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What Is Xkeyscore, and Can It 'Eavesdrop on Everyone, Everywhere'? (+Video) - Csmonitor.Com
8/3/13 What is XKeyscore, and can it 'eavesdrop on everyone, everywhere'? (+video) - CSMonitor.com The Christian Science Monitor CSMonitor.com What is XKeyscore, and can it 'eavesdrop on everyone, everywhere'? (+video) XKeyscore is apparently a tool the NSA uses to sift through massive amounts of data. Critics say it allows the NSA to dip into people's 'most private thoughts' – a claim key lawmakers reject. This photo shows an aerial view of the NSA's Utah Data Center in Bluffdale, Utah. The long, squat buildings span 1.5 million square feet, and are filled with super powered computers designed to store massive amounts of information gathered secretly from phone calls and emails. (Rick Bowmer/AP/File) By Mark Clayton, Staff writer / August 1, 2013 at 9:38 pm EDT Topsecret documents leaked to The Guardian newspaper have set off a new round of debate over National Security Agency surveillance of electronic communications, with some cyber experts saying the trove reveals new and more dangerous means of digital snooping, while some members of Congress suggested that interpretation was incorrect. The NSA's collection of "metadata" – basic call logs of phone numbers, time of the call, and duration of calls – is now wellknown, with the Senate holding a hearing on the subject this week. But the tools discussed in the new Guardian documents apparently go beyond mere collection, allowing the agency to sift through the www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/USA/2013/0801/What-is-XKeyscore-and-can-it-eavesdrop-on-everyone-everywhere-video 1/4 8/3/13 What is XKeyscore, and can it 'eavesdrop on everyone, everywhere'? (+video) - CSMonitor.com haystack of digital global communications to find the needle of terrorist activity. -
Advocating for Basic Constitutional Search Protections to Apply to Cell Phones from Eavesdropping and Tracking by Government and Corporate Entities
University of Central Florida STARS HIM 1990-2015 2013 Brave New World Reloaded: Advocating for Basic Constitutional Search Protections to Apply to Cell Phones from Eavesdropping and Tracking by Government and Corporate Entities Mark Berrios-Ayala University of Central Florida Part of the Legal Studies Commons Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015 University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIM 1990-2015 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Recommended Citation Berrios-Ayala, Mark, "Brave New World Reloaded: Advocating for Basic Constitutional Search Protections to Apply to Cell Phones from Eavesdropping and Tracking by Government and Corporate Entities" (2013). HIM 1990-2015. 1519. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015/1519 BRAVE NEW WORLD RELOADED: ADVOCATING FOR BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH PROTECTIONS TO APPLY TO CELL PHONES FROM EAVESDROPPING AND TRACKING BY THE GOVERNMENT AND CORPORATE ENTITIES by MARK KENNETH BERRIOS-AYALA A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in Legal Studies in the College of Health and Public Affairs and in The Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Fall Term 2013 Thesis Chair: Dr. Abby Milon ABSTRACT Imagine a world where someone’s personal information is constantly compromised, where federal government entities AKA Big Brother always knows what anyone is Googling, who an individual is texting, and their emoticons on Twitter. -
Suspect Until Proven Guilty, a Problematization of State Dossier Systems Via Two Case Studies: the United States and China
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations Fall 2009 Suspect Until Proven Guilty, a Problematization of State Dossier Systems via Two Case Studies: The United States and China Kenneth N. Farrall University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Communication Technology and New Media Commons, International and Intercultural Communication Commons, and the Social Influence and oliticalP Communication Commons Recommended Citation Farrall, Kenneth N., "Suspect Until Proven Guilty, a Problematization of State Dossier Systems via Two Case Studies: The United States and China" (2009). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 51. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/51 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/51 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Suspect Until Proven Guilty, a Problematization of State Dossier Systems via Two Case Studies: The United States and China Abstract This dissertation problematizes the "state dossier system" (SDS): the production and accumulation of personal information on citizen subjects exceeding the reasonable bounds of risk management. SDS - comprising interconnecting subsystems of records and identification - damage individual autonomy and self-determination, impacting not only human rights, but also the viability of the social system. The research, a hybrid of case-study and cross-national comparison, was guided in part by a theoretical model of four primary SDS driving forces: technology, political economy, law and public sentiment. Data sources included government documents, academic texts, investigative journalism, NGO reports and industry white papers. The primary analytical instrument was the juxtaposition of two individual cases: the U.S. -
TAZ, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism.Pdf
T. A. Z. The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism By Hakim Bey Autonomedia Anti-copyright, 1985, 1991. May be freely pirated & quoted-- the author & publisher, however, would like to be informed at: Autonomedia P. O. Box 568 Williamsburgh Station Brooklyn, NY 11211-0568 Book design & typesetting: Dave Mandl HTML version: Mike Morrison Printed in the United States of America Part 1 T. A. Z. The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism By Hakim Bey ACKNOWLEDGMENTS CHAOS: THE BROADSHEETS OF ONTOLOGICAL ANARCHISM was first published in 1985 by Grim Reaper Press of Weehawken, New Jersey; a later re-issue was published in Providence, Rhode Island, and this edition was pirated in Boulder, Colorado. Another edition was released by Verlag Golem of Providence in 1990, and pirated in Santa Cruz, California, by We Press. "The Temporary Autonomous Zone" was performed at the Jack Kerouac School of Disembodied Poetics in Boulder, and on WBAI-FM in New York City, in 1990. Thanx to the following publications, current and defunct, in which some of these pieces appeared (no doubt I've lost or forgotten many--sorry!): KAOS (London); Ganymede (London); Pan (Amsterdam); Popular Reality; Exquisite Corpse (also Stiffest of the Corpse, City Lights); Anarchy (Columbia, MO); Factsheet Five; Dharma Combat; OVO; City Lights Review; Rants and Incendiary Tracts (Amok); Apocalypse Culture (Amok); Mondo 2000; The Sporadical; Black Eye; Moorish Science Monitor; FEH!; Fag Rag; The Storm!; Panic (Chicago); Bolo Log (Zurich); Anathema; Seditious Delicious; Minor Problems (London); AQUA; Prakilpana. Also, thanx to the following individuals: Jim Fleming; James Koehnline; Sue Ann Harkey; Sharon Gannon; Dave Mandl; Bob Black; Robert Anton Wilson; William Burroughs; "P.M."; Joel Birroco; Adam Parfrey; Brett Rutherford; Jake Rabinowitz; Allen Ginsberg; Anne Waldman; Frank Torey; Andr Codrescu; Dave Crowbar; Ivan Stang; Nathaniel Tarn; Chris Funkhauser; Steve Englander; Alex Trotter. -
“Guía Metodológica De Uso Seguro De Internet Para Personas Y Empresas Utilizando La Red Tor”
PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DEL ECUADOR FACULTAD DE INGENIERÍA ESCUELA DE SISTEMAS DISERTACIÓN DE GRADO PREVIA A LA OBTENCIÓN DEL TÍTULO DE INGENIERO EN SISTEMAS Y COMPUTACIÓN “GUÍA METODOLÓGICA DE USO SEGURO DE INTERNET PARA PERSONAS Y EMPRESAS UTILIZANDO LA RED TOR” NOMBRES: Javier Andrés Vicente Alarcón Verónica Cristina Guillén Guillén DIRECTOR: Msc. Luis Alberto Pazmiño Proaño QUITO, 2015 “GUÍA METODOLÓGICA DE USO SEGURO DE INTERNET PARA PERSONAS Y EMPRESAS UTILIZANDO LA RED TOR” TABLA DE CONTENIDO RESUMEN .......................................................................................................................... 3 INTRODUCCIÓN ................................................................................................................ 6 0. ANTECEDENTES ......................................................................................................... 8 0.1. Internet .............................................................................................................. 8 0.1.1. Definición .................................................................................................... 8 0.1.2. Historia........................................................................................................ 9 0.1.3. Evolución .................................................................................................. 12 0.2. Ciberataque ...................................................................................................... 13 0.2.1. Definición ................................................................................................. -
Digital Security for Activists
Training the Motivated: Digital Security for Activists Glencora Borradaile Kelsy Kretschmer Abstract School of Electrical Engineering School of Public Policy The state of global surveillance and the political and Computer Science Sociology Program environment has many activists caring more about their Oregon State University Oregon State University online security culture. We report on the initiation of a Corvallis, OR 97331, USA Corvallis, OR 97331, USA Digital Security for Activists program and a pilot study of an [email protected] [email protected] introductory seminar. Pre- and post-surveys of the seminar will form an initial assessment of what kind of intervention might increase the security practices of activists and to inform the design of program offerings. We report on the pre-surveys from three offerings of the seminar. Introduction In collaboration with the Civil Liberties Defense Center (CLDC), the first author had been offering informal digital security trainings for activists and their lawyers. After the fall elections in the U.S., requests for these trainings increased dramatically and shortly thereafter we launched a Digital Security for Activists (DSA) program. The DSA program’s intent is to align with the CLDC mission (“to defend and uphold civil liberties through education, outreach, litigation, legal support, and assistance”) and enable citizen activists to assert their constitutional rights while organizing online. Copyright is held by the author/owner. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee. Poster In order to provide trainings that are useful and effective, we presented at the 13th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2017). -
Jus Algoritmi: How the NSA Remade Citizenship
Extended Abstract Jus Algoritmi: How the NSA Remade Citizenship John Cheney-Lippold 1 1 University of Michigan / 500 S State St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, United States of America / [email protected] Introduction It was the summer of 2013, and two discrete events were making analogous waves. First, Italy’s Minister for Integration, Cécile Kyenge was pushing for a change in the country’s citizenship laws. After a decades-long influx of immigrants from Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, the country’s demographic identity had become multicultural. In the face of growing neo-nationalist fascist movements in Europe, Kyenge pushed for a redefinition of Italian citizenship. She asked the state to abandon its practice of jus sanguinis, or citizenship rights by blood, and to adopt a practice of jus soli, or citizenship rights by landed birth. Second, Edward Snowden fled the United States and leaked to journalists hundreds of thousands of classified documents from the National Security Agency regarding its global surveillance and data mining programs. These materials unearthed the classified specifics of how billions of people’s data and personal details were being recorded and processed by an intergovernmental surveillant assemblage. These two moments are connected by more than time. They are both making radical moves in debates around citizenship, though one is obvious while the other remains furtive. In Italy, this debate is heavily ethnicized and racialized. According to jus sanguinis, to be a legitimate part of the Italian body politic is to have Italian blood running in your veins. Italian meant white. Italian meant ethnic- Italian. Italian meant Catholic. -
PRISM/US-984XN Overview
TOP SFCRF.T//SI//ORCON//NOFORX a msn Hotmail Go« „ paltalk™n- Youffl facebook Gr-iai! AOL b mail & PRISM/US-984XN Overview OR The SIGAD Used Most in NSA Reporting Overview PRISM Collection Manager, S35333 Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 April 20L-3 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20360901 TOP SECRET//SI// ORCON//NOFORN TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON//NOEÛEK ® msnV Hotmail ^ paltalk.com Youi Google Ccnmj<K8t« Be>cnö Wxd6 facebook / ^ AU • GM i! AOL mail ty GOOglC ( TS//SI//NF) Introduction ILS. as World's Telecommunications Backbone Much of the world's communications flow through the U.S. • A target's phone call, e-mail or chat will take the cheapest path, not the physically most direct path - you can't always predict the path. • Your target's communications could easily be flowing into and through the U.S. International Internet Regional Bandwidth Capacity in 2011 Source: Telegeographv Research TOP SECRET//SI// ORCON//NOFORN TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON//NOEQBN Hotmail msn Google ^iïftvgm paltalk™m YouSM) facebook Gm i ¡1 ^ ^ M V^fc i v w*jr ComnuMcatiw Bemm ^mmtmm fcyGooglc AOL & mail  xr^ (TS//SI//NF) FAA702 Operations U « '«PRISM/ -A Two Types of Collection 7 T vv Upstream •Collection of ;ommujai£ations on fiber You Should Use Both PRISM • Collection directly from the servers of these U.S. Service Providers: Microsoft, Yahoo, Google Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube Apple. TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON//NOFORN TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON//NOEÛEK Hotmail ® MM msn Google paltalk.com YOUE f^AVi r/irmiVAlfCcmmjotal«f Rhnnl'MirBe>coo WxdS6 GM i! facebook • ty Google AOL & mail Jk (TS//SI//NF) FAA702 Operations V Lfte 5o/7?: PRISM vs. -
NSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG), 2003-2006
Description of document: Semi-annual reports for Congress produced by the National Security Agency (NSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG), 2003-2006 Requested date: 14-April-2008 Release date: 09-March-2020 Posted date: 30-March-2020 Source of document: FOIA Request National Security Agency Attn: FOIA/PA Office 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6932 Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6932 Fax: 443-479-3612 Online FOIA Request Form The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is a First Amendment free speech web site, and is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website. ,. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE I~ FORT GEORGE G. -
National Programmes for Mass Surveillance of Personal Data in Eu Member States and Their Compatibility with Eu Law
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS NATIONAL PROGRAMMES FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONAL DATA IN EU MEMBER STATES AND THEIR COMPATIBILITY WITH EU LAW STUDY Abstract In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillance programmes, this study makes an assessment of the large-scale surveillance practices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of surveillance practices at stake, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligence gathering, the study contends that an analysis of European surveillance programmes cannot be reduced to a question of balance between data protection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collective freedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member states selected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scale interception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels and discrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. The study argues that these surveillance programmes do not stand outside the realm of EU intervention but can be engaged from an EU law perspective via (i) an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law framework where fundamental human rights standards and judicial oversight constitute key standards; (ii) the risks presented to the internal security of the Union as a whole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners, and (iii) the potential spillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. -
PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL Claimant
IN THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIBUNAL BETWEEN: PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL Claimant -and- (1) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (2) GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION HEADQUARTERS Defendants AMENDED STATEMENT OF GROUNDS INTRODUCTION 1. Privacy International is a leading UK charity working on the right to privacy at an international level. It focuses, in particular, on challenging unlawful acts of surveillance. 2. The Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is the minister responsible for oversight of the Government Communication Headquarters (“GCHQ”), the UK’s signals intelligence agency. 3. These proceedings concern the infection by GCHQ of individuals’ computers and mobile devices on a widespread scale to gain access either to the functions of those devices – for instance activating a camera or microphone without the user’s consent – or to obtain stored data. Recently-disclosed documents suggest GCHQ has developed technology to infect individual devices, and in conjunction with the United States National Security Agency (“NSA”), has the capability to deploy that technology to potentially millions of computers by using malicious software (“malware”). GCHQ has also developed malware, known as “WARRIOR PRIDE”, specifically for infecting mobile phones. 4. The use of such techniques is potentially far more intrusive than any other current surveillance technique, including the interception of communications. At a basic level, the profile information supplied by a user in registering a device for various purposes may include details of his location, age, gender, marital status, income, 1 ethnicity, sexual orientation, education, and family. More fundamentally, access to stored content (such as documents, photos, videos, web history, or address books), not to mention the logging of keystrokes or the covert and unauthorised photography or recording of the user and those around him, will produce further such information, as will the ability to track the precise location of a user of a mobile device. -
Installare Tor
/ DARK WEB / TECNOLOGIA 11 13 14 12 15 16 INSTALLARE TOR sicurezza riducendo al minimo (specialmente file .doc e .pdf) la navigazione Web è solo uno (client di posta elettronica), la superficie di attacco e quindi mentre si è ancora online. degli strumenti di comunica- ProtonMail (Webmail). Tails, la possibilità che l’indirizzo IP Tor non è una rete ottimizzata zione anonima a sistema operativo reale dell’utente venga smasche- per le prestazioni, quindi l’e- disposizione del Sicurezza: il team open source basato rato, il team di Tor suggerisce sperienza di navigazione può pubblico. Fra i di Tor suggerisce su kernel Linux, è tra l’altro di non usare un client variare anche molto e magari tool progetta- preconfigurato per BitTorrent facendolo passare richiedere la selezione di un ti per sfruttare di non usare un client ridirigere tutto il dalla darknet, non installare o nuovo circuito se un sito (pub- Tor segnalia- BitTorrent facendolo traffico di rete attra- abilitare plug-in esterni sul Tor blico o nascosto che sia) non mo OnionShare passare dalla darknet verso la rete di Tor. Browser, usare sempre la ver- vuole proprio saperne di cari- (condivisione In tutti questi casi sione https di un sito Web lad- carsi. La darknet di Tor suppor- file), Tor Mes- lasciamo all’utente dove disponibile e di non aprire ta tutti i flussi di rete basati su senger, TorChat, Ricochet (mes- il piacere della scoperta e della documenti scaricati tramite Tor protocolli Tcp e socks, quindi saggistica istantanea), Mailpile sperimentazione. PC Professionale / Novembre