.<,":. THIS IS EXHIBIT "V" OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHIEF MISKOKOMON, SWORN BEFORE ME T S 8 D YOF AU UST,2013
Beulah Marlon Kechego, a Commissioner, etc., County 01 Middlesex for Chippewas of the Thames First Nation expires September 8.2014 Spill Science &: TechlHJfcKY BalJeiiH, Vol, 7, Nos, {,,2, pp, 75--£7, 2002 Pergamon @ 2002 Elsevier Sdeno: Ltd, All Tighl:;; n;wrvcd e> Pr1u:CQ in G~'!a( llri(oio nS3·2S61102 $ • sec fmn: rmdicr PH: 81353-2561(02)00054-3
The Cultural and Behavioral Impact of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on the Native Peoples of Prince William Sound, Alaska
RITA k MIRAGL1;\* US Department ~f lhe Interior, Bureau ~f I"dian Affairs, ANCSA Office, 2nd Floor, 2101 East 63rd Avenue, Anchorage, AK 99523, USA
This paper explores the impact of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill and its aftermath on Tatitlek and Chenega BaY1 two small predomioantlJ Alu'utiq Native communities in Prince 'William Sound, Alaska. Specific topics discussed include: real and perceived contamination of traditional food resources, disruption of traditional subsistence practices, beach treatment and attempts at cleaning-up the oil, litigation of claims for spill-related damage, and oil spill restoration under the EXXQ" Vahic'{. Oil Spill Trustee Council including habitat acquisition. The effects of the spill are contrusted with those of the 1964 Good Friday earthquake on the same communities. @: 2002 Elsevier Sciene<' Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: on spill, Exxon Vuldez~ Maska native, su~istence, dative cultures, beliefs, traditional values
Introduction Chugach Traditional-Cultural View of Animals This paper explore, tire impact of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill and its aftermath on the cultural The closest we can come (0 reconstructing the and environmental values of residents of two pre pre-contact Chugach view of the relationship be dominantly Native villages in Prince William Sound, tween humans and the natural world is through ref Alaska. The oil spill impacts were no! limited to the erence to information collected by anthropologist Kaj direct effects of the oil on the water, land, and other Birkel-Smith from Chugach elders in the 1930s, nearly resources of the region, but also included the effects of 200 years after the earliest kno'Wn contact 'With Euro the attempts to cleanup the oil, litigation over dam peans. ages. restoration efforts, and the increased attention of In the predominant European world-view, animals the media, government agencies, and the general exist to be under the dominion of man to be l1.<;;ed as he public. Through all of this, the residents of the region sees fit. The traditional Chugach View of animals is have struggled to interpret the event through both very difli:!rent. The power in the man-anlmal rela their individual life experien<.-'e and their shared tradi tionship belongb to the animals, who must be shown tional cultw'al values. respect by man. or they will withhold the game and other resources they provide to humans. The Chugach believed that everything in the world, including wIlflt
"'TeL +l·907-271-4137~ fax: +l-907-271-l750, we call inanimate objects, is alive and therefore has its E-mail address:1..IDiflfJ;.Ii 75 I jl $1 Hi' jIg: I R.A. M1RAGLlA A sua was descrjbed as looking like a buman, only they were passed on out of context and blended with more "bright" (Birkel-Smith, 1953). the clergy-approved Christian world-view. Stepan Brizgaloff, a hunter from Chenega, who was By lhe mid- to late-20th century, most Chugach one of Birket~ William Sound by Heiromonk Iuvenaly, 1 of 10 was before we ever moved there < • ," (Kompkoff, monks who came to Alaska from St. Petersburg as 1980). part of [he first Russian Orthodox mission to AmeriCil (Oleksa, 1990), who baptized 700 Chugach in 1795 'Vhile some of the principles of the traditional sys (Veniaminoy. 1984). tem are preserved in this phi1osophy, the idea of hu At about the same time they were introduced to mans as stewards OVer the land and the animals Russian Orthodoxy, the Chug'dch were also exposed to represents a significant inversion. Seeing humans as the secular Russian view of the relationship between stew.lrds of the natural world, puts man on top, \\ 76 Spill Sdence & Techn%gy Bulletin 7(1~2) IMPACT OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL ON TATITLEK AND CHENEGA BAY With the introduction of commercially raised and For example, one of the foods provided by the processed foods, wild resources no longcr make up the intertidal is the chiton, locally called bidarkies or entire diet of the Chugach as they did in the pre gumboots, and considered a delicacy by the Chugach. contact era. However, wild foods are highly valued, In 1991, a woman from Chenega Bay gathered some especially by elders, for both their nutritional and chitons during a low tide with her father. The chitons cultural values. A Tatitlek elder said that switching to came from the beach right in front of the village. After store bought food is less healthy, because of the they cooked thcm, they noticed multiple white sores on chemicals that are put in commercially raised stock to the bottoms of the chitons. They did not eat them, in make them grow faster and bigger, which in his stead saving them in a freezer, in hopes someone could opinion can not be good to eat (Miraglia, 1991). examine them and tell them what the white spots were. Two months later, there was a similar report from Tatitlek, a woman there said that she threw away eight Exxoll Valdez Oil Spill Impacts gumboots because they had white spots on the mar gins of the foot. She described them as being hard, The Exxon Valdez oil spill was unprecedented in "like little barnacles, embedded in the flesh (Miraglia, Chugach experience. There may have been times in the 1991)". past when a single species, or even a group of species, Residents of Chenega Bay were the first to note the was scarce and the focus of the harvest would shift to overgrowth of algae iu the spill area. A community other species to compensate for the shortage. How resident pointed out "the brown mucky stuff' growing ever, this was the first time the safety, health, and over everything in the upper intertidal area. He said continued availability of all the animal species was that there didn't used to be so much of it before the called in to question at the same time. spill (Miraglia, 1991). In March 1991, an elder in Prior to the oil spill, people relied on their obser Cheuega Bay said that the fucus was not so bright in vations and experience to tell them if an animal was color as it should have been at that time of year. "It's safe to eat or not. If an animal appeared diseased or dead-looking", he said, adding that he had never seen abnormal in some way, it was not used for food. Im so much dead fucus floating around (Miraglia, 1991). mediately following the oil spill, subsistence users were This same elder talked about seals with yellow puss concerned about the safety of all resources. This in under their "arms" and said it was a rare OCCUlTence cluded terrestrial mammals, such as bears and deer, before the oil spill, but has been more common since which are known to forage for food in the inter the oil spill (Miraglia, 1992). A fIsherman in Tatitlek tidal areas. Some residents even reported that the said they had seen unusually small red salmon with berries growing in the uplands were affected by small eggs, which had blood spots at the end of the egg the fumes rising from thc oil in the water and on the sac (Miraglia, 1994). beaches. In subsequent years, subsistence users re Local marine mammal hunters also noted changes ported the scarcity of numerous species including in the composition of the seal population. A hunter marine mammals, marine invertebrates and some from Chenega Bay said when he went seal hunting in waterfowl species. late 1991, he only saw two seals at the north end A Chenega elder, then in his late sixties, talked of Chenega Island, and two more over near Knight about things his father taught him about hunting. One Island. Hc did not get any seals on that trip. He said of the first things he was taught was to always leave his that this was the first year he had gone without getting campsite clean. He was also told never to butcher seals a seal pup. He said he had not seen any seal pups that at a haul-out. You can tell where the haul-outs are year (Miraglia, 1991). because the rocks are smooth there. If you do butcher There was also concern that the mortality caused to a seal on the haul-out the seals will not come there micro-organisms in the intertidal and the water col anymore, because they can smell it. Seal hunters from umn caused by hydrocarbon contamination would Chenega say the same thing about the spilled crude impact the larger species higher on the food-chain. A oil-that the seals smell the oil and will not come back Chenega elder pointed out that all of the small crea to those beaches (Miraglia, 1992). tures that the clams, crabs, shrimp, and other marine Following the oil spill, local residents tried to apply invertebrates feed on were killed by the oil, and that is the same rules they had before the spilL They carefully why those animals were themselves in decline (Mira observed the animals in the area, discussed their ob glia, 1991). He was also concerned about reports that servations with one another, and tried to make sense the oil would be cleaned up by micro-organisms. He of what they were seeing. One Chenega Bay resi spoke about how the small organisms are eaten by dent put it this way: "People are really looking for larger ones and finally by humans (Miraglia, 1990). signs, now, things they haven't seen before" (Miraglia, The oil was so pervasive, and the nature of the 1994). threat unclear, that, traditional solutions alone did not Spill Science & Teelmology Bullefin 7(1-2) 77 1;1 if1 a,' JIB: I R.A. MfRAGLIA seem sufficient. }.rtore information was needed. Be came. There arc several reasons why the scientists were cause the nature of the threat was unfamiliar, the distrusted. These bave been identified: residents of the splll area turned to scientists for • Results were oftell inconcillSive answers to some of their questions. The Tatitlek Vil lage Council stated in a leller to the Oil Spill Health A good example of inconclusive results is the way Task Force (OSHTF): the jssue of sores on c.hitons was dealt with by scien Tbe resources that our people have subsisted on for tists. Some chirons were collected and tested for the generations are no longer available to U'S, the numbers presence of hydrocarbons. The tcsts showed very low of these resources have been declining since March 24, to non-detectable levels of hydrocarbons in the chi J989. We do not need scientists: and researchers to teU tOllS, well below levels that should he a health concern us this. We do, however, need the scientists and re for humans eating them, These tests did not result in searchers to explain to us how the resources have been any answer to the question of what cansed the white affected. how long can we expect these resources to spots on the chitons. Some chitons were also collected remain afieeted, and the safety of consuming any of for examination by an invertebrate pathologist. These the resources (Tatitlek Village IRA Council, 1993a). were examined by a biologist at ADF&G in Anchor In Chugac-h m)1_hology there are stories about ani age, who verified that the white spots observe-d by mals tricking people, and stories where the animals subsistence harvesters were indeed lesions. The chitons withhold themselves from people, causing starvation. were then preserved, sectioned, and the sections However, there are no stories about people being mounted on slides, which were sent to an invertebrate poisoned by bad food. Animals are never depicted in pathologist in Seattle. Months later, the pathologist Chugach mythology as trying to Itick humans by of reported that he was unable to find any lesions on fering themselves; an animal offering itself was always the slides. He suggested that subsistence users were considered good (1953). seeing injuries caused lo the foot of the chitons when The gteat value placed on wild foods as an absolute they were harvested. I The question of what caused good carried over into modern times, One Tatitlek the lesions observed by the ADF&G biologist and elder put it this way: '''1 know it's hard for you to residents of Chenega Bay and Tatitlek was never understand, but when we can~t get it, it's a little like a answered by scientists. Part of the problem may have sickness. Then you get some and eat it, il's like med been that chitons have been Htde studied by scientists, icine. You feel well again" (Miraglia, 1991), and not much is known about them. An experienced That local harvesters no longer trusted their own harvester of chi tons later said that such white spots ability to tell whether or not their traditional foods were common on chitons. She suggested that people were safe to eat is poignantly demonstrated by the were looking at resources more closely, and noticing foUO\\-'ing descdption of what occurred when a erew things that they had not noticed before. Whether this from the DiYIsion of Subsistence of the Alaska De is true or not; the fact remains that scientists were not partment of Fish and Game went to Chenega Bay to able to give subsistence USers a satisfactory answer to collect samples of bivalve shellfish to test for hydro this question. carbon contamination. We went to the beach in front of the village and dug for clams with the assistance of • Tlteir ailvice was contradktol'Y to traditional Chug a group of local children. One little girl, about six ach values years of age, worked arduously and collected more The OSHTF advised tbat while the expending of clams than all of us put together. She gave me some energy to metabolize oil contamination could cause for testing, but kept most of lhem. She was very ex~ health problems for oiled animals, such as slowed cited and said "My uncle will be so happy, he just growth, reduced fertility, or increased susceptibility to loves clams, my aunt will hoil these for him" On the disease, it would prevent the contamination from way back to the village. we ran into her uncle, The gelling in to lhe edible flesh of the animals; Utereby little girl gave hcr uncle her beg of clams. He said "Oh, making them safe to eat. The Chugach had a funda honey, we can't eat these. First we have to make sure mental problem with the idea that an animal can have they're safe", then handed the bag to me, and said "As something wrong with it and still be safe to eat. As one soon as you tell me they're safe to eat, I'll be down re."lident of Tatitlek put it: "We don't understand that. there digging them" (Miraglia, 1991). How can something be gooo to eat if it's sick?H (Miraglia, 1991). To the Chugach, if an animal has Distrust of Scientists ---~-~~~~.------~ While the help of the scientists was wanted, it '.vas ) Chitons adhere to rocks in the intertidal and are harvested by difficult for tbe Chugnch to aceept their advice when it prying them ofr the rock, usually using a butter knife. 78 Spiil ScfCl1(,C & Teclmoiogy Bullerin 7(l~2) IMPACT OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL ON TATITLEK AND CHENEGA BAY something wrong with it, it is sick. If it is sick, it is not dining and we are very concerned about our fu good food. ture lifestyles. All indications are that the resources have been very adversely affected by • The motives of the scientists were considered suspect the oil spill to some degree and we are being told Despite attempts to involve local residents as much not to worry" (Tatitlek Village IRA Council, as possible, scientists were seen as outsiders and they 1993a). were not trusted by local residents. When a commu nity representative from Tatitlek reported back to the community on a trip to the laboratory where subsis Impacts of Catastrophic Events tence foods were tested, local people said "Let them (the scientists) come here and eat the food. Then we'll Twenty-five years before the Exxon Valdez oil spill, believe it's safe" (Miraglia, 1994). on Good Friday March 27, 1964, South-central Alaska was stuck by a massive earthquake, with a • The oil remained in the envi,.onment magnitude of 8.4 on the Richter scale. The earth The continued presence of oil in the environment quake's epicenter was in Prince William Sound. has also made it difficult for people to accept the ad Earthquakes have been common enough in the vice of the scientists. One Chenega Bay resident, who Chugach region that there is a name for them in the was not initially concerned a bout the spill's effects on Alutiiq language, "aoolut", which literally translated subsistence resources continued eating subsistence means "shaking ground" (Chemavisky, 1979). How foods. When asked in October 1990 if he was con ever, the toll this particular earthquake took on Che cerned, his comment was "I'm still alive". However, nega was devastating, it was followed by a tsunami by April 1991, he had changed his mind. He had that destroyed the village and swept away 23 people, not expected to still find oil in the environment two one-third of the population. years after the spil1. When he did, he became very One elder in Chenega Bay told me he was out coneerned about contamination (Miraglia, 1991). In hunting in a skiff near Cordova when the 1964 March 1999, 10 years after the spill, oil persisted on earthquake hit. He said it was snowing, very largc and below some of the beaehes in Prince William flakes, but it was warm, with no wind. He was Souud. watching "an eagle and a sea otter fighting over some pieee of fish", then the trees on shore started swaying • The image of oiled animals persisted in the minds of and he felt dizzy even though he was still in the boat. the people He hunted a while longer and then went in to camp. Even where the oil did not remain, the image of He turned on his radio and heard that Chenega had oiled animals persisted in the minds of residents, been washed away. He said, "I lost my father, I lost making their traditional foods less palatable to them. my mother and my brother" (Miraglia, 1990). Whcn A Chenega elder said, "I haven't been able to get it he traveled to Chenega inuuediately fonowing the di out of my mind, since I saw those seals dying all saster, he found the Sound was red with floating dead covered with oil on Green Islands and Seal Is red snappers, young black cod were swimming at the land ... can't get it out of my mind and when I eat it surface near the dock, and there were octopus and now, I can't get that out of my mind, I'm afraid of it, squid and "all kinds of bottom things" on the beach in but I eat it, because I need it. That's my food. I can eat front of the village. He said that many animals died as your food, your white food, but there's something a result of the earthquake, but things came back missing, there's something that doesn't get full" quickly. He was certain the Sound would not a re (Miraglia, 1991). cover as quickly from the oil spilL He was skeptical The residents of the Prince William Sound vi11ages of reports that things were getting better in the after remained concerned, but they gradually returned to math of the oil spill He would get angry when it was using subsistence resources, where they could get suggested that they were getting better (Miraglia, them. They continued to rely more on their own ob 1990). servations than on the advice of biologists in their The main impact of the earthquake on Tatitlek was attempt to understand what was happening in the the loss of family members and friends killed in the environment. A 1993 letter from the Tatitlek Village tsunami at Chenega, and the increase in population Council to thc Exxon Valdez OSHTF stated: when the survivors of Chenega moved there several months after the disaster. There was very little physi " ... the residents of this village are very worried cal damage at Tatitlek. The surviving residents of about the condition of the resources in our area. Chenega were evacuated initially to Cordova, and The herring are sick, the ducks, to some degree then to Tatitlek. Over the succeeding years, many of are sick, the seal and sea lion populations are de- the Chenega survivors moved on from Tatitlek to Spill Science & Techllology Bufletin 7(1-2) 79 R.A. MIRAGLIA other communities, inc1oo1ng Anchorage. As a com The people of Chenega suffered both a natural di munity, Chenega lost both its social and physical saster (the earthquake) and a technological disaster strncture. (the Exxon Valdez oil spill) in succession. The effects With the passage of the Alaska Native Claim, Set of these two events were compounded. However, there tlement Act (1971), the snrvivors of Chenega started are significant differences between these two kinds of a movement to get their village recognized. Chenega disasters. Corporation was established and applied for lands it There is a tendency to view a natural disaster as an was entitled to under the act. In 1984, survivors and act of God for which no one is to blame. People come descendants of the original population of the village of together to help one another to recover from the ef Chenega started a new community called Chenega Bay fects of a natural disaster. In a man-made disaster, at Crab Bay on Evans Island, those whose lives are impacted feel a need to assign The diaspora lasted 20 years. In that time) an entire blame as part of an effort to regain a sense of control generation grew up. A generation, for the most part. over their own hves. These two types of disaster also not raised with the same dose connection to the land differ in that natuml disasters have a clear beginning as the preceding generations. J\.fost of the young men and ending; the temporal extent of a technological in Chenega, those currently in their twenties and disaster may not be so easily defined (Edelstein, 1988). thirties, who grew up in Anchorage, Cordova, and In Chenega, there was no one to blame for the other large communities, did not learn to hunt or fish. earthquake and tsunami. White the experience was and most of them are not shOWIng any interest in devastating to the families that jost loved ones. and to learning these skins now. Some of the current gronp of the community as a whole, the disaster had a clear teenagers are learning subsistence skIDs and values. beginning and ending. The survivors were able to They are being taught to hunt, fish, and gather by their move on with their lives and make plans. By contrast, fathers and other men in the community, who are the Exxon Valdez oil spill bad a clear beginning, but mostly in their late forties and early fifties. there is no elear end to the disaster, and there is plenty Harvesters began the process of exploring the area of blame to go around. around the new community to find new sites to allow During the initial response to the spill, in the spring them to harvest more efficiently. In addition. the earth~ and summer of 1989, both the community of Chenega quake changed the shorelines of the Sound sufficiently Bay and the harvest areas used by its residents, were that, especially in the case of shellfish, knowing the old invaded by cleanup workers, government agency rep~ harvest sites did little good, The Chenegans also faced resentatives, repOlters, and the curious. A virtual army the challenge of reconnecting with one another, and of thousands of peopJe were on the Sound that sum forming a new identity as a community. mer (Impact Assessment Inc., 1990a; Piper, 1993). One The Exxon Valdez oil spill hit five years after the C1tenega Bay resident said that beach treatment crews resettlement of Chenega Bay began. The community fishing in their spare time had wiped out the halibut in of Chenega Bay was directly in the path of the spilled a favorite loeal fishing spot. In addition, residents say oil. Many of the beaches that were heavily oiled in the that people who first eame to the Sound as part of the spill are adjacent to land then owned by Chenega spill response effort now return to the area to hunt and Corporation. These are tribal lands, to which the fuh~ which further impacts local resources. people of Chenega have ancestral, cultuml and tradi TIl.e Alaska Department of Environmental Conserff tional ties. The spill struck at the two things the new vation rented a home in Chenega Bay to house their residents cited as most important to them: the sub~ personnel. who were responsible for organizing the sistence lifestyle and oontrol over their lives. local response. Helicopters landed, sometimes on a The spill disrupted subsistence harvests for a variety daily basis. at the end of the main street, only about 20 of reasons, including: yards away from the community cemetery. Repre sentatives of Exxon. VECO (the company contracted • actnal contamination of resources, by Ex.'Xon to run the oil cleanup etTorts)J state and • fear of unseen contamination and possible detri federal agencies and members of the press, all came ment to health from consuming resources, throngh this tiny community ~ith an average pOpIl~ • the physical presence of so many people in the lation of 83 people. Sound following the spill (with people everywhere. Dnring the succeeding years of beach treatment, residents felt it 'WaS Impractical to attempt to harvest local leaders struggled to be heard with varying de wildlife), and grces of snccess. There was and continues to he strife • the spill disrupted commercial fishing, both an im hetween the residents of Prince William Sound and portant source of jnc{)me for some residents, and officials in the state and federal agencies over spin an important sonrce of fish for home use in the com impacts and appropriate responses. Many of the .Na munity. tive residents of tl1e Sound want to See every bit of oil 80 Spill Sdem:e &- Technology Bulletin 7(1~2) IMPACT OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL ON TATITLEK AND CHE"EGA BAY removed from the beaches of the Sound. The position pro"vide meat for his family and to share with others in taken by the state and federal governments was that his community. Despite being told that he could not oil should be left alone in cases where it would do develop brain lesions from eating the meat of oi1ed more harm than good to remove it (Piper, 1993). seals, 2 both he and his hunting partner smpped A decision was made early in the respotL'>e to set hunting and cating seals. Both of these men passed aside a group of beaches and leave them untreated. away in 1998. To the best of my knowledge, neither The "Cset~asjdes" included beaches with different sub one ever hunted or ate seals again. Thc partner once su'ales and different degrees of oiling and exposure confided that he could not ~ any purpose in hunting to tides, The purpose of thi1) was to have untreated if it meant giving his family and friends meat that beaches to compare later with the treated bea<:hcs to could end up poisoning them. This is a dear inversion, allow an evaluation ofthe both effectiveness and of the with an activity that once provided a sense of purpose damaging impact of various treatment methods. It and identity> tuming into a source of distress; and a would also provide a gauge of how much "natural" oil food once considered wholesome becoming perceived reduction could be expected on the various substrates as a potential poison. (Holloway, 1996). Tests done under the auspices of the OSHTF; and To residents of Chenega Bay and Tatitlek, leaving interpreted by the Expert Toxicological Committee any oil on the beaches was unacceptable. In the words and the United States Food and Drug Administration. of a community leader, "The subsistence lifestyle of demonstrated that the risk of increased cancer mtes the residents of Chenega was being sacrificed to benefit due to consumption of subsistence foods contami scientific studies, which held no interest to C1lenega nated with crude oil was minimal. Ine risk was shown Bay residents" (Miraglia, 1999). lo be much less than the increased risk of cancer from The spill left a legacy in tbe Prince William Sound smoking cigarettes and eating smoked salmon. How villages, including a loss of trust in the wholesomeness ever, the risks incurred by smoking cigarettes and of the food supply, increased iutrusiou by the gov eating smoked fish are voluntary risks. The additional ernment in people's lives, continued uncertainty about risk from eating oiled subsistence foods was involun the future, and a sense of helplessness. tary, because subsisteuce users did not choose to have their food sources contaminated with oil. To subsis tence users in the spill area any involuntary risk, uo Lifescape Changes matter how small, was unacceptable. In 1993, as many as one~third of the herring re In his book, Contaminated Communities, Michael turning to Prince William Sound exhibited external Edelstein refers to five "lifescape changes" that are lesions. Scieutists identified the lesions as the result of often experienced by those exposed to contaminants in a fish virus called viral hemorrhagic septicemia (VHS). the environment These are: The vinls was likely always present in the herring popUlation, but some sort of stress caused it to be • a re·assessment of the assumption of good health; expre:ssed more viruJently. It has yet to be determined 0- a shift to pessimistic expectations about the future, whether the stress was the result of the oil spill, the resulting from victims' perceived loss of control over fordng of herring into pounds for a commercia1 roe fon.. 'es which affect them; fishery, or &ome other uuidentified stressor. In 1993 • a changed perspective on environment; it is now un and 1994, co-iucident with the emergence of VHS, certain and potential1y harmful; • an inversion of the sense of home involving a bew tra:yal of place. Vv'hat was fonnerly the bastion of 1 Since 1990, the OSHTF has advised Ihm all the fish, deer, family security is now a place of danger; and ducks, ~cal!;. and !;.Ca lion'> tC.}ted as lmrt of the Sll?si(ltence food safety • a loss of the na'ive sense of trust and goodwill ac testing program were found to be safe to eat, but people should not corded to others in general; specifically, a lost belief use shellfish from be"lches whcre oil is still present. Between j 989 that government acts to protect those in danger and 1991, ab{' Spiff Sdenee & Tec!mofogy Bulletin 7( 1-2) 81 1;1 ifi &;1;18 II R.A. MIRAGLIA there was a near-failure of the herring spawn in front and the number of physician-verified illnesses occur of the village. As demonstrated by the following ex ring since the spilL The conditions most frequently cerpt of a letter from the Tatitlek Village IRA Council reported in descending order were hypertension, ar to the OSHTF, community residents were not com thritis, 3 skin rashes, ulcers, and emotional problems. forted by scientists assurances that VHS is a fish virus, Most of the communities (four of five) with the highest which cannot be transmitted to humans and that the average number of medical conditions verified by a herring with lesions were safe to eat. physician were small predominantly Alaska Native When the herring returned to the Sound with sores communities (Impact Assessment Inc., 1990b). and lesions on them, we became extremely concerned In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, a bout the safety of harvesting any and contacted the Chenega Bay has attained an odd sort of celebrity as Alaska Department of Fish and Game and the De the first community in the direct path of the spill. It partment of Environmental Conservation about their has become a destination for a particular kind of condition; we were told that while both agencies were tourist, specifically journalists and officials seeking not sure what was affecting the herring, they were safe insight on the long-term impacts of an oil spilL When for human consumption. This made absolutely no major spills occur elsewhere, a delegation is sent to sense at all to us. Suppose there were meats in the Prince William Sound, often to Chenega Bay, on a American super markets that had sores and lesions on fact-finding mission. them, do you think that either agency would have told the consumers that the meats were safe, even before they had determined what was affecting the meats? Impact of Litigation and Government We very seriously doubt that (Tatitlek Village IRA Settlements Council, 1993b). Four years after the spill, Tatitlek residents had A major factor keeping the residents of the spill area become distrustful of their government, environ villages in a continuing state of crisis with regard to ment, and food supply. They were pessimistic about the oil spill is on-going litigation. The state and federal the future and concerned about their health and the governments settled their civil claims with Exxon for health of their families. $900 million in March 1991. 4 Exxon paid an addi Along with the uncertainty left in the aftermath of tional $100 million to be split evenly between the state the Exxon Valdez oil spill, residents of the spill im and federal governments to settle the criminal charges pacted communities have experienced an increase of against the company (Swiderski, 1996). Many com conflict within their communities. In 1991, a Chenega munity residents saw the government settlement as a Bay elder told me that people in the community had betrayal, because it left them with less leverage to get a been fighting a lot. He told me he thought it was settlement of their claims against Exxon. According to because of the money coming in from spill employ Charlie Cole, Alaska's,Attorney General at the time, ment. He said, "it changed people" (Miraglia, 1991). the communities chose to withdraw from the settle Many of the arguments I either heard about or wit ment discussions. nessed in Chenega Bay involved disagreements over According to the court settlement decree, the gov who had the right to interpret the spill and its impact. ernment settlements are for the restoration, enhance People argued over who the "real Chenegans" were. ment, or replacement of the injured resources and lost The Oiled Mayor's study, found a significant positive services, not to restore individual losses. Some com correlation between the level of an individual's expo munity leaders think the money Exxon paid to the sure to the oil spill and cleanup efforts, and a decline in governments should have gone to the residents of the the quality of their relationships with family, friends, spill area to restore their losses and this remains a neighbors, and co-workers. In several of the small, point of contention between the communities and the predominantly Alaska Native communities, more than EVOS Trustee Council, which administers the settle 40% of respondents reported cases of friendships ment fund (Miraglia, 1990-1999). ended over the oil spill cleanup-related issues (Impact In November 1992, Alyeska Pipeline Service Com Assessment Inc., 1990b). pany (Alyeska), the consortium of oil companies that The conflict and stress took its toll on the physical health of the people as well. In 1994, the Tatitlek .. _--_._-"-""------Village Council President said that stress-related ill 3 A commuuity leader in Chenega Bay listed an increase in nesses were up in the community, and he blamed this reports of carpal tunnel syndrome, whieh she attributed to injury increase in health problems on the oil spill. The Oiled from scraping oil off rocks (Miraglia, 1999). This increased repoliing of arthritis may also refer to joint pain resultiug from the repetitive Mayor's study found a significant association between scraping. the level of exposure to the oil spill and cleanup efforts 4 With a possible additional $100 million to be paid if additional with both a perceived decline in post-spill health status damages, not knowable in 1991 were later identified. 82 Spill Science & Teelmofogy Bulletin 7(1-2) IMPACT OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPTLL ON TATITLEK AND CHENEGA BAY operates the Trans-Alaska oil pipeline, paid the state deavor. Chenega Bay and Tatitlek have obtained government $30.7 million to settle charges against the funding for a combination of projects including those company. Alyeska also reached an out-of-court settle promoting the increased involvement ofloca1 residents ment with the private plaintiffs against the company. in the restoration process, projects intended to en These claims were based on the assertion that between hance or replace lost subsistence resources, and spirit 1977 and 1989, Alyeska reduced its spill response ca camps and workshops to restore the teaching of sub pability with «reckless indifference" to the interests of sistence and cultural values disrupted by the oil spill. the plaintiffs. In July 1993, Alyeska agreed to pay $98 The communities also took part in projects designed million to settle with the private plaintiffs. $11.5 million to study the safety of subsistence resources in the spill of this went to settle with individuals in the Native class area in direct response to local coneerns. Some of and $9.8 million for village corporations (less 30% in these projects were funded out of $5,000,000 set aside attorneys fees) (Enge, 1993; Fortier, 1996). by the Alaska Legislature from the state's portion of In July 1994, Exxon agreed to pay $20 million to the the Exxon criminal settlement specifically for subsis Native subsistence class for lost subsistence uses. 5 tence restoration grants to the unincorporated com This dollar amount was based on the replacement cost munities in the oil spill impact area. for lost subsistence harvests, the difference between One effect of the oil spill restoration process has been pre- and post-spill subsistence harvests as documented the dramatically changed relationship between scien in part in surveys conducted by the Alaska Depart tists working in the region and the local people. A good ment of Fish and Game, Division of Snbsistence example of this is the marine mammal biosampling (Duffield, 1997). The claims of this class for the loss of project. Beginning in 1994, funding was provided for a culture had been previously rejected in federal court, a study of the status of harbor seals and sea lions in the very painful fact for villagers to accept (Miraglia, spill area. This project led to the establishment of the 1994). The $20 million settlement was disbursed to all Alaska Native Harbor Seal Commission and a bio of the private plaintiffs against Exxon. In a sense, the sampling program that continues to the present. Na Native subsistence class used the $20 million settle tive hunters are trained to take samples from and ment as an "ante" in order to maintain a claim to a measurements on marine mammals harvested for portion of a $5 billion punitive judgment handed subsistence use. These samples and observations are down against Exxon in federal court. That judgment is sent to scientists trying to understand the reasons for still on appeal (Phillips, 1994a,b; Fortier, 1996). the decline of these animals in the region. The scientists The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund (TAPL) communicate the results of their studies back to the paid out $27 million, including interest, to private communities through the Harbor Seal Commission. claimants. Nearly all of this went to the village corpo It has been frustrating for the communities that they rations for damage to their lands. None of the village can only get funding for projects that fit into very spe council claims to the TAPL fund succeeded. The claims cific criteria established by the courts, the state legisla of subsistence users were also denied (Fortier, 1996). ture, and government attorneys. A persistent complaint The issue of putting a price on the damage done to from community representatives is that the human el them by the spill was itself problematic for many ement has been left out of EVOS restoration. A good residents of the spill impacted communities. A resident example of this is a proposal for a community store of Chenega Bay told me that the lawyers for the village repeatedly put forward by Tatitlek. Community leaders had advised them not to fill out the TAPL claim argue that the spill resulted in a significant reduction in fOlms, but to instead put in for a quarter of a million the local availability of subsistence resources and an dollars per man, woman, and child. She was bothered increased dependence on store-bought foods; there was by this because on the one hand, she felt that $250,000 no store in Tatitlek. Therefore, the community pro was a ridiculously large sum of money, when com posed that funding to establish a store be provided from pared to her annual family budget. At the same time, EVOS settlement dollars. This proposal has been re she also saw it as putting a price on something she jected each time it has been suggested on the grounds considered priceless, the loss of culture, and therefore that it would not directly restore a damaged resource not enough money to compensate for the loss. and would not promote subsistence restoration. The communities have had to compete with scien Additional state criminal settlement dollars were al tists and other researchers to get funding for oil spill located by the state legislature to pay for new airports restoration projects out of the government settlement for Chenega Bay and Tatitlek. Alyeska settlement funds. They have been fairly successful in this en- dollars have been used to fund oil spill response docks for both communities, to purchase and install equip ment to enhance communieation in Prince William 5 Exxon agreed to pay an additional $3 million to pay subsistence Sound and to place oil spill response equipment at claims of tllOse not part of tlIe Native subsistence class. Chenega Bay, Tatitlek, and Cordova (Swiderski, 1996). Spill Science & Technology Bulletill 7(1-2) 83 RA MIRAGLIA The improvements to village infrastructure make it transfer of lands from Native ownership to federal and much easier and less expensive to get in and out of state ownership. Lands purchased in fee simple with these communities, Prior to the construction of the funds from the civIl and criminal Exxon settlements new airport~ Chenega Bay was only accessible by boat, are conveyed 10 Ihc statc or federal land management Roa t -plane; or helicopter. With the larger docks, the agency lllilnaging adjacent lands. Negotiations have communities have been added to the state ferry route. been conducted with the ANCSA regional and village According to the Village Administrator for Chenega corporations in the oil spill impact area. Thc Trustee Bay, the funds coming into the community are placing Council has a poticy of only considering large parcel a burden on village government, because the grants land packages if they include a Significant proportion and projects also bring papenvork and reporting re of fec simple land sales (Barnes, unpublished manu quirements. The Chenega Bay Village Council Presi script), 'The 'village corporations of both Chenega Bay denl has also pointed out that gran~s and contracts and Tatitlek have completed land deals with the from the State of Alask.a come with the requirement Trustee CounciL that the Village Council sign a waiver of sovereign In February 1997, Chenega Corporation signed an immunity. Community officials are uncomfortable agreement with the Trustee Council covering 59,520 with this. requirement, but at the same time. they want acres. Chenega Corporation sold about half of its the grant money (Miraglia, 1997, 1999). land holdings in fee simple. They sold conservation Efforts have been made to bring traditional eco easements in perpetuity on much of the remaining logical knowledge (TEK) into the EVOS restoration land, including nearly all of Chenega Island. In ex process. In the last couple of years, Alaska Natives change, the corporation received $34 million (EVOS have heen deluged with requests for their knowledge Trustee Council, t997a). Some of the money was as TEK has been made a priority for so many agencies distributed to shareholders in an initial disburse~ and organizations. This has raised issues over owner ment in January 1997. 3 $14 million of the proceeds ship of data, fear of loss of control over information, of the land deal were placed in an irrevocable and questions of confidentiality or credit for con tri b trust that will provide shareholder dividends in per uting to research, as well as questions of CDmpensation petuity (Chenega Corporation Board of Directors, for participation in research projects (Miraglia 1996~ 1999). 1999). One message has come across clearly; the In the Spring of 1998, Tatitlek Corporation and the people in the spill area want an active role in the EVOS Trustee C..ouncil reached agreement on a habi collection, interpretation, and use of their TEK. They tat protection package. The corporation received are not interested in being a passive source for infor~ $34~550,OOO in exchange for a combination of con mation or a mere subject of research. servation easements, timber casements, and fee simple A major facet of the EVOS Trustee Council's res land transfer on 68,914 acreS. Roughly half of the toration program is something caned "habitat pro~ acreage was transferred in fee simple (EVOS Trustee tection". which in effect is land acquIsItion. This Council, I997b). program has a larger share of the civi) settlement Each of these land agreements contains a clause dollars allocated to it than any other part of the res reserving subsistence rights for community resi toration effort. 6 The stated goal is to protect the dents on the lands sold in fee simple to the United hahitat of resources injured in the spill from further States. degradation by development, including logging and The habitat acquisition process has its critics, miniug, 7 In practice, the program has involved the among them most of the EVOS community facilita tors, The community facilitators expressed their con cerns in a letter addressed to the Trustee Council Executive Director in January 1997. According to the EVOS Trustee Cultncil 1998 statns report, $392 mUlinn is eomn:1Ued to habitat protection mduding, "Inrge As you know~ many of us are opposed to the parccl and swall p<;rcel hab-itat protection programs (past expeudi Habitat Acquisition Program. The reasons for this are tnres, ouhtauding offers, e8tim::tcd fltture oommitments and pareel many, but the main c.oncerns are: (a) Tribal Govern evalnat:on costs)" {Exxofl Valdez Oil Spill Trnstee Conncil, 1998a). ments arc nol consulled in this process. TIle creation In addition. the Trustees r.ave decided to oomrolt $55 million 0: the offor-pront corporations \vho are tasked wilh making estimated $170 million that 'foill be in the restnrat10n reserve (a fund ad aside out of the dvU fund :0 pay tor retitoration »cdons needed a profit for their shareholders has created this beHef after Ex:.;on l1wkes i:s. final ;:taymcut iu200i} in 2002 to be spent on that Tribal Governmem(s) have no say in this process additional habita~ protection (EVOS Trustee Council, 1999). 1 There arc two t'Ompouen~s (If the habitat protcctiiY.l program~ the large parcel program involving btocks of land in excess of 1000 acres, and the small parcel pl'Ogtam involving blocks of land mnaner than 1000 acres (Exxon Voldez Oil Spill Trustee Council, 1998b:19). & Rnmored to be between $30,000 and $47,000 per 100 shares It is the large parcel program that is discussed here_ (Miraglia, 1997). 84 Spill Science & Technology Bullelill 7(1··2) [MPACT OF THE EXXON VALD1:;Z OIL SPILL ON IATITLEK AND CHENEGA BAY since the contract is negotiated between the Trustee Council (Miraglia, 1997), 10 They charge that the Council and the corporations. The philosophies of federal government's. pursuit of the purchase ofJands tribal governments. and for profit corporations are at conveyed under ANCSA was a violation of [he gov odds due to the profit making nature of the corpora~ ernment's trust responsibilities and was prohibited lions. 'DIe Trustee Council must take this "tribal tmder the Alaska Land Bank provisions (Miraglia. philosophy" jnto consideration when negotiating land t999), sales through the habitat acquisition program; (b) the One Chenega Bay resident, who opposed the land land sales are based upon a vote by the corporation sale, said the primary rcason why so many share shareholders, many of whom do not live in the villages holders were for it was because their finances were in or have any ties to the village j 9 so are more readily bad shape and they were being told they would still apt to vote for such a proposal (than) those of us who have use of the land after selling h. This resident exw live here and depend on these resourees for our live~ pressed the opinion that Chenega onJy had a voice in lihood; (e) many of the village councils in the oil spill decisions made dnTing the response to the oU spill affected area are establishing traditional natural re~ because of the residents' status as Jand owners and source management programs to manage the re that a landless Chenega would be voiceless and pow sources utilizing traditional knowledge and western erless (Miraglia, 1996), science. We feel that the habitat acquisition prow Another resident, who supported the land saie, gram is a slap in the face of these efforts in that this is stated that in his view the land sale was done to pre a statement that \ve do not have the knowledge or serve the land and stop the logging, He thinks logging capability to manage these resources wisely, so the would have been detrimental to tourism and also federal/state government must purchase these lands would have had an adverse effect on wildhfe, He said back so that they can be managed properly. It seems the preservation of subsistence is better than it would to be quite ironic. since we, as traditional managers, have been if those lands had been logged, He thinks were not the ones who created thc oil spil1. The real tie that regardless of land ownership, the voice of the to restoration, in our opinion, is ensuring that these village will still be heard. "Even if we had a million natura) resources upon which we depend are managed acres of land~ if what we were saying went against the at the local level. thu.<; providing meaningful em rest of society would they Ustcn to us then? If what we ployment opportunities in the communities and pro have to say is pertinent, we will be heafd~ whether we viding a sense of contributing to the restoration own land or not" (Miraglia, 1.997). proces~ (Community Involvement Facilitators et ai., A third resident, when interviewed in 1999, said he 1997), believes that the sale of Chenega Corporatiol1 lands Some Chenega Bay residenlS, have asserted that the land sale was carried out without proper consultation with the tribal government, the Chenega Bay IRA ~O This assertion is based. in l---att on A::-lSCA Section 3 Gl. \\'hid1 defines a "Village Corporation" as: " ,. an Ala$ka Native Village Corporation orgnni1.ed under the laws of the State of Alaska as a business for profit or non*profit corporation to hold, invest, manage andlor distribute lands, -"'~".~~~~--:-~~-=--- !t SlwreholdcfS in fhe village corporations arc not an emnmnnity propt:rty. funds. and other rights and assets for and on behalf of a re3itients and ronvcrsely. not all community l"CSidents are mare~ Native Village in accordancc with the tenns of this Act" (Alaska holders. Under ANCSA, each eligible Alaska Native who was Hving Native Claims Sett:cment Act, 1971). in 1971 was Is!>ucd 100 share!> ill the regional End viUage corporation 1n which they enrolled. Shares were no1 issued to anyone born al1er TneSl" residents contend that the phnH,e "for and on behalf of' December 18, 19i1. ~hc duy Congrl'Ss passed A:SCSA (Berger. indicates the jntention of Congress that lhe village corporation be 1985:25). Individuals born Since 1971 can only obtain shares r~ponsive and responsible to the village govcrnment, and therefore through inheritance, or pursuant (0 a c-onn decree of separation, should not havc <;aId village lands without the 85 I jJ fi >Ii' jIg iI RA. MIRAGLIA and the invasion by outsiders will have more of an to the community. He said, "Being put on the map effect on the community than tlte spilled oiL He did hurt: the loss of privacy hurt". not think the full impact of the land sale could yet be Today, the villages of Prince \Villiam Sound have to seen, He thinks the younger generation, the children of work within the existing framework of dual state~ the shareholders, who do not themselves own shares in federal management of fish and other wildlife. The the corporation will return to the village because they residents of Chenega Bay and Tatitlek have, of ne will not have the free income their parents are re cessilY, taken a much more active role in natural re ceiving, He pointed out that the money Chenega sonree management. This is demonstrated by their Corporation received from the EVOS Trustee CA)uncil increasing involvement on the federal fish and wildlife and the federal govemment in exchange for the land advisOly councils~ by the formation of groups such as deal, $34 million, amounted to roughly $0.5 million the Alaska Native Harbor Seal Commission and the per shareholder. He said ""The government offered so Chngach Regional Resources Commission, and the much mOlley, shareholders felt they couldn't refuse the push for co-management agreements between Alaska offer" (Miraglia, J 998). Native groups and the state and federal governments. As of May 1999, the population of Chenegn Bay including the hiring of natural resource specialists: and was down Toughly one-third from what it was prior to the development of natural resource programs in both the oil spilL Following as it did on the heels of the Chenega Bay and Tatitlek. Community residents at tsunami, the diaspora, the re-establishment of the vl1- tend meetings, sit on advisory councils. and present lage, the oil spill and the subsequent uncertainty, the testimony. This often involves being away from the land sate further broke down residents' conuection to homes they love more than they would like, However, the land. [t also provided disalfected community mem they have learned through their experience with the bers with the money they needed to move away. Ta~ Exxon Valdez oil spill that decisions made far away titlek has been established at the present location for a can powerfully affect their lives. They want to be sme much longer period of time and the Chief and Village that their voices as Natives of Prince William Sound, Council have worked hard to provide local employ as suhsistence users, and as stewards of their tradi ment and economic development. So far) Tatitlek has tiona] tribaJ lands are heard. not seen the same degree of exodus as Chenega Bay. Acknmrlrdgcmt:trts-The auihor WOUld tike to thank the residents of By 1997, local people were beginning to report the L':ie communities of Cheneg:1 Bay iHld Tatitlek lor J.haring their ex recovery of some resources. A man from Chenega Bay periences with me, as wcl1 as for their buspitaiity over the years. gave the following assessment of the status of the Special thanks goes to Larry Evanoff. Chenega Bay Village Conncil President, and Gary Kompke/!. Ta.titlek Village Council President. Prince William Sound ecosystem: for !.aking the time to read and comment or: the drafts of this paper, Up until thTee years ago, you needed to go half way to Cordova before you would see any 'Wildlife. Now Re/eN!nt:es it's getting better. I'm seeing more and more wild life. , . whales~ porpoises, birds and sea otters, Even Barnes, N. (tlflpul::lished manuscript). Habitat protection following though seals have declined, if we were to go to the Exxon Valdez: A lasting treasure, Paper presented at Legacy of an Oil Spill: JO Years After Exxnn Va/de:;:, March 23. 1999. Montague, lhe seaJs are there and they ate coming Anchorage, Alaska. back to LaTouche. They seem to be coming back. Berger. T" 1985, Village Journey: The Report of tbe Alaska Nalive Shrimp and crab still haven't come back Clams are Review Commission, Hill and Wang, New York (202p), Birket-Smith, K., 1953, The Chugach Eskimo. Nationaltntlsccts coming back (Miraglia, 1997). Skeifter. EtJK'grafisk Raekke. VI. Natlona[mu5eet~ Ptlblikatjont\~ In 1999, 10 years after the spill, oil could still be fond, Kobenhavll, 26Ip, found in pockets and o07.ing up from the substrate on Chernavi~ky. T.F., (1979). Taped IItterview, j, Mal'cott.e, W, MitchelL interviewers. 25 August, Corco'ia, AJas(a, Tape many beaches. Many of the reporters, who visited the 79CAC008, pj)rt~ :: and 4, On fire at the Bureau of fndian beaches in preparation for writing articles on the lOth Affair!; A'SCSA Office, Anchorage. anniversary of the spill, commented on the smell of oil Chenega Corporation Board of Directors, Jm, Chenega working t..1gctheL Anchoruge Daily News, Sunday, April 1 Lxxxp. on these beaches (O'Harra, 1999; Romano-Lax, 1999; Community Involvement Facilitators, Local Community Repre:.en. Slavik, 1999). The oil was still strongly aromatic, in tat!Ve5. other Regional Representatives, 1997, Leiter to Mony dicating the continued presence of some of the lighter McCammon. Executive Director, Exxon Valdc:: Oil Spill Trustee Council. 25 January. aromatic components not expected in weathered 011, Duffield, J., 1997. Notlfuarket valuation and the courts: The case of Residents of Chenega Bay temain concerned about the the EXXfllt Valdc;;, COUIe1npofcry Economic Policy XV (Octo long-term effects of the residual oil on the resources on ber): XJ()tp, Edelstein, M,R" 198K Contaminated Communities: TIle Social and whieh they depend. Psychologi~l Tmpacts of Residential Toxic Exposure. Westview One Chenega Bay resident summed up what he SeeS Press, B0ulder and London, 217p, as the worst impact of the spill on his community. He Enge, M" 1993. Faces in a big crowd wail for spill money, Anchorage Daily News, 26 July, has seen a loss of local control, as a result of increased EXXVlI Valdez Oil Spilt Trustee Council, 1997<1, RcstOl'ution Updnle, exposure, which he perceives as being velY damaging Volume 4, Number 3, August~Sepfember, Anchorage, 86 Spi.'l SL1mce & Tecllllology Bulletin 7(l~2) IMPACT OF THE EXXON vALDEZ OIL SPILL ON TATITLEK AND CHENWA BAY Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, 199Th. Res{oratiou Update, ContCl:'ence on Ru~sian AU1¢rica. Sitka, Alaska, !9~12 August. Volume 4, Number 1, March, Ancltorage. 11,c Limestone Press, Fairbanks. R¥xon Volde:: Oil Spill Trustee Council, !99&a, Status Report, Phillips, N., 1994. Exxon &Cttlcr. lawsuit Natives get $20 million for Anchorage, subsistence los:>CS. Anchorage Daily News. 26 July. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, 1998b. Reslomlion Update, Phillips, N., 1994. S5,OO{),00Q,OiJO: Jury sets otl spill damages:. An~ Volume 5, Numher 3, May, June, July, Anchorage. chornge Daily News. 17 September, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, 1999. Restof' S~vill Science & Technology Btdlerln 7(1-2) 87 THIS IS EXHIBIT "W" OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHIEF MISKOKOMON, SWORN BEFORE ME TH (1 D YO AUGUST,2013 ommissioner for Taking Affidavits Beulah Marlon Kechego, a Commisslonlll", etc., County of Middlesex for Chippewas of the Thames First Nation Expires September 6,2014 5 7 Washington, D;:: 2GD09 (2C2) of; 7 ~b981 Arnes, lA 5001 Acknowledgements This rep(lrt was "1"",<1", p{,ssibjl~ in 190, dean energy adivi;lcillte and philanthrop!st 10m \:\'iI2s, f,12as\t~ eiT1:;!! fon n h';: p"n"li£!,i"'"n,qIJ",'t;>,@ ewg.org liNE T Find Toxic Stew i Oil Spill BY SHARP, MA, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH PH,C" SENIOR SCIENTIST AND NNEIiA L;;;I,,''', DepUTY DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH !:NVIIlONMENTAL WORK!NG GROUP DEBATES WH contained seven highly toxic compounds, including lead, benzene and others that can cause cancer and KLVSTOI\J E XL developmental problems, EWG's findings raise new LD SHrLVED questions about the potential health and safety risks of the proposed Keystone XL pipeline, which would RVVARD, A ~JS: carry 830,000 barrels of tar sands oil daily from Canada across the United States, (see Table 1 on page 4) E TRANSPORTlr~G The seven contaminants found in EWG's testing THE /)M:RICl\N HEARTI .. AND? (,iVEN THE may be only the beginning, however. Crude oil is known to contain many volatile and semi-volatile SIG!,\iFlCANT POTENTIAL LEAKS AND chemicals that rapidly disperse into air. Community SPILLS, AND THE PIPELINE' air sampling conducted directly after the Mayflower spill confirmed the presence of more than 25 toxic NI In an attempt to answer this question, clean energy advocate and philanthropist Tom Steyer sought the eyes were help of a community resident to collect a sample I could slneii that of spilled tar sands crude oil from the March 29 ExxonMobii pipeline rupture in Mayflower, Arkansas, The sample, taken on April 11 ,was provided to Environmental Working Group roughly two months later to test for the presence of toxic chemicals, Eight students were sent home from school after EWG commissioned an independent laboratory the spill because they were vomiting and complaining analysis, which found that - despite the likelihood of headaches (McAllister 2013), Other Mayflower of significant off-gassing of volatile chemicals prior reSidents complained of nausea, headaches, to the sample's delivery - the spilled tar sands oil breathing problems, respiratory problems and I :3 c (:---1:::.: I( : Benzene Known human carcinogen associated with leukemia; exposure during pregnancy may cause birth defects; can also have toxic effects on blood and bone marrow, the nervous system and immune system. (IARC 1982; 1987; 2012; ATSDR 2007a; Lupo 2011) Toluene Toxic to the nervous system and kidneys; exposure to high levels during pregnancy may lead to birth defects and other health problems. (ATSDR 2000) Ethylbenzene Listed as a carcinogen in California's Proposition 65 inventory of toxic chemicals; animal studies suggest that it may also be toxic to the nervous system, cause developmental harm and damage hearing and the kidneys. (ATSDR 2010; OEHHA2013) 1,2A-Trimethylbenzene A volatile chemical that can irritate the skin and respiratory system; exposure to high levels may cause adverse central nervous system effects such as drowsiness and headache; animal experiments show that it can have toxic effects on development. (EPA 1994, Saillenfait 2005) Xylenes Toxic to the nervous system; can cause respiratory irritation; some human studies indicate that exposure may also affect the kidneys and liver. (ATSDR 2007b) Chromium A common form (called chromium-6 or hexavalent chromium) is a known human carcinogen and has been shown to cause birth defects and developmental defects in animals. (ATSDR 2012) Lead Highly toxic to the developing nervous system; can cause serious and permanent damage to the unborn, including effects on cognition and growth; can affect almost every organ and system of the body and has no known safe level. (ATSDR 2007c) other symptoms after breathing the fumes; these capture the volatile and semi-volatile chemicals complaints perSisted for days and even weeks after that likely off-gassed from the spilled oil into the the spill (McAllister 2013, GeM 2013, Peeples 2013). surrounding air. Rather than being placed in a special, One community resident who lives just outside the hermetically sealed container of the kind typically evacuation zone described waking up in the middle used to transport volatile-containing samples to a lab, of the night a couple of days after the spill: "I couldn't the Mayflower oil sample was placed into a plastic breathe. My throat and nose and eyes were burning food container with a piece of plastic wrap over the really bad ... I could smell that horrible smell. I got top. It was later transferred to an ordinary screw-top really scared" (Peeples 2013). jar, which was then given to EWG. In addition, the sample was kept at room temperature rather than refrigerated. Such handling is known to Increase the The citizen-collected sample provided to EWG volatilization of chemicals and can make them break was not gathered in a manner that could adequately down or dissipate faster. Furthermore, EWG received the sample more than two months after the spill took above the 5 parts per billion limit allowed under place, providing significant opportunity for the crude federal drinkingwaterstandards (PHMSA 2013). Long oil to off-gas. term exposure to benzene above this limit increases the risk of cancer and blood problems (EPA 2013a). For these reasons, EWG's tests focused on the . presence of toxic chemicals, notthelr levels. The Arkansas spill sample also contained detectable levels of lead, which is toxic at such low levels that the Environmental Protection Agency Despite the fact that EWG's test results likely has set the drinking water goal at zero. A lead represent significant underestimates of the contaminated pipeline spill that came into contact concentrations of volatile and semi·volatile chemicals, with drinking water supplies would likely pose the level of benzene found (4.5 parts per million) unacceptable public health risks. is still cause for significant concern. This volatile compound readily dissolves in water, and the estimated 3,500-to-5,000 barrels of oil spilled In I: I r··] Arkansas contained enough benzene to contaminate Pi E 132-to-188 million gallons of drinking water at levels Because of industry trade secrets, EWG was able to test for only a limited number of potential YF contaminants in the Mayflower crude oil sample. 01_. This constraint also makes it difficult for the federal government to assess the safety oftransportlng hi! ----~ED F Vlf\NY tar sands 011 through the Keystone XL pipeline. This could have significant Implications for communities along the proposed pipeline route, should there be additional spills Into communities, farm fields Chemical name and waterways. Given that significant pipeline spills million} happen every three days on average In the United States, it will be only a matter of time before spills take place along the Keystone pipeline route if it is Benzene 45 constructed (McAllister 2013). Toluene 23 The pipeline that burst in Arkansas was carrying Ethylbenzene 7.4 the same type of Canadian tar sands 011 that would flow through Keystone XL technically termed 1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene 30 "bitumen." Because bitumen typically occurs in m,p-Xylene 41 solid or semi-solid form, It must be diluted with significant quantities of a chemical cocktail before o-Xylene 15 It can be pumped through a pipeline. The resulting mixture Is called diluted bitumen or "dllblt." The exact Chromium 0.29 composition of dllbH: Is anyone's guess since the tar sands Industry claims that the Identity of the diluting Lead 0.31 chemicals Is a trade secret and does not disclose that *Levels are likely to be underestimates due to non-standard Information. sampling methods used by local resident. management plans and potentially longer time frames to effectively remediate." AJuly, 2010 pipeline spill in Marshall, Mich., provided ample evidence of how challenging it is to clean up spills of tar sands oil. In that incident, ,,- Environmem:a! Protection Enbridge Energy Partners reported that a rupture of a 3D-inch diameter oil pipeline had released 843,000 gallons of dilbit into a nearby creek and ultimately The lack of such basic information was one reason into the Kalamazoo River. (The Keystone XL pipeline the Environmental Protection Agency gave a rating would be 36 inches in diameter, which would make of "inadequate" to the State Departmenfs draft a similar spill even more devastating.) Heavy oil from Environmental Impact Statement on the pipeline the Enbridge spill sank to the bottom of the river and proposal. This rating indicates that the EPA did not mixed with sediment and organiC matter, making the think the draft document adequately assessed the recovery process extremely difficult. potentially significant environmental risks of building and operating the pipeline (EPA 2011). llfJ clean/nit:~,. .. The EPA noted that "an analysis of potential diluents is important to establish the potential health spill and environmental impacts of any spilled oil, and responder/worker safety, and to develop response After almost three years of cleanup efforts, the strategies" (EPA 2011). Equally importantly, the public EPA recently determined that it will be necessary cannot make an informed judgment on the safety of to dredge of the bottom of the Kalamazoo River the Keystone XL pipeline if it is in the dark about what to "protect public health and the welfare of the kinds of toxic chemicals will flow through it. environment (EPA 2013b)." A document filed by Enbridge with the US Securities and Exchange It is clear, however, that dilbit spills pose a unique Commission (SEC) in March said that as a result of and serious environmental and public health threat. EPA's final order, the estimated cost of cleaning up The EPA recently emphasized that spills of diluted the spill had risen to a staggering $1 billion (SEC, bitumen "require different response actions or 2013). equipment from actions for conventional oil spills" (EPA 2013b). N L According to Cornell University soil scientist EWG's testing of the Arkansas spill sample Corey Ptak, tar sands oil is particularly challenging to highlights the risks that the Keystone XL pipeline clean up and takes a long time to break down in the would pose to water resources, especially in light environment. "Heavy crude oil and crude bitumen the EPA's earlier conclusion that pipeline spills are a from oil sands contain a higher percentage of long "very real concern" (EPA 2011). Pipeline ruptures are chain hydrocarbons, asphaltenes and resins," Ptak common: The industry's record makes clear that it's told EWG. "These compounds are highly resistant a matter of when, not if. Spills might be especially to microbial actions, making these forms of crude likely with tar sands oil because it takes higher more difficult to degrade than lighter crude oils. As temperatures and pressures to keep bitumen flowing a result, crudes from oil sands will require different 6 Pcisor~5 In the Pipeline than with conventional crude oil. E At a bare minimum: or acres (U'ml(J,I1C/ "KI,YF:IT be Oil and gas companies must be required to devl['J!stated ruptures fot publicly disclose the names and amounts of all chemicals used to dilute tar sands oil. months, if rhl'Wls!orever Oil and gas companies must be required KflJlst@fU! to submit samples ofthe diluted for thorough independent testing to assess the concentrations of toxic chemical pollutants, Over its planned route of 1,179 miles from Alberta, Canada, to Nebraska, the Keystone XL pipeline The State Department must revise its would traverse a number of critical water resources, Environmental Impact Statement, which including aquifers that provide drinking water to dismissed concerns about the pipeline without millions who live in the High Plains area of the taking into account the highly toxic nature of United States, This includes the Ogallala aquifer, the what would flow through the pipe, and address nation's largest underground drinking water source the risks of the chemicals that will be used to (Heineman 2013). The proposed pipeline route also dilute tar sands oil flowing through Keystone crosses 65 rivers, streams and other water bodies XL. designated for drinking water or for recreation, fishing and agricultural uses (USDS 2013). The Arkansas and Michigan pipeline ruptures are clear warnings of the dangers facing America's waters, soils and homes if the Keystone XL pipeline is approved, as well as a reality check on the incredible difficulty and expense of cleaning up after spills of tar sands oil. Given the industry's track record, it is essentially inevitable that such spills will take place sooner or later in America's heartland if Keystone Xl moves forward. EWG's findings raise crucial questions: How many drinking water supplies or acres offarmland might be devastated by pipeline ruptures for months, years, or perhaps forever? Would people want to buy food from a farm that had been contaminated with crude oil containing benzene, lead and any number of other toxic chemicals? These are difficult questions that deserve serious consideration. This is especially true given that - as the Mayflower rupture demonstrates - pipelines do not fail gracefully. They fail catastrophically. ----- 14. Hannigan JH, Bowen SE. 2010, Reproductive toxicology CI"""" - EFt:RE and teratology of abused toluene. Syst Bioi Reprod Med, 1. ATSDR. 2000. Toxicological Profile for Toluene. Available: 56(2):184-200. http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tpS6-c2.pdf 15. Heineman, D, 2013. Letter to President Obama and 2. ATSDR. 2007a. Toxicological Profile for Benzene. Secretary Clinton from Nebraska Governor David Available: http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/ Heineman.january 22,2013, tp110-c3.pdf 16. IARC, 1982, Some industrial chemicals and dyestuffs, 3. ATSDR. 2007b. Toxicological Profile for Xylene. Available: IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic http://www.atsdr.cdc.govltoxprofiles/tp71·c3.pdf Risks to Humans. Volume 29. 4. ATSDR. 2007e. Toxicological Profile for Lead. Available: 17. IARC, 1987, Overall evaluations of carcinogenicity: an http://www.atsdr.cdc.govltoxprofilesltp13-c3.pdf updating of IARC Monographs volumes 1 to 42, IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks 5. ATSDR. 2010. Toxicological Profile for Ethylenzene. to Available: http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/ Humans. TP.asp?id=40&tid=14 18. IARC, 2012, A review of human carcinogens: chemical 6. ATSDR. 2012. Toxicological Profile for Chromium_ agents and related occupations. IARC Monographs on Available: http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp7-c3. the Evaiuation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans. Voiume pdf 100F, 7, California Office of Environmental Health Hazard 19. Lupo Pj, Symanski E, Waller DK, Chan W, Langlois PH, Assessment. 2013, Current Proposition 65 list. Canfield MA, Mitchell LE, 2011. Maternal exposure to Available: http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/prop65Jlst/filesf ambient levels of benzene and neural tube defects P6SsingleOS2413,pdf among offspring: Texas, 1999-2004, Environ Health Pers pect, 119(3): 397-402, 8. EPA (Environmenta I Protecjon Agency), 1994, Chemicals in the Environment: l,2,4-trimethylbenzene. Available: 20. McAllister E, 2013. Insight: Mayfiower, meet Exxon: http://www,epa,gov/chemfact/Urimet,txt When oil spilled in an Arkansas town. Reuters, April 11 ,2013, Available: http://www.reuters.com/ 9, EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), 2011, Public EPA articlef2013f04f11 fus-exxon-spill-mayfiower-insight comment letter to US Department of State regarding the idUSBRE93AOPI20130411 Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement 21, from TransCanada's proposed Keystone XL project. Peeples, L 2013. Arkansas 011 Spi:! Health Complaints Available: http://www.bilateralist.com/wp-content/ Emerge In Mayfiower. Huffington Post April 10, 2013, upl oa ds/2011 f06fkeystone-xl-project -epa-comment- Availa ble: http://www.huffingtonpostcom/2013104/101 letter-20110125,pdf arkansas-oi I-spili-health-_. n._304561 O.html 10, EPA (Environmentai Protection Agency). june 3, 2013a, 22. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Water: Drinking Water Contaminants. Available: http:// 2013. http://www,phmsa.dot.gov/staticfilesl water.epa.govldrink/contaminantslindex,dmItLis PHMSAlDownloadableFilesiEnforcement%20 Noticesf420135006H_CAO,pdf 11, EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). 2013b_ Public EPA comment letter to US Department of State 23. SailienfaltAM, Gallissot F, SabatejP, Morel G. 2005. regarding the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Developmental toxicity of two trimethylbenzene Statement from TransCanada's proposed Keystone XL isomers, mesityiene and pseudocumene.ln rats following inhalation exposure. Food Chem Toxicol. project. Available: ~ttp:/Iepa,gov/compliancelnepal keystone-xl-p roject -epa-comment-letter -20130056,pdf 43(7):1055-63, 12, EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), Last updated 24, United States Department of State. Bureau of Oceans june 3, 2013, Water: Drinking Water Contaminants and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. Available: http://water,epa,govfdrink/contaminants/ Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement Index.dm#Lis fo' the Keystone XL Project. March 2013, 13. Global Community Monitor. 2013, Independent Air Test 25, United States Securities and Exchange at Mayflower Oil Spill Reveal 30 Toxic Chemicals at High Commission. Commission File Number 1-10934. Levels. Available: http://www,gcmonitor,orgiarticle, Availa ble: http://www.secgov/Archivesledgarf php?id=1672 data/88028SI000119312513117435/d506989d8k.htm P':,isons I n the Pipe-: inc: THIS IS EXHIBIT "X" OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHIEF MISKOKOMON, SWORN BEFORE ME T S g AY F AUGUST, 2013 Beulah Marion Kechego, a Commissiol18l', etc., County of Middlesex for Chippewas of the Thames First Nation expires September 8, 2014 &EPA United States Oil Cleanup Continues Environmental Protection Agency On Kalamazoo River Enbridge Oil Spill Marshall, Michigan June 2013 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Michigan Department of Environmental Quality are supervising cleanup work by Enbridge Energy Partners LLP that is focusing on remaining pockets of submerged oil in the Marshall, Battle Creek and Galesburg areas. Enhridge's Pipeline 6B ruptured in July 20 I 0, spilling a large volume of crude oil into Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. After the discharge, some of the oil sank and mixcd with river sediment, making it difficult to locate and remOVe without doing additional environmental damage. 'Poling'technique The best way to identiry the location of submerged oil and detennine its extent is by using a field technique known as "poling." Poling involves manually agitating soft sediment (river mud) using a pole with an attached disc combined with a global positioning system to record the exact location. When the sediment is agitated, submerged oil rises to the smface in the foml of oil sheen and globules. A team, composed of mostly Enbridge personnel with oversight and direction from EPA and MDEQ employees, categorizes the response of the submerged oil to poling at each location as "heavy," "moderate," "light," or "none." Thousands of poling results are used to map out locations of the river where submerged oil can then be targeted for removal by dredging. Workers on the Kalamazoo Ril'er pel/orming poling operation 10 locate submerged oil. 011 spill amounts Dredging was the chosen tecllllique because it has proven Enbridge initially reported the pipeline break released effective at removing submerged oil and oil-containing 819,000 gallons of crude, The company later revised that sediment. EPA and MDEQ experts agree that controlled amount to 843,000 gallons. dredging is the best and most proven way to eliminate the remain10g recoverable oil and to remove oil that has At EPA's direction, Enbricige has provided regular, collected in sediment traps. updated estimates of how much oil it has recovered since thc spill. These estimates are based on methods worked Community impact out with EPA technical experts to determine the amount Dredg10g ""ill affect residents and visitors to the area, For of oil 10 all waste recovery categories: oil, contam1oated safety reasons, parts of the Kalamazoo River will have to water, soil, vegetation, debris, and cleanup materials, be closed while dredging takes place, EPA and MDEQ have As of this May, Enbridge estimates the company advised Enbridge that the river does not require complete has recovered 1,15 million gallons of oil from the closure and that the number and length of closed river Kalamazoo River. sections should be m1oimized, Once detailed dredge plans Remaining oil and future recovery have been finalized in late June, EPA will publicize the river closures, In the parts ofthe river that stay open, normal EPA estimates about 180,000 gallons of Line 6B oil recreational activities such as kayaking and fish10g remain (plus or minus I 00,000 gallons) remain in the river available to the pUblic, Some fishing advisories are, however, bottom sediment. EPA has ordered Enbridge to remove in effect (see box below), the recoverable oil (about 12,000-18,000 gallons) by dredg1og, Local and state health departments agree there are no expected long-term health problems related to occasional contact ""ith TheI62,OOO-168,OOO gallons of oil that will remain 10 the remain10g oiL Enbridge will maintain cleaning stations the river after this dredging work is complete will not along the river for people who do encounter oiL be able to be recovered right away without causing significant adverse impacts to the river. Instead, it must Although dredging is a temporary 1oc01lvenience to the be carefully monitored and collected over time using community, EPA and MDEQ ex~m have concluded that it traps that gather contaminated sediment. Future oil is the best option for dealing with the continuing problem of recovery will depend on whether the crude eventually submerged oil, EPA and MDEQ are committed to remaining moves to the areas with these sediment traps. Ou-scene until the area has been restored to the fullest practical extent, Dredge order issued Talk with us On March 14, 2013, EPA ordered Enbridge to remove EPA and MDEQ continue to staff a local field office at Line 6B oil and oil-containing sediment along parts of 13444 Preston Drive in MarshalL Residents who would the Kalamazoo River where significant accumulations like to discuss the cleanup may drop by to talk to agency have been recently found. representatives, Visitors are encoumged (but not required) The order requires dredg10g of submerged oil and oil to call first to make sure staff is available when they arrive, contaminated sediment within the following areas: Call 269-727-2511 and leave a message, We will call you back to confirm a time, • Upstream of the Ceresco Dam • Mill Ponds area EPA and MDEQ will host informal open houses several • Morrow Lake, Morrow Lake Delta and adjacent times during the summer to give people additional areas opportuoities to discuss the spill response (see front-page boxfordetails). • Sediment traps at tvvo designated locations Several availability sessions may also be scheduled in other The dredging of the specified areas must be completed places over the next few months, Those meeting dates and by Dec, 31 this year, locations will be advertised in the local media, Commissioner for Taking Affidavits Beulah Marlon Kechego, a Commissioner, etc., County of Middlesex for Chippewas of the Thames First Nation Expires September 6, 2014 Analysis of Frequency, Magnitude and Consequence of Worst-Case Spills Fl"Om the Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline John Stansbury, Ph.D., P.E. Executive Summary TransCanada is seeking U.S. regulatory approval to build the Keystone XL pipeline from Alber la, Canada to Texas. The pipeline will transport diluted bitumen (DilBit), a viscous, corrosive form of crude oil across Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas. As part of the regula tory process, TransCanada is required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of a pipeline spilL The Clean Water Act (CWA) also requires Trans Canada to estimate the potential worst-case discharge from a rupture of the pipeline and to pre-place ad equate emergency equipment and personnel to respond to a worst-case discharge and any smaller spills. The K.eystone XL environmental assessment documents (e.g., Draft Environmental Impact Assessment) as well as the environmental impacts documents for the previously built Keystone pipeline, can be found on the US State Department web site. It is widely recognized that the environmental assessment docu ments for the Keystone XL pipeline are inadequate, and that they do not properly evaluate the potential environmental impacts that may be caused by leaks from the pipeline (e.g., USEPA 201Ia). The purpose of this paper is to present an independent assessment of the potential for leaks from the pipeline and the potential for environmental damage from those leaks. The expected frequency of spills frorn the Keystone XL pipeline reported by TransCanada (DNV, 2006) was evaluated. According to TransCanada, significant spills (i.e., greater than 50 barrels (Bbls) are expected to be very rare (0.00013 spills per year per mile, which would equate to 11 significant spills for the pipeline over a 50 year design life). However, TransCanada made several assumptions that are highly questionable in the calculation of these frequencies. The priruary questionable assumptions are: (1) 'rransCanada ignored historical data that represents 23 percent of historical pipeline spills, and (2) TransCanada assumed that its pipeline would be constructed so well that it would have only half as many spills as the other pipelines in service (on top of the 23 percent missing data), even though they will operate the pipeline at higher temperatures and pressures and the crude oil that will be transported through the Keystone XL pipeline will be more corrosive than the conventional crude oil transported in existing pipelines. All of these factors tend to increase spill frequency; therefore, a more realistic assess ment of expected frequency of significant spills is 0.00109 spills per year per mile (from the historical data (PHMSA, 2009» resulting in 91 major spills over a 50 year design life of the pipeline. The CWA requires that TransCanada estimate the "worst-case spill" from the proposed pipeline (ERP,2009). TransCanada's calculation of the worst-case spill from the proposed Keystone XL pipeline was not available at the time of this assessment, so an assessment of the methods used by TransCanada for the existing Keystone pipeline and a comparison of the results of those methods with the methods recommended in this analysis were made. The worst-case spill volume at the Hardisty Pumping Sta tion on the Keystone (the original pipeline will be referred to as simply the Keystone pipeline while the proposed pipeline is the Keystone Xl pipeline) pipeline predicted using methods recommended in this analysis was 87,964 barrels (Bbl), while the worst-case spill predicted using TransCanada's methods was 41,504 Bbl (ERP, 2009). The difference is a factor of more than 2 tirues. The primary difference betwcen the two methods was the expected time to shut down the pumps and valves on the pipelinc. TransCanada used 19 minutes (TransCanada states that it expects the time to be 11.5 minutes for the Keystone XL pipeline). Since a very similar pipeline recently experienced a spill (the Enbridge spill), and the time to [mally shutdown the pipeline was approximately 12 hours, and during those 12 hours the pipeline pumps were operated for at least 2 hours, it is clear that the assumption of 19 minutes or 11.5 minutes is not appropriate for the shut-down time for the worst-case spill analysis. Therefore, worst-case spill volumes are likely to be significantly larger than those estimated by TransCanada. The worst-case spill volumes from the Keystone XL pipeline for the Missouri, Yellowstone, and Platte River crossings were estimated by this analysis 10 be 122,867 Bbl, 165,416 Bbl, and 140,950 Bbl, respectively. In addition, this analysis estimated the worst-case spill for a subsurface release to groundwater in the Sandhills region of Nebraska to be 189,000 Bbl (7.9 million gallons). Among numerous toxic chemicals that would be released in a spill, the benzene (a human car cinogen) released from the worst-case spill into a major river (e.g., l\1issouri River) could contaminate enough water to form a plume that could extend more than 450 miles at concentrations exceeding the Safe Drinking Water Act Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) (i.e., safe concentration for drinking water). Therefore, serious impacts (0 drinking water intakes along the river would occur. Contaminants from a release at the Missouri or Yellowstone River crossings would enter Lake Sakakawea in North Dakota where they would adversely affect drinking water intakes, aquatic wildlife, and recreation. Con taminan Is from a spill at the Platte River crossing would travel downstream unabated into the Missouri River for several hundred miles and affect drinking water intakes for hundreds of thousands of people in cities like Lincoln, NE; Omaha, NE; Nebraska City, NE; SI. Joseph, MO; and Kansas City, MO, as well as aquatic habitats and recreational activities. In addition, other constituents from the spill would pose serious risks to aquatic species in the river. The Missouri, Yellowstone, and Platte Rivers all provide habitat for threatened and endangered species including the pallid sturgeon, the interior least tern, and the piping plover. A major spill in one of these rivers could pose a significant threat to these species. The benzene released by the worst-case spill to groundwater in the Sandhills region of Nebraska would be sufficient to contaminate 4.9 billion gallons of water at concentrations exceeding the safe drinking water levels. This water could form a plume 40 ft thick by 500 ft wide by 15 miles long. This plume, and other contaminant plumes from the spill, would pose serious health risks to people using that groundwater for drinking water and irrigation. Introduction TransCanada is seeking U.S. regulatory approval to build the Keystone XL pipeline from Alber ta, Canada to Texas. The pipeline will transport diluted bitumen (DilBit), a viscous, corrosive form of crude oil across Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. As part onhe regu latory process, TransCanada is required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of a pipeline spill. The Clean Water Act (CWA) also requires Trans Canada to estimate the potential worst-case discharge from a rupture of the pipeline and to pre-place ad equate emergency equipment and personnel to respond to a worst-ease discharge and any smaller spills. The Keystone XL environmental assessment documents (e.g" Draft Environmental [mpactAssessment) as well as the environmental impacts documents for the previously built Keystone pipeline, can be found on the US State Department web site. It is widely recognized that the environmental assessment docu ments for the Keystone XL pipeline are inadequate, and that they do not properly evaluate the potential environmental impacts that may be caused by leaks from the pipeline (e.g., US EPA, 201Ia). The pur pose of this paper is to present an independent assessment of the potential for leaks from the pipeline and the potential for environmental damage from those leaks. 2 In addition to evaluating potential environmental damage from pipeline leaks, TransCanada is required by law to pre-position emergency equipment and personnel to respond to any potential spill. This paper does not address these requirements. However, an independent assessment ofTransCanada's emergency response plans for the previously built Keystone pipeline was done by Plains Justice (Black burn, 2010). This document clearly shows that the emergency response plan for the Keystone pipeline is woefully inadequate. Considering that the proposed Keystone XL pipeline will cross much more remote areas (e.g., central Montana, Sandhills region of Nebraska) than was crossed by the Keystone pipeline, there is little reason to believe that the emergency response plan for Keystone XL will be adequate. Since spills from these pipelines will occur, and since they will be extremely difficult and ex pensive to clean up (likely tens to hundreds of millions of dollars), it is imperative that TransCanada be required to be bonded for these clean-up costs before any permits are granted. This proposed require ment is supported by the recent Enbridge spill, where a smaller crude-oil pipeline leak released crude oil into a tributary of the Kalamazoo River, and early clean-up costs, as reported by the U.S. EPA, have exceeded $25 million. Worst-Case Spill One of the requirements of the CWA is to calculate the worst-case potential spill from the pipe line. An assessment of the potential worst-case spill from the Keystone pipeline was conducted by TransCanada; however, some of the methods and assumptions in that assessment are in question. The primary focus of this paper is to provide an independent assessment of the worst-case spill from the Keystone XL pipeline and to compare that to the assessment done by TransCanada. Spill frequency To support understanding of the potential impacts due to releases from the pipeline, an assess ment of the likely frequency of spills from the pipeline is made. TransCanada calculated the likely frequency of a pipeline spill for the Keystone XL pipeline in the Draft Environmental Impact State ment (ENTRIX, 20 I 0) using statistics from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). Nation-wide statistics from PHMSA for spills from crude oil pipelines show 0.00109 signifi cant (i.e., greater than 50 Bbl) spills per mile of crude oil pipelines per year. When this rate is applied to the Keystone XL pipeline with a length of 1,673 miles, the expected frequency of spills is 1.82 spills per year (0.00109 spills/mi * 1,673 mi). Adjusting the nation-wide PHMSA data to only include data from the states through which the Keystone XL pipeline will pass results in a frequency of 3.86 spills per year for the pipeline length (ENTRIX, 20 I 0). The state-specific data are more applicable to the Keystone lo cation; however, the smaller state-specific data base might over-estimate spill frequency. Therefore, the frequency of 1.82 per year is adopted as the best available value for this assessment. Assuming a design life of 50 years for the pipeline, 1.82 spills per year results in 91 expected significant spills (i.e., greater than 50 barrels) for the Keystone Pipeline project. According to the TransCanada Frequency-Volume Study of the Keystone Pipeline (DNV, 2006), 14 percent of the spills would likely result from a large hole (i.e., greater than 10 inches in diameter). Using the 14 percent value, the 91 expected spills during a 50-year lifetime for the pipeline would result in 13 major spills (i.e., from holes larger than 10 inches in the pipeline). However, TransCanada diverged from historical data and modified the estimate of the expected frequency of spills from the pipeline (DNV, 2006). The company's primary rationale for reducing the frequency of spills from the pipeline was that modem pipelines are constructed with improved materi als and methods. Therefore, TransCanada assumed that pipelines constructed with these new improved 3 materials and methods are likely to experience fewer leaks. The revised expected frequency for spills was reported in the Frequency-Volume Study (DNV, 2006) to be 0.14 spills/year over the 1,070 miles from the Canadian border to Cushing, OK. This value was adjusted to 0.22 spills per year for the total 1,673 miles of pipeline, including the Gulf Coast Segment (ENTRIX, 20 I 0). Using the 0.22 spills/year, TransCanada predicted II spills greater than 50 barrels would be expected over a 50-year project life. This reduced frequency estimated by TransCanada is probably not appropriate for a couple of reasons. First, the study of the revised frequency ignored some of the historical spill data; i.e., the spill cause category of "other causes" in the historical spill data set (DNV, 2006). The "other causes" category was assigned for spills with no identified causes. Since this category represents 23 percent of the total spills, this is a significant and inappropriate reduction from the spill frequency data. In addition, the assumed reduction in spill frequency resulting from modern pipeline materials and methods is probably overstated for this pipeline. TransCanada used a reduction factor of 0.5 in comparison to historical data for this issue. That is, according to TransCanada, modern pipeline construction materials and methods would result in half as many spills as the historical data indicate. However, the PHSMA data used in the TransCanada report were from the most recent 10 years. Therefore, at least some of the pipelines in the analysis were modern pipelines. That is, the initial frequency estimate was calculated in part with data from modern pipelines; therefore, a 50 percent reduction of the frequency estimates is highly question able based on the data set used. More importantly, DilBit, the type of crude oil to be transported through the Keystone XL pipeline will be significantly more corrosive and abrasive than the conventional crude oil transported in most of the pipelines used in the historical data set. The increased corrosion and abrasion are due to IS - 20 times the acidity (Crandall, 2002), 5 -10 times the sulfur content (Crandall, 2002), and much higher levels of abrasive sediments (NPRA, 2008) compared to conventional crude oil. In addition, the high viscosity of DilBit requires that the pipeline be operated at elevated temperatures (up to 1580F for DilBit and ambient temperature for conventional oil) and pressures (up to 1440 psi for DilBit and 600 psi for conventional oil) compared to conventional crude oil pipelines (ENTRIX, 20 I 0). Since corrosion and pressure are the two most common failure mechanisms resulting in crude oil re leases from pipelines (DNV, 2006), increased corrosion and pressure will likely negate any reduced spill frequency due to improvement in materials and methods. Although pipeline technology has improved, new pipelines are subject to proportionally higher stress as companies use this improved technology to maximize pumping rates through increases in operational pressures and temperatures, rather than to use this improved technology to enhance safety margins. Also, TransCanada relies heavily on "soft" technological improvements, such as computer con trol and monitoring technology, rather than only on "hard" improvements, such as improved pipe fabri cation technology. Whereas "hard" technological improvements are built into pipelines, "soft" improve ments require an ongoing commitment of monitoring and maintenance resources, which should not be assumed to be constant over the projected service life of the pipeline, and are also subject to an ongoing risk of error in judgment during operations. As demonstrated by the spill from Enbridge's pipeline into the Kalamazoo River, as pipelines age maintenance costs increase, but pipeline company maintenance efforts may be insufficient to prevent major spills, especially if operators take increased risks to maintain return on investment. Moreover, TransCanada assumes that future economic conditions will allow it to commit the same level of maintenance resources from its first year to its last year of operation. Given future economic uncertainty, this is not a reasonable assumption. It is reasonable to assume that decades from now TransCanada or a future owner will likely fail to commit adequate maintenance resources, fail to comply with safety regulations, or take increased operational risks during periods of lower income. Overtime, PHMSA should assume that the risk of spill from the Keystone XL Pipeline will increase due to weakening of "soft" technological enhancements. Over the service life of the pipeline it is not reason- 4 able to rely on TransCanada's "soft" technological improvements to the same extent as built-in "hard" improvements. The TransCanada spill frequency estimation consistently stated the frequency of spills in tenus of spills per year per mile. This is a misleading way to state the risk or frequency of pipeline spills. Spill frequency estimates averaged per mile can be useful; e.g., for extrapolating frequency data across vary ing pipeline lengths. However, stating the spill frequency averaged per mile obfuscates the proper value to consider; I.e., the frequency of a spill somewhere along the length of the pipeline. Stating the spill frequency in terms of spills per mile is comparable to acknowledging that although some 33,000 deaths from automobile accideuts occur annually in the U.s., the average annual fatality rate across 350 million people is only 0.000094; therefore, fatalities from automobile accidents are so rare as to be unimportant. In other words, it is ofIittle importance to know the risk (frequency) of a release in any particular mile segment (frequency per mile); rather it is important to know the risk of a release from the pipeline. As shovvn above, the expected number of spills for the pipeline over the pipeline lifetime ranges between II and 91 spills, depending on the data and assumptions used. In summary, there is no compelling evidence to reduce the frequency of spills because of mod ern materials and methods. The increased corrosiveness and erosiveness of the product being trans ported wiIllikely cancel any gains due to materials and methods improvements and soft technological safeguards will likely become less effective over time. Moreover, the modified frequency stated by TransCanada should not have been reduced by omitting an important failure category. The frequency of spills should have been stated as frequency of spills across the pipeline length per year and per pipeline lifetime. Therefore, the best estimate for spill frequency is the value from the PHSMA historical data set resulting in 1.82 spills/yr or 91 significant spills over the pipeline lifetime. Table I compares the pre dicted nuruber of spills over the lifetime of the pipeline computed from TransCanada's assuruptions and from historical data. Table I' Predicted Nuruber of Spills from Keystone XL Pipeline Over a 50-Year Lifetime TransCanada Estimate Estimates Using Historical Data Spills per year per mile 0.00013(') 0.00109<') Pipeline spills per year 0.22(],; 1. 82(b) Pipeline spills per 50-year lifetime 11 (e; 91 (el Pipeline spills from> 10 inch hole 1. 54(d; 12.74(d) (a) ENTRIX,201O {b) spills/year-mile *1673 miles (c) spiUsiyear* 50 years of pipeline lifetime (d) spitWHfctime * 14 percent spH1s from.> 10 .inch hole Most Likely Spill Locations Crude oil could be spilled from any part of the pipeline system that develops a weakness and fails. Likely failure points include welds, valve connections, and pumping stations. A vulnerable loca tion of special interest along the pipeline system is near the side of a major stream where the pipeline is underground but at a relatively shallow depth. At these locations, the pipeline is susceptible to high rates of corrosion because it is below ground (DNV, 2006). Since the pipeline is helow ground, small initial leaks due to corrosion-weakened pipe would potentially go undetected for extended periods of time (e.g., up to 90 days) (DNV, 2006) providing conditions for a catastrophic failure during a pressure spike. 5 In these locations, pressures would be relatively high due to the low elevation near the river crossing. In addition, major leaks at these locations are likely to result in large volumes of crude oil reaching the flver. In addition to river crossings, areas with shallow groundwater overlain by pervious soils (such as the Sandhills region in Nebraska) where slow leaks could go undetected for long periods of time (e.g., up to 90 days) (Dr.>', 2006), pose risks of special concern. Worst Case Spill Volume The volume of a spill is calculated in two parts: the pumping rate volume and the drain-down volume. The pumping rate volume is the volume of crude oil that is pumped from dIe leaking pipe during the time between ilie pipe failure and stoppage of the pumps. The time to shut do"m the pumps after a leak can be divided into two phases: the time to detect the leak, and the time to complete the shut-down process. The pumping rate volume also depends on the size of the hole in the pipe and the pressure in the pipe. The drain-down volume is the volume of crude oil that is released after the pumps are stopped, as the crude oil in the pipe at elevations above the leak drains out. The following sections explain how the pumping rate volume, the drain-down volume, and the total spill volume is calculated. Pumping Rate Volume The pumping rate volume is calculated as: PRV = PR * (DT + SDT) Where: PRV = pumping rate volume (Bbl) PR = pumping rate (Bbl/min) DT = detection time (time required to detect and confirm a leak and order pipeline shut-down (min) SDT = shut-down time (time required to shut down pumps and to close valves (min)) TransCanada's frequency-Volnme Study (DNV, 2006) states that detection of a leak in an un- derground pipeline section can range from 90 days for a leak less than 1.5 percent of the pipeline flow rate to 9 minutes for a leak of 50 percent of the pipeline flow rate. The 90-day time to detection is for a very slow leak that would not be detected by the automatic leak detection system. The 9 minute time to detection is for a leak that is large enough to be readily detected by the leak dete,,1ion system. How ever, this time estimate is questionable because, as has been shown by experience, it is difficult tor the leak detection system to distinguish between leaks and other transient pressure fluctuations in a pipeline transporting high viscosity materials such as DilBit. For example, in the Enbridge pipeline spill, signals from the leak detection system were misinterpreted, and up to 12 hours elapsed between the time of ilie leak and final pipeline shut-down (Hersman, 2010). During the 12-hour period between the initial alarm and the final shut-dovm, the pipeline pumps were operated intermittently for at least two hours. It should be noted that the location of the Enbridge spill was a pepulated area where field verification of the leak should have been quick and easy. Indeed, local residents called 911 complaining about petro leum odors (likely from ilie leak) 10 hours before the pipeline was shut down. In the case ofthe Key stone XL pipeline, leaks could occur in remote areas (e.g., central Montana, or the SandhiIls region of Nebraska) where direct observation would only occur by sending an observer to the suspected site; this could take many hours. 6 TransCanada states that the time to complete the pipeline shut-down sequence is 2.5 minutes (ERP,2009). Therefore, using TransCanada's time estimates, for a 1.5 percent leak, the total time be tween leak initiation and shut-down could be up to 90 days, and for a large (>50 percent) leak, the total time between leak initiation and shut-down would be 11.5 minutes (ERP, 2009). However, given the difficulty for operators to distinguish between an actual leak and other pres sure fluctuations, the shut-down time for the worst case volume calculation should not be considered to be less than 30 minutes for a leak greater than 50 percent of the pumping rate. This would allow for 4 alarms (5 minutes apart) to be evaluated by operators and a 5th alarm to cause the decision to shut down. In addition, the time to shut down the systems (pumps and valves) would require another 5 minutes. The assumption that the decision to shut the pipeline down can be made after a single alarm, as is sug gested by TransCanada (ERP, 2009) is umeasonable considering the difficulty in distinguishing between a leak and a pressure anomaly. The ability to make the decision to shut down the pipeline after 5 alarms is likely a reasonable "best-case" assumption. However, this "best-case" does not describe the "worst case" conditions that are being assessed here. Rather, the worst case should consider confusing and confounding circumstances where a shut -down decision is not clear and where the leak site is remote and not verifiable in a short time period. The total time is then considered to be between 30 minutes (a best-case scenario) and 12 hours (the time for the Enbridge final shut-down) from leak initiation to shut down. Considering that the Keystone XL pipeline will cross extremely remote areas and that verifica tion of a leak could take many hours, a shut-down time of 2 hours (i.e., the time the pumps were oper ated during the Enbridge shutdown process) is a reasonable time for the worst-case analysis. Therefore, for the worst-case spill for a large leak, a shut-down time of 2 hours is assumed. With a maximum pumping rate of 900,000 Bblld, and a shut-down time of 2 hours, the pumping rate volume is 75,000 Bbl (900,000 Bbl/d * I d/24 hr * 2 hr). This pumping rate volume (75,000 Bbl) is used in the calculation of the total worst-case spill volume for all high-rate leaks (i.e., greater than 50 percent flow rate). The worst-case spill for a small leak could occur where the pipeline is buried and in a remote location (such as central Montana or the Sandhills region of Nebraska), and where direct observation would be infrequent. According to TransCanada documents (DNV, 2006), a slow leak ofless than 1.5 percent of the pumping rate could go undetected for up to 90 days. However, since pipeline inspections are scheduled every few weeks, it is likely that the oil would reach the surface and be detected before the entire 90 days elapsed. Assuming that the pipeline is buried at a depth of 10 feet and that the 1.5 percent leak (75,802 ft3/d) is on the bottom of the pipe, oil would fill the pore spaces in the soil mostly in a downward direction, but it would also be forced upward toward the surface. Assuming that the oil initially fills a somewhat conical volume that extends twice as far below the pipeline as above it, the oil would emerge at the surface within about one day (volume of a cone 30 feet deep with a base diameter of 30 feet is 7,068 ft3). Therefore, the leak would likely be detected in 14 days during the next inspec tion (assuming bi-weekly inspections). A 1.5 percent spill at a pumping rate of 900,000 Bbl/d over 14 days would result in a release of 189,000 Bbl (7.9 million gallons). 7 Table 2' Pumpin (a) Desh,,'1l pumping rute fur Keyi>tone XL = 900,1..100 Bblld. Calculation of worst~case spill requires 100 percent Gf pumping rate. (b) T:me between -pipeline inspec:ions.(DNV, 2006) (c) TroosCnnada's assnmed shut..(]own time (ERP. 2009) Drain-Down Volume The drain-down volume is the volume in the pipe between the leak and the nearest valve or the nearest high point. Some oil in locally isolated low spots will tend to remain in the pipe. TransCanada arbitrarily assigned a drain-down factor of 0.6 for the Keystone XL pipeline, meaning that 40 percent of the oil in the draining pipeline at elevations above the leak will be captured in low spots. However, since siphon effects will tend to move much of the oil even in local low spots, the 40 percent retention factor is likely too high for a worst-case analysis. PHMSA regulations require valves to be placed on either side of a major water crossing. If these valves are working, they should limit the amount of crude oil that drains from the pipeline to the amount that is between the valves. However, to calculate a worst case spill, the volume should be calculated assuming that at least some of the valves fail (recall the fail ures of the safety devices in the recent Gulf oil spill). If the valves fail, the drain-down volume would be limited by the major high elevation points on either side of the leak, with a reasonable adjustment for residual crude oil remaining in the pipeline. For this worst-case analysis, a reasonable estimate for re sidual crude oil remaining in the pipeline is assumed at 20 percent of the total volume of oil at elevations above the leak. All of these parameters are site-specific; therefore, for this assessment, the worst case drain-down volumes will be calculated for several of the river crossings of the Keystone XL pipeline, including the Missouri, Yellowstone, and Platte Rivers. The drain-down volume is calculated using: DDV ~ PLDV * DF ~Where: DDV = Drain Down volume (Bbl) PLDV ~ Pipeline Drain Volume (Bbl) (volume of pipeline either side of the leak to next valve or high elevation point) DF ~ Drainage Factor (SO percent) Worst-Case Release Calculation for the Missouri River Crossing The Missouri River crossing is located at mile post (MP) 89 along the Keystone XL pipeline. The upstream valve is located at MP84, and the dmvnstrearn valve is located at MP 91. The river is at an elevation of 2,035 feet. Figure 1 shows the elevation profile of the cfossing at the Missouri River. Since there are no major high elevations between the river and the valve at MP 84, it is likely that nearly all of the oil in the pipeline between the valve and a hypothetical leak at the river will be siphoned or drained via gravity. If the valve at MP 84 fails, all of the oil in the pipeline between that point and the next valve (MP 81.5) could drain since the pipeline rises gradually in elevation between MP 84 and MP 81 (eleva- 8 tion of2,225 feet). If the valve on the downstream side of the crossing (MP 91) fails, oil in the pipeline up to the major high point at MP 93 could drain to the hypothetical leak at the river crossing. There are several scenarios that could affect the drain-down volume. In the worst-case scenario both valves could fail, and the drain-down volume would then be the cross-sectional area of the pipe, times the length of pipeline draining times 80 percent. For this scenario, the length of pipe is 11.5 miles (MP 81.5 to MP 93). The cross-sectional area of the 36 inch pipe is 7.07 fl2 Thus the drain-down vol ume is 3.43xl05 fll (61,164 Bbls, 2.57 million gallons). However it is highly unlikely that both valves will fail at the same time. A second scenario would occur if both valves operated correctly but the siphon effect removed the oil from the high point downstream of the valve at MP 84. Under this scenario, the length of drained pipe is 7 miles, and the resulting drain-down volume is 2.09x10' fl3 (37,230 Bbls, 1.56 million gallons). A third scenario would occur if both valves operated correctly, and the siphon effect did not remove the oil between the high point at MP 86.5 and the valve at MP 84. In this scenario, the length of drained pipe is 4.5 miles (valve at MP 91 to the high point at MP 86.5), and the drain-down volume is l.34xl05 ft3 (23,934Bbls, 1.01 million gallons). A fourth scenario would occur if one of the valves fails. To be conservative, the valve closest to the river will be the assumed failed valve. In this scenario, the drain-down distance would be 9 miles (between the valve at MP 84 and the high point at MP 93). The resulting drain-down volume would be 2.69 x 105 fl3 (9 mi * 5,280 ft/mi * 7.07 fl2 * 0.8) (47,867 Bbl, 2.01 million gallons). While the first scenario is very unlikely, valve failure is a reasonable consideration in the worst case spill analysis. So for the purposes of this analysis the fourth scenario, where one of the valves fails, is used to calculate the worst-case spill drain-down volume for the Missouri River crossing site. There fore, using the fourth drain-down scenario, the drain-down volume is 47,867Bbls. Adding the pumping rate volume of 75,000 Bbl, the worst-case release volume for the Missouri River crossing is 122,867 Bbl (5.16 million gallons). 3000 ~ 2500 !:~ 0 .... •- til 2000 1ii::!: 1500 > Figure 1: Horizontal profile ofsurface elevations at the Missouri River erossing. Note that the vertical axis is exaggerated compared to the horizontal axis. Solid eireles show Ioeations of pipeline valves. The solid triangle shows the location of the river erossing. Worst Case Release Volume Calculation for the Yellowstone River The crossing on the Yellowstone River is at MP 196.5 which is at an elevation of2,125 feet. The closest upstream valve is at MP 194.5 at an elevation of2,230 feet. The nearest major high point on the upstream side is at MP 183 at an elevation of2,910 feet. The closest valve on the downstream side is at MP 200 at an elevation of2,506 which is also the high point on the downstream side of the crossing. Figure 2 shows the elevation profile for the crossing at the Yellowstone River. 9 The first scenario for drain-down volume is if all valves work properly. The drain-down volume is 80 percent of the volume between the valves (the cross-sectional area of the pipe (7.07 ft2) times the pipe length between the valves (5.5. miles)) which equals 1.64xl05 ftl (29,252 Bbl, 1.23 million gal lons). Another scenario considers the volume if the valve at MP 194.5 does not work. In this case, the drain-down volume is the volume of the pipe between the two high elevations which are at MP 183 and MP 200 (17 miles). In this scenario the drain-down volume is 5.07xl0' ft3 (90,416 Bbl, 3.80 million gal Ions). Assuming failure of the valve at mile-post 194.5 is a reasonable assumption for conditions of the worst-case spill volume. The total worst-case volume is then the drain-down volume of90,416 Bbl plus the pumping rate volume 0[75,000 Bbl totaling 165,416 Bbl (6.95 million gallons). 3500 "-... 2500 I:-0 ... ,-i:EVI HOO !II 115 180 195 200 105 iii 185 190 Mlle·Post Markers (mil Figure 2: Horizontal profile of surface elevations at 1he Yello'i'l1ltone River crossing. Note that the vertical axis is exaggerated compared to the hori zontal axis:. Solid circles show locations of pipeline: valves. The solid triangle shows the iocation of the river crossing. Worst-Case Release Volume Calculation for the Platte River. NE The Keystone XL Pipeline is proposed to cross the Platte River in Nebraska at MP 756.5. There is an upstream valve at MP 747.6 and a downstream valve at l\1P 765. Figure 3 shows the elevation profile for the crossing at the Platte River. A reasonable worst-case spill scenario is to consider the valve at MP 765 (i.e., closest to the river) to fail. The drain-down volume would then be the pipeline vohune between the high point at MP 760 and the valve at MP 747.6. The resulting drain-dov>'ll volume would be 3. 70xlO' ft3 (65,950 Bbl, 2.77 million gallons). Adding the pmnping rate volume, the worst-ease spill at the Platte River crossing would be 140,950 Bbl (5.92 million gallons). 735 750 755 760 765 770 Mile-Perot Markers (mil Figure 3: Horizontll profile of surface c:evatjons at !.xi.e Platte River- crossing. :l" ote fhat the vertka! axis 1S exaggerated compared to the horizontal axis. Solid ,,'i.rclct) show locations of pipeline valves. The sol:d triangle shows the location of the river cfO&'Sing, 10 Table 3: Worst-Case Spill Volume Estimates. Location Estimate from this analysis Pumping Rate Vol- Dmin Down Volume Total Release ume (Bbl) (Bbl) (Bbl) Groundwater 189,000(') NA 189,000 Missouri River 75,000(b) 47,867(0) 122,867 Yellowstone River 75,000(b) 90,416(0) 165,416 Platte River 75,000(b) 65,950(0) 140,950 (a) 900,000 Bblld (K>:lystone A'"L design pumping rate)" l.5percent Jeak '* shllt~down time of 14 days (b) 900.000 Bbl!d (Keystone A'"L design pumping rate) ,.. shut-down time ofl hours (e) Expected volume to drain from ruptured pipeline after pumps and valves closed Comparison to TmnsCanada methods TransCanada calculated the total Worst-Case Release Volume in a way that appears to be flawed. Tbe worst-case volume was calculated from (ERP, 2009): WCV ~ ALV + PRY Where: WCV worst-case volume (Bbl) ALV adjusted line volume (Bbl) PRY pumping mte volume (Bbl) i.e., pumping rate (Bbl/min) * time to shut-down (min) The adjusted line volume was caJculatod from: ALV = (ILFV PRy) * 0.60 Where: ILFV initial line fill volume (Bbl) i.e., the volume of the pipe between the leak and the nearest valve on both sides of the leak. 0,60 = dram-down factor where 60 percent of the oil in the pipe will drain after shut-down. For the Hardisty Pump Station/Regina Pump Station (Keystone pipeline) calculation, the ILFV was stated as 63,346 Bbl. 'Inc pumping mte was 662,400 Bbl/day, and the time to shut down was 19 minutes (10 minutes of evaluation of whether a leak had occurred and 9 minutes to shut down the sys tem). 'This resulted in a PRY of 8,740 Bbl, and anALV of32,763 Bbl. TheALV plus the PRY resulted in a total release of 41,503 BbL TransCanada does not explain how the initiallinc fill volume is calculated, They simply pro vide a value (ERP, 2009). For the Hardisty Pump Station/Regina Pump Station calculation. they state the value to be 63,346 Bbl. TI1ere is no way to verifY this value. Whatever method was used, the value should be the pipeline volume between the leak and the high points of elevation on both sides of the leak. TransCanada then, in what appears to be a flawed process, subtracts the pumping rate volume from the initial line fill volume. It is not clear why this subtraction was done. Apparently, TransCanada considered that since the PRY would be pumped out of the pipeline during the leak discovery and shut down time, that volume of oil would not be still in the pipeline during draining. However, even though the PRY would be removed from the pipeline during shutdown time, an equal amount would be pumped into the draining section. Therefore, tile DDV should be calculated as simply the volume of tile drain- II ing pipeline modified by the fraction of oil trapped in local low points. That is, the PRY should not have been subtracted from the ILFV. The result of subtracting the PRY from the ILFV was then multiplied by 0.60 to account for 40 percent of the oil in the pipe being caught in locally low spots in the pipeline and failing to drain out Certainly some of the oil in the pipe will fail to drain, especially in locally low spots; however, considering siphon effects, it is very likely that nearly all of the oil will dtain even through the locally low spots. Therefore, the 60 percent drain factor is likely to be a significant under estimate of the fraction of oil that will drain. For this worst case spill analysis, a drainage factor of 80 percent is a more reasonable assumption. Table 4 shows the PRY, DDV, and total worst-case release estimates for the Hardisty Pumping Station on the original Keystone pipeline using methods recommended in this analysis and methods used by TransCanada (ERP, 2009). Note that the PRY values using the method of this paper are much larger than those using TransCanada's method because the assumed shut -down time is much shorter in Trans Canada's method (19 minutes compared to 2 hours). The drain-down volumes used for both methods are the reported drain-down volumes from TransCanada's method because sufficient detail was not available in the TransCanada report (ERP, 2009) to allow a comparison of methods. Table 4: Worst-Case spill volume estimate using the method recommended in this analysis and the method used by TransCanada for the Keystone Pipeline Estimate from this Paper TransCanada Estimate(') PRY DDV Total Re- PRY (Bbl) DDV Total Re- (Bbl) (Bbl) lease (Bbl) (Bbl) lease (Bbl) Hardisty Pumping 55,200(b) 32,764Cc) 87,964 8,740(d) 32,764k ) 41,504 Station (al ERr,2009 (b) Pumping rate volume 662,400 BbUd {Hardisty) $; shllt~down time of2l:ours (c) Drain~down volume reported by T:ranllCan2.d.:l (ERP, 2009) (d) Pumping rate 662,400 Bblin" ShllHiowj~ time of 19" min Impacts from Worst-Case Spill Impacts to the Air The primary impacts to the air will be from benzene, hydrogen sulfide, and light molecular weight constituents of the DiIBit. The DiIBit will be pumped at high temperatures (up to 158°F) and pressures (up to 1440 psi) causing these compounds to volatilize into the air at the site of the spill. The Occupational Health and Safety Agency (OSHA) acceptable concentration of benzene in the air for a workplace is 3.25 mg/tn' (NIOSH, 1990) for short-term (8-hour) exposures, Since benzene is denser than air, it could accumulate in low-lying areas that are protected from the wind. Under these condi tions, the benzene concentration could be above acceptable levels for inhalation. The basements of buildings located above groundwater plumes could also trap benzene gases that exceed safe levels. This could have serious consequences for the occupants of such a building, who may not be aware that a plume of benzene lies beneath the building. Hydrogen sulfide is another toxic gas that could cause dangerous conditions at the site. The OSHA acceptable concentration for a workplace is 14 mg/m' for an 8-hour exposure and 21 mg/m' for even a momentary exposure (NlOSH, 1990). The concentrations of hydrogen sulfide in the air are 12 expected to be above acceptable levels in areas near a spill site (Enbridge, 20 I 0) and will likely be a serious health threat to emergency workers, remediation workers, and possibly to local residents. In addition to toxicity effects, benzene, hydrogen sulfide, and the light molecular weight fractions of the oil could create explosive conditions as they volatilize from the spilled oil. Again, this risk will be greatest in areas that are protected from the wind and where concentrations could reach the explosive limits. Impacts to Terrestrial Resources The proposed pipeline will cross numerous types of terrestrial habitats (e.g., upland prairies, lowland prairies, woodlands, northern high plains, etc.) as it passes from Canada to Texas. Each of these habitats is unique in terms of its physical conditions (e.g., soils, climates), biological communities, and human communities. Because the physical, biological, and human conditions are so varied in these habitats, the potential impacts from a spill will be different for each type of habitat and location. There fore, it is not possible to thoroughly assess the potential impacts to terrestrial habitats in this paper. In general, a primary negative impact caused by a crude oil spill on land will be burial and smothering of plants and ground-dwelling animals. The spilled DilBit will form a very dense and thick layer over the ground that will kill essentially any organisms that are contacted. This effect will be localized to the immediate area of the spill, and most animals will be able to avoid contact with the oil. However, some animals may inadvertently contact the oil (e.g., birds landing in the oil) and be harmed or killed. In addition, the spill will release toxic constituents such as benzene, hydrogen sulfide, light molecular weight oil fractions, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), all of which will have toxic effects on local wildlife. A significant concern arises when the pipeline crosses habitats of the nu merous threatened or endangered species that are found along the pipeline route. Finally, the spill could affect human communities via exposures to the toxic constituents. Impacts to Surface Water Resources The primary constituents of concern in surface water are: benzene, PARs, hydrogen sul fide, and bulk crude oil. The amounts of these constituents in the surface water are affected by several factors including: the concentration of the constituent in the crude oil, the solubility of the constituent, and the turbulence and velocity of the water. Constituents of special concern are benzene and certain PAHs because they are carcinogenic. Benzene makes up 0.1 to 1.0 percent ofDilBit crude oil (Shell Canada, 200S), and it is relatively soluble in water. The amount of benzene that will be dissolved in the water can be estimated from the octanol-water partition coefficient (a measure of how much of a contaminant will dissolve into the wa ter) which is 131.S for benzene (LaGrega et aI., 2001). Using the octanol-water relationship, and assum ing that the benzene concentration in the DilBit is I per cent (-I xl 04 mg/L), results in a benzene water concentration immediately at the oil/water interface of 75 mglL (lxlO4 mg/L 7 13I.S). This benzene concentration is 15,000 times the MCL for benzene of 0.005 mg/L. Since the temperature of the DilBit will be up to 15 SOp, the actual water concentration at the spill will likely be somewhat higher than this calculation, which is based on an octanol-water partition coefficient for ambient temperatures. The ben zene concentration will decrease with distance from the oil/water interface. TransCanada's Risk Assess ment calculated that the average (mixed) benzene concentration in surface water for a 10,000 Bbl spill in a 10,000 ft3/sec stream would be 2.2 mglL (ENTRIX, 2010); however, this calculated concentration assumes that all of the benzene would be released into the water within one hour (likely over-estimates resulting concentrations) and that the benzene is immediately mixed across the entire stream (under- 13 estimates resulting concentrations). Note that 2.2 mg/L is 440 times the MCL for benzene. In most cases, the benzene will form a plume that travels downstream from the spill site. The concentration in the plume will gradually decrease as it moves farther from the spill site. Besides human health risks from contaminated drinking water supplies, benz.ene also poses risks to aquatic species. The EPA Region III screening water concentration for benzene designed to be protec tive of aquatic biota is 0.370 mg/L (EPA, 201Ib). The predicted benzene concentration at the oil/water interface is 75 mg/L which is 200 times higher than the screening concentration. Therefore, negative ecological impacts due to toxicity are expected, at least in localized areas where benzene is actively dis solving from the oiL If a spill of 150,000 Bbl (i.e., in the range of predicted worst-case spill volumes) were to occur in a stream with a flow of 10,000 ft3/sec and a velocity of3 ftisec (e.g., the Missouri River below Fort Peck dam has a flow of9,225 cfs, and the Yellowstone River at Miles City, MT has a flow of 11,180 cfs (USGS, 2009)), the mass and resulting plume of the benzene in the water could be charactcrized as fol lows. Assuming that benzene makes up 1.0 percent ofthe DilBit, 150,000 Bbl of DilBit would contain approximately 2.3xlO' Kg of benzene (150,000 Bbl * 42 gal/Bbl • 3.788 L/gal * I Kg/L * 0.01). If80 percent of the benzene is lost via volatilization and product removal during and immediately after the spill, 4.77xl 04 Kg of benzene would remain in the stream. This benzene would dissolve through time into the water from the DilBit mixture. To be released into the water, the benzene in the mass of crude would have to diffuse to the oil/water interface. Since the composition of DilBit is variable and since the thickness ofthe crude mass is case-specific (i.e., depends on turbulence, temperature, etc.), it is not possible to predict precisely the rate at which the benzene will diffuse to the oil/water interface; how ever, a reasonable assumption would be that 5 percent of the benzene would reach 111e oil/water interface per day. If this assumption is too high, these calculations will over estimate 111e water concentrations but underestimate the duration of the negative impacts. and if it is too small, the opposite vdll be true. Assuming 5 percent of the benzene is released into the water per day, over 2.3 million gram, of benzene will be released to the water per day. This will result ina water concentration 0[0.09 mgfL (2.3xl06 g/d * sec/lO,OOO ft' * Id/86,400 sec * 1,000 mg/g * 35.3 fWmJ * 0.001 mJ/L) once the contaminant plume completely mixes across the entire width of the stream (several miles downstream of the spill). This concentration exceeds the MCL of 0.005 mg/L by 18.8 times. As the benzene plume migrates do\>;'ll stream, the concentration will decrease because of processes such as degradation and volatilization. Reported half-lifes ofbenzenc in surface water range from 1 to 6 days (USEPA, 1986). Assuming a half-life of 3 days, a stream velocity of 3 t1/sec, and a tributary contribution of 20 cfs/mi (the measured value for the Missouri River downstream of the proposed crossing (USGS, 2009)), the plume would reach over 450 miles before its concentration would drop to the MCL and be safe for public water in takes. The plume length was modeled using a series of 10-milc long river reaches with first-order decay (k=-0.231d·') and increased flow 0[200 cfS/lO mi reach. Contaminants from a release at the Missouri or Yellowstone River crossing would enter Lake Sakakawea in North Dakota where they would adversely affect drinking water intakes, aquatic wildlife, and recreation. Contaminants from a spill at the Platte River crossing would travel downstream un abated into the Missouri River for several hundred miles affecting drinking water intakes for hundreds of thousands of people (e.g., Lincoln, NE; Omaha, NE; Nebraska City, NE; St. Joseph, MO; Kansas City, MO) as well as aquatic habitat~ and recreational activities. In addition, other constituents from the spill would pose serious risks to humans and to aquatic species in the river. 14 Worst-case spill at the Missouri River or Yellowstone River crossing, North Dakota Montana lake ~- ~~weaC~ Yellowstone River -i------I --- -_J I I A spill at either crossing could release millions of gallons of crude oil into the rivers and extending downstream as far as Lake Sakakawea, polluting drinking water, and threatening endangered species and recreation areas, Popu lations affected by a worst-case spill Iowa at the Platte River Kansas {ily - ,ppro~ 44lK Omaha -approx. 420K linwln - approx. 241K $t Joseph - 'pprox, 73K Kansas (ouncil Bluffs - 'pprox. 6IlK o llcll.\I\l.- approx. 4IJK Missouri Population estimates ba!i€d on avallab!eda1:a from the us, Census. Bureau, http://qukkfacts.census.gov. Clrclfts representing thrule cities are for il!ustrative purposes and ace not to scale 15 Of course other assumptions (e.g., shorter half-life) would give somewhat different results. For example, assuming that benzene makes up only 0.3 pereent ofDilBit and that 10 percent of the benzene is released per day, the calculated plume length would be reduced to around 200 miles. However, since the case-specific details are not known at this point, the precise impacts cannot be calculated; however, it has been clearly shown that if a worst-case spill occurs in a major stream, the impacts would be serious, far-reaching, and long-lasting, and claims to the contrary should be challenged. The concentrations ofPAHs (e.g., benz(a)pyrene) are not specified in the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for DilBit (Shell Canada, 2008). Also, the risk assessment done for the pipeline (ENSR, 2006) discusses the presence ofPAHs, but doesn't detail specific concentrations. Therefore, this analy sis will assume that PARs make up 2 percent of DilBit, and that benz(a)pyrene (BaP) makes up one tenth of the PAHs or 0.2 percent of the DiIBit. This is likely an underestimate. PAHs are not as soluble or as mobile in surface water as is benzene. Much of the released PAH mass will sorb to sediments and remain closer to the location of the spill. However, they will be transported downstream with suspended solids and sediments, and the PAH fraction that does dissolve will form a plume and also be transported downstream. Since they are less soluble and mobile than benzene, PAHs pose less of a threat to munici pal water intakes. Using the octanol-water coefficient for benz(a)pyrene (BaP) of 1.1 x 106 (LaGrega et aI., 2001), the BaP concentration at the oiVwater interface would be 0.0018 mgIL (1.8 /1 giL). This concentration exceeds the MCL for BaP of 0.0002 mglL by a factor of about ten; however, this concen tration would be quickly reduced as the plume mixes in the stream. Therefore, based on the assumption that PAHs make up 2 percent of the DiIBit, drinking water is probably not significantly threatened from release ofPAHs. However, PAHs are toxic to aquatic organisms. The EPA Region III water quality criteria for benz(a)pyrene to protect aquatic species is 0.015 11 giL (EPA, 2011 b). In addition, there are several other PAHs with water quality values to protect aquatic species (e.g., benzo(a)antbracene (0.018 !1 giL), fiuoranthene (0.04 11 gIL), and naphthalene (1.1 flglL» that are likely to have concentrations that exceed water quality criteria in a major spill. Therefore, the estimated concentration of PARs is approximately 100 times the allowable level for protection of aquatic life. Hydrogen sulfide is very volatile, and much of it will likely volatilize to the air during a major spill. However, some ofthe hydrogen sulfide will dissolve into the surface water and cause toxic effects to the aquatic biota. The EPA Region III screening water concentration protective of aquatic species is 2.0 1" gIL. Since the hydrogen sulfide will quickly volatilize, it is expected that these toxie efleets will be limited to areas near the spill. Bitumen, which makes up most of the DilBit, is more dense than water, so it will sink to the bot tom and smother any aquatic plants or sediment -dwelling organisms. These effects will be limited to the immediate area of the spill and are expected to pose a significant risk primarily if the stream is the habi tat to threatened or endangered species. Since the Missouri, Yellowstone, and Platte Ri vers all provide habitat to threatened and endangered species, including the pallid sturgeon, interior least tern, and piping plover, these impacts should be considered potentially significant. Table 5' Benzene Plume Development for Spill of 150 ,000 Bbl into a 10.000 cfs Stream. Estimste From This Analysis Spill Volume 150,000 Bbl Stream Discharge 10,000 cfs Fully Mixed Concentration(') 0.09mg/L 16 Ratio of Concentration to MCL (b) 18.8 Length of Plume> MeL (0) 450 miles Duration of Release to Water (d) 20 days (a) rug/sec benzene Iclease to strC'Jm + USe\: OfllOW (10,000 cfs. = 283,236 Usee} (b) fully mixed concentration .... (1.005 mg/L (c) assumes: half·Ufe of 3 Ii; velocity of 3 ftlsec; (d) assumes 5 percent of benzene is released from DilBit mass per day Impacts to Groundwater Resources The primary constituent of concern for a spill into groundwater is benzene. Since DilBit is very viscous, the bulk crude oil will not likely migrate through the soil to groundwater in large quanti ties. However, if a small, underground leak remains undetected for an extended period of time, a large amount of benzene will be released with the DilBit. The released benzene could then be transported to groundwater via infiltrating rainwater. According to a TransCanada publication "Frequency-Volume Study of Keystone Pipeline" (DNV, 2006), a leak of 1.5 percent oftatal flow could remain undetected for 90 days. For this analysis, the discovery and shut-down time is assumed to be 14 days which corre sponds to the time between pipeline inspections. At the design flow rate of 900,000 Bbl/d, a 1.5 percent leak would release 189,000 Bbl (7.9 million gallons) of DilBit in 14 days. Since DilBit is 0.1 to 1.0 percent benzene, this would result in a release of up to 79,380 gallons of benzene. A spill of the magnitude ofl89,000 Bbl ofDilBit would occupy approximately 2.65x106 cubic feet of subsurface sands with a porosiry of 0.4 (189,000 Bbl * 5.61 it'/Bbl 7 0.4). Assuming that the DilBit mass occupies a somewhat cylindrical volume and that the aquifer is 20 feet below the pipeline, the DilBit would spread to an area approximately 335 feet in diameter (335 feet diameter X 30 feet high). A reasonable worst-case 100-year, 24-hour storm would deposit 6 inches of rain water on the site. In the Sandhills of Nebraska, nearly all of this water would infiltrate. Six inches of water infiltrating onto a contaminated area of8.8x104 ft' (335 feet dian1eter) results in 4.4xl04 cubic feet of water (8.8xl04 ft2 * 0.5 ft infiltrating water) contacting the DilBit. Using the octanol-water partition coefficient of 131.8 (LaGrcga et aI., 2001), the benzene concentration in the infiltrating water would be approximately 75 mglL. The 4.4xl04 cubic feet of water at a concentration 01'75 mg/L equates to 9.35xl07 milligrams of benzene. Thus, this storm would transport 9.35xlO'milligrams of benzene to the groundwater. Once in the groundwater, the benzene plume would migrate down-gradient, potentially to down-gradient water supplies or basements where it could pose a cancer risk to residents. The 9.35xlO'milligrams of ben zene in the groundwater, if evenly distributed (not likely) could pollute 1.9xl01O L (4.9xlO' gallons) of groundwater at the MCL, enough water to form a plume 40 feet thick by 500 feet wide by more than 15 miles long (assuming porosiry of 0.4) at the MCL. These plume dimensions arc given for illustrative purposes only. The actual dimensions of a groundwater plume cannot be determined with the available information. Of COUISe, the benzene would not be evenly distributed; however, the plume would still be many miles long. In addition, future storms would transport additional benzene to the groundwater increasing the size of the plume. The worst-case site for sucb a spill is in the Sandhills region of Nebraska. The Sandhills are an cient sand dunes that have been stabilized hy grasses. Because of their very permeable geology, nearly 100 percent of the annual rainfall infiltrates to a very shallow aquifer, often less than 20 feet below the surface. This aquifer is the well-known Ogallala Aquifer tbat is one of the most productive and impor tant aquifers in the world. 17 Worst-case spill above the Nebraska Sandhills. 100 90 o100 200300 400 -;('.11' 500 600 700~~:S~:S~=S~=S~=S~=S~=S~=S~=S~=S~=S~=S~~~~~~~~ 2 3 4 6 7 B 9 11 12 13 miles A spill over 14 days, releasing 7.9 million gallons of crude oil could contaminate 4.9 billion gallons afwater and form a plume 40 feet thick by 500 feet wide by 15 miles long. By comparison: The length of the plume is equal to 264 football fields. Manhattan is 13.4 miles long. 3 The volume of the plume (1 ,584,000,000 feet ) is equal to that of 19,631 Olympic sized pools. Table 6: Benzene Plume from a189,000 Bbl Spill to Groundwater. Volume of released DilBit (Bbl) 189,000 Volume of benzene in spill (gal) 79,380 Mass of benzene dissolved in groundwater (mg) 9.35x107 Volume of contaminated water> MeL (gal) 4.9x1O' Equivalent plume dimensions 40 feet X 500 feet X IS miles References Crandall, G. (2002) Non-Conventional Oil Markel Outlook. Presentation to: International Energy Agency, Conference on Non-Conventional Oil, 2002 p.4, hHp://www.ica.org/workI2002/calgmlC!1!!lilllll,p\lI (last accessed January 12, 2011). As cited in"Tar Sands Pipelines Safely Risks". A Joint Report by: Natural Resources Defense Council, Na tional Wildlife Federation, Pipeline Safety Trust, and Sierra Club, February 20ll. DNV Consulting (2006) Frequency-Volume Study of Keystone Pipeline.Report No. 70015849-2 rev l.Report forTransCana da Pipelines, Ltd. May 2006. Enbridge (20 I 0 Enbridge Line 6B 608 Pipeline Release, Marshall Michigan, Health and Safety Plan, Enbridge. Inc. 2010. hUp://cpa.gov/cnhridgcspilllpdfs/finahvorkplaupdt!,/enbridge final healthsat~I;,V~O I00819.pdL Last accessed March 15,2011. ENSR (2006) Pipeline Risk Assessment and Environmental Consequence Aoalysis. Prepared for: Keystone Pipeline Proj ect, TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP. ENSR Corporation, June 2006, document No.: 10623-004. 18 ENTRIX(20 I 0) Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Keystone XL Oil Pipeline Project. Applicant for Presidential Permit: TransCanada Keystone, LP. April 6, 2010. Submitted by: ENTRlX, Inc. Seattle, WA. ERP (2009) TransCanada Emergency Response Plan: Worst Case Discharge Analysis and Scenarios. Appendix B, Version 21.0.1. O'Brien's Response Management Inc. Hersman, D. (2010 Testimony before Committee on Transportation and Infrastmcture, September 15,2010. Deborah Hers man, Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board. htlp:!/\V'ww.ntsb.gov/speechcs!hersmanldaphI00915. html (last accessed January 12,2011). As cited in "Tar Sands Pipelines Safety Risks". A Joint Rep0I1 by: NaturaJ Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, Pipeline Safety Trust, and Sierra Club, February 2011. NIOSH (1990) NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. US De partment of Health and Human Services. NPRA (2008) NPRA Q&A and Technology Fomm: Answer Book, Champion's Gate, FL: Natinal Pctrochemical and Refiners Association, 2008, Question 50: Desalting, hltjl:iiwww.npra.orgifonnsiuploaeVFiles/17C4900000055.file name.2008_QA_ Answer_Book.pdf(last accessed March 15,2011). PHMSA (2009) Hazardous Liquid Incident Files.U.S. Department ofTransportation.Office of Pipeline SafetyData for 1997 - 2008. http://primis.phmsa.doLgov/comm/repolts/psi.htm. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Last accessed on March 25, 2011. Shell Canada Ltd. (2008) Material Safety Data Sheet for Albian Heavy Synthetic Crude. USEPA (1986) Superfund Public Health Evaluation Manual. Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, Washington, DC. USEPA (201Ia) Letter to U.S. State Department (Mr. Jose W. Fernandez, Asst. Secretary and Dr. Kerri-Ann Jones, Ass!. Secretary), June 6, 2011. USEPA (2011b) U.S. EPA Region III Risk-Based Concentration Table. http://ww\Jv:.cpa ..lLQy/rcg3hwmc1!tiskihulTIan/in4e~ .... htm.. Last accessed March 15,2011. The attached report, "Analysis of Freqnency, Magnitnde and Consequence of Worst Case Spills from the Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline", was written solely by Dr. John Stansbury who is solely responsible for its contents. Dr. Stansbury is employed by the University of Nebraska, but the report does not represent the opinion or views of the University or the UNL Water Center. The purpose of the report is to provide decision-makers (e.g., State Legislators, Congressmen, State Department representatives) an independent and unbiased assessment, based on available data, of the magnitude and impacts of potential worst-case spills from the Keystone XL pipeline. The intended use of this report is neither to lobby for or against the proposed pipeline. Rather it is intended to provide unbiased information to decision-makers to assist them in making informed decisions regarding the pipeline. Any questions or comments regarding this report should be directed to Dr. Stansbury (jstansbury2@unLedu), 19 THIS IS EXHIBIT "Z" OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHJJ:F MISKOKOMON, SWORN BEFORE ME T S r5 DAY OF AUGUST, 2013 Beulah Marion Kechego, a Commissioner, etc., County 01 Middlesex for Chippewas of the Thames First Nation expires September 6. 2014 I \ Enhridge Pipelines Inc. ("Enhridge") Line 9 Reversal Phase 1 Project Application under section 58 of the National Energy Board Act OH-005-2011 Enhridge Response to Ontario Ministry of Energy ("OME") Information Request ("IR") No.1 PROLOGUE: The preambles to several of the information requests include assertions that may not be factually correct. Unless expressly stated otherwise, Enbridge does not concede the accuracy of any preamble or part thereof. Similarly, Enbridge does not concede the relevance of any request to which it has provided a response. Unless expressly stated otherwise, responses are provided only to requests as they relate to the segment of the Line 9 pipeline between Sarnia Terminal and North Westover Pump Station and to the period since reversal of Line 9 to its current operation (in a westward direction). 1.1 PROJECT NEED Reference: i) Bl-l, Line 9 Reversal Phase 1 Project Application, "Project Description", PDF page 1, (A2COU9) Preamble: In reference i) Enbridge states "In order to meet the business demands of shippers, Enbridge has proposed to reverse the segment of Line 9 (30 inch crude oil pipeline) from the Samia Terminal to the North Westover Station to flow in an eastward direction. The line currently operates in a westward direction, with deliveries from the Montreal Terminal flowing through the North Westover Station and onward either to the Sarnia Terminal or the Westover Terminal". To evaluate the need for the proposed project, the Ontario Ministry of Energy requests additional information regarding the perfonhance record of Line 9 in westbound service. Request: a) Please provide a table with annual average Line 9 throughput for each of the years from 2000 through 2011, the percentage capacity utilization of Line 9 in each of those years, and Line 9 deliveries separated by delivery point (Sarnia, Nanticoke, Other). b) Please provide a table with monthly average Line 9 throughput for each of the months from January 2010 through the latest month for which I Enbridge has data available. As in request a), please also provide the percentage capacity utilization of Line 9 in each of those months as well as Line 9 deliveries separated by delivery point (Sarnia, Nanticoke, and other \ I OF-Fac-Oil-ElOI-2011-0I OI/Hearing Order: OH-5-2011 Enbridge Response to OME IR No.1 Page 2 of20 delivery points). c) Please provide, in table form, the NEB approved tolls for Line 9 for both the Montreal to Sarnia path and the Montreal to Nanticoke path. The time period covered should be from Line 9's westward in-service date to today. Response: a) - b) Refer to Attachment OME IRNo. 1.1 a) and b). Enbridge objects to providing delivery point information as it can identify confidential shipper information. c) Enbridge objects to the request as the information sought is not relevant to the issues in this proceeding. In any event, this is public ihformation that can be obtained from the NEB's website. :-': I \' \ .. · .. _.•... _ .. '._, Attachment 1 to OME IR No 1.1 a)-b) Page 1 of 1 LINE 9 AVERAGE ANNUAL DAILY THROUGHPUT FROM WESTOVER TO SARNIA (bQd} 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 __._ .... __...... " "" .• ~"."UH'''',,.'''' .... ·'''''' "' •.. ~" .. '~''''''''H ~ .. , .... ' .. 11' ,.,_.",,"y~~ ""'" "",~,.H.~." ~.'" LI' ~"" II<. ", .1' ..... ,. ",.~ .• ",_"" ." ... "." ..•• "." ..... ~t" .. ,,< "H""'.'-''''~t'''''' .,,"" "t'''C~'"H'''~' "'~_ "'" " .... ~...... ~,·" .. ,.. t, ."'''' .... ~''_'.''''' .• ~·''~I1~''''"""'"',t ,~""_, ... '~" .. I' ••• , I I., ."., ,. " ... '.'" ",."."." .•. ~ .... """" ..... ,... H' .. '~" .1" '~"""U .. "'''''''''~ " .. ",. " ..... ~ '''11 ... ,. .- '~II"" ~ ... ,. .-"", ~~ BARRELS/DAY 30,300 77,906 73,463 91,920 95,369 84,186 74,655 55,953 22,517 20,410 133 0 PERCENTAGE CAPACITY UTILIZATION 13 32 31 38 40 35 31 23 9 9 <1 0 ... ' 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 ~ ______""'''' ___'''''''R_''''''''''''''''''~ ___ ~ __~~_' , .... A .. _'_.. ~ .~I~._'_"~""'.'H""''''''',,,,,_ ._<, ~~"""'""'''.~.,t''''''_ ,~."_-'~~"""'_".,. ~"", __"_,,, __ ._._~_,~,_."_' __'~---""~R_"""'-""~".~""~~--'_"" .. H..... ~.R' I••. ~ .. _._ ...... - ... __~ ... ~._ .. ~ .... ,_.. _" ... ~,_M." .. _~I. .~_ ...... ~ __ .•• I""~~",.~.... ~~, .. ,~_ .• ~ .. __._.~.~,~, ... ,._.,_."__ "'_' __ "~'''''~'' _.1 .. >1 " .... " ....__ • __.... FCP 4,230 14,052 21,585 22,379 18,309 17,675 22,310 20,439 7,434 2,325 0 0 FHP 24,886 56;620· 38,999 42,192 46,306 37,486 33,126 20,029 8,613 3,177 0 0 FOP 1,184 7,234 12,879 27,349 30,755 15,308 7,746 6,820 3,879 10,858 133 0 FSP 0 0 0 0 0 13,718 11,474 8,665 2,591 4,050 0 0 LINE 9 AVERAGE ANNUAL DAILY THROUGHPUT FROM WESTOVER TO SARNIA (m 3/day} ~. ;. %'c':; 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 =--... -.--.".~--.. --.--.-"" .. -" ... -... -..-,--.-.--"--."",, ,...... --_ ...... , ~,,_ ...... ~_, ,.,,~~,, __ ~ ...... , ...... ,_ ..... _. L~"~.~"' •• ~~,_, ... ,... _,~_"'L." ... ,....." .... '''..... ~N"' .... '". "' ..•. ,.~, ...... , ,,,-,,,,~,_~ _'~'''''''' ."· ...... ~t .~~,.~I .. L'>~ ".'"<"~,_.,.,, m .... ' ._,,~ ..... ~, ...... ,~ ___.""-'" ...... __...... ___ • _ .. ~"~ ...,_,, __'"--"oO._ M3/day 4,817 12,386 11,680 14,614 15,163 13,385 11,869 8,896 3,580 3,245 21 0 PERCENT CAPACITY UTILIZATION 13 32 31 38 40 35 31 23 9 9 <1 o , , f,,: 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 r;.,":" __~., __" .. ~'---...... ____• __ ... _ .. ,~.~~, .. ,___ ..... -:-.....--v_.~ __ .".,,,",, ____,,-~""'''''''''''''"'''~''i''''t"."","~,.--,~ .. t~~ ...... - .• - ...... ,~.- ...... _"'--_'__ ~I~,~ __ """'T"_"""" ~''''''''''H",.~"._." __ ~ ...... ,.",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,~,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,'''' __M'''''''''''''''''_""'~''''''''''''''''''''~''''"~''~''''_''~'''' __,,_.'''''''r'''''~_··'~·~''~_L' •.• ,.... -':--___ FCP 672 2,234 3,432' 3,558 2,911 2,810 3,547 3,249 1,182 370 0 0 FHP 3,957 9,002 6,200 6,708 7,362 5,960 5,267 3,184 1,369 505 0 0 FOP 188 1,150 2,048 4,348 4,890 2,434 1,231 1,084 617 1,726 21 0 FSP o o o o o 2,181 1,824 1,378 412 644 0 0