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INDEX FROM NO PLACE TO HIDE BUY THE BOOK: E-BOOK GLENNGREENWALD.NET INDEX ABC, 235 AOL, 21, 108, 110 ABC News, 233 Apple, 21, 75, 108, 110 abortion, 133, 181 Apuzzo, Matt, 186 Abramson, Jill, 224–25, 240 Arab Spring, 4 Abu Ghraib scandal, 235 Area SpA, 4 Access and Target Development (NSA), Argentina, 126 148 Armed Forces Services Corporation accountability, 42, 202, 209, 244 (AFSC), 123 Ackerman, Spencer, 67 ARTIFICE, 107 Aerofl ot, 135 Assad, Bashar al-, 4 Afghanistan War, 188 Assange, Julian, 188, 219, 226–27 Agriculture, Department of, 136 assassinations, 5, 202 airlines, 163–66 Associated Press, 72, 85, 186 Alexander, Keith B., 92, 95–97, 138–39, surveillance of, 60, 213 203–4, 221 AT&T, 103, 168, 233 Algeria, 123 Atlantic, 205, 237 Al Qaeda, 199, 204, 206 Aurora shootings, 203 Amanpour, Christiane, 232 Australia, 23, 91, 122 Amash, Justin, 249 Austria, 123 American citizens. See domestic Axelrod, David, 235 surveillance American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), backdoor surveillance, 118–10, 147 19, 71, 109, 114, 127, 133, 171, 185, 187 Balkin, Jack, 127 Amesys, 4 Bamford, James, 95, 153, 201 Anonymous, 8, 189–91 banking and fi nancial records, 118, 135, antiwar activists, 183–86, 196 138, 201, 205 020-58305_ch02_2P.indd 277 5/7/14 7:37 AM 278 INDEX Baquet, Dean, 233 BUFFALOGREEN, 106 BBC, 234 Bulgaria, 145 BEBO, 161 Burns, John, 226, 231–32 Belgium, 123, 138 Bush, George W., 1–2, 5, 55–56, 58, 96, Bentham, Jeremy, 175–76, 209 127, 182, 185, 197–98, 217 Bergen, Peter, 204 Bernstein, Walter, 178 Campbell, Duncan, 238 Biden, Joe, 199 Campbell, Joseph, 45 Bing search, 156 Canada, 23, 91, 94, 119–20, 124, 135, 221 Binney, William, 99 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Blackberry, 165 (CBC), 221 BLACKHEART, 147 Carle, Glenn, 206 blacklist, 178 Carney, Jay, 235 black nationalists, 184 CBS News, 222 BLACKPEARL, 135 cell phones, 12, 37–38, 122, 166, 201 BLARNEY, 102–3, 108, 136–37, 142–43, Center for Advanced Study of Language, 150, 160 University of Maryland, 41 “Blogger, with Focus on Surveillance” Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 216 (New York Times article), 212 Al-Qaeda and, 204 Bloomberg News, 4 black sites and, 55 Bolivia, 49 domestic spying and, 179, 185 Booz Allen Hamilton, 48, 80, 84, 101, 168 Hayden as head of, 96, 217 Bosnia, 143 journalists and, 219, 229 Boston Marathon bombing, 203 media and, 234 BOUNDLESS INFORMANT, 30, 59, Miranda laptop and, 236–37 81–82, 92–93 NSA data sharing and, 116, 136 Brandeis, Louis, 172 NYPD surveillance of Muslims and, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 183 186 Brazil, 90, 92, 103, 106, 126, 138–39, 141, Obama advisory panel on surveillance 144–45, 202, 243–44, 250 and, 202 Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy, Snowden’s work for, 41–44, 47, 84 94, 119–21, 135 Swiss bankers and, 42 BRECKENRIDGE cable site, 107 CHAOS operation (CIA), 185 Britain (United Kingdom). See also Chavez, Hugo, 139 Government Communications Cheney, Dick, 217 Headquarters (GCHQ) Chilling Eff ects: NSA Surveillance domestic spying and, 122 Drives U.S. Writers to Self-Censor Five Eyes and, 91 (PEN report, 2013), 178 Guardian and, 238, 240 “Chilling Eff ects of Surveillance, Th e” internal unrest and, 177 (White and Zimbardo), 179–80 journalists and, 238, 245 China, 5, 92, 126, 135, 147–48, 151, 227 Miranda detention and, 186, 241–46 Snowden accused of spying for, 49–50, suspicionless surveillance and, 1–4 223–26 Broadwell, Paula, 8 Chinese Internet companies, 147–48, 151 Brooks, David, 223 Christmas-day bomber, 203 Brzezinski, Mika, 89 Church, Frank, 3, 201 020-58305_ch02_2P.indd 278 5/7/14 7:37 AM INDEX 279 Church Committee, 27, 184–85, 251 data storage, 151–53, 159–60 “Cincinnatus,” 7–10, 12, 81–82 dating services, 133 Cisco, 150 Defense, Department of, 135–36 civil liberties, 208 Defense Intelligence Agency, 32, 44, 136 civil rights movement, 183–84, 196 Dell Corporation, 43, 47–48, 101 Clapper, James, 30–31, 221 democracy, 202, 207–9, 252. See also Clemons, Steve, 237–38 freedom Clinton, Hillary, 139 Democracy Now! (TV show), 99 Close Access SIGADS, 145–46 Democratic National Committee, 223 CNBC, 170, 219 Democrats, 197–200, 249 CNET, 171 Denial of Service attacks, 192–93 CNN, 71–72, 126, 155, 204, 216, 217, 218, Denmark, 93, 123 231–32 Dershowitz, Alan, 217 Cohen, Richard, 222 Destination Short Message Entity (DSME), COINTELPRO, 183–84 132 Coleman, Gabriella, 190 detention, 5, 14, 241–46 Colombia, 106, 145 DEWSWEEPER, 147 Comey, James, 221 Dialed Number Recognition (DNR), 92 Commerce, Department of, 136 Digital Network Intelligence (DNI), Committee to Protect Journalists, 214 92–93, 105, 124 Communications Services Establishment diplomatic espionage, 94, 139–47, 202 Canada (CSEC), 119–20 Discipline and Punish (Foucault), 176 Communists, 184, 196 disruption and deception techniques, Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), 190–94 117 “Disruption Operational Playbook” conservatives, 198 (GCHQ), 194 content dissent, 3–5, 50, 174, 177–200 metadata vs., 132–34 demonization of, 224–28 storage and search, 153–60 FBI and, 183–85 Conyers, John, 249 GCHQ and, 190–93 Cooper, Anderson, 216 NSA and, 185–90 Cornyn, John, 208 domestic surveillance, 1, 3, 5, 29–32, 74, Corona, Jorge, 140 90–93, 96, 99–100, 124, 126–29, 131, Corporate Partner Access (CPA) portfolio, 169, 171, 177–78, 189, 195–202. See 102–3 also contents; metadata; National Croatia, 123 Security Agency; surveillance; Cryptocat, 59 warrantless wiretapping scandal; and CRYPTO ENABLED, 147 specifi c agencies and programs C-SPAN, 249 Five Eyes and, 23–24 Cuba, 139, 224 prohibition on, 201 CUSTOMS, 147 spending on, 206–7 Czech Republic, 123 Downie, Leonard, Jr., 214 drones, 43, 229 database searches, 153–60 DROPMIRE, 147 Data Intercept Technology Unit drug addiction centers, 133 (DITU, FBI), 115 drug-related cases, 200 020-58305_ch02_2P.indd 279 5/7/14 7:37 AM 280 INDEX East German Ministry of State Security PRISM and, 77, 113–16 (Stasi), 4, 176–77 roving bugs and, 37 economic espionage, 94, 134–39, 147, Snowden and, 51–52 167–68, 202 STORMBREW and, 107 Ecuador, 49 X-KEYSCORE and, 160 “Edward Snowden: Th e Whistleblower Feinstein, Dianne, 71, 130–31, 133, 171–72 Behind the NSA Surveillance Felten, Edward, 133–34 Revelations” (Guardian article) fi ber-optic cables, 92, 101, 103–4, 107, 119 84–85 fi nancial crisis of 2008, 177 EGOTISTICAL GIRAFFE, 94 Finland, 123 Egypt, 4, 141, 196 First Amendment, 183, 208 elections of 2004, 55–56 FISA. See Foreign Intelligence Electronic Communications Surveillance Surveillance Act Unit (ECSU, FBI), 114 Five Eyes alliance (FVEY), 23, 91, 95–97, Ellsberg, Daniel, 30, 84, 226 118–23, 161, 164, 166 emails, 92, 94, 99–100, 119, 122, 153–54, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 157–58, 178, 201, 252 (FISA, 1978), 27, 201 journalists and, 213 Amendments Act (2008), 74–75, 116, metadata and, 133 126–28 encryption, 8–9, 94, 115, 118–19, 205, 225, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 252 (FISA) court, 27–30, 127–30, 143, Energy, Department of, 136 228–30, 251 Energy and Research Branch (NSA), 138 Verizon and, 27–28, 30, 58–59, 61–72, energy companies, 134–35, 137–38 75, 78, 91, 93–94 environmentalists, 183, 186 Yahoo! and, 109 Espionage Act (1917), 50, 59, 222 foreign leaders, 138–42, 202 Ethiopia, 123 foreign nationals, 127 European tech companies, 252 “Foreign Partner Review” European Union, 92, 103, 138, 145, 251 Fiscal Year 2012, 124 Evolutionary Psychology, 178 Fiscal year 2013, 123 executive power, 1–2, 14, 128 foreign partners, 90, 101, 118–26 Foreign Policy, 95, 96, 109, 148, 206 Facebook, 18, 20–21, 74–75, 77, 84, 108–11, foreign press, 234 119, 126, 155–56, 158, 160–63, 165, foreign telecoms, 92, 103–7 170–71, 194, 252 Foucault, Michel, 176 Face the Nation (TV show), 199, 231 Fourth Amendment, 1–3, 207–8, 250 facsimiles (faxes), 122, 132, 168, 192 Fox News, 60, 213, 215–17 FAIRVIEW, 102, 104–5, 108, 150 France, 4, 90, 93, 103, 123, 138, 144–45, 148 false fl ag operations, 190, 194 Frank, Anne, 5 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), freedom 3, 207 privacy and, 172–74 Al Qaeda and, 204 safety and, 207 COINTELPRO and, 183–85 Snowden on, 46–47 journalists and, 60, 221 surveillance and, 174–80, 196, 201–2 Muslims and, 186 freedom of assembly, 180 Patriot Act and, 28 freedom of association, 183 020-58305_ch02_2P.indd 280 5/7/14 7:37 AM INDEX 281 freedom of speech, 179–80, 183 NSA partnership with, 118–19 freedom of the press, 32, 65, 183, 213–22, PROJECT BULLRUN and, 94 230–31 TARMAC and, 97 UK and, 238–40 Th ieving Magpie and, 164–65 Grayson, Alan, 130, 220–21 Gabon, 143 Greece, 103, 123, 145, 177, 216 gays and lesbians, 133 Greek mythology, 45 Gazprom, 135 Gregory, David, 217–19, 229–30 GCHQ. See Government Griffi th, Morgan, 130 Communications Headquarters Guantanamo, 245 Gellman, Barton, 18, 54, 57–58, 77, 109, Guardian, 81, 91, 224 181–82, 220 choice of, for Snowden story, 21–22, GENIE, 147 58–59 Georgia, 145 fi rst NSA article of, 210 Germany, 4, 90, 92, 103, 123, 138, 176–77. fi rst Snowden stories published by, See also Nazi Germany 53–54, 59–78 Gibbs, Robert, 235 GCHQ reporting by, 118–19, 122 Gibson, Janine, 21–26, 59–61, 63–64, GCHQ threats to, and hard drive, 66–69, 73–78, 224–25, 238–39, 242, 238–41, 245 244 Hersh and, 235 Global Access Operations unit, 92 Hong Kong support for Snowden and, Global Telecoms Exploitation 86–89 (GTE, GCHQ), 119, 161–63 Hong Kong trip and, 22–27, 62–63 Gmail, 8, 77, 155–56 impact of Snowden stories and, 248–49 Goldman, Adam, 186 Miranda and, 237, 241–44 Goldsmith, Jack, 234 New York Times and 225, 240–41 Good Morning America (TV show), 71 Snowden identity revealed by, 84–85 Google, 18, 20, 21, 74–75,
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    T.C. İSTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ SİYASET BİLİMİ VE KAMU YÖNETİMİ ANABİLİM DALI YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ İSTİHBARATIN TEŞKİLATLANMA ve YÖNETİM SORUNSALI: A.B.D. ÖRNEĞİ Fatih TÜRK 2501110836 TEZ DANIŞMANI DOÇ. DR Pelin Pınar GİRİTLİOĞLU İSTANBUL - 2019 ÖZ İSTİHBARATIN TEŞKİLATLANMA ve YÖNETİM SORUNSALI: A.B.D. ÖRNEĞİ Fatih TÜRK Günümüzde teknolojinin gelişimi ve küreselleşme dünyayı uçtan uca değiştirdi. Toplumlar ve ülkeler birbiri ile etkileşime geçtikçe bireysel özgürlükler ve demokrasi konusunda hassas alanlar giderek artmaktadır. Bu etkileşim ülkelerin güvenliğini ve bireysel özgürlük alanlarınıda etkilemektedir. Bu hızlı değişime karşın ülkeler geçmişin soğuk savaş anlayışı ve güvenlik hassasiyetlerini de aynı zamanda taşımaya devam etmektedirler. Gelişmiş demokrasilere sahip ülkelerin başında gelen Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nde (ABD) mevcut güvenlik ve istihbarat anlayışı, faaliyetleri ve denetimi işte bu çatışmanın uzun sürede meydana geldiği denge üzerine kuruludur. ABD açısından istihbarat teşkilatlanma süreci yeni problemler, hak arayışları, çatışma ve çözümler doğurmaktadır. Tüm bunların ışığında bu tezin temel amacı istihbarat problemlerini ABD istihbarat teşkilatlanma süreci üzerinden analiz edip karşılaşılan problemleri neden sonuç ilişkisi içerisinde tespit etmektir. Bu çalışmada Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nde istihbaratın yönetim modeli, teşkilatlanması ve hukuki alt yapısı incelenmiştir. Birinci bölümde kavramsal anlamda istihbarat incelemesi literatüre önemli bir katkı olarak görülebilir. İkinci bölümde