Does Population Decline Lead to a "Populist Voting Mark‐Up"? a Case Study of the Netherlands
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Received: 7 February 2020 Revised: 2 October 2020 Accepted: 11 October 2020 DOI: 10.1111/rsp3.12361 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Does population decline lead to a "populist voting mark-up"? A case study of the Netherlands Eveline S. van Leeuwen | Solmaria Halleck Vega | Vera Hogenboom Urban Economics Group, Wageningen University & Research, the Netherlands Correspondence Eveline van Leeuwen, Wageningen University Abstract & Research - Urban Economics Group, The main thesis of this paper is that people in areas of Hollandseweg 1, Wageningen 6700 HB, the (expected) population decline vote more populist to express Netherlands. Email: [email protected] their discontent about the current and future state of their place of residence. In many ways a “populist voting mark- up” could be expected, as declining areas often are associ- ated with being forgotten, fomenting societal discontent and mistrust in established political parties ultimately expected to lead to more populist votes. Using the out- comes of the Dutch national elections in 2012 and 2017, we link shares of populist votes for the PVV (Party for Free- dom) and SP (Socialist Party) to indicators of population decline, as well as other demographic (“compositional effects”), local and regional characteristics (“contextual effects”) to appraise what causes higher rates of votes for populist parties in regions of decline. We do not find a “pop- ulist voting mark-up” for declining regions when controlling for contextual effects. However, we do find that both the compositional and the contextual circumstances in areas of population decline are in such a way that they provoke dis- content expressed in voting. We also conclude that it is very important to distinguish between different parties when This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © 2020 The Authors. Regional Science Policy & Practice published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Regional Science Associa- tion International Reg Sci Policy Pract. 2020;1–23. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/rsp3 1 2 van LEEUWEN ET AL. their party programs are as contrasting as in the case of the PVV and the SP. Their different focus on immigration (PVV) and jobs (SP) is clearly visible in the results. KEYWORDS broad welfare, population decline, populist voting, the Netherlands JEL CLASSIFICATION D72; J11; R12; I3 1 | INTRODUCTION Within the current Regional Science literature, there is growing interest in changing spatial voting patterns, in partic- ular the geography of recent surges in populism (e.g., Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2017; Dijkstra, Poelman, & Rodríguez- Pose, 2020; Gordon, 2018; Los, McCann, Springford, & Thissen, 2017; McCann, 2018, 2020; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). These patterns are so interesting because they provide indirect information about the perception of welfare, happi- ness or discontent. The information is indirect because casting a vote is influenced by a myriad of factors, such as: (i) party programme; (ii) characteristics of a candidate; (iii) regional socio-economic circumstances; and (iv) strategic consider- ations related to other parties or the government in general. In addition, voting does not provide information about actual levels of welfare, but of the perception of welfare. It might as much be influenced by objective factors (e.g., income or (un)employment levels), as by more subjective factors (e.g., relative income compared to other regions such as to the capital city), resulting in a feeling of inequality and “being left behind” (Dijkstra, Poelman, & Rodríguez- Pose, 2020; Garretsen, Stoker, Soudis, Martin, & Rentfrow, 2018; Gordon, 2018; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). In this paper, we are particularly interested in regions that face population decline. Population decline can have a negative effect on the stability of the economy and society, especially when at the regional level a feeling of inequality arises and people in declining areas feel left behind by the national government (Ubarevicˇienė, Van Ham, & Burneika, 2016). This feeling can be fed by higher unemployment levels, a decreasing supply of facilities and prop- erties that are difficult to sell. In some cases, people are “locked in” due to the inability to sell their property and move somewhere else. The inability of local governments to address livability and the (perceived) disinterest of the national government often results in lower levels of government trust and a lack of confidence in politicians (Obbink, 2016). This “societal discontent” has been linked to rising Euroscepticism, with studies on different but related focuses, namely on anti-EU voting or on determinants shaping citizens’ attitudes towards the EU (cf. Dabrowski, Stead, & Mashhoodi, 2019; Dijkstra, Poelman, & Rodríguez-Pose, 2020). Here, effects of demo- graphic developments such as ageing population and low population density is intricate and results have been mixed, meriting further attention. Overall, the Dutch population is growing. Nevertheless, one in five municipalities faces population decline (Van Weezel, 2017). Although the decline should be labeled as “mild” compared to most EU regions, according to the Dutch Statistics, in these declining areas only around 26% of the inhabitants trust the national politics, whereas this is 39% in areas of growth. These lower levels of trust can lead to more voters for populist parties as a way of protesting against the current system and its politicians. According to Vossen (2012, p. 32), inhabitants of shrinking regions “feel that the current establishment fails to serve the interest of the people.” Since population decline can encompass both sorting of people and their socio-economic context, it is therefore apposite to raise the question: to what extent do regions in decline face higher levels of populist voting when controlling for “compositional effects” (e.g., demographic factors) and “contextual effects” (e.g., regional economic conditions)? van LEEUWEN ET AL. 3 Like more European countries, the Netherlands has also faced a rise in parties labelled as populist. These include the PVV (Party for Freedom), the SP (Socialist Party), DENK and more recently the FvD (Forum for Democracy). Not- withstanding their similarities of having a charismatic leader and promoting anti-establishment sentiments, these parties actually exhibit quite distinctive party lines. In this respect, we have to be careful in interpreting votes for these parties in a similar way, which can also be a significant distinction to make in other countries with different political spectrums. For our study of the Netherlands, we distinguish between the largest right-wing party (PVV) and the most domi- nant left-wing populist party (SP). The empirical analysis uses outcomes from the 2012 and 2017 national elections to appraise the impact (or lack thereof) of population decline, along with a range of other potentially relevant factors. The relationship between populist voting in national elections and population decline has not been addressed before, nor the intricacies of populism encompassed in the different types of political parties in this context. Hence, it is of important to explore whether determinants have different impacts on the voting behaviour for these parties, and the wider policy implications. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we outline the related literature, also in context to the situation of declining regions in the Netherlands, spatial voting patterns and particulars of the populist parties. Accordingly, we present the relevant factors, method and data in Section 3, followed by the empirical results and discussion in Sections 4 and 5. Finally, we provide conclusions, policy implications, and potential directions for further research. 2 | THE IMPACT OF POPULATION DECLINE ON POPULIST VOTING 2.1 | Voter behaviour Why do citizens vote in democratic countries? Clearly, somehow, the gain from voting must make up for any deficit caused by the cost of participating for a citizen (Harder & Krosnick, 2008). From earlier research, we know demo- graphic factors play an important role by influencing both the motivation, ability to vote and the barriers to voting. Citizens with a higher education level are more likely to vote and have a higher voter turnout (Shields & Goidel, 1997). Education may increase the skills of a person to understand how the political system works which lowers the cost to vote. Wealthier people vote more than less wealthy citizens, possibly, because they have more at stake in the elections than less wealthy citizens (Harder & Krosnick, 2008). Also, age plays a role. Citizens are more likely to vote when they are in their middle adulthood, while after the age of 75 people vote less. Again, the middle adulthood may have gained more information about the political system and therefore are more motivated to vote. Another reason could be that this group of citizens has the most at stake in the outcome of the elections (Harder & Krosnick, 2008). Ethnicity is generally considered to not have a significant effect when controlling for income and education (see e.g., Bevelander & Pendakur, 2014). Of course, due to historical reasons, in some countries certain minorities might vote less often. Gender appears to have no significant effect as well. In addition, regional/local factors impact voter’s turnout. The motivation to vote, for example, is often affected by;