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Download Thesis This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ From Spectre to Spectrum Effective Military Offensive Network Operations Moore, Daniel Awarding institution: King's College London The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 27. Sep. 2021 King’s College London – Department of War Studies From Spectre to Spectrum Effective Military Offensive Network Operations A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the subject of WAR STUDIES Daniel Moore Student No. 1224743 Word Count: 99620 Daniel Moore is a PhD Candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is a former Israeli military intelligence officer, has worked as a cybersecurity researcher with the Israeli government and as a cybercrime researcher in IBM, and is now a security principal in Accenture Security’s threat intelligence practice. 2 ABSTRACT Cyber-warfare is frequently discussed and rarely seen. Network incidents classified as warfare mostly fall below the required threshold, and instead are varying criminal acts or peacetime information operations. That we distinguish where cyber-warfare begins and ends is essential towards using it effectively. The spectre of cyberwar can and should be turned into a spectrum of military offensive network operations (MONOs). This thesis argues that the underlying characteristics of MONOs draw heavily on existing military thought, and that MONOs can be best employed by militaries by correctly categorising them. By exploring the idea of intangible warfare – conflict waged through non-physical means such as the information space and the electromagnetic spectrum - existing operational and strategic doctrine can be adapted rather than reinvented. While MONOs are often discussed as a monolithic operational space, they can usefully be divided into presence-based and event-based operations. The former are strategic capabilities that begin with lengthy network intrusions and conclude with an offensive objective. The latter are directly-activated tactical tools that can be field-deployed by personnel to create localised effects immediately. This top- level distinction is abstract enough to be usable by military planners and researchers and specific enough to create two meaningful categories. Once defined, the two categories are applied against military thought to show how different MONOs can contribute to the overall military effort. Three chapters are then dedicated to an in-depth examination of MONO strategy demonstrated by the United States, Russia, and China. Each of the three exhibits a unique approach to intangible warfare stemming from differences in culture, resources, history, and circumstance. It thus becomes possible to observe the relative advantages and disadvantages of each military and how they stand to benefit by better employing MONOs. Daniel Moore 3 CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 5 The Argument ........................................................................................................................................ 5 Concepts ................................................................................................................................................ 9 Structure ............................................................................................................................................... 10 Methodology And Sourcing ................................................................................................................. 15 Limitations ........................................................................................................................................... 18 1. A Theory of Cyber-Warfare .................................................................................................................. 21 Overview ............................................................................................................................................... 21 The Boundaries of Cyber-Warfare ..................................................................................................... 23 Cyberwar & Cyberwarfare .................................................................................................................. 35 2. Charting Intangible warfare ............................................................................................................... 44 Overview .............................................................................................................................................. 44 First Cycle – The Second World War ................................................................................................ 46 Second Cycle – Cold War & Electronic Warfare ............................................................................... 50 Third Cycle – Command & Control ................................................................................................... 53 Fourth Cycle – Cyber Warfare and Information Operations .......................................................... 56 A Revolution in Military Affairs? ....................................................................................................... 60 3. Offensive Network Operations ........................................................................................................... 63 Overview .............................................................................................................................................. 63 Military Offensive Network Operations .............................................................................................67 Preparation .......................................................................................................................................... 69 Engagement .......................................................................................................................................... 75 Presence ................................................................................................................................................ 77 Effect .................................................................................................................................................... 80 Challenges and Opportunities............................................................................................................ 83 4. Virtual Victory: Applied Cyber-Strategy ........................................................................................... 87 Overview .............................................................................................................................................. 87 Why - Technology and Warfare ......................................................................................................... 90 When and Where – Applying Force to Networks ............................................................................. 93 Daniel Moore 4 What and How – Manoeuvres ........................................................................................................... 99 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 106 5. American Cyber Superiority ............................................................................................................. 109 Overview ............................................................................................................................................ 109 Separation by Doctrine ...................................................................................................................... 110 Event-Based CEMA............................................................................................................................ 115 Presence-Based Operations ............................................................................................................. 120 Integrated Warfare ............................................................................................................................ 125 6. The Russian Spectrum of Conflict ....................................................................................................128
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