ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 16, No. 1 (GR) March 2019 Greece political briefing: The Prespes Agreement: The Perspective from Greece George N. Tzogopoulos 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 The Prespes Agreement: The Perspective from Greece ‘North Macedonia, welcome into our lives’ was the phrase tweeted by former Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias following joint parliamentary ratification of the Prespes Agreement in Greece and North Macedonia in January 2019.1 The road to this development was long and difficult though. The name dispute lasted over 25 years following the end of the Cold War. In particular, it arose in 1991 when North Macedonia seceded from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and proclaimed its independence under the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’. The reaction of Greece was immediate. Macedonia is a Greek lemma. It refers to the culture of the Ancient Macedonians – who were part of the Greek nation – and constitutes an indisputable part of the historical and cultural heritage of Greece. Moreover, Macedonia covers a wide region extending into the current territory of various Balkan countries, namely Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and North Macedonia. Athens could thus not accept that one country only would benefit by the usage of the term.2 In 1995, following four years of bilateral tensions and a trade embargo imposed by Greece to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as the provisional name of North Macedonia had been until recently, the two countries signed the so-called Interim Accord. Greece recognized FYROM within its internationally recognized borders pending settlement of the name difference. The two countries agreed to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the UN pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993) with a view to reaching agreement on the difference described in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993). Additionally, Greece reserved the right to object to any membership of FYROM to international, multilateral and regional institutions to the extent the government of Skopje would make use of another name than FYROM.3 This practically meant Greece could veto applications of the government of Skopje to join organizations such as NATO and the EU 1 Ekathimerini website: ‘Former FM: North Macedonia, Welcome into our lives’, available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/236522/article/ekathimerini/news/former-fm-north-macedonia-welcome-into-our- lives, 11 January 2019, accessed April 2019. 2 For the official position of Greece on the name issue see the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘The Issue of the Name of North Macedonia’, available at: https://www.mfa.gr/en/the-question-of-the-name-of-the- republic-of-north/, accessed April 2019. 3 Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Interim Accord – signed in New York on 13 September 1995, available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MK_950913_Interim%20Accord%20between%20the% 20Hellenic%20Republic%20and%20the%20FYROM.pdf, accessed April 2019. 1 or warn of exerting a veto in order to push its allies to respect its concern before making relevant decisions. The year of 2008 saw Greece use all available diplomatic means to block the potential membership of FYROM to NATO indeed. Although the International Court of Justice ruled three year later that by obstructing this bid of the government of Skopje under its provisionary name Greece had breached the afore-mentioned Interim Accord,4 the then conservative government of Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis served the national interest of Greece. The 2008 Bucharest NATO Declaration surpassed the 1995 Interim Accord. Article 20 stipulated ‘an invitation to FYROM will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached’.5 In other words, NATO considered the mutual accepted solution of the name issue a prerequisite for the government of Skopje to be a formal candidate to enter the Alliance. More importantly, Greece convinced its partners – including the USA that had recognized FYROM as ‘Republic of Macedonia’ in 2004 – to pay attention to its national sensitivity on the issue. NATO support of the Greek cause was critical in that regard. According to Athens, the intransigence of the then Prime Minister of FYROM Nikola Gruevski was the main reason for the lack of progress in negotiations with FYROM. Practices of extreme nationalism such as the use of ancient Greek symbols on the flag of FYROM, irredentism, and anti-Greek propaganda, for example in the education system, caused ire in Greece.6 Former Consultant on Balkan Affairs at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Kofos explained ten years before the Prespes Agreement that the Greek position on the name issue was not maximal. The Greek government as well as major parties would perhaps not object a compound geographical name containing the lemma Macedonia for their neighbor country. Kofos also argued the emergence of a new generation of politicians in FYROM belonging to the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party – some of them with family roots in Greek Macedonia – brought to the surface issues and grievances dating back to the years of the Greek 4 International Court of Justice press release, available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case- related/142/16841.pdf, 5 December 2011, accessed April 2019. 5 NATO website, Bucharest Summit Declaration, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm, 3 April 2008, accessed April 2019. 6 See for example: Aristotle Tziampiris, ‘Resolving the Name Dispute’, available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/65133/article/ekathimerini/comment/resolving-the-name-dispute, 9 September 2009, accessed April 2019 and Erwan Fouéré, ‘Progress in resolving the Greek-Macedonian Name Dispute: Will it Break the Gordian Knot at Last?’, available at: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EF_GreekMacedoniaNameDispute.pdf, CEPS Commentary, 18 June 2018, accessed April 2019. 2 Civil War of 1945-1949.7 Under these circumstances, the mediation effort of UN Special Representative for the naming dispute, Matthew Nimitz, could hardly yield results. On the Way to the Accord For many years after the 2008 Bucharest Summit, optimism for a breakthrough on the name issue was limited. In parallel with steady disagreements between the two sides, the Greek economic crisis, which broke out in 2009, overshadowed foreign policy developments. But the 2015 national election in Greece was the beginning of a policy shift. Premier Alexis Tsipras and Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias started to explore ways to improve bilateral relations with the neighboring country – still known as FYROM – even under the premiership of Nikola Gruevski. Kotzias, in particular, believed a better understanding between the two sides could – in the medium and long-term – pave the way for fruitful discussions on the name dispute. In June 2015, he traveled to Skopje to meet his counterpart Nikola Poposki and reach an agreement on confidence-building measures ensuring immediate strengthening of bilateral cooperation.8 Several rounds of discussions preceding the Prespes Agreement concentrated on connectivity- related projects, police collaboration, European programs, culture, education, civil protection, public administration and health. 9 The 2017 governmental change in FYROM created an unprecedented opportunity. Nikola Gruevski left power and the new coalition government in the country was led by moderate Premier Premier Zoran Zaev. Nikola Dimitrov became the new Foreign Minister. Tsipras and Kotzias intensified contacts with the other side. The international community encouraged the process. Being concerned about Russia’s influence in South-Eastern Europe, the US sought to accelerate the enlargement of NATO following the 2017 Montenegro adhesion.10 FYROM 7 Evangelos Kofos, ‘The Current Macedonian Issue between Athens and Skopje: Is there an Option for a Breakthrough?’, available at: https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2009/04/eliamep-thesis-3_2009- kofos.pdf, ELIAMEP Thesis, April 2009, accessed April 2019. 8 Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, ‘Joint Statements of Foreign Minister Kotzias and FYROM Foreign Minister Nikola Poposki, Following their Meeting’, available at: https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top- story/joint-statements-of-foreign-minister-kotzias-and-fyrom-foreign-minister-nikola-poposki-following-their- meeting-skopje-24-june-2015.html, 24 June 2015, accessed April 2019. 9 For a discussion on confidence-building measures with emphasis on the fields of justice and home affairs see: Yorgos Christidis and Panagiotis Paschalidis, ‘Greece and FYROM: Bilateral cooperation between Athens and Skopje in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (Police): An assessment of the State of Play Before and After the Adoption of the Confidence Building Measures’, available at: https://www.eliamep.gr/wp- content/uploads/2019/01/Bilateral-cooperation-in-Justice-and-Home-Affairs-FINAL.pdf, ELIAMEP South East Europe Programme Research Report, December 2018, available April 2019 10 See for example: Amon Wilson and David J. Kramer, ‘Enlarge NATO to Ensure Peace in Europe’, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/enlarge-nato-to-ensure-peace-in-europe, 7 August 2018, accessed April 2019. 3 could be the next candidate provided a solution on the name dispute was found. Germany shared the American view endeavoring to strengthen its presence in the Balkans. Berlin had initiated the so-called ‘Berlin Process’ and wanted to see more countries of the Western Balkans rekindle an appetite for joining the EU.11 Russia never hid its frustration on new developments in South-Eastern Europe.12 An Erga Omnes solution but… In the first six months of 2018, Greece and FYROM engaged in difficult negotiations leading to the June Prespes Agreement. Athens’s most important priority was for Skopje to accept an erga omnes usage of a compound name and seal it with a constitutional amendment.