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UPD

SOUTH - RELATIONS IN THE 1990s

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, the Institute's Senior Research Officer, keeps a close watch on Mozambican developments. This paper is based on a very recent visit.

1. Introduction agricultural production is being revived. Are these hopes well-founded? Many analysts On the 27th and 28th of 1994, remain sceptical. In my view, a more realistic Mozambique will experience its first national assessment must consider the following factors: multi-party elections in living memory. This event, although the culmination of a long process of * Economic growth must be seen in the negotiations between former adversaries Frelimo context of starting from an extremely low and Renamo, will be overshadowed by other base. Problematic too is the continuing considerations: among them, the daunting task of decline in industrial production, now in its rebuilding a shattered society, revitalising the fourth year of downturn. Industrial national economy, and rethinking Mozambique's operation is extremely ineffective, using place in the community of Southern African states. obsolete technology. There is a continuing Given its dominant position, it is perhaps inevitable shortage of raw materials and spare parts. that neighbouring will play a prominent role in all of these developments. In * In rural areas, appearances are deceptive. light of the remarkable interplay of forces in the Even though farmers are now benefitting transition processes evident in both countries, the from a peace dividend as well as good aim of this essay is to report on current agricultural prospects, more is needed to developments in Mozambique and relations between achieve sustainable growth. There is an it and South Africa. extreme shortage of skilled human resources, and as a result of the war, virtually no local government structures 2. Peace in Mozambique - But where is the are in operation. These deficiencies were development? well illustrated by the disastrous management of the 1993/4 bumper Visitors to Mozambique are often struck by the -nut crop. Because of the failure of new mood of optimism evident in many quarters both the authorities and the delivery agents (especially noticeable among street vendors to reach agreement on prices, all five peddling curios: their prospects have improved processing plants have ground to a halt. dramatically with the influx of dollars from the Result: no cashew nuts for export. huge UN contingent in the capital). Closer investigation reveals that this is very much a * Even though investment opportunities psychological phenomena, flowing from a belief appear attractive, investors remain that the negotiation process (begun in 1992) will hesitant. The main reason for the delay, deliver peace and (redevelopment. Indeed, this apart from awaiting the outcome of the feeling is supported by economic data: it appears election in August, lies with the that the economy has turned around, growing by performance (or lack thereof) of the 5.6% in 1993: rural transport works again: and bureaucrats in . It is known that

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Jan Smuts House P.O. Box 31596 University of the Witwatersrand Braamfontein Braamfontein 2017 South Africa Tel: (Oil) 339-2021 Telex: 4-27291 SA Fax: (Oil) 339-2154 some potential investors have been waiting so have 13 political parties. The CNE is also since 1992 for a detailed investment code, confident that the parallel-running peace process, without which informed decisions cannot which includes the demobilisation of the rival easily be made. armed forces, is well under control. It therefore does not foresee a 'Savimbi-option' scenario for * Many analysts believe that donor Mozambique. involvement perpetuates Mozambique's dependency on the North; the country therefore remains underdeveloped. Indeed, Electoral Divisions and Numbers of MPs for there are many problems related to aid each to elect dependency, including aid addiction. For example, the extent of external support for Area No. of Potential Voters No. of Seats the national budget to be balanced, South amounts to 75 % -80 %. Added to this is the City of Maputo 486,685 20 problem of growing corruption. Maputo 440,432 14 Bank observers believe that paradoxically, Gaza 729,473 16 money is not the problem in Mozambique; 687,559 19 rather, it is the 'absorption capacity' of the Centre country: the ability to spend money wisely 683,904 19 on development projects. Manica 328,141 11 Tete 464,601 14 * Underlying all of this is a wider question Zambezia 1,533,444 48 concerning the impact on society of North colonialism and underdevelopment, 1,473,853 52 inappropriate state policies, destabilisation, Niassa 413,158 10 and 're-colonialisation'. What has Cabo Delgado 653,600 24 variously been described as the collapse of Source: CNE (National Elections Commission) estimates, before the end of the state in Mozambique, social anarchy, voter registration and political decompression,1 has left an (See Map on Page 5). indelible mark on the country and its people, with after-effects to be felt for Talking to the public reveals that potential problem generations to come. areas do exist, however, and it has to do with voter education (adult rate: 31%); the sheer Nevertheless, one need not be deterministic in inaccessibility of parts of the countryside; and the thinking about the country's future. New trends in lack of information available to potential voters in global as well as regional politics, and especially an especially the northern parts of the country. Given emphasis on societies to adopt democracy, might these obstacles, voting will almost definitively not offer hopeful possibilities. Some analysts argue that be completed within two days. Consider, also, that the dynamics of the peace process, international the CNE must organise the transport and delivery support for reconstruction, and the coming of voting material to 7000 'assembly points' or multi-party election in October are aspects of a voting stations throughout the country in the week development that should result in normalisation and prior to the election itself. As we have learnt in eventual recovery. What then are the prospects for South Africa, there is every possibility of the the coming election? voting process being dragged out considerably longer than actually planned or budgeted for.

3. Election 1994: Some Change? No On the question of the election outcome, opinion change? polls have generally put President Chissano and his ruling Frelimo party ahead of Mr Dhlakama and All indications are that with the invaluable support his ex-rebel Renamo movement. Of the 16 of the peace-keeping mission in opposition parties, only three or four (including Mozambique (ONUMOZ), preparations for a Renamo, Monamo/PMSD, and Fumo/PCD) can be relatively free and fair election are well advanced. considered as serious candidates for presidential elections and might obtain significant percentages At the time of writing, it appeared the 21-member 2 National Electoral Commission (CNE) was for the legislative elections. Generally, given the confident of successfully completing the registration lack of both democratic structures and a vibrant, of voters and political parties. According to the participatory civil society, it appears that the CNE, 80% of potential voters (7 million voters out prevailing balance of forces will result in little of a population of 16 million) have registered, and change of governance in the post-election phase. Given this situation, will it be possible for the new regardless of the outcome. Mozambican government to turn to the region for support in realising its National Reconstruction Plan Currently, the following bilateral agreements are in (NRP)? place:

* The (to be phased out 4. Bilateral relations: No to politics, Yes to and replaced by agreements listed below); technical co-operation * Sea Fisheries Agreement; Mozambique has limited options. The dominant foreign policy direction in recent years has been * Trade Office Agreement; both to secure the flow of emergency and development aid from the North, and to maintain a * Labour Agreement; working relationship with those International Financial Institutions that are involved in (some * Bilateral Air Services Agreement; would argue, run) the country's economic rehabilitation programme. However, the problems * Civil Aviation Agreement; associated with this option are increasingly recognised by Mozambicans. Secondly, * Agreement (on electricity); Mozambique is tied into regional political initiatives primarily through membership of SADC. * Agreement on Relocation of ;

Thirdly, since 1990, Mozambique's relationship * Agreement on Diplomatic Relations. with South Africa, which previously was strained by political and ideological factors, have been In future, agreements on security, extradition, and characterised by a process of normalisation. road transport might be entered into. As things However, the relationship continues to be currently stand, therefore, the two countries have extremely uneven. full diplomatic relations (established in October 1993), with the extent of cooperation perhaps The current view from (where bureaucrats reflected in the signing (by the two presidents) of still determine policy - rather than the new political an Agreement for the Establishment of a Joint elite) is that relations with Mozambique, as with Permanent Commission for Cooperation during the region, should be conducted within a President Mandela's first State visit to the country 'functionalist' or 'neo-realist' framework.3 in July 1994.

Essentially, this means that South Africa's approach Key areas of cooperation include bilateral trade, to Mozambique consists of the following elements: security issues (especially illegal cross-border activities such as weapon smuggling), the Cahora * An emphasis on the expansion of bilateral Bassa hydroelectric scheme, development relations to promote South Africa's assistance, repatriation of refugees (in conjunction economic and commercial interests. This with the UNHCR), health issues (with a focus on should be done by opening up training and dealing with communicable diseases), opportunities for South African companies and transport. In addition, there is growing concern and institutions through trade, tourism and among sectors of South African society about the joint ventures increasing number of illegal immigrants from the region. * This approach should be used to gain Mozambique's support for the Estimates of illegal Mozambicans in South Africa achievement of greater economic (excluding refugees) range from over 500,000 integration in the region (1994) to a projected influx of 2,300,000 by the year 2000.4 * Support for the peace process to ensure that a 'stable neighbour' will pose less of In the of trade, a Preferential Trade a security risk to South Africa Arrangement is in place, whereby Mozambican exporters can export certain specified goods * An attempt to develop an 'unbiased' (including fish & prawns, cashew nuts, citrus fruit, approach toward all Mozambican political coconut oil, tyres) to South Africa at a nominal parties. The purpose is to ensure 'good import duty rate. Quotas are allocated on an annual relations' with a post-election government, basis. An overview of statistics5 reveal that trade has continued to grow at a steady pace since 1990. notion that South Africa will benefit from In 1993 total exports from South Africa to expanding trade and commercial opportunities with Mozambique were R964.5 million. By January the region. Although it is argued that this approach 1994, exports had increased by 41 %, compared to will benefit all sides, it cannot be assumed. Given the same period in 1993. On the other hand, the acute imbalances in existing regional economic exports from Mozambique to South Africa are relations, a conscious effort must be made to growing very slowly, as shown in the following promote equitable and mutually beneficial table: cooperation and integration. It is therefore vitally important that Mozambique develops an appropriate and well-informed policy in response to the South Tonnage of goods transported by road between African initiatives as outlined above. South Africa and Mozambique

End notes Mozambique to South Africa South Africa to Mozambique 1990: 92 tons 1990: 17,065 tons Simpson, M., Political Decompression 1993: 3,810 tons 1993: 44,315 tons and Historical Revisionism in Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 1994.* Mozambique, SAIIA, Braamfontein, 1992.

Interview with Dr Simbine, Vice-president 5. Conclusions of the Comissao Nacional De Eleicoes (CNE), 8 September 1994, Maputo. Relations between South Africa and independent Mozambique were for many years characterised by Information obtained from the Southern suspicion, hostility and outright aggression. Many African Research and Documentation blame the government for Mozambique's Centre (SARDC), Maputo. predicament. Indeed, destabilisation must be recognised for destroying the socialist dream. Du Pisani, A., 'Ventures into the interior: However, a balanced view would also acknowledge Continuity and change in South Africa's other factors, including inappropiate state policies regional policy', in Van Nieuwkerk and pursued by Frelimo, as well as the scars left by Van Staden, at the colonialism. Emerging from this maelstrom of Crossroads, SAIIA, 1992. struggle and instability is a new relationship between South Africa and Mozambique, made 5. Financial Mail, 9/9/1994. possible by exciting developments in both countries which could bring them closer towards achieving 6. Information obtained from the Department peace and stability. However, the terms of the new of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria. See also relationship are almost exclusively determined by Maasdorp & Saville's, The SADC South Africa. Bureaucrats and business interests are Economies ~ Waiting for South Africa, pursuing a functionalist agenda, in line with the SAIIA Occasional Paper, 1994. MOZAMBIQUE: PROVINCES

ZAMBIA 285 km from coast

200 Miles

SOUTH AFRICA

Main railways * —•«— International boundaries SWAZILAND/^. \.J boundaries