Improving Governance: Practical Methods and an Analytic Framework for the Enhancement of Democracy
By Jean-Paul Gagnon
BA History, Trent | MA/PhD QUT
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Humanities Program
Queensland University of Technology
11 October, 2010
Declaration
I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which, to a substantial extent, has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of the university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment has been made in the text.
Signature:
Name: Jean-Paul Gagnon
Date: 11/10/2010
i Abstract
Seven endemic governance problems are shown to be currently present in governments around the globe and at any level of government as well (for example municipal, federal). These problems have their roots traced back through more than two thousand years of political, specifically ‘democratic’, history. The evidence shows that accountability, transparency, corruption, representation, campaigning methods, constitutionalism and long-term goals were problematic for the ancient Athenians as well as modern international democratisation efforts encompassing every major global region.
Why then, given the extended time period humans have had to deal with these problems, are they still present?
At least part of the answer to this question is that philosophers, academics and NGOs as well as MNOs have only approached these endemic problems in a piecemeal manner with a skewed perspective on democracy. Their works have also been subject to the ebbs and flows of human history which essentially started and stopped periods of thinking.
In order to approach the investigation of endemic problems in relation to democracy (as the overall quest of this thesis was to generate prescriptive results for the improvement of democratic government), it was necessary to delineate what exactly is being written about when using the term ‘democracy’. It is common knowledge that democracy has no one specific definition or practice, even though scholars and philosophers have been attempting to create a definition for generations.
What is currently evident, is that scholars are not approaching democracy in an overly simplified manner (that is, it is government for the people, by the people) but, rather, are seeking the commonalities that democracies share, in other words, those items which are common to all things democratic. Following that specific line of investigation, the major
ii practiced and theoretical versions of democracy were thematically analysed. After that, their themes were collapsed into larger categories, at which point the larger categories were comparatively analysed with the practiced and theoretical versions of democracy.
Four democratic ‘particles’ (selecting officials, law, equality and communication) were seen to be present in all practiced and theoretical democratic styles.
The democratic particles fused with a unique investigative perspective and in-depth political study created a solid conceptualisation of democracy. As such, it is argued that democracy is an ever-present element of any state government, ‘democratic’ or not, and the particles are the bodies which comprise the democratic element.
Frequency- and proximity-based analyses showed that democratic particles are related to endemic problems in international democratisation discourse. The linkages between democratic particles and endemic problems were also evident during the thematic analysis as well historical review. This ultimately led to the viewpoint that if endemic problems are mitigated the act may improve democratic particles which might strengthen the element of democracy in the governing apparatus of any state. Such may actively minimise or wholly displace inefficient forms of government, leading to a government specifically tailored to the population it orders.
Once the theoretical and empirical goals were attained, this thesis provided some prescriptive measures which government, civil society, academics, professionals and/or active citizens can use to mitigate endemic problems (in any country and at any level of government) so as to improve the human condition via better democratic government.
iii List of Abbreviations
APT ASEAN Plus Three ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations BPOA Barbados Programme of Action CCD Council for a Community of Democracies CDT Centre for Democracy and Technology COHA Council of Hemispheric Affairs EU European Union GOPAC Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption ICJ International Court of Justice ICTs Information and Communication Technologies InfoDEV Information for Development Program IntIDEA International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance IPU International Parliamentary Union IT Information Technology LDCs Least Developed Countries LIFE Local Initiative Facility for Urban Environment MDGs Millennium Development Goals MNO Multinational Organization NED National Endowment for Democracy NEPAD New Partnerships for Africa’s Development NGO Non Governmental Organization OAS Organization of American States ParlCent Parliament Centre SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany SSPs Small Scale Projects TI Transparency International UN United Nations UNDEF United Nations Democracy Fund UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development WB World Bank WMD World Movement for Democracy
iv Acknowledgements
I would like to take this opportunity to thank my mother and father (Celina and Pierre, respectively) for everything that you have worked so hard to achieve. It was ultimately your efforts that provided the opportunity for me to research this thesis. I love you both very much and thanks, Mom, for bravely defecting from communism, and Dad, for patiently putting up with the Air Force: these two journeys led you to each other and well, we know the rest.
To my wonderful wife Tracey, thank you for your continuous encouragement and keen support. You’ve made these past years of hard work a sincere enjoyment. It is amazing that researching my PhD led to meeting you and I hope that one day you too will take this fantastic journey. To my wife’s family, your generosity and inclusion of me in your lives gave me a surrogate family: one that kept me from missing my nuclear family too greatly. Thank you for everything you have shared with me over the years, you are great people, each and everyone.
To my brother Julian—thanks for adventurously stomping through the Borneo jungle with me! Without having found that massive satellite dish in Mulu National Park, I may have missed the deadline of accepting the offer to research my PhD with QUT’s School of Social Sciences in Australia.
I would like to thank Professors Clive Bean and Gavin Kendall for your continual support, scrupulous natures and fun personalities. Without the two of you, my doctoral research would, no doubt, have been an interminable bore and a disastrous failure.
Finally, to my colleagues Nicholas Osbaldiston, Christian Callisen, Geraldine Donoghue, Theresa Sauter, Gino Orticio, Mathew Ball, Lanka and Dan Butler-De Silva, and many others as well as our very special administrator Melody McIntosh: this could not have happened without you.
Warmest regards and truthfully yours,
Jean-Paul Gagnon
v Table of Contents
Declaration ...... i Abstract ...... ii List of Abbreviations ...... iv Acknowledgements ...... v Table of Contents...... vi Table of Figures ...... ix
SECTION ONE ...... 1 Chapter 1 : INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.1 Endemic Governance Problems ...... 2 1.2 Endemic Governance Problems and Democracy ...... 4 1.3 What is Democracy? ...... 5 1.4 Sovereignty ...... 10 1.5 The Element of Democracy ...... 13 1.6 A New Definition of Democracy ...... 14 1.7 Challenges to Democracy ...... 15 1.8 Area of Research ...... 22 1.9 Purpose of this Thesis ...... 23 1.10 Findings: Contributions to this Thesis ...... 24 1.11 Why is this Thesis Important? ...... 25 1.12 Why Has This Not Been Done Before? ...... 26 1.13 How is this Thesis Argued? ...... 27 1.14 Breakdown of Historical Arguments ...... 29 Chapter 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 32 2.1 Introduction ...... 32 2.2 Sources Used: A Discussion of Validity ...... 33 2.3 What is Known About the Subject? ...... 34 2.4 Chronology of the Development of Knowledge on the Subject ...... 41 2.5 Ancient Athens and Republic of Rome ...... 44 2.6 Italian City-State Republics ...... 47 2.7 Britain, Revolution Era ...... 47 2.8 France, Revolution Era ...... 49 2.9 United States of America, Revolution Era ...... 51 2.10 Third Wave Democracy ...... 52 2.11 The Modern Period...... 53 2.12 The Gap of Knowledge? ...... 56 2.13 Consensus on the Relevant Issues? ...... 57 2.14 Most Fruitful Direction of the Research? ...... 59 2.15 Conclusion ...... 60 Chapter 3 : CLASSICAL DEMOCRACY ...... 62 3.1 Introduction ...... 62 3.2 Corruption ...... 63 3.3 Accountability ...... 65 3.4 Representation ...... 67 3.5 Transparency ...... 73 3.6 Constitutional Issues ...... 75
vi 3.7 Campaigning Methods ...... 77 3.8 Long-Term Goals ...... 81 3.9 Conclusion ...... 83 Chapter 4 : NORTH ATLANTIC DEMOCRACIES...... 85 4.1 Introduction ...... 85 4.2 Transparency ...... 86 4.3 Representation ...... 89 4.4 Accountability ...... 103 4.5 Long-Term Goals ...... 108 4.6 Campaigning Methods ...... 109 4.7 Corruption...... 114 4.8 Constitutional Issues ...... 120 4.9 Conclusion ...... 128
SECTION TWO : CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS ...... 130 Introduction ...... 130 Questions Derived from Academic Literature ...... 133 Chapter 5 : QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ...... 136 5.1 Identification of Texts Analysed ...... 137 5.2 A Qualitative Look at the Evidence ...... 142 5.3 Conclusion of Qualitative Analysis ...... 175 Chapter 6 : QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS ...... 179 6.1 Describing Types of Analysis ...... 180 6.1 Explicit and Implicit Words: A Comparative Utility ...... 183 6.2 How Questions Were Investigated ...... 185 6.3 Further Notes: Proximity Analysis Method ...... 186 6.4 Discussion of Frequency and Proximity Analyses ...... 188 6.5 Endemic Governance Problems ...... 189 6.6 Democratic Particles ...... 193 6.7 Proximity Results ...... 196 6.8 Discussion of Frequency and Relational Based Analyses Continued ...... 198 6.9 Cognitive Mapping ...... 203 6.10 Answering Research Questions ...... 204 6.11 Conclusion ...... 209
SECTION THREE : PRESCRIPTIONS AND CONCLUSION ...... 211 Introduction ...... 211 Chapter 7 : PRESCRIPTIONS ...... 213 7.1 Methods for Enhancing Democratic Particles ...... 213 7.2 Law ...... 214 7.3 Equality...... 219 7.4 Selecting officials ...... 223 7.5 Communication ...... 225 7.6 Mitigating Endemic Governance Problems ...... 233 7.7 Corruption...... 236 7.8 Representation ...... 238 7.9 Accountability ...... 242 7.10 Constitutional Issues ...... 245 7.11 Transparency ...... 247 7.12 Campaigning Methods ...... 250
vii 7.13 Long-Term Goals ...... 253 7.14 Political Education ...... 256 7.15 Parliamentary Checklist ...... 257 7.16 Treasury Application Form ...... 259 7.17 Ethical Standards for Media ...... 260 7.18 Super-Census ...... 261 7.19 Integrated Centralised Campaigning ...... 263 7.20 Modern Gracchus ...... 264 7.21 Reinforcing Democratic Associates ...... 265 Conclusion ...... 266
Works Cited ...... 272
APPENDIX A ...... 290 Taxation ...... 290 Physical Infrastructure ...... 291 Bureaucracy (Government Infrastructure) ...... 291 Trade ...... 293 Military ...... 293 Media ...... 293 Essential Glossary ...... 294
viii Table of Figures
Figure 5.1 The Ecology of Governance (ParlCent and WB, 2008:10) ...... 144
Figure 5.2 The Unbalanced Ecology of Governance (GOPAC, 2005:8) ...... 146
Figure 5.3 Multipronged Anticorruption Strategy (GOPAC, 2005:30) ...... 149
Figure 5.4 Conceptual Composition of the Capacity Building Programme (IntIDEA, 2004:117) ...... 152
Figure 5.5 Four Areas of Democratic Reform (UNDP, 2004:69) ...... 158
Figure 6.1 Explicit Terms: Endemic Governance Problems (Frequency) ...... 189
Figure 6.2 Explicit Terms: Endemic Governance Problems ...... 189
Figure 6.3 Comparative Implicit Results: Endemic Governance Problems ...... 190
Figure 6.4 Implicit: Campaigning Methods ...... 192
Figure 6.5 Implicit: Long-Term Goals ...... 193
Figure 6.6 Explicit Terms: Democratic Particles (Frequency of Terms) ...... 193
Figure 6.7 Explicit Terms: Democratic Particles (Documents Found) ...... 194
Figure 6.8 Comparative Implicit Results: Democratic Processes ...... 195
Figure 6.9 Predominance of Law and Equality in Democratic Discourse ...... 197
Figure 6.10 Grouping Analysis: Democratic Associates and Democratic Associates .. 199
Figure 6.11 Grouping Analysis: Democratic Associates and Democratic Particles ..... 200
Figure 6.12 Proximity Analysis: Endemic Governance Problems (Short Variables) ... 201
Figure 6.13 Overall View ("Diamond" Shape) ...... 203
Figure 7.1 Proximity Analysis: Democratic Particles versus Endemic Governance Problems #2 ...... 222
Figure 7.2 Political Communication Matrix ...... 226
Figure 7.3 Super-Census: The Triangular Methodology ...... 230
Figure 7.4 Geographical Representation of Triangular Methodology ...... 231
Figure A.1 The Nature of Taxation in Relation to Democratic Particles ...... 291
Figure A.2 Bureaucracy and Its Relation to the State ...... 292
ix
SECTION ONE
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
Democracy is, naturally, a large field and the undertaking of this work, given its title, may imply an attempt to cover the entire discourse. Although the thesis attempts to open an innovative line of investigation in political theory and provide some prescriptions for enhancing democracy, the research has been conducted in a scrupulous and concise manner following the guidance and style of past and present academics. To exemplify, the wholesale criticism of institutions created during periods of heightened democracy
(i.e. American, French and British revolutions) and democracy itself has not been conducted for over 200 years (Przeworski, Stokes, Manin, 1999:51) even though many of these institutions are germane to democratically-styled government at present.
Recently, however, Keane (2009)—perhaps inspired by his predecessor (Capen, 1874)— produced a masterpiece history of democracy. In the majority, this thesis is not an historical work, but a matter of political theory however Keane’s (2009) methodology is still relevant.
Far from engaging every published authority, Keane (2009) strategically chose his evidence and arguments in such a way as to precisely make points, with appropriate academic rigour and free from unsubstantiated claims, yet covering about 5,000 years of history. Thus the technique used herein is the strategic argument of the thesis which enables it to deal with the large discourse of enhancing democracy in a concise manner.
Whereas Keane (2009) divided his work in relation to assembly, representative and monitory periods of democracy and used an anthropological definition of democracy
(2009:160), this thesis employs a different perspective based on endemic governance problems and an ‘elemental’ view of democracy.
1 1.1 Endemic Governance Problems
Presently, every country in the world may be affected to various degrees by endemic governance problems. This includes local to state government levels and it is becoming increasingly apparent that endemic problems affect non-governmental entities like corporations, multinational organisations and other institutions like the military, hospitals and banks. These problems not only affect present polities, but were also problematic for Ancient Athenians, Romans and latter day European governments through the Middle Ages to the industrial period and beyond. It is probable that endemic problems affected polities before Attica consolidated the sovereignty of its empire and might be present in Linear B texts as recorded by the Mycenaeans.1
Accountability, transparency, corruption, representation, campaigning methods, constitutional issues and long-term goals (or lack thereof) may be endemic problems for governments internationally—past and present. They are problematic because each of them can have a positive or negative effect on democracy and the quality of governance a citizenry receives. Accountability, or the practice where office holders in government are held legally responsible for their actions is a widely known problem in government.
Similarly, transparency (the practice of providing information and communicating that information to the public) and representation (the institution of being represented by an elected member of parliament) are also areas of government widely acknowledged in the literature to be problematic. Campaigning methods (the practices used by individuals running for election and the conventions inherent in that process), constitutional issues
(mainly whether constitutions written before globalisation still apply to a different plural citizenry), and long-term goals (the lack of them) of a government having been derived
1 Keane (2009) revealed that assembly styled ‘proto-democracy’ was practiced as early as 3500 BCE by Mycenaeans, Phoenicians and other polities in and around the Middle East. His book challenges the common understanding that the Athenians were the inventors of democracy. Similarly, Diamond (1997, 2005) can be said to have argued that the basic parts of democracy may be endemic to human nature. Should that be the case, it is highly probable that endemic problems were just as prevalent in early governance systems as they were in the Athenian and Roman polities.
2 from the citizenry are also areas that are problematic for governments as will come to be seen.
In effect, all of the governance problems are being engaged, to various degrees, by civil societies, other governments, media and other such influences, but not in an explicit and informed manner. Rather, the current international trend in democratisation is to focus primarily on accountability, transparency and corruption with a growing concern regarding representation and campaigning methods. Constitutional issues and long-term goals are, however, the smallest and least considered.
A good question to ask is why, after so long, are endemic problems still problematic?
There are several answers which come to mind: the first is that these problems benefited some individuals or groups and not others (like corruption, lack of accountability, preventing transparency, limiting representation, profiting from unequal campaigning methods, and not having long-term goals derived from the entire plurality but perhaps controlled by ‘big business’ or government). The second is that certain endemic problems, like long-term goals and constitutional issues, are only beginning to gain attention in the extant literature. And the third is that politics has most likely not matured enough to use the sophisticated institutions required to resolve these problems. There are most likely other reasons why these problems have not been resolved, but that will be left for future research.
A contribution made to political science is the perspective of endemic problems which explains their history: that they may be currently present in all polities, that they may be interrelated and share complex relationships, and most notably that they may improve democracy should one or more of them be mitigated.
Endemic problems were analysed in a process involving a general foray into literature firmly established in democratic discourse. A preconceived notion that there are
3 problems related to democracy guided the literature-based scrutiny. It was during the general foray that the phenomenon occurred: regardless of a work’s topic the same themes were being seen. This was how endemic governance problems took shape, gained context and formed an analytic framework.
It is prudent to note that this thesis also deals with ‘democratic associates’. These are institutions in government that have been consistently present in the democratically styled governments analysed. They are the media, taxation, trade, bureaucracies, and the military. Their role in this thesis is marginal but their inclusion in the quantitative analysis was useful as they generated questions which are important to answer.
1.2 Endemic Governance Problems and Democracy
The perspective of endemic problems, in the main, was not something predetermined by the author before investigating the thesis, but there was a general inclination of long- standing problems before research was undertaken. It is, in large part, a viewpoint that emerged through the literature review and is central to this thesis statement.2 It is this investigation of endemic problems that keeps this thesis coherent. Were accountability, transparency, corruption, representation, constitutional issues, campaigning methods and long-term goals problematic for Athenians, Romans and, later, Europeans? If they were, are they still problematic today? If so, are there some general time-tested or innovative ways of mitigating them? And if so, what impact will this have on democracy?
In this work, it will be seen how endemic problems were refined by the literature: historically they were problems; they are likely to be affecting contemporary governments (regardless of political alignment) internationally; and there are some
2 If an historical pattern of problems within democracy is related to, or are the same or similar as modern problems within democratic theory and practice, then new methodologies to ratify these problems may improve democracy (page 32).
4 prescriptions that may help mitigate them. But where does democracy come into all of this?
As endemic problems and their mitigation acts as the compass pointing a bearing through the discourse of democracy, it, like a vessel travelling the sea, must be related to its master. Otherwise this thesis would be about endemic problems and not improving government. Democracy, as shown in the proximity analysis in Chapter 6 (page 179), interacts with endemic problems (which, prior to the proximity analysis, was a notion that emerged from the literature). This relationship reveals that democracy and endemic problems are potentially related, meaning that, should endemic problems be mitigated, democracy may be enhanced and vice versa. However, proving that democracy is related to endemic problems does not mean much if the issue of what democracy actually means is not resolved.
1.3 What is Democracy?
Academics and professionals have been trying to create an acceptable definition of democracy for hundreds of years but have been constantly refuted (Dahl, 1989; Keane,
2009; Terchek and Conte, 2001; Habermas, 1987, 1991, 1996, 2008; Schmitt,3 1932,
1932a, 1985, 1985a, 1996a). The reason for this is that previous and current thinkers have been defining styles of democracy, not democracy ‘itself’. The conceptualisation of democracy in this thesis is an attempt to provide a definition of democracy that each style or form of democracy is, or can be, based on. In this way, the term ‘democracy’ can be used without any other qualification such as liberal, constitutional, consensus, deliberative, or social because these styles are all derived from democracy ‘itself’. As will come to be seen, in order to achieve this conceptualisation of democracy, thirty
3 Schmitt’s works are important to democracy (that which all styles or forms of democracy are based upon) because he considers democracy to be un-political. In other words, it can be viewed as a political formula not dependent on institutions which is central to the conceptualisation of democracy in this thesis.
5 styles of democracy were analysed. The result of the analysis and its subsequent argumentation created the element of democracy theory. The theory supposes that democracy is an element in society which allows pluralist populations to political order their society in an environment where there are no rulers. This democracy is a political formula which emerges from the pluralist citizenry in a violence free state and is not something that can be imposed but rather observed. Finally, this element of democracy contends with the element of totalitarian political formulas such as oligarchies, communism, and absolutist regimes which seek to order society by way of rulers.
Democracy can be seen as a good, for example, by engaging the works of Ober (2007),
Keane (2009), Sen (1999), Fukuyama (1989), Weale (2007), and Crick (2002). Ober stated that democracy is a good because it promotes eudaimonia (civic happiness) which even the most benevolent ruler cannot provide as a ruler takes away a citizen’s ability to order his or her community. Keane, Sen, and Fukuyama each discuss the good of democracy in their own ways whether declaring the history of democracy to be non-
Western (Keane), or that democracy is now an international right (Sen), or that democracy was a triumph of the enlightenment (Fukuyama) each agree that it is better than other ruler based political formulas. Finally, Weale and Crick provide many examples of positive emotions in their works dealing with democracy and its institutions which makes it difficult to view democracy itself as something bad. Of course, when discussing the tyranny of the majority or elitism these are negative political situations but they are not democracy.
Between approximately 1945 and 2000 democracy was viewed (Dahl, 1989; Lijphart,
1999; Huntington, 1991; Held, 1995) as an institutional affair linked to markets, history or imperialism (which is still a commonly taught perspective), whereas the present definition is shifting toward the idea that democracy is a cultural entity. It is now believed that it must be derived from a citizenry composed of many different actors,
6 allowing them, in a violence free environment, to express their sovereignty to create new, use or adapt current or old institutions in what Keane (2009:160) calls “a form of human action shaped by institutional circumstances…and surprise.”
The UNDP (Pruitt and Thomas, 2007) (they are, inter alia, the democratisation body of the UN) has recently pegged its working definition of democracy as violence-free4 dialogue between a pluralist citizenry.
Schmitt (1932) described his understanding of democracy as a precondition to government; that it was something un-political and summed up as the interaction between citizens and government. He used this viewpoint to attack liberal polities, as well as equality, and to defend authoritarianism so as to strengthen the Weimar government in turbulent post-WWI Germany. Although Schmitt (1932, 1932a, 1996,
1985, 2004) is critical of democracy for its weakness in the face of violence, his view, that it is not a polity, but rather an organic condition that allows polity to happen, is important.
Yet this implicit, culturally relevant (Kofi Annan supported this point), violence-free, dialogue-based and un-political sense of democracy is intrinsically linked with pluralist sovereignty, which is only part of democracy. What was needed was to bring an explicit definition of a democracy that all styles of democracy are based upon which is not far off from where the discourse has implicitly gone.
Bernstein (1993) asks it best:
What is democracy? The answer to this question appears very simple. It is translated as ‘government by the people’ and, by first glance, this would seem to settle it. But even a brief consideration tells us that this gives us only a very superficial and purely formal definition. Almost everyone who uses the term ‘democracy’ nowadays takes it to mean something more than
4 Keane (2004) had written about the effect violence has on democracy nearing the end of Annan’s term as Secretary General of the UN which reflects the zeitgeist of democratic discourse in early 2000. Violence is the “democracy killer” and its absence is intricately linked to the viability of pluralist sovereignty (versus populist).
7 just a form of government. We shall come much closer to the heart of the matter if we express ourselves negatively and define democracy as the absence of class government. This indicates a state of society in which no class has a political privilege which is opposed to the community as a whole. This also makes it immediately clear why a monopolistic corporation is anti- democratic. Furthermore, this negative definition has the advantage over the phrase ‘government by the people’ that it leaves less room for the idea of the oppression of the individual by the majority, which is absolutely repugnant to the modern mind… As we understand it today, the concept of democracy includes an idea of justice, that is, equality of rights for all members of the community…(Bernstein, 1993:140-141).
Bernstein (1993) expresses the current dissatisfaction thinkers have with the general, and empty, line ‘government by the people’. Keane (2009) also showed (in Caudillo democracy) how a charismatic leader (Weber, 1947) could use the meta-narrative
(Lyotard, 1994) of ‘the people’ for purposes of demagoguery. Bernstein (1993) then continues to define his own style of democracy; again, not democracy itself.
It was the efforts of previous thinkers developing styles of democracy that permitted the following analysis to happen. It was also the perspective of endemic problems that led to the questioning of whether democracy has general endemic qualities about it. Since endemic problems are over three thousand years old and affect all governments regardless of official political lineation, then perhaps democracy could have similar qualities (they are, after all, related).
It came down to analysing many major practised, theorised, contemporary and historical styles of democracy.5 Once the comparative thematic analysis was complete, it was seen that each democratic variant had themes which could be grouped in larger categories. In other words, the same themes were being seen in the various democratic styles and those
5 Styles of democracy analysed: aristocratic, delegative (O’Donnell, 1994; Trujillo, 2007), republican, Christian, Islamic, bourgeois, socialist, workers’, social, liberal, conservative, neo-liberal, neo-conservative, representative, sortition, lot (Katz, 1997), consensus (Lijphart, 1999), parliamentary, majoritarian, presidential, interactive (Bezold, 1978; West, 2007; Hague, 1999; Alexander, 1998; La Porte et al., 2002), direct, anarchist (Russian cultural sub-class; Kropotkin, [c 1887] 1987), e-democracy, global, corporate, Iroquois (Ivison, et al., 2000), consociational (Kaiser, 1997; Andeweg, 2000), assembly, and monitory (Keane, 2009).
8 became democratic particles. Once the collapsing of categories (Charmaz, 2006)6 was complete, four distinct concepts were left: selecting officials,7 equality, law8 and communication. Out of 30 styles, there is not one that has not built on those four concepts.
It is important to state that these particles are not meant to be explicitly defined. They are meant to be open concepts which are then defined by the pluralist citizenry they are being observed in. Yet, certain basic parameters for the particles can be described.
Equality is the balance of power which promotes justice; law is the physical manifestation of how a pluralist citizenry desires to have its society ordered; selecting officials details the need for a pluralist citizenry to identify which individuals will hold which offices regardless of which institutions a citizenry adopts to achieve this; and communication relates to the various ways information is exchanged or produced.
Through this explanation it can be seen that should these particles be defined by a plurality in a certain way that would result in the formation of a distinct style of democracy: perhaps liberal constitutional, social, or aristocratic.
Why equality versus equity, law versus justice, selecting officials instead of elections, and communication rather than information? In the process of collapsing categories, it helped to have some reproducible information, which was attained by the frequency
6 “Now examine [categories] for their power, purpose, and patterns. Consider collapsing categories that lack power. Ask yourself: what purpose do they serve here?” (Charmaz, 2006:159) 7 Keane (2009) showed that, rather than the ‘selection of rulers’, there are no rulers in democracy. 8 Law, rather than the perhaps more defined ‘rule of law’, was chosen due to Schmitt (1932) and Keane (2009) theories that laws are diverse and that, in democracies, there are no ‘rulers’. Legal positivism, teleocratic legislation, normative implicit customs, nomocratic statutes, precedent, civil codes, judicial review, executive vetoes, parliamentary bargaining, interest or pressure groups, top-down or bottom-up legal participation, for example, are all things that can impact the nature of a law. Schmitt (1932) argued that the legitimacy of law was eroded by parliament as the deals struck by those elected were foreign to the homogenous will that would be better represented by a popularly elected president. Although he has been shown wrong in his arguments over the last 60 years (notably that there is no such thing as a homogenous citizenry and that authoritarian violence cannot function with democracy), he did open the way for Habermas (1996; Dyzenhaus, 1994) to argue that the level of citizen participation in the formation of laws is what provides its legitimacy. Hence the more inclusive the formation of laws are of the pluralist citizenry, the greater chance there is for law to reflect its heterogeneous will.
9 analysis conducted in Chapter 6 of 14 major multinational organisations’ and international NGOs’ documents dealing specifically with democracy.9
Another technique for refining categories was derived from Charmaz (2006) who argued that, if there is no logical fit in the context of the argument, the concept should be collapsed. Thus selecting officials was chosen instead of elections because there are other methods of choosing who is or are to order and run government (not to rule in the conventional sense of sovereignty). Equality over equity, as equity is implicit in equality, and that equality is a more pervasive term internationally than equity. This was the same case with law and justice. Furthermore, law is not as ambiguous as justice and is something easier to define by a pluralist citizenry. Finally, communication houses all forms of the interaction of information and is logically a superior category, even if information was more pervasive than communication in the frequency analysis.
Yet, democracy is not simply the confluence of four concepts.10 It has to be attached to a body of power and, as the UNDP (Pruitt and Thomas, 2007), Keane (2009) and Annan have pointed out, it rests with the sovereignty of the pluralist citizenry.
1.4 Sovereignty
The argument made herein is that pluralist sovereignty cannot be expressed or accessed in a culturally relevant, violence-free and long-term manner without engaging the process of selecting officials, equality, law and communication. However, in order to understand what is meant, ‘pluralist sovereignty’ is in need of some further refining.
Sovereignty traditionally meant the power of a monarch or state (post Westphalia) and still does (Krasner, 2001; Howland, 2008) although its traditional powers are
9 Mainly the UNDP, UN, Council for a Community of Democracies (CCD), Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU), Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC), World Bank, Parliamentary Centre, International IDEA and Organization of American States (OAS). 10 In the proximity analysis, Chapter 6, it was shown that selecting officials, law, equality and communication are related terms.
10 increasingly threatened (Wenhua, 2008). Just as before the rise of representative democracies (and for a period near the decline of that style), the monarch or dictator was both sovereign and the state. Parliaments in their sovereign prime could also be viewed in the same light (Young, 2008) as being the sovereign body—albeit ‘legitimised’ by elitist electors—mainly composing the state. However, things begin to muddle on three fronts at this stage: native peoples such as Amerindians are recognised as a sovereign people in treaties (Fixico, 2008:261; Shaw, 2008); theories of the ‘post-sovereign nation- state’ are emerging due to political pluralism and monitory democracy (Wissenburg,
2008; Keane, 2009); and the gradual widening of the franchise.
Engaging Amerindians in the context of sovereignty revealed that First Nations did not practise typical European models of sovereignty, meaning that a recontextualisation of sovereignty occurred. The idea of a rather more egalitarian society, such as the Iroquois, gaining sovereign power (defined as their hold over a territory) contributes to the notion of pluralist sovereignty as power within the community was more diffuse, thus sovereignty was accessing more individuals and interests.
Political pluralism, its accountability and promulgation—termed by Keane (2009) as
‘monitory democracy’—are viewed as a threat to the traditional sovereignty of the nation-state. In effect, the emergence of more ‘eyes and ears’ bodies, both within and without the state, is gradually removing the power of the state to rule and, in that way, intrinsically affects its sovereignty. However, as Krasner (2001) explains, the nation- state has been adapting since its inception in 1648 and is adapting to the current ‘post- sovereign’ zeitgeist. Keane (2009:763-769) argued that ‘über-democracy’ was the negative effect of this adaptation.
Change everybody’s sense of the short-term rhythm of electoral politics by planning for repeated victories. Aim to win several elections in a row, so that the rules of the political game and the whole atmosphere of public life can be changed. Act as if the principle of checks and balances is no longer
11 meaningful. Mobilise every (dirty) trick in the book of politics to achieve what others haven’t achieved…a vital priority is executive control of political communication (Keane, 2009: 767, 766).
Yet, the beneficial results of monitory democracy and theories of the post-sovereign state are the focus of power elsewhere, namely toward the citizenry and supranational or multinational organisations. This, coupled with the recent explosion of communication technologies, explains the contemporary trend of activists targeting the WTO, IMF, G8
(20, 20+), as well as the increasing disaffection with the EU by European civil society and academics. Although Putnam (2000) writes that more individuals in America are
‘bowling alone’ rather than ‘bowling together’, in political terms, the results of his study do not agree with the growing focus of sovereignty as being composed of the many interests of a diverse society nor with pluralist sovereignty. The main opposing argument to Putnam’s (2000) political work is by Keane (2009), who depicts how monitory democracy and recent innovations in communication have, in fact, created far more opportunities to ‘bowl’ alone or together due to the proliferation of civil society locally through to internationally.
Finally, the widening of the franchise over the past 200 years has furthered the idea that individuals are the units which compose the sovereign. Equality of gender, ethnicity11 or sexuality, for example, contributed to the notion of pluralism and dispelled the myth of the majority or, in other words, ‘the people’. That is the last distinction for pluralist sovereignty to be made clear.
Popular sovereignty (Lupel, 2009), in its basic form, means that people are the source of political legitimacy. The trouble is that it returns to the explicit use of ‘people’, that same term hijacked and abused by demagogues over the past 200 years. Pluralist12 sovereignty,
11 As opposed to race. Recent archaeological findings posit that all humans are from the same race (genetically speaking) and that differences in appearance are solely matters of ethnicity. 12 Connolly (Chambers, 2007) argues capitalism to have ‘minoritized’ society in his description of pluralism, whereas pluralism in this work is not related to economic postulation but is tied to the notion of debunking the ‘myth of the majority’.
12 on the other hand, dispels the myth of an existing explicit body of the ‘people’ and places power with diverse individuals which, when configured geographically, forms a complex political milieu which can be considered the implicit, non mythical, notion of
‘the people’.13
1.5 The Element of Democracy
Pluralist sovereignty is the core of democracy and, as previously stated, cannot be expressed or accessed without being ‘wrapped’ in its four democratic particles: selecting officials, equality, law and communication. With that frame in place, a citizenry or government can then enhance democracy by increasing the cultural relevancy of its institutions and mitigating endemic problems.
As endemic problems are universal problems for governments, and that they are related to democracy’s four particles, the element of democracy (that grounded theory of pluralist sovereignty ‘wrapped’ by its four particles) is equally pervasive. A mixed constitutions approach, borrowed from Hellenistic thinkers, was required to view it as such. Diamond (1997, 2005) argued that dialogue (communication), equality, and order
(selecting officials and law) are endemic to human nature: this is the archeo- anthropologic argument which Keane (2009) nearly touched upon in his own work.
Keane (2009) contributes to Diamond’s (1997, 2005) work by revealing that assemblies were prevalent by about 2500 BCE14 in and around the Middle East. Together, the evidence allows democracy to be understood as endemic to human nature (recalling
Schmitt’s un-political democracy). It is typically when power is perverted by violence, hawkish groups and warring civilisations that democracy is suppressed, but not
13 It should, however, be mentioned that an explicit majority concerning a well-defined concept could be attained via improved census methods and improved political communication. Yet, for the majority to be legitimate, it would have to contain the agreement of most, if not all, individuals composing the pluralist body with time for minorities to argue their opinions until a normative agreement can be reached. 14 BCE stands for Before Common Era. This term is used instead of BC or Before Christ as it is devoid of religious connotations.
13 eliminated. It is in this way that democracy is viewed to be a constant element in governments, regardless of official or unofficial political lineation and that a variety of styles can be present in any given polity depending on how individuals or groups are expressing their sovereignty. This is so because democracy is the mechanism that allows a pluralist citizenry to govern themselves. It is what allows polities to emerge and the effectiveness of the polity (society’s organisation) depends on how it addresses democracy’s four particles. For, if it addresses them poorly, pluralist sovereignty is ineffectually expressed which leads to political discontent.
This perspective lends a universal aspect to democracy which fits with the history and pervasiveness of endemic problems. It allows the aforementioned ‘nexus’ of democratic particles and endemic problems to work theoretically and empirically.
1.6 A New Definition of Democracy
Democracy is pluralist sovereignty expressed by selecting officials, equality, law and communication. It is not, whatsoever, an institution such as voting, parliaments, or presidents, but it is a culturally distinct entity.15 It is present as the root in every style of government and is active at any level of state, from local to global. Ultimately, it is a general tool which enables a pluralist citizenry to create a culturally distinctive style of government based on their definitions of “selecting officials,” “equality,” “law” and
“communication.” Whether that means a monarchy, anarchy, parliament, oligarchy or other form of government, if conducted in a long-term manner without oppressing any disaffected citizens, a government would be a culturally relevant style of democracy.
However, it is problematic actually obtaining such an outcome from a long-term, all- inclusive process. It has to current knowledge not been done before and is probably not something that can be achieved in the near future; that is, explicitly. This process is
15 Institutions are what give democracy its flavour or style, enabling it to function as a pluralist and culturally distinct sovereignty would want it to.
14 something that occurs every day, but in an implicit and unconscious manner.
Democracy, just like endemic problems, is currently—and always has been—an ongoing process. People are engaging in dialogue, changing or creating new laws, challenging authority and seeking equality every day in a myriad of contexts. Democracy is active everywhere and it is affected by endemic problems, only it has been implicit, through the unattached and random actions of billions of people from past and present. Now, for the first time, it has been recognised explicitly.
1.7 Challenges to Democracy
Although Nietzsche’s ([1886] 2008, [1885] 2008a) thoughts on truth and utility ultimately contribute to the ontology of this work, he was critical of nineteenth century
European-styled democracy. Due to his somewhat inconsistent writing style (in that he tends to muddle things together in his rather hawkish prose), it is only after going through the majority of his works that his critiques of democracy become pronounced.
Nietzsche’s view of morality was influenced by Homeric values where good was
“wealth, strength, health, and power…whereas badness becomes associated with the poor, weak, sick, and pathetic” (Nietzsche, [1886] 2008:115). He also held a misogynistic view of women, stating:
… the weaker sex has in no previous age been treated with so much respect by men as at present—this belongs to the tendency and fundamental taste of democracy, in the same way as is respectfulness to old age--what wonder is it that abuse should be immediately made of this respect? They want more, they learn to make claims, the tribute of respect is at last felt to be well-nigh galling; rivalry for rights, indeed actual strife itself, would be preferred: in a word, woman is losing modesty. And let us immediately add that she is also losing taste. She is unlearning to FEAR man: but the woman who “unlearns to fear” sacrifices her most womanly instincts (Nietzsche, [1886] 2008:71).
His comments are relevant to the times in which he lived. European representative styled democracies were, in the majority, inclusive only of propertied men, with women and the poor engaged in the process of gaining the franchise and increasing their civil
15 liberties. It appears that Nietzsche ([1886] 2008, [1885] 2008a) himself sought satisfaction in the knowledge that he was a descendant of Polish nobility,16 which furthers his aristocratic leanings and Hellenistic mistrust of ‘the masses’ and women.
Thus, the way he viewed what was then believed to be democracy (probably a mixture of parliaments filled with turbulent rabble-rousers which, in turn, occupied local assemblies and terrorised the ‘rational’ minorities) was contemptuous.17
Misarchism (Siemens, 2009:242), or the hatred of rule, is another of Nietzsche’s critiques. Siemens (2009) shares the suggestion that Nietzsche, as previously stipulated, was an aristocrat and believed in the superiority of wealth over poverty, male over female, and strong over weak, which inherently rested on the need for strong rulers “for the sake of enhancement” (Siemens, 2009:242). However, misarchy is a component of pluralist sovereignty (as is non-violence) because democracy does not deal in sovereign rulers, aristocrats or oligarchies. This “rule of no thing over nothing else” is especially apparent in the current growing style of monitory democracy (Keane, 2009:856-857).
Nietzsche also claims that democracy is ruled by herd-morality or a “social reality” of the masses (Taureck, 2009:200). He was embroiled, as were a host of other thinkers during his time, in the myth of the majority. Even if individuals may act in groups— perhaps establishing the phenomena of ‘herding’18 in unique situations—this group is still a minority as it is composed heterogeneously of individuals.19 The threat of the
‘masses’ was a threat to aristocratic living as the disparity of income did not provide a large number of people with the means to become educated. The belief was that, should
16 His Polish noble ancestry was most probably involved in the creation of an aristocratic democracy that governed the Polish-Lithuanian Empire from roughly the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries (Keane, 2009:257-263). 17 This contempt for democracy is not surprising as classical thinkers (Aristotle, Socrates, Plutarch, for example) were critical of democracy. Their arguments were subsequently taken up again in Europe, especially after the Protestant revolution and after existing universities permitted the education of the wider public. 18 The act of subconsciously reacting or behaving in a manner not conducive to the normative behaviour of an individual due to the actions of others in a group (i.e. stampeding, rioting, etc.) 19 The only legitimate instance in which a majority can be formed is after a hyper-specific questioning of the entire population concerned with the matter at hand.
16 government be opened to ‘unqualified’ electors, the state would be doomed by the stupidity, violence and ignorance of the ‘riff-raff’. The fact that non-wealthy individuals composing citizenries are increasingly being focused on by governments and multinational organisations internationally, disproves Nietzsche’s argument that democracy cannot work because of the herd-morality (Taurek, 2009:201).
Another viewpoint, in part related to herd-morality, is Nietzsche’s ([1886] 2008, [1885]
2008a) notion that ‘radical insecurity’ is ultimately necessary for the enhancement of the
‘human plant’. Democracy mitigates radical insecurity due it its stabilising and secure habits which are necessary for diminishing violence.
One will look in vain for such human beings of great creativity, the actual great humans, as I understand it, today and probably for a long time to come: they are lacking; until finally, after much disappointment, one must begin to understand why they are lacking, and that nothing stands more inimically in the way of their emergence and development for now and for a long time yet than that which one now in Europe calls simply “the morality”: as if there were no other and could be no other – that herd- morality [….], which with all its powers strives after the general green pasture-happiness on earth, namely security, lack of danger, comfort, lightness of living and in the end, “when all is going well”, also hopes to rid itself of all manner of shepherd and leader [Leithammel]. Their two most frequently preached teachings are: “Equality of rights” and “Compassion for all that suffers” – and suffering itself is taken by them as something that one must abolish altogether (Siemens, 2009:244).
Nietzsche ([1886] 2008, [1885] 2008a) claims the abolition of suffering to be the responsibility of the shepherd or leader and criticises democracy for then wanting to replace the shepherd with equality. In pluralist sovereignty, each individual is a shepherd or a sheep, a leader or a follower, a political Übermensch20 that is not ruled and that cannot rule but, rather, can exercise an office, should such be approved by his or her peers, or challenge a law, should the law be felt unjust. His argument that the ‘masses’ need a leader holds no water as it has time and again lined the path of demagoguery,
20 The Übermensch (or ‘super-man’) is Nietzsche’s ([1886] 2008, [1885] 2008a) ideal post-nihilist and post-Christian man who creates his own reasons for living and does not succumb to the impostors of joy and sorrow but stays in a state like Zen. In this case, Übermensch was adapted as a political individual who does not succumb to power or subordination but, rather, maintains a state of pluralist sovereignty.
17 dictators and Caudillo-styled21 leadership. He similarly critiques the effects of equality as declining ‘organising power’.
As it turns out, the only institutions that we late moderns are able to support are the liberal institutions that Nietzsche sneeringly associates with the spread of democracy, which he regards not as an alternative form of government but as the ‘form of decline in organizing power’ (TI Expeditions 39). While he has many disparaging things to say about liberal institutions (cf. TI Expeditions 37–43), their chief political failing is that they are unable to support the production and advancement of culture. As such, they are unable to contribute directly to the enhancement of the human type (Conway, 2009:41).
The evident capacity of humans to innovate in periods of heightened democracy disproves the need for sovereign leaders to provide a guiding hand. Whereas measures that turn to concentrating power in an institution or personage in times of crisis reflects naught but poor governance in terms of risk assessment and preparedness (here critiquing Schmitt).
Finally, Nietzsche’s ([1886] 2008, [1885] 2008a) famous line ‘God is dead’22 poses a challenge to the notion of the element of democracy and endemic governance problems as general or universal grounded theories. Rather than speculating further about the anthropological endemic qualities of democratic particles, or trying to show that the truth of the element of democracy and endemic governance perspectives will still be true
(hence useful) in 500 years (which is probable), the aforementioned are general grounded theories. Firstly by the fact that the empirical results, which permitted these statements to be made, can be reproduced by any scholar. Secondly, that these theories were derived from an exhaustive historical and theoretical analysis. Thirdly, because the
21 See Keane (2009) for further details about Caudillo democracy. 22 This statement, in fact, lines the way for nihilism and the belief that nothing is universal; that there is no reason for life and that there are no general principles to live by (as Christianity attempted this for nearly two thousand years but failed).
18 empirical evidence they were drawn from is contemporary and hence useful (thus true) to modern polities internationally, at least for the near future.23
Weber’s (2004) notion of the state and the charismatic leader does not necessarily have to be viewed as critiques of democracy. In its simplest terms, Weber (2004) views the state as a body holding the legitimate right over power and its use. This view can be transposed into the pluralist sovereignty framework, in that the state is the composition of institutions created by a pluralist citizenry and, as such, derives its legitimacy to use power. However, this does not remove the state’s responsibility to remain accountable for its use of power. The scrutiny of the pluralist citizenry, intrastate civil society and other bodies such as the media, as well as supranational bodies aid in this regard. The necessity of having a charismatic leader or politician who is somewhat distanced or
‘disinterested’ in his or her subjects is a viewpoint, if related today, that is retrograded and non-conducive to current progressive political thought (Ladkin, 2010). As stipulated before with Nietzsche, Weber lived in the height of the representative style of democracy and ultimately witnessed the beginning of its decline (World War I). He did not experience the contemporary ill-effects of charismatic leadership, nor monitory democracy (which rejects citizens as subjects). However, it would have been interesting if he had produced a work concerning the experiences of the French Revolution as there were many charismatic leaders and realpolitik (i.e. Napoleon).
One problem in Weber’s (1968) deliberation is his overdependence on parliaments. He argued that charismatic leadership would become rationalised (although he claims charisma is anti-authoritarian, which Schmitt rejects) thus leading to entrenched bureaucratisation. Parliaments would then keep bureaucracies efficient and, hence, keep
23 The utilised argument relates to Nietzsche’s notion of perspectivism in that there can be a variety of perspectives that could be utilised to view something (such as democracy), but also that one perspective may be more valid than others depending on its utility.
19 the system running.24 The trouble is, that this viewpoint is specific to the Weimar condition that parliament was the only other power that could order the state and keep it from dissolving into civil war or outright violent anarchy spurred on by paramilitary political wings (communists versus NSDP, for example) by making bureaucracy more efficient. This over-dependence on the resilience of parliament—and the perspective of humans that Weber held—was shown to be insufficient in ordering society, as the
Weimar republic died and became subverted by the NSDP. From this, it can be seen that parliament and political parties are not capable of dissuading the inefficient mechanisation of polities by simply existing (as Weber, 1968, argued).
Inefficient bureaucratisation is a bugbear for any governmental system, as bureaucrats are the individuals who turn the wheels of the pluralist citizenry’s institutions. If bureaucratisation is conducted inefficiently, then government cannot operate effectively but, rather, at a disaffecting pace. Efficient bureaucratisation is also an important factor for governments as it is these very institutions that most citizens, in most cases, interact with, rather than the officials they have selected to run government. Keane (2009) shows that political pluralism is what keeps the institutions of government (its bureaucracies) accountable, not just parliament. A modern civil society and advanced information technology was not available to Weber, which is why his insistence on parliament is entirely rational, but from the modern perspective, misplaced.
Other thinkers such as Mosca (1939), Pareto ([1893] 2007); Marshall, 2008), Michels
(1968), Wintrop (1985), Carter and Stokes (1998), and Pettit (1997) also made important contributions to the critique of various styles of democracy. With Mosca, Pareto, and
Michels we can examine the role of elitism in various democratic governments and how these elites are the aristocracies which keep a government styled in such a way as to balance their interests with those of the wider citizenry. Wintrop, Carter and Stokes
24 As the parliament is the highest echelon of bureaucracy and is in the best position to modify it.
20 specifically examine liberal democracies and liberal democratic theory but not democracy ‘itself’ whilst Pettit posed important questions about citizenship in democracies throughout his work on republicanism. However, the critique of the literature still stands because these thinkers as well as those previously mentioned are engaging specific conceptualisations of democracy and not democracy as a whole.
Schmitt uses his own idea of democracy to combat liberalism, pluralism and the rule of law (Kalyvas, 2008:82). He defines democracy as the “identity between the state and people” (Schmitt, 1985a:26), whereas democracy is herein seen as an ever present form of government endemic to human nature which enables pluralist citizens to express their sovereignty by forming institutions, laws and processes that, in turn, form the state. This is not entirely alien to Schmitt’s concept of the un-political aspect of democracy. In other words, democracy permits a style of government to emerge which pictures the state as the powerless25 framework which orders the pluralist citizenry, based on their wants rather than having wants imposed on them by a dictator. Schmitt’s thoughts on the benefits of a dictator or, more precisely, an individual who has the ‘emergency powers’ to act above the law (rather for expediency) is excusive. Democracy is a form of government that can adapt to situations by the driven genius of its citizens. Emergency powers can be defined and individuals can be protected by instituted accountability measures, rather than relying on a dictator and his or her powers of the ‘exceptional’
(Schmitt, 1965a:28, 82).
Schmitt does not effectively use democracy to battle liberalism, primarily for the reason that his understanding of democracy as capable of supporting authoritarianism was false.
Secondly for the reason that he used his own style of democracy to do battle with styles of liberal democracy, not democracy itself. His challenges to pluralism (1985a), the rule
25 Powerless in the sense that the state, or the officials that compose it, does not have a legitimate authority (in a democracy) to break laws or harm its citizens.
21 of law (1996a), legal positivism (1932) and essentially the capacity of the ‘masses’ to engage politically, stem from an authoritarian perspective that was influenced primarily by Weimar aristocratic republicanism and later by fascism and totalitarianism—all of which engaged in demagoguery to win the day and dictatorship to ruin it. He promotes the standard Hellenistic inspired distaste of populist government driven by the mythical fear of the majority backed by Weimar militarism, Italian Fascism and Nazi totalitarianism. However, his critiques of liberalism, constitutional democracy and, inter alia, parliaments enabled the theoretical establishment of democracy as the previously stated government forming mechanism.
Finally, Schmitt argues that, in cases of the ‘exceptional’, the capacity of shifting the sovereign to a dictator from the ‘people’26 also gave the state the legitimate use of violence. Schmitt tried to link democracy in his works to presidential-based unaccountable violence but failed as violence is anathema to democracy (Keane, 2009).
Violence is ruinous to pluralist sovereignty and in that line of thought there cannot exist an effective violent democracy; that would only produce a violent style of government.
Actual democracy provides conditions in which no one thing rules over anything else
(Keane, 2009) and, as such, disproves Schmitt’s critiques.
1.8 Area of Research
This thesis discusses matters of political science, most notably government and democracy. As the literature review will show, seven endemic governance problems have been identified. These problems took their definitive shape during the literature review and are what prompted the historical and empirical investigations. Previous notions of endemic problems helped to provide a rather more focused investigation of
26 Recalling that the use of this term up until post-1945 engaged the ‘myth of the majority’ and often meant a limited male franchise.
22 the literature. The evidence suggests that each of these areas has been problematic for governing polities throughout history.
Based on these problems, a new analytic framework and perspective on government emerged. The perspective is that, if all seven endemic problems are corrected27 in a particular government, it would then increase the element of democracy in that state. The analytic framework which allowed this perspective to take shape is based on research detailing the prevalence of endemic problems in history and at present, as well as evidence indicating that the endemic problems are interrelated with the particles that make up the element of democracy.
It is believed that the perspective created will allow for the appropriate use of some prescriptions made in Chapter 7. The prescriptions are based on the synthesis of various techniques and strategies already suggested in academia, as well as inferences gleaned from the empirical research undertaken in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Overall, this thesis shows: how the seven endemic problems were identified; that they are still present in modern governments; and that they affect democracy.
1.9 Purpose of this Thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to provide new information regarding the reform of government in the hope that this will lead to the enhancement of democracy. There is a residing belief that an enhanced democracy will lead to overall better governance. This is due to the nature of democracy. It is founded on the principles of equality, communication, law and the selection of officials. Each of these particles arguably increases the peaceful interaction of citizens and government. Furthermore, if democratic particles are related to endemic problems (as they are shown to be in Chapter 6) then it might be inferred that the improvement of one will result in the improvement of the
27 Reminder that the process of mitigating endemic problems is, most likely, an ongoing one.
23 other. Perhaps the outcome of that will be a culturally unique streamlined system of government which would invariably increase the quality of life for all citizens in the particular state undergoing reform.28
1.10 Findings: Contributions to this Thesis
This thesis argues that there are at least seven endemic problems recognised throughout history. These problems may be present in all modern states and affect democracy in negative ways. For example, if accountability is lacking in a government, it will be more difficult for citizens to trust the political process and it may contribute to violence or apathy of the public sphere. The evidence concerning the prevalence of endemic problems in modern states was strengthened through the empirical analysis conducted in
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
An interesting result emerged when endemic problems were analysed. Long-term goals are not typically used in democratic government. Neither is the idea of using long-term goals in government an area heavily researched by academics (Crook and Rawson, 1994, discuss long-term impacts in Rome; O’Leary, 2006, mentions the long-term effects of large governments on citizen participation; and Popper, 2002, questions the feasibility long-term projections in the social sciences). The utility of elected long-term goals by a pluralist citizenry could provide benefits to their society and, by way of contrast, the lack of long-term goals could be detrimental. Logically, a government would understand their populace better if a census (improved using information technology, see Super-Census, p.261) were conducted with long-term goals in mind. It could affect political parties in the sense that during elections parties would campaign on issues central to citizens and thus could help to keep government and society progressing in the manner desired by the population. An alternative would be to attach a constitutional effect to long-term goals,
28 Reminding the reader that the earlier discussion, establishing democracy as a permanent element of any state, gives this viewpoint a universal applicability in any stage of government (i.e. local, state, and federal).
24 making them something that the governments of the day must work to achieve. The discussion of long-term goals and certain prescriptive measures can be found in Chapter
7.
Political theorists, academics and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as multi-national organisations (MNOs), have written about endemic problems and have reached a variety of useful conclusions. Some examples include: Mill ([1859] 1989,
[1859] 2004) who had done a noteworthy amount of work on representation, namely regarding the protection of the minority. Grant (2004) critiqued the nature of Australian campaigning methods, as well as stipulating the need for transparency and equality to be present during campaigning advertisement in public media. International IDEA (1999) imparted practical information for political parties, specifying the need for them to remain under the rule of law. Finally, Héritier (2003) demonstrated that the EU is in need of transparency for greater operability. This also exemplifies how a multinational organisation can give a raison d’être for the prescriptive conclusions in the thesis.
The difficulty with many of the aforementioned works is that they lack a realistic edge.
The pervasiveness of theories and themes relating to reform does indicate the importance of doing ‘something’. However, more realistic detail would be beneficial which is the main criticism of most works drawn upon.
1.11 Why is this Thesis Important?
It has the potential to change the way in which people understand democracy due to the perspective offered. Rather than seeing democracy as a type of government, it becomes a fundamental element that allows government to form. Apathy could potentially turn to participating in a system where the public sphere is more inclusive and perhaps easier to access.
25 By the public gaining awareness of endemic problems, a positive feedback cycle has the chance of forming. Detailed in Chapter 6, the endemic problems and democratic particles are interrelated. That particular circumstance signifies that the improvement of one problem invariably leads to the possible improvement of others and, in that way, the positive feedback continues. This argument can be related to Downs’ (1991) ‘Issue-
Attention Cycle’ wherein he states that, as public opinion grows, it is responded to by government and then diminishes (due to obstacles becoming apparent). Only those public interests that have been through the cycle may be taken up again by the public and further built upon.
Overall, this thesis indicates that mitigating endemic problems may improve democracy around the world, thus improving the human condition. That is, perhaps, the greatest potential effect that this work could possibly make.
1.12 Why Has This Not Been Done Before?
There are many works which use similar analysis methods to the one in this thesis, but they are conducted using different analytic frameworks. It has not been seen that a scholar has approached democratic reform from the same angle taken in this thesis.
Furthermore, the research done by other academics and non-academics alike has been shown to be piecemeal. Rather than analysing all seven problems together, there has only been the analysis of one or a few of those problems. Long-term goals are not heavily scrutinised by academics (nor NGOs and MNOs) and research into constitutional issues is also minimal in comparison to the work regarding other endemic problems (such as accountability, transparency and corruption). The mixed methods empirical analysis of the seven problems is unique to this thesis.
26 1.13 How is this Thesis Argued?
This thesis is divided into three areas. The first, encompassing Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 represent Girling’s (1997), Rosanvallon’s (2007) and Adams’ (O’Neil, 2007) borrowed historical methods. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are the empirical study which acts, inter alia, to give the conclusions reached in the previous chapters a scientific (reproducible) footing. Finally, Chapter 7 includes the prescriptive measures in order to offer a practical conclusion.
The first area required evidence that showed endemic problems were prevalent in the past. This historical technique was borrowed from Girling (1997:152) who states that history can be used:
… to provide the organizing principle. In this sense: historical investigation over a sufficient lengthy period of time – from decades to a century or more – reveals, in the first place, dominant patterns of activity…Girling (1997:152) which summarily can be said to “let history do the talking” Girling (1997:152).
The second technique (Rosanvallon, 2007) was the necessity of understanding the history of democracy before actually being able to comment on it. Rosanvallon
(2007:708) states that he has “been struck by the extent to which the questions and contradictions of democracy recur throughout its entire history.” He claims that it is impossible to research the revolutions of France, the United States of America or those in Latin America without first seeking the root of the problems, such as representation.
What interested me was locating and analyzing the contradictions and structuring tensions of democracy, and seeing how its history could be understood as a history of attempted responses to these contradictions, resulting from the experience of confronting them; hence the idea of a history that would be both intellectual and practical. (Rosanvallon, 2007:708)
The point, he writes, is to contrast and compare the failures and successes history has had, with the problems he researched, in order to understand their unique contexts. It is
27 in that manner that endemic problems can be better understood thus contributing to the integrity of the argument.
The third technique, stemming from John Adams (O’Neil, 2007), adds to the importance of looking into history.
Adams turned to history, understood as a repository of empirical evidence, examples, and data pertaining to the success or failure of particular institutional experiments in governing human beings over time. (O’Neil, 2007: para 8)
Adams thought that scrutinising history “could reveal the motive force, the crucial independent variable, if you will, driving it.” O’Neil, 2007: para 8). The question, which
Adams’ perspective brought to light, is whether endemic problems are a ‘motive force’ for enhancing democracy and improving governance.
The second area (empirical analysis) needed to show that the endemic problems identified historically are still present in modern governments. Fourteen documents drawn from professional institutions were used to argue this point. As discussed, it was necessary to establish, via the literature, that endemic problems are still present for the empirical analysis to have an appropriate framework (this can be found in Chapter 4). In other words, the literature helped to shape the research questions used in the qualitative and quantitative studies. Some recommendations on how to mitigate certain problems also emerged in this phase, primarily from MNOs and international NGOs.
Research was undertaken to solidify the evidence thus far accrued in a scientific manner showing that, ultimately, all seven endemic problems still affect governments internationally. The empirical study also analysed the relationship that endemic problems share with democratic particles and democratic associates.29 These findings were crucial
29 Democratic associates (taxation, trade, media, bureaucracy and military) are identified in APPENDIX A. They make up five areas which are prominent (to various degrees) in democratically aligned governments. They were analysed in the empirical work to ascertain their relationship to endemic problems and democratic particles (recalling the four: selection of officials, communication, law and equality). This
28 to completing the analytic framework, as it is now evident that endemic governance problems are present and are intertwined with the particles that make up the element of democracy. In this way, the conclusion that endemic problems are affecting democracy was reached and, by mitigating them, it may be possible to enhance democracy, thus improving governance overall.
The last area concerns Chapter 7, the prescriptive body of this thesis. Drawing from the literature, certain general suggestions were devised to help mitigate endemic problems.
The focus taken concerned the ‘real world’ applicability of each prescription, for example, how viable is it to implement a Super-Census or a Parliamentary Checklist? In this way, the author aspires to these suggestions being of future use as practical tools, which could enable governments, the plural citizenry, civil society or other bodies to engage the process of improving governance.
1.14 Breakdown of Historical Arguments
The method employed to maintain a clear thread throughout the chapters consisted of breaking chapters into sub-headings with each endemic problem as the topic. Although this risks some monotony, it nonetheless provides a clear delineation of the argument.
This trend is continued until the end of Chapter 4.
Democratic particles have a rich presence in human history. Various researchers
(Diamond, 1997, 2005) pinpoint the emergence of democratic attitudes in the earliest hominids. However, this evidence is generally presumptuous as the few modern ‘hidden’ tribes are used for comparison by anthropologists and may not truly represent the behaviour of our earliest ancestors—even as likely as it may seem. Yet, there are many historical periods (Athens, Rome, Italian city-states, revolutionary England, USA, and
France) which do offer a slew of facts regarding democratic particles and their relation to analysis provides greater evidence to see whether endemic problems affect democratic associates and not just democratic particles. However, this analysis is minor.
29 the seven endemic problems. The historical periods soon to be discussed were chosen due to the bounty of evidence they introduce, which maximises their contribution to the thesis.
Ancient Athenian democracy and the Roman Republic (Chapter 3) were collectively analysed. The evidence accrued by scrutinising corruption spurred on by unruly elites; the accountability and unrepresentative nature of socially unjust governance; constitutional, campaigning and transparency inefficiencies; as well as a lack of long- term goals compose the chapter. Chapter 3 establishes the classical nature of endemic problems, suggests areas of further research and offers brief comparative discussion relating to the modern period.
The revolutionary/constitutional eras of England, France and the United States of
America, and their commensurate, contemporary thinkers, are interesting to analyse as they were, and in the majority still are, the periods which defined the institutional practices of many modern democratic polities. For this reason, modern thinkers (such as
Rawls and Habermas) are included. Chapter 4 helps the reader to understand the current struggles with endemic problems that democracies are dealing with today due to its more recent historical focus including modern thinkers.
The importance of the contents of Chapter 4 is the establishment of research questions approached in the empirical analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. It also acts to complete the historical analysis. It is not an argument that this body of work is exhaustive and all inclusive.
Overall, with this discussion, precedence of the problems has been set. In other words, governance problems are shown to be endemic to each period. In a cumulative sense, they represent the lineage of the relevant issues and generally raise the question of why we are still trying to solve these ills after over two thousand years of trial and error.
30 It has become apparent that one answer is probably ‘due to the ever changing face of society’. There are few instances of societies remaining isolated and uninfluenced by other societies. The very act of immigration and accepting new citizens from different backgrounds, as well as the popularly celebrated notion of multiculturalism, impact democratic behaviour. Perhaps such ills could be dissipated, if a government and its society mutually agreed on a set of guidelines to mitigate governance problems to enhance democratic particles.
31 Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
If an historical pattern of problems with democracy is related to, or is the same as, or similar to modern problems with democratic theory and practice, then new methodologies to ratify these problems may improve democracy. Coupled with that are other research questions: What methods can mitigate those recurring problems in democracy? What way(s) would be the most beneficial? It would be misguided research to charge headlong into these queries without actually addressing the previous literature on the subject. Hence, to sensibly approach this literature review, a qualifier question has been developed: Is democracy really in need of change?
The purpose of this review is to answer that qualifying question so as to know whether or not the original research is:
(a) called for in academic literature;
(b) necessarily novel;
(c) feasible; and
(d) seen to have precedence.
It is important to investigate these areas to ascertain the worth of the thesis and to identify a gap. This will be done, firstly, by examining the sources used; secondly, by showing what is already known about the subject; thirdly, the chronology of the political historical analysis is undertaken; fourthly, describing the gap in knowledge which is being filled; fifthly, scrutinising whether a consensus exists regarding democratic reform; and sixthly, identifying the best direction for research.
32 2.2 Sources Used: A Discussion of Validity
The citations that are included in this document met several requirements and thus gave more of a contribution to the review than other sources that appear more obscure, too broad or too narrow. The requirements are that the sources chosen come from academics, from reputable publishers or journals, and are of high quality research.
The discourse of democratic reform is enigmatic. It can, at times, appear overwhelming in information or simply diminutive, due to the fact that ‘democratic reform’ is seldom addressed directly in a wholesale manner. In most instances, the notion of improving modern democracy, or a facet of it, is coupled with another area of scholarship. To illustrate, Ober (1996:5), while discussing the Athenian Revolution, links his work to elitism in modern democracies. Hansen (1991:310), whose work on Athenian democracy, often speaks to the future:
Willingness to take the initiative must be encouraged by rewards, but promoting private interests to the detriment of the common weal must be punished by the laws harshest penalties; (Hansen, 1991:310) and Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki’s (1975) work had the same coupling. They argued that situations which merit longer-term and greater foresight for the benefit of society often occur during a time when government is least able to provide this kind of an agreement due to a variety of reasons like decreasing governmental legitimacy.
Discussion is (in this last example) thus premised not on the area of reform, but on the duality of how reform is compromised by problems in government.
Another difficulty with this subject matter is that democratic theory as a whole has not, so far, been challenged in an academically researched manner. Sources, mostly journal articles, approach democratic reform with geopolitical boundaries, such as Fraser
(1990:56) who deals with the USA, or Bolleyer and Radaelli (2009) with the EU.
33 It is unclear why academia has not approached the task of challenging the institutional theory of democracy. Perhaps it is due to fragmented schools of thought (Habermasian critical theorists versus Rawlsian social/justice democrats versus contemporary Marxists, for example), a lack of agreement on a definition of democracy or a lack of primary research evidence to support literature-based calls for reform.
The fact is that during the past 200 years we have thought little about the institutional design of democracy. Since the great explosion of institutional thinking, when the present democratic institutions were invented – and they were invented – there has been almost no institutional creativity (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999:51).
This is the evident gap in the literature and will be discussed further on page 56.
However, it is apparent that most reform is pushed by magistracies and legislative bodies in government, NGOs and interest groups, but, so far, not academia. As Dunn and Uhr
(1993) argued, Australia has a Government Reform Commission; Przeworski, Stokes and Manin (1999) mention the Chilean Contraloria (a type of auditor-general) and, similarly, mention the World Bank as an acting auditor-general for many nations
(1999:50).
2.3 What is Known About the Subject?
If ‘subject’ means research work in the same area as my research plan, then much is available. However, the coming sections will show that whatever research or published materials related to this thesis are a fragmented body. This body often critiques but one aspect of the current institution of democracy, instead of questioning the long-standing problems that our ancestors also had to deal with. To demonstrate the validity of the previous statement, a detailed investigation of published literature and research in the discourse of democracy is found below.
All searches were completed with the equal use of the following keywords in various combinations: ‘democracy’, ‘reform’, ‘history’, ‘theory’, ‘problem’, ‘practical’ and
34 ‘resolution’. The words ‘corruption’, ‘representation’, ‘campaigning’, ‘accountability’,
‘transparency’, ‘constitutionalism’ and ‘long-term’ were seen in the former searches which began to strengthen evidence of endemic problems. Following this trend,
‘endemic’ ‘problems’ were then used as keywords, which revealed the fragmented academic works on democratic reform. Firstly, the use of any one of these words in conjunction with ‘democracy’ revealed further relevant material. For ‘corruption’,
Sung’s (2004) study applied a statistical examination using hierarchical polynomial regression which revealed that “intermediate” democracies have more corruption than
“advanced” or “consolidated” democracies. Rose-Ackerman (1999) takes a different approach,
I analyze the problem of corruption along four dimensions. The first takes the background organization of state and society and asks how corrupt incentives arise within public programs … The second recognizes that corruption has different meanings in different societies … The third approach considers how the basic structure of the public and private sectors produces or suppresses corruption … The final section of the book considers the difficult issue of achieving reform (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:4-5).
Two works add capitalism or economics into the democracy-corruption duality:
Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000), and Girling (1997). Both contribute to the statement that it is the marketplace with its rampant capitalism which is corrupting the public and political as well as social spheres. Additionally, Elliot (1997) and Johnston (1997) argue how free-market capitalism and privatisation help to eliminate corruption (Elliot,
1997:51) and “any assessment of the role of corruption in the world’s economies must also address its political dimensions” (Johnston, 1997:61).
Representation yielded Carpenter (1925) and Abrams (2002), as well as recalling
Przeworksi, Stokes and Manin (1999), O’Leary (2006) and Manin (1997). Campaigning offered Swanson and Mancini (1996), whilst accountability revealed Breton (1997) and
Zweifel (2006). Transparency brought about works centred on the European Union and on corruption. Finally, the search ‘democracy AND long-term’ or ‘long-term legislation’
35 or ‘long-term goals’ uncovered works related to democratisation (developing state democracy) and economic growth but, at this point, no work has identified the need for long-term legislation in ‘established’ democracies—nor the injection of long-term policies explicitly derived from the pluralist citizenry. ‘Democracy AND constitution’ yielded Dworkin (1999) as well as Cohen and Fung (1996), but the discussion concerning the relevancy of constitutions to the populations they are said to order is not evident.
Further investigation and advanced searches were run in databases using the keywords in the thesis statement to see if any research of this nature or of a similar nature was conducted, with results showing no matches.
Acknowledging that perhaps research of this nature would inherently run at longer lengths than most articles, physical and Internet-based searches of several libraries and
Internet engines have also yielded no results previously completed on this thesis topic.
However, it has shown that efforts of a similar nature have been undertaken. Holme and
Elliott (1988) presented essays presented at the Scarman seminar coordinated by the
‘Constitution Reform Center 1987-88’. They discuss whether “Britain’s constitution has changed and improved since those [Bill of Rights] 300 years ago.” Bradley (1989) continues to inform that Holme and Elliott (1988)
examine topics such as the enabling State, the dispersion of power, the redefinition of citizenship, the revitalization of democracy and the reform of government. In the process, they define an agenda for constitutional reform including devolution and decentralization, a Bill of Rights, electoral and parliamentary reform and freedom of information (Bradley, 1989:473).
Holme and Elliott’s (1988) work—albeit a survey of the British democratic system—is comparable in nature to the study conducted in this thesis. It targeted the whole of the
British constitution, whereas this thesis research will be targeting the endemic governance problems that were conceptualised from my abductive and deductive reasoning. It is rational to presume that other governance problems which may also be
36 endemic were missed. Should these other problems have been known, it would have also been difficult to include them as this would have caused the thesis to lose its depth.
Given that the problems included in this thesis are limited, it is the author’s argument that this line of investigation is sensible. Comparatively, Schwartzberg (2007) depicts similar methods. She examines ancient Athens, seventeenth century England, the United
States Constitution and post-war Germany in her effort to show the importance of legal change within democracies.
Continuing, D’uiso (1954), Wright (1970), Chadwick (1999), and Plamenatz’s (1973), have the same themes in common when comparing their works to the nature of this thesis: they address the reform of certain aspects of democracy, often in different time periods, but do not use empirical studies or address endemic problems collectively. To show more evidence of this, another area of concentration by academics, journalists and other thinkers related to democratic reform is foreign policy. Chomsky (2006) and Curtis
(2004) describe how American and British democracies (respectively) violate international human rights law and do not respond well to public opinion. Another critique of modern democracy, presented by Saul (1997), focuses on the reduction of the public sphere in democracy.
There are simply no current academic critiques of democratic institutionalism which were pervasive during the American, French and English revolutions as was seen in the reasoning of Keane’s (2009) work. Przeworski, Stokes and Manin (1999:51) were right when they wrote that in the “past 200 years we have thought little about the institutional design of democracy.”
The final effort to discover whether work of this nature had already been undertaken was by running the same key words through various search engines (including www.science.gov, a ‘deep-web’ database) on the Internet. Bresser-Pereira (2004)
37 showed the same tendency as most of the other works previously mentioned, in that he used historical sources to justify his critique of republican practice. Other sources on the
Internet were democracy-oriented organisations such as the United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED) and the World Movement for Democracy (WMD). These organisations offered a critique of practically every aspect of current democratically-styled government, but did not approach methods using the same analytical framework as the one contained in this thesis.
Beetham (1994) and other contributors to a European Consortium for Political Research argue that democracies can be defined by evaluating them based on scales or indices.
Beetham (1994:1) claims that the practice of evaluating democracies has a “pedigree” in political science and that Dhal’s (1971) work helped to spark this method.
Further support of Beetham’s argument comes in the form of a popular periodical, The
Economist. Every year this source conducts a survey of the world’s governments ranking those into three categories: democratic, semi-democratic, or non-democratic. The
Economist’s survey is based on sixty questions with three qualifying answers. It appears to be taken relatively seriously by academia (Nelson and Singh, 1988; Sung, 2004;
Stasavage, 2003). Further evidence of such efforts at consolidating a denotation of democracy comes from Diamond (1999), who writes at length on how to measure or compare democracies.
Bernstein (1993) defines democracy as “the absence of class government” (1993:140).
Some theorists and academics (Bohman and Rehg, 1999; Habermas, 2008; Hill, 2007) agree that democracy must ensure equality for all people under the law. Other writers
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Curran, 1997; Chomsky, 1985) argue that democracy requires consent and, through that, can logically be defined by cultural norms, but only if
38 the citizen body is sufficiently sovereign. As the empirical segment of this thesis will come to show, NGOs and MNOs argue that a democracy is something which should be grown out of a sovereign citizenry (the pluralist citizenry), rather than having an alien model imposed on a state.
Oakeshott (1994) defines two separate versions of democracy. The first is that a given society makes its government rule by a set of goals or purposes (1994:34-39). The second is that a government of a society has no rules but exists only to provide basic securities to ensure maximal freedom (1994:25-30). Some theorists (Paine, [1776] 1989;
Mill, [1859] 2004; Schumpeter, 1994) argue that democracy should be based on socialism, with the welfare-state and limited capitalism as its dogma. Others like Nozick
(2001) and Strauss (1999) argue to the contrary. Some prefer a more federalist style of democracy, some a more centralist. Is democracy simply the definition of any given society?
As formerly described in Chapter 1, those tenets (such as equality amongst all citizens and under the law, as well as protection from the majority and minorities (compromise law, or egalitarian law)) revolve around the larger ideas of pluralist sovereignty (the ability to change government through election or impeach during election; to lobby government through opinion polls or representatives; universal suffrage; approval of legitimate coercive force). Although a stable definition of democracy has not been attained, until now, as has been seen, there appears to be a certain degree of acceptance of a loose idea of democracy by combining several camps and viewpoints into one.
Delving deeper into what is known about the subject of democratic reform; Manin
(1997) contributed to the discourse with his survey, explanation and critique of representative democracy. He argues that, “modern usage, which classifies representative democracy as one type of democracy, when looked at closely has
39 uncertainties about this republican type” (1997:5). Additionally, Terchek and Conte
(2001) write that public office is the property of the citizenry and not the incumbents
(2001:xiii), whilst Martin (2007) believes that “it has been difficult to explain to power hungry bureaucrats that the best government may be a shift from centralized decision- making to market-place decision making” (2007:300). Manin (1997) describes the periods in which choosing people by ‘lot’ in governance were popular and why this institution receded, as he noted “Italian city-republics overcame factionalism by use of
‘voting by lot’” (1997:52) thus hinting to perhaps bringing a version of ‘lot’ back to modern times. He also shows that costs for running in an election have risen since the eighteenth century (1997:96) and that “political representation is experiencing a crisis” of representation issues.
Przeworski, Stokes and Manin (1999a) produce a string of criticism concerning democratically-styled governance. Their book, a collection of chapters by various authorities in the discourse offers much at first but is generally repetitive as all three editors were also chapter writers themselves. The first criticism deals with campaigning for election as special interests are exchanged for favours (1999a:35). The second, public impeachment of government, does not target the betrayal of promises (1999a:39).30 The third critique concerns shirking, clientalism and acting against the interests of the people
(1999a:41). Similarly, Fearon (1999) responds to the idea of paying politicians more to avoid shirking, by arguing that paying more would attract exactly the wrong types into government (1999:61). The fourth and last point depicts accountability in democratic treasuries with Przeworski, Stokes and Manin (1999a) quoting James Madison:
Hamilton argued in Federalist no. 70 that accountability is obscured under a plural, that is, cabinet executive:
30 Ferejohn (1999) tells how the United States’ democracy “opened-up” after 1967 with various concessions such as the Freedom of Information Act, the recording of minutes and their subsequent publishing, as well as easier monitoring by the public (1999:138-140). His arguments showed that the ability to make concessions is a facet of democracy.
40 But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the executive … is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility … The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that there are a number of actors who have different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin,1999a:47).
Przeworski, Stokes and Manin (1999a) continue to argue that the situation Hamilton described two hundred years ago is still quite the same problem today, especially in presidential systems. They divulge: “We need electoral institutions that enhance clarity of responsibility and make it easy for citizens to reward and punish those responsible.”
(1999a:50). These authors produced well over two hundred words of suggested improvements (admittedly, not researched in depth) which presents an example of the current reform gap in the discourse.
2.4 Chronology of the Development of Knowledge on the Subject
Qualifying that chronology, in this sense, refers to where in history scholarship has begun on the issue of democratic reform, a sensible place to begin is at the beginning of mankind. Diamond (1997) provides a well-argued stance on the origins of government.
He argues that pre-civilisation human bands, depending on their population size, were generally inclined to use discussion and deliberation (communication) when decision- making for the whole (1997:90). Diamond created a theory based on integrated archaeological and historical evidence of the behaviour of tribal people throughout
Polynesia (1997:63-64).31 Additionally, attention is given to Germanic tribes (Glassman,
1995:2, 1986) as well as the cantons (Landesgemeinde) of Switzerland for being democratic in nature (Elazar, 2001:199). Nevertheless, most historical research has been
31 What is of notable interest here is that Diamond’s (1997) archaeo-anthropological work can be utilized to suggest that democracy is in fact endemic to human nature. Whereas this thesis argues equality, communication, law, and the selection of officials as the four basic particles required for the pluralist citizenry to express their sovereignty (which is argued to be democracy); the same four particles can be found in early hominid social structure. It can be argued that early hominid bands had their own implicit or explicit definitions of equality, law, and the selection of officials. It is known that they communicated – with great emphasis put on egalitarian deliberation or nonviolent discussion.
41 based on ancient Athens, Republican Rome, republican city-states of Italy, constitutional revolutions of England, the United States of America and France, as well as ‘periods’ or
‘waves’ of democracy.
There is literature relating to ‘waves of democracy’ with reformist suggestions.
Huntington (1991) sparked this idea of democracy (Doorenspleet, 2000). Markoff
(1996:xii) explains that “waves of democracy [are] unusual in several important ways.”
He depicts democracy as continuously reinvented by social movements over two centuries and guesses at the future of democracy. His statement is thematically substantiated throughout the book and speculates on the future of democracy in a conservative manner.
Similar to Markoff’s (1996) work is Diamond’s (1999) who tries to consolidate a definition of democracy, but also explains the waves and ‘anti-waves’ of democratic government (1999) during the past two centuries.
The tentative conclusion … is that the third wave of expansion in electoral democracies is drawing to a close. The best that can be realistically hoped for in the next decade is the consolidation of many of the fifty or so electoral democracies that remain in a twilight zone of persistence without legitimation or institutionalization (Diamond, 1999:5).
He continues to argue that the consolidation of those fifty or so non-legitimate or pseudo-democracies must standardise with the rest of the globe’s democracies so as to prevent a third wave of anti-democracy and begin a fourth wave (Diamond, 1999:22).
The literature is divided into similar parts in this thesis, albeit focused solely on endemic problems. Chapter 3 of this thesis deals with ancient Athens and Republican Rome, whilst Chapter 4 deals with revolutionary France, England, United States of America and more modern political thinkers as a lead up to the empirical analysis in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6.
42 Dahl (1989:13) offers his thoughts on approaching research using this historical method.
He claims that from 500 to 0 BCE, an ideological transformation occurred between the
Greek and Romans, which he compares in importance to the invention of the wheel as it
“reflected a new understanding of the world and its possibilities.” In an unadorned description, Dahl (1989) writes that, somewhere along the historical timeline,
several city-states, which from time out of mind had been governed by various undemocratic rulers, whether aristocrats, oligarchs, monarchs, or tyrants, were transformed into systems in which a substantial number of free, adult males were entitled as citizens to participate directly in governing (Dahl, 1989:13).
This happening, and the corresponding knowledge, created “a new vision of a possible political system” where the people are sovereign and have dominion over government, resources and institutions. “This vision remains at the core of modern democratic ideas and continues to shape democratic institutions and practices” (Dahl, 1989:13).32
Conversely, and as can be recalled from Chapter 1, Girling (1997) has a similar view to
Dahl (1989) concerning the benefits of conducting an historical analysis. He argued that
“history can provide the organizing principle” (1997:152) which it did in the case of the seven governance problems. The literature (beginning with Aristotle, Plato and Plutarch) also had the effect of shaping the perspective of democracy as depicted in Chapter 1 and which is thematically present in this thesis. Ultimately, the ‘elemental’ view of democracy lends a universal applicability to the results held in this work. Just as the variety of authors, already discussed, helped to shape an understanding of endemic problems, so, too, did historical texts shape the view of democracy.
32 It should be reminded that Dahl’s insistence on the invention of democracy in ancient Athens is not correct. See Keane (2009) for further information.
43 2.5 Ancient Athens and Republic of Rome
Beginning in Athens, information was drawn from both primary and secondary sources.
There is evidence that other poleis33 in Greece had democratic systems during Athenian hegemony. Syracuse, Mantineia and Khios all held forms of limited democracy (Sinclair,
1988:218-219; Keane, 2009). Subordinates to the Athenian Empire were also persuaded to introduce democracy as their political systems (Rhodes, 2003:18).
Philosophers such as Aristotle staunchly believed that some men were meant to rule and others meant to serve. He was also a common critic of democracy and did not favour rule by the masses, as commoners were not intelligent enough to govern themselves
(1962:25-29).
There is a conflict in the literature regarding the problem of elitism in Athenian-styled democracy between Farrar (1988) and Ober (1996). Whereas Farrar (1988:123) believes elitism to be a greater threat, Ober (1996) details the functions of the assembly and how certain aspects of it worked to stifle any elitism (1996:27-28). This conflict is an example of others that arise due to the fact that Athenian and Roman histories are based primarily on second-hand accounts, legend or piecemeal archaeological information.
With this in mind, continuing the effort of synthesising materials (that is, not to take the word of one well-researched piece of information if another presents different information) was tedious. One exception is the Keane (2009) work which only concerns the aspect that Athens did not invent democracy. The evidence in his work is incontrovertible as it draws from Linear B text derived from Mycenae and dated to an earlier era considerably before the rise of the Athenian democratic state.
In that vein, there are some indices of agreed upon problems within Athenian democracy. Woodruff (2005) states that a,
33 Poleis (plr) is the Greek word for cities. It may also refer to polity. Polis is the singular form.
44 convicted criminal with the means to do so often corrupted their guards. After Socrates was convicted and sentenced to death, most people expected that he would allow his rich friends to buy his way out (Woodruff, 2005:119).
Coupled with this evidence is Sinclair’s (1988) work which describes bribery, corruption and elitism in Athenian government. He lists which areas of Athenian government were weakest.
The problems with which most Athenians dealt were bribery, elitism, corruption, attempts at dictatorship (undermining democracy), trying to involve the public sphere and external military threats. Evidence supporting these claims involve Ober’s (1999:24) statement concerning elitism that as most people consider themselves democrats today we nonetheless consider an established elite as a fact, Pericles “stressed the need for ‘the majority not to leave matters in the hands of the talkers, but to offer the best advice themselves’” (Sinclair, 1988:xi) and that it was crucial that the democracy of the
Athenian polis maintain a level of high citizen participation (Sinclair, 1988:65).
Furthermore, Hansen (1991) argues that those citizens willing to act by their own initiative should be rewarded for their efforts so long as they are not promoting their own interests over the common will which is something that “should be punished by the laws harshest penalties” (Hansen, 1991:310).
Republican Rome, like ancient Athens, had similar deficiencies. According to Matyszak
(2003), the finances of Rome were often a problem: at around 218 BCE contractors
(publicani) stole resources from public works causing “scandal in Rome” (2003:94).
Family related factionalism (similar to modern partisan political divides) was a major issue in Rome as Le Glay et al. (1991) evince; especially in the latter part of the republic, politics in Rome became a dangerous job. If different political factions had problems with each other, it often resulted in violence. Men being stoned to death or even slain in the streets was not uncommon for the times (1991:125-126).
45 Matyszak’s survey of Republican Rome also documented the ongoing civil strife between patricians and plebeians. The Roman’s answer, under Marcus Furius Camillus, sought to resolve civil divide by forcing the senate to accept legislation mandating that the consulship would, henceforth, be shared by patricians and plebeians (Matyszak,
2003:68). This act, in fact, increased the power of the plebeians to a certain degree
(depending on the political leanings of a plebeian consul) and certainly lowered the influence of the aristocracy. The plebeian/patrician divide is an example of unintended long-term consequences in government.
Polybius ([c 140 BCE] 1979) discusses the dealings of Rome in a positive manner. His life spanned between 200-118 BCE, much before the crises that accompanied Sullus and
Caesar, and he was from the upper-class (Walbank, 1972). Writing about the aristocratic domination of the senate and their responsibilities, he also described the power of the plebeian assembly and how both were dependent on each other (Polybius, [c 140 BCE]
1979:313). He (1979) and Livy ([5 BCE] 1919; Oakley, 2008) give positive biases toward
Rome, whilst other modern scholars (Matyszak, 2003; Yakobson, 1999; Masson, 1973) removed from ancient Rome can, at times, exhibit negative biases and tones.
When dealing with heavy bias, how can an historian be ‘in the right’? Dealing objectively with material is a matter unto itself. The only answer, conceivable to the ebb and flow of information emanating from ancient Rome, is recognising that the periods encompassed were massive and that historians are forced to broaden their understanding of Rome by generalising. It is hard to simplify certain periods in history, especially with
Rome, as information is often missing. However, taking into view certain surviving first- hand accounts from Polybius or Livy, it is possible to gain perhaps not a better understanding (as those writers were of a different socio-economic group) but the need to be aware of generalising periods where there is missing information through over- dependency on such texts. Previous historians (Machiavelli, [c.1520] 2003; Barnes and
46 Miriam, 1999) have at times exhibited possibly unjustified biases due to putting too much emphasis on historical periods with scanty information.
2.6 Italian City-State Republics
The chronology of democratic reform continues with the Renaissance, especially the city-state republics of Italy. Recalling the previous acknowledgment of how scholars often remark on modern democratic problems by drawing from a particular historical or geo-political work, the Renaissance era Italian city-state republics contribute to this style of scholarship. O’Leary (2006) comments,
… the Romans and the Italian city-states had two goals. The first was to create a system in which the people had a voice. The second was to divide the state’s power among people and groups in order to keep a single individual from acquiring too much power (O’Leary, 2006:37).
Hall (1994) shows how Italian republics drew upon Roman history for an idea of how to manage their governments. He argues that the equilibrium of the state was a dynamic affair and that shifts in power typically followed Polybius’ model of “monarchy to monarchy via aristocracy and democracy” (Hall, 1994:534). However, Hall (1994) grants that the Renaissance Italians’ implementation of Roman practices were impractical. He argued that the Italian city-state model did not fit the Polybian system but rather went “monarchy-democracy-aristocracy-monarchy instead” (Hall, 1994:534).
His argument is supported, as Monahan (1987) describes
city-states, specifically the current Italian republican models, did exist in the thirteenth century, the period of greatest flowering of medieval political thought and activity. Scarcity of date, however, makes it difficult to be specific about the actual evolution of these interesting and vigorous medieval polities (Monahan, 1987:151).
2.7 Britain, Revolution Era
Dumont (2007) argued that, during the French Revolution, what was needed was a precept to democracy such as Britain’s constitutional success since 1688 (2007:2).
Although France ended up adopting more advice from across the Atlantic with the, then,
47 new United States, Britain’s history, beginning with the Magna Carta, restarted the tradition of opening political power to greater numbers (such as was effected in Athens,
Rome, tenth century Spain, the assemblies of Islam and Swiss cantons).34
Britain was the site of democracy’s comeback or rebirth in the world. Laid aside during the Dark Ages for monarchic, oligarchic or aristocratic governments, it took the Magna
Carta and a British Constitution for democracy to gain prominence. However, the
English added a twist, in the form of bringing representatives to the democratic system.
For example, James Mill ([1837] 1992) recognised the futility of the Greek system, as citizens (men of a certain status) needed to work and that keeping corruption out of a large direct democracy was too difficult.
Mill’s ([1837] 1992) work helped shape British representative democracy. He believed
“… that the concern of government … its business is to increase to the utmost pleasures, and diminish to the utmost the pains, which men derive from one another” ([1837]
1992:4). Mill also felt that no man should ever have authority over another which is why, he contends, government is formed ([1837] 1992:4). Thus, it is surmisable that government is society’s elected authority, as order is necessary for society to function.
Mill’s ([1837] 1992) writings came during the Industrial Revolution. He argued that creating the condition for full labour was an utmost necessity ([1837] 1992:5) and that
all the difficult questions of government relate to the means of restraining those in whose hands are lodged the powers necessary for the protection of all, from making bad use of it (Mill, [1837] 1992:6).
Mill’s thoughts, procured in part from his mentor, Jeremy Bentham, and the volatile nature of English society at the time, made arguments about how representative democracy is more practical than a direct system ([1837] 1992:8).
34 See Keane (2009) for further information.
48 Evidence suggests that it was not liberalism which was first to come out of the regime shift in England, but, rather, a distrusting and tempered conservatism initiated by
Machiavelli, followed by Hobbes and popularised by Burke. To further illustrate the uncertainty of exactly when British democracy began, Dellamora (2006) suggests that it commenced during the Victorian era and after men’s universal suffrage.
Problems of the state could be traced back to Athens, as Mill ([1837] 1992) showed earlier. Ideas of representation, private versus public interest, liberalism, conservatism and a response to the harsher aspects of the industrial revolution through social reform were prevalent.
2.8 France, Revolution Era
Considered a country which developed its own style of democracy (as are the United
States of America and Britain), French political thought was influenced by thinkers across the Channel and vice versa. French theorists also came to scrutinise the emerging
American government, as did the English. Hence it could be reasonably argued that, since the 1770s, a triangle of information diffusion began in the Atlantic culminating in the predominance of representative-styled democracy.
French political contributions to democracy are generally ascribed to observations of
American and English societies, but also stem from French society and the hard lessons learned from the French Revolution. A notable thinker is Montesquieu ([1748] 1914).
From France, he was an avid commentator on the British revolution and influenced the
American constitution and French Revolution. Of value to pondering democracy in a different light, would be his emphasis on geography and culture in relation to government. Montesquieu refers to this as the ‘esprit generale’ (1914:9). He argues that law (and, by extension, government) should be based on reason, should be adapted to the
49 people over which it is framed and, ultimately, that it should be reflect all aspects of a country and its people.
This argument can be applied to the observation that perhaps democracy is not the best form of government because not all nations develop in the same manner or with the ideology as the West. That point of view held water during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but is less credible at the present as the world’s countries, whether
‘democratic’ or not, have the element of democracy present. However, the present developing or ‘newer’ democracies were largely former colonies of the West. Perhaps, as Montesquieu might argue if he were alive today, the West destroyed or severely limited the progress of the governments which they occupied and impeded the democratic development of those countries.
Tocqueville, on the French Revolution (taken from the beginning of Palmer, 1959), exemplifies how a shift in dominant, political paradigms can affect a country or society.
When we look away from those accidental features which modified its appearance at different times and in various countries, and consider the Revolution only in itself, we see clearly that its effect was simply to abolish those political institutions which had prevailed for centuries among most European peoples (Palmer, 1959:ii).
The French Revolution was an effort to destroy the feudal and aristocratic governing methods of the past.
Although Francis Fukuyama (1989:108) associates the Battle of Jena and the victory of
French Revolution ideals as the end of history (a widely contentious claim), there is much more to the emergence of democracy in France than a victory of ideals in a decisive battle. It took over half a century for France to establish a constitution that could withstand major challenges but its impact did not last long as the anti-democratic response of the Great War emerged to establish Fascism, hard-line Nationalism and communism for the next half-century. It is in the period of constitutional struggle that
50 much can be learned about endemic problems and how France, and other societies, engaged them.
2.9 United States of America, Revolution Era
Downes (2002:39) describes American democracy as beginning with the metaphorical regicide of King George III, whilst Wiebe (1995:4) offers linkages to the present by discussing how “the few expounded the issues and the many listened” during the revolution and stated that perhaps, as Harbermas presupposed, such is still ongoing.
Palmer (1959:3-7) writes of how a period of forty years (1760-1800), centred around the
French Revolution, saw revolutionary behaviour take place all over Europe, and from
Quebec down to Brazil, with people toasting the French Revolution and liberty. He argues that this was a ‘Democratic Revolution’ and includes the Americans as viewing the French with disdain (indicating his preference for the American impact on liberty and the republican tradition). However, Tocqueville (a French national) elaborates on the potential dangers in the American system concerning the tyranny of public opinion, the rise of individualism at the expense of the family and community and the cultivation of a sense of political apathy (Tocqueville, 1839:8, 46, 86, 175).
Adams and Dyson (2003) explain that
democracies induce an overriding preoccupation with, and a large degree of anxiety about, the self and one’s immediate family. In practical terms, this preoccupation manifests itself in a passion for material goods and success to the exclusion of communal or social concerns (Adams and Dyson, 2003:132).
Once times of turmoil have passed, they continue to argue, a mentality of complacency takes hold of individuals and things are “left to the politicians” to create an “anonymous government.” They end by arguing that a political formula where citizens are not engaging politics by entrusting “themselves without thought or interest” to
51 representatives is a “new kind of despotism” which undermines “the very desire for liberty” (Adams and Dyson, 2003:132).
Patterson (2003) explains American constitutional issues in an effort to reveal the effect that certain events have had on the American democratic system. Edling (2003) supported the notion that the United States Constitution was based on creating a nation- state that could defend America’s interests from Europe. Arendt (1990) agreed with this when she stated:
Clearly, the true objective of the American Constitution was not to limit power but to create more power, actually to establish and duly constitute an entirely new power center, destined to compensate the federal republic, whose authority was to be exerted over a large, expanding territory, for the power lost through the separation of the colonies from the English Crown (Arendt, 1990:154).
Because these texts are broad the analysis of endemic problems in American constitutional times is assisted by reading texts from the ‘Founding Fathers’ (Hamilton et al., 2005).
2.10 Third Wave Democracy
After the Second World War, the explosion of post-colonial states emerging into being, as well as the creation of states such as Israel, amounted to a ‘wave’—or third wave—of democracy crashing over the world. This style of democracy was based mainly on western models (be it Westminster, French or American derivations) and many democracies (such as those termed to be ‘developing’) are still trying to ‘consolidate’ their governments. Setbacks include coup d’états, crippling debts, foreign pressure, war and, most likely, an inappropriate understanding, as well as model, of democracy. This phenomenon will not be examined in this thesis but, by scrutinising Huntington’s (1991) theories, endemic problems could reasonably be seen in each wave.
52 2.11 The Modern Period
This period of democratic reform—that is information regarding the present state of affairs—has its critics. Wiebe (1995) writes, with relevance to the American government, that:
most proposals [for reform] seek to compensate for deficiencies in the general public: stronger political parties because ordinary citizens need focus and leadership; limits on campaign spending because voters are defenseless against soundbite propaganda; mandated rights because the weak need protection against the strong, minorities against majorities (Wiebe, 1995:3-4).
He states that electoral politics are dominated by media and money. Wiebe also observes that the ballot system confuses voters, who avoid or perhaps do not understand real issues. Citizens, Wiebe (1995:3-4) claims, are too ignorant to participate effectively in current American politics.
Why has it been nearly two centuries since a scholar or group of scholars questioned democracy as a whole? Certain political theorists like Arendt, Popper, Oakeshott,
Marcuse, Rawls, Dahl, Naess and Lyotard approach a substantial rethinking of areas related to or often having direct bearing on democracy. Yet, out of this list, governance and democracy are generally thought upon in fragmented ways depending on the thinker’s ontology.
Arendt (1990, 1993) argues the importance of politics in an attack on the manipulative lullaby consumerism and an overly comfortable, hedonistic lifestyle of decadence which many Westerners live.
Although influenced by her existentialist mentors, this was a matter of method rather than content. It gave Arendt an approach to politics very different from the prevailing traditions of political thought. She sought to understand the nature of political experience ‘from the inside’ rather than construct an external ‘objective’ theory of how it all works (Adams and Dyson, 2003:188).
Arendt (1990, 1993) depicts in her work the sound belief that action, or participation
(and the availability to participate) in politics, is of importance to democracy.
53 D’Entrève (1994:64) explains that Arendt was able to create an idea of politics which
“questions meaning, identity and value”. Arendt was further able to view the actions of humans as forms of social fabric and to view democracy as something based on participation, on action, and not the complacency which gives further power to elites, which D’Entrève (1994:64) believed to be “so characteristic of the modern epoch.”
Comparatively, Adams and Dyson (2003) criticize Arendt:
the reason that Arendt grants this high status to politics is that she sees it as creating the framework that gives meaning and purpose to all the rest. However, the mistake of most theorists is … to treat politics as a form of work. That is, in terms of designing and creating permanent structures that supposedly ‘fit’ human nature (Adams and Dyson, 2003:189).
D’Entrève (1994) returns the salvo, reasoning that Arendt’s vision of citizenship is tangible and not entirely linked as a construct of ‘human nature’ by way of “(1) the public sphere; (2) political agency and collective identity; and (3) political culture”
(1994:139). There are themes of egalitarianism, feminism, representation and communication in her work which are related to democracy. It is more useful to regard her work as offering an alternative to the current constructs of governance, rather than dismissing it as another ‘theory’.
D’Entrève (1994:139) finishes by describing that many of Arendt’s views are important for democratic theory as they can be used to inform several different conceptualisations of democracy and citizenship such as participatory and egalitarian. He feels that this point explains Arendt’s arguments concerning the role of the individual in political life.
Arendt’s political theory regards political history in relation to modern times. Her ideology can be related to “Ancient Greek political thought and practice, especially
Greek citizens participating in the affairs of the city-state” (Adams and Dyson,
2003:189-190). However, she took a specific focus on the republican practices of pre- imperial Rome, known as “Classical Republicanism” (Adams and Dyson, 2003:189-
54 190), “which stressed unity and patriotism and saw the ‘public space’ as an arena of competition to serve the public good” (Adams and Dyson, 2003:189-190).
This particular
tradition of thought was revived in the Renaissance and influenced thinkers like Machiavelli, Harrington and the American and French Revolutionaries, though it rather died out in the nineteenth century (Adams and Dyson, 2003:189-190).
Lastly, Arendt argued that it is a necessity for individuals to engage more in political life and to recognise that the public sphere is something that needs to be nurtured to ensure its future (Adams and Dyson, 2003:190).
Adams and Dyson (2003:190) state that the tradition of republicanism “rather died out in the nineteenth century”. It is not certain whether republicanism (in the sense of classical
Rome) is best used to depict a lifestyle of politics as the comitias35 of Rome were not particularly inclusive. True, the plebeian committee held much power, but that was probably a political trick used by the consuls and senators to sway the masses or override other comitias. However, Arendt’s view of republicanism during the American and
French Revolutions is useful to depict a lifestyle of politics. Both countries were subjected to war and violence, but the key is that many people were involved in the political issues of their time.
Tocqueville (1848) predicted that political will would decline into a borderline obsession with the individual and materialism. Although considering democracy as a necessary evil
(1848:202), he wrote of the dangers to democracy well over a century before Arendt
(1990, 1993) began her work. How can something mitigate this apolitical lullaby? The answer, in one opinion, lies in political education (J. Mill, [1837] 1992; J. S. Mill, 1861).
Some political theorists (Arendt, 1990; Oakeshott, 1951; Gramsci, [1925-1939] 1987,
35 Comitias or committees, were political power bodies (a form of representation based on wealth and title) during the Roman republic.
55 1992; and Wollstonecraft, 1792) emphasize the need to educate the masses in politics.
Most say this to lend credibility to their vision of the future (for example, utilitarians, socialists and communists) but others, like liberals advocating democracy, emphasize education as well (Paine [1776] 1989; Popper 2003, 1971; and Rawls, 1999).
2.12 The Gap in Knowledge?
As has been alluded to in the beginning of this literature review, there is a gap of knowledge in the specific area of primary research for democratic reform based on a survey of historical problems and resolutions, which are arguably the ancestors to the same modern democratic problems. There is sufficient evidence to piece together many problems and resolutions in historical democracies, although no academic or other body has conducted a survey in the same manner as the line of investigation taken in this thesis. Yet, that is only a crack, not so much a gap. The hole that presents itself relates to primary research; that is, qualitative and quantitative investigation spring-boarding from a theoretical, historical, political analysis derived from a unique perspective of endemic problems and democracy.
The gap presented during this literature review allowed for the formation of a specific analytic framework. As has been discussed, a perspective of democracy and its four particles, as well as seven problems endemic to governance, have taken shape thus far.
These two concepts form the backbone of the analytic framework that underlies this thesis.
Investigating classic political theorists like Arendt, Paine, Mill (both), as well as more contemporary thinkers (Dahl, Ober, Rawls, Fukuyama, Habermas) and mining NGO as well as MNO publications (UNDEF, International IDEA, Transparency International,
EU) began to solidify an understanding of endemic problems. The same sought after seven themes kept reoccurring during various readings to the extent that the phenomenon
56 formed an argument. It was reading Wood (1988), Ober (1989) and Rhodes (2000) which initially prompted the want of a historical review, as the problems which were read about from more contemporary thinkers were also being discussed by historians.
The importance of using history as a database of evidence (in order to effectively argue the need of mitigating the problems) became quickly visible.36
During the empirical analysis, the notion of practicality and usability which Adams and
Dyson (2003) view as not being effectively present or utilised in political science gained ground. It served mainly to bridge the divide between academia and the professional democratisation realm, to gain a reproducible sense of whether or not theoretical problems were actually affecting present governments. If endemic problems were shown to still be present in modern governments, there would be greater need for their practical mitigation.
The mitigation of the endemic problems is another positive step to filling the democratic reform gap. Two examples include long-term goals (or a lack thereof) in the government apparatus, as well as a new tool to improve parliamentary practices. Both are proposed in
Chapter 7 (pages 253 and 257 respectively).
2.13 Consensus on the Relevant Issues?
There is a consensus in the literature that governments (mainly democracies) are capable, or in need, of reform. However, the debate arises concerning the nature of reform.
Dryzek, Honing and Philips (2006) highlight some of these divisions:
For much of the twentieth century, democracy was conceptualized as a matter of universal suffrage, competitive party elections, and the rule of law (Dryzek, Honing and Philips, 2006:32).
To contrast this statement, Arneson (2006) writes “political liberalism affirms that a society that avoids sectarianism satisfies a liberal ideal of legitimacy” (2006:49). Dryzek,
36 As discussed concerning Girling, Rosanvallon and Adams.
57 Honing, and Philips (2006) write of competitive party politics (partisanship, sectarianism), as well as universal suffrage (liberal practice), whilst Arneson brings forth
Rawlsian liberal/justice theory that denounces sectarianism (partisan politics) and boasts liberalism. This comparison exemplifies how some styles of democracy (as with democratic reform) may share consensus on certain aspects but differ on others.
The largest divide in democratic reform, or perhaps the direction of democratic evolution, is the current neo-conservative/neo-liberal (capitalist) versus social democrat
(often portrayed as ‘nanny-state’) schism. Koelble (1991) shows the European capitalist versus social democrat battle from the 1970s onwards in his study, trying to explain why social democracy staged a ‘comeback’. “Marxists, liberals, and conservatives agreed that social democracy was at an impasse” and it took much ‘ruining’ of the social state in the
1970s for the electoral body to weaken capitalist tendencies in Europe (Koelble, 1991:1).
Additionally, Wiebe (1995) argues
Perhaps the individual’s freedom is being frustrated, as the philosopher Robert Nozick and legal theorist Roberto Mangabeira Unger might agree; or social justice is being denied, as the consumer’s champion Ralph Nader and the political commentator Kevin Philips would argue…(Wiebe, 1995:3).
Out of these two camps, the literature generally stands by Habermasian-Rawlsian perspectives (which are mostly based on justice, social necessity, neo-Marxist and critical theory analysis) somewhat versus the Chicago School of Economics program with Robert Nozick (aligned with individual rights, neo-conservative/neo-liberal ideals, free-market capitalism and avoiding the ‘nanny state’). Those are both somewhat mediated by classicists following Locke (private property liberalism) or Burke (moderate progress, traditional conservatism) which can be viewed as precursors of the Third Way.
It is evident that the Cold War arguments of traditional Marxism, Trotskyism, Leninism,
Stalinism and, to a certain degree, Communism are practically non-existent in accepted journal publications concerning the discussion of democratic reform.
58 2.14 Most Fruitful Direction of the Research?
Works of the most similar nature to this thesis constitute O’Leary (2006), Elazar (2001),
Bresser-Pereira (2004), D’uiso (1954), Dunn (2006), Plamenatz (1973), Girling, (1997),
Holme and Elliot (1988) and Heater (2004), which all employ a method of historical analysis to reason for modern change. Examples from these works provide support for the research plan and line of primary investigation in this thesis have support.. O’Leary
(2006:38) describes how James Madison “believed he had solved the major problem facing republican government”, which was corruption. It is claimed that Madison
failed to think about the long-term consequences of citizens being less effective and officials more remote in large democracies [here he speaks critically of the American democracy] (O’Leary, 2006:38).
Elazar (2001:x) demonstrates growing concern with the distortions of democracy in contemporary Swiss society. He considers himself a democrat and a friend of democracy, but a sober one, and he is prepared to look at democracy “warts and all” (in the words of Oliver Cromwell and Abraham Lincoln) in the hope that he may eliminate those ‘warts’.
Bresser-Pereira (2004:1, 8) argued, when referring to Britain, Australia, France, New
Zealand, the United States of America and Sweden, that “political institutions change … fast”. This change is occurring due to the rapidly modifying natures of human society.
New forms of democratic governance and public management are consistently occurring because states need new methods to order society.
This style of work (the O’Leary, Elazar and Bresser-Pereira examples, looking at democracy from a more comprehensive stance) continues throughout the abovementioned literature, as well as in previously discussed published materials. Thus, it is evident that the most fruitful direction of research as the result of this literature review is to canvas historical, democratic periods (see Chronology of the Development of Knowledge on the Subject, page 41) so as to analyse and document government
59 problems. As has so far been seen, answers are most often not found in the historical solutions to many modern democratic problems but, moreover, historical lessons teach what avenues have been fruitful and which have been disastrous. Perhaps some utility can be generated for policy making if the empirical research in this body of work answers the research questions derived from the historical analysis.
The direction for research, indicated by published material, is to pursue the identification of governance problems and try to offer practical methods whereby they may be mitigated. This problem-resolution pattern became evident whilst examining works from
Plamenatz (1973), D’uiso (1954), Woodruff (2005), Holme and Elliot (1988), and
UNRISD’s 2000-2005 study.
It is not the specific directionality of their work, but rather the nature of it (i.e. drawing upon historical evidence related to democracy in order to substantiate modern claims for improvement). Holme and Elliot (1988), as well as UNRISD (2000-2005), incorporate a synthesis of modern documentation but, again, over a substantial period of time, as long as the historical investigation they use is relevant to their specific line of inquiry.
O’Leary’s (2006) work has no primary research element but, instead, develops a balanced argument by combining modern literature and arguing that most ills in
American democracy are corruption-based.
2.15 Conclusion
Henceforth, with evidence supporting this style of investigation, literature analysis and research, it is knowledgably reassured that this thesis is of academic nature, has precedence, is practical and can yield optimal results for the improvement of governance.
60 The literature review has shown that this thesis is pertinent due to the gap it is helping to fill. In the process of showing the gap, it became evident that the work undertaken has not been done before, but that there is a history of publications using similar methodologies, only in a more piecemeal and less practical manner. Due to the history of works using the same or similar theoretical research methodologies as the one used in the historical review of this thesis, it shows that the goals in this thesis are feasible and able to be completed. Finally, throughout the literature review, a volume of works established precedence regarding the theoretical and empirical framework used in this thesis.
This was done, firstly, by examining the types of sources investigated; secondly, inspecting what is known about democratic reform; thirdly, explaining the chronology of the development of knowledge regarding democratic reform; fourthly, by scrutinising the gap of knowledge through identifying how the gap became open and how it can be bridged; fifthly, evincing whether a consensus or debate exists concerning relevant issues; and, sixthly, arguing about the most fruitful direction of research and how this was indicated by previous publications.
61 Chapter 3: CLASSICAL DEMOCRACY
3.1 Introduction
The following will discuss endemic problems in ancient Greece and the Republic of
Rome. These two periods were selected due to the abundance of available evidence concerning their polities. Furthermore, both polities also influenced modern politics to a notable degree through the evolution of democratic styles Greco-Roman polities inspired.
Greece is famously known as the cradle of democracy, although its fifth century BCE claim of inventing it is now shown to be false.37 Athens, in particular, holds that recognition. Scholarly discussions of the Athenian polis have such themes as democracy, citizenship, empire and society at the heart of their documents. There is also evidence that other poleis in Greece had democratic systems during Athenian hegemony.
Syracuse, Mantineia and Khios all held forms of limited democracy (Sinclair, 1988:218-
219) and subordinates to the Athenian Empire were convinced to introduce democracy as their political system (Rhodes, 2003: 18). However, it is the Athenian government that appears most, as it often relates to contemporary matters. The Athenians shared many of the same problems which modern countries face today and it is crucial to make the connection of past and present so that the burden of mitigating these problems is lessened.
The period encompassing the Republic of Rome runs from 750 BCE to around 30 BCE, depending on which account is read (Harl, 2008; Smith, 1955; Dillon and Garland,
2005). When compared to the government of ancient Athens, Rome was a giant. Its size
37 Keane (2009:xi) explains: “The lamp of assembly-based democracy was first lit in the ‘East’, in lands that geographically correspond to contemporary Syria, Iraq and Iran. The custom of popular self- government was later transported eastwards, towards the Indian subcontinent where sometime after 1500 BCE, in the early Vedic period, republics governed by assemblies became common. The custom also travelled westwards, first to Phoenician cities like Byblos and Sidon, then to Athens, where during the fifth century BCE it was claimed as something unique to the West, as a sign of its superiority over the ‘barbarism’ of the East.”
62 created a shift of focus from the polis itself to a larger picture of the state and of a belligerent citizenry. There are themes of violence, factionalism and administration which came out of this new focus. The discussions resulting from these themes raised a few questions for future research and revealed further evidence of endemic governance problems.
The Roman republic is significant as it holds a variety of lessons to be learned which are relevant to modern governance. Evidence suggests that the Republic of Rome was a source that Europe and North America drew from which reveals a connection through time. It is, moreover, significant as a logical connection to Chapter 4, since England,
France and the United States of America all drew from classic Roman texts during their constitutional/revolutionary periods.
The following will look at endemic problems found in Athens and Rome, how they tried to resolve them, and what can be learned from their efforts. Endemic problems will act as subheadings with historical evidence drawn from both empires to exemplify the presence of the aforementioned problems. The areas discussed are corruption, accountability, transparency, representation, campaigning methods, constitutional issues and a lack of long term goals.
3.2 Corruption
If compared with the modern standard, Roman politicians were easy to corrupt, as there were no normative regulations to safeguard the people against interested parties for most of the republican era. Still, evidence suggests that there were some actions taken by politicians to curb corruption.
Pompey’s vigorous action against electoral corruption in 52 [BCE] is also said to have provoked popular resentment … this may have been another instance of the view that bribery is something that happens to someone else, in your case it is a matter of perfectly good gifts (Yakobson, 1999:30, quoting Lintott, 1990:14; Brennan 2004:48).
63 Lintott (1990:2) reveals that an “increase of wealth, especially landholdings” and the wants among the poor created a rise in violence which created conditions whereby
“might became the measure of right; legislation was promoted by force; while consuls and tribunes undermined the constitution by riots.” Taxes were taken by force, “the people put their support up for sale and bribery brought the death of the city.” He continues to provide more evidence concerning the nature of Roman and Carthaginian corruption (Lintott, 1990:3) although his main source, Polybius, is said to have provided out-of-date evidence concerning capital punishment for bribery in Rome.
Crook and Rawson (1994) take Lintott’s (1990) point and depict the way in which some
Roman writers viewed corruption and the downfall of the republic. They argued that
Rome succumbed to endemic problems such as corruption and a lack of accountability as there was no longer any polity that could keep Rome’s ambitions in check, like Carthage before its destruction at the end of the Punic Wars. Issues of regarding constitutional problems and representation are also present in Crook and Rawson’s (1994:7) work.
It is evident that, although corruption in modern terminology was present in both public and private spheres, it was not regarded well by at least a few politicians and writers.
Lintott (1990, 2003) argued that, according to Polybius, there may have been a capital punishment law for bribery (in this sense, Hellenistic) and the attestation of laws against bribery from candidates (interestingly, not to them) as shown by Brennan (2004:48): he argued that despite laws preventing illicit activities in public offices, Roman magistrates were “highly skilled at finding the loopholes” (Brennan, 2004:47). It came to the point where the evidence suggests that magistrates were difficult to call for account near the end of the Republic “especially if they were well connected” (Brennan, 2004:47).
Politicians, then, may have held a greater ability to shirk, as Brennan (2004) further indicates:
64 the question of how much power should reside in the hands of individual magistrates in relation to central governing bodies is obviously central to any constitution, written or not (Brennan, 2004:55).
Coupled with this evidence is Sinclair (1988), who provides support related to bribery, corruption and elitism in Athenian government. He generates speculation on several names or positions that would have been easy to corrupt. Sinclair lists, throughout his book, which areas of Athenian government were problematic. Bribery of politicians with less affluent backgrounds, corruption of jurors, as well as canvassing and bribing members of the assembly during a party or group meeting were among them (Sinclair,
1988:45, 70, 121). He gives one strong example:
It is a commonplace in the orators that men make money out of office (arkhe) and out of public life (politaia), and Aistophanes’ depiction of demagogues like Kleon, bloated with the proceeds of embezzlement and with bribes from allies and foreign states, is well known (Sinclair, 1988:179).
Furthermore, he takes time to detail the penalties of being convicted of accepting a bribe or for corrupting the democracy of the polis. They ranged from repaying the bribe itself, repaying it tenfold, exile, and even death (Sinclair, 1988:174-5).
3.3 Accountability
The issue of accountability in Athens and Rome concerns the power held by elitists and the increasing desire of such to be distributed wider, whether it was well-off citizens of
Athens or the plebeians of Rome making that call.
Athenian governance changed considerably from Drakon and Solon to Cleisthenes and
Ephialtes of Athens (Manville, 1980; MacDowell, 1978; Fornara and Samons II, 1991;
Smith, 1925). It began as a conservative implementation of citizen involvement through the laws of Drakon and Solon so that the citizenry could secure its power from the regal state (MacDowell, 1978:41). It then turned with Cleisthenes to involve more citizenry so as to abolish oligarchy (Pomeroy et al., 1999:175). Power, however, was still
65 comfortably wielded by tribal leaders and other elitists. Ephialtes was the man to radicalise the Athenian system giving full power to the citizenry and, in turn, making it difficult for the elite to meet their interests (Pomeroy et al., 1999:210).
The men responsible for trying to empower citizens were mostly elected by the assembly but held some sway. “… Ruling political elite … used constitutional institutions to mask its true power” (Ober 1996:112). Hansen (1991)
conceptualizes the Athenian citizenry as a political institution: citizens are defined in relationship to the institutions of Government, for which they were (for the most part and at least in principle) equal (Ober, 1996:113).
These points show that elitists ruled but were generally weak, thus providing greater accountability to governance. The demos held power to change institutions if they so desired. Accountability was, potentially, at the risk of their vote.
Fear of elitism was the fear that the interests of the people would succumb to the interests of the elite minority, thus subverting the accountability of their governing system. Leaders like Solon, Cleisthenes, Pisistratus, Hippias and Isagoras all encountered resistance from the citizenry and either played to that advantage or were dismissed by the majority. Ober (1999) argues that
successful defence of democracy against the forces of elitism was predicated on the domination by the mass of citizens of the conceptual apparatus essential to decision making (Ober, 1999:19).
In other words, the citizenry were included in the decisions of the state so that the majority would be placated and elitism checked.
What was it, then, that the Athenians used to help combat elitism? The assembly and the court (still the assembly but alternatively titled when judicial matters were decided) held the practice that, if a public speaker rose up, he faced a large group of adjudicators who could argue his speech at any time (Ober 1996:24). This practice helped but, understandably, was not a salve. It was probably the amalgam of the Athenian legal
66 custom based on the reformed laws of Solon, Cleisthenes and others that helped to stifle influential speakers from swaying the assembly. Commensurately, scholars (Held,
1995:168; Wollin, 1996:38-39; Hesk, 2000:51, 289) argue about the blindness to minority interests, slaves and non-originators of Athens due to the non-inclusive nature of the citizen status. In other words, perhaps these people could have contributed to the
Athenian polis and were not heard. The relevance that this point bears is the potential for a more diverse or plural citizen body to be less swayable by a speaker of a different background.
3.4 Representation
The Athenian effort of trying to hear all citizens’ voices and encourage participation will be detailed here. This problem was most likely encountered early in Athenian democracy, probably before the age of Pericles. This comes about after reading Sinclair
(1988), especially the passage where he claims that Pericles advised the majority to seek the best advice themselves, so as not to be swayed by strong orators (Sinclair, 1988:xi).
Yet, Hesk (2000) argues about the manipulation conducted by the executive to limit or control the opinions of the demos using military (fear), religion (belief) and a corruption of truth (reason) as instruments to sway citizenry. He refers to this as the “noble lie”
(Hesk, 2000:143) and it was used mostly in public oration. As the assembly and boule were filled with mostly non-political or, often times, uneducated people, those who had schooling or a natural gift for public speaking could potentially control discussion which may have lead to elitism as previously discussed by Ober (1996) and Farrar (1988).
One such resolution to the problem of influential speakers was the “ostracism rule.”
Every year, the assembly would elect one man to be voted into exile for ten years
(Forsdyke, 2005:152). It was a harsh rule to be implemented, but it helped deter elites from swaying the masses or seizing power. Forsdyke (2005:152) stipulates that
67 ostracism and exile helped reduce inter-elite violence and intra-elite politics (see also
Hansen 1991, 310).
Another example of how Athenians dealt with representation issues and ensured that more people speak was through politicians’ own savvy. During trials (as most legal matters were decided by the assembly), “before the moment of the hearing neither the litigants nor the court official know which citizens will be deciding the case” and that each citizen allowed to speak has an equal amount of time as the other, measured by a water-clock (Gagarin and Cohen, 2005:147). The importance of identifying the assembly as also representing the jury may have implications for the drafting and/or implementation of legislation. The regulation of keeping assembly members for a trial anonymous also extends to not knowing who everyone will be in the assembly on the day of voting a law. This practice would be a useful attribute in modern times to help combat corporate manipulation and private interests from interfering in democratic nations. It is more difficult to bribe an individual in a randomised system.
Regarding Rome, Matyszak (2003) opens this discussion with his argument that the
Republic was not ruled by monarchs with divine right or claims to heredity. Rather, it was run by executive who were elected and who had their powers “checked by a constitution” (Matyszak, 2003:6) that inspired the creation of the constitution of the
USA. “In theory, even the weakest and poorest Romans had the protection of the law, and by and large their rights were protected” (Matyszak, 2003:6).
Oakley (2004) continues,
In Rome, as in all ancient and many medieval and modern states, public life may be seen in retrospect … to have been dominated by three issues: how to divide the wealth of the state, how to determine who was to administer the state, and how best to secure the state against attack from those outside it (Oakley, 2004:16).
68 Brennan (2004) sheds further light on Oakley’s (2004) statement arguing that Rome did not have a written constitution. What it did have was a variety of normative institutions
“which were or at least seemed virtually primeval” (Brennan, 2004:31). He wrote that all it took for the law to possibly change was a confident assertion made by a senator, magistrate, or priest. Anything “was legally possible under an often fuzzy and ever evolving political and administrative system” (Brennan, 2004:31).
Oakley (2004) shows that,
In 494 [BCE], in protest against patrician treatment of those in debt-bondage … the plebeians went on strike and withdrew to a hill outside Rome; this episode is commonly known as the First Secession of the Plebs. In a conciliatory response, the patricians granted them the right annually to elect their own leaders, who were called tribunes of the plebs; initially these were two in number, later ten (Oakley, 2004:17).
Such battles continued through the rest of the republic. Other rights won by the physical uprisings of the plebeian classes included the right of appeal after a trial, a representative legislative body called the Tribunes, the codification of Roman law “(known as the
Twelve Tables),” as well as land limitations for the patricians, and the opening of official offices to plebeians (Oakley, 2004:17).
Yet these concessions were not enough to appease the struggle. Oakley (2004:19) continues to argue that although the evidence explaining how plebeians escaped patrician dominance is mostly correct, it was most likely not done in the way that is traditionally explained. Although he does not deny certain events occurred during the fourth century
BCE, he does maintain that the patricians and plebeians were not distinct static classes prior to the 490s. Even though early republican documents are mired in uncertainty about specific details, as Matyszak (2003:12) agrees, there is no doubt that the long- standing socio-political and economic divisions between plebeian and patrician actually occurred.
69 The Conflict of Orders is a good example of a representation issue within Rome. The problem, as Oakley (2004:17-21) argues, was that poor plebeians (plebs) disliked squalid living conditions while elite plebs resented the inequality between themselves and patricians. The most successful measure that the plebs took was a form of strike, notably a series of secessions from the republic until further political rights were extended to them. The plebs acted as a “state within a state” (Oakley, 2004:21). It was not until after
366 BCE (when the Conflict of Orders moved into a less violent stage, showing some societal congruence) that the Roman expansion and conquering of the Mediterranean became significant (Oakley 2004:21). This reveals the impact that the plebeian uprisings had on the republic’s administration and the overall effect which poor representation can have on a state.
Keightley (1858) describes the relationship between plebeians and patricians quite succinctly:
By this treaty all outstanding debts were cancelled, and all who were in slavery for debt were set at liberty; but the plebs neither regained the consulate nor any other honours; for the senate with the usual wisdom of an aristocracy, contrived to separate the interests of the lower order of plebeians from those of their gentry, by making individual sacrifices in the remission of debts, while they maintained the solid advantages of place and power for their order. They also managed to have no alteration made in the law of debt … But the real gain of the plebeians … was the making [of] the tribunate an inviolable magistracy (Keightley, 1858:66-68).
He continues to describe the personal protection of the plebs against, for example, murder, marking this as an upgrading of citizen’s rights. In the end, the guaranteed inviolable law of the plebeian tribune allowed some greater leeway for the plebs and can be considered a boost of representation during the republic.
Matyszak (2003:54-55) argues that the plebeians staged a strike by unifying with each other and separating themselves from the Roman state. Being mostly the labourers (in other terms, the citizenly cogs of the Roman wheel), the state needed to make a concession and political strategy changed within Rome (Brennan, 2004) once the plebs
70 got their tribune. Caesar played heavily to the plebeian masses and also acted to circumvent the senate and other tribunes by lobbying for the plebeian veto. Brennan
(2004:38) confirms,
Yet, soon (after 494 b.c.) the powers of the plebeian tribunes would encroach further on the consuls’ exercise of imperium. Indeed the tribunes had the power of veto against all regular magistrates, but only in Rome itself (Brennan, 2004:38).
This phrase, “Rome itself” speaks of the inequity experienced by subjected peoples in conquered lands. Matyszak (2003) writes, on several occasions, of the grievances expressed by populations under provincial (praetor or propraetor) control.
A geopolitical angle for issues with representation emerges from Crook and Rawson
(1994), when they argued that the Roman assemblies were not as representative as previously claimed because citizens from geographically distant districts composed
“perhaps two-thirds of the total Roman citizen body at the time” (Crook and Rawson,
1994:44). This distance may have prevented or been a problem for many citizens to attend assemblies and to cast their votes as the travelling was too great of a burden.
This may indicate that there was a country/city divide but, as many poorer Romans lived within the bounds of the city, it did not mean that voting was disproportionately conceded to them. Rather, some of the voters with greater political weight had an advantage over their country-dwelling counterparts (generally the wealthiest of Romans) when elections came about. Furthermore, evidence shows that there was “no clear bias towards the wealthy” (Crook and Rawson, 1994:44) during the Roman voting processes.
This may indeed go toward dispelling the notion that Rome’s elections were determined by the wealthiest, as the better positioned elites geographically had more opportunities to influence policy.
Issues of representation can be seen via the brothers Gracchus and other leaders.
Caesar’s contribution to grains and a more generous level of state support
71 developed out of the political ideology and rhetoric of the late Republic that Ti. and C. Gracchus had initiated, for they declared that the Roman people should share in the spoils of empire (Sumi, 2005:62).
An example of Ti. Gracchus’ awareness of Roman societal ills is represented in a statement made by Sumi (2005:87). The argument is that Ti. Gracchus pointed out the irony of the Roman state: that it called the Roman people the “conquerors of the world, yet they could not afford a single clod of earth to till” (Sumi, 2005:87), and further, with his brother’s self-styling as “… the defender of the public treasury … against the depredations of the aristocracy” (Sumi, 2005:88). These actions seem to have been acting as guarantors for the preservation of plebeian rights.
Brunt (1988) wrote that the Roman republic had no written constitution with “only the civil and criminal law...codified in the fifth century BC” (Brunt, 1988:13) with the fragments of this document showing that the authors had taken “political institutions for granted” (Brunt, 1988:13). A part of the constitution stated that
whatever the people last commanded was binding; this meant that there were no ‘entrenched’ constitutional rules which the people could not change by statute (Brunt, 1988:13).
However, most rights possessed by the citizens of Rome
rested on custom or tradition … Our term ‘constitution’ is indeed best rendered by Cicero’s periphrasis: ‘the political order most widely instituted by our ancestors’ (Brunt, 1988:13).
Representation was not a large issue when determining the executive arrangement of the
Roman state (Brunt, 1988:112). War was looming on several fronts and a distribution of political power was needed to most feasibly conduct a large and concerted battle. This brings to the fore whether or not the Roman constitution was Hellenistic (as some historians have described it as being). Brunt (1988) describes Tacitus saying,
all nations or cities are governed either by the people or the chief men or a monarch; a political system based on a selection and combination of these elements can more readily be commended than come into existence, or then long endure (Brunt (1988:15).
72 Power, and thus government, in Rome was established over time by whatever needs arose. The constitution was not written and, as seen, allowed for many concessions to be made regarding class structure. This ‘fuzziness’ in Roman law and their unwritten constitution probably aided the more disadvantaged citizens to claim their rights but, like a double edged sword, could also be used against them and it was one of the contributing factors to the downfall of the republic.
The improvement of plebeian lifestyles may have implications for modern times. Would social programs and/or better representation in government reduce social tensions and violence, and could it improve the human condition of citizens within a state?
3.5 Transparency
In a democracy where those who were classified as ‘citizens’ were only a minority in the population, the transparency of the Athenian state comes into question. The omission of women, non-citizens and slaves, are one of the many blemishes which cultures of that period have left behind (Ober, 1989:5). However, these are blemishes as seen through the spectacles of modern values. The democratic state system as organised by the
Athenian polis was as accountable as it was allowed to be by the political process of that era. There are, however, some opportunities missed by their cultural alignments from which we can learn.
The lack of participation from women, slaves and people who were not born Athenian puts the government of the polis at a loss. Freedom for a limited number of males may have required an oppressive system in the Athenian polis as its government required a large amount of passive income to maintain its inclusive political formula. Alongside women, people who lived in Athens and contributed to the polis, but were not born there, were also omitted as citizens (Ober, 1989:33; Wallace, 1996:106). Such people were
73 mostly merchants and artisans. Their opinions were important to items such as the trade of Athenian commodities and international relations.
As seen earlier, there was discussion in front of ‘judges’, prosecutions of politicians, rotations of tenure, ostracisms and a bounty of opinions. Yet, elements for constructive criticism were missing, namely from the minorities. The polis did not allow for those in opposition to their governmental system to voice their opinions in front of the citizenry.
Ober (1996:140-142) wrote that a cultural critic is necessary to keep democracy healthy.
Seen from today, the omission of women, non-citizens and slaves had a negative impact on Athenian government. The only debate occurring was within the citizenry which
Orend (2002:193-4) showed to be a small segment of the overall population. This led to a ‘disease’ to which certain governments succumb. It is comparable to the health of genetic diversity, except with ideas. If a government is full of heterogeneous ideas, the chance of making a bad decision is reduced. However, if government is full of homogenous ideas, ‘intellectual inbreeding’ occurs and strange decisions may happen.
To break things down, the Athenian social strata limited the scope of their socio-political relations. If women and non-citizen residents had been involved in government, then perhaps history would have unfolded differently. Just (1989:21) stated that it could have been possible for women to have influenced their politically active husbands at home. If the excluded minorities, including slaves, participated then there could have been an increase in social capital which probably would have led to increased cultural output and inter-regional cultural integration.
Thus, this omission of minorities probably did have some negative impact for the
Athenians but, in general, met their desired level of transparency, which were, again, unlike those conceptions of transparency known today. To relate the previous Athenian body on representation, there is also a modicum of transparency within representation, as
74 democratic particles stipulate logically that only a government acting in the interests of its citizen body (not just those who voted) can be accountable and transparent. For the interest of Athenians, it was within practice for a citizen to challenge a law or legislation passing, either through direct questioning in the assembly, during juries or discussion in private. In that sense, it helped keep the state accountable through the efforts of constant probing and discussion which may have bolstered transparency.
3.6 Constitutional Issues
When trying to determine the origins of a government’s social contract the question arises as to whether it was the social contract or government that came first, which is the case in Athens. Most evidence is drawn from Homeric epics or plays said to have come down from the ‘Dark Ages’ or a period with a weak public realm. The interest, at this stage, is not to determine who or why or how the Athenians agreed upon their constitution (as through the reading of Solon, Pericles, Demosthenes, Cleisthenes and other influential law makers it can be seen that the Athenian constitution originated from a set of norms or customs—similar to England) but, to be more precise, a discussion of the nature of their constitution, law making, state and how these relate to other endemic problems.
The basis of Athenian government allowed the demos of the day to enact or reverse any laws put before them (Gordon, 1999:71-72, 68, 74). As there were few professional politicians, no long-term judges, a continuously changing executive body and only a constitution defined by cultural norms, logically, things could have been quite unstable.
Yet, there exists some contention in the literature that the state was, indeed, heavily influenced by the elite families (the old aristocrats who held influence with the archons) and that it was they, through their customs and political sidings, who helped keep things stable (Farrar 1989; Ober 1996; Gordon 1999). Others argued that the state was, in
75 majority, run by amateurs or, better put, commonfolk with the required wealth to be part of the citizenry. Even though participation in the assembly was paid, it was usually less than a regular day’s wages, but came up to almost that standard near the end of the independent Athenian democracy (Joint Association, 2008:208).
The constitutional body, then, is represented by a cumulative sum of previous norms, current laws and future reform. In other words, some aspects of it were capable of being changed quite liberally. The practice of constitutionalism, at present, generally relates to a rigid ‘doctrine’ which is difficult to challenge for the purpose of protecting the state’s institutions from future governments so as not to relapse into authoritarian government; in a sense, a form of guarantee to the public. The Athenian individuals in government bodies, like government institutions found at present, had the power and role of drafting, passing and revising laws. Accordingly, this action is, in a sense, keeping the law up to date. Athenians had an unwritten set of customs to fall back upon, whereas moderns generally have protection in the form of a written body (the formal constitution). The difference being that, through an unwritten constitution (although Solon’s Laws are sometimes argued to be the written form of their customs, his Laws generally only deal with how to prosecute crimes), the constant revision of laws indirectly modified the set of norms and, thus, kept the constitution relevant to the population. A modern written constitution enjoys the same legal reforms, but does not allow for the constitution to change its norms apropos to the needs of the present population without considerable efforts.
Did the Athenians assume certain risks with this unwritten state system and what advantages come from a written body in comparison? For the Athenian state system to form, a social agreement was created over a long period which is generally accompanied by social hierarchy. As Gagarin and Cohen (2005) and Aristotle ([c.384-322 BCE] 1948) showed, a long pattern of social upheaval, reform, penalties on the aristocracy and
76 benefits to the masses occurred over many centuries. The democratic system was a changing entity during those times, generally giving more power to more people in the attempt to divulge power from the elites. In that method, the unwritten norms become established and less threatened by any intra-state minority power as their political capabilities became weakened over time. It is the beginning of such unwritten systems that generally spark the greater chance of violence (as seen in the politics of republican
Rome, revolutionary England, America, France and some democratising states in the modern realm) and instability. The risk is of having an early state with various bodies of potentially equal power, with a varied notion of customs balanced by the always unpredictable uprising of the masses that may destabilise a custom-based constitutional system. This is, in large part, why many states have a written constitution, as the process to gain a constitution was more often than not, tumultuous.
It is possible that the Athenians would have lost certain aspects of their constitution had it been written by Solon. If the nature of the written law determines the social rights of the citizen (like the United States’ constitution) in a time of deep social hierarchy, this may have hardened the barriers of society and made concessions more difficult for citizens to obtain. The important point is this idea of ‘hardening social norms’ and not what may have happened if Solon did something different. It relates to a larger thematic question within the constitutional endemic problem which is whether constitutions are relevant to modern societies if they were written by an elite body in a society rather different than the one to which the constitution is bringing order.
3.7 Campaigning Methods
Before the ascension of the plebeian tribune, the voting structure used by the Roman republic is easily explained by Matyszak (2003:38-39), “Servius’ greatest creation, however, was the census”, which contained five classes of people based on land
77 ownership. Eighty centuries composed of forty senior and forty junior first-class citizens, followed by twenty centuries of both junior and senior second, third, fourth and fifth class citizens (Matyszak, 2003:38-39). All other citizens too poor to own weapons (as wealth and, hence, a stronger militaristic contribution to the state was the determinant of social position at that time) were solely counted by the head (Matyszak, 2003:38-39).
Knights, the wealthiest of Romans, voted first, followed by the others in turn (Matyszak,
2003:38-29). A majority decision by the centuries won the day. Due to the lopsided representation the wealthy minority had, plebeians were essentially strung along until they mutinied for the improvement of their political rights (Matyszak, 2003; Shelton,
1997; Bell, 2007).
Consuls, proconsuls, praetors and propraetors, were men who governed their own regions. They were in charge of the military stability, Romanisation38 and finances of the regions which they ruled (Le Glay et al., 1991:201-202). Men in charge of a province (or state) were not permitted to return to Rome during their tenure. This was done as a precautionary measure, as the men who ruled had many loyal legions under them which could take the city of Rome if they so desired. This method was used by Sullus and
Caesar to undermine the republic.
Rome exhibited an exclusionary administrative system which dictated to the masses, it exemplified an overly divided system with much room for corrupting governmental policy and it portrayed a tax-laden bureaucracy upheld by the fasces.39 Comparatively, moderns exhibit an inclusionary administrative system. They exemplify a sometimes minimised system encouraging the private sector to take over some public services and they also portray bureaucracies as funded with tax money.
38 Romanisation was the process by which the Roman Empire consolidated its rule over a newly conquered region. It would involve teaching the locals the structures of Roman society so that they would become dependent on the hegemony in the future. Another term is cultural assimilation. 39 The fasces, a collection of thin rods bound together and sometimes bearing an axe head, were symbols of power carried by bureaucrats or those supporting politicians in higher offices. They were also carried by the tax collectors of Rome, known as the knights (Matyszak, 2003:49).
78 In Rome, factionalism, clientage, campaign support, bribery, hidden agreements and corruption were consistent elements in the choosing of leaders within the republic’s voting system. Yakobson (1999) elaborated on this point when he argued that corruption during elections was so common in the late Republic that it “can be seen as indicating that the traditional patronage system could not control large sections of the electorate ...”
(Yakobson, 1999:25-26). There were also different forms of corruption and some
were considered quite legitimate by Roman standards; these were often, as we shall see, no less ‘democratic’, i.e. directed at the masses, than overt bribery that could be the subject of biased accounts, gossip, and scandal (Yakobson, 1999:25-26).
These examples reinforce the previous points made in the discussion of corruption (page
62) and also show that corruption disrupted ‘patronage’ systems. Patronage can be understood as factionalism (political blocks, early version of political parties) or clientage (where a candidate(s) is sponsored by a wealthy man or faction). Yakobson
(1999:122) stated that those voters who were wise enough to accept bribes from candidates yet still maintain their own decision making capabilities could “have made manipulative use of the important resource at their disposal – their vote” (Yakobson,
1999:122). Handel (1990) provides more about clientage. Roman patronage systems were traditional and held patterns of “patron-client” relationships. The benefit of these relationships were the
exchange of rewards (beneficia) given by the patron for services rendered by the client. This form of relationship not only existed between politicians and aristocrats, but also between the sovereignty of Rome and client kings (Handel, 1990:133).
This long-term patron client relationship shows how the aristocracy continuously excluded the citizens of Rome from fully participating in the republic. The way government operated was that men of means (that is, men with vast amounts of money) could buy their way into a position of influence. Depending on how many drachmas one had, he could either be situated in the senate or in any lesser governmental body as well as the military (Polybius, [c.140 BCE] 1991:318).
79 Factionalism may be understood as a sum of several patron-client relationships. As politics was often considered the struggle between families, or family factions, a certain degree of violence was tolerated. Crook and Rawson (1994:14) argue that it was specifically due to this tolerance of violence between aristocratic families which
“spiralled upwards into civil war” (Crook and Rawson, 1994:14). The practices of republican politics are not entirely surprising given the amount of corruption and the incipient sprouting of violence.
Factionalism, corruption, clientage and violence go hand-in-hand. The evidence helps to understand the area of electoral bribery within Rome by both offering a contrast to modern views and a critique of the republican system. Lintott (1990) explains that,
in Western Europe to-day we tend to assume automatically that electoral bribery is pernicious, in that it distorts the democratic process, the selection by the people of their own representatives, by shifting whatever power lies in the generality of the electorate back into the hands of the people who seek office, so that a democratic procedure becomes in effect oligarchic (Lintott, 1990:1).
Bribery is not in the long-term interests of the citizenry, as politicians could be prone to swapping mandates depending on who is bribing them (Lintott, 1990:1). He continued to stipulate that bribery evolved through a secondary problem, the need to raise money, especially in Rome. Lintott (1990:1) argued that money can be used, as it currently is, to corrupt individuals holding public offices by tempting them or by gradually bringing these individuals into debt at which point they are at the violent mercy of “illegitimate businessmen or criminals.” Bribery can produce “unfortunate political consequences” if pursued on a large scale.
Moreover, if bribery is prevalent in elections, this will affect the perception of politics both by office-seekers and those who elect them. Office-seekers may come to despise the venality of an electorate, which may, unknown to them, be exercising a considerable degree of independent judgement; the electorate for its part may deduce from the bribes that it is offered, that those pursuing public office are merely selfseekers who are not concerned with the general interest of the public (Lintott, 1990:1).
80 3.8 Long-Term Goals
Although it is uncertain whether or not certain politicians during the Roman republic actually intended to create laws with long-term goals in mind, the literature tends to speak of laws in regard to their long-term impact. The discussion here does not concern the speculation of whether or not a politician desired a certain duration of impact when implementing a law. Rather, it shows instances where laws may have inadvertently worked in the interests of long-term improvement and the subsequently learnt inherent lessons.
The brothers Gracchus are typically ascribed as being the republic’s most radical reformists. Scullard (1982) takes the Gracchian reforms as the initial strike against the foundation of the state, opening the door for Pompei, Sullus and Caesar, for example, and the decline of the republic. Stockton (1979), however, appears to applaud them for their attempts to improve the social conditions of plebeians. The brothers’ most daring legal reform regarded land legislation. Led mostly by Tiberius Gracchus, the redistribution of aristocratic landholdings to accommodate the landless of the Roman plebeian class was their ultimate goal (Matyszak, 2003:129).
Crook and Rawson (1994:63) write that, prior to 111 BCE, no public land was rendered private and that no public land could count towards an individual’s census rating. This evidence seems to show that Tiberius Gracchus’ law was misinterpreted or perhaps wilfully ignored. Tiberius desired to give more land to the poor so as to increase military recruits (which was short-sighted), but a possible long-term aim would have been to increase the Roman population (Crook and Rawson, 1994:63).
Matyszak (2003:129-130) shows that the Gracchian reforms were made to increase concessions to the plebeian caste. In Rome, it was long a custom that the only way to be ascribed as a citizen was to go to war for Roman causes. Also, the act of going to war
81 was supposed to guarantee soldiers a piece of land. The catch was that the soldier had to have sufficient means to provide weapons and armour (in order to not burden the state with material costs and training). If this was not met, regular troop infantry were dismissed without land-entitlement and it was up to the praetor (general) or propraetor to divide the spoils of war evenly among his men (Matyszak, 2003:50). The Social Wars
(90 BCE to 88 BCE) were fought for this same reason; the will to be included as a full, rights bearing citizen of Rome for trade, security and social benefits, such as marrying a
Roman citizen (Matyszak, 2003:155).
Crook and Rawson (1994) reveal more about the nature of the Gracchians’ attempted reforms:
Although Gracchus’ bill was proposed at a time when military weakness and the number of slaves seemed urgent political issues, it was not an emergency measure to deal with a crisis, but one which sought to improve the social and economic conditions of Italy in the long-term (Crook and Rawson, 1994:65).
Following suit is Matyszak’s (2003:147) mention of Saturninus’ attempted land reforms in 100 BCE for the war veterans of a recent victorious campaign against the Germans. He also tried to pass laws allowing Roman citizens to settle in Greece, Asia and Africa, as well as other parts of Italy.
These laws, which held strong implications for the increased welfare of the plebeians, had long-term implications. Even if the law was not passed in whole, in part, nor at all, the popularity and awareness of the law may have held socio-political ramifications for the uniting of the plebs and their cause. In this case, legislation seemed to carry long- term effects as it aided in increasing the plebeians’ quality of life. The Roman political structure was not conducive to operating in a highly communicative manner between all citizens, however, as are many modern systems. By using this advantage of communication and applying the notion of the ‘awareness of long-term legislation’ such could result in the creation of a new body of long-term law.
82 3.9 Conclusion
The discussion of Athenian and Roman political life revealed evidence indicating difficulties with endemic problems. Corruption was problematic concerning bribery and violence; there were issues with representation apropos citizen participation, effectiveness and social justice; transparency was a concern amongst excluded citizens and in the Athenian state itself; the section on campaigning methods discussed specifically how and which citizens could fill positions (note the first use of the lottery system in Athens); accountability was a common struggle as was seen by the successive legal reforms by various rulers throughout the centuries to curb the power of elitist minorities and ensure that the balance of power was maintained (for example, plebeian withdrawals and Cleisthenes’ reforms); constitutional issues presented themselves during the discussion regarding the nature of the unwritten Athenian constitution; and, finally, long-term goals were absent most probably due to the often changing decisions made by those in government.
Based on the evidence and discussion of endemic problems within Athens and Rome, evidence of their early nature has been established. This was seen by way of the endemic governance subheadings guiding the discussions of corruption, representation, accountability, transparency, campaigning methods, constitutional issues and long-term goals.
The importance of documenting the existence of endemic problems in those classical polities is that it establishes that the problems are over two thousand years old. Although this information may seem to conflict with the work of John Keane, it does not as he engages some of these themes in a different and cautious manner. It also indicates that the presumptions made concerning the anthro-archaeological argument in the literature review, are perhaps valid since the Greco-Romans did, in fact, need to acquire the
83 precursors to these ideas initially from somewhere.40 There is also indication of the need for future research in a few areas. The first regards a comparative analysis of the penal measures used for politicians in a modern nation, as there are probably lessons to be learned from the classics; second, greater research into why long-term goals were not utilised by Athens and Rome; third, how to ‘randomise’ political practice in modern governments to mitigate bribery or intense lobbying (inspired by Athenian uses of the lottery system); fourth, scrutiny of the idea of injecting more direct democracy in the representative system using IT; and, fifth, whether written constitutions are actually relevant to the societies they order.
40 Keane (2009) reveals in his groundbreaking work that ancient Mesopotamia (i.e. the fertile crescent, arguably the cradle of civilization) practiced forms of deliberation, compromise and inclusive systems of ruling (as opposed to the previous belief that such regions were governed by autocratic systems). This information stems from recent evidence procured from Arabic historical scholarship. Diamond (1997) hinted at such an occurrence due to his anthro-archaeological argument stating that the precursors to democracy (herein known specifically as communication, equality, law and selecting officials) were practiced by pre-civilization human communities.
84 Chapter 4: NORTH ATLANTIC DEMOCRACIES
4.1 Introduction
In the quest to exemplify endemic governance problems in the period between classical democracies and present day democracies, a discussion of political theorists and academics will be conducted. The evidence encompasses the revolutionary periods of
England, France and the United States of America commensurate with modern political thought. Such was done to synthesise modern thoughts with their historical counterparts in the effort of creating precise research questions concerning Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
Chapter 4, following suit from Chapter 3, is divided into subheadings addressing endemic governance problems and encompasses themes that have been recurring thus far throughout the thesis (for example, violence and administration).
This chapter’s investigation is necessary as it completes the literature-based, thematic research of this thesis. It is also the first stage in showing the steady progression of endemic problems as issues discussed by political theorists and academics in the modern period. By establishing the evidence that endemic problems are potentially still affecting governments at present, the empirical methods used to establish this as a fact through the investigation of carefully selected raw data from the international governance
(democratisation) environment can commence.
If the analysis of endemic problems evinces that they are potentially present, the need to understand their effect and interaction with democratic particles also becomes necessary.
The study of original thinkers and academics (pertaining to endemic problems) will be done by discussing and comparing thinkers in a linear fashion, organised by thematic subheadings.
85 The modern analysis of endemic problems is similar to the style used in the previous chapter. However, rather than identifying a region or choosing a singular country representative of a major geopolitical region, it is the thematic synthesis of academic publications regarding north Atlantic democracies (England, France, United States of
America, for example) in specificity to endemic problems.
4.2 Transparency
J. S. Mill ([1859] 1989, [1859] 2004) contributed to the view of liberty as it is currently regarded. He argued for the need of a negative concept of government in that laws controlled behaviour that is damaging to the social good, such as violence, but allows individuals to manage their own lives and finances within those confines. He continues to expound his work on the individual and the freedom of speech reasoning that should one person in society be of a different opinion to the rest of society “mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind” (Mill, [1859] 2004:17).
His need for the ‘freedom of speech’ recalls the modern notion of transparency in governance, specifically the access and verifiability of information from government.
Grigorescu (2003) details the state of transparency in present day literature stating that interest in the concept of transparency had been growing with the literature emphasizing
“the effects that government transparency can have, especially on democratic consolidation” (Grigorescu, 2003:643). Interestingly, he states that little attention in the literature has been paid to the causes of transparency with more given to its effects. Here he describes the relevance of transparency:
political scientists appear to have recently become more aware of the concept of ‘transparency’ and its potential explanatory power. Because of the varied interests in phenomena involving the flow of information, the concept does not appear to be monopolized by any one area of study. Discussions of transparency can be found in studies of international conflict,
86 international organization, environmental politics, monetary policy, trade, corruption, and democratic theory (Grigorescu, 2003:643).
Finel and Lord’s (1999) article warns against the potentially disastrous effects of transparency in international relations, namely the ‘noise’ of one state’s domestic affairs being indecipherable or exacerbating tensions with other nations. They describe transparency as being one or more mechanism which allow for the “public disclosure of information” (Finel and Lord, 1999:316). In a weak state such could invariably result in several actors disseminating conflicting messages.
Kopits and Craig (1998) shed further light on the issue arguing that fiscal transparency is essential for appropriate economic policy. The “timely publication of a clearly presented budget document makes it easier for the market to evaluate the government’s intentions”
(Kopits and Craig, 1998:2) which allows the market to discipline the government should it intrude on private boundaries. However, and as Finel and Lord (1999) warned,
“transparency increases the political risk of unsustainable policies” (Kopits and Craig,
1998:2) whereas no transparency would allow corrupt behaviour to go unknown for longer than it otherwise would.
InfoDev and the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) (2002) detail the merits of ‘e-government’ regarding transparency. The authors of the report argue that the effects of e-government can reduce the cost of government and public services, that it can present savings in public procurement, in “tax collection and customs operations, with better and continuous contacts with citizens, especially those living in remote or less densely populated areas” (InfoDev and the CDT, 2002:2). They suggest that e- government can be useful to government by
providing greater access to government information; promoting civic engagement by enabling the public to interact with government officials; making government more accountable by making its operations more transparent and thus reducing the opportunities for corruption; and providing development opportunities, especially benefiting rural and traditionally underserved communities (InfoDev and the CDT, 2002:8).
87 Their research uses several case studies to support their arguments. The first involves transparency through the publication of documents as exhibited by the government of
Colombia. They state that the President of Columbia had issued a directive at the start of the year 2000 for all federal governmental institutions to create Internet sites in order to provide their services to the citizens of Colombia online.
E-government managers focused on the quality of the sites, because they recognized that producing a supply of useful material on the Internet would stimulate greater demand for Internet access overall, and there by increase the penetration rate (InfoDev and the CDT, 2002:9).
There are other government and civil society examples used in the document and, as such, show the promise of e-government or IT for transparency, accountability and the strengthening of civil society. Yet the study did not focus on current transparency literature and it also skirted the issue concerning the applicability of e-government in countries with no means for Internet usage by stating that they will soon have Internet access (2002:8).
Further evidence pertaining to transparency shows that not only is transparency in political and economic areas important for developing economies in states with new forms of democratic government, but that these measures are important for all states
(Grigorescu, 2003:644). Governmental transparency is argued to be a necessity for accountability, responsiveness, and by extension “a truly democratic polity” (Grigorescu,
2003:644). “Also, increased transparency leads to greater public trust in government and in the democratic system” (Grigorescu, 2003:644) which may contribute to a new democratic government’s chances at staying democratic.
Grigorescu also states that further work needs to be done regarding how to “increase transparency in government” (Grigorescu, 2003:645) maintaining his point that political science “has been mostly pre-occupied with the effects of transparency and not the causes” (Grigorescu, 2003:645). Furthermore,
88 the few discussions of causes of transparency are generally found in the literature focusing on corruption and press freedom and point to some domestic factors such as political structure (e.g., Geddes and Neto, 1992) or economic determinants (e.g., Nixon, 1965; Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997; Hellman and Kaufmann, 2001) (Grigorescu, 2003:645).
Finally, Grigorescu argues that state transparency, or the need for it, has risen due to international organisations which demand such information in their mandates
(Grigorescu, 2003:645).
4.3 Representation
James Mill ([1837] 1992) recognised the futility of the Greek system as citizens (men of a certain status) needed to work and that keeping corruption, let alone having government function, out of a direct democracy for large amounts of people was too difficult. Burke (1793:70), on the other hand, argued for the merits of monarchy as the best form of representation. He reasoned that democracy tended toward party tyranny and that the good in democracy came out only when it was mixed with other forms of government such as monarchy. He states that historical evidence shows that “... you can better ingraft any description of republic on a monarchy than anything of monarchy upon republican forms” (Burke, 1793:70).
To contrast, Mill ([1837] 1992) believed “… that the concern of government … its business is to increase to the utmost pleasures, and diminish to the utmost the pains, which men derive from one another” (Mill, [1837] 1992:4). He also felt that no man should ever have authority over another and this is why government is formed (Mill,
[1837] 1992:4).
Mill ([1837] 1992) recognised that “the means of insuring labour must be provided for as the foundation of all,” and that
all the difficult questions of government relate to the means of restraining those, in whose hands are lodged the powers necessary for the protection of all, from making bad use of it (Mill, [1837] 1992:5-6).
89 His thoughts about the volatile nature of English society at the time argued how representative democracy is more practical than a direct style (Mill, [1837] 1992:8) mainly due to an easier method of ensuring checks and balances. A direct style (as seen in Athens) involved an array of laws designed to keep power from concentrating in too few hands. Representative democracy reduced the scale of government making it easier to balance bodies of governance.
In a political environment which sought to limit the power of a monarch, the institutionalisation of checks and balances was necessary. He states, “In Greece, notwithstanding the defects of democracy, human nature ran a more brilliant career than it has ever done in any other age or country” (Mill, [1837] 1992:11). The notion that the
House of Commons acted as a check to the King (Mill, [1837] 1992:23) exemplified the accountability of representative democracy as humanism rather than deism increasingly became the focus of governance.
Blackstone (1765), who revives Aristotle in his discussion of the classical ideas of mixed or alternative governments, ratifies an area of Mill’s opinion (notably the view that democracy is useful). He argues that should the right to make laws be given to the public, then concepts of public virtue and good intention are “more likely to be found, than [in] either of the other qualities of government” (Blackstone, 1765:49). However,
Blackstone (1765) has a critical perspective of democracy too:
Popular assemblies are frequently foolish in their contrivance, and weak in their execution; but generally mean to do the thing that is right and just, and have always a degree of patriotism or public spirit (Blackstone, 1765:49).
His Aristotelian perspective emerges with his view on governance because he believed that wisdom was to be found more in aristocracies “than in the other forms of government; being composed, or intended to be composed, of the most experienced citizens” (Blackstone, 1765:49). Aristocracy however has “less honesty than in a republic, and less strength than in a monarchy” whilst he reasons a monarchy to be the
90 most powerful form of government because the legislative, executive, and imaginably the judiciary are “united in the hand of the prince” (Blackstone, 1765:49). However, there is the ever present danger that the prince could employ “that strength to improvident or oppressive purposes” (Blackstone, 1765:49) which he uses to support his favourable argument of Aristotle’s mixed governments.
Blackstone (1765:49) goes on to say that democratic forms of government are typically the most capable of forming the best laws, with aristocracies figuring out how these laws will function in society and how the ends of these laws will be obtained, whilst it is the monarchy that is best suited to execute the laws created first by the public, and perfected by the aristocracy. As the aristocracy/monarchy/democracy debate occurred in England, different experiences were being acknowledged in the nascent United States of America.
Ackerman (2005) quotes Washington in his farewell address to the Republican Party, warning of the dangers inherent in ‘party passion’:
Let me … warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally. This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind (Ackerman, 2005:22).
Continuing,
It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness and is truly its worst enemy (Ackerman, 2005:22).
Washington claims that factionalism distracts the public councils from their duties and weakens the public administration. It agitates the public with “ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another; [and] foments occasionally riot and insurrection” (Ackerman, 2005:22). Washington maintains that factionalism “opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passion” (Ackerman,
2005:22). Although the bane and perils of factionalism were identified, there were other
91 difficulties surrounding representation, mainly resolving the style of it as seen in the
Federalist (2005) and Anti-Federalist (Storing, 1985). Grady (1993) shows,
… James Wilson enthusiastically hail[ing] the Constitution’s founding: ‘The world has left to America the glory and happiness of forming a government where representation shall at once supply the basis and cement of the superstructure. For representation … is the true chain between the people and those they entrust the administration of government’ (Grady, 1993:1).
J.S. Mill (1861) advocated the practice of a bicameral parliamentary system with an executive responsible to the lower house with equal representation of voters and voting rights for both men and women (Mill, 1861). Although Mill’s definition of representative government is, in most cases, current to the way democracies comport themselves, it is hard to apply his idea that listening to everyone’s voice is an imperative.
The only people he excluded from government were criminals and those that cannot sustain themselves through meaningful employment (Mill, 1861:7).
Mill (1861) warned of the dangers in representative democracy (like Paine, Washington and Tocqueville), such as the perils of majority rule. He recommended that universal enfranchisement and political education were ways to help mitigate this danger of
‘ignorance’ (Mill, 1861:14, 34, 67-68). Although he hinted at the use of a meritocratic society where people with higher educated gained more voting power, his political ideologies have resulted, to some extent, in modern democracies.
There were other debates about how representation should be obtained. Herbert Spencer
(1884), the man who coined the phrase ‘survival of the fittest’, was also the originator of social Darwinism. His theories are meticulous and directly influenced by Darwin’s work on evolution. He believed that politics and, in turn, government would shape themselves after the organic evolution of society through history. His philosophy is dependent on theory and cut-throat thinking. He argued that, if people are incompetent or prone to idleness, they are not fit to survive and should not be supported by the government. He advocated that the government should be severely restricted and recommends a state
92 with no written legislature, only the laws that evolved with the socially Darwinian vision of historical evolution.
These sentiments prelude some of the perspectives held in neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies today. Spencer (1884:I) laments the growth of what he considers to be coercive state power in liberalism. He questions why liberalism has increasingly “adopted the policy of dictating the actions of citizens, and, by consequence, diminishing the range throughout which their actions remain free?”
(Spencer, 1884:I). He continues to attack the coercive measures of the state. “Nothing more than cursory allusion has yet been made to that accompanying compulsion which takes the form of increased taxation, general and local” (Spencer, 1884:I-II). He argues that the state becomes increasingly coercive as populations rise because the state must fund the construction of a greater number of public institutions like schools, baths, libraries, and museums which he finds to be a form of coercion that “restricts still more the freedom of the citizen” (Spencer, 1884:I-II). As Spencer explained his belief of freedom (especially from taxation), he now furthers an argument regarding a lack of adequate representation as he does not want to support the poor.
Naturally, then, if the wretched are unknown or but vaguely known, all the demerits they may have are ignored; and thus it happens that when, as just now, the miseries of the poor are depicted, they are thought of as the miseries of the deserving poor, instead of being thought of, as in large measure they should be, as the miseries of the undeserving poor (Spencer, 1884:I-II).
He advocates a minimal state, economic laissez-faire, capitalism and leans away from socialism due to what he feels is a lack of representation underpinning social programs
(thus challenging the legitimacy of taxation).
The other side of the representation spectrum can be seen with T. H. Green (1999). His philosophies are simple in nature and promote the idea of a ‘welfare state.’ He discusses how individuals have an inert desire to work for the common good and that, only
93 through supporting each other, can humans feel free. Based on the analysis of Spinoza,
Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau, Green (1999) builds his argument from the basis of explaining membership before the building of a state. He then stipulates that happiness and social order are to be found in the community whereby membership is applied if individuals abide by the laws agreed upon (Green, 1999).
Continuing,
it is thus that when the highest stage of reflective morality is reached and upon interests in this or that mode of social good there supervenes an interest in an ideal of goodness, that ideal has already a definite filling; and the man who pursues Duty for Duty’s sake, who does good for the sake of being good or in order to realise an idea of perfection, is at no loss to say what in particular his duty is, or by what particular methods the perfection of character is to be approached (Green, 1999:191).
As can be seen, both Spencer (1884) and Green (1991) showed different representation- based arguments that are still relevant.
Scher (1997:88) describes the desire of the American voter in the way that “it is commonplace for Americans to complain about the lack of issues discussed by candidates in political campaigns.” Personality, character assassination, doubting integrity and motives, an inability to trust politicians, the emptiness of debate, the senseless mudslinging, photo shoots, short mass-media “bites and all the other defects of the modern political campaign is the feeling, often wistfully expressed, that voters wish candidates would stick to issues, explain their positions, and then leave the decision to them, the voters” (Scher, 1997:88). Scher finishes his argument stating that voters want more: they crave substance in electoral campaigns and abhor the increasing mindlessness political parties exhibit during campaigns. Furthermore, the responsiveness of government to the desires of voters may have positive ramifications. Grigorescu (2003) explains:
In the domestic realm, perhaps most significant, domestic government transparency has been considered to be an important factor contributing to
94 the accountability of democratic government and, implicitly, to democratic consolidation (Grigorescu, 2003:664).
He argues that a key aspect of democratic theory is the understanding that government must have a continuous responsiveness to the wants and desires of its citizens.
Grigorescu maintains that this form of responsiveness should not only occur during times of elections but also between them. “Governments need to inform the public of their actions and intentions and offer mechanisms through which officials can be punished for not being representative” (Grigorescu, 2003:644).
Government responsiveness could be linked to the quality of its administration and an interesting line of thought concerning the administration of representative government emerged with Max Weber (1947). He compared the effectiveness of capitalism and bureaucracy and produced a theory dependent on rationalisation called ‘value reasoning’ or ‘means/ends reasoning’ (Weber, 1947:158-165):
Today’s capitalist economic order is a monstrous cosmos, into which the individual is born and which in practice is for him, at least as an individual, simply a given, an immutable shell, in which he is obliged to live … The ‘state’ in general, in the sense of a political institution, with a vital combination of essential characteristics comprising a rational ‘constitution’, rationally constituted law, and an administration carried out by specialist officials according to rational constitutional rules …(Weber [1905], 2002:13, 358).
He continues to argue that the “spirit” of capitalism (that is, the need to succeed) is the key ingredient to “tame” irrationality and breed “rational tampering” (Weber [1905],
2002:359). Bureaucracy was termed to be the most effective mechanism for the ordering of capitalism, government and society but, as its efficiency grows, so does the dehumanising aspect of it resulting in the ‘iron cage’ of society (Weber [1905],
2002:360-375,121). Through capitalism and bureaucracy, the ever growing rationalisation of social life progressively reduces the individual to a mere cog in the great Kafkaesque socio-economic machine.
95 After detailing this ‘new serfdom’ of rational modernity, Weber did investigate different perspectives of democracy, specifically pertaining to government in Germany. He supported parliamentary democracy but had a critical view of the process, as he believed it was only the ‘elite’ who ruled and not the enfranchised voters. This ‘elitism’ then, he argued, had the ability to come up with unique and differential ideas which would remove the iron cage of a bureaucratized society.
It is eastern Germany’s tragic fate that its formidable achievements for the nation dug the grave of its unique social organization. The east deserves the chief credit for the nation’s political greatness. Prophetic foresight, not limited vision, prompted prominent Prussians [elites] and even their main representatives to struggle against absorption into the greater unity of the empire (Mommsen and Steinber, 1984:26).
Adams and Dyson (2003:170) offer a good point concerning Weber. They argue that we currently exist in a state of ‘disorganized capital’ which Weber did not foresee. This liberalized market has given individuals the capacity to grow in the directions they want rather than having no choice but to participate in a specific ‘cog’ of the bureaucratic state mechanism. Adams and Dyson (2003:170) do however warn rightly, if for example we consider the works of Adorno ([c1960] 2001, [c1966] 1990), that “the dangers lie more in our consumerist over-fondness for creature comforts and mass entertainment, and the cultural conformity these tend to impose” (Adams and Dyson, 2003:170). It can be seen between Scher (1997), Grigorescu (2003) and Weber (1947) that the effectiveness of representation is called into question.
Like the aforementioned questioning of representation, Vladimir Ilich Lenin ([1917]
1992), in his extreme social representative perspective, postulated that the organisation of the communist party would be ‘democratic’.
The abolition of all financial allowances for persons chosen as political representatives and of all financial privileges accorded to officials: the reduction of the pay for all servants of the state to the level of ‘a workman’s wages’ (Lenin, [1917] 1992:39).
96 He continues to express what he considers to be the division between bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy or “between the democracy of the oppressors and the democracy of the oppressed classes” (Lenin, [1917] 1992:39). He sees the state as a
‘special force’ which suppresses particular classes with the general force (or the popular majority) in turn suppressing the oppressors or the bourgeois state.
His arguments support poorer people and this has a relationship with a Latin American study on democracy calling for greater admission (hence representation) and inclusion of the poor into politics to represent their needs and, hopefully, reduce violence caused by poverty (Guerra-Garcia and Sample, 2008:21). Thus, Lenin uses representation in an attempt to argue for the equality which permeates throughout theoretical communism and, in so doing, offers a different, perhaps hard-line, socialist style of democracy.
Taking a different tack, Sir Isaiah Berlin’s (1969, 1976, 1996) philosophy is central to the democratic problem of legislating egalitarian laws. Garrard (1997) shares that
Berlin’s concept of liberalism is “rooted in pluralism, which more accurately represents the actual character of the world than monism, since reality is plural, complex, and not reducible or assimilable to a single comprehensive vision or pattern (Garrard, 1997: para
6). Continuing,
on this view there are many truths and many roads to each truth that are incommensurable. Individuals should be free to choose between these rival goods. This entails tolerance of the diverse values and beliefs of others. Therefore, the need for negative liberty has priority over other principles, since it is the necessary condition for making such choices. This implies the existence of a sphere in which individuals are free to pursue the values in which they believe without interference, provided they do not harm others in the process (Garrard, 1997: para 6).
Berlin argues that the true importance of egalitarianism lies in pluralism set as a negative liberty balanced by Mill’s ‘harm principle’ (1969, 1976), which can be seen in his description of emancipatory international relations (Berlin, 1996:52-53).
97 What Berlin’s (1996) philosophies imply for legislation is that, no matter how a law is passed, it will always be perceived as a ‘negative’ freedom for some and a ‘positive’ freedom for others. In other words, certain citizens may view a specific law as restricting the presence of government (negative) and allowing greater individual freedom.
However, other citizens may view this same law as a decentralization of power providing opportunities for local government to regulate the area in question (hence positive). This is not a new problem and, in effect, tries to be solved through the use of plural multi-party representation in the legislative body of government.
Whereas Berlin (1996) advocated more government, Friedrich von Hayek’s (1948, 1982) ideology centres on the need for minimalist government run by the free-market. His mistrust of politicians is a common attribute, as can be seen in his arguments concerning governmental catch phrases such as ‘laissez fair’ and ‘the protection of life, liberty, and property’. He reasons that these concepts are empty buzzwords used by governments to control populations because he does not see how these concepts indicate “necessary fields of government activity” (Hayek, 1948:17). Furthermore, he states that
… it would indeed seem that the particular form of representative government which now prevails in the Western world, and which many feel they must defend because they mistakenly regard it as the only possible form of democracy, has an inherent tendency to lead away from the ideals it was intended to serve (Hayek, 1982:3).
Continuing, he argues that it cannot be denied that this form of democracy (perhaps a
Westminster inspired liberal constitutional republican democracy) which has thus far been widely accepted in the West is moving us away from the classical ideal of liberty
“which it had been regarded as the surest safeguard, and are now drifting towards a system which nobody wanted” (Hayek, 1982:3).
What should not be forgotten is that the kind of neoliberal, free-market, non-welfare state system Hayek favours invariably puts a lot of pressure on the lower classes. Such pressure relates to social frustration which is related to social trust (social trust meaning
98 citizens trusting their government). Social frustration breeds corruption in citizens.
Whereas Hayek believes that a welfare-state will lead to corrupting politicians. Without socialism in the form of safety nets, the lower classes could, in turn, experience social frustration and social trust issues because their government would not be easing their suffering. Furthermore, Hayek (1982) does not go on to explain the dangers of neoliberalism in terms of corporate lobbying. A minimalist government is dependent on competitive business so that capital stays in its borders. This gives the corporate lobby an advantage and also can lead to the bribing and corruption of politicians at the expense of the citizen body. Ultimately, what Hayek (1982) does not recognise is the need for some form of socialism in a free-market state as well as anti-corruption laws for politicians and citizens alike to mitigate social problems.
Coupled with his views concerning the necessity of having egalitarian laws which minimise government coercion and impartial legislation, Hayek also describes the need for economic freedom and the minimisation of government interference in the economy.
It is clear that Hayek’s philosophy is neoliberal. He is not alone in these less compassionate sentiments toward the lower income citizens who are fragile to the volatility of the free-market.
Whereas previous thinkers were concerned about the best ways of representing people, a growing body of thought regarding the lack of participation in representative government emerged. Arguing similar themes as Arendt, Tocqueville and the others depicting the fall of politics in the public sphere, Habermas (1991) offers this unique view.
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s public use of their reason (Habermas, 1991:27).
99 He continued to discuss the rise of public reasoning in France (1991:31), America
(1991:94) and Great Britain (1991:57). Examples of publications, revolution, the town halls of New England, the salons of Paris, the parliaments and thinkers of Great Britain were what he drew upon.
If the public sphere ever existed, where did it begin to fall? Habermas (1991) argued that
the public is split apart into minorities of specialists who put their reason to use non-publicly and the great mass of consumers whose receptiveness is public but uncritical. Consequently, [politics] completely lacks the form of communication specific to a public (Habermas, 1991:175).
Manin (1997) also writes of, what Habermas (1991) considers, the diminution of the
‘public sphere’. However, Manin (1997) relates this problem to the ‘representative gap’.
That is, as representative democracy evolved from Rome, through to the Italian city-state republics, to England, America and France, representative government was becoming more aristocratic and less democratic by the removal of selection by ‘lot’. However, as the twentieth century witnessed campaigns for universal suffrage, equality among race, gender and sexual preference, and politics went from ‘parliamentarianism’ (prior to
1870) to ‘party-government’ (Manin, 1997:195), public opinion was becoming difficult to express and was replaced by opinion polls. Manin (1997) is careful to state that, if opinion polls are done correctly, then they can equally represent the population, given that the right parameters for the sample population are ensured. However, ordinary citizens cannot add questions to the survey and must answer what is provided which perhaps does not convey their needs. He also stated, ironically,41 that party-democracy seemed to bring representatives closer to the represented and give the people more sway with the weight of the party (Manin, 1997:197).
He writes that
41 Manin’s statement is ironic due to the volume of work concerning the elitist and non-representative qualities that political parties have in representative democracies. His statement does not entirely fit with some of his other arguments.
100 it is sometimes claimed … in Western countries, political representation is experiencing a crisis. For many years, representation appeared to be founded on a powerful and stable relationship of trust between voters and political parties, with the cast majority of voters identifying themselves with, and remaining loyal to, a particular party. Today, however, more and more people change the way they vote from one election to the next, and opinion surveys show an increasing number of those who refuse to identify with any existing party (Manin, 1997:193).
This notion of party politics (Manin, 1997:194-195), he claims, is not often written about.
Furthermore, there are clear links (that is, representation issues) between Manin’s (1997) views of mass-culture and that of Habermas (1991). Habermas’ philosophy of the public sphere is used in the debate concerning the ‘information society’. Webster (2002) argues that democratic processes could be undermined by a lack of information or the provision of poor quality information which is made available for the public. He reasons that “if the citizenry is denied reliable information, then how can the ideal of a thoughtful, deliberative and knowledgeable electorate be achieved?” (Webster, 2002:161) which is something Habermas, Manin and others are clearly concerned about. Quoting Madison,
Webster (2002) continues,
popular government without popular information…is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives (Madison in Webster, 2002:161).
The synthesis of a retracting public sphere, technocratic governance, capitalist and material-based mass media is perhaps becoming confronted by interactive communication via IT, growing citizen-based political engagement, and monitory democracy (Keane, 2009).
Habermas (1987) considers technology to be a major reason for the failure of the public sphere which is not something that this thesis agrees with. It is apparent that government in modern times, captured as it is in the mindset of technical scientism, tries to mitigate
101 the problem of the retracting social sphere through the use of a technique, or a scientific salve, which is a non-productive methodology, as the public sphere has been and is based on dialogue, hence, the exchange of ideas and information (Habermas, 1987:140).
In modern societies, there obviously exists an asymmetry between the (weak) capacities for intersubjective self-understanding and the (missing) capacities for the self-organization of society as a whole (Habermas, 1987:359).
This stands to identify the missing capacity or area that would allow society to recognise and ‘self-organise’ itself which, arguably, is already happening due to ICTs like the
Internet.
Habermas goes on to discuss the distribution of power in society and concludes that, due to the nature of capitalism and the commoditisation of almost everything (for example, information and problems), certain bodies effectively oppose each other in society.
These areas of opposition, like state and economy, “agree in assigning a merely passive role to the vulnerable domains of lifeworld [Habermas’ term for civil society] interaction” and, hence, continue the struggled divide whereas some modicum of resolution could be achieved through communication with the ‘lifeworld’ (Habermas,
1987:356).
He continues to argue how ‘technical rationalisation’ is threatening power politics in democracies for several reasons, including the selection of language used in media.
Habermas’ arguments in this case are similar to those of Weber. Habermas argues that the ‘clockwork’ of administrative society disrupts the natural outcomes of human interaction which occur spontaneously in his concept of the public sphere. He argues that the state has become dependent on “a media steered economic system” (Habermas,
1987:351) which has led to the assimilation of private and public power creating the only remaining true power in society: money. Here, it can be seen that Habermas is a post- structural socialist identifying Weber’s ([1905] 2002, 1947) ‘iron cage’ as predicted by
102 Arendt (1990, 1993) and Tocqueville’s (1839, 1848) materialist, as well as individualist, critiques.
What do these thoughts imply for representation? If Manin’s (1997) claims are correct and there appears to be a widening divide between government and citizen, and if
Habermas’s (1987) arguments are to be believed, it is probably definitive that the strengthening of the public sphere (whatever that may be) is the only answer for the mitigation of these ‘crises’ and should be a top priority for democracies.
4.4 Accountability
Monitory democracy (Keane, 2009:585) is described as a new style of democracy which emerged after 1945 with the advent of the United Nations and later the growth of international civil society (Keane, 2003:174) and has superseded representative governance. It is a style of democracy heavily laden with keeping the users of power accountable. ‘Monitory’ stems from transnational, multinational and international civil society (amongst other local and national bodies) monitoring sovereign states. An example would be the International Labour Organization (ILO), which has a committee of experts who produce observations and recommendations on a yearly basis for sovereign states to improve their labour standards. This monitoring, in itself, promotes accountability in a state by way of international peer pressure.42 Continuing, Keane
(2003) states,
… because of [civil society’s] propensity to monitor the exercise of power from a variety of sites within and outside civil society, global public spheres – when they function properly – put matters like representation, accountability, and legitimacy on the political agenda (Keane, 2003:174).
42 An example of how international standards (which are considered, depending on the context, either hard or soft laws, which are binding, or recommendations that are non binding) influence sovereignty can be seen through the analysis of legal cases where one party (for example, defence, prosecution, judge or jury) consults or uses an international standard stemming from the United Nations. Typically, especially in older, democratically-styled countries, international standards are the deciding factors in most cases.
103 Keane (2009:839) warns that monitory democracy’s effect on ‘democracy’43 itself can intrude to such an extent as to damage the sovereignty of the people in the state being monitored, so that a culturally relevant style of democracy becomes too difficult and irrelevant. That situation, as has been argued, can create civil frustration and create violence in an attempt to restructure power and redress injury (Keane, 2004).
Two parts relate to accountability in Oakeshott’s (1951, 1991, 1994, 2004) philosophy: first, Oakeshott’s (1991) thinking on teleocratic governments; second, his idea of
‘rationalism’ in politics. His distinction of teleocratic governments being based on institutions with a forced purpose, dictating to their citizens the direction of life, is rejected with his preference towards a non-teleocratic system based on morals, somewhat like an enterprise between people, needing no particular destination or purpose other than the fulfilment of personal satisfaction. It supports the notions of negative liberty, restricted top-down governance and argues for individuals to live in a system which grants them the freedom to pursue their own happiness.
Oakeshott’s second idea, the challenging of rationalism, adds more dimension to the notion of non-teleocratic governance by arguing that politics is not something that can be rationalised or left entirely in the ideological realm. Politics is a body sensitive to its populations. They are relegated to the character of communities and individuals, real institutions and people, and not abstract and technical ideology (1993). It is only after consulting Oakeshott’s lecture (1951) on political education that the complexity of his philosophies becomes clear. His ideal position is more of a cautious state, gradually changing and conservative in the Burkeian fashion in an effort to gain accountability and legitimacy in the politics of a state.
43 Keane (2009) describes democracy as the process by which people can organise their society on an equal basis without intelligence, lineage, power or other factors, excluding others, which, in effect, describes sovereignty in its original form.
104 Another area of accountability is justice. John Rawls’ (1999:35) idea of justice is commonly referred to as ‘justice as fairness’. “We cannot take for granted that there must be a complete derivation of our judgments of social justice from recognizably ethical principles.” He writes that those following an ‘intuitionist’ perspective of justice reason that it is necessary to have a “plurality of competing principles” (Rawls, 1999:35) whilst the opposite to this concept of justice would involve accounting “for the weights which, in our considered judgments, will think appropriate to give to the plurality of principles” (Rawls, 1999:35).
For there are matters which concern the interests of everyone and in regard to which distributive effects are immaterial or irrelevant. In this case the principle of the common interest can be applied. According to this principle institutions are ranked by how effectively they guarantee the conditions necessary for all equally to further their aims, or by how efficiently they advance shared ends that will similarly benefit everyone (Rawls, 1999:83).
The problem with his ‘principle of common interest’ is that it is a methodology based on subjective material. It is right in the sense of accountability, justice, equality and pluralism to consider the interests of every citizen in every law, but the public cannot be forced into voting on every law and a government would not be able to input or codify, in a timely manner, every opinion given from a large population.
Rawls’ (1999) provides a thought experiment. He details that typically in ‘original position’, ‘state of nature’, or ‘isolationist’ theoretical analyses each party is given the same rights. That is, each person involved in the experiment is given the same power to
“make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice” (Rawls,
1999:17). The thought of a classroom of children doing this experiment and the results collected and sent to government might be of some value. If a government keeps an accurate census of what their citizens are politically concerned with, it could be a useful
105 way to shift policy to meet their desires as can be seen in Rawls’ theory of “equilibrium”
(Rawls, 1999:18).
What he does not speak of is the idea of the ‘economic vanguard’, or the wealthy elite
(people or firms), who are needed by the capitalist system for investment and so on. If economic inequalities are arranged to maximise justice in his sense, then it could restrict the capital accumulation by the ingenious. The evidence in his work suggests for the state to be built in such a way as to not disrupt or hinder the market economy but, rather, produce a system that may engender basic human living conditions through proportional tax expenditure.
He argues for the improvement of legislation, taxation, society, as well as equality and he could ultimately be speaking of a multi-culturalism that is found in many of today’s democracies. Such multi-culturalism is hard to cater in terms of to legislation, as citizens are vastly different in minute respects, but similar in larger ones. The commentary he provides on the nature of ‘liberal democracy’ shows how it allows multi-culturalism to prosper (at least as far as the laws of the land permit). Rawls (1999) contributes to democracy because he brings ideas (rooted in equality) about ‘practicality’ in redistributive taxation (socialism in liberal democracies) and ‘justice as fairness’ in legislation to minimise social tensions. Rawls (1999) debates utilitarianism versus
Lockean liberalism and stakes his theories of justice on something of a balance between the two.
Sperling (2009) discusses the role that globalisation is playing regarding accountability in democratically-styled governments.
In many of its forms, globalization has had detrimental effects on accountability to citizens. Even where transnational forces – primarily transnational social movements and judicial institutions – have had positive effects on governmental accountability, those effects are quite limited, and significant accountability gaps persist (Sperling, 2009:319).
106 She details that transnational bodies and institutions are detrimental to the sovereignty of the state and, in that manner, reduce a citizen’s capacity to engage and affect their government’s policies. These transnational bodies restrict the opportunities for the public to assert itself (Sperling, 2009:319). However, Sperling (2009) does state that transnational bodies can increase accountability by working to enhance political participation (representation) and access to information (transparency). Logic, at this stage, shows that, if a transnational body engages in mitigating endemic governance problems, such will enable a sovereign state’s citizenry to develop their own culturally distinct style of democracy based on enhancing democratic particles. Keane’s (2009) argument regarding the ascension of “monitory” democracy (post-1945) solidifies
Sperling’s (2009) position.
Conversely, Ezzamel et al (2008:167) state that the Belfast Agreement places the responsibility for the formation of budgets clearly linked to policies and programmes squarely on the Executive. This requirement is not only found in Northern Ireland but also in both Scotland and Wales. Furthermore, all governments included in the study
(United Kingdom, United States of America, New Zealand, for example) expressed
an awareness of the need to go beyond the financial numbers to analyse and report on performance measures – activity statistics, outputs and/or outcomes (Ezzamel et al., 2008:172).
The authors mention that these improved accounting practices have led to increased accountability (specifically contributing to the peace process in Northern Ireland).
However, they neglected to discuss the manner in which budgetary information is provided to the citizenry. Questions which could have been focused upon include: At which stages is budgetary information provided to the citizenry and in which media? Is the information accessible and transparent? And, does the information include appropriate cross-referencing regarding the politicians drawing funds, why the money was needed, where it went, and what outcomes it provided? Budgetary information in the
107 case of Norway was said to be readily accessible, but the quality of information could have been better (Ezzamel et al., 2008:144).
4.5 Long-Term Goals
Sir Karl Popper (1971, 2003, 2002) argues the validity of scientific induction through his idea of ‘falsifiability’ (originally thought upon by Xenophanes of Colophon), which means that, if one counter-example exists, any generalisation made (even in the most precise science) cannot be true.
He is an advocate of gradualism, the notion of applying new laws in a careful and gradual manner, always listening to anyone with a complaint because it is impossible for any one person or group to have universal truth. However, his notion of history is that there are rules or laws within history, that can be interpreted by humans in order to help predict the future, which may contribute to reaching ‘truth’.
Modern historicists have been greatly impressed by the success of Newtonian theory and especially by its power of forecasting the position of the planets a long time ahead. The possibility of such long-term forecasts, they claim, is thereby established, showing that the old dreams of prophesying the distant future do not transcend the limits of what may be attained by the human mind. The social sciences must aim just as high. If it is possible for astronomy to predict eclipses, why should it not be possible for sociology to predict revolutions? (Popper, 2002:32).
Although Popper claims that ‘historicism’ breeds tyranny because it allows minorities to control society due to their education and ability to interpret or ‘forecast’ the coming of society (Popper, 2002:146-147), perhaps his idea of interpreting social movements or the laws inherent in history could be made to apply to democracy. Are there laws about democracies hidden in their pasts? Perhaps democratic particles and endemic problems are such ‘laws’ not that endemic problems cannot be overcome.
Finally, Peel (2001:316) writes that “only governments have the means and the legitimacy to tackle large-scale problems with long-term measures.” Also, Levi
108 (2001:87) argues for the need for governments to engage in institutional arrangements which promote the “collective benefit” and hints at long-term interests over short-term ones.
4.6 Campaigning Methods
Reilly (2001:102, 151) discusses accountability in his work on electoral engineering (the accountability problem in elections). Single-member versus multi-member districts, as well his debate concerning the merits of proportional representation, led to his use of accountability. Reilly (2001: 100, 115, 118) links voting with constitutional issues stating that
the 1987 coups saw the abandonment of the 1970 electoral arrangements, and the introduction in 1990 of a new, ethnically biased constitution which enshrined a racial weighting in favor of indigenous Fijians in both civil rights and political representation …(Reilly, 2001:100).
Furthermore, he also discusses the nature of campaigning (2001:71, 136), long-termism,
“the long-term impacts of apparently minor variations in electoral rules is a key aspect of electoral engineering that deserves greater recognition …” (2001:148), as well as
“crafting well-organized parties thus remains an important long-term goal of political engineering in the Third World” (Reilly, 2006:122). He also writes about elections dealing specifically with issues of representation. Mention of transparency as well as corruption is not present although both are clearly linked to political conflict.
Reilly (2006:32, 100) does address corruption whilst discussing political engineering in the Asia-Pacific region. “The resulting candidate-centred, intra-party competition [in
Japan] has been widely identified as a cause of factionalism, corruption, and clientalism
…”, which recalls the same ills experienced by the Romans of antiquity and recalls
George Washington’s warning concerning factionalism and the arousal of party passions.
Yet Reilly (2006) does not discuss transparency which is something that would have
109 been interesting to read given that he included six other endemic problems in his previous works.
Specifically concerning campaigning methods, Reilly (2001) links the changing nature of campaigning methods with the possibility of an increase in violence:
Such changes in the nature of campaigning have been among the most marked effects of the increasing incidence of election-related violence under [‘first past the post’ voting] (Reilly, 2001:88).
Reilly (2001:93) contributes to the argument that electoral systems are not ‘one size fits all’ when discussing that alternative voting promoted cooperative campaigning in Papua
New Guinea, as candidates could attempt to get the second preference position on ballots in districts outside of their clan boundaries. If, perhaps, a ‘first past the post’ mechanism were in place, such could not have happened.
Although it is necessary to recognise that voting mechanisms are diverse and should be tailored to the specific socio-economic situation where elections are being held, Ward
(2009) stipulated that campaigning methods (specifically post-modern, for example, using television and new technologies) are becoming an international standard from
Latin America to Europe and the South Pacific. What is needed, as was thematically seen in Gierzynski (2009), is a focus on equality in campaigning. Although this attention on equality is a growing trend,44 unless government, media and citizens change how they engage campaigns (Voltmer, 2006), it will be difficult to reduce the capital incentives needed to campaign for office.
Voltmer (2006) reveals that
it has been argued that political communication emerges from the interaction between the media, politicians, and citizens which entails a complex set of rules, normative expectations and routines that govern the day-to-day business of producing and disseminating messages to the wider public (Voltmer, 2006:215).
44 See recent Australian campaigning legislation: mandatory declaration of private donations of over $1,000 AUD and the declaration within 14 days of private donations over $100,000 AUD are two examples.
110 The nub of the argument rests on the fact that she not only expresses the need “for the transformation of media institutions and journalistic practices”, but also “a change of behaviour and orientations of political actors and citizens in this process” (Voltmer,
2006:215). However, Voltmer (2006) solely focuses on ‘new democracies’ such as
“Russia, South Africa, Chile, and Taiwan”. A comparative study of ‘old democracies’ with the issues of democratising political communication in ‘new democracies’ would reveal the inequities inherent in those ‘older’ communication systems.
Ward (2009:346), in his work concerning Australia’s post-modern campaigning methods, argues that an Australian political campaign firm titled ‘Crosby-Textor’ has been able to work with campaigns in countries other than Australia in settings which are very similar, if not the same, as those found in Australia itself.
Electioneering in Australia closely resembles the efforts of parties and candidates to woo and win voters in Europe and North America. Since the 1960s, the major Australian parties have sent employees to study, firsthand, campaigns in the United States and elsewhere. They then adapt those particular techniques which are thought to be useful. The national campaigns are centrally controlled, capital rather than labour intensive, make extensive use of technology and are primarily conducted through television (Ward, 2009:346).
Furthermore, Ward (2009) argues that campaigns begin well before parliament is dissolved and the campaigns deal specifically with the qualities of the candidates, rather than their mandates.
Gierzynski (2009) examines the nature of equality in the United States’ political campaign system. He argues that “free campaign finance systems will result in political inequality” (Gierzynski, 2009:151) if wealth is not evenly distributed in society. “On the other hand, if political equality is desired, freedom to give or spend will have to be restricted” (Gierzynski, 2009:151). He suggests that a middle ground, and government led, solution be sought due to inequality arising from private donations, since the added
111 leverage individuals or groups may have from their generous contributions leads to corruption.
The philosophy behind governmental regulation of campaign finance practices is that a private system of financing campaigns will … create political inequality (Gierzynski, 2009:155).
Much of Machiavelli’s work on the legitimacy of rule is not heavily explored. The reason his work is included under ‘campaigning methods’ is due to the recommendations he makes concerning how a prince is to stay in power.45 It is obvious to most readers that
Machiavelli was not a particular fan of human nature, with statements such as:
Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you (Machiavelli, 1515:80).
However, it is important to recognise Machiavelli’s background to truly understand what he wrote. His republicanism, nationalistic pride, concentration on the politics of making a powerful government during the Italian peninsula’s struggle against tyranny, and his trepidation concerning the practices of various government forms that can be used to rule a state are seen in The Prince (1515:1, 22).
An illustration of his strong emphasis of the state in the body of a prince can be seen in the following:
I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength (Machiavelli, 1515:67).
Adams and Dyson (2003) share that in The Discourses, Machiavelli explains a method he believes would permit a republic to endure and progress by “channeling the fundamentally selfish vigor of its citizens in publicly beneficial ways…” (Adams and
45 Keane (2009) also went on to show that monarchs were not specifically the sole authority of the land, but had to contend with the nobility, clerical estate and, often, town aldermen, as well as merchants. For a monarch to stay in power, they had to remain legitimate to their citizens and act in a manner designed to retain that legitimacy, hence, an almost constant state of campaigning, although in a different context.
112 Dyson, 2003:39). Machiavelli’s “underlying hope seems to be that a strong prince will one day unify Italy and that a republican form of government will thereafter emerge”
(Adams and Dyson, 2003:39). Machiavelli was trying to prepare a ruler in the ruthless world of politics by teaching him that nothing in politics is constant or continuous, that random occurrences often happen and that “for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil”
(Machiavelli, 1515:72). Through his explanation of ‘virtu’, he argues that it enables rulers to meet the blows of fate and turn them to their own advantage. The Prince (1515) contributes largely to this aspect of his argument, but discussions concerning ‘virtu’ can be found in his Discourses (1983:124) as well.
Machiavelli ([c.1520] 1983:124) was clear concerning the implications of ‘virtu’ for the rule of law. He wrote regarding the nature of law and the importance of equality amongst individuals. He makes mention of ‘a proper outlet’ which could point to a form of order through the use of law. In The Prince (1515:26), he argues that laws should be unambiguous and advertised, which can be related to a constitution and political communication. Troublingly, however, he does advocate extra-legal practical advice to the ruler of a republic which, in turn, mars the overall impact of his earlier discussions; perhaps similar to coating an apple in poison (from a democratic perspective, but useful advice to a ruler in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries).
We gain an idea of the impact Machiavelli had on British politics. Blackstone
(1765:169), in his discussion of democracy in the British parliamentary system, succinctly reveals some Machiavellian thought when debating suffrage.
With regard to the election of knights, citizens, and burgesses; we may observe that herein consists the exercise of the democratical part of our constitution: for in a democracy there can be no exercise of sovereignty but by suffrage, which is the declaration of the people’s will (Blackstone, 1765:169).
113 His Machiavellian tone comes about when discussing the need for a strong rule of law
(contrasting ancient Athens with Britain) in a democracy, as well as the qualifications of those who are to be elected as representatives of the people (Blackstone, 1765:169).
His use of the Athenian example to support his arguments regarding elections and his detailing of the voting practice in England (or, more generally, for the use of parliamentary institutions of his time) are consistent with the political writing of the eighteenth century.
4.7 Corruption
Arguing the relevancy of corruption to American democracy, Shumer (1979) states that the idea of corruption is not alien to American politics. The concept of corruption and the continuous promises by politicians and magistrates seeking election to mitigate it are
“major and recurrent themes at least from Andrew Jackson's spoils system to the
Watergate scandals, Carter's ‘outsider's’ presidential campaign, and the Korean lobby”
(Shumer, 1979:6). Continuing,
Good government meant non- partisan city elections, professional, nonpolitical city managers, and more businesslike procedures. The targets of the attack were obvious: appointments or government jobs and contracts to friends, relatives, or political supporters who were otherwise unqualified; government decisions and services as well as contracts in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or political support; and government by favor (Shumer, 1979:6).
Tocqueville (1848:428, 417, 353) also wrote of the effect that unanimity and egotism have on the individual in society, as well as the consequences such can have on civil society. His view of democracy is that of a government distributed over the whole of society, with citizens chosen through election to represent the others. There is equality between each citizen with no person greater or lesser than another. He introduces the idea that this equality lessens the intellectually or more meritorious individual as mass society becomes common. Tocqueville appears to have a constant fear of the tyranny of
114 the majority and the loss of the individual by the dilution of merit and increase of greed and materialism, as well as the loss of civic duty. He also warns of the possibility that the majority could be swayed by the executive body’s sinister plans during crises. He concludes that this is why democracy can be liberty’s enemy.
Burke is considered to be the original conservative and founder of that political viewpoint (Kirk, 2001:3). He tactfully described governments as running according to the necessity of precedence, traditions and, essentially, the past. This viewpoint was generally hostile to anything considered abnormal, or what Oakeshott (1994) called
‘rational politics’: fundamentally, the adoption of new practices, somewhat spontaneously, in government. This view of conservatism is seconded by a quote from
Abraham Lincoln, “what is conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried, against the new and untried?” (Kirk, 2001:8).
Burke furthers his thinking when explaining that changes in government occurred once men had become accustomed to, or adopted, whatever options or changes came about in society and government. He uses the British constitution as an example, stipulating how it is based on precedence (Burke, 2006:363). Lord Brougham (1861:1) agrees when discussing Britain’s mixed governmental history.
Burke’s ideas begin to shape the earlier meaning of ‘conservative’, which was to progress in politics through a gradual procedure. Being content with the past has advantages, mainly in the stability of government and society. Conservatism is not static politics, it just makes change harder. If such is based in transparent dialogue and using potentially helpful tools (see Chapter 7), it could be beneficial to society.
Exemplifying Burke’s conservative method is Lord Brougham’s (1861) description of democracy. In terms of benefits, he argues that rulers of a democracy have no interests detrimental to the public, that their personal ambition has no direction, that virtues such
115 as purity in both public officials and citizens are upheld, and that public resources are constantly guarded “while in war they are fully called forth” (Brougham, 1861:4). In terms of detriments, Lord Brougham reasons them to be that sovereign power is placed in ill-equipped hands because the holders of this power are not called to account and that they are beyond censure. He also makes mention of the tyranny of the majority which
“oppresses the humblest as well as the highest” (Brougham, 1861:4). He continues to describe factionalism46 as being more dominant in democracies than in aristocracies and concludes that
the administration of justice is constantly interfered with, especially of criminal justice. There is no security for steady and consistent policy, either in foreign or domestic affairs; a risk of entire and violent change attends the administration, and even the constitution and the peace of the country, as well abroad as at home, is in perpetual and imminent danger (Brougham, 1861:4).
Brougham’s (1861) description of Burke’s conservatism helps to further understand
Burke’s method. It is also an equal account of democracy’s virtues and vices based on
English social custom.
Burke clarifies the conservative method:
Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploring general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek, and they seldom fail, they think it more wise to continue the prejudice with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice, and to leave nothing but the naked reason … Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, and does not leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision …(Burke, 1770:130).
In other words, the use of precedence must be taken into account when debating change.
The application of Burke’s prejudice is necessary in order to keep a ‘steady course of wisdom and virtue’. What may seem odd to many who read Burke is that he was in favour of the English and American revolutions, however, he openly criticised the
French.
46 Connoting an increased risk of corruption and poor accountability (as seen in Chapter 4)
116 Burke states that both the British and American revolutions were based on the already established right of rebuking unlawful tyranny (through lack of representation and taxation respectively) of a king; whereas the French Revolution was a radical shift based on the emerging humanist values concerning the rights of man which had little precedence in French government (Burke, 1793:55).
Harrington’s philosophy can be linked to the capitalist nature of western democracies, at least in terms of land: “… equality of estates causeth equality of power, and equality of power is the liberty not only of the commonwealth, but of every man” (Harrington,
[1656] 1992:20). He continues his theory by dividing governments into camps using land as the main parameter. “That which is the matter of government is what we call an estate, be it in lands, goods, or money,” (Harrington, [1656] 1992:270). The argument
(Harrington, [1656] 1992:270-273) depicts the system by which land acts as its own check to the power of monarchy devolving some mixed feudal hierarchy—in essence, the more land a person has the greater power they should be given. Through the passing down of estates (breaking them up) and the subsequent division of goods and moneys over time, government begins to resemble a republic as there are more people with equal property, something much better for spawning democracy, as Harrington described using the growth of nobles in Venice (Harrington, [1656] 1992:105).
Harrington ([1656] 1992) is important to mention on another issue, the idea of the
‘impartial rule of law’.
Equal … law establishing and preserving the balance of dominion, by such a distribution that no one man or number of men within the compass of the few or aristocracy can come to overpower the whole people by their possessions in land (Harrington, [1656] 1992:33).
Although his practical suggestions to realise his philosophy are limited, he does come up with some fundamental structures of current democratic practice. He advocated rotation in office, elections for short terms only, no eligibility for immediate re-election, a secret
117 ballot, a bicameral legislature (Harrington, [1656] 1992:32-35) and cited antiquity
(biblical, Greek, Roman and his contemporary Italian city states, specifically Venice) heavily in his arguments. His progressive philosophies based on land requirements could seem familiar to a modern citizen, but they are still non-representative of what is currently practiced. Moreover, Harrington wrote about another commonly accepted virtue of the democratic state, that of education:
What ever was in the womb imperfect as to her proper work, comes very rarely or not at all to perfection; and a formation of the citizen in the womb of the commonwealth is his education (Harrington, [1656] 1992:197).
Finally, he advocated equality, impartial law, a commonwealth over monarchy, civil education and, notably, a republic (for example, representation, constitution and voting).
John Locke roughly takes up where Harrington left off, but elaborates the theory of liberty rather than on practical governmental strategies (Locke, [1689] 1821). Many of
Locke’s ideas concern the placement of the wealthier classes in eighteenth century
Britain. In so doing, he debated the merits and pitfalls of liberal governance and questioned the weakness of liberal practice. Despite these class-based arguments, Locke is regarded as the man of liberty and his writings have influenced the political perception of the individual. This is especially the case as his views were tempered by the English revolution and were one of the philosophical stepping stones used during the American and French revolutions.
His argument on the rights of the individual and anti-slavery was progressive.
The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature as his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it (Locke, [1689] 1821:205).
118 Arguments of this nature had a significant impact on the concept of individual rights and contributed to the ideas of representation and equality.47
Locke ([1689] 1821) wrote the notion of a ‘social contract’ emerging from a ‘state of nature’ (previously expounded by Hobbes and Machiavelli). He also argued concepts of taxation regarding individual consent and there is a brief mention that he believes that different offices within government should be given to different people, which is a precursor to the ‘separation of powers’ initiative (Locke, [1689] 1821:375-376). He makes further points on the nature of government, law and religion. For government, he advocates the “dissolution of the state” if the government breaches the trust of its citizens through various forms of tyranny (Lock, [1689] 1821:375). This argument can be linked to the influence of the English revolution. Furthermore, on the topic of law and religion, Locke writes of law in a similar manner to Harrington, in that it should be ordered and be equal within the commonwealth, and that religion is something practised by the individual and has little or no bearing on the commonwealth (Locke, [1689]
1821:302, 368). This evidence continues to support the themes of the rule of law and religious toleration (equality).
On the beginning of political society, Locke ([1689] 1821) stated that men in a state of nature are free, equal, independent, and protected from losing his private property. Man is not subject to the political will of another without his given consent. The only way,
Locke rightfully reasoned, that an individual can lose his natural freedom, “and puts on the bonds of Civil Society” (Locke, [1689] 1821:269) is by forming a social contract which binds other individuals with normative regulations in the effort of creating a mutually beneficent society “for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security
47 See Mary Wollstonecraft (1792) and Simone de Beauvoir (2007) for feminist contributions to equality in governance.
119 against any that are not of it” (Locke, [1689] 1821:269). These words, although restricted to the limited suffrage of men in seventeenth century England, spoke vitally of the shape democracy was to take in the coming centuries. His arguments concerning the need for liberty can be seen in the following:
The great end of Men’s entering into Society, being the enjoyment of their Properties in Peace and Safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the Laws establish’d in that Society; the first and fundamental positive Law of all Common-wealths, is the establishing of the Legislative Power; as the first and fundamental natural Law, which is to govern even the Legislative it self, is the preservation of the Society, and (as far as will consist with the publick good) of every person in it (Locke, [1689] 1821:301).
Locke’s liberalism defined the political meta-narrative often assumed to be ‘a given’ in any western society, but it was an idea hard fought over in Britain, as men resisted tyrannical monarchy in the quest for their desired style of governance.
4.8 Constitutional Issues
Sharswood (1860) describes the significance of a check on the majority in parliamentary votes during his discussion on the problems of parliamentary government. He argues that homogeneous aggregates form during elections and these bodies create a variety of large and small majorities within legislatures. The result of this is that both majority branches
“may not truly represent the views of a majority of all the voters” (Sharswood, 1860:49).
Furthermore, although the basic numerical majority is trusted with the formation of the executive magistrate as well as the treasury “it has long been a prevailing opinion that something more than a bare numerical majority should be required in the passage of laws” (Sharswood, 1860:49). He stipulates that stability in financial and jurisprudential matters is so important that popular excitement or a neutral party strong enough to frequently sway government is “injurious to the best interests of the commonwealth
[long-term goals]” (Sharswood, 1860:49).
120 In continuation of these previous points, he states that
the difficulty is, and has been felt to be, how to arrange such a system which, while not denying to the numerical majority its legitimate influence, will operate to afford such a check upon it as to secure the rights and interests of the minority [equality, law, communication]. Perhaps the adoption of a different basis for the two branches, as of territory for the Senate, and of population for the lower house, comes nearer practicability than any other plan (Sharswood, 1860:49).
At the end, Sharswood (1860) offers a potential institutional change for the improvement of the American parliamentary system. He (1860:49) writes that the “supreme power in every state” is with the citizenry. Sharswood explains that although Blackstone considers the juri summi imperii (right of sovereignty) to be with legislators it is more reasonable to view the government as a “mere agency established by the people for the exercise of tose powers which reside in them” (Sharswood, 1860:49). He finishes his argument stating that “the powers of the government, are not, in strictness, granted, but delegated, powers. As all delegated powers are, they are trust powers and may be revoked”
(Sharswood, 1860:49).
Sharswood (1860) did not challenge the origins of the social contract, as Blackstone
(1765:48) did, nor had he broached the subject of why common people were not part of the constitutional deliberations of the United States government. However, he did state that even in the ‘freest nations’ the consent of the entire citizenry “has never been expressly obtained” (Sharswood, 1860:49) in his discussion of voting qualification. He continues to discuss the nature of delegated powers arguing that government does not hold sovereignty in any way. He stipulates that sovereignty “resides in the body of the state” (Sharswood, 1860:49) by the consent of its citizens and that sovereignty conceptualised in this manner can only be divisible “by voluntary or forced subjection to, or merger with, some other state or people” (Sharswood, 1860:49).
121 Sharswood (1860) showed that women, Africans, native Amerindians and other minorities in the population were probably not consulted during the drafting of the
American constitution. This has important implications for the modern realm as it, once again, brings to the fore the question of constitutional applicability in societies that are: far removed from whence the constitution was drafted; were omitted during the drafting of the constitution; and the previous two categories in relation to constitutional reform.
Popular French political contributions of the revolutionary period are generally observations of American and English societies, but also stem from French society and the hard lessons learned from the French Revolution (1779). Mons (1790) relates to the
Revolution as follows,
The distance to which I am now removed from France, affords me full liberty to despise those prejudices, and censure those errors, which have led my countrymen, instead of rational and manly assertors of freedom, to become the persecutors of their fellow citizens. Amidst the noise of faction and popular tumults, you cannot view the late revolution of our government with a philosophic eye, nor judge of the conduct of individuals with that freedom and indifference which impartiality requires (Mons, 1790:1).
This critical assessment depicts the continued presence of factionalism (associated with representation) as well as violence (a democratic antithesis), displaying a lack of legitimacy concerning the rule of law and communication.
Mons (1790) provides an explanation of one contemporary French constitution. He argued that the assembly which framed a new constitution drew on the experiences of other countries in order to make their own constitutional model designed to ensure freedom so much the better. “If no sinister accident obstruct their process, and obscure the glorious prospect before them, a system of the most perfect liberty that has ever obtained among men, will be the result of their labours” (Mons, 1790:5-6). A criticism of the French Revolution emerged from Burke (1793).
In that constitution, elective temporary, local judges, such as you have contrived, exercising their dependent functions in a narrow society, must be the worst of all tribunals. In them it will be vain to look for any appearance
122 of justice towards strangers, toward the obnoxious rich, toward the minority of routed parties, toward all those in the election supported unsuccessful candidates (Burke, 1793:115).
In the last quote, Burke (1793) shows disdain for violence, radicalism and a lack of legal consistency. He argues that French democracy is so perfidious and straying from classical examples that he criticizes the revolutionaries across the channel for taking a less tempered route to new government.
To offer understanding as to the inherent difficulty of conducting a challenge to government using non-violent methods and as to how revolution can be ruinous, Mons
(1790:3) explains that the abuses of government cannot be righted solely with reason nor can despotic power be crushed through argument along. It seems he advocates the occasional need for violence. Continuing, he reasons that although men of liberal education understand the benefits of liberty, the multitude does not. When popular masses are worked up by these educated men, and when popular passions are so “wound up to that high pitch necessary to effect this grand purpose, human wisdom can seldom direct their operation; no foresight can determine their consequences” (Mons, 1790:3).
Even after the spark of freedom has, thus, been kindled among the illiterate multitudes, plots, assassinations and pretended conspiracies are the gross nutriment by which it is fed. Therefore, a populace suddenly animated by a spirit of liberty and incapable of comprehending, far less of pursuing, a confident or systematic plan to acquire its object, is like the dreadful monster of the ancient poet: Horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum [A monster frightful, formless, immense, with sight removed— The Aeneid, (III, 658) (Mons, 1790:3).
The only solace offered—to this rampant beast—by Mons (1790:4) is the proportion of
French citizens who lost their lives during the revolution. He claimed that some
“obnoxious characters” and “innocent lives” were lost, but these are small in comparison to the entire population. He justifies the loss of lives by the coming of liberty and the end of despotism.
123 Continuing with the attacks by Burke (1793:46) upon the French Revolution, he uses the theatre as a metaphor for comparing the criminality recorded during the Revolution. He reasons that no classical Athenian audience would have been able to tolerate the tragedy experienced by the people of France during the revolution. He argued that the protagonist of the play, weighing the benefits and detriments of new French democracy, would so pain the audience by the criminality of it all, that they would not be able to tolerate it. He stakes his critique of the French Revolution
in the moment of riot and drunken delirium from the hot spirit drawn out of the alembic of hell, which in France is now so furiously boiling, we should uncover our nakedness by throwing off that Christian religion that has hitherto been our boast and comfort, and one great source of civilization amongst us and amongst many other nations, we are apprehensive (being well aware that the mind will not endure a void) that some uncouth, pernicious, and degrading superstition might take place of it (Burke, 1793:51).
Burke (1793) continues to contrast the shortcomings of the French Revolution by explaining the English methodology or ‘constitution’. He argues that the English method of mitigated radicalism had the formation of clear governmental alternatives which would be in place for a transition from one type of government to another as had occurred during the Glorious Revolution. He is clear in his argument that the French, in all their folly, did not have an adequate alternative and as such deserved to suffer the penalties they incurred on themselves (Burke, 1793:51).
On these ideas, instead of quarreling with establishments, as some do who have made a philosophy and a religion of their hostility to such institutions, we cleave closely to them. We are resolved to keep an established church, an established monarchy, an established aristocracy, and an established democracy, each in the degree it exists, and in no greater (Burke, 1793:51).
Burke pondered the definition or classification of the state of French government. He is not sure how to classify the ruling body in 1793 France. Is it a pure democracy? Is it a
“mischievous and ignoble oligarchy” (Burke, 1793:69)? In the end he reasons that whatever the ruling class is trying to be, that it certainly is not. He also discusses
124 democracy’s resemblance of tyranny (1793:70) as well as the problems associated with the rule of law in French democracy (1793:116).
Offering an opposing view to Burke (1793), Baker (1990), in discussing the French philosopher Saige ([1770] 1781), writes
… only gross ignorance of the general will could have allowed political writers to claim that an absolute monarch could represent the will of the nation … Nothing is more ridiculous than the idea of intelligent beings delegating one individual – or several – to express their will. [Quoting Saige] ‘It follows that people who have representatives possess as little freedom as those who are subjects to a despot, for the will of a nation can no more reside in four hundred men than in one’. Only in a true democracy, where sovereignty is exercised by the entire body of citizens, can liberty be effectively preserved as the essence of the political body (Baker, 1990:137).
He continues quoting from Saige ([1776] 1977) that the only legitimate constitution is one found in a state described as a democracy “since that which is called ‘monarchy’
(and which is only a moderated despotism) and that which is called ‘aristocracy’ (which is only the despotism of a few) cannot be legitimate” (Saige, 1977:107). Furthermore,
in a true republic, nothing can deprive the citizen, as member of the association, of the right to give his opinion in the affairs that concern it, and it is from the majority of these opinions that there results the general will, which cannot be known in any other way (Saige, 1977:107).
A lesson learned from the French Revolution, as argued by Mons (1790:2-3), is that
“popular prejudices and party-zeal are the dangerous instruments laid hold of and employed equally by the patriot and the usurper”. It is evident that the direction democracy has taken in the past two hundred years or so has not been in the direction of
Saige’s predictions. Most notably the paradox of representative democracy, in which a country is still exemplifying oligarchic natures if people are represented. The obverse side of this viewpoint is that representation was necessary to conduct democratic governance in countries with a large or politically inactive citizen body.
Distinguished as having mathematical or scientific (deductive) reasoning in his political philosophy, a reasoning which he believed assured the validity of his conclusions, was
125 Hobbes ([c 1640] 1994). In Leviathan (Hobbes, [1651] 2002), he uses linear presumptions in his logic based on theories pertaining to human behaviour in order to pursue his ‘scientific method’. This reasoning most likely set the precedent for political thinkers to view politics as a science more than an art, which, arguably, dehumanised politics by regarding the individual as more of a cog in the political wheel. Hobbes’ mode of thought is, thus, exemplified by his understanding of politics. He argues that it is first necessary to analyse the smallest details of social bodies by which he means looking at individuals. “Then, having studied the properties and behaviour of those parts in isolation, we can deduce from them, as it were from first principles, rational conclusions about social and political organization” (Adams and Dyson, 2003:52).
Continuing, Spinoza (1996) critiques Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’ approach to democracy.
He characterized democracy as a natural form of government because the individuals composing a democratic society are presumed equal, “as they were in the state of nature, and because democracy approaches most nearly to the freedom of the state of nature”
(Spinoza, 1996:317). Furthermore, in a democracy,
no one so transfers his natural right onto another that in the future there is no consultation with him; instead he transfers it to the greater part of the whole society, of which he makes one part (Spinoza, 1996:317).
Sharswood (1860) then synthesises these philosophies by giving an historical account of the English Constitution. He begins by describing the disadvantages of the British feudal system.
It may be a general unlimited delegation of all the power of the people to predescribed functionaries … The king, Lords, and Commons are vested with unlimited power. They can change at any time the established form of the government, and have done so in many instances, as in the change of the succession to the throne, the powers and organization of the Lords and House of Commons (Sharswood, 1860:48).
126 He explains that the function of the constitution is mainly to place restrictions on the power of the monarchy, aristocracy, and citizenry (Sharswood, 1860:48). No “court in
England would” support a law that parliament passed if it were against those principles.
And if it could not be repealed by the force of the popular will, by the same power which made it, it would have to be submitted to as the law of the land, unless the people chose to resort to a revolution (Sharswood, 1860:48).
Downing (1991) shows an impact of English constitutionalism on the modern era explaining that after two periods of Stuart rule, the English parliament grew suspicious of monarchical power. Parliament strengthened its position through the creation of
“oversight committees to work with the royal chancery on taxation, war policy, and other matters of national import” (Downing, 1991:178) which invariably created the institution of the cabinet in the executive so commonly known today in a variety of governments.
The lower house of Parliament convened more often than the House of Lords and limited that ability of the monarch to control or dissolve sessions which “signalled the initial infusion of legislature and executive, a central feature of modern parliamentary government” (Downing, 1991:178). Downing argues that parliament in England had developed from “awkward estates only loosely integrated with the monarchal chancery, and becoming an effective political body capable of assuming more state functions”
(Downing, 1991:178) over time. He (1991:179) continues,
local autonomy was treated roughly at times by Parliament, but it reasserted itself in the years leading up to and following the Restoration. No commanding bureaucracy or unlimited monarch ever emerged (Downing, 1991:179).
In this sense, the British efforts to check regal influence over the state helped to strengthen the notions of representation, rule of law and accountability.
Finally, it is agreed with Adams and Dyson (2003) that Hobbes’ work is easy to understand once it is “reduced to its essentials” (2003:56). By only considering the worst behaviour known to humans as the state of nature, the only way for a great number of individuals to live together is if they are subject to a higher coercive authority like a
127 government which serves to mitigate humanity’s “destructive tendencies” (2003:56).
This take on Hobbes’ philosophy is contrasted by Skinner’s (1996) more positive view.
Skinner (1996) argued that Hobbes achieved an “objective science of virtue” (1996:325) which highlighted the importance of maintaining peace and seeking it.
4.9 Conclusion
Transparency, representation, accountability, long-term goals, constitutional issues, corruption and campaigning methods were the main foci. It became clear that endemic governance problems were experienced and thought about from the seventeenth century onwards.48 It was also clear that certain endemic problems, such as representation, constitutional issues and accountability, were more closely scrutinised than long-term goals and transparency. The inference gained is that these problems were not resolved through the various political ideologies (liberalism, conservatism, socialism, for example) discussed. It is also evident that certain thinkers focussed heavily on voters and voting mechanisms, but very little on equality in campaigning methods between those vying for election.
There were also instances where Athens and Rome were used as ideological platforms by original thinkers, such as James Mill. This consolidated the logical flow from Chapter
3 to Chapter 4.
By engaging revolutionary era England, France, United States of America and more modern thinkers, evidence of endemic governance was seen, firstly, by discussing transparency; secondly, through the analysis of representation; thirdly, the scrutiny of accountability; fourthly through the brief examination of long-term goals; fifthly via the
48 There is a considerable amount of work dealing with the period between the classics and the seventeenth century. Should the reader adopt the endemic governance problems perspective whilst investigating those periods, endemic problems are easily tracked.
128 investigation of campaigning methods; sixthly by discussing the subject of corruption; and seventhly by revealing constitutional issues.
This investigation delineated the progression of endemic problems from the seventeenth century to the more recent modern period of thinkers and completes the historical analysis. As these problems are now seen to have been present in the political periods that served to define the methods of governance which are in use today, it is reasonable to begin developing research questions that will seek to show their presence in the most recent time period: the present.
129 SECTION TWO: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
Introduction
Now that the intended historical and modern thematic analyses have been argued, it is, at this time, useful to examine texts somewhat removed from academic literature. The international realm of democratisation provides information that can be scrutinised to gain a better sense of how endemic governance problems affect modern governments.
There is a potential that this material could provide evidence contrary to the extant literature. There is also the potential that results will not be different from their academic counterpart. The usefulness of this particular area of investigation lies with the empirical study: It can very well bring to light an original contribution to political discourse through the analysis of endemic problems and democratic particles.
There are certain publications which have used material from NGOs and MNOs to make their arguments, similar to the methodology used herein. Wolf et al. (1996) cited
Freedom House (an NGO supporting democratisation) to argue their case; Kaaya (2004) utilised content analysis to examine government websites and drew from the UNDP,
World Bank and others to support her analysis of e-government in East Africa; whilst
Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal (2006) cited a UNDP report to support their ends. These examples show that the method of drawing from non-academic literature, in concert with academic works, is rather common.
Fourteen documents derived from eleven different international organisations and non- governmental organisations, often in association with universities or research centres, have been used as the primary data source for the conceptual analysis. The analysis is broken into two stages: the first is a textual and qualitative analysis of the 14 documents which can be found in Chapter 5 (page 136); the second is a quantitative analysis using frequency and proximity analysis methods, and is discussed in Chapter 6 (page 179).
130 Endemic governance problems have been a consistent series of trouble spots for governments (not only those democratically-styled). As has already been seen, endemic problems will be a major part of this conceptual analysis. However, the opportunity now presents to delve a bit further into the data and investigate the added question of how endemic problems, if mitigated, could heighten democratic particles and modify the behaviour of democratic associates (which have been recognised as existing in tandem with democratically-styled governments).
Democratic particles (selection of officials, communication, law and equality, see
Chapter 1) form the foundation of the democratic element in the state government apparatus. Commensurate with these four particles are five associates (taxation, trade, media, bureaucracy and military) which are, as stated, typically seen in conjunction with a democratically-styled government. Recollect that these associates are not mandatory for a democracy to operate, but are typically used by democratic states and, as such, have relevance to the element of democracy. The rationale behind quantitatively analysing democratic particles and its associates relates inherently to how they interact with endemic governance problems (and, to a lesser extent, each other). In that respect, this analysis is conducted to gain a better sense of whether or not mitigating seven endemic problems will have the effect of increasing the element of democracy at any level of government (regardless of a state’s official political orientation).
This conceptual analysis research is important for several reasons. The first is due to its role in providing evidence to argue the final segment of the thesis statement (see Chapter
1). The results indicate that, indeed, endemic governance problems are still present in modern, democratic discourse. As it will be seen in the qualitative and quantitative analyses, some endemic problems are more prevalent than others. There are also some endemic problems which are less prevalent or all together missing in the analysed literature. This is a dilemma in itself, as the missing problems confirm an historical
131 trend. This line of investigation provides evidence that law and elections are more prevalent, internationally, over the topics of communication and equality. Further, a greater understanding of the relationship between endemic problems and democratic particles (as well as democratic associates), revealed the relationship that certain themes have with each other, which could help to indicate which endemic problems to target in the effort of mitigating them.49 Secondly, it allows for the consummation of the ‘mixed methods’ approach, in that it provides an area of synthesis between the literature and empirical body. Lastly, this research contributes to the prescriptive measures regarding the mitigation of endemic governance problems (Chapter 7).
Taking a step back from the conceptual analysis briefing, it is prudent to explain the logic used throughout this thesis which has led to this point. The literature review initially revealed a gap regarding the critique of the institutions of democracy (coupled with Chapter 3). This provided the justification for the analysis of original thinkers in
Chapter 4 since, it was assumed, a body of political philosophers would have the greatest opportunity to critique the democratic foundation. There had been little to no research concerning the basic democratic foundations since Tocqueville and the Federalists
(Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999:51) some two hundred years ago and the analysis conducted of original thinkers supports this argument. There has been no wholesale, only piecemeal, re-evaluation of basic democratic institutions for well over two hundred years. This, in conjunction with the historical scrutiny of endemic problems, led to a further need for an empirical study. Not only is it necessity to answer a fundamental aspect of the thesis statement50 but, also, a strong incentive to gauge whether or not
NGOs and MNOs are challenging democratic theory (it has turned out that, similar to academia, NGOs and MNOs are approaching democratic reform in piecemeal ways). As
49 Democratic particles and associates were also analysed separately via frequency and proximity analysis. This was done to better understand their prevalence and behaviour in the text, allowing for better conclusions to be drawn when endemic problems are analysed for proximity with them. 50 Are endemic problems still present?
132 will be shown, the mitigation of endemic governance problems may actually provide a large scale critique of governance, notably of the present institutions of democracy.
The empirical approach (qualitative and quantitative) has revealed that accountability, transparency, corruption, law, media, elections and representation are all issues given considerable attention. NGOs and MNOs focus on law and election heavily, probably because of their importance to ensuring a peaceful government due to their work in democratisation and development. Academia, as well as NGOs and MNOs, however, did not substantially address long-term goals, constitutional issues, campaigning methods nor varied techniques for the selection of officials. These neglected areas may prove to be of importance to advancing governance and would, most likely, enhance democracy, if used in tandem with the mitigation of other endemic problems.
Questions Derived from Academic Literature
As explained, both frequency and proximity analyses are to be conducted to answer a variety of questions, the results of which contributed to answering the final aspect of this thesis (are modern problems the same as historical ones?). The analyses are also used for the consolidation of the ‘mixed methods’ approach and provide data to draw from in the next section, when discussing prescriptive measures (the ‘answer’ to the thesis statement,51 Chapter 7).
The evidence, to this point in time, has shown that there are seven specific problems which have been areas of concern for governments over the past 3500 years. This has been ascertained through a thematic argument of various important, and democratic, periods of governance. The reason democratically-styled governments were the focus of the thematic analysis rests on the conceptual framework that democracy is an element
51 If an historical pattern of problems and resolutions within democracy is related to, or are the same or similar to, modern problems within democratic theory and practice, then new methodologies to ratify these problems may improve democracy (see page 32, literature review).
133 present in every state government apparatus regardless of government ideology (see introduction). As such, if endemic governance problems are present in democratically styled governments, then it may be that, by mitigating these endemic problems, the democratic element in government may be enhanced.
With that established, the first question to investigate in the empirical study is whether or not endemic governance problems can be shown to be in existence in many current governments. If the inferences derived from the thematic analysis can be shown through this method, then the ideological basis for recommending prescriptions for the institutional change of basic governance structures will be complete.
If the analysis shows that endemic problems are still prevalent in modern governments it becomes necessary to ascertain the way in which these problems interact with democratic particles and associates. An understanding of that particular interaction is needed to show whether or not endemic problems are distinctively tied to the element of democracy and what this relationship is like. This will be achieved through the use of both frequency and proximity analyses, as well as the use of cognitive mapping to visually represent the conceptual matrix. In the process of answering this second question, the opportunity will also be taken to determine whether or not democratic associates are linked to democratic particles. That, rather more marginal, investigation could contribute some scientific backing to the underlying conceptual framework in this thesis.
The final question, which is possibly the hardest to answer, is exactly how or if these empirical results can aid in the formulation of recommendations for the mitigation of endemic problems. This is undertaken to ascertain whether new information regarding governmental reform can be derived from the analysis of the data. If such is actually attainable, then it would provide a new host of information that could be used by states
134 or civil society to better their government structures. The method used in the attempt to find new information consists of the comparison of concepts (that is, how differing concepts relate to each other) through proximity analysis and cognitive mapping. It is believed that the investigation and representation of data, based on the conceptual framework already established, could produce findings independent of those present in academic literature.
135 Chapter 5: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
Fourteen separate documents originating from international NGOs and MNOs are to be used as the foundation for frequency and proximity analyses. At this stage, the concern lies with an initial textual (qualitative) analysis of the documents themselves, so as to gain a better understanding of exactly what each seeks to accomplish. In this way, we can ascertain the nature of the works and that will give greater insight into the empirical results to come. This will be accomplished, firstly, by examining each document separately to answer several questions (What is the goal of the document? What are the major themes discussed? How is it related to the previous literature in the thesis?); secondly, by providing a summary of the results for each document; and thirdly, by relating how this material formed the questions in the empirical study.
Fairclough (2003:21) argues that texts are parts of social events. He suggests that texts considered in relation to social events will aid in their analysis, as researching them without a greater context may omit valuable information such as the relevance of certain inferences. ‘Social agents’ (globalisation for example) within a text are thus required to be scrutinised as the ‘agency’ of the language used can provide useful indicators of underlying assumptions, hidden agendas and/or bias. Silverman (2006:129) suggests that a series of questions must be asked in order to understand the ethnography of a text.
Similar to Fairclough (2003), both ethnography and social agency are tools used to reveal social constructs within the text. Social agency caters more to the grand-narrative depiction of events, such as globalisation, whilst ethnography aids in the opposite by interpreting, for example, for whom the text has been written, and for what purpose
(essentially the smaller things). Both sets of perspectives are important accompaniments to the identification of themes and will allow for an understanding of how the texts relate to each other, as well as how they relate to this thesis.
136 5.1 Texts Analysed
The 14 texts referred to above, come from 11 different non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and multinational organisations (MNOs); four publications are co-authored and five documents come from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The 11
NGOs and MNOs whose work will be analysed are:
(1) The United Nations (UN) with the International Parliamentary Union (IPU):
(i) World E-Parliament Report, 2008;
(2) Transparency International (TI):
(i) Global Corruption Report 2007, 2007;
(3) The United Nations Development Program:
(i) Ideas and Contributions: Democracy in Latin America, 2004;
(ii) Engaging Parliaments in the Millennium Development Goals: A Key Part of
National MDG Strategies, 2007;
(iii) Governance for the Future: Democracy and Development in the Least
Developed Countries, 2006;
(iv) The Handbook on Working With Political Parties, 2006a;
(v) Pro-Poor Urban Governance: Lessons from LIFE 1992-2005, 2005;
(4) The World Movement for Democracy with the National Endowment for
Democracy:
(i) Advancing Democracy: Justice, Pluralism, and Participation, 2006;
(5) The Parliamentary Centre with the World Bank:
(i) Parliamentary Accountability and Good Governance: A Parliamentarian’s
Handbook, 2008;
(6) International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance:
(i) Democracy at the Local Level in East and Southern Africa: Profiles in
Governance, 2004;
(7) The Council for a Community of Democracies:
137 (i) A Diplomat’s Handbook: For Democracy Development Support, 2008;
(8) The World Bank in Association with ParlCent (2008);
(9) The International Parliamentary Union:
(i) Law and Justice: The Case for Parliamentary Scrutiny, 2006;
(10) The Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption in association
with the Parliamentary Centre:
(i) Controlling Corruption: A Parliamentarian’s Handbook, 2005; and
(11) The Organization of American States in association with International IDEA:
(i) Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns in the Americas, 2005.
The criteria for these organisations to be included and not others was that:
(a) they needed to be at least 20 years in operation or have been started by an NGO or
MNO that is 20 years old or older. An example of this can be seen by the National
Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) initiative in creating the World Movement
for Democracy (WMD) in New Delhi, 1999;
(b) they have a variety of publications to choose from;
(c) they have an international focus in their publications; and
(d) their publications must be centred on either endemic problems, democratic
particles, associates or other matters related to democracy (for example,
parliament, democratisation, political parties).
Thus, after compiling an initial list of 19 various NGOs and MNOs, the selection criteria produced 11 eligible candidates.
The only exception to the rule of ‘age’ comes in the form of the Council for a
Community of Democracies (CCD) which, in Warsaw in 2000, established an agreement for democratic cooperation between 106 independent states. The CCD is an MNO representing diverse information from governments themselves. Omitted organisations,
138 such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières, were not eligible for this study. They had international scope and were over 20 years in operation, but did not work primarily with democratic issues. This was ascertained by investigating their publications. Amnesty International had many publications on human rights violations and Médecins Sans Frontières had works concerning the banning of land mines.
After a list of eligible organisations was established, it was then necessary to identify which documents matched the study criteria. The publications with the largest volume
(in terms of pages) and relevance (in terms of subject matter) were chosen for conceptual analysis. In this way, the analysis will have enough data to be representative of the discourse in international democratic affairs. If other (smaller, younger) NGOs and
MNOs were selected, this process would not be as effective and could be subject to attack on the grounds of misrepresentation and irrelevance to the thesis argument, due to the narrow scope and lack of depth these other organisations could have created.
Furthermore, other NGOs, and even smaller bodies of work or papers from the included
NGOs, were omitted due to the lack of depth, both in terms of volume and argument.
Substantial volume is required for the proximity analysis to be effective as an in-depth argument or position is staked out and provides a greater chance of interaction between terms maximizing the relevancy of proximity stage analysis. If the methodology comprised solely of a frequency analysis, then it would not matter if a document was short or long, as many smaller works could then be chosen to show the predominance of the terms.
As has been seen, some bodies, such as the CCD, only have one publication under scrutiny (CCD, 2008), whilst others, such as International IDEA or UNDP, have several
(OAS and IntIDEA, 2005; IntIDEA, 2004; UNDP, 2004; UNDP, 2007; UNDP, 2006).
This is due to the fact that many of the larger organisations (including the World Bank)
139 often cooperate when compiling research. This cooperation also happens with smaller
NGOs, as well as academic centres attached to university bodies (such as Princeton; see
CCD, 2008). Thus, the reason that several documents were chosen from the UNDP (5),
International IDEA (2), the Parliamentary Centre (2), and the Inter-Parliamentary Union
(2) is partly to do with cooperation, but also that there was more than one document fitting the criteria by these organisations.
An issue arises about the possibility of over-representation of certain viewpoints by the
UNDP. With the largest amount of documents coming from one MNO, it is reasonable to infer that there could be a bias in the data. However, there is little to suggest a contamination of the data by the over-representation of the UNDP in the population for the reason that there are many authors for each published document, as well as many different individuals, groups and organisations which aided in the research. There is, perhaps, more chance of bias emanating from a popular academic publisher than there is from the UNDP, due to the different editors found in each document published by the
MNO. In fact, the UNDP is careful to state that
the report is an independent work commissioned by UNDP. It is the result of collaboration between a group of prestigious consultants and advisers and the team that produced the Report on Democracy in Latin America (UNDP 2004, copyright page).
Similar statements are made in other UNDP (2006a, 2005, 2007) documents. There is also evidence in both the qualitative and quantitative analyses which show that all documents share common themes. This indicates a balanced, non-biased perspective by the UNDP and other organisations that may have a more pronounced presence in the data pool. If it were not so, there most likely would be a noticeable deviance in the data during one or more of the analyses.
The documents selected for the analysis concern democratic reform either in the way of a ‘handbook’ (ParlCent, 2008; GOPAC, 2005; UNDP, 2006a; CCD, 2008) or a more
140 academically oriented analysis and research (UNDP, 2004; UNDP, 2005; WMD, 2006).
The orientation in the handbook formats varies from the academically-styled mostly in presentation, narrative and contextual depth. A quick comparison of the CCD’s (2008) handbook on diplomacy with the UNDP’s (2004) Latin American research depicts these differences.
The UNDP (2004:21) states that “it is through both politics and economics that it is possible ‘to expand people’s choices’, in other words to achieve human development.”
This statement is broad and directional. It tells the reader the ideological presumptions upon which the upcoming research is based. This is similarly done in the CCD (2008) text, when John Dunn is quoted.
Democracy is not an end in itself. As a form of governance relying on the consent of the governed, democracy is a means of fulfilling individual lives and pursuing common purposes. As such, democracy expresses human aspirations which are judged to be universal (CCD, 2008:1).
Where the divergence occurs is in the methodology. Whilst handbooks offer a more practical methodology, research documents analyse, summarise and contextualise events.
Thus CCD (2008:10) goes on to reveal the “Diplomat’s Toolbox” and UNDP (2004:24-
26) jumps into an executive summary of their research results.
These documents from international organisations offer a global perspective, often not limited to geo-political regionalism or specific government types. Some documents are instructive to the employees of the organisations (UNDP, 2006a; UNDP 2007), offering information about general practice rather than specific country delineation. In the instance where there are delineations (WMD, 2008; IntIDEA, 2004), it is most often in the discussion of ‘democratic’ states with globalisation, internationalism or local governance as notable social agencies. Due to the international and depth-oriented selection criteria that determined which organisations and their publications can be used
141 for this analysis, the findings in the empirical body are representative of the modern international, democratic discourse and, as such, are central to this thesis.
5.2 A Qualitative Look at the Evidence
The Parliamentary Centre (ParlCent) and the World Bank (WB) (2008) wrote a parliamentary accountability handbook in order to increase good governance.
Accountability is based on the authors’ perceived need for balance in governance, as indicated here:
We would go further and suggest that after all the ideological sound and fury of the twentieth century, a consensus of sorts is beginning to emerge around the importance of balance in governance (ParlCent and WB, 2008:9).
The practices of accountability in governance stem from the analysis of two reports
(“Human Development in South Asia 1999, prepared by the Mahbub ul Haq Human
Development Centre of Pakistan and Entering the 21st Century, the 2000 World
Development Report of the World Bank” (ParlCent and WB, 2008:9)) in the handbook.
These reports denote several steps to be taken by governments, mainly in South Asia, for the improvement of their human development (ParlCent and WB, 2008:9-10).
Furthermore, the documents which ParlCent and WB (2008:9-10) draw from link accountability, transparency and law, as well as equality, long term citizen-based goals
(known as “collective vision”), and a balance between financial prudence, partnerships with civil society and independence from “assistance agencies”. It is clear that ParlCent and WB’s (2008) notion and use of accountability in governance is well delineated, of international scope and backed by substantial research.
During an explanation of the intricacies of good governance, ParlCent and WB
(2008:10) depict the “Ecology of Governance”. Figure 5.1 visually represents the idea that “parliament should serve as a bridge between state and society, facilitating the participation of citizens in their own government” (ParlCent and WB, 2008:10). The
142 interconnectivity of civil society, state and marketplace is a common explanation of the modern state. It is the addition of ‘active citizens’ and ‘global village’ that attracts attention.
Firstly, an ‘active citizen’ being separate from civil society is a rather more contemporary perspective. It connotes an individualistic approach to the responsibility of governance. In other words,
the term ‘ecology’ underlines the fact that governance involves a complex web or network of interrelated organizations centered around active citizens. Just as natural ecologies highlight the relations between organisms and their environments, the ecology of governance draws our attention to the relations between organizations and their social, political and economic environments (ParlCent and WB, 2008:10).
Secondly, the addition of ‘global village’ to the concept of the state can imply the growing importance of foreign policy in government. A striking aspect comes about when active citizens are grouped with the global village. In this way, a concept emerges regarding the importance of individual citizens participating in foreign policy, which is sometimes an area of government closed to public influence.
By showing the relevance that citizens and globalisation have for the accountability of government, ParlCent and WB (2008) inherently depict the complex nature of the accountability problem. Not only are governments presently encouraged to account to their citizens, other government bodies within the state, civil society and economy, but also to those interacting with the government in the global village (for example, UN,
IMF, WB).
143
Figure 5.1 The Ecology of Governance (ParlCent and WB, 2008:10)
The authors of the manual wrote it for civil society purposes. It uses international case studies which do not target any particular region. For example, the authors draw from
Kenya when discussing the ecology of commerce, Bulgaria and the Philippines regarding systems of governance, Palestine regarding members of parliament and so on, in the process of explaining the requirements, problems and solutions of parliamentary accountability (ParlCent and WB, 2008:9-47). The variety of countries analysed in the text is indicative of a balanced approach to observing accountability internationally. The target audience is anyone involved with or having influence in a parliament, most obviously members of parliament (MPs). The language used is of a tertiary level and is for use in parliaments for the reduction of corruption and an increase in accountability.
Social agency indicates that this document recognises globalisation as a construct which affects parliaments. It adapts the language in an international perspective through the use of words such as “universal” and “global.” This global language use is further seen here:
“Earlier, we spoke of the need for every nation to have a competitive economy, a responsible effective state and a vital, diverse civil society” (ParlCent and WB, 2008:13).
However, parliaments are mechanisms of representational governance and exemplify a
144 local perspective (national rather than international). This was also taken into account by the document and resulted in a comparative analysis of globalisation and local democracy.
Making the global and the local work in balance is the central challenge of governance at the start of the 21st century. It is around that challenge, or at least the part of it having to do with parliamentary accountability, that our collection has been written. Accountability is one of those terms that has emerged as a universal attribute (or indicator) of good governance. As commonly understood, the word carries a simple meaning: those with power must answer to those they serve—the people. So defined, accountability is a fundamental concept in ethics, rule of law and democracy and few today would attempt to dispute the concept in principle (ParlCent and WB, 2008:5).
An underlying assumption was that, just like cars of different makes, governments of different countries may look different, but still operate with an engine, wheels and so on
(ParlCent and WB, 2008:5). Commensurately, the “ecology of governance” and
“environment of accountability” were used, implying a “state of nature” approach to parliamentary mechanisms.
There is a focus on the areas of concern regarding parliaments, such as accountability and corruption, ethics of government and citizen, globalisation and civil society, ineffectual power, as well as the role of MPs within this framework. The handbook and the academic literature formerly surveyed share certain thematic relationships, specifically with terms such as “improve” and “effective” which indicate a reformist and or practical perspective by Parclent and WB (2008). This is apparent when comparing the following two statements:
Through improved accounting standards, timeliness of reporting, better auditing and a stronger commitment to financial integrity, progress can be made in laying the fundamentals to attack the modern scourge of bribery and corruption around the world (ParlCent and WB, 2008:57). versus
In framing a new constitution, they [the Assembly] are allowed freely to profit by the experience of other countries; to improve on the models of freedom which there have been constructed. If no sinister accident obstruct their process, and obscure the glorious prospect before them, a system of the
145 most perfect liberty that has ever obtained among men, will be the result of their labors (Mons, 1790:5-6, discussing the French Assembly).
The Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC, 2005) produced a handbook on controlling corruption in parliament. This work is similar to that of ParlCent and WB (2008) (as it was built from a ParlCent conference). The ideological foundations are similar to ParlCent and WB (2008), as the GOPAC (2005) document begins with the description of the ecology of governance (2005:6) and the
“World Bank Approach” (2005:11). The discussion regarding the “Unbalanced Ecology of Governance” gives clearer insight to how fighting corruption would strengthen accountability. Figure 5.1 shows the predominance of the executive body and a separation between state bodies, civil society and the market place. By comparing Figure
5.1 with Figure 5.2, it becomes easier to understand what the Parliament Centre, World
Bank and GOPAC are striving to achieve with their handbooks.
Figure 5.2 The Unbalanced Ecology of Governance (GOPAC, 2005:8)
It is becoming noticeable that accountability, transparency and anti-corruption are linked.
Accountability, transparency and participation are inter-related qualities of the Ecology of Governance and cannot exist independent of each other. Without transparency, there can be no accountability and so on …(GOPAC, 2005:6).
Controlling Corruption rests on the 1998 Laurentian Seminar participant’s assertion that the institution of parliament and parliamentarians are crucial in
146 serving as a bridge between state and society and in implementing and/or strengthening the good governance values of accountability, transparency and participation [see Figure 5.1 The Ecology of Governance (ParlCent and WB, 2008:10)]. It also claims that parliaments play a key and a leadership role in encouraging good governance and, furthermore, that parliaments and parliamentarians need to work regionally and internationally in order to effect change (GOPAC, 2005:6).
The World Bank approach to reducing corruption is a valuable guideline, as the recommendations are based on a study of 199 countries between 1996 and 2002. The study’s
indicators [were] based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different organizations (GOPAC, 2005:22).
The World Bank thus focuses on several categories when trying to mitigate the
“unbalanced ecology” of governance. These include:
(1) constitutional reviews;
(2) the budget process;
(3) oversight committees;
(4) parliamentary codes of ethics; and
(5) strengthened relations with civil society.
Constitutional reviews show the process of a government reviewing the tenets upon which their constitution is founded in an effort to strengthen laws so as to combat corruption and increase accountability as well as transparency. The “budget process” simply observes public consultations before budgets are announced and “post-facto monitoring”, as well as the recognition that there are:
major obstacles to parliamentary effectiveness, including the executive’s lack of cooperation, inexperience of many parliamentarians when it comes to the complexities of national finances and the weak state of parliamentary research and information services (GOPAC, 2005:12).
Oversight committees are self-explanatory and are used to help target corruption and strengthen accountability by forcing measures that create transparency. These committees also consider the need for independent, yet cooperative, government bodies
147 such as the judiciary, legislative branch and ombudsman. Finally, the parliamentary code of ethics and a strengthened civil society call for tougher laws concerning MPs and the greater involvement of citizens in parliament. The World Bank notes that civil society (a specific country was not mentioned) uses a “report card” method (GOPAC, 2005:12) to evaluate parliament.
GOPAC’s (2005) method of explaining their ideology before the handbook begins is similar to ParlCent and WB’s (2008) method. GOPAC (2005) discusses the need for
“political will” (whilst ParlCent and WB discussed accountability in parliament).
The World Bank and others have agreed that in order for the practical measures described above to take place, political will must exist, for it is clear that political will is a necessary component in bringing change. Political will involves the recognition that a healthy system of governance is essential to national well-being. Without it, leaders are not able to work together constructively to effect change (GOPAC, 2005:12).
As can be seen, the GOPAC (2005) document draws on the causes and consequences of corruption from an international perspective. It then provides recommendations to mitigate corruption through various initiatives (regulating parliament, strengthening the private sector and civil society, for example).
Corruption is a symptom of weakness in the political, social, legal and economic systems of a country. An effective litmus test to assist in determining the difference between corrupt and non-corrupt actions is whether activities are carried out in an open, transparent, and accountable manner for, even where corruption is widespread; its practitioners strive to keep it hidden from public view (GOPAC, 2005:18).
Note the use of the word “country” as it implies an international perspective.
It was written for parliamentarians (MPs) and fits well with the ParlCent and WB (2008) accountability handbook. Interestingly, a social agency emerging from the recommendations of GOPAC (2005:55-68) is the continued growth of parliamentary networks, similar to inter-parliamentary unions, that is, the positive effect which globalisation has on parliaments. This networking of parliaments is not indicative of a growing “global government” but, rather, is using new tools available to transmit
148 information and experiences between parliaments for the mitigation of corruption and accountability (GOPAC, 2005:56).
GOPAC (2005) uses the World Bank’s anti-corruption strategy (see Figure 5.3) as the basis for their anti-corruption recommendations. By combining the accountability methods found in ParlCent and WB (2008) with GOPAC’s (2005) anti-corruption strategies, it has become apparent that both of these documents can contribute to the prescriptive recommendations to be made in Chapter 7.
Figure 5.3 Multipronged Anticorruption Strategy (GOPAC, 2005:30)
While ParlCent (2008) and GOPAC (2005)—both in conjunction with the World
Bank—incorporated an international, or globalised, perspective in their handbooks, the
International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IntIDEA, 2004) took on a wholly local, and urban, viewpoint in their work (in fact, they argue that certain
African cities are not well connected to the global economy) (IntIDEA, 2004:7). The goal of this work is to scrutinise democracy at a local level so as to evaluate its efficiency (IntIDEA, 2004:5). This local level emphasis is evident during the authors’ description of the study:
149 This detailed report presents some of the findings and recommendations of four comprehensive assessments of local democracy in four cities in East and Southern Africa[:] Gaborone City, Botswana; Lusaka, Zambia; Mwanza, Tanzania; and Nairobi, Kenya-conducted in late 2003 and early 2004 (IntIDEA, 2004:6).
A new social agency occurs when going from a more comparative narrative (global versus local) to focusing on a local study. Constructs such as ‘citizen inclusion’ become more prominent, but are also coupled with accountability and transparency.
Accountability and transparency were, as seen, also present in the context of globalisation.
IntIDEA (2004) uses a method, which may actually support the argument made in
ParlCent and WB (2008), that all governments have the same basic structure. IntIDEA’s method was to primarily take a local approach, study the demands by citizens and problems with local democratic governance, then apply the results to a national structure so as to achieve a more representational or “bottom-up” approach to democracy.
National legislative frameworks establish the structures of city-level democracy in Africa, yet these frameworks are incomplete and often serve to limit the quality of democracy at the local level. Both Kenya and Zambia are engaged in constitutional reviews that will examine the ability of local- level authorities to address governance challenges. All four cities report the need to invest greater authority in local-level structures, particularly in the areas of self-generated municipal finance, conflict management, and economic development planning (IntIDEA, 2004:7).
A close “examination of local elections, city council operations, mechanisms to ensure inclusion and accountability, and efforts to stimulate direct citizen participation …”
(IntIDEA, 2004:5) reveals the underlying assumption of transparency, anti-corruption, and the desire for easier access to government (representation). As previously stipulated, four cities in Africa were scrutinised in order to assess the effectiveness of local level democracy: “(elections, political parties and council functioning) and participatory (civil society and citizen engagement)” (IntIDEA, 2004:6). This scrutiny, coupled with accountability and its connotations of transparency as well as anti-corruption, exhibits the prevalence of endemic problems at the local level in certain African cities. That piece
150 of evidence suggests that endemic problems could be present at every level of government.
An example of the analysis undertaken can be seen with Gaborone City, Botswana. The researchers define
local democracy in terms of people’s voting power in a specified area (in this case, Gaborone) and their participation in, and influence over, the management of recognizable area-specific issues. Thus it places emphasis on local people’s voting power, and their involvement in, and influence over, the delivery of services offered by the local authority (IntIDEA, 2004:21).
An outline of the services the municipality provides its citizens are provided, as well as to how these services are connected to the local democracy (IntIDEA, 2004:21-22).
The mapping of the state of local democracy in Gaborone City was the product of a two-day stakeholder workshop, which was held in Fall 2003 and involved Gaborone councillors and chiefs, the district commissioner, representatives of the Independent Electoral Commission, city council staff, police officers, leaders of the Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO), the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA)- Botswana, vendors, and ward development committee members. The participants deliberated various issues concerning local democracy; the results are presented below (IntIDEA, 2004:22).
The results depicted the location and layout of Gaborone City, the city’s socio-economic base, its institutional arrangements, population and demography, and the nature of its representation and participatory democracy. Certain recommendations for the improvement of Gaborone City’s government were made in the conclusion.
The research within IntIDEA’s (2004) document reveals a tertiary language level targeting an audience of professionals and/or academics. The intended goal of the document is to outline the nature of local democracy in four distinct African cities and, by doing so, show how local democracy interacts with national democracy. The process of providing an analysis of four separate cases also allows the authors to compare and contrast various local democracies so as to reach some general conclusions. It appears
(2004:116-132) that the examination of the four cities (see Figure 5.4) led to the
151 development of a question-based checklist (for professionals to assess the nature of representative and participatory democracies in African cities). Appropriately, the
IntIDEA (2004:133-146) document ends with a report “Governing Southern Africa’s
Cities” which was based on the results of a survey which questioned 22 mayors in
Southern African cities. There are similarities in the report, for example, violence in
Nairobi corresponds with violence towards refugees; and the strengthening of the mayoral position matches with Gaborone’s calls for increased local autonomy.
Figure 5.4 Conceptual Composition of the Capacity Building Programme (IntIDEA, 2004:117)
The Council for a Community of Democracies (CCD, 2008) is a
Handbook [that] favors outside arms’ length support for the long-term development of civil rights and civil society, with the emphasis on responsive support for citizens, democracy activists, or human rights defenders already engaged in the peaceful effort to realize empowerment (CCD, 2008:2-3).
The CCD is an MNO representing democratic countries throughout the world. Its handbook targets the international diplomat by providing some practical experiences and
152 techniques from which to draw, so as to minimise violence and allow the country in which they are serving to grow their own brand of democracy.
This is an interesting approach as it is typically against the predominant American foreign policy (Meernik, 1996; Kristol and Kagan, 1996) method of a top-down imposition of liberal constitutional democracy, which may conflict with certain aspects of a nation’s society. The CCD (2008) document is also careful to state that diplomacy is a tradition of
supporting democrats and sharing practical know-how, while being respectful that ultimately democracy is a form of self-rule requiring that things be done by a domestic civil society itself (CCD 2008:3).
It describes a variety of “tools” for diplomats to use such as “listening” and “cultural sensitivity” by drawing on a myriad of case studies like Czechoslovakia’s Velvet
Revolution, Burma’s authoritarian debacle and other similar studies. It has an international outlook and raises many endemic problems, such as accountability
(2008:21, 34, 51), transparency (2008:18, 32, 34) and corruption (2008:8, 32, 35).
The CCD (2008) text is written in a simpler language. This is probably not due to an intentional choice but rather the international contributions of non-native English writers have, most likely, created this appearance. This does not detract from the overall merit of the document, but rather makes the vernacular easier to understand for readers below a tertiary literacy level. The following sentences are indicative of the style found throughout the handbook:
To repeat, holding elections represents only the starting point for democracy. In some cases, election winners once in power are tempted to limit democracy or slide back toward outright autocracy. ‘One person, one vote, one time’ was a slogan skeptical of democracy in South Africa, but sadly has described a tendency elsewhere which has had deeply corrosive effect on public morale which can endure for many years. As opposition leader in Zimbabwe Morgan Tsvangirai, has pointed out, a political culture of abuse and corruption can outlive any specific authoritarian leader (CCD, 2008:19).
153 The CCD drew from a large collection of international organisations, including academic bodies such as the Journal of Democracy or the Woodrow Wilson School (Princeton).
This collection of works form the basis of the case studies and practical suggestions which have been made, however, there is little use of citation. The limited referencing does not show a lack of academic integrity because this document is not meant to be
‘academic’, but practical and accessible for persons without tertiary education.
Of notable interest in this document is the “Diplomat’s Toolbox” (CCD, 2008:10-35) which informs the reader of a variety of practical tools to use as a diplomat. The information provided is laden with references to accountability, transparency, corruption, long-term goals, constitutionalism, for example, which indicates the presence of endemic problems in modern day diplomatic practices.
Law and Justice (International Parliamentary Union (IPU), 2006) details methods by which parliaments can ensure an independent judicial system, starting with arrest through to imprisonment (IPU, 2006:5). This document is similar, in some ways, to the
ParlCent and WB’s (2008) international parliamentary focus in that the IPU (2006) has an international target of all judicial systems in democracies across the globe. It was based on the results of a seminar hosted by the IPU, Association for the Prevention of
Torture (APT) and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) regarding the role of law and justice in democracy.
It has often been said that the separation of powers prohibits parliaments and their members from intervening in cases of abuse of due process of law. The seminar gave us the opportunity to explore this issue and see to what extent we, as parliamentarians, do in fact have a role to play to ensure due administration of justice, and - most importantly - the independence and impartiality of the judiciary (IPU, 2006:18).
The recommendations made in the IPU (2006) document are based on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Some themes found within the work are the rule of law
(2006:52, 67), justice, fairness (2006:13, 14, 56), accountability (2006:13), transparency
154 (2006:13), privatisation (2006:21, 92, 94) and international justice (2006:40). This work shows the importance of law and justice for successful governance; in fact, it shows the need for parliaments to guarantee the universal human rights of their citizens through the strengthening of their judicial systems:
Effective democratic governance therefore rests on the responsible exercise of power by an executive that respects the prerogatives of other branches of governance, as well as a parliament and an independent judiciary that are vigilant and assertive in protecting the constitutional powers vested in them (Ms. L. Arbour, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, quoted in IPU, 2006:13).
Essential to these arguments is the stipulated need for a strong legislative body to counter an over-imposing executive in a bid for greater accountability, transparency, equality and legality in democracy (IPU, 2006:14). The document is not overly in-depth
(due to its information coming from a three day conference), but does provide some general recommendations that a country can adopt to help ensure an independent judiciary (IPU, 2006:18-20). The recommendations are found within each body of the seminar groupings. They are general and call for attention to be paid in broad directions
(for example, it is necessary to protect children’s rights).
The document is divided into seminars composed mainly of MPs from countries around the world, which brings a global and diversified (in subject matter within justice and law) flavour to the reader. While S. Monageng looks at “the purpose and forms of punishment” (IPU, 2006:86), namely the execution of sentence, I. Robbins describes the
“privatization of prisons and its impact on the human rights of detainees” (IPU,
2006:90).
The IPU (2006) document provides a recent international perspective from academics, professionals and policy leaders, which can be used by academics, students and professionals alike, for a general understanding of law and justice in geographic blocs as well as the international arena (global village). The nature of the document makes it
155 adequate for quantitative analysis, but does not present information practical enough to be taken into account in the prescriptions found in Chapter 7.
Poverty, the loss of trust in governance, and social inequality are some of the major problems facing Latin American states (South America, Central America and the
Caribbean) (United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2004:26). Violence, mainly through homicide, against women, minorities and native peoples is said to be the highest in the world (at “25.1 deaths per 100,000”) and mainly exacerbated by poverty (UNDP,
2004:44). The document has a focus on areas such as poverty, social inequity, violence and a citizen’s trust in government (UNDP, 2004:44, 47, 45, 58). By regarding these areas as central to democracy, the marketplace, civil society and government, these bodies can take a social perspective in order to appease the areas of distress within their populations so as to generate an environment more conducive to communication, equality and law. It can be assumed that having those three former criterions met, a trusted process of selecting officials can be engaged as well as the implementation of the processes required to mitigate endemic problems.
The focus of this UNDP (2004) study diverges from the tendency of previous documents which look at institutions, such as parliaments or judiciaries, and seek to explain how to reintegrate Latin American civil society so as to gain greater equality and representation for the majority of citizens (who are mostly poor). Violence, due to poverty, is an issue in Latin American states and the UNDP (2004) is attempting to mitigate them.
There is no unease about the concept of democracy, but there is disquiet within democracies. Overcoming this requires that we use the most valuable instrument that democracy affords us: freedom. Freedom to discuss the things that cause anxiety, which some would rather conceal. Freedom to say that the emperor has no clothes and to try to understand why. Freedom to know why a system that is virtually synonymous with equality exists alongside the highest level of inequality in the world. Freedom to know if what we are discussing is what we need to be discussing or whether it is what others have forced upon us. And freedom to know our priorities and the matters that are urgent (UNDP, 2004:17).
156 Their themes and findings are indicative of the same conclusions made in this thesis.
Such themes as equality, pluralism, representation, corruption and the selection of rulers are used to understand how citizens relate to government and, like this thesis, seek to enhance democracy. This forms the basis of UNDP’s (2004) prescriptions for change.
An interesting hypothesis has emerged as a result of their work:
Our hypothesis – that problems associated with democracy can be solved through more democracy – contains the idea that more democracy means more citizenship and that this demand for more citizenship has not been broadly discussed in key countries, multilateral organizations and Latin American societies themselves (UNDP, 2004:68).
This is a similar argument to one made by Girling (1997:173) who states that, to mitigate corruption, “the solution is not more neo-liberalism, but more democracy.” These arguments could indicate that democracy is simply not being implemented sufficiently or properly, due to a myriad of reasons (inequality, lack of representation, lack of communication, for example). Ultimately it is argued that a dysfunctional style of democracy is due to an improper understanding of democracy itself.
The UNDP (2004) composed their report in the manner of a research document and the language is not advanced, as can be seen in the quotations provided earlier. The goal of the document is to provide evidence showing “the major challenges to democracy and to promote broad debate on them” (UNDP, 2004:23). Furthermore, the document ends with ideas meant to “spark the debate” surrounding the short-comings of democracy, specifically in fields found in, or related to, poverty, social inequality and violence
(UNDP, 2004:67-70). The report mentions that “it is necessary, therefore, to identify clearly the problems that affect us, to discuss them and to develop the social and political channels needed to deepen our democracies” (UNDP, 2004:68). The UNDP (2004:69) continues to call for a move away from electoral democracy and towards a “democracy of citizens” (participatory democracy), and that this may be achieved through the reform of democracy as is practiced throughout Latin America.
157 Figure 5.5 reveals the UNDP’s (2004) suggestions regarding the reform of democracy.
“Content and relevance of politics” speaks of the need to readdress and rethink the role and purpose of government at all levels in all countries. The consensus gained from the report is that a government should establish its institutions democratically (equality, law, selection of rulers, communication) and, most importantly, from in-depth information acquired by surveying the pluralist citizenry which the government serves. Once a government is based on citizen-derived information (thus being representative of its populations), the UNDP (2004) suggests the promotion of the ‘new statehood’, a redirection of the economy (so as to support the wants and needs of its citizens) and a careful stance regarding the global community, so as not to allow globalisation to erode the reformed democracy.
Figure 5.5 Four Areas of Democratic Reform (UNDP, 2004:69)
A final and important aspect of this document is a quotation regarding the central importance that the law plays in the element of democracy.
The foundation of citizenship is the premise that all individuals are autonomous and hence enjoy basic equality … Effective citizenship concerns not only voting without coercion, but also the formation of relations between citizens and the State and between citizens themselves (individuals are protected and empowered by their status as citizens). The development of such relationships is an ongoing process, occurring before, during and after elections. Citizenship is no less violated when the voter is
158 coerced as when a woman is beaten or a rural peasant maltreated without any hope of a court punishing those responsible, or when the home of a poor family is illegally invaded by the police … the rule of law reinforces citizenship and therefore is a core element of democracy (UNDP, 2004:44).
Although the author of the last quotation uses ‘element’ to define the law, the theoretical preference therein is to view the law as a fundamental particle within the element of democracy. In this way democracy, as well as totalitarianism and communism, can continue to be viewed as a constant on the elemental table known as government. In other words, and recalling classical mixed constitution political theory (Aristotle for example), this point argues that various forms of government compete with each other and may have done so perhaps from the earliest onset of human political organisation.
Another UNDP (2006) report, this time published for the benefit of the fifty LDCs, seeks to improve governance through the eradication of poverty, and corruption, and the improvement of accountability, transparency, the economy and representation (UNDP,
2006:3-4). These are familiar terms after reading the UNDP (2004) document about
Latin America.
The focus of UNDP (2006) is to delineate the practices and values of good governance in order to maximise democratisation, so as to aid the development of all LDCs. The efforts found therein are meant to support the BPoA between 2001 and 2010.
The BPoA therefore is seen as integral to the goals for poverty eradication articulated in the Millennium Development Declaration; in fact, Goal 8 of the MDGs, to develop a global partnership for development, has direct relevance for democratic governance (UNDP, 2006:37).
The terminology used is fairly advanced with regard to UNDP jargon, as indicated by the large glossary necessitating a tertiary level of reading. The target audience is most probably professionals working with and/or in LDCs. The breadth of information taken on is truly wide, which makes the document something more of a survey regarding the general movements which must be made both by LDCs and the environment of ‘global governance’.
159 There is a targeting of the most common problems found in LDCs regarding the establishment of a functioning democracy. Cultural relativism is explained by the UNDP
(2006:45) as a debate regarding whether liberal democracy and constitutions can operate within different cultures.
A large number were developing countries undergoing democratization, and a debate arose among political thinkers regarding the cultural relativity of democracy. Many analysts of comparative constitutional government concluded that there were cultural limitations to the moral authority of liberal democracy, and calls emerged for a morally neutral conceptualisation. For example, Abdullahi Al-Na ‘him, in an article titled ‘Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and the Limits of Cultural Relativism,’ argued that ‘Islam cannot be totally discarded in the question of human rights because people understand things through their own culture.’ He concluded, however, that Muslims themselves ‘must seek ways to reconciling Shari’ah with fundamental human rights’ because ‘no cultural relativism argument may be allowed to justify derogation from the basic obligation to uphold and protect the full human rights of religious minorities, within the Islamic or any other cultural context’ (UNDP, 2006:45).
Two items emerge that require attention. The first is that the authors identified “liberal democracy” as not being culturally relevant to non-western societies. It is recognised that liberal democracy, in its general form, cannot be transposed directly onto a different culture without the institutions inherent in that style of democracy being culturally modified. The second item is that the authors did not take care to state that democracy can emerge from non-western cultures. For the element of democracy to succeed in any level of government, it must be derived from the citizen base and, as such, becomes culturally relevant.
Continuing with the suggestions for democratic success in LDCs, the UNDP (2006:46-
52) focuses on post-conflict and gender issues in their democracies, as well as utilising the international community for an assessment of their democracy. The financing of
“peace and post-conflict reconstruction” with “institutions of democratic governance” are also key aspects of the BPoA (UNDP, 2006:50-52). Peace and post-conflict reconstruction is typically facilitated by regional communities (for example, ASEAN,
160 NEPAD, OAS) and a stress is put onto engaging positive leadership as a crucial first step after a conflict. Institutions of democratic governance are defined as those which provide transparency, mitigate corruption and hold government to account. The UNDP (2006:52) recommends that LDCs focus on maintaining a balance of power, which aids the construction of these institutions.
After addressing these general goals and practices for LDCs as well as analysing the role of state capacity for democratisation, the document diverges into more global oriented discussions.
Democratic governance is imperative not only at the national level, but also at the global level. As long as opportunities, voice and representation are not equitably distributed at the global level, LDCs will continue to be constrained in their efforts to overcome their development challenges. The eighth MDG focuses on the need for global cooperation among all nations. Without such cooperation, neither development nor human well-being can be secure in any part of the world — rich or poor — and cooperation can only work for all if it reflects a fair system and is based on mutual benefits. Democratic governance at the global level is thus essential for LDCs as they strive to achieve the MDGs within the next 15 years (UNDP, 2006:175).
As can be seen, it is a broad piece of research but covers national, regional and global policy regarding democratisation.
The prescriptions recommended by the UNDP (2006) have to do with strengthening the public sphere, providing greater equality in international trade and fortifying the law to lessen violence and armed conflict in LDCs (UNDP, 2006:148-172). These recommendations stem from events like drug trafficking, poverty caused by poor governance, and international inequalities in trade negotiations and agreements, as well as environmental concerns.
A useful explanation of the role that civil society plays in helping to mitigate the problems of accountability and transparency in governments is provided below:
One of the most important functions of civil society is to provide checks and balances to government power. In this context, civil society serves as the watchdog of democratic institutions, helping ensure that they are
161 accountable to their constituencies. Civil society promotes state accountability in many cases by empowering and making the State’s checks and balances work efficiently. In other instances, where government mechanisms of accountability do not exist, civil society can exert pressure to create them in the first place. Civil society in this sense is not an adversary of the State, but instead serves to encourage it to improve and maintain its democratic nature (UNDP, 2006:96).
Therefore, the necessity, and emerging consensus thus far (throughout the documents analysed to this point), is for governments to facilitate the growth of civil society and engage it as a regular part of political practice.
The third UNDP (2006a) document (out of five) analysed concerns that have emerged from working with political parties, for the benefit of UNDP itself. The document is a self-analysis generated by the New York headquarters as a general policy guideline on how best to interact with political parties. Democracy, conflict resolution, accountability, transparency, corruption, equality, the law and elections are themes discussed throughout the work. It reads like a technical manual that requires a tertiary level of literacy, indicating the expectations the UNDP has of its staff.
The document itself is internationally oriented, with case studies ranging from
Guatemala, Vietnam, Algeria, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia. The focus of the document is to explain the reasons and methods that the UNDP uses to engage with political parties. Its international footing can be seen with the following description of those who contributed to the formation of the document.
Seventy-nine contributors wrote from 45 UNDP offices in countries as diverse as Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Serbia and Montenegro, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. There were 30 contributions from Africa, three from the Arab States, 11 from Asia and the Pacific, six from Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 13 from Latin America and the Caribbean, and 16 from headquarters offices (UNDP, 2006a:10).
Evidence regarding endemic problems can be found throughout the document. Party accountability (UNDP, 2006a:11), financial accountability (UNDP, 2006a:13), public accountability (UNDP, 2006a:19), transparency (UNDP, 2006a:8, 33, 44), corruption
162 (UNDP, 2006a:33, 52, 57), constitutionalism (UNDP, 2006a:60, 70, 71), campaigning methods (UNDP, 2006a:23, 47, 62), long-term goals (UNDP, 2006a:79, 83, 86) and representation (UNDP, 2006a:23, 29, 46) are all utilised in various contexts throughout this manual. It continues to demonstrate the pervasive presence of endemic problems.
A question is raised regarding the existence of political parties as the “nature of how political information is conveyed to citizens” (UNDP, 2006a:38) changes. Does democracy actually need political parties to function? The authors of the document skirt the question by assuming that “even if that were the case, however, clearly parties will continue to play a critical role in democracy” (UNDP, 2006a:38). If a citizenry decides political parties would be in the best interest of their particular style of democracy, then they should exist and vice versa.
A main concern in the document is the behaviour of political parties and ultimately how to engage them. Campaigning methods are an issue for the UNDP as can be seen in the following passage:
Donor support began late in the election process, and some donors maintained that cash support to political parties would be the only way to even out campaign opportunities. UNDP and the majority of donors insisted on providing in-kind support in the form of access to printing facilities to produce campaign flyers and to transportation companies so candidates could campaign in their districts … After the election was over, there were indications that many opposition parties had illegally sought support from the diaspora. Many parties did not take advantage of the goods and services made available and only wanted cash. Some donors have since concluded that support might be better channelled towards advocacy for changing election campaign finance laws or should be limited to technical assistance. A case has also been made to avoid support to future campaigning in order to prevent dependency on foreign donors (UNDP, 2006a:37).
Transparency International (TI, 2007) provides a synthesis between the IPU (2006) and
GOPAC (2005) documents by analysing corruption in judicial systems. The document targets judges and other members of the judiciary, civil society groups, as well as citizens. The analysis in the work has an international outlook and provides many
163 specific articles that help to understand the causes of corruption in the judicial system and their potential remedies.
For example, the authors identify four key problems that relate to judicial corruption:
1. judicial appointments not based on merit; 2. improper terms and conditions of employment; 3. inefficient processes relating to ensuring accountability as well as discipline; and 4. opaque transparency, “notably court processes that prevent the media and civil society from monitoring court activity and exposing judicial corruption” (TI, 2007:xxv) [numbering, punctuation and spacing added for readability].
Following the identification of the most common problems is a list of recommendations
(TI, 2007:xxvi-xxix). These recommendations include creating laws to protect independent judges from manipulation by the legislative or executive, “an objective and transparent process for the appointment of judges ensures that only the highest quality candidates are selected …” (TI, 2007:xxvii) and that any process for the removal of judges must be transparent and entrenched in the law.
The language is accessible and presumably understandable by those without tertiary education as can be seen in the quote provided below. TI (2007:xvi-xvii, xix) shows the
“many factors which mitigate corruption” as being accountability, transparency, careful legislation and appropriate monetary compensation or benefits for judges to keep them on the “straight and narrow” (xvi-xvii).
Nevertheless, an enormous challenge for the anti-corruption movement is to ensure that anti-corruption laws are enforced and that legal redress for injustice can be secured through a functioning judicial system. The failure of judges and the broader judiciary to meet these legitimate expectations provides a fertile breeding ground for corruption. In such environments even the best anti-corruption laws become meaningless (TI, 2007:xix).
A central argument of this work concerns the separation of power of the judicial from the executive. Without that mechanism in place, citizens have fewer defences from the power of the executive and legislative branches (TI, 2007:xx, xxvi). The international
164 scope of this article (representing every major continent, TI, 2007:xii-xiv) reveals the prevalence of corruption in the judicial systems of many governments throughout the world. This, then, could mean that corruption is somewhat of a grand narrative or social agency in governments. The possible anti-theses to corruption are accountability, transparency, law and the sovereignty of the people, as can be seen in the following two quotes:
(a) These include accountability mechanisms that increase the chances that judicial corruption will be detected and penalised; safeguards against interference from the spheres of politics, business and organised crime; processes of transparency that allow the media, civil society and the public to scrutinise their own judicial systems; and decent conditions of employment that convince judicial staff to remain on the straight and narrow (IT, 2007:xvi).
(b) In Guatemala, the mandate of the Myrna Mack Foundation is to combat impunity and strengthen the rule of law. Initially, the Foundation aimed only to promote litigation related to Myrna Mack’s assassination, but in fighting the case it realised that the obstacles encountered were endemic in Guatemala’s judicial system and determined to promote activities toward overcoming them (IT, 2007:xvi).
These are the recommendations against corruption in TI’s (2007) work and, as has been seen, similar prescriptions using accountability, transparency and the law to combat corruption are found in the previously analysed documents.
The Organization of American States (OAS) and IntIDEA (2005) have produced a document similar to that of the UNDP (2006a) work regarding political parties. OAS and
IntIDEA (2005) look at the funding of political parties and election campaigns in the
Americas. The major themes include transparency, corruption and the law, regarding the financing of political parties and elections. An example of transparency, as a theme, can be found below:
However, as noted above, most Latin American countries presently have poor law enforcement capabilities, scant transparency, weak oversight bodies and ineffective systems of sanctions. Pursuing legal reform, therefore, is not enough. Our countries need to go one-step further. As de la Calle has rightly noted, largely, the topic of political funding concerns both the cultural milieu and civic education (OAS and IntIDEA, 2005:53).
165 Furthermore, the prescriptions made for election campaigning centre on equality, transparency through accountability (disclosure of funds), corruption, education rather than publicity, and law (OAS and IntIDEA, 2005:52-53).
We can draw two main conclusions from our analysis thus far. First, the funding of political parties and election campaigns is a complex, controversial issue, one that remains unresolved and for which there are no universal remedies or magical formulae. Moreover, current rules can only be improved by means of successive steps rather than through ambitious reform initiatives. The matter of political and campaign funding is not only technical, but also essentially political; it is key to the quality and sound functioning of democracy (OAS and IntIDEA, 2005:49).
This work is written in an academic way and targets those not only involved in politics, civil society and academia, but also non-tertiary educated individuals as the language is accessible. It provides a complete overview and analysis of the regions in the Americas which share the same themes mentioned earlier. Finances and structures (of political campaigns) were discussed in depth, but challenging and questioning the foundation of election campaigns was not done.
The work suggests that political parties in many Latin American countries practise the similar styles of election campaigning. The OAS and IntIDEA (2005) work acknowledges that each country has its own way of running elections and mitigating their negative aspects (that is, there is probably no ‘magic’ solution to all the problems), yet there was no critique of the practices of election campaigns except for a focus on spending.
Financial support for political parties is important in three ways: one, for public campaigning before elections; two, for issue development, necessary to attract voters; and three, for mobilization potential, what Americans call ‘party-building’ in the form of registration and get-out-the-vote drives … Election costs have increased significantly, especially in the last ten years. Everywhere in the region, elections have become more closely fought and campaigning methods increasingly ‘high-tech’. This has highlighted the political importance of financial resources and that of wealthy donors, both on-shore and offshore; it has tended to marginalise reform-oriented parties (OAS and IntIDEA, 2005:106, 161).
166 The lack of attention regarding the way campaigning methods are implemented (such as changing the structure of campaigning to severely reduce the need for finances)52 is a notable shortcoming, as scrutinising all the roots of election campaign methods would help to understand the difficulties experienced during political campaigns throughout the
Americas.
OAS and IntIDEA (2005) support their arguments regarding the need for greater financial accountability, transparency and anti-corruption with a variety of case studies from countries in the Americas. This also demonstrates the international breadth of the
OAS and IntIDEA (2005) document. Antigua and Barbuda (2005:162), the Bahamas
(2005:163), Barbados (2005:164) and Belize (2005:166) are a few examples.
This research project on the funding of political parties and election campaigns in Latin America, whose results are presented in this publication, was conceived within the framework of said institutional cooperation agreement. The research that resulted in this publication constitutes an unprecedented effort in our continent. Its aim was to examine the situation and perspectives of political finance in 34 countries. The present study on Latin America forms part of a trilogy that also includes another study on North America (Canada and the United States), and another one on the countries comprising the Caribbean Commonwealth (CARICOM). The third of the Latin American study, corresponding to the comparative regional reading of funding practices in the region is presented...(OAS and IntIDEA, 2005:12).
Prescriptions for the improvement of a wide range of issues relating to democracy are present in WMD (2006). Based on a four day assembly, with over six hundred participants from various backgrounds and professions, plenary sessions, workshops, presentations and discussions resulted in a useful document. It is rather piecemeal in terms of topic material (other documents analysed have a narrower focus), but the method by which information is conveyed is made effective through the use of sub- headings.
52 For example, through the creation of a centralised political area in communities, this could reduce the need for advertisement, as candidates would be operating on an equal platform. Commensurate with this benefit is also the protection of the environment and resources, as less energy used, resources consumed and waste produced would result from a restructuring of common campaigning practices.
167 The use of civil society and independent media to combat the anti-democratic use of populism and nationalism (WMD, 2006:16) and how greater access to information can encourage transparency (WMD, 2006:19) are both subtitled for ease of reference.
Furthermore, the editorial body (those who put the information obtained from the conference into the work) made sure to present the material in a critical manner. This point is illustrated by the following:
While the workshop was intended to examine the role of the right to information in fighting for transparency, however, participants mostly focused on the quality of the legal mechanisms in their countries for ensuring access to information and the problems of implementation (WMD, 2006:19-20).
The document format is consistent. A topic heading is given, followed by a discussion of what that topic exactly entails, followed by observations of the members writing in that group, finishing with a list of recommendations for the amelioration of a particular topic.
The quality of information, however, varies. Some responses in the recommendations areas are logical and practical, whilst others miss critical areas of concern. An example of this ‘miss’ can be seen in the recommendations for Developing Independent and
Responsible Media (WMD, 2006:21-22). The group of individuals writing the recommendations neglected to acknowledge the subjectivity of the term ‘responsibility’ in media and, as such, indirectly transpose their understanding of the term. This relates to
Bourdieu’s (1991) point concerning the difference between “objectivity” and
“subjectivity”. Objectivity is the academic analysis of terms or events. Subjectivity, on the other hand, is the academic pursuit to understand (qualitatively) how a subject or population view a term or event. It is the latter that is distinctly missing from this set of recommendations. What is more helpful to achieving responsible media in a nation is the distinction of what responsible media means to a plural citizenry and, thus, the potential to ensure that such behaviour in the media is met. This example highlights a certain lack
168 of academic depth in some of the WMD (2006) documents, but it does provide a useful and general bank of information from which academics and professionals can draw.
The piecemeal nature of the document is exhibited with the following excerpt, which recommends the use of information gathering so as to empower civil society in failed states (this logic, as earlier argued, can be used to ensure a more responsible media):
Consult people on the ground to gain a full awareness of their priorities, concerns, and opinions on important issues of development or democratic governance; use tools, such as dedicated radios or newspapers, to give marginalized citizens the ability to bring their opinions and concerns to the public sphere and to the attention of political leaders; empower marginalized citizens by facilitating their participation and interaction with public institutions (i.e., by introducing in the legislative body draft laws that address those citizens’ concerns) (WMD, 2006:23).
Moving to another UNDP (2007) document, the MDGs are a varied set of basic aims to be achieved in the near future by all member states of the UN. The mix of goals includes the upholding of universal human rights, environmental protection, conflict resolution, disarmament, democracy and good governance, the strengthening of the UN, HIV/AIDS reduction, poverty reduction, “meeting Africa’s special needs” (UNDP, 2007:58), protecting the vulnerable and development.
The importance of democracy as a tool for improving governance, human rights and the protection of vulnerable populations is stipulated by the UNDP (2007). Regarding the discussion of the “role of Parliaments in establishing innovative international financing and trading mechanisms to address the problem of debt and achieve the millennium development goals” (UNDP, 2007:71), it is noted that the IPU (112th Assembly) is
“convinced that increased development assistance funding can only be beneficial if the receiving countries promote democracy and good governance” (UNDP, 2007:73).
Furthermore, the IPU (same assembly),
urges the parliaments of the developing countries to make sure that their governments mobilise the resources required for development, combat corruption, continue institutional reform, adopt the economic and social policies appropriate to stimulate growth, establish national strategies which
169 place the MDGs at the centre of their policies, and promote democracy and human rights, paying special attention to the implementation of the new World Programme for Human Rights Education, and follow the principles of good governance (UNDP, 2007:74).
It is evident that the UN’s and IPU’s conceptualisations of democracy are concerned with governance, human rights, development and social health. The UNDP (2007) acknowledges that combating corruption (2007:74), enforcing the rule of law (2007:66,
69), ensuring poverty eradication (2007:68), as well as promoting development
(2007:66, 68, 69, 73) are all actions which can both support, or be supported by, democracy. It may not guarantee participation (although the UNDP encourages states to promote participation, 2007:37), but democracy can provide a safer, more open and welcoming environment for individuals to participate politically. The UN and IPU’s concept of democracy could be taken on by citizens if individuals were to participate more in government.
The key for greater participation may lie in a restructuring, or a revaluing, of how individuals interact with states in a democratic environment. Falling levels of participation in ‘established democracies’ could be a symptom of an ineffectual program of interaction; perhaps individuals feel that the effort and time commitment required to engage their government are too great. It is an area that requires further attention.
Equality, communication, representation, justice, pluralism and accountability are some of the themes in the UNDP (2007) document. This work provides international information which parliamentarians can use to help achieve the MDGs. The intriguing aspect of this work is that, even due to its completely varied topic material, it still generates the same themes as other documents which focus solely on issues of justice or equality (for example, GOPAC, 2005; TI, 2007). This evidence, as in the historical analysis of the literature, continues to support the argument that there are endemic governance problems which permeate all tiers of government.
170 The language found in the UNDP (2007) document is not technical as can be seen in the quote below. The target audiences are the parliamentarians of the world, as well as professionals and academics who seek to engage or study the duties and responsibilities of parliamentarians internationally. This can be seen by listing UNDP’s (2007) section headings:
1. The role of parliamentarians in rich and developing countries in meeting the Millennium Development Goals.
2. Legislatures in pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals: a key part of National MDG strategies; and
3. Best Practices for European Union Parliamentarians to meet the Millennium Development Goals. (UNDP, 2007:1, 13, 35) [numbering, punctuation and spacing added for readability]
Social agency implies a globalised outlook. Political regionalism (such as the EU), as well as internationalism (‘rich and developing countries’), reinforces that particular analysis. The UNDP (2007) works closely with the IPU in framing their document. The presence of the IPU helps to understand why an international focus is taken.
The UNDP’s (2005) LIFE program is a mix between UNDP (2007) and IntIDEA (2004) in terms of focusing on the MDG of reducing poverty through the strengthening of local governance. The UNPD’s (2005) document is a self-analysis survey of thirteen years of operation.
The LIFE programme operates in a global context in which the concept of local governance has come to the fore. Local governance has become an important aspect of development theory and practice, and there is growing evidence of the successes of dynamic local experiments in budgeting, planning, service delivery, multi-sector partnerships and participation. It has become clear that these examples are not isolated successes, but part of a broader political and social trend based upon the growing predominance and power of local concerns. Research increasingly demonstrates that good local governance has tremendous potential for addressing the challenges of sustainable and equitable human development and democratic transition by introducing participation, transparency and accountability to the interface between government and its constituents (UNDP, 2005:2).
171 The UNDP (2005:2) continues to argue the significance of local governance as being
“significant particularly [because] … it is here that government is closest to its constituents and where the two groups can most powerfully interact”.
Considerable focus goes to strengthening the poor in regard to increasing their participation in local governance through sustainable micro-projects and raising awareness regarding the lack of representation the poor receive in local governance
(UNDP, 2005:10, 14, 40). The document also depicts LIFE’s methodology of initially analysing local government issues of any given nation, then developing a plan to mitigate these problems, which is afterwards taken to the national level and then enacted through a top-down approach using sustainable micro-projects at a local level to help to achieve these goals.
It has gradually become apparent that local governance is an important level for democracy and the health of governance overall. It seems that the disconnect between individuals and the national government of their country is growing, typically due to poverty and poor governance, or materialism and poor governance (depending on whether one is analysing a poor or wealthy country). It may be possible that local governance, perhaps through a strengthened community, sense of citizenship or social awareness, could bring the public sphere increasingly back into political issues. This is a method being used, as has been seen, in the development of poorer nations. If such techniques were borrowed and implemented in wealthier countries suffering from political apathy, perhaps that would aid in the cooperation of government and society, potentially resulting in better representation.
The UNDP (2005) presented its material in an organised and accessible manner. The target audience appears most likely to be civil society (local and international), MPs from developing governments and academics. Social agency indicates a strong focus on
172 networking vertical scales with horizontal practices. An example of this would be the emphasis placed on Small Scale Projects (SSPs). It requires, as previously stipulated, the involvement of national level policy support followed by the implementation of the policy by local civil society or government bodies, further supported by international
NGOs (both nationally and locally) as well as other related agencies, groups and/or individuals. An example of an SSP from UNDP (2005) can be seen in the text (UNDP,
2005:33).
The cooperation between the United Nations and the IPU resulted in a document which combined information and communication technologies (ICTs), as well as inter- parliamentary unions, to generate the concept of “e-parliament” or an international online parliamentary environment.
It empowers people, in all their diversity, to be more engaged in public life by providing greater access to its parliamentary documents and activities. It is an organization where connected stakeholders use information and communication technologies to support its primary functions of representation, law-making and oversight more effectively. Through the application of modern technology and standards and the adoption of supportive policies, it fosters the development of an equitable and inclusive information society (UN and IPU, 2008:vii).
This initiative strives to broaden the influence of transparency in parliaments so as to strengthen civil society and accountability (UN and IPU, 2008:33, 100, 21).
A certain issue arises within the document referred to above, concerning the involvement of representation in “e-government.” The document shows considerable research concerning the technical implementation of parliamentary practices created to provide user-friendly, environmentally friendly and cost-effective computer software. This might make information increasingly available to civil society and may aid in the organisational aspects of creating legislation. What is lacking is the notion of using ICTs to include civil society in parliament to a greater extent.
Throughout the Report, e-parliament is regarded as a continually evolving concept that is rooted in the institutional approach to modern technologies in
173 the complex parliamentary environment. In this context, the document outlines the definition of an e-parliament as a legislature that is empowered to be more transparent, accessible and accountable through ICT. It empowers people, in all their diversity, to be more engaged in public life by providing greater access to its parliamentary documents and activities. It is an organization where connected stakeholders use information and communication technologies to support its primary functions of representation, law-making and oversight more effectively. Through the application of modern technology and standards and the adoption of supportive policies, it fosters the development of an equitable and inclusive information society (UNDP and IPU, 2008:vii).
The UN and IPU (2008) use a technical level of language, as it probably directs its efforts towards a more specialised audience, such as academics, technical professionals, civil society bodies vested in improving parliaments and MPs. Furthermore, the idea of linking parliaments internationally, as well as having them further integrated online, connotes globalisation, transparency and increased participation from active citizens.
Endemic governance problems are also present. Representation (UN and IPU, 2008:33,
62), accountability (UN and IPU, 2008:23, 139), long term goals (UN and IPU,
2008:159) and constitutionalism (UN and IPU, 2008:124) are some examples.
There is also a noteworthy view regarding the value of information (linked to the democratic parameter of communication).
Parliaments are information intensive and information demanding organizations. Acquiring, organizing, managing, distributing and preserving information is fundamental to their constitutional mandate (UN and IPU, 2008:125).
Legislatures create information themselves through their documents and their actions, and require information from many external sources, including the government, the judiciary, civil society, experts, the media, academicians, international organizations, other legislative bodies and citizens. To ensure that parliament is properly informed in today’s fast evolving environment, it is increasingly important to have a comprehensive approach to identifying, managing and providing access to critical resources. Internal information resources, such as databases of proposed bills, committee and plenary documents, and other related sources materials, need to be organized in ways that make them easily accessible to members, officers and staff. These must be integrated with the most relevant sources from outside the parliament. Access to a coherent body of information is of great importance to legislatures. Making this information accessible to the
174 public serves the goal of transparency and contributes to an informed legislature and an informed society (UN and IPU, 2007:124).
5.3 Conclusion of Qualitative Analysis
The research conducted in the documents analysed contains information from individuals (whether from conferences or interviews), organisations, countries, universities, as well as research centres. The high level of cohesion between themes
(endemic problems, democratic particles) seen throughout the analysis supports the observation that endemic governance problems are present in modern day governance practices internationally. To achieve a level of consensus regarding democratic particles and governance problems from unrelated documents shows that there are some basic commonalities in international democratisation and by extension, democracy.
Those commonalities are the major themes focused on in these works. Ideas like accountability, transparency, communication, representation, selection of officials, law, equality and corruption are all used in the varied discussions found throughout the 14 documents. It shows that endemic problems are influencing the effectiveness of democratic particles. These negative impacts are most likely universal and reduce, inter alia, the quality of life for citizens by diminishing their connectivity with democracy and government.
Each document showed its own specific method of analysis, prescription and research regarding various international government functions. There were, nonetheless, many thematic similarities as previously discussed. Noticeable, at times, was also a lack of academic quality to these works, as some documents were conference findings. The international breadth and representation of all major areas of the globe was also seen during the analysis.
175 There are less prominent themes in all the documents, which are of some concern. It has already been shown that accountability, transparency, corruption, the law, equality, campaigning, elections and representation were often mentioned. There are, however, two more specific endemic problems that have not often been mentioned. Long-term goals (in legislation, as a statement of the will of the people) and constitutional issues
(specifically the relevance and formation of a constitution over a population) are not often considered. There is also a fundamental lack of criticism regarding the basic foundations of democratic practice in the documents. The reason for this is, most probably, that such critiques are not, perhaps, considered to be practical by the authors of these documents. What is needed is further research on these issues.
The UNDP and IPU (2008) showed that the opportunity now exists to create posts within parliament (a people’s consul) which represent the subjective will of the people regarding the behaviour of, or minimum code of practice for, parliament. Typically, government is seen as a realm of three institutions; those being legislative, executive and judiciary (classic American model). There is an emerging focus in academia of a fourth institution, the people. In the classic American republican model, the people are generally considered sovereign by way of electing their representatives and, in so doing, allowing government to exist. This election process is the first realm of public influence.
The second realm of public influence comes from civil society pressure, otherwise known as the special interest (third party) lobby. The third realm of influence is social upheaval, and such typically occurs with the failure, corruption or imbalance of the former two realms.
The public sphere in representational democracies can be fragmented. With the advent of
ICTs, there is the opportunity to include the public sphere as an actual fourth dimension of the state apparatus. By taking a top-down approach to gather information from a plural society via a complete census of the population (producing better statistics, see
176 Super-Census page 261), a government may be able to statistically understand the people’s will regarding the basic behaviour and code of conduct that legislative, executive and the judiciary must meet. This could be ensured with the technique of a parliamentary “checklist” (see Chapter 7, page 212).
ICTs could allow the parliamentary checklist to be done in silico, so that any citizen interested in the drafting or passing of legislation or judicial rulings could be informed.
The physical institutionalisation of the fourth realm in government can allow for a situation never before had: That is a basic code of behaviour for government mandated by the plural citizenry. This has the potential to extend to media, business and civil society as well. In parliament, it could ensure that a basic amount of information is always provided (for example, who or what will this bill benefit, what are pros/cons) and allow the opposition sufficient time to organise and present their perspective(s) (this information should also be made directly available to the public with the same basic questions answered) before a vote can be taken by elected officials.
This material has helped to form some of the research questions used in the empirical segment of this analysis. The first assumption to test is whether or not certain endemic problems are as prevalent as they seem in the extant literature; the second, is whether the missing endemic problems are as omitted as they appear to be; and the third is more of a double question: to what extent do endemic problems relate to each other and why?
A frequency and proximity analysis of the seven endemic problems will help provide answers. These research questions seek to contribute to the overall argument made that endemic problems are still burdening modern democratic governments, as well as to gain further information regarding their nature and interplay so as to consolidate basic principles on which prescriptions can be made. These prescriptions will seek to help the
177 reader to attain a practical sense of how to mitigate endemic problems, in the hope of enhancing democratic particles at any level of government.
178 Chapter 6: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The methodology used in the quantitative content analysis of the 14 documents previously qualitatively analysed, has three parts. To begin with, Krippendorff’s (1980)
“designations analysis” (a version of frequency analysis) is used principally to determine how often endemic governance problems and, secondarily, democratic particles and associates, appear in the texts. The frequency of these concepts, determined using a more
‘scientific’ method than the qualitative analysis in Chapter 5, is important, as the results can be used to compare, contrast and, ultimately, establish certain answers to the research questions. There are already indications of answers to the questions from the textual analysis, but such results are not reproducible and, thus, are less rigid findings.
The qualitative analysis provides some indication as to why endemic problems are intrinsic to democracy. The research suggests that problems like a lack of accountability, transparency, and representation negatively affect democracy because they reduce the quality of governance which in turn reduces the capacities of democratic government.
The World Bank and the UNDP can be said to investigate these problems for that reason amongst others.
Following the designations analysis, a proximity analysis (Busch et al., 2005) is undertaken to understand the relationship(s) between concepts. This will create information about the way concepts interact with each other and build on the conclusions derived from the first analysis. Finally, cognitive mapping (Busch et al., 2005) will be conducted so as to represent the findings visually. This visual presentation of the relationship between concepts will visualise the conceptual matrix. It is argued that the conceptual matrix, due to the international and recent scope of the data, is representative of current international democratisation practice.
179 6.1 Describing Types of Analysis
The empirical analysis was conducted using two methods of content analysis: frequency and relational. A frequency analysis is when certain themes, in this case the individual words which make up the categories of endemic problems, particles and associates, are counted how many times they appear in 14 different texts. The sum of their appearance is their ‘frequency’ (that is, how frequently a theme is seen in the texts). Relational analysis measures when two or more themes are found in proximity to each other (that is, how often, in a bloc of 50 words, the terms ‘corruption’ and ‘transparency’ are found). The nature of thematic proximity depicts rudimentary information about the relationship between themes.
There is an important difference between a conceptual analysis and a content analysis, although they both analyse the same data. A conceptual analysis is philosophical and deals qualitatively with the textual material through ethnography, social agency and discourse analysis, for example (Fairclough, 2003; Silverman, 2006). Typically, this form of qualitative analysis is non-reproducible but can reveal both a scholar’s viewpoint on subject matter or new information emanating from the textual data due to the conceptual framework which a scholar may be using to analyse it. This conceptual approach was used in Chapter 5.
A content analysis, as argued by Krippendorff (1980), is scientific due to its reproducible nature.
Techniques are expected to be reliable, more specifically, research techniques should result in findings that are replicable. That is, researchers working at different points in time and perhaps under different circumstances should get the same results when applying the same technique to the same data (Krippendorff, 1980:18).
As a technique, content analysis involves specialized procedures. It is learnable and divorceable from the personal authority of the researcher. As a research technique, content analysis provides new insights, increases a researcher’s understanding of particular phenomena, or informs practical actions. Content analysis is a scientific tool (Krippendorff, 1980:18).
180 This form of analysis is used herein.
Krippendorff (1980) argued that “specialized procedures” are present in content analysis.
Two of these procedures were chosen as tools to be used to conduct a quantitative analysis. Typically, content analysis looks at the frequency of words, symbols, spaces
(between words or columns), or even time, in the case of radio and television
(Krippendorf (1980:44-48). As such, measuring the frequency of words is the content analysis technique to be used. There are various frequency methods which can be used.
Krippendorf (1980) provides several, however, the one used in this empirical study is termed
designations analysis: [which] provides the frequency with which certain objects (persons, things, groups, or concepts) are referred to, that is, roughly speaking, subject matter analysis (Krippendorff (1980:45).
Busch et al. (2005) offers a different explanation of content analysis. They frame frequency as part of conceptual analysis and thus assume the scientific nature of conceptual analysis by rejecting its philosophical roots. Busch et al. (2005) write of relational analysis as being separate from frequency analysis, but indicate that both can be used to achieve different ends.
Relational analysis, like conceptual analysis, begins with the act of identifying concepts present in a given text or set of texts. However, relational analysis seeks to go beyond presence by exploring the relationships between the concepts identified. Relational analysis has also been termed semantic analysis (Palmquist, Carley, & Dale, 1997). In other words, the focus of relational analysis is to look for semantic, or meaningful, relationships. Individual concepts, in and of themselves, are viewed as having no inherent meaning. Rather, meaning is a product of the relationships among concepts in a text. Carley (1992) asserts that concepts are ‘ideational kernels’; these kernels can be thought of as symbols which acquire meaning through their connections to other symbols (Busch et al., 2005).
Although Krippendorff (1980) provided several methods to conduct a frequency analysis, Busch et al. (2005) also provide various methods by which a relational analysis can be conducted. Due to the nature of the research questions (exploratory, for example,
181 seeking to understand which concepts are most often related and why), proximity analysis and cognitive mapping were the chosen methods.
[Proximity analysis], on the other hand, is concerned with the co-occurrence of explicit concepts in the text. In this procedure, the text is defined as a string of words. A given length of words, called a window, is determined. The window is then scanned across a text to check for the co-occurrence of concepts. The result is the creation of a concept determined by the concept matrix. In other words, a matrix, or a group of interrelated, co-occurring concepts, might suggest a certain overall meaning. The technique is problematic because the window records only explicit concepts and treats meaning as proximal co-occurrence. Other techniques such as clustering, grouping, and scaling are also useful in proximity analysis (Busch, et al., 2005).
A relational analysis can be conducted in a variety of ways. The method used herein is proximity analysis, which counts how many times certain themes appear together in a block or “window” of words. Conducting a proximity analysis offers a deeper understanding of the relationships between themes to reach more meaningful conclusions. In other words, the proximity method will create a matrix representing a sample of the current relationship between the endemic problems, democratic particles and associates as perceived by NGOs, MNOs and governments practicing democratic reform.
Most of the problematic nature of proximity analysis has been mitigated by the ethnographic and social agency analysis conducted in Chapter 5. The argument that
“meaning” becomes a “proximal co-occurrence” is no longer justifiable, as there is a conceptual framework already in place that can provide meaning to the results. The remaining problem is the removal of analyst bias. Proximity analysis can also be conducted by analysing which words appear most often in proximity of a term without designating those words. It is believed that this method has the potential to produce a more anomalous result. However, that is not the nature of the current research questions, as they are meant to answer specific inquiries related to the theoretical and qualitative evidence already accrued (recalling the evidence provided in Chapters 1-5). Using the
182 anomalous method in a different study would, nonetheless, be an interesting experiment to conduct in order to ascertain if there are other concepts in proximity to those analysed herein.
To finish off, cognitive mapping (Bush et al., 2005) can be used to visually represent the data so as to ascertain its meaning. Thus, with the frequency and proximity analyses complete, the cognitive mapping component will support the drawing of inferences and findings in juxtaposition to the qualitative textual analysis.
6.1 Explicit and Implicit Words: A Comparative Utility
Explicit words are the terms used throughout this thesis (the seven endemic problems, the four democratic particles and the five democratic associates). Busch et al. (2005) argue that it is useful to have both an explicit and implicit set of data categories when conducting a frequency analysis. Implicit terms are words that have similar meanings to the explicit terms and are used comparatively when examining the explicit word results.
An example would be ‘selection of rulers’, which is the explicit term used throughout the thesis. The idea, from social contract theorists, is that people have the right to choose how to order their society (that is, who would be the ruler) and how such is to be done.
Implicit words for that term would be synonyms such as ‘election’ or ‘voting’, due to the fact that every democracy in the world uses a voting method to select their rulers.
To further explain the difference between explicit and implicit categories, assume that the sum of the explicit words mentioned above is 18. These 18 words will be analysed, both through frequency analysis and proximity analysis. The results of these two analyses will be the data used for inferences. Implicit categories, as explained, are a grouping of synonyms or words related to each explicit category (see Table 6.1). They are used as a resource for comparing and contrasting the explicit analysis results to
183 further understand certain anomalies, phenomena, inferences and to draw better conclusions.
Table 6.1 Data Set Sample: An explicit word, its symbol and implicit category
Explicit Word Symbol Implicit Words Selection of Rulers SR voting, voter, election, campaign, campaigning, election process, campaigning methods, election period, voter turnout, voting methodology, voting transparency, voting process accountability, campaign equality, campaign problems, representation.
The difficulty in writing predetermined implicit categories is that some may relate to one or more explicit terms. Due to the inter-operability of synonyms between explicit terms like accountability, transparency and corruption, it was not possible to create implicit word categories that were wholly distinguishable from their explicit word counterparts.
Regression analysis was used to help create distinctions.
There will be a specific approach concerning implicit words during the frequency analysis. If any new words are added to the implicit sections, they will be separately re- evaluated so as not to compromise the numbers and integrity of the frequency analysis.
The mostly pre-defined coding will allow for interactive coding if relevant information
(outside the translation rules) becomes apparent. Such interactive data will be identified in the analysis.
Coding will be done in a manner that groups words of similar meaning to the implicit concept words. That is, the level of generalisation that extends as far as implication is not compromised. Any additional words will be identified using Safire’s Political
Dictionary (2008) so as to mitigate author bias. It should be recalled that these technical
184 requirements for implicit categories are marginal to the entire analysis. The reason for giving this information is to establish a better logical base in the analysis.
The explicit word counts are the items which matter most, however the implicit categories are also indicative of the nature of the concept. The concept is shown by figuring the prevalence of explicit terms in the texts. It must be noted that due to the fact that the term ‘selecting officials’ is not found in the data the term ‘election(s)’ will be used in its place, as it is through elections that democratic governments select their rulers and, as such, make a legitimate substitute without compromising the integrity of the analysis.
6.2 How Questions Were Investigated
Data was analysed together using the Adobe Acrobat PDF program. That is, all 14 documents were analysed at the same time by using the “all PDF documents” option in the Adobe search function. This program allowed for the computerised analysis of explicit and implicit concepts (both frequency and proximity). For frequency, once a concept was entered into the Adobe search mechanism, a numerical result was returned, showing how many times the concept was used and in how many documents. For proximity, two or more concepts were entered and a numerical result was returned, indicating how many times these concepts were found together, revealing their relationships.
The analysis of frequency began using Krippendorff’s (1980) designations analysis. It was centred on identifying the prevalence of endemic governance problems within the data, in order to answer the question of whether or not endemic problems are actually shown empirically to be present in modern international governance. Following this, the prevalence of democratic particles and associates were investigated to see if they, too, were present. The logic behind investigating the prevalence of democratic particles and
185 associates is that, if they are not present or only partially present, such could identify a flaw in the conceptual framework used from the beginning of the thesis.
Secondly, the proximity phase resulted in the analysis of interrelations between endemic problems, as well as how each problem related to democratic particles and associates.
These relationships revealed that there are several endemic problems which are typically associated and that there are some which are notably absent from the discourse. These results did not vary from the inferences derived from the academic literature.
Furthermore, some democratic particles and associates were represented in connection with endemic problems, whilst certain particles and associates were absent. These results depicted the way in which the international democratisation community presently conducts their work.
Once both the frequency and proximity analyses were completed, cognitive mapping was used to visually represent the conclusions derived from both analyses. The cognitive map revealed that the three concept groups (endemic problems, democratic particles and democratic associates) were all linked, indicating the relevancy of endemic governance problems to the democratic element in the state.
6.3 Further Notes: Proximity Analysis Method
In order for the proximity analysis to work, a ‘window’ must be decided (Busch et al.,
2005). The use of a ‘window’ refers to the number of words that a program searches to ascertain what concepts are in proximity to each other. In the case of this study, the search particles for Adobe were such that, when two concepts were entered
(accountability and transparency), it could only look for the incidence of these words occurring within 50 words of each other. That is, accountability and transparency do not necessarily have to be next to each other to be counted but, rather, have to be within 50
186 words of each other. The idea is that, if the incidence of two terms appearing in 50 word blocks is high, then there is a strong relationship between them.
The ‘window’ used for the proximity analysis for two terms was 50 words. This number was chosen so as to keep the window narrow. A trial run using a 450 word window
(searching ‘communication’ and ‘election’) returned 23 incidences. A run using a 250 word window returned 10 incidences and a 50 word window returned eight incidences, whilst a 25 word window only returned three. This shows that the favourable word count for a window in a proximity analysis is 50 words. In other words, a larger window does not necessarily return more concepts and, as such, could reduce the meaning of the relationship between concepts due to the large areas of text analysed. At the other end of the spectrum, a slightly smaller window produced a notably lower return of concepts.
What is striven for then is a window that falls between the two ends of the spectrum allowing for a middle-ground representation of the proximity between concepts.
Additionally, the proximity search was done, not only with two concepts, but by measuring each concept with every other. This resulted in some searches that included over eight concepts. Hence, it was necessary to keep the window proportional to the search to maintain relevant results. In this way, the window size increases geometrically depending on the amount of concepts searched. For example, if two words are being searched, then the window size should be 50. If three words are being searched, the window size should be 100. If four words, then a window size of 200; if five words, then a size of 400, and so on. Increasing the size of the window when searching greater numbers of concepts allows for the identification of larger and, perhaps, more sophisticated arguments. This, then, represents the deeper connectivity between concepts in the discourse of international democratisation, which could provide new information.
187 6.4 Discussion of Frequency and Proximity Analyses
The following discusses the results of the empirical analyses undertaken of 14 documents from specific NGOs and MNOs that may represent the discourse of international democratisation. The use of analysing these documents was to ascertain whether or not endemic governance problems are shown to still be present in governance internationally. The analysis was also conducted to determine what the relationships between endemic problems were. Finally, the analysis also served to ascertain the relationship between endemic problems, democratic particles and associates. This was done to answer three questions:
(1) Are endemic problems present in modern governments?
(2) What is the nature of their relationship to democracy?
(3) Is there any new evidence coming from the relationship between endemic
governance problems and democracy (particles and associates)?
Recall that there are seven endemic governance problems: representation, accountability, corruption, constitutionalism (issues surrounding constitutions), transparency, long-term goals and campaigning (issues surrounding campaigning). There are four democratic particles: the selection of rulers, communication, law and equality. There are also five democratic associates: taxation, trade, media, bureaucracy and the military.
It was argued that endemic governance problems have been found to be problematic for democratic governments throughout history and in the modern period. Additionally, through the comparison of practiced and theoretical styles of democracy, certain basic commonalities were ascertained. These are the democratic particles mentioned above. In conjunction with democratic particles, certain associates were identified, as potentially all democratic governments of the world and in history have and had their own versions of the five aforementioned areas. These associates were included in the analysis of endemic problems and democratic particles as they are relevant to democracy. Perhaps
188 then, the mitigation of endemic problems could help to improve these associates which would make them operate in a way that reflects the will of the plural citizenry.
6.5 Endemic Governance Problems
Figure 6.1 Explicit Terms: Endemic Governance Problems (Frequency)
Figure 6.2 Explicit Terms: Endemic Governance Problems
Endemic governance problems were well represented in the data; Figure 6.1 and Figure
6.2 show the predominance of corruption, accountability, transparency and representation over long-term goals, constitutionalism and campaigning methods. The literature also contained information concerning corruption, accountability, transparency and representation. Constitutional issues and campaigning methods are well represented in the literature, which reveals a disparity between the two sources. Conversely, constitutional issues were not recognised during the textual analysis of the primary data,
189 yet issues surrounding campaigning certainly were, specifically in managing political parties and corruption.
Only the concept of long-term goals is notably absent from both the non-academic and academic literature. This was reflected in the number of documents in which the words were found. The absence of long-term goals and to a lesser extent constitutionalism and campaigning issues clearly indicates that some problems are more widely considered than others. This indicates the need for further research towards issues surrounding constitutions, campaigning methods and long-term goals. However, further investigation of these findings, by comparing implicit word results, revealed a different story.
Figure 6.3 Comparative Implicit Results: Endemic Governance Problems
As can be seen in Figure 6.3, corruption no longer has the highest incidence of the results but, rather, all concepts fell compared with the rise of campaigning methods.
Why such a sudden shift? Figure 6.4 shows that the implicit terms of ‘political party(ies)’ and ‘election’ had very high frequency counts when compared to corruption.
The implicit result for corruption would dominate campaigning methods if the concept
‘law’ was in place, but such was removed to ascertain the impact it would have in the sense of a regression analysis where ‘law’ is treated as an error term (Cameron and
Trivedi, 1998:301).
190 Removing certain variables, in an analysis composed of many variables, enables the researcher to gain a greater understanding of the interplay between categories. By removing ‘law’ and treating it as an error term (that is, a variable which is potentially disrupting measurements (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998)) creates a new perspective or argument to be made during analysis. This is a common method used in the regression analysis of count data (data coming from non-negative integers, for example, counting how many apples there are in a basket). Thus, in this case, the removal of the ‘law’ variable in the ‘corruption’ category (Figure 6.5) reveals a new difference between the
‘campaigning methods’ and ‘corruption’ categories.
This implicit result must not be understood in the manner that ‘campaigning methods’ do not need attention because they are so well represented; the conclusion of this concept’s weakness was reached in the explicit phase. As has already been shown, the increased incidence of campaigning methods in the implicit section was due to variables such as
‘election’ and ‘vote’. Campaigning methods, themselves, are not heavily scrutinised, as was ascertained during the textual analysis (Chapter 5), but the process of election and the importance of political parties is apparent.53 The conclusion in this data variation is that parts of explicit terms (as represented by implicit terms) are considered of greater importance than others. In other words, that the very basis of the methods used to campaign are not as important as elections and political parties. This is another example showing that the institutional practice of democracy, using the underlying principles of campaigning as an example, have not changed for some 200 years.
53 However, Keane (2002:12) writes that political parties are suffering a crisis partially due to “long-term evidence [showing] that political parties frustrate and disappoint the work of representatives and represented alike.”
191
Figure 6.4 Implicit: Campaigning Methods
The discussion and importance of long-term goals is not present amongst NGOs and
MNOs. As was seen in the arguments made in the secondary literature, long-term goals have poor representation in academic literature as well. This is not the case with campaigning methods nor constitutional issues, as both have been, and are, widely discussed. The reason that campaigning methods and constitutional matters are not heavily discussed by NGOs and MNOs is probably due to the long-term implications of engaging them. They involve discussions with the plural society and are often compromised by non-democratic states. However, campaigning methods and constitutionalism, not to mention long-term goals, is not common discussion in many established democracies. It is the practice of these established democracies that many
NGOs and MNOs draw from, creating a skewed model of democracy used in democratisation.
Further discussion is required concerning the nature of ‘long-term goals’ in the conceptual analysis. As Figure 6.5 shows, the only reason that implicit long-term goals generated any hits was due to the word ‘plural’. This word was added as it shows the necessity of pluralism in long-term goal decision making. Furthermore, many of the explicit hits generated were done in further searches involving ‘long-term goals’ by running both ‘long-term goals’ as well as ‘long-term’. The hits were consistently low.
192 This evidence further underlines the lack of attention paid to long-term goals in international democratic reform and academic research.
Figure 6.5 Implicit: Long-Term Goals
6.6 Democratic Particles
Through the analysis of the data, it has become apparent that the basic democratic particles, their associates and six of the seven endemic problems are present to varying degrees in the international discourse of democratic reform. Recall that the analysis of democratic particles and associates was undertaken to ascertain their relevance to endemic governance problems. Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 (below) show the representation of concepts, both in frequency and the number of documents in which they were found.
Figure 6.6 Explicit Terms: Democratic Particles (Frequency of Terms)
193
Figure 6.7 Explicit Terms: Democratic Particles (Documents Found)
As can be seen, law predominates as a concept in democratic reform, followed by communication and equality. Strikingly, selecting officials was not evident at all in any of the documents. This is an indication that the process of deciding who rules over a sovereign people is considered democratic only through elections and voting. As will be seen later, these results are supported by the analysis of implicit concepts.
Three of the four democratic particles are fairly equally represented in each document.
‘Law’ and ‘communication’ were in every one, the ‘selection of rulers’ was completely absent, but ‘equality’ was missing in two documents. The two documents which did not contain the variable ‘equality’ were both written by, or in conjunction with, the
Parliamentary Center (ParlCent 2008, 2005). The lack of the concept equality is an anomaly. Gender equality in government is an important issue. So is the equality of representation, notably the lack of representation for the African and Latin American poor. Implicit terms associated with equality, such as justice and pluralism, were also low scoring variables for these two documents. It is apparent that ParlCent (and perhaps the World Bank) has a more technocratic focus on parliaments and does not address social issues related to equality based on the results from two of their documents.
The point that three of the four terms are well represented within the documents is vital to explaining why these terms are central to democracy. At the beginning of this thesis, a hypothesis was made that there may exist some particles which form the element of democracy (that which all other forms or styles of democracy are based upon). From an
194 in-depth analysis of thirty democratic styles and the identification of their underlying themes, four basic democratic particles were identified. As these particles have been shown to be in existence and that they are related to endemic governance problems, the hypothesis may be correct. The absence of the selection of officials is problematic in itself, as it shows that the current method practised by democracies to select officials is established and not challenged.
The term ‘selecting officials’ may also be skewed, as it is not often used in academic or professional discourse. Search terms such as ‘lot’, ‘sortition’ and ‘lottery’ were used and none generated any hits. This further indicates the lack of discourse, specifically in international democratisation, concerning different methods which citizens can use to select their rulers.
Why is it that communication and equality returned lower hits? Looking at Figure 6.8 the divide is less dramatic between implicit concept groups, but still represents similar conclusions made in the explicit concept analysis. It is also evident that law is a concept of great importance to NGOs and MNOs.
There are some problems, which must be discussed, concerning the implicit categories.
Firstly, ‘justice’ was a term used in the equality category and inflated its score. Justice is relevant both to law and equality and, as such, the variable has the potential to distort measurement.
Figure 6.8 Comparative Implicit Results: Democratic Processes
195 The treatment of the term ‘justice’ as an error term and its removal from ‘equality’, commensurate with the same treatment of the variable ‘information’ and its removal from ‘communication’, demonstrates that the behaviour of these two implicit categories begins to mirror the ‘explicit frequency’ results, except that ‘equality’ is now slightly more pronounced than ‘communication’. This regression of ‘justice’ and ‘information’ from their respective categories shows that they are both almost equally occurring terms in the data, revealing their importance in the discourse.
Justice has a logical place in both of the categories of law and equality. It is a good example of an interactive concept. On a different note, it could be argued that justice may have its own place as an endemic problem due its attachment to both equality and law. The other notable concept, which could have its own place, is pluralism. The reason they are not included in the endemic problems is strictly due to the fact that justice is too subjective (every society or individual could have their own version of justice) and thus is grouped in the law category. This is because it could be argued to be present in all endemic problems whilst pluralism is inseparable from representation and, in being so, is already included as an endemic problem when considering representation.
6.7 Proximity Results
Further investigation into the relationship which concepts share shows similar conclusions to those reached during the frequency analysis. Figure 6.9 exemplifies the predominance of ‘law’ in discussions concerning ‘election’, ‘equality’ and
‘communication’. ‘Election and communication’ and ‘equality and communication’ show that the discussion of these concepts is not prevalent within present democratic reform discourse.
196
Figure 6.9 Predominance of Law and Equality in Democratic Discourse
The pairing of ‘communication’ with ‘election’ and ‘equality’ was undertaken in order to ascertain whether, perhaps, discussion of these concepts was prevalent (it was not). By inputing different implicit words (‘information’ rather than ‘communication’), there are a greater number of hits, potentially indicating a desire for information during elections.
The nature of the relationship between these terms shows that NGOs and MNOs regard equality, information and the election process as essential staples of democracy. This demonstrates that there is, indeed, a discrepency between academia and the non- academic or professional realm, as academics challenge the concepts of elections and equality (Yakobson, 1999; Przeworkski, Stokes and Manin, 1999) whilst NGOs and
MNOs typically do not. The results are as such because professionals in NGOs have no need to challenge existing practices for elections or equality for two reasons. The first is the fact that these practices have long been established. The second is due to the fact that communicating the best practice and having equality in those practices are long-term processes involving the government and society (pluralism) in whichever country they
197 are working and is most likely counter-productive to the goals of the organisation(s).
Perhaps the roles of equality and communication should be reconsidered.
It would seem advantageous to include populations, especially conflicted societies, in the democratisation process and establish the idea of ‘long-term’ goals in governance. Some societies, such as Iran and China, have not met equality standards conducive to ensuring basic human rights for all populations residing within their borders. Both receive international condemnation and their governments are subjected to violent attacks (the
Uighur conflict in China’s Xinjiang Province and Kurdish resistance in Iran are two contemporary examples which draw international attention). Communication, such as that between bureaucracies, is often inefficient and slow, which reduces government efficiency. The United Nations, for example, is considered by some to be “just another ingrained bureaucracy” (Reinicke et al., 2000:xvii), meaning something slow and inefficient. By strategically adding communication and equality to the democratisation process, it would probably aid the legitimacy of government, the possibility of ascertaining long-term goals and, perhaps, provide new avenues for whistleblowers concerning corruption.
6.8 Discussion of Frequency and Relational Based Analyses Continued
Now that the prevalence of terms has been identified and a discussion explaining anomalies has been conducted, it is, at this time, prudent to analyse the ramifications pertaining to the relationships between concepts as identified by the proximity analyses.
Figure 6.11, as previously noted, has already shown the proximity between democratic particles. Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12 show the relations between democratic associates, as well as democratic particles and associates. Law, election, media, communication, trade, taxation, bureaucracy, military and equality, were represented in the mix. The largest importance was given to ‘election and media’ indicating the popular correlation
198 between the two. Not surprisingly, ‘equality and media’ scored low, as there is a well recorded phenomena of media bias during elections in the literature (D’Alessio, D.,
Allen, M., 2000; Gentzkow, M., Shapiro, J. M., 2006; Bernhardt, D., 2008).
‘Communication and media’ was well represented in the mix, showing the importance of media in democracies concerning communication. ‘Law and media’ was the second highest scorer, indicating a need to regulate media.
Figure 6.10 Grouping Analysis: Democratic Associates and Democratic Associates
199
Figure 6.11 Grouping Analysis: Democratic Associates and Democratic Particles
Endemic governance problems showed that ‘accountability and corruption’ and
‘corruption and transparency’ (see Figure 6.12) are equally focused on. The frequency of these terms with ‘representation’ was also noted. This indicated that accountability and transparency are needed to combat corruption, whilst representation is generally considered to be corrupt (or perhaps operating ineffectively). Yet, ‘representation and corruption’ did not specifically score highly and was dwarfed by ‘corruption and campaigning’, which shows that NGOs and MNOs are aware of corruption during election campaigns. Accountability and transparency generated high hits as did corruption and constitution. Surprisingly, ‘representation and accountability and corruption and transparency and campaigning methods’ as well as ‘representation and accountability and corruption and transparency and constitution’ both generated hits.
This advanced conceptual relationship indicated that representation and campaigning were subsequently tied to corruption, transparency and accountability. The same inference can be made for constitutionalism, though not to such an extent as the former.
200 This advanced relationship is indicative of the necessity for investigating a wider range of reforms to governance.
Figure 6.12 Proximity Analysis: Endemic Governance Problems (Short Variables)
The relationship between democratic particles and endemic governance problems provided telling information. The highest scores should be taken into consideration, as they indicate the zeitgeist in international democratisation and provide information on the focus that NGOs and MNOs have in their work. Some of these high scores included words such as ‘election and campaigning’ and ‘law and corruption’. These scores explain that elections are generally considered the standard method used to select rulers, with campaigning to become elected as the choice instrument. They also revealed that law is necessary to combat corruption, or that law is corrupt although the textual analysis revealed more of the former. The score of ‘law and accountability’ demonstrated the need for law not to go unchecked and that accountability can be achieved through legal measures, but not separate from the need of transparency in law. ‘Election and accountability’ as well as ‘election and corruption’ generated significant hits, showing that it is important to have accountability in elections so as to reduce corruption during
201 those events. One obvious result is ensuring that elections are run legally. Transparency was also a good fit with elections. Due to the relationship between transparency and accountability, it is arguable that any move to improve one will most likely result in the advancement of the other.
As expected, the highest scoring areas concerned law, election, accountability, transparency and corruption, since these were major themes identified during the textual analysis. Representation and constitutionalism were shown to be ‘middle issues’ demonstrating their importance to democracy. Long-term goals, communication and equality were the lowest scoring hits and supported the previous arguments made concerning them notably that they were absent and in need of further research.
Communication, in its implicit sense (represented by media), and access to information were both well identified in the data. However, there was no sense of stressing the need for political communication between the actors within the state. Equality was often linked to either justice or pluralism, but none of these terms represented the words themselves. In this sense, there was concrete evidence suggesting that equality needs greater attention in democracies.
It is evident that communication, equality and long-term goals are not concepts greatly considered in the international discourse of democratic reform amongst NGOs and
MNOs. Equality is a concept widely discussed in academia, as is the need for communication between government and its institutions as well as government and society. However, it is in both areas of the literature that long-term goals are missing.
What implications does this have for democracy or governance itself? Perhaps it is the style of democratic government that is practised at present that limits the institutionalisation of long-term goals. Short-term governments, which are necessary, simply do not have enough time to plan a generation ahead. It is the advent of environmental awareness that may change this, as ‘long-term planning’ for the care of
202 the environment is something popularly undertaken and hosts a major international political platform. However, this is generally an agreement of governments with each other or major industry. What of the long-term aspirations of the plural citizenry? The government may have an inaccurate picture of the plurality’s wants due to interest group pressure on MPs and other government office holders. This does not result in fair attention to all ideas.
6.9 Cognitive Mapping
There exist complex relationships between various ‘concept groups’. Democratic particles are linked with democratic associates, which, together, are linked with endemic governance problems (see introduction for their definitions). What do some of these relationships look like? In its most basic form, the concepts operate in a “diamond” shape (Figure 6.13).
Linked
Democratic Particles Linked Democratic Associates
Linked Linked
Linked Linked
Endemic Governance Problems
Figure 6.13 Overall View ("Diamond" Shape)
Further concept mapping displayed the unique relationship, with percentages, of endemic problems, democratic particles and associates. This concept map is of secondary importance to the original findings but assisted in understanding the results of the proximity analysis. It was again evident that law and elections are dominant in international democratic discourse. This is due to the fact that ‘law’ and ‘election’ were
203 the highest scoring terms when compared to other terms, as their use in the 14 primary source documents was widespread.
6.10 Answering Research Questions
(a) There are endemic problems present in modern democratic reform, as was seen by
the frequency of the endemic problems in the data as well as their relationship with
democratic particles and associates. The concepts most often found in the
documents were corruption, accountability, transparency and representation. The
highest scoring was corruption, with accountability, transparency and
representation as mid-range results, and constitutionalism, long-term goals and
campaigning methods as the lowest scoring. These variations indicate that
corruption is a major issue that is currently drawing much attention and is, thus, of
central importance to most states as well as citizens. Accountability, transparency
and representation (respectively) were fundamental issues, each with their own
weighting in the democratic discourse. Accountability and transparency were
directly linked to corruption, meaning that they are key to combating corruption.
Corruption and campaigning methods were also medium scoring, confirming the
awareness of corruption during political campaigns.
There were concrete examples of terms with no hits in both the frequency and
proximity analyses. Long-term goals, as was already shown, dominated this area.
Constitutionalism and campaigning methods were also missing hits. The strongest
results implied that democratic reform is mostly concerned with mitigating
corruption in elections, representation issues and constitutional issues through
accountability and transparency methods. Interestingly, the advanced proximity
relationship of campaigning methods and constitutionalism both earned medium
scores when analysed with corruption, transparency, accountability and
204 representation. This was not the case with long-term goals. Perhaps there is a lost
institution when it comes to long-term goals in democracy?
(b) Democratic particles and their accompanying associates were seen to be well-
balanced amongst all documents and mostly generated high frequency scores.
However, in the area of associates, ‘taxation’ and ‘bureaucracy’ were low scorers
compared to ‘media’, ‘trade’ and ‘military’. The analysis of implicit results
ironically produces the opposite, with ‘bureaucracy’ scoring the highest and
‘taxation’ second highest. Why was this the case? Taxation generated consistent
scores with words such as ‘treasury’, ‘tariff’ and ‘fiscal’. Bureaucracy, on the
other hand, scored inconsistently, but generated hits with terms like
‘administration’, ‘infrastructure’ and ‘civil service’, for example. ‘Media’, ‘trade’
and ‘military’ scored consistently (‘trade’ the lowest of the three). This indicates
that taxation and bureaucracy are not considered whole bodies but, rather, are bi-
directional terms commensurate with their closest synonyms. It is important to
acknowledge ‘taxation’ as a whole, as well as ‘bureaucracy’, so as to best judge
their operability and place in government. Having a variety of terms changes
emphases, especially due to the fact that ‘taxation’ and ‘bureaucracy’ are closely
denoted terminologies.
The nature of the relationship between democratic particles and associates reveals
‘election’ and ‘media’ as the highest scorers, with ‘law’ and ‘media’, as well as
‘law’ and ‘military’, scoring medium. ‘Communication’ and ‘media’, ‘law’ and
‘trade’ as well as ‘election’ and ‘military’ gave expected high score results. Their
relationship shows the behaviour of these institutions between each other. What is
important to highlight is the absence of ‘communication’ and ‘bureaucracy’,
‘communication’ and ‘military’, ‘equality’ and ‘taxation’, and ‘communication’
and taxation’. It indicates that there is a lack of communication between
205 bureaucratic offices, military offices, and taxation offices. There was also a lack of discussion concerning the equality of taxation. This shows that the necessary exchange of information (communication) between government and its bodies, as well as with society, is not on the democratic reform agenda in regard to bureaucracy and taxation. It has been seen that corruption, accountability, transparency, representation and law are well discussed, so why not bureaucracy and taxation, two government life-bloods?
The reason for this is that both bureaucracy and taxation are staples of the state.
NGOs and MNOs operating upon these grounds could possibly infringe upon the sovereignty of the state, jeopardising its institutions. This viewpoint is derived from the debate in academia surrounding the effects of MNOs’ and trans-national
NGOs’ challenges to the nation state. Conversely, it would most likely be the case that, when analysing texts concerning structural adjustments, economy and so on, there would be a much higher incidence of the concepts ‘taxation’ and
‘bureaucracy’ due to the relevance they import to that subject material. Yet, this lack of discussing concerning taxation and bureaucracy in democratic discourse is probably something that should be focused on more by NGOs and MNOs, as they are associates of democracy.
‘Equality’ and ‘media’, as well as ‘equality’ and ‘trade’, scored low which shows an inconsistency regarding equality in many democracies when compared to other issues such as law and elections. Taking a closer look at the implicit results concerning the frequency of equality in the data, it becomes a smaller category beside ‘communication’. Both are dwarfed by ‘law’ and by ‘election’. As has been reminded, the implicit categories should not be over considered as they are based on subjective terms and could generate different scores if a different person ran this analysis. In this case, the search to understand which words, other than
206 pluralism, scored high concerning equality. Popular issues, such as cultural
equality, fiscal equality and religious equality, for example, are related to equality
and pluralism. Given the often fragmented nature of terminology in the
international democratic discourse, these terms can reasonably be used for these
kinds of analysis. A proximity search for all three of those terms only generated 18
hits.
Perhaps issues of equality are considered to be associated with universal human
rights, which presents its own set of problems, such as cultural clashes between the
western notion of human rights, and more conservative societies with their own
traditional rights structures. It could also be that equality has reached an
intellectual standstill regarding the evolution of methods by which to increase
equality in society. Thinkers such as Girling (1997), Hanke and Walters (1997),
and Kolm (2004) are a few examples regarding the arguments completed
concerning economic growth and inequality. Perhaps equality is considered the
realm of government, local civil society or economic institutions by NGOs and
MNOs? At this stage, the question of bringing equality to the level of importance
that law and elections enjoy certainly needs an answer.
(c) The proximity of endemic governance problems and democratic particles
generated hits. This was not anticipated. It is logical, in hindsight, that seven
endemic governance problems would be linked to the four basic democratic
particles. It reveals the interconnected nature of the democratic particles and the
endemic problems associated with them. As was seen, the concepts with the
highest frequency resulted in the highest scores for proximity. This comparative
analysis shows that endemic problems are far more ingrained in democratic
particles than previously believed. This result generates more importance and
207 relevance to democratic institutional reform and the prescriptions, as well as
recommendations made in Chapter 7.
(d) These findings contribute to the development of a conceptual framework designed
to mitigate endemic problems primarily by displaying their prevalence in the
international discourse of democratisation, by exemplifying their relationships
between each other, and by showing which are more common than others. The
frequency and proximity research also demonstrated that accountability,
transparency, corruption, representation, campaigning and constitutionalism are
linked. Accountability and transparency are necessary to combat corruption, and
representation, campaigning and constitutions are considered to be most likely (but
not entirely) negatively affected by corruption. It was also seen that campaigning
methods, long-term goals and constitutional issues are not widely discussed
problems and are in need of greater attention, both in practice and research.
(e) These results imply that, for the mitigation of endemic problems, the focus should
be on basic democratic particles and their interplay with endemic governance
problems. Democratic associates can be included in the analysis of a government
to understand the unique relationship these institutions may have between each
other and how the particular relationships might affect the government. The
interrelated nature of the concepts means that, by changing one, it will affect
others.
This raises concerns regarding unintended consequences. It is difficult for government, business and civil society to know what the effects of mitigating one endemic problem will be. In fact, it is arguable that each government may experience different effects due to the balance of state structure and governmental practices. For example, ‘government
A’ could have good indications of transparency but problematic campaigning methods, whilst ‘government B’ could have great representation but suffer from corruption. What
208 is certain, nevertheless, is that the mitigation of any endemic problem will result in the enhancement of the democratic element in any level of government in the world. This is due to the fact that endemic problems and democratic particles, as well as associates, are dependent on each other for maximal performance. How can trade be successful if it is corrupt? Is communication between government and society worthwhile if there is no indication of trust by society concerning the information their government releases
(indicative of a lack accountability and transparency)? Is a constitution relevant if it was enacted in an unrepresentative manner? There are many questions of this nature, and effectively reveal the interrelated nature of each concept.
6.11 Conclusion
In this section, it has been seen that endemic problems are present in modern democratic states. An investigation into the nature of the relationship between concepts showed evidence pertaining to their interrelated status, exemplified by the cognitive ‘diamond’ shaped map (page 203), and argued for their capacity to create a positive feedback loop when one or more endemic problems are mitigated. The risk of unintended consequences was also identified, with no solution strategy for it at this time. Finally, evidence concerning the lack of long-term goals was shown which supported the argument that there is a missing governmental strategy in the state apparatus. The benefits of using long-term strategies will be discussed in Chapter 7.
This was accomplished, firstly, by qualitatively analysing the data using a textual analysis composed of ethnography, social agency and thematic analyses in Chapter 5.
Following that, Chapter 6 described the logic and methodology used in the quantitative content analysis. Frequency, proximity and cognitive mapping techniques were used to empirically argue the inferences derived from the textual analysis and further present the data through visual aid and comparative analysis with implicit variables and categories.
209 With the aims and research questions of this thesis answered by this empirical data, the recommendations made in Chapter 7 may hold greater value for diplomats, ministers, consultants, citizens, academics and others to understand democracy based on perhaps its oldest and most neutral determinants. The key to the recommendations is that they may be applied to any government, at any tier of government. Each concept within a recommendation can be argued to have had its basic elements met by even the smallest and most remote tribal societies. They are human elements, perhaps common to everyone and, in that manner, operate as a clean slate available to be written upon as the concepts have to be defined by the pluralist citizenry using them. The recommendations may work with the unique situation of any government.
210 SECTION THREE: PRESCRIPTIONS AND CONCLUSION
Introduction
Democracy is the political governance system equivalent of the liar paradox. Just as the liar paradox has perfect grammar and semantics, democracy has four non-dilutive particles. It is the content of each (the words of the sentence and the style of democracy, respectively) which allows for the paradox or logical contradiction to form. This sentence is false can neither be true, nor false. Liberal democracy is true can also neither be proven true or false depending on the observer. A person inclined to social democracy could consider liberal democracy to be a falsity and vice versa. Conversely, a person who believes in liberal democracy can think that there is much to be improved in that style of democratic polity, which also shows that ‘liberal democracy is true’ is, in fact, false. This small discussion rests on the idea that there exists a principle of bivalence in democracy and that inherent in the calculus is the standard of the ‘excluded middle’. The key is to recognise that democracy does not deal in ideological absolutes, that democracy is most often found as a ‘middle’, and that it is often portrayed as the culmination of each observer’s paradox which, in itself, is a resolution to the riddle.
In less cryptic language, democracy, whichever style, is only true if it has been ratified by the people fulfilling the four necessary democratic particles. By being aware of the seven endemic governance problems, either at the beginning, throughout or in revision of democracy, these basic and inviolable democratic particles are heightened and become dilatable. The process of trying to select officials, the justice and equality of the plural society’s individuals, communication between government with and between other parties in civil society, as well as law determined by the legitimacy of pluralist
211 inclusion (based on the foundations of mitigating endemic problems), can lead to an improvement in governance and society.
There are secondary themes worth mentioning which evolved or were made present through the combination of major themes. Education in civics—an advanced and longer curriculum than practiced in countries such as Canada—as expressed by John Stuart Mill
(([1859] 1989:182) and Michael Oakeshott (1991:210) is an excellent way to inform citizens of the opportunities found in their government and to have them understand how to help the government to achieve their goals. Also notable is a check on violence which is necessary for the growth of a culturally relevant style of democracy to happen.54 For example, the United Nations Democracy Fund is devoted to reducing violence in efforts to engender peaceful voting for the citizens of a growing democracy.
54 Keane (2004:1) explains: “This essay is about violence, and the pity of violence. It dwells upon its connections with democracy because unwanted physical interference with the bodies of others, such that they experience pain and mental anguish and, in the extreme case, death – violence, in a word – is the greatest enemy of democracy as we know it. Violence is anathema to its spirit and substance.”
212 Chapter 7: PRESCRIPTIONS
The following is but a small contribution to the larger body of work required to further explore the practical methods by which endemic governance problems can be mitigated.
The prescriptions found below are based solely on the synthesis of recommendations from academics, political philosophers and professionals (recalling the 14 documents qualitatively analysed) as well as the inferences gleaned from the quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 6.
It must be acknowledged that further research should go into each prescriptive measure outlined below as they have not been empirically tested. Theoretical feasibility and practical reality are, at times, at odds, which is why the former acknowledgement was made.
There is no distinct order in which the following prescriptions should be followed, as each government (at various tiers) has their own unique set of circumstances which will dictate the order in which prescriptions should be applied. Moreover, the quantitative conceptual analysis (namely proximity analysis) showed that each concept—hence each prescription—is probably interconnected. This means that an action affecting one concept may invariably affect one or several others. It is recommended that when trying to mitigate one endemic problem all other endemic problems should be monitored to gauge their interplay. Thus, if a negative result occurs, corrective measures can be applied, whilst, if the desired effect occurs, they can be used to maximise results.
7.1 Methods for Enhancing Democratic Particles
Democracy is viewed in this thesis as an ever present element found in every government in the world and at every tier of government (local, municipal/regional,
213 state/provincial, national, international). The element of democracy is composed of four particles: law, equality, selecting officials and communication.
The argument is that each of these particles must be addressed by governments, civil society and active citizens in order for the element of democracy to grow. It may be cautiously said that by removing one of these particles democracy cannot exist.
Without law, secure and equal political discourse and elections would not be possible.
Without equality, law would be illegitimate (from the pluralist perspective), communication would be unbalanced and the selection of officials corrupt, as certain individuals could be disadvantaged due to some inequality. Without the ability for citizens to select those who are to order a society for a given period of time, other elements of governance (such as oligarchy or authoritarianism) could dominate the people’s choice. Finally, without communication the gathering of information and conduct of all bodies within the state (for example, government, civil society, individuals) could not function and there would be no democracy. Therefore, it is stressed that each of these areas must be pursued equally so that a distinct (relevant to its citizenry) democracy can grow.
The result of trying to enhance and improve democratic particles through the mitigation of the seven endemic problems may create a unique culturally relevant democracy. This unique democracy may be applied to other areas of the state (such as its associates) in order to reform them as well.
7.2 Law
Law is, and has been, an ever changing body, as laws are modified to order the changing faces of society. It is the right of the political Übermensch (recalling Nietzsche) to challenge laws that are considered unjust, especially if a law restricts political
214 communication, the right to selecting officials and equality. This also applies to endemic problems as the Übermensch should challenge the lack of transparency, accountability and corruption in law. In Schmitt’s (1985) discussions concerning the legitimacy of law, coupled with pluralist sovereignty, the idea exists that law is proportionately legitimate to the number of citizens portraying the pluralist citizenry involved in the creation of a law. Hence, a law inclusive of few people is not legitimate and vice versa (Keane, 2009).
The discussion in Chapter 1 concerning Nietzsche, Weber and Schmitt also sheds light on the current lack of legal measures concerning emergency powers. The right of expediency is, as stipulated, excusive and unnecessary. Technology and knowledge derived from recent experiences is enough to ensure that measures are in place and that, should emergency powers be executed, these measures are to be put under strict re- evaluation once normal conditions have been restored. This is to maintain accountability, transparency and anti-corruption in the legislation of emergency powers.
International IDEA (1999) promoted the idea that political parties must remain under the law. Ober (1996) and Hansen (1991) argued the need for politicians to be punished by the law’s harshest penalties for corruption (inspired by Athenian custom). Chomsky
(2006) and Curtis (2004) discussed how the United States of America and Britain have, time and again, violated international human rights law with unaccountable and inaccessible foreign policies which do not reflect the pluralist will of their countries.
Bernstein (1993), Bohman and Rehg (1999), Habermas (2008) and Hill (2007) argue that there must be equality under the law; and Montesquieu ([1748] 1914) argued the need for laws to be based on reason and that law should be relevant to all people (the ‘esprit generale’).
It was seen that during the classical era politicians faced capital punishment for bribery, treason and other forms of treachery counter to the common good (Lintott, 1990, 2003;
215 Brennan, 2004). Another, perhaps forgotten, technique in enacting legislation or appearing in jury was the efforts which Athenians went through in order remain anonymous (who was to be present when a law was formed or reviewed), so as to mitigate corruption. If an interest party is unaware of which individuals will be making the decisions that they would like to influence with coercion, the intentions of the interest party are defeated in that way.
Matyszak (2003) and Oakley (2004) revealed that citizens of Rome had legal protection and such was most effectively used by the lower classes, commonly known as the plebeians, to acquire further civil rights and increase their power. The Roman ‘conflict of orders’ can be depicted as a large scale strike which nearly ground the Roman economy to a halt. In the deliberations between patrician and plebeian representatives, a plebeian tribunal was formed that rivalled the powers of the Roman senate. This lesson of organised withdrawal should be remembered by unrepresented poorer people the world over; social justice concessions wrought from the power of government is possible through organised and large-scale, peaceful withdrawal from society.
Another practice emanating from ancient Athens was the right of a citizen to challenge a law publicly or privately. The mechanisms by which a present day citizen can challenge law are often inaccessible due to financial or time restrictions. Lobbying and pursuing justice through the courts are capital and time intensive activities, which is why they are generally pursued by industry or wealthy interest groups. Civil society, both local and international, is addressing the quality of government legislation through internationally agreed standards or collective grassroots movements for justice. Although these mechanisms are in place, there is still a missing opportunity. Through the use of the
Internet and software programming, governments have the capacity to create lines of communication whereby individual citizens can challenge laws and receive quality answers in a cost- and time-effective manner.
216 Popper (1971, 2003, 2002) showed his method of gradualism—the notion of applying new laws in a careful and gradual manner, always listening to anyone with a complaint because it is otherwise impossible for any one person or group to have universal truth.
Although the real-world feasibility of this immediately comes into question, there are two strategies which may keep legislation from taking much time to be passed. The first is a regular process of ‘updates’, via government statistics, to accumulate wider-ranging and relevant information derived from its citizenry through a more intensive census (see
Super-Census), with opinion poll follow-ups addressing each group composing the pluralist citizenry. The second is to engage citizens via the aforementioned idea of an
Internet program that allows citizens to communicate with various governmental bodies.
In this program, each time a new question is asked by a citizen it can be codified to statistically represent the percentage-based areas of concern exhibited by X amount of citizens (or which questions/comments are most commonly asked/made). These strategies are fairly optimistic but given the correct software and community-wide discussion it is not a utopian dream.
Commensurately, the law should be based on in-depth information derived from a pluralist citizenry. If law is applied without comprehensive knowledge of the pluralist society which it is ordering, then, logically, it cannot be legitimate in this sense. In the classical republican sense, a state’s legitimacy to create laws for its citizens was simply the mandate that a government was elected. The act of election signified the transfer of power to the selected rulers from the citizenry (who, in the process of selecting rulers, showed their desire to have an ordered society).
A philosophical root problem to this process is that, typically, the choice of government made (as can be seen in the British, French and American revolutions) was not a pluralist or equal process. Thus, certain populations were coerced to participate in the system imposed on them if they wished to be represented. Legitimacy can no longer simply rest
217 on the fact that certain individuals were elected and, thus, allowed to use the law.55 For true legitimacy to occur, law must be founded on in-depth information (perhaps using the Super-Census tool). Without such, there is a larger risk that the law will be illegitimately applied, as the law will be ordering society against the interests of the pluralist citizenry.
This discussion takes a specific view of criminal activity. It is the state’s responsibility to protect citizens from acts of violence and, if acting under the aforementioned legality, is always legitimate. Illegitimacy, in the sense discussed above, occurs if criminal activity is being pursued in a manner that is outside of the legal framework instituted by representatives selected by the people.
Governments can find themselves in trouble when protecting a portion of the citizenry from political violence. Notable examples are Israel and Hamas, as well as Sri Lanka and the Tamil separatists. Both operate under different circumstances, but their actions are being questioned by the international community specifically concerning the legitimacy of their actions. How can a state government commit violence against a people that is not their own or that are wishing to have their own independent government?
In the case of Israel and Palestine, there is a criminality on both sides which needs to be legally clarified, by the citizens of both states, for any meaningful resolution to happen.
After such is agreed (recalling the need for these agreements to rest on in-depth information), the law should be upheld through better policing from within both states to ensure that criminal activity is minimised.
55 To regain legitimacy in governance, the current institution of representation should be challenged. A parliamentary checklist (page 256), long-term goals (page 252), a constitutional review (page 244) and other tools or ideas are needed to inject the public sphere into parliamentary politics. Just as parliament checked a king, so, too, can pluralist sovereignty check a parliament-based government administration.
218 In the case of Sri Lanka and the Tamil separatists, there is a lack of communication occurring on both sides. Sri Lanka may have the capability to run a Super-Census on the individuals living in separatist lands, but cannot conduct such with political violence being present. A consequence, as was seen earlier in 2009, was the need to pacify all regions affected by war between the separatist parties and the Sri Lankan government.
Steps could now be taken to gain information from all those living in Sri Lankan territory in order to understand the complexity of its people’s desire (that is, how many wish to separate). This can be coupled with a referendum allowing the people of the territories who wish to separate to decide if, indeed, they would like to be their own nation. During the entire process, the security of individuals (from all parties) must be maintained. If this is not done, then Sri Lanka would be operating an illegitimate law as it would lack representation.
The main argument is that the law is committed to ensuring order. In other words, it stipulates a set of boundaries which the bodies found within the state must heed. If such boundaries are broken, then penal measures should be taken. Violence reduction is also an important function of the law. As has been argued, violence limits the ability of democracy to function.
7.3 Equality
Schmitt (1932) attacked the notion of equality, as he argued that it removed a homogenised society’s capacity for order and progress. Although he was incorrect in understanding society as a homogenised body, there is some reason in his argument. If a government has illegitimate measures of equity in their legislation, then society risks losing considerable amounts of money and time whilst mitigating inequality.
International standards promote the idea of using equality and equity as cross-cutting parameters in the creation and modification of laws. The difficulty arising here is that for
219 equality to be relevant to a population, it must first be defined by the population that it is meant to ensure equality over. This also can be achieved through a Super-Census.
Bernstein (1993:140-141) sees justice as equality, specifically the “equality of rights for all members of the community”. Lenin ([1917] 1992) sought equality in communism.
Manin (1997) showed how the rise of ‘party-politics’ from ‘parliamentarism’ made it increasingly hard for average citizens to voice their opinions, which created political inequality. Rawls (1999) discussed the ‘principle of the common interest’:
Obviously the purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice (Rawls, 1999:17).
Gierzynski (2009) looked at the inequality of election campaigns. Machiavelli ([c.1520]
1983) addressed the importance of the prince maintaining equality amongst each individual subject so as to maintain peace in his domain. Tocqueville (1848) stated that there is equality between each citizen with no person greater or lesser than the other.
Locke ([1689] 1821) and Harrington ([1656] 1992) argued how equality could be ascertained through capital-based possessions, and equality was observed to be a poorly addressed democratic particle when compared to law.
It was seen that equality, bolstered by the widening franchise and human rights, contributed to the notion of pluralist sovereignty and dispelled the ‘myth of the majority’. The only time that a majority can be had is when one or several specific issues are asked in a way that individuals can answer and through intensive empirical work to understand the aggregates which form in the data. That means that a political party voted into power is not the citizenry’s majority decision as it embodies a mish-mash of wants and desires by whatever percentage of the population that voted.
People, composing a distinct pluralist citizenry, are unconsciously seeking equality through a complex milieu of random activities not bound to national borders or locales.
220 Therein emerges the globalisation-fuelled clash of definitions concerning equality; one persons definition of equality is different to another. A good way to understand equality is to present the data explicitly. In that way, differing segments of a plural citizenry can exemplify the ‘what’ and ‘why’ of their notion of equality, so as to open the way for peaceful debate. This, done on an international scale, could also ease cultural misunderstandings. The realistic feasibility of achieving this is inherently linked to political will and organisation, as the mechanisms for ascertaining this information have long been in place.
Rome, Athens, France, the United States of America, England and various MNOs exemplified the way in which inequality sparks violence (the democracy killer). It is the longstanding inequalities, those most difficult to redress (such as the disparity of wealth between rich and poor countries) or those that are constantly redressed but unjustly blocked, that enrage citizens as frustration grows within the political system. Past and current experiences show that there is a need for vigilance concerning equality, not simply for matters of civil rights, but also for matters of peace.
Another prescription to ensure equality, is that it must be continuously applied to all areas of the state, such as democratic particles, associates and endemic governance problems. The basic premise is that all citizens should be given the same opportunities regardless of, for example, race, gender, physical attributes, religion and sexuality. Of specific importance to the case of democracy is equality in pluralism and justice.
Citizens should be ruled in an equal matter and justice should be applied equally, based on the law.
Equality, specifically concerning campaigning methods, is needed as was apparent in the review of modern literature and empirical analysis (see Figure 7.1). ‘Equality’ and
221 ‘campaign(ing)’ were found within 50 words of each other only 11 times. Compare that with ‘law’ and ‘corruption’, which appeared together 1,230 times.
Figure 7.1 Proximity Analysis: Democratic Particles versus Endemic Governance Problems #2
The statistics show that equality lacks across the board concerning all endemic problems.
However, this is not the case within the academic literature. Focus is currently being given to issues of equality in representation and constitutions (Bernstein, 1993; Griffin,
2008; Irving, 2008; Garvey, 1967). The lack of focus by NGOs and MNOs on equality
(connoting gender in this sense) and representation is something not currently understood, as international democratisation and development focuses heavily on gender as well as the increased representation of individuals living in poverty.
A specific focus on equality and equity in legislation is necessary to ensure that gender, for example, as well as indigenous and minority peoples’ rights, are cross-cutting issues
222 for all laws. This is done to combat single or double discrimination56 experienced by women, indigenous peoples and minorities.
7.4 Selecting officials
The selection of officials was theoretically established in Chapter 1. It dealt with the idea that there are other means of selection (besides elections) by which a pluralist citizenry can decide who is to temporarily hold office. Manin (1997) discussed the prevalence of the lottery system in the Athenian and early Italian city-state republics, where qualified citizens would volunteer and be chosen at random to fulfil an office for a predetermined amount of time. Manin (1997) continued to declare that this style of selecting officials was ruled out primarily by English parliamentarians and American Founding Fathers, which had a resounding influence on the establishment of future constitutions, such as the French, German and Spanish.
However, as was seen in the frequency analysis (Chapter 6), selecting officials is not a common term (as it did not appear), nor something investigated by the international democratisation sphere. In order to proceed with the analysis, ‘election’ had to be substituted for ‘selecting officials’ due to the fact that elections are the primary method of choosing officials across the globe. Nevertheless, there is some focus on this area in academia (as was seen with Manin, 1997) and, perhaps increasingly, in professional practice. The Citizen’s Assembly for Voting Equity in British Columbia (BC) addressed that citizens of that Canadian province on 13 May 2009 in a referendum concerning which voting method should be used in BC. The Citizen’s Assembly had spent ten months receiving ‘hearings and deliberations’ and recommended making a change to
BC-STV (single transferable vote) from FPP (first past the post), as such would provide
56 Double discrimination often occurs when a minority or an indigenous person is female, physically or mentally disabled, of alternate sexuality, unemployed or similar. The first discrimination occurs because the person (male or female) is part of a minority or indigenous population. The second discrimination occurs if this person is female, homosexual, etc.
223 greater fairness in the electoral system (VotingBC, 2009). This recalls Reilly’s (2001,
2006) work concerning electoral engineering in that one voting system is not necessarily the right system for a particular pluralist citizenry. That logic then extends to selecting officials: Is voting the right system for all pluralist citizenries?57
A problem, as expressed by O’Leary (2006), was that, as representative democracy was maturing, the gap between citizen and elected official kept growing. It is still, at present, difficult for the average citizen to gain time with his or her representative in parliament, with the reality being that individuals interact more with bureaucrats than politicians.
However, InfoDev and CDT (2002) describe how e-government can bridge the gap between citizen and officials, once again recalling the merits of technology for facilitating the improvement of governance and the enhancement of democracy.
Grigorescu (2003), in his argument, reminds us that
governments need to inform the public of their actions and intentions and offer mechanisms through which officials can be punished for not being representative (Grigorescu, 2003:644).
It is felt that officials are not adequately held responsible for their actions. Further research needs to go into the merits of greatly increasing the penalty for damaging the pluralist interest and making contemptible politicians serve hard time for their indiscretions.
On the farther end of the spectrum, Lenin ([1917] 1992:39) argued that officials should be paid “a workman’s wages” and not be entitled to the financial privileges of their post.
Fearon (1999) implicitly agrees, as paying politicians more would inherently attract the wrong types of people to the post, as they would be seeking financial incentives over the idea of serving their fellow people. However, this is beginning to trail into the endemic problem of corruption (page 236) and, as such, the discussion will continue there.
57 Recall that this line of argument extends to all levels of governance. Selection by lot could be a better way of selecting officials at the municipal level from a pool of volunteers.
224 Selecting officials is an idea that was never fully posed to citizens of any nation, most likely due to practical restrictions. Even though individuals in the past did not have the opportunity to collectively debate the method by which they would order themselves
(hence selecting officials), the process of choosing rulers freely, equally and effectively is ever necessary. Campaigning methods (page 250) will deal mostly with the problems in this area, however, the capability of the potential for a society to order their selection of rulers should be discussed.
Originally argued by Locke, Hobbes, Machiavelli and Rousseau ([1762] 1953, 1968,
1988), the social contract or the phase where people sat down and decided, in an orderly manner, how to organise their society most likely never occurred. What if a long-term process were engaged wherein individuals could actually form a social contract to govern themselves locally and at other tiers of government? The feasibility of this could be ascertained by trialling the methodology in a small locality and working to include greater numbers if successes are met. It is a different—albeit, rather useful—method to have a pluralist and culturally relevant social contract reached by consensus, not one imposed by non-pluralist, culturally skewed, historically outdated and elitist normative progress.
7.5 Communication
Communication was chosen over information due to the logic that communication is the umbrella term for all means of transmitting information; with specific attention given to political communication. This milieu is depicted in Figure 7.2, which is a cognitive map of the basic political communication matrix.
225
Figure 7.2 Political Communication Matrix
As can be seen, each rectangle around the political communication diamond represents a major area of society. There are red arrows pointing to red rectangles for four of them and these red rectangles represent areas within the body that should also be part of the discussion. In other words, government should communicate within government, citizens between citizens, multinationals with multinationals, civil society with civil society, and so on. There are also blue arrows indicating discussion between the major bodies, whilst all bodies are linked together with black lines attached to the political communication diamond.
Figure 7.2 is meant to exemplify the importance of political communication for the enhancement of democracy. Without clear channels of communication, the effectiveness
226 of conveying information pertaining to the other democratic particles and endemic governance problems is lessened, thus resulting in a poorer performing democracy.
Keane (2009) wrote that, in monitory democracy, communication is the power nexus as, without pervasive communication, monitory democracy would not be able to exist. He argued that it was the advent of the internet and other ICTs that resulted in a greater capacity for other bodies to monitor governments. However, there is a darker side to communication. ‘Über-democracy’, the negative effect of governments adapting to monitory-styled democracy, resulted in the executive control of political communication so as to deceive citizens and simply overpower dissenting voices (Keane, 2009:766,
767). Another realisation regarding the increase of communication due to the Internet is the targeting of MNO gatherings by individuals and civil society, which is significant because individuals and groups are bypassing national government in their protests.
Arendt’s (1990, 1993), Habermas’ (1991) and Manin’s (1997) critique of materialism and hedonistic individualism usurping the public sphere from politics with its apolitical lullaby, contained calls for the importance of active citizens: those individuals engaged in communicating with each other and other bodies about politics. This lack of individuals participating in the communication of politics is a focused upon area in academic literature, with some concluding that it is the inaccessibility of government today that has driven individuals away; whilst others feel that the added leisure time provided by technological improvements have advanced the human condition to the point of making political interest obsolete; and more feel that it is public relations campaigning by industry, media and interest groups designed to keep individuals out of the political fray. It is uncertain whether the number of individuals participating in politics (proportionate to population density) has increased or decreased over the last 200 or 300 years. What is certain is that there are many avenues through which individuals
227 can engage politically, due to the Internet and the growth of civil society in the past 50 years (contrary to Putnam’s (2000) belief).
Political communication has been increasing, as Keane (2009) explained in his description of monitory democracy. However, much of this communication is regulated, as Voltmer (2006) argued. Voltmer expressed the need for a transformation to occur so that it would be easier for individuals to communicate with other bodies and not have to overcome obstacles in every line of communication.
The utility of information for transparency, accountability, corruption, and the enhancement of democracy cannot be understated. A government, at any level, cannot operate legitimately without acting on in-depth information derived from their citizenry.
The role of government is, in the author’s opinion, to serve the citizenry of its state. It is not conducive to doing so without acting with as much information as possible. Due to the short-termism of governments at present, the long-term process of running a higher quality census is neglected in preference for opinion polls and the like that have a limited value and are not, despite certain claims, typically representative of the pluralist citizenry as it takes a highly precise understanding of the aggregates composing a plurality and is made even more difficult by trying to poll equal numbers of individuals from each aggregate. This is also due to the fact that an increasing number of countries are becoming more diverse because of global migration, which makes small sample data less representative as well as legitimate. Furthermore, the practice of communication is indispensable. Opening and using networks of communication between:
(a) government bodies;
(b) government bodies and civil society;
(c) government bodies and active citizens;
(d) civil society and other civil society; and
228 (e) active citizens and other active citizens; can, inter alia, increase transparency, anti-corruption and accountability, due to the monitory effect (Keane, 2009). Overall, transparent communication within, and between, these networks can increase the effectiveness of government, society and state.
A ‘Super-Census’, or the method of making a much more in-depth survey of the population than is currently practised in many states and levels of governance, can be a successful tool for building pertinent statistics of the plural citizenry. This process is a longer-term action and costlier than its forebears, but with appropriate planning, social advertisement (see Grant, 2004) and use of ICTs, a much higher quality of information can be generated. Such would allow legitimate and relevant policy formation, the streamlining of progress and a deeper understanding of the wants and needs inherent in the plural citizenry.
Appropriate planning necessitates a triangular approach to surveying a population.
Municipalities should, logically, be the ones to start the surveys. Once all residents in each locality have answered the census, a first-grade, statistical analysis can be made by each municipality for the benefit of their governing system. The raw data and statistics from each locality can then be forwarded to a regional and/or provincial/state level. A second-grade, statistical analysis is then conducted, so that regions and/or provinces/states can improve their governance (if a region, then send regional statistics and raw data to state/provincial level). Finally, all provinces/states send their raw data and statistics to the country (highest) level of government for the final, statistical analysis to be conducted. A further step can be used by sending this information to an
MNO, such as the UN, in order to facilitate international cooperation (see Figure 7.3 and
Figure 7.4).
229
Figure 7.3 Super-Census: The Triangular Methodology
230
Figure 7.4 Geographical Representation of Triangular Methodology
E-government can be promoted through the use of ICTs which may also assist in the growth of political communication. As previously specified e-government has the potential to increase citizen participation in democracy (perhaps through more referendums) as well as increasing transparency, which could help mitigate issues of accountability and corruption. Furthermore, e-government can also help governments to interact more with citizens in order to provide a higher quality service. Ultimately, communication increases the chance for citizens to understand, participate and engage with government at any level.
Jean-Francois Lyotard (1993, 1985) argues the notion of minority protection through multiculturalism and über-heterogeneity during his attempts at finding something
“dispossessed and dispossessing” throughout his post-modernist critique of meta-
231 narratives (Lyotard, 1993:5). He argues against the modern perception of meta- narratives, or overlying ideologies which permeate thought (1985:12, 1994:27).
His ‘narratives’ can be seen as democratic styles. Liberal-conservative, neoliberal- neoconservative, socialist-capitalist, centralist-federalist, green-industrial and so on, are all highly charged meta-narratives which are applied to basic democratic particles. It is in this way that democracy should be interpreted in a ‘dispossessed’ sense, of having no narrative, or bearing only the objective and non-biased permutation from political philosophy to realistic utility.
Two important points emerge from Lyotard’s (1994) philosophies: the first, that grand narratives have lost their credibility (1994:28); and the second, that technocrats (or narrative creators) “know” society’s needs, as society cannot know its own (1994:34). In his meta-narratives argument, he criticises the current state of humanity but does not blame humanity, as he claims that technology and technocrats, coupled with capitalism, pushed normative values toward materialism. His perspective allows political communication to be examined as a grand narrative and begs the question: Who is, or are, controlling these normative political values?
The idea of changing the role of the military and other bodies of force to heighten legitimacy is another area to investigate. For instance, civil society, industry or government, can request the presence of one of these bodies so as to maintain order and allow a discussion forum to emerge. Furthermore, all force-bearing bodies should operate with digital camera hoists and global positioning system (GPS) tracking to maintain their legitimacy in periods of violence or war. What is needed, is a rethinking of the way force-bearing bodies in the state operate; the opening of dialogue to members of the state other than government once a new system has been established; and the creation of low-cost, secure and ultra-durable, digital camera and GPS technologies.
232 7.6 Mitigating Endemic Governance Problems
Regarding the mitigation of endemic problems, the basic tools to be recommended may be universal. They may be used with any official government style, across any culture and at any government level. Further research must go into how these tools can serve to improve economic practices, the judicial branch of government, as well as organisational practices.
It should be noted that any action involving the establishment of a plural citizenry’s will must be a long term process. It must involve ample time for all opposition to be recognised, heard, discussed and reheard until a consensus is reached. ICTs have allowed, at least in countries with the required infrastructure, the ability for higher levels of government to engage citizens at a level typically enjoyed by local government. If the process is rushed, or compromise is not found with any opposition, then any consensus reached will be illegitimate.
There are certain recommendations which affect several endemic problems and, as such, will be included here. Ancient Athenians, republican Romans and Italian city-state republicans discussed the perils of factionalism in politics. Removing factionalism, or reducing its negative aspects, is a way of reducing corruption, increasing accountability and improving the functions of government. Recollecting that George Washington warned of the perils that factionalism presented.
Let me … warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally. This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness and is truly its worst enemy. It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another; foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passion (Ackerman, 2005:22).
233 Washington speaks of the need for politicians to work in a cooperative manner and to not dissolve into creating factions. His address is arguably an early call for ‘third way’ policies, not in the economic sense but, rather, in the way different political parties cooperate with each other, rather than squabbling over every step.
The idea of a democratically-styled government with no political parties would not remove factionalism, as it is not political parties themselves, but the archaic system in which they are operating, that is the problem. Factionalism has been a problem from the onset of politics, that has been determined, and yet, political parties (in the history of democracy) are a relatively recent institution but still deal with the same difficulties experienced by the Greeks and Romans. The crux lies with the realpolitik of the situation, as power in the system in which it is used creates contention and division.
Cooperation, rather than confrontation, with legitimate third-party oversight committees and a strict adherence to mitigating endemic problems, is what is needed to create this institutional reform. Further research is required to determine what ‘cooperation’ entails, and the effects that oversight committees, democratic particles and endemic problems have on reducing factionalism and strengthening cooperation.
Elitism, as was seen in ancient Athens and Republican Rome, had an adverse effect on accountability and promoted corruption. Through manipulating political systems, elites could divert power from the citizenry and use it for their own purposes (such as generating private wealth at the expense of the state and or creating an autocratic government). This is why the Athenians and Romans had their specific laws dealing with this behaviour, as it was an attempt at protecting the citizenry, other well positioned individuals, families or groups, and the state itself.
The argument made herein is that those individuals in government who have a popular or elitist form (such as those who have been easily elected to office) are important to
234 monitor (for example, Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa, who has recently gained an, arguably, demi-god status after his government’s ‘victory’ over the Tamils). In older democratically-styled governments, the risk of reverting to an autocratic state is minimal.
However, the main risk within the system is the propagation of corruption and destruction of accountability (once the corruption has been uncovered). An example of this was recently seen in the United Kingdom’s MP expenses scandal.
The UNDP (2004) proposed a prescription for increasing citizenship as a mechanism of increasing the public sphere in politics (which benefits, inter alia, accountability, transparency and representation).
Our hypothesis – that problems associated with democracy can be solved through more democracy – contains the idea that more democracy means more citizenship and that this demand for more citizenship has not been broadly discussed in key countries, multilateral organizations and Latin American societies themselves (UNDP, 2004:68).
What ‘more citizenship’ entails is in need of further research, but what can be said is that it is something that may need to be devised by a plural citizenry in a long-term manner for it to work.
Finally, the UNDP (2006) recommends the use of civil society to improve transparency and accountability. The argument is that civil society should be given access to information (communication and transparency), as well as support (financial, legislative) and safety (legitimate law) as it will promote the ingenuity of citizens to keep the state accountable and force issues of transparency, constitutionalism, campaigning methods, representation and anti-corruption, as well as transparency. The suggestion is that governments work cooperatively with civil society for the government’s own benefit.
There are bonuses in following this suggestion considering the current growth of international monitory institutions (Keane, 2009, that is, a country that practices such will be seen as a team player and not a rogue).
235 7.7 Corruption
GOPAC (2005), ParlCent and WB (2008), argue that corruption can be reduced by using the World Bank perspective of the ‘ecology of governance’ (Figure 5.1, page 144). This perspective is unique due to the focus on including citizens at the centre of government with recognition of the ‘global village’, signifying the importance of globalisation in keeping governments less corrupt. However, the aforementioned MNOs place too much emphasis on parliamentarians (as Weber did) and not enough on the effect that monitory democracy (Keane, 2009) has on reducing corruption.
The ‘World Bank approach’ is also a new tool for combating corruption (page 144). It focuses on constitutional reviews, the budget process, oversight committees, parliamentary codes of ethics and increased relations with civil society.
Sung (2004) discussed that older democratically-styled governments are less corrupt than younger ones. Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000), as well as Girling (1997:vii), demonstrate the effects which capitalism has on politics, in that corruption grows through the ideology that everything can be “bought and sold”, whereas Elliot (1997) and Johnston (1997) feel that capitalism and privatisation resulted in less corruption.
Sinclair (1988), Ober (1999) and Matyszak (2003) showed evidence pertaining to corruption in Athens and Rome; O’Leary (2006) described James Madison’s predilections for curbing and checking corruption in revolutionary America. ParlCent and WB (2008) focused on parliamentary accountability in order to combat corruption.
The literature showed a need for regulation and policing during elections, political campaigns and in parliament. Debates in the literature surround positions of public office regarding the best methods by which to keep public officials from going corrupt. From paying officials a high wage, in order to reduce the incentives of becoming corrupt, to
236 increasing penal measures if officials are caught; there is, most probably, no single universal solution.
However, it seems that lessons have been forgotten. The Athenians and Romans both dealt extensively with issues of corruption. The most visible difference between their methods to control it and those practised by many governments today, is the severity of penal measures. Public officials are, in most cases, able to ‘get off lightly’. Hence, increasing the severity of penal measures for corrupt officials is recommended.
Another practice, not typically conducted once an official has been proven guilty of corruption, is to review all of his or her work up to the point of conviction. The difficulty in conducting this type of review is cost. If an official has already wasted taxpayers’ money, then why conduct a review which could waste even more? This situation has recently taken precedence, as can be seen by Canada’s Oliphant Commission, which investigated former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on corruption charges. The former
PM’s court fees amounted to several million dollars taken from the public treasury.
However, correcting tainted work is in the public interest and could expose other areas of corruption. Queensland’s recent Misconduct in Public Office legislation carries a maximum penalty of seven years in prison for shirking public servants. Steps such as those are positive mitigating corruption.
A randomised system in parliament could reduce bribery, intense lobbying and factionalism to a certain degree. The randomisation concerns which parliamentarians are going to be present to debate and vote for laws. Rather than having one sitting of parliament to deal with a specific topic (a situation that lobby groups, bribers and party factions are aware of which MPs are going to be present), two sittings should occur with parliamentarians drawn by lot. That is, parliamentarians would not know until the last minute if they are to be included in the first or second session. This removes their ability
237 and the abilities of other parties, to a certain extent, to be affected by lobbyists, bribes and factionalism.58
The difficulty in implementing randomisation in parliament is that it would slow down decision making, which is something that may not be acceptable to politicians or citizens
(although it does have its benefits in the form of increasing deliberation and mitigating corruption). However, as Head (1994, 2008) argues, the practices of parliament need to shift in order to accommodate reform and, as was seen, this practical change is something the World Bank specifically targets.
7.8 Representation
Manin (1997) wrote that representative democracy is experiencing a crisis, which is something that correlates with the growing presence of monitory democracy (Keane,
2009). As costs for competing in an election have been steadily rising since the eighteenth century, and political parties are growing increasingly distanced from their mandates or electorate, individual voters are choosing not to engage in the representative-styled power-politics (which typically meant associating strongly with a political party) but, instead, vote differently from year to year (Manin, 1997). Monitory democracy’s emphasis on communication, civil society and checking governments, commensurate with pluralism of political parties, gives individual voters more choices and information. This, then, may allow for more informed choices to be made when voting.
It was seen that Arendt (1990, 1993), Tocqueville (1839, 1848), Manin (1997), Lyotard
(1993, 1985) and Habermas (2008, 1987, 1991, 1996) all shared views on the negative effects that materialism, technology and individualism would have on the participation
58 If a lobby group, briber or factional group wanted to affect the outcome of a law, they would have to know who is going to be present at that time. In a randomised system, their ability to affect the outcome of legislation is reduced.
238 of the public in the political sphere. Arendt’s critique centred on the need for representation to be sufficiently adequate to allow individual citizens easy access to take political action. Tocqueville predicted that new found American liberalism would lead to an obsession with the individual and materialism at the expense of the community.
Manin discussed the failings of representative democracy from about the 18th century to the 1990s, in effect tracking the death throes of that style of governance (taking Keane’s,
2009 view). Lyotard was recently seen to discuss how technocrats, and technology for that matter, are those who control the meta-narratives or grand ideologies of the present, meaning that the pluralist citizenry is not in explicit control of its destiny but, rather, being somewhat herded by specialists. Habermas details that the
public is split apart into minorities of specialists who put their reason to use non-publicly and the great mass of consumers whose receptiveness is public but uncritical. Consequently, [politics] completely lacks the form of communication specific to a public (Habermas, 1991:175).
Suggestions for mitigating the participation problem in representation, stemming from the eighteenth century onwards (for example, J. Mill, Bentham, J.S. Mill, Arendt and
Manin) focus on objective Political Education (page 256). The common argument made was that individuals, or consumers (Habermas), the ignorant (Wiebe, 1995), or the unconscious (Saul, 1997; Lyotard) need to be educated about the critical problems facing representation and the inherent importance of their participation in politics.
Common knowledge has it that, in Athens, a rope dipped in red paint was used by wards of the Pnyx or assembly to gather disinterested citizens to participate—the shame of evasion indicated by red stains on white robes. In Rome, the unjust balance of representation resulted in the plebeians seceding from the city by withdrawing to a geographic rise outside of Rome. This collective action is known as the ‘First Secession’ of the plebs (Oakley, 2004) and resulted in a fair deal of power concessions to the plebs.
Social inequality, caused by poor representation in England, France and the United
States of America, forced revolutions and, scores of years later, led to riots, which still
239 happens today. Perhaps if the intricate and, ultimately, unique problems of representation are taught to citizens through objective political education (necessitating that lessons are reflective of the government in which the citizen lives), then the mitigation of representation issues will be effective.
It has become increasingly evident that focus needs to be on the poor and less educated.
This was gathered from Athens, Rome, the Middle Ages, Revolutionary England, France and the United States of America, as well as in the practice of international democratisation. In one respect, those individuals who have less are, typically, the more numerous and diverse. In another, they are also subjected to harsher aspects of life which constrains their liberty, leading to heightened incidences of violence (the democracy killer), political apathy or radicalism and political disillusionment. In effect, not focusing extensively on the plural minorities, which encompass the poor, destroys the efficacy of democratic particles.
Instituting direct democracy via information technologies is a real possibility. The current opposing argument to this fact, is that there is no feasible method whereby large numbers of people can effectively participate in their government. Another is that the decentralisation of government and facets such as websites, referenda, access to members of parliament and the recent ‘town-hall meetings’ in the United States (a similar practice to Swiss cantons) already provide direct democracy. The first opposing view is, at this stage of technology, incorrect. The second, however, is true to a limited extent. There is a certain degree of direct democracy (differing in any democratically- styled government), but direct access to government is not institutionalised as a structured whole. In other words, what is necessary is a system of independent, randomised and anonymous external reviews conducted by bureaucrats to screen comments, criticisms or questions made by citizens. This is to remove the inappropriate ones (for example, comments that do not make sense and spam). Each citizen would be
240 reviewed by three bureaucrats, and a mark of two out of three approvals is a pass.
Software can be devised so that a citizen may select which government he or she is addressing, whether or not he or she would like to have their contribution made public online, and be responded to personally. It is also possible to have quickly generated statistics from this system (both qualitative and quantitative) and to develop an FAQ
(frequently asked questions) for citizens for each level of government.59 The real world applicability of this system depends on the monetary costs involved in hiring extra public servants to provide the service.
The Republic of Rome, as discussed, experienced one of the biggest representation crises in history. The ‘conflict of orders’ represents the plebeian/patrician divide and was a campaign launched mostly by the plebeian gentry (typically, with the support of the
‘masses’) to have their civil rights established as equal to those of patricians. In that respect: Is there currently a situation warranting a conflict of orders at present? In a globalised context the answer is ‘yes’.
Transnational governance (EU, IMF) is an example of how governments, especially the executive, have removed the ability of the citizenry to address international relations and their own sovereign issues. It places citizens who are operating within a transnational governance system at a political disadvantage. Furthermore, if regional areas of the world were focused upon, then several more situations warranting a conflict of orders arises. One example is the civil inequality experienced by indigenous people in Latin
America.
59 It is recommended that individuals not have the right to use avatars or fake names. Whistleblower legislation, third-party committees and other bodies should be in place to cover individuals exposing public or private illegality. This prescription is not meant to be a ‘crime-watcher’ but, rather, a well- structured area where citizens can participate directly in government in an accountable manner. Overall, it is meant to improve representation and, thereby, further the human condition.
241 The recommendation is that a civil society organisation should organise these individuals into a corporation and simply withdraw from the state, as was done on several occasions by the plebeians. It is a peaceful and effective way to halt economic progress (similar to a strike, only with larger numbers) and have complex issues brought to the fore. Foreign policy is another area lacking representation. Chomsky (2006) and Curtis (2004) are two authors who exemplify this need. Finally, in order to increase the efficacy of representation, a ‘Super-Census’ (p. 261) should be periodically conducted so as to draw highly relevant statistics from the plural citizenry.
7.9 Accountability
Schmitt’s (1965) argument regarding the necessity for emergency powers resulted in the critique of current emergency power legislation, highlighting that it is not, in most cases, adequately accountable. This means that actions taken in times of crisis, even if contrary to laws or customs, may be argued as legitimate and hurriedly swept away, as the expediency permitted by emergency powers allowed those actions to take place. As mentioned before, this is excusive. It is felt that greater accountability measures concerning emergency powers need to be in place. Two areas of focus which could act as suitable starting blocks for further research are:
(1) forward planning concerning the risk of natural disasters, for example, to lessen
the impact such would have; and
(2) a comprehensive, post-emergency review in order to subject to justice any who
have profited illegally or committed crimes during an emergency power period.
This review would also be useful to learn about how to increase forward planning through hindsight, resulting in a positive feedback cycle.
The empirical analysis revealed that accountability, transparency and corruption are heavily linked and most often used together in current democratisation efforts. Although
242 this triangle deals with only three of the seven endemic problems, they are cross-cutting issues from local governance through to multinational diplomacy. The relational analysis
(Chapter 6) displayed the interconnectivity of the triangle, would also result in a positive feedback cycle. Should the focus be placed on any one problem, it would also impact the other two. Mitigating accountability problems in this respect, would result in greater transparency and less corruption. Evidence, from the empirical analyses used herein, suggests that a plural citizenry living in a country with poor accountability measures may have poor transparency and higher levels of corruption. This may result in social frustration and an erosion of trust between citizen and government, which is a breeding ground for violence.
Hamilton (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999a) argued that accountability was not to be had in a plural executive, as it was harder to appropriate blame for poor or corrupt actions. In classical democracy, it was discussed that the accountability problems rested mostly with elitist politicians. Mill ([1837] 1992) described how parliament kept the king accountable in England. Oakeshott (1993, 1951) depicted the need for gradualism to be applied in governance, so that actions are not hasty or expedient, thus resulting in greater accountability. Rawls (1993) shared his ‘principle of the common interest’, in that government is not accountable if it does not pursue matters that benefit the entirety of the plural citizenry. Ezzamel et al. (2008) specifically revealed the importance of financial accountability. Using the Belfast Agreement as a case study, they argued that the joining of budgetary proposals with detailed policies resulted in greater accountability, which significantly contributed to peace in Northern Ireland.
Sperling (2009), corresponding with Keane (2009), discussed the role that globalisation and monitorism are playing concerning accountability. Sperling (2009) argued that transnational influence on the sovereignty of the state promotes accountability and other benefits, but that there are gaps and ill-effects related to this interaction. Sperling’s main
243 concern was with the non-legitimate influence that MNOs have on governments, resulting in the alienation of the government-citizen nexus in favour of the government-
MNO nexus, most likely due to the great pressure the latter can exhibit in comparison to the former. Keane (2009) stated that the pervasiveness of monitory bodies results in greater accountability as it becomes harder for governments to ‘rule’.
Burke (1793:116) stated that, “those who execute public pecuniary trusts ought of all men to be the most strictly held to their duty.” His statement demands the need for regulation to keep officials accountable (the same practice as with corruption).
A different direction shows that academics are currently debating mandates. Scholars
(Brody and Siegelman, 1983; Colton and McFaul, 2003) have pointed out that the majority of people vote for politicians through popularity. There is a reduction of the logical detailing of a candidate’s mandate, which has now been reduced to what often seems like lip-service, and the increasing decline of political parties inversely related to the emergence of personalities and voting for individuals. The reduction of the public sphere in politics has been a long trend and is often blamed on materialism and the widening gap between government and citizen (Representation problem).
Suggestions have been made to practise the Swiss method of legally holding politicians accountable to their mandates. However, as scholars have shown, sometimes unforeseen events occur beyond the politician’s control and a mandate must be compromised or abandoned. Thus, the prescription is to increase transparency by way of using the
‘Parliamentary Checklist’ (page 257) commensurate with the ‘Treasury Application
Form’ (page 259) which can compile a politician’s performance statistics (similar to sport’s athlete statistics); essentially something voters can easily trust and understand.
This should help to dissolve the growing personality cult in politics, as well as keep officials accountable.
244 The ‘ecology of governance’ (page 144) present in ParlCent and the World Bank
(2008:10), as well as GOPAC (2005:6), focused on ‘active citizens’ and the ‘global village’ as measures for ensuring accountability. Their main prescription was that active citizens (that is, the public sphere) be injected as a fourth, stable player in tripartite governments. The global village signified monitory, democratic systems (Keane, 2009) which influence countries (by way of international mandate) to be accountable. The difficulty with the global village is that transnational prescriptions for improving accountability may be culturally incorrect for a specific society’s government situation.
7.10 Constitutional Issues
The constitution building periods of England, France and the United States of America were discussed, with the common critique being that those processes were conducted in an elitist manner and were non-inclusive of the plural citizenry. The American example argued that, for the revolution to be successful, secrecy was of the utmost importance.
This made the inclusion of greater numbers impractical. The British and the French, however, did not have the reasons of the Americans and were more baseless in their disdain for the plural citizenry. It was this discussion that resulted in the questioning of modern day written constitutional relevancy.
Some Pacific islands used the more inclusive practice of constitution building
(Crocombe, 1992) by holding public forums and discussing what aspects citizens are interested in having ingrained in the constitution. This qualitative practice is a positive step forward, but would be better if accompanied by a quantitative survey of participants to assist researchers in understanding the commonalities and diversities between the populations for which the government is hoping to provide a constitution.
The constitutionalism of long-term goals was briefly discussed. Dumont (2007) shared that gradualism in France would have been better (as in the English experience) than
245 open and unprecedented revolt, sparked and maintained by violence. He also held that the period of the French Revolution shed light on the difficulties surrounding the formation of a constitution. It was the non-inclusive process that led to the violent constitutional disputes, as one or more major segments of the population were ostracised or plainly acted against. Edling (2003) and Arendt (1990, 1993) agreed that the
American constitution was designed to create a strong and unified state, capable of opposing the might of the British Empire. Lintott (1990) showed that violence and riots in Rome eroded the power of the constitution, resulting in increasing lawlessness. Ober
(1996) stated that the ruling elite of Athens used constitutional institutions to mask their alternative intentions. Ober’s point can also relate to the experience of the French
Revolution, in that constitution after constitution acted more as Potemkin villages due to the façade of claimed legitimacy which the documents purported.
Are constitutions at present Potemkin villages due to their unrepresentative creation? It is this question of legitimacy, in the formation and implementation of a constitution over an ever increasingly diverse population, that has been the crux of the constitutional problem. From Athens until the present, excluding the progressive actions taken in the
Pacific, written constitutions are not legitimate in the sense that they were, in most part, formed long ago in an unrepresentative and elitist manner over a strikingly different population and era.
So how relevant to modern plural citizenry is a constitution which was written some centuries ago, by a select few and in no way representative of the plural citizenry of that time? This is a question that certainly needs an answer and is a problem for all states.
Modern immigration, diasporas and cultural exportation results in new difficulties for constitutional law.
246 One way to have a legitimate constitution would be to conduct a review based on ‘Super-
Census’ methods. Questions should be constructed, based on the articles of the constitution, and posited to the plural citizenry. Hence, relevancy can be gauged by this long-term survey and the constitution can undergo review. Law could also gain greater legitimacy from this action.
7.11 Transparency
Grigorescu (2003) stipulated that the current focus in political science is not on the causes of transparency but, rather, the effects of transparency. He argued that increased transparency resulted in higher amounts of trust between citizen and state (herein impacting accountability and corruption). He asserted that the recent increase of focus on transparency had been pushed by international organisations demanding information from their member states. Grigorescu also stated that increased transparency in local governance resulted in a higher degree of accountability, which is inherently useful for
‘consolidating a democracy’ due to the viewpoint that “a key characteristic of democracy is the continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens”
(Dahl, 1971, in Grigorescu, 2003:664).
With regard to Athens, it was seen that the non-inclusion of women, non-citizens and slaves resulted in a lack of transparency within the state. It was postulated that, had these members of Athenian society had the opportunity to question governance, perhaps the events of the state’s demise could have been forestalled, if not altered. Ober (1996) wrote that democracy needs critics to stay healthy; the point made herein is that Athens’ lack of transparency to non-citizens resulted in intellectual inbreeding and, ultimately, a missing number of critiques.
Mill ([1859] 2004) detailed the importance of free speech, as well as access to, and the verifiability of, government related information. Finel and Lord (1999) warned against
247 too much transparency, proffering that a state could cause the ‘noise’60 of its domestic affairs to affect neighbouring countries, thereby making relations jittery due to conflicting messages. Finel and Lord (1999:316) also shared that transparency is but one mechanism for the “public disclosure of information”, but this argument is undemocratic as it presupposes the right of government or subordinate agents to provide information, as opposed to the unrestricted right of citizens to information.
Kopits and Craig (1998) wrote of the importance concerning fiscal transparency. They stated that
timely publication of a clearly presented budget document makes it easier for the market to evaluate the government’s intentions and allows for the market itself to impose a constructive discipline on the government (Kopits and Craig, 1998:2).
The merits of such a situation are debatable. Kopits and Craig (1998) also shared Finel and Lord’s (1999) warnings of too much transparency; they claimed that such would lead to unsustainable policies. However, the logic of Kopits’ and Craig’s argument is suspect, as transparency would not render a previously sustainable policy unsustainable, due to access of information or the necessity to provide information. Neither would it result in a newly formed policy becoming unsustainable. Bad policy creation results in unsustainable policies, not transparency.
InfoDev and CDT (2002) argued that e-democracy would result in greater transparency due to easier access to information. One of their case studies involved Columbia when the administration, at the beginning of 2000, ordered all government agencies to produce websites, greatly increasing the accessibility of government documents. GOPAC (2005) took a different tack by writing that oversight committees force transparency, thus resulting in less corruption and greater accountability. The IPU (2006) stated that a
60 Finel and Lord’s (1999) critique was based on a clearly ill-defined governing system. Should each office have extremely defined roles, rather than overlapping powers, this ‘noise’ problem would not be an issue.
248 strong legislative body is necessary to offset an overbearing executive which would result in greater transparency.
The UNDP (2006), Keane (2009) and a host of other academics, explained the benefits of cultivating and promoting a strong civil society due to its monitory benefits. The multitude of different services provided by civil society result in a diffusion of information ultimately informing the citizenry better. Transparency International (2007) states that court processes, which prevent the public and civil society from supervising their proceedings, are anti-transparent and may result in judicial corruption. The UNDP
(2005) surmises that strong, local, good governance results in greater transparency at higher levels of government.
Both academics and professionals alike have shown that transparency helps to combat corruption and keep officials accountable. This includes media access and the timely publication of government information. The ‘Parliamentary Checklist’ (page 257) and the ‘Treasury Application Form’ (page 259) are both comprehensive transparency promoting tools. Furthermore, the timely publication of documents (recalling InfoDev and CCT), as well as accessible non-partisan government websites (for example,
Government of Australia or Canada) are also positive tools for ensuring transparency.
Accounting in politics (Ezzamel et al., 2008) and an understandable, as well as accountable, presentation of budget figures (not only cash based) is necessary.
Transparency is a concept (similar to accountability measures and anti-corruption) in governance and many states, such as Australia and the United Kingdom, are taking proactive steps to form transparency practices. Difficulty with these practices arises in the forms of an insufficient level of funding and weak oversight mechanisms.
Transparency (accountability and anti-corruption) cannot be enacted unless the bodies or tools which are meant to mitigate those problems have a steady budget. Furthermore, a
249 rolling review mechanism (supported by said funding) ensures that public servants, who are entrusted with maintaining transparency, do not shirk from their responsibilities. If a public servant does, and the reason is found to lie beyond the public interest, then criminal proceedings should follow (a similar practice is present in Swiss cantons).
Ezzamel et al. (2008:144) shared that Norwegian parliamentary committee meetings are closed to the media and public. Why? The answer rests with the fact that media presents the information gleaned from these sessions in a distorted light, for ratings and sensationalism. By adhering to Ethical Standards for Media (page 260), closed-door government sessions could become redundant.
An area lacking investigation by scholars and professionals is the notion of ‘relevant transparency’. In other words: What does the plural citizenry want to know? As the
‘Parliamentary Checklist’ shows, identifying the type of information desired by the plural citizenry increases its relevancy.
7.12 Campaigning Methods
Grant (2004) criticised the nature of Australian campaigning methods, stating that there is a greater need for transparency and equality in several respects, including campaign advertisements on public television. This is also a trend noticeable in other countries as campaigns are becoming more about personal image than political substance (Wiebe,
1995). Wiebe (1995) felt that there should be a cap on campaign spending, as American citizens were tiring of political propaganda on popular media which were lacking political substance. He felt that electoral politics are dominated by the media and money, whereas the ballot system confuses voters who are ignorant of political issues.
Athens and Rome, as well as most of the world pre-1970s, exhibited unequal campaigning methods. In the classical period, it was only those wealthy enough or with
250 the right blood, colour or religion who could run for office. The trend of fiscal, ethnic, sexual and religious discrimination continued well into the nineteenth century. It was learned that any form of discrimination preventing a citizen from running for office resulted in uprisings. The oddity is, however, that fiscal discrimination is currently present in electoral campaigning. This is due to a lack of academic focus on the area of the feasibility concerning publicly sponsored campaigning61 and that professional practice (that is, in politics) is currently struggling with the issue in many countries around the world. It is felt herein that the best result for promoting the substance of a campaign, rather than the personality of the runner, is to publicly fund election periods banning all other private or public support (Gierzynski, 2009). In that manner, runners would be forced to think of other ways to reach their communities, which could result in a larger focus on political substance. For further information, see Integrated Centralised
Campaigning (page 263).
Przeworski, Stokes and Manin (1999a:35) stated that the way politicians campaign for elections resulted in special interests being traded for favours (such as campaign financing), which obscured the politician’s connection to his or her constituency as he or she would be promoting special interests over community interests. Scher (1997) argued that “it is commonplace for Americans to complain about the lack of issues discussed by candidates in political campaigns.” Personality, character assassination, doubting integrity and motives, as well as
the lack of trustworthiness, the shallowness and self-serving quality of debate, the mudslinging, the photo ops, the thirty second sound bites and all the other defects of the modern political campaign is the feeling, often wistfully expressed, that voters wish candidates would stick to issues, explain their positions, and then leave the decision to them, the voters. They rue lack of content, of substance, of the meat in the campaign, and claim they want more (Scher, 1997:88).
61 In that each runner would be allocated a maximum amount of money to conduct their campaign. Any other forms of contribution should not be permitted.
251 Reilly (2001) shared that certain styles of campaigning can, in effect, promote violence, especially if the method of campaigning is a bad fit for the culture it is operating within.
Electoral systems are not a one-size-fits-all, although, troublingly, Ward (2009) claims that the American style of ‘sound-bite propaganda’, using television and radio, is becoming standardised around the world. Gierzynski (2009) furthered that
unless wealth is evenly distributed in a society, free campaign finance systems will result in political inequality. On the other hand, if political equality is desired, freedom to give or spend will have to be restricted (Gierzynski, 2009:151).
It is clear that there is a growing call for equality in election campaigns, especially concerning fiscal inequality and tiresome campaign practices. Interestingly, Bean (2005) revealed that Australian audiences voted differently depending on whether they were watching public or private television. His results indicated that the way in which campaigning advertisements are run impacts the way individuals perceive issues, which confuses the pluralist citizenry as Wiebe (2009) argued.
Perceptibly, suffrage has been extended to the popularly omitted majorities in Western societies (such as women, Africans, Native Amerindians and people of lower socio- economic brackets) through many long struggles, which can serve to detail the evolution of Blackstone’s (1765) ‘qualification of the electors’ concept. The ‘qualification of the elected’ concept has also widened over time, giving the right to run for election to anyone of legal status within a state’s borders. This statement, although true, is made somewhat problematic by the current practices of some election processes in modern states. There is an exclusion of equality to all desired runners (in each level of government campaigning) by such measures as financial availability to advertise, media bias and the unavailability of information allowing citizens to easily differentiate between campaigners.
252 OAS and International Idea discussed the Latin American context of voting and campaigning issues. Tools which can mitigate these problems are ‘Integrated Centralised
Campaigning’ and ‘Ethical Standards for Media’ which can be found on pages 263 and
260 respectively.
7.13 Long-Term Goals
The absence of long-term goals was seen from Athenian times to the present. It was argued that long-term planning, especially based on in-depth information derived from conducting a Super-Census, could benefit the plural citizenry. This benefit was argued to be a streamlining of collective wants (the agreed upon areas spawned from the plural citizenry) for faster progress and, ultimately, the improvement of the human condition.
The presumed, unintended, long-term impact of legislation derived from the brothers
Gracchus (Matyszak, 2003; Crook and Rawson, 1994) showed that it is within the capacity of legislators and the judiciary, not excluding the foresight of citizens, to plan for long-term impacts. It is a common critique in academia that governments are too often focused on expediency and short-termism, due to the time-bound electoral framework in which administrations operate. However, it was shown that there is a considerable lack of research concerning the benefits of long-term planning. Reminding that this lack of focus was empirically shown in Chapter 6’s frequency analysis.
Professionals in government, as well as in MNOs, are not investigating practices to effectively break the cycle of expediency. What is most often looked at by professionals is the ‘medium-term’, as such is presently the only realistic goal to be had. Furthermore,
Lintott (1990:1) argued that bribery is not in the long-term interest of the citizenry, as politicians are prone to swapping mandates to reward those who are paying them.
O’Leary (2006:38) wrote that Madison’s planning, concerning the active involvement of citizens to keep government anti-corrupt, did not take into account “the long-term
253 consequences of citizens being less effective and officials more remote in large democracies.” Nor did the Athenians or Romans take into account the long-term impacts of ostracising non-citizens or poorer citizens from expressing their sovereignty; as was seen, it led to violence and missed opportunities. Farrar (1989), Ober (1996), Polybius
([c 140 BCE] 1991) and Gordon (1999) discussed that it was the established aristocratic families in Athens and Rome who promoted stability within the state by remembering and promoting custom (also through the established patron-client relationship). This relates to modern times as precedent, common law and a ‘customs-based’ constitution
(as in Britain) still exists. In this sense, long-termism is present in law, but only through an implicit and unrepresentative manner. The same argument arises: If customs are based on aristocratic and discriminatory ethics or, rather, on a population starkly different than any at present, is the constitution still relevant?
Relevancy and legitimacy only come about when each rational (meaning not mentally compromised) individual composing the plural citizenry have had his or her opinions, wants and needs statistically recorded. In that manner, a government can then establish relevant customs, subject to periodic review with every new Super-Census conducted.
Long-term goals are realistically capable of being defined, can, in fact, help streamline government and will also highlight the divisions between the citizenry, so that these issues can be brought forward for discussion and gradual resolution. Expediency, it seems, is only an excuse for poor governance.
Lyotard (1994) showed the need for society’s self-awareness to help control the direction of the ‘system’ (government) and not let it be controlled by the people riding the boat of technology. This implicates whole methodologies used by many governments and citizens to describe their style of democracy. Some claim to be liberal democracies, others socialist and some simply claim to be democratic. Typically, no nation practices one meta-narrative, but generally several of them in a sort of ‘mixed constitutions’
254 manner to serve their government’s (implying, the people’s) needs. Generally no nation is a pluralist system truly representative of its current populations either.
If a given society were to choose several goals they wanted to have achieved, timeframe added or not and with self-styled checks and balances, it could streamline that society’s democracy, protect valuable societal funds and, in effect, begin giving society control of the ‘system’. It would then be in the best interest if every government party of the day worked to forward these goals. If they are not met by a certain time, or if progress is lacking, there should be a fully documented reason presented to the public. Having long- term goals in concert with short-term ones is often essential in any system.
Opposition parties, civil society groups, interest parties, writers, academics, media and voters all criticise government. It is a method of improvement through the ideal of constructive criticism. Obviously, that is not always the case but, if one were to filter the fervent fodder of opinions dispensed by the masses, there are probably gems to be found.
Although this ‘battle’ in government is essential, at times it is wasteful, as some governments invest in projects which require longer investments that are sometimes undone if a new government is elected before the project is complete. The hardly- discussed importance of legislating long-term goals could, very well, have a positive impact on reducing such waste.
To ascertain long-term goals, the proposed tools are the ‘Super-Census’, commensurate with constitutional review, and the institutional implementation of these goals in the day- to-day functioning of government (that is, regardless of which political party is in power, long-term goals should be advanced). Finally, the long-term impact of legislation should also be considered (see Modern Gracchus, page 264).
255 7.14 Political Education
J. S. Mill (1859), Bentham (1823) and Oakeshott (1951), amongst others, were advocates of political education. The notion that they had in mind was different to that currently being practiced in old and new democratically-styled governments or autocratic governments such as the Peoples’ Republic of China. It is more than civics and basic governmental structures, but not jingoism or propaganda. The form of political education postulated is an objective method by which to use government as it was intended—for the individual, family, group, community, national and humanitarian benefit. The benefits of doing so include:
. a higher participation rate from the public sphere; . a greater awareness of endemic governance problems and an understanding of what democracy actually is; . the objective knowledge of governance processes and how to use them; . an insight into civil society, multinational relations and the media for greater empowerment; . education concerning international standards that are a cultural fit, not imposed upon a population;62 and . the ethics of being a citizen, as in not abusing public servants (Professor Brian Head, personal communication, 18 November 2009, 2.30 pm).
The prescription proposed is to revise the way citizens are taught about civics and politics within and without the university. This education is meant to empower people, to teach them citizenship and the notion of non-jingoistic nationalism. It is meant to help them to understand the concepts of community (local and international) as well as their civil rights and obligations. It should not be relegated only to students, as such programs would be beneficial for all mentally-able adults, including the elderly. Further research is needed into this area but, as has been seen, the idea of political education to ‘rid ignorance’ has a long and relevant pedigree.
62 Meaning that international standards are to be interpreted in the cultural context of the plural citizenry receiving training, as international standards alien to a citizenry’s norms would be an infringement of their sovereignty.
256 7.15 Parliamentary Checklist
A ‘parliamentary checklist’ (Gagnon, 2007)63 may be able to improve accountability and transparency, as well as reduce corruption. This tool’s function is to provide a minimum standard of conduct—decided by a plural citizen consensus—at all times in both houses of parliament.
The checklist, a simple series of paper or electronic forms filled out with every daily session in parliament, is related to some currently proposed parliamentary improvements. One idea, stemming from ParlCent (2009) is the notion of a
‘parliamentary report card’, designed to establish the performance of a parliament. The report card is small with broad categories that are assigned numerical values, but such was purposefully done to allow professionals a quick glimpse at the effectiveness of their parliament. However, the report card is too small to offer any meaningful statistical results. Another practice stemming from MNOs is the ‘yellow card’ tactic, whereby any government institution within a given country can send a ‘yellow card’ to another institution should a foul have been felt to have been committed. However, this tactic is also limited in that it only serves to promote discussion between governmental bodies.
The importance of a parliamentary checklist is to provide citizens with concrete evidence; information pertaining to the business of legislating new, or modifying old, laws. It also serves as a guarantee to citizens that a minimum standard of ethics (or code of conduct) is being followed by elected representatives. By imposing a citizen approved/created checklist on government, there is a direct insertion of the ‘active citizen’ body within the three spheres of traditional government, the economy and civil society (recalling the World Bank’s ‘ecology of governance’ model).
63 First proposed at an international peace and conflict resolution conference, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7-9 December 2007.
257 The questions may deal with matters concerning, for example, what the legislation is about, why it is important, whom it is to benefit, where it is to be done, when it is to be done, how much will it cost, which MPs are for it, which are against it, what the viewpoint of the opposition is, and whether the legislation has been given enough time for the opposition to counter-argue (if not, it signals that the legislation should be reviewed for accountability purposes).
This notion requires having a requisite list of questions that must be answered during every discussion over a new or revised piece of legislation with a preliminary vote (not binding). This checklist should then be published, perhaps via website, for perusal by civil society, individual citizens, media and other interested bodies. It makes sense to allocate a one or two week minimum waiting period before the resumption of the discussion of this legislation, and the allowance of the opposition to the vote or bill, to prepare a presentation, petition or any such information for further consideration by parliamentarians. Many parliaments have mandatory periods designed to allow interested bodies to take action but, as is often seen, these waiting periods are malleable. After this waiting period and redress has been completed, a final and binding vote should then take place, re-using the checklist to ensure that all of the requisite information is provided and published for the citizenry. A periodical review and investigation of the veracity of information provided, as well as the outcome of the legislation, is a necessary conduct so as to hold any negligence to account. In this way transparency will be given a foundation due to the information provided and reviewed. Accountability will be given more rigour as the investigation of politicians would become easier due to the information provided on the checklist (for example, names, dates, funds, reasoning, outcome).
Corruption (Schelder et al., 1999) may be mitigated, to an extent, by knowing exactly which politicians and special interest groups (those declared) were involved in legislation, specifically in the period of review in order to gauge whether the legislation
258 was conducted as intended and that all spending was balanced. Finally, the quality of representation in parliamentary democracies can be improved due to the added presence of the public sphere in parliament by way of the checklist.
It may also be used to improve the ability for citizens to gauge whether or not an incumbent truly deserves to be re-elected by their track record. A list of statistics can be put together for each MP and used comparatively for a medley of functions (such as, which parties or MPs are more effective, what policies did one or more push for, is government in line with public opinion, how many politicians were involved in scandal
‘A’). Such statistical information may also give citizens a quick understanding of a politician’s actions, allowing them to make a more informed choice with their vote.
7.16 Treasury Application Form
Commensurate with the parliamentary checklist is a treasury application form that is primarily meant for the reduction of corruption, but also for greater fiscal transparency
(Héritier, 2003) and accountability through more rigid accounting and filing methods.
The practice of instituting an application form for the release of any funds from the public treasury is recommended as a staple of governance. Only after the application has been made, published and held, then passed to accounting for approval/rejection, and then released to the public (with information regarding whether the application was granted or not) should treasury funds be approved or denied. It is a simple concept to mitigate corruption requiring an independent random third party oversight committee supported by media investigators. The oversight committee could stem from civil society and could request the investigation of anomalies or problems by the media, other civil society bodies or the authorities (depending on circumstances).
259 The importance of having a strong evidence trail supporting fiscal transparency, accountability and anti-corruption was seen with Ezzamel (2008) and Hamilton,
Madison and Jay (2005). Furthermore, MNOs and international NGOs (such as the WB,
IMF, UN, TI) focus on similar practices to ensure that aid money and loans are effectively used. Further research would be useful concerning the practices of parliaments concerning the detailed tracking of state finances: It is felt that the Founding
Fathers warned of an issue that is still largely at play.
7.17 Ethical Standards for Media
Another suggested tool is to work with the plural citizenry to develop a basic set of ethical standards for media.64 Typically, media (news) provides the main source of information (Lodge, 1994) to citizens (see McMillan and Zoido, 2004; Djankov et al.,
2003). In developing countries, irresponsible media has had ill effects on democracy and may create instability by enhancing endemic problems. In this manner, the citizens of a country can decide collectively as to what processes they require the media to follow in order to establish proven confidence in the information provided. Once a system of ethical practice and behaviour legally binds the media, it is probable that a citizen’s trust in the provided information will increase. This may create more active citizens and help the public sphere return to politics. Ethical media, especially investigative journalism, can increase the level of accountability, transparency and trust in government, industry and society.
Third party oversight committees could be bound to the same rules as ethical media. A check and balance method between third party committees and media (that is, one
64 Keane (1991:154) detailed: “… public intervention in the marketplace must avoid slipping into the reductionist demonology of the evil media baron. The obsession with media magnates has little in common with a politics of maximizing freedom and equality of communication. It understates the complexity of issues in the field of media politics and whets old-fashioned appetites for ‘nationalizing’ the media and placing them under state control. As far as possible, censorious and bureaucratic forms of regulation should be avoided.”
260 watches the other, whilst ethical standards reduce the chance of corruption and laziness) is a useful method. Ultimately, the importance of the law concerning the citizens’ mandate is important. That is, if the media or third party ‘watch-dog’ committees have been judicially proven to act against the rules set by the citizenry, they should be criminally punished.
Robert Nozick (1981, 1993, 2001) criticises the media saying,
beyond the possibility that the information we call to mind is not a representative sample of the information we already have, the information we have may not be a representative sample of the information there is. The relative frequency with which certain kinds of information come to our attention through the press or broadcasts, for example, may not be representative of all the information there is about a subject (Nozick, 1993:101).
His argument relates to Keane’s (1991) call for the public sphere to engage the media in order to keep their practices and information accountable, transparent and ultimately believable.
7.18 Super-Census
As previously mentioned, an in-depth census or ‘Super-Census’, designed to periodically glean the highest amount of information from all citizens of right mind living within a state’s territorial boundaries, is of integral importance.
Although Manin (1997:195) backs properly conducted opinion polls as being a sufficient method for government to gather information from its citizenry, it is logically impossible to think that the opinions of 10,000 people (even if they are proportional in all respects and perfectly represent the general type of citizens living in a state) could represent the will of 100,000 or even 10,000 or one. The only way to truly ascertain legitimate and practical information is through the census of every single citizen. Without that, it is the rule of majority or minority, whatever the case may be. Recalling J. S. Mill ([1859]
2004):
261 If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind (Mill, [1859] 2004:17).
It is up to the government, civil society and/or the citizenry of a state to create the types of questions to be asked and all the required, encompassing boundaries (for example, how often the census should be conducted, how many qualitative questions, how it should be done). There is, however, a recommended methodology. Figure 7.1 and Figure
7.2 illustrate the triangular approach (explained in the communication section).
Figure 7.1 demonstrates the triangular method via a conceptual schematic. Several levels of government are identified vertically, using the triangle to show the narrowing of data being sent to the national level. Figure 7.2 depicts a geographical representation of the triangular method. The small grey circles represent municipalities, the white boxes are regions within a state/province, the light blue represents the dominion of states and/or provinces, whilst the large black circle corresponds to the federal/national level. By mixing the two figures into one method, a basic schematic of how to conduct a Super-
Census is conveyed.
Information gleaned from the statistics can be used by governments and civil society, as well as citizens, to create longer-term policy initiatives in order to help direct governance and extra-governmental projects in the direction desired by its plural citizenry. This
‘streamlining’ of policy has the ability to make government (and other bodies) more effective, thus increasing the quality of life for citizens and advancing progress. It should be noted that long-term goals are probably best achieved if short-term elected governments continue contributing to them as long as they are relevant to information derived from the plural citizenry.
Similarly, the information gained from a Super-Census can heighten the quality of representation in parliamentary democracies, communist states, authoritarian regimes
262 and others. Continuing, themes derived from the statistics can be used comparatively with a state’s current constitution to gauge the relevancy of that constitution. Indicated directions for constitutional review are a strong possibility during that particular comparative analysis.
7.19 Integrated Centralised Campaigning
The method of ‘integrated centralised campaigning’ was developed to mitigate problems resounding from campaigning methods. The way to implement this is to make one centralised political area (similar to the rostra of republican Rome, minus the factions and bribery, of course) in localised areas in which all of the political désirants may campaign (see Noveck, 1999). The centralising of politics reduces the financial requirements needed to campaign and forces the media, as well as citizenry, to converge on that one area closest to them.
The term ‘integrated’ specifies that all levels of government election (local, regional, provincial/state, national) can use local centralised campaigning. The necessity is for all levels of government to have a central campaigning location accessible to citizens and media, and overall equality in all measures (Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Riker and
Ordeshook, 1968; Kahnemen and Snell, 2006; Lasch, 1995, discuss the importance of studying voting methods).
As those running for election will be forced to try to win votes through their logic and mandates, the quality and efficiency of voting could increase, as citizens might be able to understand politicians better and, hence, make a more informed decision. Factionalism
(party politics) may also reduce giving way to ‘third way’ policies and the practice of
‘getting things done’, which could also increase the quality of governance provided to the citizenry.
263 Monetary contributions to candidates running for election can be banned as the cost of campaigning will be greatly reduced. The government may even provide the necessary funds to those wishing to run for election, which could reduce bribery, corruption and the ill-effects of wealthy lobby groups. Correspondingly, advertisement inequality and slander can be reduced, as independent media could provide the necessary coverage.
ICTs are a viable option, but slander is an area that should be monitored so as to disqualify candidates using inappropriate methods against their competitors.
Finally, environmental preservation is increased due to the removal of the need for advertising outside of centralised campaigning areas. Raw materials, energy and waste are conserved and/or removed by this method. Issues mitigated by centralised campaigning are fiscal imbalances, advertisement inequality, reform of the typical campaigning modus operandi, environmental preservation and, potentially, an increase of citizen engagement as well as improved governmental behaviour.
7.20 Modern Gracchus
Crook and Rawson (1994:65) stated that the brothers Gracchus did not introduce their social bill as an emergency measure but, rather, fought for the legislation to secure a long-term social benefit for the citizens of Italy. If there existed a modern version of the brothers Gracchus, what would be the social ills straining modern populations and is there evidence pertaining to the need for long-term legislative planning to combat those social ills?
This question highlights the need for legislation to be considered with a long-term perspective. Democratic styles currently practiced in governments are in the trend of the
‘temporary’ and, more often than not, enact laws ex post facto. The brothers Gracchus may not have intended the long-term impacts their legislation to be brought about but, by the grace of history, it is possible to see the impacts made by their lex Romana. Hence, it
264 is recommended that the long-term aspect of legislation should be a factor when considering the creation or review of a law.
7.21 Reinforcing Democratic Associates
With the reformed ideas of law, equality, selecting officials and communication reinforced by efforts to mitigate endemic problems, which typically suppress the particles composing the element of democracy, the ability to apply a unique democratic style to associates is potentially made available.
The application of the democratic style to the media (see Entmen, 1989; Gentzkow and
Shapiro, 2006; Robinson, 1999; DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Corneo, 2006; Hadenius,
1992), military, taxation, bureaucracy and trade has the potential to improve all of them, as they will be streamlined to behave in accordance with the plurality’s will. In this way, the quality of the associates that operate within the state are improved.
Further research is needed to gain a better understanding of exactly how these bodies can improve by applying the mitigation of endemic problems and democratic particles to them. What is known for certain (by way of the proximity analysis in Chapter 6) is that democratic associates are linked to democratic particles and are affected by endemic governance problems.
Some of the early inferences are that media may be made more accountable, trustworthy, transparent and monitored; the military more equal, representative, legal and monitored; taxes with added representation of plural desires (that is, funding what the plural citizenry wants); an increase in bureaucratic efficiency; and an augmentation of legal guidelines for trade.
265 Conclusion
An historical pattern of seven problems and specific resolutions within democracy has been identified. Those seven problems are the same as modern problems within democratic theory and practice, and new methodologies to ratify them can enhance democracy.
The establishment of a unique perspective of democracy (particles make up an element which is present in every government at every level of governance)65 was the first step to arguing this thesis statement. The synthesis of popular democratic styles and theories into one general view of democracy provided the framework necessary to allow the idea that, if endemic governance problems are mitigated, they could enhance democracy.
The tracking of endemic governance problems throughout several historical periods, academic research and philosophical thought was then conducted with this aim in mind.
As has been exposed, these governance problems had negative effects for democratic particles from as early as ancient Athens to the present day.
The exemplification of the presence of endemic problems in modern governments internationally supported the last statement. The analyses conducted (qualitative and quantitative) revealed that endemic governance problems are related to democratic particles (using proximity and thematic investigations). However, information regarding the extent of the relationship between these concepts is a matter for further research.
65 Which, in turn, may have answered the ‘democracy paradox’. As has been seen, thinkers for millennia, and at present, have been trying to discern what democracy actually is. John Keane (2009) came close, so too did the UNDP and World Bank, but they lacked the ontology used in this work to see democracy as nothing that is currently explicitly practiced. The general and universal laws of democracy have, thus, been established with evidence pointing to democracy being endemic to human nature. This is, in most likelihood, an important finding in political theory liable to open new avenues of research.
266 Continuing, the qualitative and quantitative research undertaken in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6 also revealed that some endemic problems and democratic particles are related to what were identified as democratic associates (see APPENDIX A). This evidence led to the conclusion that the application of certain prescriptive measures (as seen in Chapter
7) to areas such as taxation, media and military could make them more democratic and less prone to endemic problems. This is also another area in need of more investigation.
Finally, it was seen that providing certain practical tools, which can be used to resolve many of the endemic governance problems (due to their interactions with democratic particles), may have positive ramifications for the element of democracy. Recalling that this ‘elemental’ view is universal, the implications derived from this thesis are applicable internationally and at any level of governance.
It was also seen that the improvement of one endemic problem may have positive effects on others. One example shows that, if accountability was to be improved, so would transparency and corruption, or if constitutionalism underwent reform, long-term goals could be involved. Inversely is the possibility that the mitigation of an endemic problem may have negative impacts on other areas. An example of this would be the ill effects of too much transparency (such as divulging sensitive information which could put individuals, the economy or the country at risk).
The former was done, firstly, by providing the reader with the ideological foundation used in arguing this work in the introduction. The two areas of focus were endemic problems and the explanation of how the ‘element of democracy’ perspective came to be, as well as what democracy actually is.
After the introduction came the literature review. In it, the reader was able to see the extent of preliminary research and the formation of arguments central to this thesis. The review of literature demonstrated the breadth and depth of the necessary preliminary
267 investigations. Likewise, it laid the foundation for much of the works that would later be consulted, studied and researched. Moreover, the literature review solidified the thinking that went into the formation of the research questions that were used to argue this thesis statement: Are there recurring problems in governance? If there are, can they be mitigated? If so, what impact would this have?
Based on the first of the aforementioned research questions, the investigation of governance problems identified in the literature review began with the classical democracies of Athens and the Republic of Rome. The research revealed that endemic governance problems, as well as the particles which make up the element of democracy, were themes used in academic research as well as primary source documents (for example, Aristotle, Plato). The most important fact was that all seven endemic problems were issues, either in their presence or absence, for the Athenians and Romans.
Once these themes were recognised in Athens and Rome, it was necessary to make a narrow-lined attempt at tracking them throughout political history. As such, the period between the fall of the Republic of Rome and early Renaissance Britain was surveyed but not included. It yielded a logical progression of the themes and helped to frame, or perhaps give something of an indication, as to how endemic problems and democratic particles came into discussion in early British political theory and practice, which was in line with Keane’s (2009) arguments.
Following the Middle-Ages survey, the political climates of revolutionary period Britain,
France and the United States of America were scrutinised. Both original thinkers and secondary research was consulted to show the reader that the same themes that were present in Athens and Rome were also present in the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras.
268 To bridge the gap between revolutionary periods, Britain, France the United States of
America and present day democratic governance, as well as original thinkers (political theorists) were surveyed. The analysis sought to understand how the philosophies of these thinkers related to endemic problems and democratic theory. In so doing, endemic governance problems, as well as democratic particles, were present in typically the same consistency as they were in the previous chapters.66
When the 21st century was reached, a qualitative and quantitative analysis was conducted of 14 separate (and recent) documents of international breadth to determine, empirically, the presence and behaviour of endemic problems and democratic particles.
Commensurately, democratic associates (as previously stated) were analysed.
Finally, once the empirical research was complete and inferences made, some general prescriptive measures, based on the literature and empirical work, were offered in
Chapter 7. These prescriptions were designed to mitigate many of the endemic problems and served to improve the quality of governance for humans universally. However, a great deal of further research is needed into each prescription to assay their real-world impacts.
This work shows that endemic governance problems are major issues for governments today and that they do, in fact, have negative impacts on democratic particles. It must be repeated that further research is needed to determine the nature of these impacts.
Nevertheless, a contribution made to political practice is that a more direct focus on these problems could help to streamline governance and, if mitigated, could contribute to the enhancement of democracy.
66 Consistency stipulates that some endemic problems are dealt with more than others. In other words, some endemic problems are more present than others in the literature and empirical analysis.
269 The prescriptive measures are universal as endemic problems are prevalent internationally, which was a theme argued throughout this thesis. It was argued that the evidence derived from the empirical study could solidify this claim.
Stemming from this thesis, there are also original contributions to political theory and practice, namely:
(a) a new working definition of democracy (plural citizenry’s sovereignty expressed
through four particles composing the element of democracy, which may
potentially answer the 3,500 year old, or older, democracy paradox);
(b) new information pertaining to the tracking of endemic problems throughout
history up to the present day;
(c) an original position regarding the investigation of endemic problems in relation to
democratic particles; and
(d) new methodologies to mitigate endemic governance problems.
The largest inference attained from this study is that the prescriptive measures, as well as new perspectives, can probably help to improve the human condition by streamlining governance and enhancing democracy on a universal level.
Although a falsificationist approach was present throughout the research, it is still necessary to continue a Popper-esque (2002) investigation into individual endemic governance problems. The feeling is that the research conducted thus far is truly the peak above the clouds. Further research is required to gain a deeper understanding of endemic problems, democratic particles, as well as democratic associates, and their interactions with, as well as impacts on, each other (the body of the mountain beneath the clouds).
Furthermore, the conceptualisation of democracy used in this thesis requires further research to identify whether it is the democracy that all other styles or forms of democracy are based on.
270 Research concerning the effectiveness of the prescriptive measures is also an area in need of more investigation. Questions such as whether or not a parliamentary checklist would actually increase accountability and transparency, reduce corruption, and increase representation, and would it effectively increase the presence of the public sphere in parliament, need to be answered. However, it can be said, with tempered confidence, that a priori indication shows that the prescriptive measures will mitigate endemic problems and enhance the element of democracy.
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289 APPENDIX A
It has become apparent that there is a further need to delineate the five democratic associates. Similar to democratic particles, associates are value-neutral fundamentals for the functioning state. The importance of demarcating these bodies with the democratic particles can add further practicality and reasoning to the findings of this thesis. The following will be the breakdown and discussion of democratic associates aided by the use of figures.
It should be noted that some democratic particles are related to all associates. Each can be linked to Taxation and Bureaucracy: in other words, the partial or full funding of the operations of the state. There are other facets of the state such as Trade, Military and
Media which influence, and are also influenced by, taxation, bureaucracy, the four democratic particles and the seven endemic problems. The extent of the influence is something in need of further research.
Taxation
States, no matter the size or historic inclination, have mostly practiced a form of tribute or taxation. It is a common feature of many government styles and is considered to be fundamental to the maintenance and functioning of the state. Figure A.1 shows how taxation relates to Equality, supports the implementation of the Law, Communication and Selecting officials.
290
Figure A.1 The Nature of Taxation in Relation to Democratic Particles
Physical Infrastructure
This purports to the building and maintenance of roads, buildings, communication technology, sewage and all other functionalities which citizens may deem important for their happiness. The building and planning of such is directly relatable to bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy (Government Infrastructure)
This is the face of government most often encountered by citizens. Bureaucracies widely differ but, as the literature has come to show, they are often cumbersome, inefficient and fund-drainers. It is thus important, as the findings have come to show, for states to establish a permanent review body or committee to ensure bureaucratic efficiency to maximise benefits to the public and reduce costs. Figure A.2 exemplifies the relation of bureaucracy to the state.
291
Figure A.2 Bureaucracy and Its Relation to the State
The bonus of establishing a committee to oversee, evaluate and reform bureaucracy would inherently save money, which could be an additional input to government programs or a citizen rebate if a surplus occurs. Conversely, such money could also go towards the fulfilment of long-term goals or other such programs as deemed by the citizen body.
Similarly, this practice of oversight and review of government institutions adds accountability and transparency to the state, indirectly affecting society’s perception of the state. Courts, police, fire-fighters, hospitals and postal services, for example (or whatever a society deems to be its institutions), are recommended to be subject to such a committee(s).
292 Trade
Trade is used by every state as a means to generate income for whatever purpose.
Military
Although some scholars claim that having a military is not a necessary element of the state, it is useful to have a defensive force, such as a coast guard or border patrol to help maintain law. Peacekeeping forces are also helpful elements to have in a state as they aid participation in international events.
Media
The media serves as a tool for informing citizens on many broad topics. It is also a platform used to inform citizens of what the state is doing. The difficulty with media is its bias and mis- or dis- information.
293 Essential Glossary
Democratic Particles: law, communication, equality and selecting officials represent democratic particles. They are referred to as particles in the elemental analogy of democracy.
Elemental Democracy: Democracy (as defined in Chapter 1) is a constant element present in the government of any state, regardless of political affiliation. The element of democracy is made up of four particles (the democratic particles). These particles are negatively affected by endemic governance problems.
Democratic Associates: Taxation, media, bureaucracy, military and trade are all present in most current governments around the world and, as such, are called the ‘associates’ of democracy. They do not play a role in the definition of democracy but, rather, are useful for the implementation of democratic governance. They can also be made more democratic by applying democratic particles to them, mitigating endemic governance problems which can negatively affect them, and by using the prescriptions made in
Chapter 7 to improve them.
Endemic Governance Problems: Accountability, corruption, transparency, representation, constitutional issues, campaigning methods and long-term goals represent the seven endemic problems traced throughout history and shown to still be affecting modern governments. It is theorised that, by mitigating endemic problems, democratic particles are improved, thus strengthening the element of democracy in government.
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