure to award contract and sell businesses at prices that were legitimate, and to investors and companies that would benefit the Montenegrin economy and people. As a result, most companies were sold to friends and family members of DPS, often to shell companies that in many instances were owned by Russians, and under economic conditions that were not sustainable (Center for the Study of Democracy 2018: 8). When the global recession hit in 2008, but in some cases even before this, many of these companies became insolvent and were bailed out by the Montenegrin government. Naturally, this harmed the overall economic situation in the country and perhaps most importantly, impacted society as there was less money to go to necessary social services. The Montenegrin tax base is very small; therefore, despite the fact that Montenegro is being touted as the new Monaco due to its luxurious Port of Montenegro, necessary social services are not provided to citizens. According to a survey conducted in 2017, 61% of Montenegrins think that unemployment is the biggest issue facing the country. Further, economic factors make up a portion of the five of the top six biggest issues participants identified as being Montenegro’s biggest issue. In order, the other five are: low salaries/pensions (38%), corruption and bribery (28%), low standard of living (26%) and economy (21%) (Center for Insights in Survey Research 2017: 7). When asked in the same survey if democracy or a prosperous economy was most important, 52% of participants said economy and 41% said democracy (8% said they didn’t know) (Ibid: 17).

international donor, but this is not known to most of the populous. For more information, see: (Salem 2016).

3. The Informal or Gray Economy The informal economy or gray economy is defined by the World Bank as “activities and income that are partially or fully outside government regulation, taxation, and observation..[and] allows employers, paid employees, and the self- employed to increase their take-home earnings or reduce their costs by evading taxation and social contributions” (Canagarajah et al. 2001: 4). It is usually present in countries with low levels of social protections and a high unemployment rates. With low social protections and a 16% unemployment rate, Montenegro fits the bill (Statista: 2018). The informal economy in Montenegro originally became prevalent in the 1990s as the country began moving from a planned socialist economy to a market economy, and the move from social property to private ownership (Montenegrin Employers Federation and Kostic 2014). Jobs began transitioning from rural to urban based, and the economy became more focused on service oriented industries. Though there is no official statistic on the total value of the informal economy in Montenegro, most surveys show that it is roughly 26-31% of GDP (Ibid: 7). A large informal economy in a country is usually the result of inadequate rule of law, poor macroeconomic and social policies, insufficient institutional frameworks, and poor governance (Ibid: 9). All these elements are present in Montenegro, therefore, it is no surprise that nearly 1/3 of the population works in the gray economy. However, while the informal economy does provide jobs to those who may otherwise be unemployed, it creates many vulnerabilities that can be exploited. First, given that the tax base is reduced by nearly 30% in the case of Montenegro since the money is unable to be taxed, a smaller percentage of workers are responsible for a larger tax burden to cover the excess. In addition, necessary social services are unable to be provided and individuals are less inclined to have health care and retirement incomes. Second, the businesses that do employ individuals legally and appropriately are often subjected to increased regulations and fees in order to make up for those who do not pay. Third, the frustrations that appear in both groups can lead to increased resentment and increased feelings of being left behind with globalization and capitalism. This can make other alternatives, such as that offered by Russia, more attractive. Russia feeds on societal resentment. More tangibly, it is assumed that Russia, given their real estate investments and businesses in the country, benefits tremendously financially from the informal economy and lax rule of law in Montenegro.

4. Debt Montenegro has a 78 percent public debt to GDP ratio, which is one of the highest in the Balkan region (IMF 2018). This debt will only increase as a result of the 800 million euro loan provided by the Chinese Exim Bank to construct a highway between Bar and Boljare (Ibid). The IMF has stated that Montenegro is very vulnerable to external shocks as a result of its high public-debt-to-GDP ratio. It further cautioned that Montenegro’s refinancing needs from 2019-2021 as a result of the debt severely hampers its ability to weather shocks and that there is currently no fiscal space for additional phases of the highway construction with debt (Ibid). It is very questionable as to whether Montenegro will be able to repay this debt. This creates a massive vulnerability, not only to China for money owed, but potentially due to Russian investments if Montenegro looks to Russia to help it satisfy the debt requirements.

5. Russia’s Economic Impact “For Russia, today, as in the past, every trade is a direct mean of politics.” - 1956, Yugoslav (Montenegrin) Ambassador to Moscow, Veljko Micunovic, in a 1956 letter to Yugoslav President Tito (Kovacevic 2018).

In general, when speaking about the Western Balkans, Russia’s economic presence is highly concentrated in energy, banking, mining, and real estate. In terms of Montenegro specifically, Russian economic influence is felt the most in the tourism and real estate sectors. When Montenegro became independent in 2006, Russian investors flocked to the country. Russia remains the single largest investor in the country. Russia’s cumulative foreign direct investments (FDI) in the country amount to roughly $1.3 billion of the total roughly $17 billion in cumulative FDI in the country (CSD 2018: 1). Tourism accounts for roughly twenty percent of Montenegro’s GDP. According the a study from the Center for the Study of Democracy, tourism is both the strategic driver of economic growth in Montenegro and the most vulnerable sector to Russian influence (Ibid). Russian tourists account for approximately 25% of this with over 300,000 tourists per year bringing in 200 million euros in tourist income annually out of a total 800 million euro total tourist income (Ibid). In terms of the

45 actual number of tourists, Russian tourists make up roughly 1/3 of all overnight visitors to Montenegro. Further, Russian nationals own approximately 40% of all Adriatic Sea coast properties (Eckel 2017), and it is estimated, 70,000 properties in total (CSD 2018: 4). Russian foreign direct investment in Montenegro is roughly thirty percent of Montenegro’s GDP (Hand et al. 2018). Further, of all foreign companies operating in Montenegro, one third – or 1,722 companies -are owned by Russian nationals (CSD 2018). These numbers are likely smaller even than the true amount given that many of the investments are from Russian nationals, but through companies registered in Montenegro or another country (Sullivan 2015). With that said, Russia is only responsible for 5.5% of Montenegro’s revenue, down from roughly 30% in 2006 (CSD 2018). In 2006, the level of Russia’s revenue impact in Montenegro was quite high due to the Podgorica Aluminum Plant (KAP) owned by the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, who is a very close friend of Vladimir Putin. The plant is now owned by a Montenegrin company after the Montenegrin government began bankruptcy proceedings in 2014 due to KAPs 360 million euros in debt (Ibid). This plant will be discussed in greater depth in the Energy Section. Deripaska is also an investor in Montenegro’s famed Porto Montenegro – a yacht marina project aimed becoming the new Monaco for the world’s wealthiest billionaires (Dobson 2018).

C. Religious – The Orthodox Church Largest Vulnerability – Russia’s unimpeded use of the Serbian Orthodox Church as its agent to influence Montenegrins without the possibility of repercussion under the law

There are two competing Orthodox factions within Montenegro. The most influential is the Montenegrin Metropolitanate, which is part of the Serbian Orthodox Church and is very strongly influenced by Russia. The patriarchal seat of the Montenegrin Metropolitanate has always been in Serbia, therefore, its legal status is in Serbia, not Montenegro. Thus, the church is not subject to any laws in Montenegro, only in Serbia. The Montenegrin Metropolitanate is most often referred to as the Serbian Orthodox Church even in Montenegro. It will thus be referred to as the Serbian Orthodox Church in the rest of this thesis. The second church, the

46 Montenegrin Orthodox Church, is a much weaker institution, which struggles to be recognized both within and outside of Montenegro. Government authorities have recently been calling for official recognition for the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which currently operates as an NGO. This rift poses a large vulnerability that will likely expand in the coming months in similar fashion to the current battle over the schism in Ukraine’s competing Orthodox churches.24 At present, it is hard to imagine a single influence or influencer in Montenegro that carries more weight than the Serbian Orthodox Church. A March 2018 Montenegrin public opinion poll demonstrated that 62.3 percent of Montenegrins have a high or mostly high confidence in the Serbian Orthodox Church. This was the highest-ranking institution in the poll. The church in Montenegro is not just a religious institution, but also a political, economic, and social one. It often meddles in affairs that are outside of what is typically thought to involve a religious institution. The connection between Montenegro and the Serbian Orthodox Church is thought by many to be one of the biggest vulnerabilities that exist in the country given how the Serbian Orthodox church dominates. The church, and the Orthodox religion, functions as a corrupting and polarizing influence in Montenegro. Serbian nationalists and pro-Russian groups can and do use the church to influence and usher payments to extremist groups and political parties without any recourse. The Serbian Orthodox Church is supported economically and politically by the Russian Orthodox Church and the Kremlin. The church is involved in anti-NATO, anti-Western rallies, protests, and demonstrations and has something to say about any and all political or social issues, constantly promoting the Russian line. The Church was heavily involved in pushing for a rejection of NATO membership. Many Montenegrins look up to the church and look to it for guidance. Though some recognize its bias and use as a Russian agent, many do not and view the church as both the law, and above the law believing that if the church says something, it must be true. Russia is well aware of this and uses the church anytime it needs to get a message or perspective across to the masses.

24 On the most basic level, the schism in Orthodoxy in Ukraine is largely a result of Ukraine desiring for an independent church that is not subject to the Russian Orthodox Church, but Russia’s vehement opposition to such a move. In many ways, the schism parallels the situation in Montenegro For more on the schism within the Orthodox church in Ukraine see: https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/10/18/ukraines-orthodox-church-moves-closer-to- autonomy

D. Civil Society Largest vulnerability: Russia’s support of pro-Russian NGOs that seek to destabilize the current Montenegrin order

The United Nations calls civil society as the “third sector” of society, the first and second sectors being government and business (United Nations 2018a). It is defined by the World Bank as “a wide array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations” (Jezard 2018). Sometimes, the media is included in civil society. However, given the vast expanse of what must be covered with regard to media vulnerabilities and Russian influence, media has been given its own section in this thesis. Understanding civil society in Montenegro and in any state is extremely important for three main reasons. First, civil society – when mobilized – has the power to influence the actions of government leaders, policy-makers, and firms within a country or international system (Ibid). Second, Russia frequently both targets and uses the civil society to exert its influence. And third, Montenegro wants to join the EU. The Communication from the European Commission on Civil Society Dialogue of June 2005 stated that “any future enlargement of the European Union needs to be supported by a strong, deep and sustained dialogue with civil society.” The EU has recognized that a disconnect exists between Montenegro’s government and civil society, therefore, Montenegro must boost its civil society if it is to join the EU. The Montenegrin government has been somewhat apathetic to support the civil society in meaningful ways, possibly out of fear that the ruling party could lose its power and be held accountable by watchdog NGOs. This is a scary proposition for political elites in the clientelist government. On one hand, the government understands that it needs the civil society, particularly NGOs, for EU accession and to help make sound policies. But on the other hand, the government is apprehensive to fully embrace and include civil society in the political dialogue. A tension exists that often precludes the government from engaging with civil society, even if the organizations in it are capable and could be effective at improving the societal conditions for citizens.

48 1. How Russia Uses the Civil Society to Push Its Agenda There are three main ways that Russia tries to influence civil society: by establishing and using GONGOs and NGOs, by influencing expert communities, and by attempting to create their own version of a civil society. Russia has extensively established GONGOs (government-organized non-governmental organizations) and NGOs (non-governmental organizations) both in Russia and internationally that spread the Russian agenda. There are numerous examples of pro-Russian NGOs operating in Montenegro and Serbia. These NGOs have been in place since the early 2000s, potentially earlier, and are not always active. They lie dormant during periods when they are not “necessary” to push the pro-Russian agenda, and often emerge around the time of major discord or when they feel something is heading in too much of a pro-Western direction. The pro-Russian NGOs that operate in Montenegro are very often actually based in Serbia. Due to being under the same republic until 2006, NGOs were often established in Belgrade but operated in both countries. After independence, the situation has largely remained the same given that many of these NGOs were established prior to independence. The two most significant Serbia-based NGOs that are proven to be pro- Russian and have Montenegrin operations are: Srbska čast (Serb Honor) and Noćni vukovi (Night Wolves). Srbska čast is a Niš based NGO which serves young males who are ethnically Serbian in Serbia, Bosnia, and Montenegro. Their membership exceeds 40,000 and their stated goal is “youth activism and mobilization for human rights and the environment” (Bajrovic et al. 2018). However, their actual undertakings include military training, anti-NATO and anti-Western protests and violence, and ultra-nationalism. Srbska čast has proven links and associations to the Russian- Serbian “Humanitarian Center” based in Niš, Serbia. The Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center is claimed to have been founded in order to provide humanitarian emergency responses in Serbia and other Balkan countries in the case crises or situations that requires humanitarian assistance (Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center 2018). However, it is widely publicized that the Humanitarian Centre is not really a humanitarian center at all and is really a base for covert Russian operations.25

25 For more on this, see Chivis 2017.

49 The Night Wolves are a Russian motorcycle club is become widely known for being a proxy for the Russian state and close friends with Vladimir Putin. They are funded by the Kremlin and tied to the Russian Orthodox Church (Rudic and Tomovic 2018). Their main mission is to strengthen the bonds of Eastern Orthodox communities and Russia and bring countries together under Russia. The Night Wolves have a chapter in Montenegro as well as one in Serbia and in Republika Srbska. It is unknown exactly how many members the Montenegrin branch has, but it is known that they are from many towns around the country. Their motto is “pray to God and stick with Russia ” (Ibid). The Montenegrin Night Wolves have been involved in a number of high-profile rallies and tours in Montenegro that included Night Wolves from other countries. Most notable are the Oct 2014 Russian Balkan pilgrimage, May 2016 pilgrimage to Ostroj monastery, June 2016 “Slavic World Tour 2016,” March 2018 Russian Balkans Tour of Serbia and Bosnia, and the Oct 2018 escort of the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Irinej, across Montenegro. Further, several members of the Night Wolves were implicated in the 2016 attempted coup. The Balkan Cossacks Army (BKV), a self-described Russian paramilitary organization is based in Podgorica. The group was created in September 2016 and its founding ceremony took place in Kotor. Serbian Orthodox priest Momchilo Krivokapic was in charge of the ceremony and stressed the so-called fact that “the Orthodox world is one world” (Ibid). It is unknown how many members the BKV has at the moment, or how active they currently are. According to interviews undertaken for this research, many of the groups who were very active prior to NATO accession have now quieted down, but this does not mean that they are no longer in Montenegro, merely that they are potentially laying dormant. Many members of the BKV are also members of the Night Wolves and other pro-Russian groups. In the same way that there are many NGOs based in Serbia that also operate in Montenegro, there are a few based in Montenegro that operate in Serbia as well. Some of the most influential Serb nationalist, anti-Western, pro-Russian political groups based in Montenegro are the Movement for Neutrality of Montenegro and No to War, No to NATO (Bajrovic et al. 2018: 6). Given that the pro-Russian agenda is typically also ultra-Serbian nationalist, the overall pro-Serbian agenda is the same for both Serbian and Montenegrin NGOs. They desire a reunification with Serbia and

50 closer ties to Russia. They also attempt to discredit pro-Western NGOs that exist in a society by attacking their policies and painting them in a bad light. In August, Serbian police closed a paramilitary youth camp that was sponsored by Russia and the Russian Embassy in Belgrade. The camp was organized by Zeljko Vukelic, who is a Serbian war veteran and runs the Association of Participants in Armed Conflicts on Former Yugoslav Territory (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2018a). The camp had youth from Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina who were trained by Serbian and Russian instructors in combat skills. A Russian military attaché visited the facility according to one of the camp’s organizers. The co-organizer of the “military patriotic” camp was the Russian ultranationalist group ENOT and according to organizers, the camp was based upon ‘patriotic education’ camps in Russia (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2018a). Russia also attempts to influence expert communities covertly and in plain sight in order to change public opinion. 26 According to Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept 2016, “greater participation of Russia’s academics and experts in the dialogue with foreign specialists on global politics and international security is one of the areas of public diplomacy development (Persson 2014).” These experts are quite often attached to think tanks that promote Russian foreign policy. According to expert interviews conducted for this thesis, Russia began in 2013, Russia to create an alternative civil society of sorts in Montenegro. They tried to gain legitimacy by appealing to experts to speak at their events, which were not broadcast as being supported by Russia. They also began creating and supporting existing “patriotic” NGOs that existed in the country and were anti-establishment. They organized a union of pro-Russian journalists that were registered in Germany. And they conducted extensive smear campaigns on any and all other NGOs that were not pro-Russian. This alternative civil society has largely disappeared since Montenegro joined NATO, but the individuals and groups that were part of it are still living in the country and could re-engage at any point in time.

E. Military (Security) Largest Vulnerability = Use of hard power through cyber attacks and espionage

26 Russian Think Tanks and Soft Power. file:///Users/lizanderson/Downloads/http___webbrapp.ptn.foi.se_pdf_14a37b54-8055-41a1- 8a47-85e330e8dbd3%20(1).pdf

As Montenegro is now a NATO member and does not share a border with Russia, the threat of any sort of Russian military invasion by land, sea, or air is very low. In sharp contract to many other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Montenegro is not at all reliant on Russia for military equipment repairs and parts. Only two types of equipment owned by the Montenegrin military were made in the Soviet Union or Russia –9M14 Malyutka anti-tank missiles and the D-30J 122mm Howlitzer. Yugoslavia was home to a very robust military equipment and weapons industry. As a result, a large portion of Montenegro’s large military equipment was made in Yugoslavia. However, concerns still exist. The two areas that Russia is able to exert the highest level of influence in the defense sector are through cyber attacks and operations by Russian secret service (Bechev 2017: 193). The Russian hacking Fancy Bear, which is thought to consist of Russian GRU agents, attempted to hack into the Montenegrin state’s IT system and steal classified information in January 2017 disguised as NATO documents. The number and intensity of attempted cyber attacks has increased exponentially in the last few years, with 400 attempted attacks reported in 2017 (Tomovic & Zivanovic 2018). It appears that as Montenegro was preparing to join NATO, attacks began to increase. The main goals appear to be to cause disruption and to steal classified information. Stealing classified information through cyber attacks is just one of the known methods Russia has deployed in the country. In June of 2014, an unnamed NATO source estimated that there were between twenty-five and fifty employees at the Montenegrin National Security Agency (ANB) who were suspected Russian double- agents (Bechev 2017: 195). The threat and vulnerability of classified information being leaked knowingly or unknowingly from Montenegrin security services (or NATO through Montenegrin breaches) to Russia is thought to be relatively high as a result. This poses a large potential risk not only to Montenegro, but also to NATO.

F. Societal Largest vulnerability – dissatisfaction in society with regard to the direction in which the country is headed and indicators of increased polarization amongst the people, both of which can be exploited by Russian interests and influence

52 “The highest level of war is not to fight but to subvert and pit everyone in your society against others. It doesn’t matter what it is as long as it cuts the moral fabric of society and causes people to fight against each other. And then you just take the country when everything is subverted and when the country is demoralized and destabilized (Ellick and Westbrook 2018)”-Former KGB agent

Between October 6&12, 2017, the Center for Insights in Survey Research conducted 1,218 face-to-face interviews with residents of Montenegro who were eighteen and older in order to get the most complete picture of how Montenegrins felt about key societal issues (Center for Insights in Survey Research 2017). The demographics of those who filled out the survey were almost identical to the ethnic composition of Montenegro. The survey was composed of responses from Montenegrins (49% of respondents), Serbs (28% of respondents), Albanians (5% of respondents), Muslims (11% of respondents), and individuals that fall into a category of other (7% of respondents) (Ibid: 61). The surveys were conducted in all regions and federal states of Montenegro and in both urban and rural areas. This was the most complete public opinion survey conducted in Montenegro in the last twenty years. It has a margin of error of plus/minus three percent with a ninety-five percent confidence level (Ibid). There are many trends in the sentiment of the populous that are troubling signals for society in general in Montenegro. First of all, 54% of Montenegrins believe that Montenegro is headed in the wrong direction compared with 37% who believe it is headed in the right direction (10% answered “don’t know). Equally troubling, 61% of the population does not believe that today’s young people have a good future in Montenegro (Ibid). In a report by the National Defence Academy of Latvia’s Center for Security and Strategic Research, it was determined that a "significant vulnerability in security can develop if war is implemented by non- military means as a consequence of society’s dissatisfaction with the state’s social and economic development."27 It appears based on the surveys that a major source of

27 This report by the National Defence Academy of Latvia's Center for Security and Strategic Research, titled The Possibility of Societal Destabilization in Latvia: Potential National Security Threats, is a fascinating research piece which analyzes the varying factors present in Latvia and their relative probability for destabilizing the society.

53 frustration in Montenegro is a result of these two elements – poor social and economic development. In terms of cohesion amongst ethnic groups in society, it appears that Montenegro fairs a bit better than some of its Western Balkan neighbors with regard to ethnic tensions. The country is largely peaceful and the largest protests have been with regard to the political situation, not with regard to issues between the country’s average citizens. The largest ethnic tension that exists is between Montenegrins and Serbians and the Muslims living in the country, but these issues do not appear to have a major impact on daily life and societal relations in the country. However, the groups do not completely trust each other. Progressive Montenegrins who are desirous of continuing the social advancement in the country are wary of pro-Serb nationalist forces that desire to take the country back to the days where it was united with Serbia. On a daily basis, these issues do not impact a majority of the relations between people. But, if sparked, could pose a major issue amongst the pro-Serbian nationalists and Montenegrins.

1. Citizenship Concerns Citizenship is an extremely important issue in any state. It is a particularly complicated issue in the Balkans where it is often used to maintain ethnic citizenship within states (Džankić 2010). Montenegro’s constitution defines the country as a multi-ethnic state with no one group holding a pure majority. Nonetheless, citizenship in Montenegro has been and continues to be a tool used by political elite to maintain power. The issue of citizenship was complicated with the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1992 and signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Prior to the dissolution and beginning in 1928, all citizens were registered with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) as well as from one of the SFRY republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) (UNHCR. 1997). However, the registration was basically meaningless and had no legal impact due to the fact that “it did not necessarily reflect the republic in which one lived, voted, worked, went to school nor, in fact, where one was born” (Ibid: 3). This was not an issue until independence was granted in the states. Upon independence, all the people who lived in a particular state were granted their nationality based on where the name was in the SFRY nationality register (UNHCR

54 1997). This meant that people who lived in a particular state, but hadn’t updated their registration to reflect that, suddenly became foreigners in that state, despite the fact that they may have lived there for years, worked and owned property there. Therefore, for example, people who identified themselves as Serbs, but resided in another state, such as Bosnia & Herzegovina, were not given citizenship in FRY. People who resided in the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or FRY, (i.e. citizens of today’s Serbia and today’s Montenegro), and were not citizens of another state were authorized a two-tired citizenship and were provided citizenship in FRY and their desired state (Serbia or Montenegro) beginning in mid-1996. It was retroactive to the establishment date of FRY in 1992. The FRY Citizenship Act did contain a general provision that allowed refugees in FRY and former SFRY citizens who suddenly became stateless abroad to apply for FRY citizenship, however, this required an application to the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Ibid). There was no set list of criteria required for citizenship, therefore, granting approval was at the discretion of the Ministry of Interior. It is unknown how many people were granted citizenship under this provision, but it is assumed to not have been very many, thereby intentionally creating a Serbian refugee situation (Džankić 2010). The understood rationale for this, it is believed, was to enable Slobodan Milošević to invade the newly sovereign states at a later point in time claiming his need to protect native Serbs living in other states of the former Yugoslavian territory. In many ways, this sounds quite similar to the Kremlin’s compatriots policy, which it used as justification for actions in Ukraine and has threatened to use elsewhere to protect ethnic Russians and speakers of the Russian language who live in former Soviet states (Kravchenko 2018). In 1999, the Law on Montenegrin Citizenship was enacted. This law was in direct conflict to the 1996 FRY Citizenship Act because it specified that citizenship to Montenegro could be granted without someone previously having, or simultaneously being granted citizenship in FRY (Džankić 2010). It stated that someone could become a citizen of Montenegro by one of four ways: birth, origin, naturalization, or international agreements (Ibid). The 1999 Law on Montenegrin Citizenship was again amended in 2003 with the Constitutional Charter of the State Union. The main reason for this 2003 legislation was clarification of citizenship and voting rights between citizens of Serbia and Montenegro. By the new charter, citizens of Serbia and Montenegro had equal rights in both states with the exception of voting rights (Ibid).

55 Citizenship was again clarified in Montenegro’s constitution in 2007, which laid out that citizens who had dual citizenship prior to the 2006 independence could keep it. However, it led to political backlash, largely from the Serbian contingent and in the 2008 Citizenship Act and then 2010 Law on Amendments and Addenda to the 2008 Citizenship Act, citizenship was again clarified. However, both the 2008 and 2010 addendums largely dealt with the issues of stateless persons, and retained that would- be citizens would have to give up their citizenship in their former country to obtain Montenegrin citizenship. The political repercussions of the citizenship issues in Montenegro largely persist today. Issues of dual citizenship are still the crux of the issue for both Serbians and Montenegrins. To briefly sum up the issue, Montenegrins have no desire to allow Serbians to become citizens and vote in Montenegrin elections as it is almost certain they would vote only for pro-Serbian parties and likely take Montenegrin off the road towards further European integration. The biggest vulnerability as pertains to citizenship is therefore that a new government could come to power and change citizenship rules to allow dual-citizen voting, thereby allowing Serbians to gain Montenegrin citizenship and fundamentally change the political dynamic to give pro-Serbian parties an edge.28

G. Media Largest Vulnerability – Lack of media independence and freedom coupled with a lack of understanding in the populous with regard to disinformation

According to Dusica Tomovic, writing on behalf of Balkan Insight, “if Russia really is investing heavily in an army of bots, hackers and fake news sites to affect the outcome of elections everywhere from the US to Germany, it doesn’t need to waste any money doing the same in Montenegro, where Moscow’s agenda is well- represented by local media” (Tomovic 2017b). Montenegro’s media landscape is known to be far from independent and largely captured by state and other very biased interests. According to Reporters

28 In 2018, Montenegro passed a law allowing Citizenship by Investment (CBI). However, it is highly unlikely given the thresholds of investment required and the monetary situation in Serbia that enough Serbians would qualify for this as to change the political landscape of Serbia. Further, it is also unlikely that Russians – though heavily investing in Montenegro – would apply for CBI given that this would require them to renounce their Russian citizenship. However, it is a possibility.

56 Without Borders 2018 World Press Freedom Index, Montenegro ranks number 103 on a scale of 1-180, with 1 being the most free (Norway) and 180 being the least free (North Korea) (Reporters Without Borders 2018). Montenegro has the second lowest ranking of all the Western Balkan countries. 29 Only Macedonia has less media freedom, with a ranking of 109. Journalists in Montenegro constantly live in fear, particularly investigative reporters. They are often harassed and chastised by the government, those involved in organized crime, and even fellow citizens. Journalists are most often attacked when they report on corruption or potential crimes involving Đukanović’s inner circle. The attacks are not just verbal either. Anyone who is critical of the government can find himself or herself in a very bad position. In April of 2018, a car bomb went off outside of investigative journalist Sead Sadiković’s house. After the attack, which he survived but did not think would be investigated, he said “whenever someone speaks out in Montenegro, bombs go off or noses are broken” (Walker 2018). One of the most well-known murder cases was the May 2004 death of journalist Dusko Jovanović. Jovanović managed a pro-opposition, pro-People’s Socialist Party daily newspaper Dan and was very critical of Đukanović (Reporters Without Borders 2005). Jovanović’s wife testified that the head of Montenegro’s State Security Service called and threated to kill Jovanović in 2003, along with many others who continually threatened him (Committee to Protect Journalists 2018). In August of 2004, the deputy chief of the Montenegro criminal investigation police Slavoljub Scekic, who was leading the team investigating the Jovanović’s murder was murdered himself. In 2009, Damir Mandić was charged with being an accomplice to Jovanović’s murder and sentenced to 30 years in prison, however, he still pleads his innocence and states that he was framed. When he was charged in October 2004, it was stated that he was the driving the car from which the fatal shots were fired. No other accomplice’s have been proven to be guilty.30 It is suspected, though clearly not

29 According to the index, Bosnia and Herzegovina has the most media freedom with a score of 62, followed by Albania at 75, Serbia at 76, Kosovo at 78, and then Montenegro at 103. For reference, Ukraine and Georgia, which are widely publicized for its Russian influence in the media are ranked 101 (Ukraine) and 61 (Georgia) respectively. See Reporters Without Borders 2018 World Press Freedom Index for more information: https://rsf.org/en/ranking 30 Vuk Vulević was also charged and arrested in 2005, however, it was later found that the DNA evidence used to convict him was fabricated. More information can be found here: https://www.cdm.me/hronika/u-visbaden-poslati-lazni-dnk-uzorci-vuka-vulevica/

57 proven, that the Montenegrin government ordered Jovanović’s murder as a result of his investigations into the government. More recently, in May 2018 Olivera Lakić who worked as an investigative journalist for Vijesti was shot in the leg outside of her apartment. She had received countless threats since 2012 due to her writing of articles about the government’s involvement in cigarette smuggling and the trade of counterfeits (Walker 2018). According to Vijesti’s executive editor, Željko Ivanović, “there have been 25 physical attacks on Vijesti journalists or premises in the past decade. And this is the country that is supposedly the most reformed western Balkan country and on its way to EU accession” (Ibid). In addition to its frequent attacks on the media, the government has never truly investigated any scandals or corruption cases brought to it by the media. It also uses the media not only to attack journalists but also to attack NGOs and activists through the state-owned press. One of the main reasons for this is that government authorities are extremely fearful that the media could expose connections between organized crime and Montenegrin officials. It is thought that both are closely connected with the Kremlin given that a large amount of Russian money is rumored to be laundered through Montenegro. Therefore, Russia has a double-incentive to interfere in and influence the Montenegrin media to prevent exposure of its crimes by investigative journalists, and to promote its pro-Russian anti-Western agenda. The media climate in Montenegro coupled with and the government’s continued castigation of it makes the media (both traditional and social media) a very large vulnerability in Montenegro and a very easy for Russia to influence.

1. Media with Pro-Russian Agendas Websites and social media pages with pro-Russian agendas have been launching with increased ferocity since Montenegro joined NATO. These sources are often quoted on mainstream media in Montenegro, typically without any reference to the original source of the information, creating a ripple effect of pro-Russian disinformation throughout the country. Five major new websites have been launched since 2017 to help spread pro-Russian disinformation in Montenegro. None of the websites appear to be owned by Russian individuals or organizations (Tomovic 2017b). Instead, local journalists who are representatives of pro-Russian organizations or supporters of the Montenegrin opposition run these sites (Ibid). The websites push

58 a strong pro-Russian and pro-Serbian agenda. This is consistent with the typical manner in which Russia most often and most effectively influences the media – by using local agents to push their message as opposed to owning the websites that it influences outwardly. It is much easier to conceal one’s identity and influence from behind the scenes than openly in the limelight. When Montenegro joined NATO, Russia issued the following statement: “In connection with the parliamentary decision of April 28 on the entry of Montenegro into NATO, we should state with deep regret that the current leadership of the country and its Western backers did not heed the voice of reason and conscience. The adoption of fundamental acts affecting the fundamental issues of state security by voting of individual deputies on the basis of a coarse formal majority without taking into account the opinion of the people of the country is a demonstrative act of violating all democratic norms and principles” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2017). This message then appeared on a plethora of Montenegrin news and social media sites. The vociferous sharing of disinformation in social media is a major cause for concern in country where the majority of the population does not even believe that Russian disinformation exists.

H. Energy Largest vulnerability - high dependence on energy imports, lack of proper management of energy resources, and increasing potential for influence by energy investment

Russia uses energy as a major instrument of influence against energy dependent states, particularly in natural gas. It is less effective to attempt to manipulate crude oil and refined products as they are traded on global markets in an efficient process with many other suppliers available (Collins 2017). Unlike most other countries in the Balkans, the vulnerabilities to Russian influence in Montenegro’s energy sector are somewhat less pronounced. This is largely due to the fact that Montenegro does not currently import (or use) any natural gas (Bechev 2017: 217). There are potential projects to bring natural gas to Montenegro, the most promising being the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline, which would run through Montenegro and connect to the planned Trans Adriatic Pipeline. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline is part of the Southern Gas Corridor initiative that would transmit natural gas from

59 Azerbaijan to Europe through the South Caucasus and Trans Anatolian Pipelines. These projects were designed to diversify Europe’s natural gas mix and provide an alternative to Russian gas, therefore, there is not a high risk or vulnerability to Russian influence in these projects specifically, unless Russia is able to buy any of the companies along the route that transports the gas. Russia’s Lukoil is currently a 10% partner in the South Caucasus Pipeline, but does not own shares in any of the other companies financing the pipelines at this time. This means the vulnerabilities to Russian influence within the natural gas sector in Montenegro are somewhat low. However, this does not mean that Russia will not invest in one of the companies associated with the pipeline and exert its influence through investment. Russia’s Lukoil has also sought to shore up influence by investing in petroleum products and gas stations, beginning in 2006. The company currently owns eleven gas stations in Montenegro and owns 12% of the local retail motor fuel market (Lukoil 2018). At present, the largest portion of the energy market in Montenegro is generated from electricity, which is produced in Montenegro itself. Electricity generation, distribution, and supply activities are managed by the integrated electric company Elektroprivreda Crne Gore AD (EPCG), in which the Montenegrin government is the majority shareholder and owns 55% of the company (CSD 2018). The Italian utility company A2A owns a minority share in the company at 43%. The remaining shares are traded on the Montenegrin Stock Exchange. The Montenegrin Electric Power Transmission System (CGES), responsible for electricity transmission, is also majority owned by the state (55%) and minority owned by an Italian firm TERNA (22%) and several investment funds (CSD 2018). Given the fact that the Montenegrin government owns the majority of all energy resources in Montenegro, the issue with regard to energy is less about reliance on Russian energy and Russia’s ability to use energy as a tool of influence in the country, and more about the vulnerabilities due to corruption and the potential political vulnerabilities would that exist and if a pro-Russian government came to power. The other potential vulnerability is through investments in non-energy related areas that then are used to leverage the government to provide favorable energy rates, damaging the economy in the process. Specifically, with regard to investments, the past has shown that Russia will use its investments in other areas in Montenegro to influence the energy market indirectly. The most prominent example is the Podgorica Aluminium Plant, or Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica (KAP).

1. Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica (KAP)

For decades, KAP was the largest employer in Montenegro, and was owned by the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska. His Cypriot offshore company Central European Aluminum (formerly called Salomon Enterprises), had purchased the plant, along with a bauxite mine Niksic, in 2006 right before independence in the privatization boom in Montenegro. He also attempted to purchase the thermal power plant (TPP) and coal mine in Pljevlja in 2007 in order to control the entire supply chain for his plant, but was stopped by the Montenegrin parliament (CDT 2018). Bauxite is a sedimentary rock that contains a high volume of aluminum, hence the Niksic mine was the aluminum source for the aluminum plant. The privatization agreement contained a guarantee that KAP would receive electricity at favorable rates from EPCG until 2010 (CDT 2018). In 2007, Deripaska also attempted to purchase the Thermal Power Plant (TPP) and coal mine in Pljevlja (CDT 2018). Luckily, this was blocked by the Parliament. Had Deripaska been allowed to purchase them, the results could have been catastrophic for the country, and would have given Russia a high degree of leverage over the Montenegrin government (CDT 2018). Nevertheless, despite the fact that KAP was receiving substantial subsidies for electricity, it stopped paying its electric bills. Once the agreement expired in 2010, Deripaska attempted to obtain additional subsidies from the Montenegrin government and concessions to keep the plant running. The 2008 global recession hit KAP very hard and caused major economic losses for the plant. In 2010, the Montenegrin government agreed to provide the plant with 135 million euros in exchange for 29.36% of KAP and 31.45% of the bauxite mine (CSD 2018). The Montenegrin state also agreed to forgive the debts KAP owed to the government for roughly 15 million euros in unpaid income taxes on employee salaries from 2006 and 2007, and provide an additional 2 million euros for employee severance due to necessary layoffs to keep the company going (Ibid). Despite all the concessions, KAP still refused to pay its electricity bills and Deripaska used the KAP plant’s size to try to influence and manipulate the Montenegrin government into providing him with free electricity based on the fact that the plant provided Montenegrins with essential jobs. This tactic was effective for many years, however, by the end of 2012 and with increasing pressure from the EU, the government had had enough.

61 In February 2013, EPCG stopped supplying electricity to KAP. This was a major problem as KAP provided a substantial number of jobs to Montenegrins. As a result, CGES (the electricity transmission company) began taking electricity from the European grid covertly and illegally between March and May 2013 (Prelec 2014). The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) caught EPCG and warned EPCG to stop stealing the electricity or Montenegro would be cut off of the European network. This became a scandal when it was discovered that Montenegro’s government knew that EPCG was stealing the electricity for KAP, but did nothing to stop or report it. It was sent to the state prosecutor’s office, however, nothing has come of the charges. EPCG nonetheless, paid ENTSO-E back for the stolen electricity in the amount of 3 million euros. However, KAP itself was never held responsible for its role in all of this. Adding further insult to injury, Deripaska filed a lawsuit against the Montenegrin government, where he is requesting remuneration of 700 million euros for the loss of KAP (Tomovic 2014). Though doubtful, if Deripaska wins, the implications for the Montenegrin economy could be catastrophic.

2. Potential Future Energy Vulnerabilities

According to the Energy Development Strategy of Montenegro by 2025, part of the government’s goal in managing the energy sector is to promote investments, competition and participation of the private sector in the energy sector. (Ministry for Economic Development of Montenegro 2015). With the high level of corruption that exists in Montenegro, it is easy to see the vulnerability that presents itself with regard to energy contracts and investments. It is unknown how many bribes have been paid with regard to energy services in the country but given the overall level of corruption in the government and country overall, it is anticipated that the energy sector is one ripe for potential influence by skillful Russian energy interests. Further, a pro-Russian government could come to power and choose to align energy investments with Russian companies and investors. There are a few potentially concerning developments that may create vulnerabilities later on. Work is currently in process on the Italy-Montenegro Interconnector Project, which would connect the Abruzzo coast of Italy with Montenegro via a submarine cable to transmit electricity by late 2019. According to

62 the Terna 2017 Annual report, the installation of the first pole is complete and work is in progress on creating substations in Italy (Cepagatti) and in Kotor, Montenegro (Terna S.P.A. and Terna Group 2017: 22). While this is not concerning in and of itself, the concerning element is that on June 2, 2017, Terna signed a 36 month memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Rosseti, a Russian state-controlled power company. The MoU is for the exchange of technological know-how. This potentially opens Montenegro up to increased Russian influence depending on what the arrangement with Terna looks like and how it transpires in the future. Also, there are several ongoing and potential energy projects in Montenegro that have the possibility for increased Russian investment and involvement. The first is the construction of a second block of the Pljevlja thermal power plant. This coal- fired power plant provides roughly one-third of the electricity for Montenegro. In 2016, a contract was signed with Škoda Praha to construct the second block at Pljevlja and provide financing for the same. Unfortunately, Czech and Slovak credit banks refused to back the risky project and provide financing. The main reasons cited for the rejection of financing were the declining costs of alternative energies to coal and a desire to achieve desired EU commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions (CEE Bankwatch Network 2018). In 2017, the Montenegrin government cancelled the contract and put the project on hold due to a lack of contractor and lack of funding. At the moment, it appears that there is no desire to begin this project again, however, Chinese companies have repeatedly expressed a desire to invest in and construct the second block. China is the world’s largest coal user and importer and is in need of more coal. Russian investors also could be interested in a chance to invest in a new Montenegrin project given that they likely have a ready customer in both Montenegro and in China, who is currently increasing their presence in Montenegro. This is somewhat unlikely given that Russia is currently investing in their own infrastructure within Russia to increase coal exports to China. However, given the presence of Russian oligarchs in Montenegro, it is not outside of the realm of possibility, particularly given that the main sites of Russia’s coal are in hard to reach places and not near ports (Bne Intellinews 2018). The original project was not properly bid through a formal tender process, therefore, there is no certainty that a new project wouldn’t go down the same informal selection process. Thus, there is a high potential that this project would appeal to a less trustworthy investor, like Russia or China.

63 In 2013, Montenegro solicited bids for international gas and oil companies to explore its deep-water offshore coast for hydrocarbon deposits. Two consortiums signed agreements with the government as a result: an Italian-Russian consortium (Eni/Novatek) for four blocks, and a Greek-British consortium (Energean/Mediterranean oil) for one block (CSD 2018). The Eni/Novatek ship set off on November 16, 2018 to begin 40 days of research to record the bottom of the Montenegrin offshore and produce maps and data to determine where the first two wells will be drilled (Public Relations Service of The Government of Montenegro 2018). Eni and Novatek each hold a 50% stake in the consortium. It is too early to know exactly what vulnerabilities may exist for Montenegro as a result of this project, particularly given that crude oil is traded on a global market hence typically less corrupted than Russia’s natural gas and investment influence, but it is worth keeping an eye on.

I. Regional Security Issues Largest vulnerability = spillover of conflict from another country into Montenegro

Regional security complex theory was advanced by Buzan and Ole Waever and refers to the concept that security is clustered in geographic regions (Buzan and Waever 2003). The security of one state is highly dependent on the security of those states in the surrounding geographic region and area. In Balkan countries, ethnicities and cultures mix through porous (and what some refer to as nonsensical) borders. This helps create intense competition and connection in the region. Further, given the small nature of most Western Balkan states, particularly Montenegro, the impact of conditions in its neighbors are felt in Montenegro as well. The region is characterized with unresolved past issues, unfinished democratization processes, and political, social, economic, and ethnic components that often transcend physical state borders (Skočajič Juvan and Grizold 2017: 241). Thus, any conflict or issue in the Western Balkans has the very real and likely possibility of spilling over into Montenegro and vice versa. It is outside of the scope of this paper to go into all the details of regional security issues in the Western Balkans as the depth of the region’s complexity would require much more detail than is possible in this paper. However, the most pressing

64 current issues that could impact the situation in Montenegro will very briefly be mentioned. The security of the region is a vulnerability that impacts the security situation in Montenegro. The three most troubling issues in the region today as pertains to Russian influence are: the recent election of pro-Russian, Serb nationalist Milorad Dodik from Republika Srbska to a share of the presidency in Bosnia & Herzegovina, potential territorial swaps between Kosovo and Serbia, and the name- change issue in Macedonia are three current issues that could push the region into a tailspin and have impacts on Montenegro. Dodik in particularly is outwardly troubling as he believes that the West and NATO are enemies of the Balkans, and Russia is the region’s only true friend. He also adamantly believes that Serbs in Bosnia & Herzegovina (largely concentrated in Republika Srbska) should have their own state. Any of these issues, along with a host of others, such as returning foreign fighters, migrants and refugees, or the highly profitable arms trade in the region could impact the overall security situation in the Balkans. Russia acknowledges all this and is said to have a hand in all of it.

CHAPTER 7: Summary of Delphi Analysis Results

As has been shown in the preceding sections, Montenegro has large vulnerabilities throughout its country that are exploited by Russia, and most prominently felt in its political, economic, institutional, and social systems. According to Stefanov, “the countries from the [Western Balkan] region need to not just recognize their vulnerability, but know their level of the vulnerability and work to close existing governance gaps which allow the penetration of corrosive capital and democratic backsliding” (Hand et al. (Stefanov) 2018). The thesis author is highly confident that the opinions provided from the experts provide the most accurate picture of Montenegro’s vulnerabilities that is possible for this work. The experts came from prominent Montenegrin, Serbian, Bulgarian, and US-based think tanks; academia; diplomacy; and military service. Their combined experiences includes diplomatic service in the Balkans (including multiple former ambassadors to Montenegro), ambassadors from Montenegro to NATO, OSCE, and the UN; presidents leading think-tanks; academic experts; and authors of well-respected publications on Montenegro. The experts have published

65 hundreds of publications in well-respected sources and are internationally known as experts in the field. Their names are not provided here as the Delphi method requires anonymity by design. As was mentioned in the methodology section, the Delphi analysis consisted of three rounds of questions, which were sent to each participant over the course of two months, beginning in October 2018. For space saving purposes, all of the results of the Delphi analysis will not all be described in detail this chapter and have instead been concisely summarized and attached to this thesis as Exhibits. However, a major finding of this research – the ranking of top vulnerabilities in Montenegro– is presented below. The initial first round questions make up Exhibit A attached to this thesis. A summary of responses was generated as a result of the combined responses to the first round questions (attached here as Exhibit B). This summary, along with second round questions was then emailed to all participants. The second round questions are attached as Exhibit C. Participants were also asked if they would like to change any of their responses from the first round. No participants changed responses from the first round. The responses from the second round of questions was then summarized again and returned to the participants as the third round. The third round consisted of an opportunity for the participants to change or comment on any of the results of the analysis. No participants provided feedback that they disagreed with the results. Therefore, it is assumed that the results and summary of the survey are valid. The complete third round summary is attached here as Exhibit D. The Delphi analysis identified the following as the top 5 vulnerabilities present in Montenegro. These top 5 vulnerabilities were calculated by taking an average of each of the participants scores by vulnerability, then ranking them from lowest average score (meaning the greatest vulnerability) to highest average score (meaning the least important vulnerability):

1. Pro-Serbian (or Pan-Slavic) nationalist forces 2. Corruption 3. Serbian Orthodox Church 4. National identity controversies and internal divisions 5. Crony capitalism

66 These top five vulnerabilities have been mentioned throughout this thesis as both large vulnerabilities and as typical areas that Russia targets in influence campaigns. It was confirmed by experts through this analysis that Russian influence plays a large role in exacerbating each of the vulnerabilities that exist in the society. Some experts cited Russian influence itself as the largest vulnerability, meaning the influence in and of itself is larger than any domestic vulnerability that exists in the country. If Russian influence in and of itself is portrayed as a measure for the above calculation, it would rank as the second greatest vulnerability behind Serbian influences.31 Most participants also stated that Russian influence and pro or pan- Serbian forces are nearly one and the same in the country in that the pro-Serbian groups are often heavily supported by Russia and promote the same message. However, it must be noted that the while this analysis produced a ranking of the top vulnerabilities by design, there was no actual consensus through the first two rounds on which vulnerability was actually the greatest. In other words, participants rankings were all different with no two experts having the exact same rank order of the vulnerabilities. The conclusion from this, and given the longer answers and background details that the experts also provided, is that all vulnerabilities pose a problem for Montenegro. They also do not occur in a vacuum and often impact each other in a vicious circle.

CHAPTER 8: The Creation of the Vulnerability Model To answer the third research question of this thesis – how vulnerabilities should be measured - a vulnerability model was developed. The model separates each of the most typical spheres that Russia influences – political, economic, religious, civil society, military (security), societal, media, and energy – and presents different ways to measure each. The Vulnerability Model is attached as Exhibit E. Methods, goals, and main signals of vulnerabilities are presented that will allow any analyst to measure the vulnerabilities in their country. Due to the absence of quantitative measures in all areas, alternative measurements are presented that require the use of qualitative sources and public opinion data. Where a reputable international source for the data exists, it is listed. As

31 General Russian influence itself was removed as one of the top vulnerabilities as it is present in each of the other categories, thus demonstrating that it is best viewed not as a vulnerability itself, but as a force that preys on the other vulnerabilities to impact society.

67 the data is all summarized in Exhibit E, it will not be discussed here as to not duplicate the work. This model fills the gap in current vulnerability research by presenting critical measurements and items to pay attention to when venturing to understand Russia’s influence within any state. While experts were used for this thesis to ensure that the vulnerabilities identified were accurate and to test initial theories, this model allows analysts to conduct research on their own if desired without the need to collect expert opinions for every country. This is not to say that experts opinions are not necessary and critical for understanding various issues, in fact the opposite is often true. However, this model allows information to be presented in another way and without the potential for bias from experts or the need to derive consensus. It can therefor be used to add depth to an analysis of any particular country.

Future Use of this Model While this model has identified tools, which can be used to measure state vulnerabilities to Russian influence (as shown in Exhibit E), it must be noted that the strength of the model can be improved in a number of ways. First, the model would be strengthened if it is used to measure changes in Russian influence over time. A time-series and regression analysis could be executed that could determine not only how Russian influence in each category is growing or shrinking, but also to determine if the change in influence in any category is correlated to other phenomenon in the country such as political or societal changes. The model could also be enhanced by measuring differences between countries and comparing the different levels of influence in each of them. Both directions would make for solid and warranted future research on vulnerabilities to Russian influence.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis sought to answer the following research questions:

68 3. How should nation-specific vulnerabilities to malign external influence be measured and can a dynamic, replicable model be constructed that measures said vulnerabilities?

These research questions will briefly be summarized here in an effort to close the loop on the findings of this thesis. Russia actively exerts its influence on external sovereign states for a variety of reasons, however, the main goal is to return to a position of importance – in fact, the most important player - in the global world order. It employs various tactics to achieve these ends, most prominently discrediting Western institutions whenever possible and attempting to shift the tilt of the world away from the West and towards Russia. Montenegro was used as a case study in order to understand the various ways in which Russia influences. Montenegro is a relatively new member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - having joined in 2017. It is eagerly eying European Union (EU) accession by 2025. However, it is full of vulnerabilities in nearly all layers of society and in all of its institutions. The domestic vulnerabilities that could be compromised by Russia could not only derail the EU accession process for Montenegro, but would likely have a spillover effect to other countries in the region. Destabilization in Montenegro would have an adverse effect on NATO and the EU. Russia is unable to compete with a unified West, but it can compete with individual nations if the West disintegrates (Ellick and Westbrook 2018). Therefore, Russia uses corrupting economic influences, political pressure, proxy agents, and the Serbian Orthodox Church to influence in the country. According to the results of the Delphi analysis conducted in this thesis, Montenegro’s largest vulnerabilities are Pro- Serbian (or Pan-Slavic) nationalist forces, corruption, the Serbian Orthodox Church, national identity controversies and internal divisions, and crony capitalism. Any of those vulnerabilities on their own could be a tipping point that sent the small country into a downward spiral, particularly if Russian influence continues to push on them. A vulnerability model was created to answer the third research question of this thesis and determine how state-specific vulnerabilities to malign external influence should be measured. A dynamic, replicable model was constructed that contains indicators and measurements for one to analyze in examining vulnerabilities. However, despite the applicability of the model, it should be noted that it is difficult to create a purely analytical model that does not contain bias of some sort. As a result,

69 the Vulnerability Model created through this research contains multiple categories and levels of analysis. It is separated into quantitative, qualitative, and public opinion measurements. Methods, goals, and main signals of vulnerabilities were presented that will allow any analyst to measure the vulnerabilities in their country. However, an issue would enter the model if one attempts to assign values and weights to the measurements. This is because not only is every country different, there is no hard and fast rule that determines how Russia will always influence. Given that they are opportunistic adversaries, they typically will exploit any and all vulnerability. Therefore, despite the fact that a replicable model was created – potentially the most applicable that is currently available– the model falls short in creating a single measure to understand all vulnerabilities. Multiple measures must be used when examining vulnerabilities, and it is essential that states quickly pursue vulnerability analysis. The intensity and ferocity of Russian influence is increasing at breakneck speed. If states are to have any chance at countering it, they must patch their vulnerabilities immediately. It is my hope that this research will help allow them to do so.

70 EXHIBIT A: Round One Delphi Analysis Questions

The 10 questions listed below are designed to seek your personal opinion. Please do not feel limited in the length or style of your answers. If you do not want to answer a particular question, you can leave it blank. A reply to these by email is fine.

1. Who or what is the strongest influence in and on Montenegro?

2. The country (or countries) with the largest influence on Montenegro is/are:

3. This influence exhibits itself most in the following ways:

4. Do you think this influence helps or harms Montenegro? Why?

5. The biggest vulnerabilities in Montenegro are:

6. If Montenegro was destabilized, what do you think would be the main cause?

7. Where in the country would the biggest impact(s) of destabilization would be felt, and who would be impacted the most?

8. Do you think Montenegro should remain in NATO? Why or why not?

9. Imagine Montenegro leaves NATO. The main reason(s) for this is/are:

10. What would be the impacts on NATO if Montenegro were to leave?

71 EXHIBIT B: Round One Delphi Analysis Response Summary (shortened)

1. Who or what is the strongest influence in and on Montenegro? • European Union (including desire to enter the EU) • NATO and USA • Economic interests • Serbian Orthodox Church • Russia • China • Organized crime

2. The country (or countries) with the largest influence on Montenegro is/are: • EU • Russia • China • USA • Serbia • Germany

3. This influence exhibits itself most in the following ways: • EU accession negotiation process • Exploitation of religion/Orthodoxy • Traditionally strong pro-Russian sentiment • Economic means of influence • Meddling in internal affairs • Political support • Security support • Minority issues

4. Does this influence help or harm Montenegro? • EU - helps if handled correctly, but could be used by political elites to further state capture through disingenuous political elites • Russian influence - harms/destabilizes • China - TBD • Western - helps, but can lead to increased disinformation from anti-Western groups that then harms MNE • Serbian - harms/destabilizes

72 5. The biggest vulnerabilities in Montenegro are: • Weak state institutions • Internal divisions • Corruption • Pan-Serb nationalist forces • Crony capitalism • Russian influence • Weak and fractured opposition • Serbian influences • Weak support of civil society • Lack of government support of social services, such as education, medical care, minority rights, etc. • Statehood vs. national identity controversies • Economic sustainability • Serbian Orthodox Church • Montenegrin Orthodox Church vs. Serbian Orthodox Church (this vulnerability refers to the schism between the two, the Serbian Orthodox Church line above refers to the SOC's actions more generally) • Links between national minorities and the countries where the majority of their ethnicity live (i.e. Serbs and Serbia, Albanians and Albania, etc.)

6. If Montenegro was destabilized, what do you think would be the main cause? • Crisis in region may have a spillover effect • Nationalist, pan-Serb, pro-Russian government coming to power • Russian influence • Use of extremists to destabilize • General weakening of the EU concept of enlargement • Montenegro's EU accession failure • Domestic divisions • Clashes about dual citizenship • Economic crisis • Failure within international institutions (would lead to frustration of the people and loss of motivation, hence destructive forces could hold more power, and look more favorable)

7. Where in the country would the biggest impact(s) of destabilization be felt, and who would be impacted the most? • Interethnic coherence would be impacted • Minority groups • Process of EU accession • Democratic reforms • Democratic Montenegrins • Societal divisions would be impacted • Poor and underprivileged • Pro-Serbian or extremist parties would gain power, and anyone not in their "group" would suffer • Western Balkans as a whole would be adversely impacted

73 8. Do you think Montenegro should remain in NATO? • Yes from all participants

9. Imagine Montenegro leaves NATO. The main reason(s) for this are: • Political parties backed by Russia come to power • Nationalistic, pro-Serbian powers come to power and create a new government • Serbian/Russian/Serbian Orthodox church could overturn public opinion & government structures • NATO confrontation with Russia • NATO military intervention in other parts of the world

10. What would be the impacts on NATO if Montenegro were to leave? • Stability in the region • Montenegro would again be targeted by Russia • Russia would attempt to use Montenegro's ports again • The country would become extremely vulnerable (also for NATO and Europe) • It would be a destabilizing factor for the West • Would open up the possibility for other countries to leave • No impact

74 EXHIBIT C: Round 2 Delphi Analysis Questions

Below are the 2nd round questions. With the exception of the last two questions, these questions are all “closed choice.” However, if you would like to explain or provide any clarification, please do so below each question. As in the first round, many of these have been left purposely broad.

1. Would you consider Montenegro to be a weak or strong state? Please choose and write a number on a scale of 1-5, with 5 being a strong state, and 1 being a weak state:

2. How effective are Montenegro’s domestic, or national, security policies? Please choose and write a number on a scale of 1-5, with 5 being very strong, and 1 being very weak:

3. The items listed below were identified in the first round questions as the biggest vulnerabilities in Montenegro. There are 14 of them. Understanding that many of these vulnerabilities are related to each other, and it is difficult to imagine one without the other, please number what you think are the top 5 greatest vulnerabilities, with 1 being the greatest vulnerability and 5 being the “least.” Or, it you prefer you can label all 14 (with 1 being the greatest risk, and 14 being the lowest).

Weak state institutions Internal divisions Corruption Pan-Serb (or Pan-Slavic) nationalist forces Crony capitalism Russian influence Weak and fractured political opposition Serbian influences Inefficient government support of civil society and social services, such as education, medical care, minority rights, etc. Statehood vs. national identity controversies Economic sustainability Serbian Orthodox Church in general Debate/schism between Montenegrin Orthodox Church vs. Serbian Orthodox Church Links between national minorities and the countries where the majority of their ethnicity live (i.e. Serbs and Serbia, Albanians and Albania, etc.)

75 4. What drives opinions and beliefs of Montenegro’s citizens the most? Please number on a scale of 1-8, with 8 being the highest influence and 1 being the lowest.

Their ethnicity: Level of education: Parent’s nationality: Religion: Media: Economic status: Social media: Something else:

5. How prepared (and therefore able) is Montenegro to defend itself against disinformation? Please choose and write a number on a scale of 1-5, with 5 being a very prepared, and 1 being very unprepared:

6. Are certain age groups more or less susceptible to disinformation in Montenegro? If so, what age group do you think is most susceptible?

7. Do you think that views of the government/political elites are shared with the majority of citizens?

76 EXHIBIT D: Round 2 (and Round 3) Delphi Analysis Responses

77 EXHIBIT E: Vulnerability Model

78 79

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