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Conscience and Unconscionability in English Equity Richard Hedlund Phd University of York Law February 2016

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Conscience and Unconscionability in English Equity Richard Hedlund Phd University of York Law February 2016 Conscience and Unconscionability in English Equity Richard Hedlund PhD University of York Law February 2016 Abstract This thesis will consider the role and definition of conscience and unconscionability in English equity. Whilst conscience is at the heart of equity, surprisingly little has been written, either academically or juridically, about how equity uses and defines unconscionability. It is this significant gap that the thesis seeks to fill. The thesis will ask and answer three questions. The first is how does equity conceptualise conscience? The thesis will demonstrate that equity adopts an objective conception of conscience, which is a modified version of the scholastic conception of conscience, which was used by the medieval Church. The second question is asking what the role of conscience in equity is. The thesis will demonstrate that the role of conscience is to provide an objective moral baseline by which to judge all parties. Conscience also has an important role to play in expanding, developing and adapting existing equitable principles to new circumstances. The third question is identifying the definition of unconscionability. This is done both by looking at some of the few existing academic writings on conscience as well as case studies on some of the major equitable claims, including breach of fiduciary duties and constructive trusts. The thesis offers a range of unconscionability indicia, which, taken together, outlines the meaning of unconscionability. The aim of the thesis is to provide greater clarity into how equity operates and how it uses its conscience. This will be of use to judges, lawyers, and academics (and indeed law students) and will address the critics of equity who posit that conscience is subjective, vague, and leads to arbitrary and capricious judgments. With this clear definition, it will be demonstrated that equity is not subjective, nor vague, nor arbitrary, but rather provides a clearly identified path to justice. 2 Table of Contents Abstract 2 Table of Contents 3 List of Statutes 9 List of Cases 11 Acknowledgments 24 Declaration 25 Chapter 1: Introduction 26 Part 1: The rationale for the thesis 26 Part 2: The questions being asked and answered 28 What is the nature of equity’s conscience? 28 What is the role of equity’s conscience? 28 What is the definition of unconscionability in equity? 29 Beyond the definition: the proper role of conscience 30 Part 3: The structure of the thesis 31 Chapter 2: Literature Review and Methodology 34 Part 1: Reviewing the literature 34 Conscience 35 Conscience in the law 36 Conscience in theology 38 Conscience in philosophy 38 Conscience in psychology 39 Law and morality 39 Law and psychology 40 The gap 42 Part 2: Methodology 43 Top-down reasoning and unconscionability 43 Bottom-up reasoning and unconscionability 45 Conclusion 45 Part 3: The use of legal history explained 45 Historical methodology 46 Legal History 47 Historical study of unconscionability in equity 49 3 Chapter 3: English Equity and Theories of Conscience 51 Part 1: The scholastic conception of conscience and English 51 equity Placing the scholastic conscience in context: canon law and 51 early English equity Proving the existence of conscience 55 The Universalists 55 The Nominalists 56 Carl Gustav Jung and attempting to solve the problem 57 The scholastic conception of conscience 59 The authority of conscience in scholastic theology 61 The Scholastic Theology in English Equity 62 Part 2: The subjective challenges to the scholastic conscience 63 Subjective conscience in Christian theology 63 Subjective conscience in philosophy 67 Subjective conscience in psychology 68 Summary 70 Part 3: Modern objective conceptions of conscience 70 Immanuel Kant 71 Objective conscience in modern psychology 73 Objective conscience in modern philosophy 77 Objectivity and communal stories 78 Conclusion 79 Chapter 4: The Nature of Equity’s Conscience 81 Part 1: Conscience in medieval equity 81 Part 2: Conscience in reformation equity 84 St German 85 Selden’s complaint 87 Part 3: Conscience in post-Reformation equity 88 The Earl of Oxford’s Case 88 Lord Nottingham and equity’s conscience 90 Equity’s conscience in the 18th century 93 Part 4: Conscience in modern equity 98 Lord Eldon 98 After Lord Eldon 100 Part 5: Conscience in contemporary equity 102 Part 6: Chancery’s objective conscience 108 The important of the question 108 The subjective conscience of the defendant 108 The subjective conscience of the judge 109 Conclusion 110 4 Chapter 5: The Role of Conscience 112 Part 1: Reason, conscience and the reasonable person: the 113 elephant in the courtroom The four laws 113 The law of reason and English law 114 Unconscionable behaviour and the reasonable person 115 Part 2: Differences between the common law and equity 121 Part 3: The role of conscience in equity 124 Conclusion 130 Chapter 6: Defining Unconscionability – The Law of Reason 131 Part 1: The indicia of unconscionability 132 Part 2: Defining unconscionability through the law of reason 133 Part 3: The equitable maxims 138 Introduction 138 Maxims and unconscionability 139 Morality and community 139 Fraud and pragmatism 143 Procedural maxims 144 Conclusion 146 Chapter 7: Defining Unconscionability – Theoretical Approaches 148 Part 1: Knowledge and unconscionability 149 Part 2: Klinck’s five “themes” of unconscionability 152 Mutuality 153 Leverage 155 Confidence 156 Candour 158 Awareness 159 The five themes 159 Part 3: The psychology of unconscionability 160 Psychology and unconscionability in equity 160 Conclusion 163 Chapter 8: Unconscionability in Undue Influence and 165 Unconscionable Bargains Part 1: Undue influence/unconscionable bargains – an overview 165 Undue influence 167 Unconscionable bargains 168 Unconscionability indicia 169 Part 2: Unconscionability and undue influence 170 Norton v Relly (1764) 2 Eden 286; 28 ER 908 170 5 Nottidge v Prince (1860) 2 Giff 246; 66 ER 103 172 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 173 Lloyd’s Bank v Bundy [1975] QB 326 176 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773 177 Summary on undue influence 179 Part 3: Unconscionability and unconscionable bargains 182 Clark v Malpas (1862) 4 De Gex, Fisher & Jones 401; 45 ER 182 1238 Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1872-73) LR 8 Ch App 484 184 G and C Kreglinger v New Patagonia Meat and Cold 187 Storage Co Ltd [1914] AC 25 Alec Lobb Garages Ltd v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd [1983] 189 1 WLR 87; [1985] 1 WLR 173 Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2013] HCA 25 191 Summary on unconscionable bargains 192 Conclusion 193 Chapter 9: Unconscionability and Estoppel 194 Part 1: Estoppel – an overview 194 Unconscionability indicia 195 Part 2: Unconscionability and (proprietary) estoppel by 196 acquiescence The Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 1 Chancery Reports 1; 21 197 ER 485 Ramsden v Dyson (1886) LR 1 HL 129 198 Summary on acquiescence 202 Part 3: Unconscionability and promissory estoppel 203 Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd 204 [1947] KB 130 Kim v Chasewood Park Residents Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 205 239; [2013] HLR 24 Closegate Hotel Development (Durham) Ltd v McLean 208 [2013] EWHC 3237; [2014] Bus LR 405 Summary on promissory estoppel 210 Part 4: Unconscionability and proprietary estoppel 210 Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498 211 Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159; [2003] 1 P & CR 8 213 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55; 215 [2008] 1 WLR 1752 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18; [2009] 1 WLR 776 218 Southwell v Blackburn [2014] EWCA Civ 1347; [2014] HLR 221 47 Summary on proprietary estoppel 222 6 Conclusion 223 Chapter 10: Unconscionability, Fiduciaries and the Express Trust 225 Part 1: Fiduciary duties and unconscionability 225 Defining a fiduciary 225 Unconscionability indicia 227 Part 2: Unconscionability and express trustees 228 Burgess v Wheate (1759) 1 Eden 177; 28 ER 652 229 Re Benjamin [1902] 1 Ch 723 232 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] 233 UKSC 58; [2014] 3 WLR 1367 Summary on breach of trust 235 Part 3: Unconscionability and dishonestly assisting a breach of 236 fiduciary duty Barnes v Addy (1873-1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 237 Barlow Clowes International Ltd (in administration) v 239 Eurotrust International Ltd [2005] UKPC 37, [2006] 1 WLR 1476 Starglade Properties Ltd v Nash [2010] EWCA Civ 1314 240 Summary on dishonest assistance 242 Part 4: Unconscionability and knowing receipt of misapplied 243 property Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] Ch 265; [1991] Ch 547 244 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings [1993] 3 All ER 717; [1994] 246 2 All ER 685 Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] 249 EWHC 10; [2013] Ch 156 Relfo Ltd (in liquidation) v Varsani [2012] EWHC 2168; 250 [2014] EWCA Civ 360 Summary on knowing receipt 254 Conclusion 255 Chapter 11: Unconscionability and Constructive Trusts 256 Part 1: Constructive trusts and unconscionability 256 Reallocating property: institutional and remedial 257 constructive trusts Unconscionability indicia 260 Part 2: Unconscionability and the ‘common intention’ 262 constructive trust Married women, cohabitants and the family home 262 Geary v Rankine [2012] EWCA Civ 555 266 O’Kelly v Davies [2014] EWCA Civ 1606, [2015] 1 WLR 267 2725 7 Summary on common intention constructive trusts 269 Part 3: Unconscionability and the Pallant v Morgan constructive 268 trust Pallant v Morgan [1953] Ch 43 270 Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Developments Ltd [2000] 272 Ch 372 Crossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 273 1619; [2012] 2 All ER 754 Achom v Lalic [2014] EWHC 1888 275
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