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[ THINKING ABOUT M A S S IMO P IGL I U C CI Massimo Pigliucci is professor of at the City University of New York–Lehman College, a fellow of the American Association for the Advance ment of Science, and author of Nonsense on Stilts: How to Tell Science from Bunk. His essays can be found at www.rationallyspeaking.org.

Popper vs. Kuhn: The Battle for Understanding How Science Works

arl Popper and those rare situations in the of sci- Rowbottom points out that the flash- are two of the towering figures of ence in which a field abandons a frame- point of the controversy was the publi- K twentieth-century philosophy of work in favor of another, as a result of a cation of Criticism and the Growth of science, and for good reason. Some of crisis induced by a mounting number of : Pro ceedings of the Inter - their ideas even made it into main- puzzles that cannot be resolved within national Colloquium in the Phi losophy of stream culture and are among the few the context of the old framework. Science, in which the two heavyweights from I recently read an interesting article of philosophy of science went at each that are somewhat known to practicing by Darrell P. Rowbottom, to be pub- other with no punches pulled. . Popper, of course, gave us the lished in Studies in History and Phi - Essentially, Popper’s position was idea of as a way of distin- losophy of Science (available on line for that the main role of a good is guishing genuine scientific theories from download at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop that of a critic of established or working . Kuhn introduced the 0262/SHPS.pdf ), about a notorious hypotheses. As he put it: “It is the most of shift to indicate controversy between Pop per and Kuhn. characteristic feature of the scientific

Karl Popper (left) and Thomas Kuhn. Skeptical Inquirer | July / August 2 01 1 2 3 SI July August 11_SI new design masters 5/25/11 12:16 PM Page 24

method that scientists will do every- not the theory....It is a poor carpenter an individual scientist to pursue, but thing they can in order to criticize and who blames his tools.” That’s certainly both Popper and Kuhn missed the ob- test the theory in question [i.e., any more like the reality of scientific prac- vious solution: both functions are per- theory being considered]. Criticizing tice, at least according to my experience. formed at the group level, i.e., by the and testing go hand in hand: the theory Of course, Kuhn’s view cannot be ensemble of scientists working within is criticized from very many different the entire story, because certainly Pop- a particular discipline. Some scientists standpoints in order to bring out those per-type criticism of hypotheses does are more inclined or apt to engage in points which may be vulnerable.” I have take place in science, and we need an criticism and others in puzzle solving. Science works well precisely because there is a division of labor that facili- tates the continuous interaction be- tween the two functions. Even so, Rowbottom raises but does not address the obvious crucial follow- Some scientists are more inclined up questions: What is the ideal balance between Popperian and Kuhnian func- or apt to engage in criticism tions in science? And how does that differ from the actual mix between crit- and others in puzzle solving. ical and puzzle-solving scientists that we find on the ground? Are the answers Science works well precisely to these questions different for differ- ent ? And if so, why? My expe- because there is a division rience is that there is a far greater num- ber of puzzle solvers than critical of labor that facilitates the scientists around, which is probably a good idea as long as enough critical sci- continuous interaction between entists are funded and their work is taken seriously for the vital part it plays the two functions. in the broader enterprise. It would be interesting for funding agencies and journal editors to actually address this question empirically and to adjust their priorities accordingly. To my knowl- edge, this has never been attempted. There is one more crucial function no idea which scientific laboratories— account of its role within the broader that Rowbottom mentions but leaves as if any—Popper hung around, but this context of scientific progress. Kuhn an unexplored black box: creativity. description surely doesn’t resonate with may have been right that most of the Both critical scientists and puzzle the kind of science that I have seen in time the rules don’t get questioned, but solvers have to get their ideas from action during a quarter century of prac- if they were never questioned we would somewhere, somehow. Yet what tice as a biologist. have no explanation for the occurrence philosophers of science often refer to as Kuhn’s view, on the other hand, was of paradigm shifts to begin with, thus the “context of discovery” (how new that criticism is exceptional (it’s what undermining Kuhn’s own picture of ideas come about) is simply not leads to the occasional paradigm shift) how science works. amenable to the kind of logical analysis and that much of science is what he The idea that Rowbottom explores that philosophers are good at, which called “puzzled solving,” or “normal sci- in his forthcoming paper is that Popper makes them concentrate on the “context ence.” To wit: “Trial attempts [to solve and Kuhn’s disagreement amounted to of justification” (how ideas are tested puzzles], whether by the chess player or a distinction between two functions once they have been thought out). It by the scientist, are trials only of them- within the practice of science, one of strikes me that the context of discovery selves, not of the rules of the game.” criticism (Popper) and one of puzzle is a question for sociologists and psy- Furthermore: “Failure to achieve a so- solving (Kuhn). The debate hinged on chologists of science that remains lution discredits only the scientist and which function was more important for largely unexplored. n

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