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Peace and Stability in Somalia: Kenya's National Prospects International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) |Volume V, Issue II, February 2021|ISSN 2454-6186 Peace and Stability in Somalia: Kenya‟s National Prospects John Kisilu Reuben, Dr. Susan Namaemba Kimokoti (PhD), Dr. George Akolo Lutomia (PhD) Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Masinde Muliro University of Science & Technology, P.O. Box 190-50100, Kakamega-Kenya Abstract: This paper article reviews Somalia reaction towards support for about 2000 shifta fighters was by the Somalia Kenya before and after the collapse of the Somalia Government, Government(Atta-Asamoah, The Nature and Drivers of effects of State Collapse, efforts made to restore peace and insecurity in Kenya, 2015). Somalia Radio stations and opportunities for Kenya within the context of stabilizing Somalia. Newspapers propagated the message that the NFD Somalis The researcher used both primary and secondary data collection should rise up against the Government of Kenya, a call they techniques to gather data. Under primary, the researcher used qualitative techniques by using interview schedules and FGDs. embraced. In this, they volunteered to be conscripted into the The population comprised key informants from both Kenya and Army when about 4,000 males went to Belles Qooqani and Somalia governments and opinion shapers in Somalia. The study Ras Kamboni, in Somalia for the military training (Ichani, found that the “bad neighborhood”, between Kenya and Somalia Matheka, & Wario, 2019). Shifta militia targeted Kenya had existed since independence. Kenya had experienced cross Government officials and civilians perceived to be border influenced insecurity on its Northern Frontier Districts sympathizers. A former Shifta fighter stated that, “for those emanating from Somalia, even before the collapse of the Somalia who defied the movement, the result was devastating. Men State in 1991 and this was manifested in form of irredentism and would be castrated and their women raped…the best border contestations. Generally, the Horn of Africa(HoA), punishment for a betrayer ” (Whittaker, 2015). including Kenya, had been faced with threat of increase of illicit firearms, cross border criminality, terrorism, conflict spill-over The beginning of the fall of Somalia was conceivably when and refugee crises arising from Somalia’s statelessness. The Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1977 in order to reclaim „one of ripple effects of Somalia State failure had been witnessed the stars‟ symbolized in the Somalia flag. The Somali through the regional insecurity perpetuated by Al Shabaab. The National Army jointly fought alongside Western Somali Somalia conflict ailed from the spoiler effect from within and without Somalia who wanted to influence the outcome of any Liberation Front(WSLF), a guerrilla movement funded by the political process. Kenya’s bitter relationship with Somalia was Somalia State. Ethiopia was on a verge of fall, were it not for compounded by the formation of the Horn of Africa Cooperation the massive Soviet-Cuban intervention (Porter, The Ogaden (HoAC) between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, a unified entity War, 1984). The defeat of Somali National Army greatly that could reduce the Kenyan influence in the regional politics. weakened President Siad Barre grip onto power. This saw This notwithstanding, Kenya continued to foster its support for proliferation of clan-based militia groups opposed to his rule Somalia’s peace process and creating a positive business and others in support of him. He eventually lost control of his environment, despite the outstanding maritime dispute. The Government on 26 January 1991. The hallmarks of the State study concluded that a stable relationship between Kenya and failure were still evident today; the peace was still elusive. Somalia would result in an expanded economic partnership and stable borders, which will reduce the influence of Al-Shabaab in The country had transited through various regimes of clan the region. based militia, warlords and now the ideologically based armed group: Al Shabaab (Turbiville, Meservey, & Forest, 2004). Al Keywords: Stability, Peace, Partnership, Agreement, Al Shabaab, Shabaab had embarked on external attacks alongside having Spoiler, Prospects strong connections with Al Qaeda. The agenda was to create I. INTRODUCTION an „Islamic‟ caliphate (Tar & Mustapha, 2017). This was a threat to all countries in the Horn of Africa(HoA) and beyond. mmediately after Kenya‟s independence, irredentist I movement sprung up in the Northern Frontier Despite the continuous metamorphosis of the Somalia Districts(NFD). The movement had aspirations of hiving off conflict, regional and international bodies, had attempted to part of Kenya into Somalia. Symbolically, the Somalia flag stabilize the collapsed State of Somalia. However, due to the had five stars representing the irredentist nationalism claims: asymmetrical nature of the enemy being fought in Somalia Puntland, Somaliland, Jubaland, Ogaden region in Ethiopia (Africa, 2019), it was challenging to bring peace to bear. The and NFD in Kenya, in the dream of „the Greater Somalia‟ enemy, Al Shabaab had intensified attacks in Kenya, in a (Porter, The Ogaden War, 1984). The attempts to secede were larger scale than in any other Horn of African (HoA) country. witnessed with four years‟ war between the Shifta an This was arguably attributed to the media freedom in Kenya Amhaaric word for bandits and the Kenya Armed Forces that publicized Al Shabaab activities, availability of many soft resulting into tens of thousands of civilian deaths (The TJRC, targets, a sizable number of Al Shabaab foreign fighters 2012). Notably, the secessionist aspirations and financial recruited from Kenya, and a democratic space that advocates www.rsisinternational.org Page 346 International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) |Volume V, Issue II, February 2021|ISSN 2454-6186 for the rule of law when handling terrorist suspects (Cannon Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia formed Horn of Africa & Pkalya, 2019). Though, evidence had indicated that Al Cooperation(HoAC) regional organization. This cooperation Shabaab had made successful recruitment bases in United brought together otherwise, erstwhile enemies who had at one States of America and in other Western countries targeting time embarked on a conventional war between each other. resettled Somali refugees and non-ethnic Somalis (Malet, Somalia invaded Ethiopia over Ogaden region while Ethiopia Priest, & Staggs, 2013). Internally, the marginalized groups and Eritrea fought border war which claimed many civilian like Rahanweyn clans and Somali Bantus, contributed casualties from both sides. The formation of HoAC presented significantly to Al Shabaab rank and file in order to get a direct competition to, Intergovernmental Authority of protection (UN-Somalia, 2018). Development (IGAD), African Union(AU), Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), Common Market for Eastern and The conflict in Somalia, had rendered the country in a Southern Africa (COMESA) and East African Community protracted situation in proliferating illegal firearms (Geneva, (EAC). Further, the formation of Horn of Africa Cooperation 2012), internal displacements and refugee problem (HoAC) was an attempt to tame Kenyan hegemonic (WorldBank, 2019), smuggling and cross border trade (Little, aspirations in the HoA region (Henneberg & Stapel, 2020). 2013). This had affected negatively the economy and security Possibly through the spirit of HoAC, Somalia had threatened of the neighboring countries. Further, the plight of civilians in to replace Kenyan troops in African Union Mission in Somalia became a major concern (Williams, 2013). This Somalia (AMISOM) with Eritrean troops. Further, Eritrea was directly translated that, the Somalia problem was a challenge helping in training Somalia troops (MarketWatch, 2020). for all HoA countries and could not be wished away. Additionally, similar cooperation was witnessed when Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) was integrated into the African Eritrean forces fought alongside Ethiopian troops in pursuit of Union Mission in Somalia(AMISOM) to support the Somalia fugitive leaders in Tigray region (Aljazeera, 2021). Government in fighting Al Shabaab. Earlier on, Kenya hosted II. METHODOLOGY several conferences on peace-building, she was the home of thousands of refugees and had provided an investment The study used both secondary and primary sources. opportunity for the Somalia diaspora. Positively from Somalia Secondary data was derived from electronic and print books, to Kenya, she had visa-on-arrival arrangements to allow scholarly electronic and print journals, magazines, bulletins Kenyans ease of doing business, she had also provided and internet sources. The primary data was collected using employment opportunities to hundreds of Kenyans in qualitative data collection methodologies. The study corporate, aid, service and hospitality sectors (Abdullahi, employed key informant interviews to gather information 2021). from 28 respondents. The sample population included a number of key government stakeholders in the Kenyan and Though, seemingly symbiotic relationship existed between Somalia governments, Kenyan and Somalia military officers, Kenya and Somalia, unwarranted political tirades by the Somalia citizens in diaspora. The researcher settled on semi- Somali political elites, were constantly directed to Kenya. For structured interviews as they provided the interviewees with instance, allegations of Kenya‟s interference
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