ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 16, No. 1 (GR)

March 2019

Greece political briefing: The Prespes Agreement: The Perspective from George N. Tzogopoulos

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The Prespes Agreement: The Perspective from Greece

‘, welcome into our lives’ was the phrase tweeted by former Greek Foreign Minister following joint parliamentary ratification of the Prespes Agreement in Greece and North Macedonia in January 2019.1 The road to this development was long and difficult though. The name dispute lasted over 25 years following the end of the Cold War. In particular, it arose in 1991 when North Macedonia seceded from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and proclaimed its independence under the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’. The reaction of Greece was immediate. Macedonia is a Greek lemma. It refers to the culture of the Ancient Macedonians – who were part of the Greek nation – and constitutes an indisputable part of the historical and cultural heritage of Greece. Moreover, Macedonia covers a wide region extending into the current territory of various Balkan countries, namely Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and North Macedonia. could thus not accept that one country only would benefit by the usage of the term.2

In 1995, following four years of bilateral tensions and a trade embargo imposed by Greece to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as the provisional name of North Macedonia had been until recently, the two countries signed the so-called Interim Accord. Greece recognized FYROM within its internationally recognized borders pending settlement of the name difference. The two countries agreed to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the UN pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993) with a view to reaching agreement on the difference described in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993). Additionally, Greece reserved the right to object to any membership of FYROM to international, multilateral and regional institutions to the extent the government of would make use of another name than FYROM.3 This practically meant Greece could veto applications of the government of Skopje to join organizations such as NATO and the EU

1 Ekathimerini website: ‘Former FM: North Macedonia, Welcome into our lives’, available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/236522/article/ekathimerini/news/former-fm-north-macedonia-welcome-into-our- lives, 11 January 2019, accessed April 2019. 2 For the official position of Greece on the name issue see the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘The Issue of the Name of North Macedonia’, available at: https://www.mfa.gr/en/the-question-of-the-name-of-the- republic-of-north/, accessed April 2019. 3 Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Interim Accord – signed in New York on 13 September 1995, available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MK_950913_Interim%20Accord%20between%20the% 20Hellenic%20Republic%20and%20the%20FYROM.pdf, accessed April 2019.

1 or warn of exerting a veto in order to push its allies to respect its concern before making relevant decisions.

The year of 2008 saw Greece use all available diplomatic means to block the potential membership of FYROM to NATO indeed. Although the International Court of Justice ruled three year later that by obstructing this bid of the government of Skopje under its provisionary name Greece had breached the afore-mentioned Interim Accord,4 the then conservative government of Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis served the national interest of Greece. The 2008 Bucharest NATO Declaration surpassed the 1995 Interim Accord. Article 20 stipulated ‘an invitation to FYROM will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached’.5 In other words, NATO considered the mutual accepted solution of the name issue a prerequisite for the government of Skopje to be a formal candidate to enter the Alliance. More importantly, Greece convinced its partners – including the USA that had recognized FYROM as ‘Republic of Macedonia’ in 2004 – to pay attention to its national sensitivity on the issue. NATO support of the Greek cause was critical in that regard.

According to Athens, the intransigence of the then Prime Minister of FYROM was the main reason for the lack of progress in negotiations with FYROM. Practices of extreme nationalism such as the use of ancient Greek symbols on the flag of FYROM, irredentism, and anti-Greek propaganda, for example in the education system, caused ire in Greece.6 Former Consultant on Balkan Affairs at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Kofos explained ten years before the Prespes Agreement that the Greek position on the name issue was not maximal. The Greek government as well as major parties would perhaps not object a compound geographical name containing the lemma Macedonia for their neighbor country. Kofos also argued the emergence of a new generation of politicians in FYROM belonging to the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party – some of them with family roots in Greek Macedonia – brought to the surface issues and grievances dating back to the years of the Greek

4 International Court of Justice press release, available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case- related/142/16841.pdf, 5 December 2011, accessed April 2019. 5 NATO website, Bucharest Summit Declaration, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm, 3 April 2008, accessed April 2019. 6 See for example: Aristotle Tziampiris, ‘Resolving the Name Dispute’, available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/65133/article/ekathimerini/comment/resolving-the-name-dispute, 9 September 2009, accessed April 2019 and Erwan Fouéré, ‘Progress in resolving the Greek-Macedonian Name Dispute: Will it Break the Gordian Knot at Last?’, available at: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EF_GreekMacedoniaNameDispute.pdf, CEPS Commentary, 18 June 2018, accessed April 2019.

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Civil War of 1945-1949.7 Under these circumstances, the mediation effort of UN Special Representative for the naming dispute, Matthew Nimitz, could hardly yield results.

On the Way to the Accord

For many years after the 2008 Bucharest Summit, optimism for a breakthrough on the name issue was limited. In parallel with steady disagreements between the two sides, the Greek economic crisis, which broke out in 2009, overshadowed foreign policy developments. But the 2015 national election in Greece was the beginning of a policy shift. Premier and Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias started to explore ways to improve bilateral relations with the neighboring country – still known as FYROM – even under the premiership of Nikola Gruevski. Kotzias, in particular, believed a better understanding between the two sides could – in the medium and long-term – pave the way for fruitful discussions on the name dispute. In June 2015, he traveled to Skopje to meet his counterpart Nikola Poposki and reach an agreement on confidence-building measures ensuring immediate strengthening of bilateral cooperation.8 Several rounds of discussions preceding the Prespes Agreement concentrated on connectivity- related projects, police collaboration, European programs, culture, education, civil protection, public administration and health. 9

The 2017 governmental change in FYROM created an unprecedented opportunity. Nikola Gruevski left power and the new coalition government in the country was led by moderate Premier Premier Zoran Zaev. became the new Foreign Minister. Tsipras and Kotzias intensified contacts with the other side. The international community encouraged the process. Being concerned about ’s influence in South-Eastern Europe, the US sought to accelerate the enlargement of NATO following the 2017 Montenegro adhesion.10 FYROM

7 Evangelos Kofos, ‘The Current Macedonian Issue between Athens and Skopje: Is there an Option for a Breakthrough?’, available at: https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2009/04/eliamep-thesis-3_2009- kofos.pdf, ELIAMEP Thesis, April 2009, accessed April 2019. 8 Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, ‘Joint Statements of Foreign Minister Kotzias and FYROM Foreign Minister Nikola Poposki, Following their Meeting’, available at: https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top- story/joint-statements-of-foreign-minister-kotzias-and-fyrom-foreign-minister-nikola-poposki-following-their- meeting-skopje-24-june-2015.html, 24 June 2015, accessed April 2019. 9 For a discussion on confidence-building measures with emphasis on the fields of justice and home affairs see: Yorgos Christidis and Panagiotis Paschalidis, ‘Greece and FYROM: Bilateral cooperation between Athens and Skopje in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (Police): An assessment of the State of Play Before and After the Adoption of the Confidence Building Measures’, available at: https://www.eliamep.gr/wp- content/uploads/2019/01/Bilateral-cooperation-in-Justice-and-Home-Affairs-FINAL.pdf, ELIAMEP South East Europe Programme Research Report, December 2018, available April 2019 10 See for example: Amon Wilson and David J. Kramer, ‘Enlarge NATO to Ensure Peace in Europe’, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/enlarge-nato-to-ensure-peace-in-europe, 7 August 2018, accessed April 2019.

3 could be the next candidate provided a solution on the name dispute was found. shared the American view endeavoring to strengthen its presence in the Balkans. had initiated the so-called ‘Berlin Process’ and wanted to see more countries of the Western Balkans rekindle an appetite for joining the EU.11 Russia never hid its frustration on new developments in South-Eastern Europe.12

An Erga Omnes solution but…

In the first six months of 2018, Greece and FYROM engaged in difficult negotiations leading to the June Prespes Agreement. Athens’s most important priority was for Skopje to accept an erga omnes usage of a compound name and seal it with a constitutional amendment. This goal was certainly achieved. According to the accord, Skopje had to change its constitution by adopting the new agreed name: ‘Republic of North Macedonia (short name: North Macedonia)’.13 Hence, Athens will no longer oppose the European-Atlantic orientation of the government of Skopje, allowing North Macedonia to join both NATO and the EU. Premier Zaev gave the green light for North Macedonia to be the constitutional name of his country and for a subsequent erga omnes usage to safeguard his country’s Euroatlantic orientation. With this concession he certainly crossed the red line of his predecessors, principally Gruevski. This is the main reason why President Gjorge Ivanov was hesitant to give his consent.

The author had the opportunity to interview President Ivanov in the autumn of 2010, approximately eight years before the Prespes Agreement. At that time, North Macedonia (then known as FYROM) was considering the name dispute a bilateral issue. The author asked President Ivanov why his country referred to the name dispute as such from the moment negotiations were only taking place under the UN aegis and Greece called for an erga omnes solution. President Ivanov replied, inter alia, that an erga omnes solution as proposed by Greece was not realistic as a basis for solution because it was against any international principles regulating relations among countries. In his view at that time, an erga omnes solution was not

11 Deutscher Bundestag website, ‘Deutschlands Haltung Gegenüber den Staaten des Westbalkans und die Europäische Perspektive’, available at: https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/586220/886d8e24062f343fe4aecc598eeee046/wd-2-168-18-pdf- data.pdf, 19 November 2018, accessed April 2019. 12 Billy Perrigo, ‘How the Renaming of a Country Became a Battleground Between Russia and the West’, available at: http://time.com/5415031/macedonia-rename/, 4 October 2018, accessed April 2019. 13 Final Agreement for the Settlement of the Differences as Described in the UN Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the Termination of the Interim Accord of 1995 and the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the Countries, available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/resources/article-files/aggliko- 1.pdf, 12 June 2018, accessed April 2019.

4 acceptable in a situation when two thirds (129) of the UN member-states had recognized his country as ‘Republic of Macedonia’. It thus becomes evident the Prespes Agreement serves the Greek national interest and constitutes a diplomatic defeat of the other side.

Of course, the Prespes Agreement could not have been signed if Greece had remained intransigent to some demands of North Macedonia. A compromise requires mutual concessions. This said, Greece accepted that the nationality of North Macedonia shall be ‘Macedonian/citizen of the North Macedonia’ and the official language shall be ‘Macedonian language’. Article 7 of the Prespes Agreement stipulates the two countries acknowledge their respective understanding of terms ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonian’ refers to a different historical context and cultural heritage. North Macedonia notes its official language, the Macedonian language, is within the group of South Slavic languages while both sides note the official language and other attributes of North Macedonia are not related to the ancient Hellenic civilization, history, culture and heritage of the north region of Greece. Here, some ambiguity does exist indeed. And this is helping the cause of opponents of the Prespes Agreement in Greece. For example, in December 2018, Premier Zaev told lawmakers that the deal would allow the teaching of the ‘Macedonian’ language in Greece to ‘Macedonians’.14 Some international media reports about a ‘Macedonian minority’ in Greece are fueling new political tensions in Greece.15

Generally speaking, a lively debate on the Prespes Agreement is being played out in Greece. Alexandros Mallias, a former Ambassador of Greece to the USA who has also served in countries such as Albania and North Macedonia, believes Athens should not have come to an agreement with Skopje on issues such as nationality and language. He explains previous Security Council decisions stipulate for only one difference between the two sides, that of the name.16 For his part, Professor Angelos Syrigos characterizes the deal problematic because it allows the people of the neighboring country to call themselves ‘Macedonians’ rather than ‘North Macedonians.’ He also focuses on Article 7 of the Prespes Agreement which states that – in reference to North Macedonia – the terms ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonian’ denote ‘its territory, language, people and their attributes, with their own history, culture and heritage’ and

14 Vassilis Nedos, ‘Zaev Pivots after Athens Storm’, available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/235345/article/ekathimerini/news/zaev-pivots-after-athens-storm, 4 December 2018, accessed April 2019. 15 BBC website, ‘Greece’s Invisible Minority - the Macedonian Slavs’, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-47258809, 24 February 2019, accessed April 2019. 16 Alexandros Mallias, ‘Greece and North Macedonia: An Autopsy of the Difficult Prespes Agreement’, Sideris Publishers, Athens, 2018 (in Greek).

5 says this might not only designate citizenship but also identity.17 But Nikos Mertzos, the former president of the Society for Macedonian Studies, attempts to appease fears by elaborating on specific constitutional amendments in North Macedonia. For example, the Constitution clarifies nationality does not mean ethnicity and accepts indirectly the so-called ‘Macedonian’ people are multiethnic: Slav Macedonians, Albanians, Vlachs, Bulgarians, Serbs, Roma, Bosnians and Turks.18

Political Debate in Greece

Most Greek citizens tend to emotionally approach the North Macedonia name issue. Being misinformed by politicians and the media for years, they have been allergic in accepting a compromise. The opposition of the majority of to the Prespes Agreement in all opinion polls is placed in this framework. So, in a divided political landscape, only the governing party has been a passionate supporter of the accord. The right-wing party – SYRIZA’s coalition partner in government – was divided but its leader fervently opposed the deal. Furthermore, the main opposition party also disagreed. In the view of its leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis the agreement does not serve the Greek national interest as it, inter alia, accepts the ‘Macedonian language’ and the ‘Macedonian ethnicity’. In his own words, the solution that was agreed ‘is a bad agreement’ and ‘some people do not realize it or, even worse, they do not care understanding it’.19

Attempting to politically benefit by the public opinion opposition to the Prespes Agreement, New Democracy submitted a no-confidence motion against the government in June 2018. The main objective of Mitsotakis was to expose the governmental coalition partner of SYRIZA. Tsipras survived the confidence vote and the motion brought by New Democracy party was rejected by 153 MPs – with 127 in favor. Among the MPs who voted in favor of the motion was Independent Greeks MP Dimitris Kammenos though. Dimitris Kammenos was immediately expelled from the parliamentary group of party on the basis of a decision made by its leader Panos Kammenos. In that regard, Mitsotakis’ decision to file a no-confidence motion

17 Angelos Syrigos, ‘Crucial Decisions that Will Affect Greece’s Future’, available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/236910/opinion/ekathimerini/comment/crucial-decisions-that-will-affect-greeces- future, 24 January 2019, accessed April 2019. 18 Nikos Mertzos, ‘A Solution that is not Hamful to Greece’, available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/236763/opinion/ekathimerini/comment/a-solution-that-is-not-harmful-to-greece, 20 January 2019, accessed April 2019. 19 Ekathimerini website, ‘Mitsotakis: FYROM deal is Bad, Recognizes Macedonian Ethnicity and Language’, 12 June 2018, available April 2019.

6 was partly successful at last because the governmental majority was reduced from 154 to 153 MPs20. Later, Dimitris Kammenos also left his post as vice president in the parliament.

Following the ratification of the Prespes Agreement by the Parliament of North Macedonia, it was Greece’s turn to approve it. In January 2019, it came to the Parliament only a few days after another confidence vote was won by Tsipras in response to the decision of Panos Kammenos to leave the government. The Greek Premier managed – in comparison to the confidence vote – to increase the number of MPs who supported the governmental policy from 151 to 153.21 In parallel with the 145 MPs of SYRIZA the other ones who voted in favor of the Prespes Agreement were Stavros Theodorakis (To Potami), Spyros Lykoudis (To Potami), Spyros Danelis (independent), Katerina Papakosta (independent), (independent), Thanasis Papachristopoulos (independent), George Mavrotas (To Potami), Thanasis Theocharopoulos (Democratic Left). From those 8 MPs only 4 had supported the government in the confidence vote, namely Katerina Papakosta, Elena Kountoura, Thanasis Papachristopoulos and Spyros Danellis.

The Prespes Agreements has impacted on the cohesion of the government as Independent Greeks officially withdrew from the coalition. SYRIZA stayed in power by individually collaborating with some of the MPs of the right-wing party though. Therefore, SYRIZA managed to politically escape from a serious crisis benefiting by the maneuvering capacity of its leader Alexis Tsipras. As far as future developments are concerned, even if SYRIZA loses the next election to take place in 2019 – as opinion polls anticipate – the implementation of the Prespes Agreement will hardly be jeopardized. Kyriakos Mitsotakis, who will possibly be the new , has clarified he will respect the deal in spite of his disagreements with its content.

The International Framework

The Prespes Agreement has also influenced relations between Greece and the US as well as Russia. The Balkan Peninsula has been a field of American-Russian rivalry and Greece could not but take sides. Against this backdrop, Greek-American relations do flourish while Greek-

20 Ekathimerini website, ‘Greek Government Survives Vote of no Confidence but Loses an MP’, available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/229747/article/ekathimerini/news/greek-govt-survives-vote-of-no-confidence-but- loses-an-mp, 16 June 2018, accessed April 2019. 21 Ekathimerini website, ‘Greek MPs Pass Prespes Deal with 153 Votes in 300-Seat House’, available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/236998/article/ekathimerini/news/greek-mps-pass-prespes-deal-with-153-votes-in- 300-seat-house, 25 January 2019.

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Russian ones are suffering. For its part, Washington is considering Athens a reliable ally in a turbulent region. The perplexed nature of Turkish-American relations along with the Russia’s deepening involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans has pushed the US to boost its partnership with Greece.22 The inaugural strategic dialogue launched in December is indicative. According to the official statement, the US lauded Greece’s leadership and vision in promoting regional stability and cooperation, in particular the latter’s initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans to facilitate common regional economic and security benefits, as well as in reaching the Prespes Agreement with Skopje and working towards its implementation. Among other things, the two sides expressed their desire to modernize and expand their multifaceted defense relationship in order to better meet their needs and to more effectively address regional and global security challenges, citing recent successes in combined joint training and security exercises, and an increase in joint activities.23

By contrast, Greece and Russia are experiencing difficult moments in their bilateral relationship. In the summer of 2018 Athens accused Moscow of intervening in its internal affairs and decided to expel two Russian diplomats.24 This diplomatic gesture was officially endorsed by the US which was constantly criticizing Russia on the matter.25 For its part, Russia responded by also expelling Greek diplomats.26 The tone of announcements in the Greek and Russian Foreign Minister became aggressive. But Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras travelled to Moscow in December and met with President Vladimir Putin. The two leaders discussed the 2018 summer crisis and decided to make steps in order to restore trust. The meeting was successful but it remains to be seen whether Greek-Russian relations can return to normalcy. For trust to be restored time is required.

On a more positive note, the ratification of the Prespes Agreement paved the way for Greece to join 16+1 Initiative. In April 2019, Alexis Tsipras attended the Dubrovnik summit where Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic welcomed Greece as the 17th

22 George N. Tzogopoulos, ‘Israel, Greece, and Join Hands in Beersheba’, available at: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-greece-cyprus-beersheba/, BESA Perspective Paper No. 1049, 28 December 2018, accessed April 2019. 23 US Embassy and Consulate in Greece website, ‘Joint Statement Regarding the Inaugural United States-Greece Strategic Dialogue’, available at: https://gr.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-regarding-the-inaugural-united-states- greece-strategic-dialogue/, 13 December 2018, accessed April 2019. 24 Deutsche Welle website, ‘Greece to Expel two Russian Diplomats, Ban Two Others’, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/greece-to-expel-two-russian-diplomats-ban-two-others-newspaper/a-44628127, 11 July 2018, accessed April 2019. 25 Ekathimerini website, ‘US Backs Greece Regarding Russian Diplomat Expulsions’, available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/230639/article/ekathimerini/news/us-backs-greece-regarding-russian-diplomat- expulsions, 12 July 2018, accessed April 2019. 26 website, Russia Expels Greek Diplomats in Retaliatory Move’, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-russia-envoy/russia-expels-greek-diplomats-in-retaliatory-move- idUSKBN1KR1L2, 6 August 2018, accessed April 2019.

8 member.27 Greece constitutes the point of entry to the Balkan region for Chinese investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. To take full advantage of the Piraeus port, Beijing invests in transport links across the Balkan Peninsula. Its plan is twofold. First, it is cooperating with North Macedonia to prepare a feasibility study for the route and costs to modernize the railway. Second, it has already signed separate deals with Serbia and Hungary to construct and revamp the rail link between them. Commodities can thus reach Piraeus, and then be transported to and from FYROM to Serbia and Hungary by high-speed rail. With Greece being a member of the 16+1 – now 17+1 – Initiative additional business and investment deals are expected to be reached. 28

Conclusion

In 2018, the governments of Greece and North Macedonia decided that, instead of investing in nationalism, they would seek to build friendship. Tsipras, Kotzias, Zaev and Dimitrov managed to achieve what had seemed unthinkable a few years ago, achieving a diplomatic success unusual in South-Eastern Europe. It was not surprising that Tsipras and Zaev were nominated for Nobel Prize. Additionally, the political and economic collaboration between Greece and North Macedonia has already started to develop. In April 2019, Tsipras went to Skopje on a historic visit after the ratification of the Prespes Agreement and was accompanied by a delegation of businessmen. Also, North Macedonia has already signed an accession protocol with NATO. Although the effort of the country to join the EU is more complicated and will take more time, the road is clearly open. From an international perspective, Greece can count on closer relations with the USA and China but has also to overcome a serious diplomatic crisis with Russia.

27 Ekathimerini website, ‘Greece Joins 16+1 Initiative for Regional Trade with China’, available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/239523/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-joins-161-initiative-for-regional-trade- with-china, 12 April 2019, accessed April 2019. 28 For a discussion on regional cooperation see: George N. Tzogopoulos, ‘Whither Sino-Greek Relations? The Bilateral and Regional Context and International Implications’, available at: https://china-cee.eu/wp- content/uploads/2018/08/Work_paper-201823.pdf , China-CEE Institute Working Paper, 22 June 2018, accessed April 2019.

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