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Iran and the Gulf Military Balance

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Iran and the Gulf Military Balance IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE By Alexander Wilner and Anthony H. Cordesman December 1, 2011 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman/Wilner, Iran & The Gulf Military Balance 12/1/11 2 Acknowledgements This analysis draws on the work of Dr. Abdullah Toukan and a series of reports on Iran by Adam Seitz, a Senior Research Associate and Instructor, Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University. 2 Cordesman/Wilner, Iran & The Gulf Military Balance 12/1/11 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS III. MILITARY COMPETITION ...............................................................................................................6 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 6 Figure III.1: Summary Chronology of US-Iranian Military Competition: 2000-2011 ............................... 8 CURRENT PATTERNS IN THE STRUCTURE OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ........................................... 13 DIFFERING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 16 US Perceptions .................................................................................................................................... 16 Iranian Perceptions............................................................................................................................. 17 Arab Perceptions ................................................................................................................................ 20 Israeli perceptions .............................................................................................................................. 21 Figure III.2: Assessing the Full Range of Iranian Competition and Threats ........................................... 22 KEY UNCERTAINTIES IN ASSESSING THE DETAILS OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ................................ 23 COMPETITION IN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES ......................................................................................... 25 The Trends in the Conventional Balance ............................................................................................ 25 The Limits to Iran’s Air Power ......................................................................................................................................... 25 Ground-Based Air Defenses ............................................................................................................................................ 26 Land and Naval Forces .................................................................................................................................................... 27 The Problem of Iraq ........................................................................................................................................................ 29 Measuring the Balance of US and Iranian Military Competition ..................................................................................... 29 Figure III.3: Comparative Spending on Military Forces and Arms Sales ................................................ 31 Figure III.4: Total Gulf Holdings of Combat Aircraft in 2011 ................................................................ 32 Figure III.5: Comparative Modern Iranian and Gulf Air Forces ............................................................ 33 Figure III.6: Gulf Reconnaissance and AWACS Aircraft in 2011 ............................................................ 34 Figure III.7: Comparative Land Based Air and Missile Defense Forces ................................................. 35 Figure III.8: Comparative Iranian and Gulf Land Forces ........................................................................ 36 Figure III.9: Comparative Iranian and Gulf Major Naval Forces ............................................................ 37 Figure III.10: Iranian and Gulf Smaller Naval Ships by Category in 2011 .............................................. 38 Figure III.11: Gulf Warships with Anti-Ship Missiles in 2011 ................................................................. 39 Figure III.12: Gulf Attack, Anti-Ship and ASW Helicopters in 2011 ...................................................... 40 Figure III.13: Shifting the Balance: Iran vs. Iraq in 2003 and 2011 ........................................................ 41 COMPETITION IN ASYMMETRIC FORCES .......................................................................................................... 42 Iran’s Growing Asymmetric Forces ..................................................................................................... 42 Conventional Weakness vs. Asymmetric Capability ........................................................................... 44 Iran’s Growing Mix of Asymmetric Warfare Forces ........................................................................... 45 The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) ................................................................................. 47 IRGC Land Forces ............................................................................................................................................................ 47 The IRGC Air Force .......................................................................................................................................................... 50 The IRGC Naval Forces .................................................................................................................................................... 50 The Al Qods Force ........................................................................................................................................................... 51 Other Asymmetric Forces ................................................................................................................... 54 US and Arab Gulf Options for Competing with Iranian Asymmetric Threats ..................................... 55 Figure III.14: Key Iranian Capabilities for Asymmetric Warfare ............................................................ 57 Figure III.15: Key Elements of the IRGC ................................................................................................ 58 Figure III.16: The Evolving Capabilities of the IRGC .............................................................................. 59 Figure III.17: The Impact of the IRGC Naval Guards: Force Strength, Roles, and Missions ................... 60 Figure III.18: Iranian Naval Capabilities for Asymmetric Warfare ......................................................... 61 Figure III.19: Iranian Capabilities for Mine Warfare.............................................................................. 62 Figure III.20: Iranian Amphibious Warfare Capabilities ........................................................................ 63 Figure III.21: The Iranian Al Qods Force ................................................................................................ 64 Figure III.22: Iranian Use of Other States and Non-State Actors........................................................... 65 Figure III.23: Iranian and the Hezbollah ................................................................................................ 66 Figure III.24: Iran and Hamas ................................................................................................................ 67 3 Cordesman/Wilner, Iran & The Gulf Military Balance 12/1/11 4 COMPETITION OVER NUCLEAR THREATS, MISSILES, AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ........................ 68 Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program and its Role in US and Iranian Military Competition ........................ 68 What Iran’s Actions and Statements Say About Its View of Competition: Ballistic Missiles .............. 70 Figure III.25: Estimated Range of Iranian Long-range Missile Forces.................................................... 73 Figure III.26: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal .......................................................................................... 74 Figure III.27: Iranian Rockets and Missiles ............................................................................................ 75 Estimating the Iranian Nuclear Threat ............................................................................................... 76 Figure III.28: Cumulative LEU Production at Natanz ............................................................................. 80 Figure III.29: Number of Centrifuge Cascades enriching, under vacuum, installed, or with centrifuges disconnected, January 31, 2010 ........................................................................................................... 81 Figure III.30: Centrifuge Trends at Natanz ............................................................................................ 82 Figure III.31: ISIS Estimate of Monthly Trends at Natanz ...................................................................... 83 Figure III.42: Amount of Fissile Material Need to Build a Basic Fission................................................. 94 (Non-Boosted) Weapon ........................................................................................................................ 94 Figure III.43: February 25, 2011 IAEA Report ........................................................................................ 95 Figure
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