Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

A New President in Northern The End of an Era but No Solution in Sight

Heinz Kramer / Kirstin Hein SWP Comments

The long presidential reign of Rauf Denktaş came to an end with the election of April 17, 2005. After almost thirty years in the highest office of the Turkish Republic of (TRNC), Denktaş—a resolute opponent of reunification of the divided island—has been succeeded by the prime minister, . Does Talat’s rise from head of government to become the leader of his ethnic community give grounds for new hope of reopening negotiations on the island? The rigid line taken by Greek Cypriot President suggests not. The change in leadership in the north will not end the impasse in the Cyprus question and the conflict will remain an obstacle on Turkey’s path to European Union membership.

Mehmet Ali Talat, a supporter of Cypriot The Rise of Mehmet Ali Talat reunification, was elected president of The have expressed this northern Cyprus in the first round on April wish repeatedly since summer 2003, when 17, with a majority of 55.6 percent of the significant numbers of Turkish Cypriots vote. Derviş Eroğlu of the National Unity first started protesting against Denktaş and Party (UBP), Talat’s main rival and an op- his policies, which stood in the way of an ponent of the , drew less than accommodation with the . 23 percent. After almost three decades in Mehmet Ali Talat became the spokesman office, Rauf Denktaş did not stand again in for the protests and embodied the hopes for this election. a political alternative. As president, Talat intends to move on The victory of his left-leaning, pro-Euro- from the “two states” theory that his pre- pean (CTP) in the decessor had declared to be the starting parliamentary elections of December 14, point for any solution to the Cyprus prob- 2003, allowed Talat to replace UBP leader lem, and attempt a fresh start of negotia- Eroğlu as prime minister. Now, for the first tions with the south of the island. The clear time in the history of the conflict, the vote for Talat demonstrates yet again that parties loyal to President Rauf Denktaş the Turkish Cypriots would like to see an found themselves in the minority. However, end to the conflict, which has dragged on the outcome of the elections produced in the eastern Mediterranean since 1964. deadlock in parliament, and forced Talat to

SWP Comments 18 May 2005

1 enter a shaky coalition—holding a margin ported a solution based on the Annan of just twenty-six to twenty-four seats—with Plan. With twenty-four of fifty seats, Talat the Democratic Party (DP) led by Serdar narrowly failed to achieve the absolute Denktaş, the president’s son. Talat’s victory majority he aimed for, so the coalition attracted positive reactions abroad. The with Serdar Denktaş’s DP was revived. The European Union and the United States had DP had gained six seats, so the government clearly sided with the Turkish Cypriot commanded thirty seats and a solid par- opposition, believing that an electoral liamentary majority. victory for the opposition would improve However, already in September 2004, the prospects for a solution to the conflict. Mehmet Ali Talat had announced that he During the talks on the Annan Plan in would stand in the regular presidential spring 2004, Talat and Serdar Denktaş elections in April 2005 unless visible prog- represented the president in the third and ress toward a resolution of the conflict had final round of negotiations in the Swiss been made by then. As a consequence of resort of Bürgenstock. By personally staying the clear failure of his “no” campaign, Presi- away from the discussions, Rauf Denktaş dent Rauf Denktaş had already declared kept open the option of campaigning in May 2004 that he would not stand for against the negotiated proposal in the another term. referendum. Talat countered the passionate Denktaş’ withdrawal was a sensible “no” campaign of the Turkey-oriented decision, given that the polls forecast a nationalists with a powerful “Evet” (yes) decisive defeat should he have stood again. campaign for acceptance of the Annan This cleared the way for Talat to rise from Plan. Serdar Denktaş, on the other hand, head of government to become the leader took a neutral position in the referendum of his nation. Talat strove for the presidency campaign and merely stated that he per- in the conviction that only in that office sonally intended to vote against the plan. would he be able to act as the undisputed Several factors contributed to the Turkish chief negotiator for the northern part of Cypriots’ clear 65 percent vote in favor of the island. the Annan Plan, but Talat’s campaign In order to be able to act as head nego- certainly had a considerable influence on tiator in the otherwise symbolic office of the result. Nonetheless, the even clearer president—as Rauf Denktaş did—Talat needs “no” from the Greek Cypriot side prevented not only the support of the populace, as him from realizing the declared goal of his expressed in the result of the April 17 government, and on May 1, 2004, a divided elections, but also the backing of parlia- Cyprus joined the European Union. ment. There, however, he will continue to Shortly after the referendum, in May meet the resistance of the parties loyal 2004, Talat’s government lost its parlia- to Denktaş. Like his father, Serdar Denktaş mentary majority when several deputies also opposed Talat’s candidacy, so even left the coalition. The prime minister sur- within the governing coalition Talat could vived a confidence vote initiated by the face difficulties in organizing support. UBP, but resigned nonetheless in October Talat’s move to the presidency made it 2004 to hold new elections in the hope of necessary to appoint a new prime minister. broadening the base for his policies. Talat’s Meanwhile , who fol- CTP indeed recorded gains of about 9 per- lowed Talat as leader of the CTP, has also cent in the elections of February 20, 2005. been appointed his successor as leader of Even though these votes came primarily at the government. The rest of the cabinet the expense of the second reformist party, remains unchanged. the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH), the 44 percent for Talat’s party demon- strated that Turkish Cypriots still sup-

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2 The Positions of the Main Actors group had been ignored. In his letter to Talat’s main task will be to launch a new Annan of June 7 last year, informing the and auspicious initiative for solving the Secretary-General of the plan’s rejection, Cyprus problem. Here, however, he will Papadopoulos identified security as the part have to depend not only on the support of of the plan containing the greatest short- his own population, but also to at least comings. The president—and, as opinion the same degree on the cooperation of the polls showed—the majority of his popu- other parties on the island and among lation too—regarded the permanent the international community who are presence of up to 650 Turkish troops on indispensable for a solution. A brief exami- the island and Turkey’s continuing right nation of their current attitudes to the of intervention as unacceptable. To many Cyprus conflict shows that Talat faces no Greek Cypriots the number of Turkish easy task. settlers the plan would have allowed to remain on the island seemed too high and unreasonable. Although there is no real Why the Greek Cypriots basis for most of these security worries, Rejected the Annan Plan they can be explained as a psychological Although regarded by the international consequence of the Greek Cypriots’ community as the best possible solution, “invasion trauma” of 1974. the Annan Plan—in its fifth version, with Under the Annan Plan the Greek Cypri- the final details decided personally by ots—unlike the Turkish side—would have the UN Secretary-General (Annan V)—was had to fulfill their obligations, such as decisively rejected by the Greek Cypriot side giving up sole sovereignty over the island, in the nationally separate referendums of immediately, while implementation of the April 24, 2004. At least for the time being, Turkish Cypriot contributions to reunifica- four and a half years of negotiations and tion, such as reducing troop levels and work on the plan had come to nothing. returning Greek property in the north of The most obvious reason why the Greek the island, would have been phased over Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan was that several years. Precisely this implementation they, unlike their Turkish neighbors, were of Turkish Cypriot obligations appeared to under no particular pressure to find a Papadopoulos to be uncertain, and he was solution. Back in December 1999 the Hel- unwilling to take the risk of being depen- sinki European Council had dropped its dent on the good will of the north’s leaders. precondition that the conflict had to be Another reason for the Greek Cypriots’ resolved before accession. In other words, rejection is that they would have had to the Greek Cypriot side faced no decisive bear the most of the financial burden of disadvantages if the status quo continued. reunification with the economically much The gains that could be achieved through weaker north. The no campaign, led by a solution—land restitution, resettlement, Papadopoulos and according to Annan and compensation—were not enough to bristling with misinformation about his outweigh the expected losses, beginning plan, fanned insecurity and worries about with the sharing of power between two the consequences of reunification among politically equal communities. the Greek Cypriots, and ultimately led to Tassos Papadopoulos, President of the rejection of the Annan Plan. Republic of Cyprus and a firm opponent of the Annan Plan, had complained in par- ticular that all the suggestions of the Turkish Cypriots had found their way into the Annan Plan, while many of the con- cerns that were important for his national

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3 Do the Greek Cypriots Want Another Try? plete withdrawal of Turkish troops, fairer Under What Conditions? distribution of the costs caused by re- Although the Greek Cypriot hard-liner unification, and the removal from the Papadopoulos is always at pains to stress island of a larger number of Turkish that he is not per se against a resolution of settlers than stipulated in Annan V. Here the conflict, but only rejects the specific the attitudes of the Greek Cypriots largely reunification plan put to the referendum concur with those of their political leaders. last year, he has failed to follow his words The main obstacle to greater Greek with deeds. For example, he has yet to Cypriot flexibility continues to be the lack comply with Annan’s request of February of any incentive to achieve a solution. this year to list in detail the points he Although the blame for blocking agree- would like to have changed. Papadopoulos ment passed from Rauf Denktaş to his believes that his demands were sufficiently Greek Cypriot opposite number last April, clearly articulated in his letter of June 7, the resulting pressure applied to 2004, and regards Annan’s request to be by the international community and the more specific as an attempt to weaken the European Union partner states has not Greek Cypriot negotiating position in been great enough to bring the Cypriot advance. In other words, there is no sign at president back to the negotiating table. the moment that Papadopoulos is seriously Above all, Papadopoulos feels that his interested in a solution. In any case, the stance is backed by Russia, which in the Greek Cypriot side is not going to agree to a Security Council blocks any relaxation of new attempt before has signed the the official international position. In a Protocol on the adaptation of the Associa- continuation of traditional Soviet policy, tion Agreement of 1964 in the course of its Moscow plainly regards the smoldering accession negotiations. But even then the conflict and the resulting insecurity in the basis for negotiations would have to be an eastern Mediterranean as a welcome dis- Annan Plan clearly revised to the benefit of ruption weakening the Western position the south of the island. in a region of crucial importance for inter- The Papadopoulos government has also national development. repeatedly stated that any new attempt would have to dispense with the powers of arbitration for the UN Secretary-General. The Turkish Cypriots: A solution in all its details would have to Caught between the Wish for Recognition be the direct result of negotiations between and the Will to Reach a Solution the two parties on Cyprus. The Greek The situation in the north is quite different. Cypriots would seem to favor a solution Talat continues to insist on a resumption of within the European Union framework, or negotiations within the at least one clearly based on European framework. His foreign minister Denktaş Union principles. That, however, seems supports him in this position, but also almost impossible, because after accepting describes international recognition of the Cyprus as a member the European Union is Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a no longer in a position to act as a neutral feasible alternative to reunification. The mediator. latter is, however, absurd. Despite inter- However, according to the polls only 25 national praise for the Turkish Cypriot com- percent of Greek Cypriots reject reunifica- munity after their approval of the Annan tion out of hand. This figure suggests that Plan, both the UN Secretary-General and under other conditions a solution to the representatives of the European Union conflict could find acceptance. According to reject any suggestion of international rec- a study by Cyprus expert Alexandros Lordos ognition, and neither verbal references to the citizens have three main demands: com- the “Turkish-Cypriot state” by the Organi-

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4 zation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) nor signaled serious willingness to negotiate. the efforts by the European Union and Furthermore, he knows that a new attempt United States to end the north’s economic to solve the conflict will only have a isolation are going to change that. There realistic chance of success if the inter- is still not the slightest realistic basis national community gives sustained for setting up an independent state in support to the process—and that is ruled northern Cyprus. out by the Russian blockade in the Security The Talat/Denktaş government has Council. repeatedly signalized its willingness to make concessions to the south’s demands, and according to the polls the northern The Attitude of the “Motherlands” population would agree to such conces- Although the Turkish Cypriot yes to the sions. However, to date the government has Annan Plan removed one decisive obstacle said not a word about the possible sub- to the European Union agreeing to begin stance of the concessions under considera- membership negotiations with Turkey, for tion. To do so would on the one hand Ankara the Cyprus question continues to underline the seriousness of efforts to find hang as a sword of Damocles over the a solution and on the other make it clear accession process. Turkey’s interest in to the south the extent to which it might resolving the conflict is also motivated by expect to benefit from a revision of the the justified fear that it will otherwise face Annan Plan. However, the status of political a flood of compensation claims by dis- equality for the Turkish Cypriots in a possessed Greek Cypriots. Plaintiffs are united Cyprus is a point where even Talat entitled to go directly to the European would not consider making concessions. Court of Human Rights and it can be Unilateral steps toward implementing expected that claims following the Loizidou some of the provisions of Annan V, such as precedent will be granted. The ECHR beginning the withdrawal of Turkish troops ordered Turkey as the “occupier” of the or starting the process of resettlement in northern part of the island to pay the Greek the north to vacate areas that would return Cypriot Titina Loizidou u1.1 million in to Greek Cypriot administration under the compensation for her seized property. plan, would also substantiate the credibility Another reason for Prime Minister Erdoğan of the Turkish Cypriots. But for the Turkish to favor a quick solution is his hope for a Cypriot side, such unilateral steps also con- success in the Cyprus question to counter- tain the risk of possibly irreversibly weaken- balance his promise to sign the Protocol on ing their negotiating position if a solution the adaptation of Turkey’s Association were not to come about quickly. Agreement with the European Union to cover all ten new members, which many political circles in Turkey regarded as a Annan’s Hesitancy defeat. But Erdoğan’s calls for a return to It would seem that a solution to the Cyprus the negotiating table have not so far been conflict can only be achieved under the accompanied by statements of substance auspices of the United Nations. But Kofi on possible Turkish concessions to the Annan hesitates to resume negotiations, Greek Cypriots. It is also hard to under- because what was at stake in the referen- stand why Ankara continues to give the dum of April 24, 2004, was not only the green light for more mainland Turks to most detailed proposal to date, but also settle on the island. considerable prestige on the part of the After its cautious agreement to Annan V Secretary-General. Annan will not risk his last year, the Greek government under initiative failing again, so he will not Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis is still launch a new round until both parties have looking for a solution based on that plan. It

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5 would be impossible for Greece to advocate from the north to be exported to the the same rigid position as Papadopoulos, south of the island. But exporting northern because that would endanger relations Cypriot products onward from the south- with Ankara, which have improved greatly ern half of the island requires the coopera- in recent years. However, great efforts to tion of the Greek Cypriot authorities. In find a solution are not to be expected this respect the rule is no great gain for the from Athens, because the Greeks expect north, because it implies strong depend- the initiative for a solution to come from ence on the good will of the south. How- Nicosia, and because like the Greeks on the ever, for many Turkish Cypriots who have island, the mainland Greeks would suffer found employment in the south the rule no obvious disadvantages if the status quo brings perceptible advantages. were maintained. On the other hand, the The failure of the promised aid to arrive Greeks are undoubtedly aware that it will represents a bone of contention for the be difficult to achieve a lasting resolution Turkish Cypriots. In the controversy over of the points of bilateral conflict with the EU Directives it became clear that the Turkey unless the Cyprus problem is Union is condemned to acting as Cyprus’s resolved. hostage and in that sense is itself part of the conflict rather than a mediator. Where the Council of Ministers makes fundamen- The Role of the European Union tal decisions concerning Cyprus, the repre- Because one of the parties to the conflict sentatives of the twenty-four other member is one of its own members, it is impossible states are dependent on Cyprus’s willing- for the European Union to take an active ness to compromise. This unfortunate mediating role in the Cyprus conflict. situation within the European Union also Although prevented from adopting an insti- has a negative effect on the Turkish acces- tutional role in the unification process, the sion process. European Union is still concerned to sup- port developments leading to a solution. It would like to ameliorate the north’s eco- Cyprus as a Stumbling Block on nomic isolation and thus lessen the Turkey’s Path to Membership economic gap between the two parts of Disagreements over Turkey’s recognition of the island. This would increase the chances the Republic of Cyprus were the sticking of unification. However, Greek Cypriot point of the negotiations before and during resistance in the Council of Ministers has the Brussels European Council of December so far ensured that the promises made by 16 and 17, 2004. Papadopoulos initially former Enlargement Commissioner Günter contented himself with Ankara’s readiness Verheugen, of providing u259 million in to sign the Protocol on the adaptation of economic aid and allowing direct trade the Association Agreement as a condition with the north, have remained unfulfilled. for opening membership negotiations. The Papadopoulos government particularly However, the rather circumstantial formu- opposes direct trade, fearing that this lation of this point in the summit’s final would represent the beginning of a creep- declaration allows for a wide range of inter- ing or even open recognition of the TRNC. pretations and thus bears potential for Nicosia has enforced so many restrictive further disagreement. Whereas Papadopou- conditions for European Union economic los believes that signing the document aid that, divorced from direct trade, it expresses at least implicit recognition of appears unattractive and unacceptable to Cyprus by Turkey, Erdoğan continues to the Turkish Cypriots. deny this. The EU Commission does not see So far only the “Green Line regulation” the signature as formal recognition, but has been implemented, allowing goods does regard it as implicit de facto accep-

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6 tance of the existence of the Republic of unresolved. As in the case of economic aid Cyprus. Ankara and Brussels agreed the for the north of the island, the European exact wording of the protocol at the end of Union’s room for maneuver with respect to March after weeks of negotiations, but the Ankara depends on the Greek Cypriot’s signing of the document will still have to readiness to make concessions. For Turkey’s wait until at least July 2005, because it process of accession to the European Union must first be ratified by the Turkish par- it is also a problem that the Cyprus conflict liament. This is by no means certain, and prevents Ankara from adopting particular will take some time. parts of Union’s acquis communautaire. For Although in December Papadopoulos did example full adoption of the existing body not make any additional preconditions for of European law on transport is incompati- opening membership negotiations with ble with the controversial embargo against Turkey, he never tires of reiterating the Greek Cypriot ships and planes mentioned demands he raised in the run-up to the earlier. summit. Above and beyond the signing of Finally, it is not imaginable that Turkey the protocol, his main demands were and could join the European Union as long as are for Turkey to recognize Cyprus under the status quo continues on the island. For international law, for Turkey to open its that reason a solution will have to be found ports and airports to ships and aircraft during the accession process. The Greek operating under the Greek Cypriot flag, Cypriot side will probably use its newly and for Turkey to end the blockade that strengthened position as a member state excludes Cyprus from various trans-Atlantic to enforce an outcome that largely corre- processes and institutions. sponds to its wishes. Turkey’s willingness Immediately after the summit, the Greek to make concessions will depend on how Cypriot president also threatened Turkey long President Papadopoulos waits before with the many veto options available to agreeing to Erdoğan’s calls to resume Nicosia during the course of the negotiat- negotiations. If Papadopoulos waits too ing process, which he could make use of if long, Erdoğan might fall back on a more the situation on the island remains dead- rigid position and then initially be less locked. The first occasion could be the willing to compromise. dispute over full and complete implemen- tation of the protocol, which according to the EU Commission also encompasses the Conclusion aforementioned opening of Turkish ports Talat’s accession to the presidency will and airports. So far Turkey has strictly defuse the political antagonism between rejected this interpretation of the protocol. opponents and supporters of reunification, A veto based on this issue would also find because the president and government will the approval of the Greek Cypriot popula- generally pull in the same direction. Never- tion, where a majority rejects Turkey’s theless, nationalist forces will continue entry to the European Union. Parts of the to struggle against Talat’s reunification population felt that it was a defeat when course, possibly even with Rauf Denktaş as their president returned from Brussels with their figurehead; Denktaş has already nothing but Turkey’s readiness to sign the announced his intention to remain active Protocol on the adaptation of the Associa- in politics. Some parliamentarians will tion Agreement. refuse to back the new president’s course, In view of Papadopoulos’s threats and but Talat’s ability to act in unison with the Turkey’s rigidity on critical issues it can be Turkish government will have a positive expected that Cyprus will delay or even effect on his negotiating position. block the membership negotiations as long However, until Talat approaches the as the conflict on the island remains Greek Cypriots with substantial concessions

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7 they will not be willing to resume negotia- tions. There is nothing impelling Papado- poulos to move quickly toward a solution. Instead, he will delay the process until he finds an appropriate opportunity in the course of Turkey’s membership negotia- tions to force the Turkish Cypriot side to accept a deal that largely conforms to his wishes. The only way to accelerate the process would be to massively increase the inter- national pressure on the Greek Cypriot side. However, the situation would also fun- damentally change if Russia were to

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und abandon its support for Papadopoulos’s Politik, 2005 course. This would mean Moscow giving All rights reserved up its veto against the Security Council

SWP resolution welcoming the “Report of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Secretary-General on his mission of good Politik German Institute for offices in Cyprus” (document S/2004/437). International and Russian support for the resolution would Security Affairs lead to a decisive change in the United Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 Nations’ stance on the Cyprus problem and 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 make it considerably easier to end the Fax +49 30 880 07-100 north’s isolation without this involving www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] crossing the threshold of recognition. In recent months Putin has signalized that the Russian side might reconsider its position, but the Russian president will probably only actually do so if he is strongly urged to by the strongest support- ers of a solution. To date, however, there is no evidence that the United States or Great Britain or the European Union or Germany intend to take a lead on this issue. Unless the circumstances for talks im- prove decisively, the negotiating table will remain empty and even a proponent of reunification as enthusiastic as the new President Talat will be unable to bring about a resolution of the conflict. The impasse continues.

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