FISA Or the Act)

Home , Carter Page

All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise SECRETHNOFORNFOP US. FOREIGH shown. INTELLIGENCECTELLIGERCE UNITED STATES SURVEILLANCE COURT - Classify By: J23J98T32 206 OCT . Reason: (C) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTua uy bl-1 Derived From: FBI NSICG,dated 102016 Declassify O i . LEEA,CLERKi ruaUr edCOURTHA - b3-1 eclassify On: . WASHINGTON,D.C. b7A-1

($) IN RE CARTER W.PAGE,A U.S. Docket Number: | bl-l

, b7A-1

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

(8) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to

conductis as describedherein, pursuant

bl-1. to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended,Title 50, United b3-1 | b7A-1 States Code (U.S.C), Ss (FISA or the Act). b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

| } 1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is

made byME a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)of the Federal

Bureauof Investigation (FBI) whoseofficial duties at FBI Headquarters include 1-1 b3-1

supervision of the FBI's investigation ofthe above-captioned target based upon eT b7C-1 informationofficially furnished oii b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRETH/NOFORN FOP

Classified by: biel Derived from: Pe b3-1 Declassify on: P| | | at

OI Tracking No: 143045

17-cv-597(FBI) - 1 SECRET/NOFORN FOP

2. ) Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W. . b1-1 Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, describedin detail below. The b3-1 b7A-1 | b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 status of the target was determined in or about October 2016 from information provided by the U.S. Departmentof State. PO]

3. §) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts

bl-1 and circumstances in supportof this application. b3-1 b7A-1 a. () Thetargetof this application is an agent of a foreign power. b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

$8) The following describes the foreign powerandsets forth in detail a description of the target andthe target's activities for or on behalf ofthis foreign power.

(U) (6) The Governmentof the Russian Federationis a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).

(U) (%) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally recognized foreign governmentand,as of the executionof this application,is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States DepartmentofState, and in

Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof.

SECRETHNOFORN FOP

-2- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 2

-FOP-SECRET/NOFORN

' ¥S) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation a

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E- 1, 2 |

17-cv-597(FBI) - 3 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 | b7E- 1,2

(U) (8) Carter W, Pagi | . b7A-1 knowingly engage in Bly en6a6 b7E- 1, 2 clandestine intelligence activities (other thanintelligence gathering activities) for

or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to

involvea violation of the criminalstatutes of the United States, or knowingly

conspires with other persons to engage insuch activities and, therefore, is an

agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

(§XMR) This application targets Carter Page. The FBI believes Page has been

the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Governmenti ES b3-1 undermine and influence the outcomeof the 2016 U.S. Presidential election in re

; b7C-2 violation of U.S. criminal law. Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1). Pe

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN

17-cv-597(FBI) - 4 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2

1 () (31/0) RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

organization, the (SMR) During a recentinterview withan identified news

to influenceU.S. Director of NationalIntelligence (DNI) stated, “Russia hastried

in Russia of elections since the 1960s during the Cold War”and “there’s a tradition

that this interfering with elections, their own and others.” The DNI commented

or providing influence included providing money to particular candidates¢

shock to people, wes disinformation. The DNIaddedthat “it shouldn’t comeasa big

tools that they can I thinkit’s more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber bring to bear in the same effort.”iii bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 a

17-cv-597(FBI) - 5 SECREF/NOFORN

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2

(SANK In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee (DNC).1 Se FOP b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 7 There has been speculation in U.S. media that the Russian Government was b7E- 1, 2,3 behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvementin the hack. Russian

_ President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not

responsible for the hack, butsaid that the release of the DNC documents wasa net

- positive: “The importantthing is the content that was given to the public.” Despite Russie’s dena)is _ b3-1 a b7A-1 b7E-1, 2,3

* (GKANEX According to information onits website, WikiLeaksis a multi- national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwiserestricted official materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it says bl-1 e from the accounts of DNCofficials. b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2

SECRETF/NOFORN

17-cv-597(FBI) - 6

FOP FOP

SECRET/NOFORN I28, accorcing to 3 b7A-1 Security and the b7E- 1, 2,3 an October7, 2016 Joint Statementfrom the DepartmentofHomeland

(Election Security Joint Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence on Election Security

directed the recent Statement), the USICis confident that the Russian Government

including from U.S. compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions,

states that therecent political organizations. The Election Security Joint Statement

are consistent with the disclosures of e-mails on; among others,sites like WikiLeaks

to the Election methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According

intended to interfere with Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures are

-— the Russians have the U.S. election process, activity that is not new to Moscow

for example, to used similar tactics and. techniques across Europe and Eurasia,

statesthat, influence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statement

senior-most officials basedonthe scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia’s

could have authorized these activities.

influence (SHXIEK) Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to US. elections, i 27 with Carter Page bl-1 the information discussed herein regarding Russia’s coordination | b3-1 » b7A-1 a b7E-1, 2

17-cv-597(FBI) - 7 SECRET/NOFORN MI ermine anc improperly and illegally ' bl-l b3-1 influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. b7A-1 (U) ON) ee b7E-1, 2

ee b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 ae stated in thelegislative history of FISA: FOP Not only doforeign powers engage in spying in the UnitedStates to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities mayincludepolitical action (recruiting, bribery or influencingof public officials to act in favoror the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleadingarticles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens,

HLR. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

IL. (U)XGY/KIK) The Russian Government's attemptsAttem ts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

XRF) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos? and Carter Page(the | targetof this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part ofhis/her foreign b1-1 policy tam. [aa b3-1 b7A-1 ~ b7D-1 b7E- 1,2

esb1-1 estoinfluencethe2016U.S. b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

17-cv-597(FBI) - 8 TOP

SECRET/NOFORN

efforts are being a the FBI believes that the Russian Government's with Candidate coordinated with Page and perhapsother individuals associated 1's campaignSE

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-17-cv-597(F BI) - 9 SECRET/NOFORN

b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1, 2 FOP Ft As discussed below, Pagehasestablished relationships with Russian

Government officials, including Russian intelligence officers

111.(U)(g) Carter Page.

(U) A. (&) Page’s Connections to Russia and the RIS.

{XANE) Page, a U.S.citizen,is the founder and managing partner of Global

Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment managementand advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets, Fs , pal as 7E-1, 2. a as

-10- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 10 b7AT a b7E-1, 2

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| | b7A-L (vb GEfrom approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia I1this time, Page began business dealings with Gazprom

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“il 17-cv-597(FBI) - 11 FOP-SECRET/NOFORN

(3XNK) According to information provided by Page during 7 a 2 es:age

-12- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 12 TOP

SECRET/NOFORN b6-2 b7A-1 oe . . — -b7C-2 jon12 GHEE) According to information provided by Page during || interview with the FBI,

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2,6

Buryakov (U) XSZAXKKIn or about jaruary 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny

U.S. District Court and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the

§§ 371 and 951 | for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 US.C.

government). (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agentof a foreign TOP as an agent of the According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States

posing as an SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover,

worked with two employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov

on behalf of other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev,to gatherintelligence

SECRET//NOFORN “13- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 13 SECRET/NOFORN |

Russia.* The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy

and Sporyshevinchided, among otherthings, attempting to recruit New York City residentsas intelligence sources for Russia. ‘SYRG

bl-1 FOP b3-1 - --b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(U) * (@NKIEX Buryakov wasarrested in or about January 2015. At the time of Buryakov’s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longerlived in the United States and were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakovpled guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of Russia, without providingprior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov wassentenced to 30 months prison. in

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| U.S.-based lawfirm had hired the identified U.S. person to conductresearch regarding Candidate #1’s ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source#1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified'U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivationbehind the research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person waslikely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign. (U) BSXASBY Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s), described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI. b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

XKSZAXR) Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 Providedreliable informationto the FBI, the FBI bl-1 believes Source #1's teporting herein to be credible. b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1, 2

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“16- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 16

FOP-SECRET/NOFORN

of Rosneft [a Russian energy secret meeting with Igor Sechin, whois the President bl-l President Putin.” Fo company] and close associate to Russian | : 3-1 discussed future bilateral energy b7A-1 reported that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin , b7D-1 2 moveto lift Ukraine-related Western b7E- 1, cooperation and the prospects for an associated sanctions against Rusia, i

-b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1, 2 FOP ofthe Treasury (U) 10 @@KIEX In or about April 2014, the U.S. Department against Russian Government (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts and further identified as the identified as an official of the Russian Government, for Rosneft, a position he President and Chairman of the Management Board stated Sechin was formerly the continues to hold. The USDOT announcementalso from 2008 until 2012, and from Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation of Staff for Russian President Putin. 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief Sechin as someone whohas “shown The USDOTsanctions announcement identified to his current standing.” utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin —a key component

SECRET/NOFORN - 17 -17- 47-cv-597(FBI) FOP-SECREFHNOFORN

XESANE) Fe according to Source 1, _— —— brb1-1 EE Divyekin [whois assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin] b7A-1 b7D-1

es metsecretly with Page

and thattheir agendaforthe meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or

“kompromat”?? that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility ofit being released to Candidate #1’s campaign." es

11 ( bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1,2 (UU) x» (3 ) Kompromatis a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or Political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or

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17-cv-597(FBI) - 18 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 . b7E-1,2

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bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2 47-cv-597(FBI) - 19 b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1,2

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-20- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 20 |

FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN

b7A-1 | Ne b7E-1,2 organization reported that OU July 2016 article in an identified news

to makesurePolitical Party #1’s | Candidate #1’s campaign worked behind the scenes to fight Russian andrebel platform would notcall for giving weapons to Ukraine

Party #1’s foreign policy leaders - forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political

#1’s campaign sought “to make in Washington. Thearticle stated that Candidate

Ukraine the weapons it has sure that[Political Party #1] would not pledgeto give

August 2016 article published beenasking for from the United States.” Further, an #1 as soundinglike a by an identified news organization characterized Candidate

[2015], adopted a “milder” supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in September

August 2016article further -tone regarding Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The

recognize Crimea as Russian reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might

Thearticle opined that territory andlift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia.

not clear, Candidate #1’s more while the reason for Candidate #1’s shift was FOP #1's official platform,follow conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party

sympathetic to Russian Candidate #1’s recent association with several people

Carter Page. to influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor b7A-1 ae }|:

SECRETHNOFORN

-21- : 47-cv-597(FBI) - 21 SECREF/NOFORN bl-1 b3-1 es b7D-1b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 (TSASEY bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1,2

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IV.(U) (GME) Page’sDenial of Cooperation with the Russian Government.

(U) (HNMR) On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization

publishedan article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news organization’s Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence

officials are investigating Page with Tespect to suspected efforts by the Russian

Governmentto influence the U.S. Presidential election. Accordingto the September

23rd News Article, US.officials received intelligence reports that when Page wasin

Moscowin July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencementaddressat the New Economic School, he met with two senior. Russian officials. The September 23rd NewsArticle stated that a “well-placed Westernintelligence source” told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

SECRET/NOFORN

-22- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 22

FOP chairman of Rosneft. At their Russian deputy minister who is now the executive

of sanctions with Page. alleged meeting, Sechin raised theissue ofthelifting

Westernintelligencesource also According to the September 23rd News Article, the

that Page met with another reported thatU.S.intelligence agencies received reports

official who now serves as top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security

officials to have deputy chief for internal policy andis believed by US.

aboutthe U.S.election. responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies

Artide, certain members of (U) (SNE Accordingto the September 23rd News

alleged meetings and Congress were “taken aback” after being briefed on the

Russiansthat could undercut viewed the meetings as a possible back channel tothe

stated that, following the ‘US. foreign policy. The September 3rd NewsArticle-also andciting the reports briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director,

associate to 18 () As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business #1 provided the results conduct research into Candidate#1’s ties to Russia. Source that the business of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that hired the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm provided this — bh in thefirst place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only associate b3-1 FOP the business associate and the FBI. information to b7A-1 b7E- 1,2

The FBI does notbelieve that Source #1 directly providedthis information to the press. .

SECRETHNOFORN

-23- | 17-cv-597(FBI) - 23 SECRET/NOFORN

of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamedin the letter, butthearticle indicated that the advisoris Page] and “high ranking

sanctioned individuals”[in context, likely a reference to Sechin]in Moscow over the _ summeras evidence of “significant and disturbing ties” between Candidate #1’s campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

(U) §SXANB} Based on statementsin the September FOP 23rd News Article, as well as

in other recentarticles published by identified news organizations, Candidate f’s

campaign repeatedly has made public statements in an attemptto create the appearance of distance between Page and Candidate #1’s campaign. For example,

the September 23rd News Article noted that Page’s precise role in Candidate #1’s

campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign called Page an “informal foreign advisor” who“doesnot speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign.” In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate

#1’s campaign said that Page “has no role” and added “[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present.” However,the article stated thatthe campaign

spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously

described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an

. identified news organization published an article that was based primarily on an _ interview with Candidate #1’s current campaign manager(the September 25th News

SECREFYNOFORN

-24- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 24

FOP SECREF/NOFORN FOR

Article). During the interview, the campaign managerstated, “[Page is] not part of the campaign I’m running.” The campaign manager added that Page is not part of |

Candidate #1’s nationalsecurity or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In responseto a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page has been meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign - manager responded,“If [Page is] doing that, he’s certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledgeof the campaign... .” PO b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

| (U) (SKMKKOn or about September 25, 2016, Page senta letter to the FBI Director.

Inthis letter, Page madereferenceto the accusations in the September 23rd News |

Article anddenied them. Pagestated that the source of the accusations is nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meetthis year with

any sanctionedofficial in Russia. Page also stated that he would Be willing to

-25- 17-cv-597(FBI) -25 - SECRETHNOFORN

discuss any “final” questions the FBI mayhave.”

EXANEY Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news

organization published an article that was based onan interview with Page

(September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated

thatall of the accusations are complete “garbage” and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Pagealso stated that he wouldbe taking a leave of absence FOP

from his work with Candidate #1’s campaign because the accusations are a

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VII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (SXASEY As discussed above, the FBIbelieves that Page has beencollaborating

and conspiring“os with. the Russian. Governneni b7A-1 , b7E-1, 2 I 5503 on tne

foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that Page (iis .owingly engage in

clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gatheringactivities) for or

on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other personsto

engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E). CO) Gx, eeb7A-1 ee th. FBI submits that there is probable causeto believe that

such activities involve or are aboutto involve violations of the criminal statutes of

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acquired 4. (§) Proposed Minimization Procedures Asto all information bl-1 through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will follow b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 Ne

-36- —-17-c\-597(FBI)- 36

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bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(3) bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 \ -38- ~ 17-cv-597(FBI) - 38 Throughthe authorities Py 5. (9%) Nature of th Information Sought b7A-1 2, 3,6 foreign intelligence information with b7E-1, requested herein, the United States is seeking

above and detailed further in the respectto the activities of the target described

by the facts set forth herein, the FBIis certification set forth below. Asindicated

relates and is necessary to theability of seeking foreign intelligence information that

intelligence activities by an the United States to protect against clandestine

powerorby agents of this foreign intelligence service or network ofthis foreign

power or foreign territory that power, and information with respect to a foreign

security, and the conduct of the relates and is necessary to the national defense,

authorities may also incidentally foreign affairs of the United States. These same

as defined by the Act. acquire other foreign intelligence information,

(8)

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-39- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 39

b1-1 a b3-1 Slb7A-1

es es| b3-1 : : yar : _b7E- 1, 2,3,6 es

—— EEE es

(4) a bl-1 boatb3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

~40- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 40 FOP-SECREFHNOFORN

6. () Certification Thecertification of the Assistant to the Presidentfor

National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the bl-l b3-1 Presidentas a certifying official in Executive Order Numberfii b7A-1 SI2s 20sec, is set forth below. b7E-1,2, 3,6 —

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2,7

(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested

®& The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the authorities requested in this application may produce information and material which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidenceof a violation of United States law, and this investigation mayresult in an eventual

SECRET/NOFORN FOP -41- - 47-cv-597(FBI) - 41 SECRET/NOFORN | FOP

criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at

least a significant purpose of this request 1__s iii a is to collect foreign intelligence information aspart of the FBI’s investigation

of this target. 2 3-1b1-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-42- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 42

SECRETHNOFORN . FOR

9. %) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See ds)as ' b3-1 The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 intelligence information hasfirst been obtained. Additional information of the same

type will be obtained on a continuousbasis throughoutthe entire period requested.

The activitieswhich the United States must identify and monitor are incremental

and continuous, and communicationsrelating to such activities are often disguised

to appear innocuous. The type offoreign intelligence information being sought and

the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusionthat, at a

given time,all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended.

Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period

of ninety (90) days. SS

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2

-43- : 17-cv-597(FBI) - 43 —

bl-1

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 | b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-2,6 ~44- | 17-cv-597(FBI) - 44 | bl-1 b3-1

b7A-1 |

b7E-2 |

& es... a b3-1 b7A-1 - b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TB bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 I

-45- * . 47-cv-597(FBI) - 45 SECRET//NOFORN FOP ee b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

13. () bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

-46- - 17-cv-597(FBI) - 46

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 |

bl-1. b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 foregoing information, (UYS) Specific Authorities Requested Based uponthe

to conduct the activities the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI

herein. described immediately below for the period requested ©is 5 FOP bl-1b3-1 Pe SO b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6 5 ee ee

SECRET/NOFORN “A7- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 47 _ a bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

es |b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

= ©) es bi-1 b3-1 b6-2 ss b7A-1 | b7E.1,2,3,6b7C-2

17-cv-597(FBI) - 48 bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1. b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-49- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 49 bl-1 esb3-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 REEb7A-1

ees b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 es b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 a . es 1

-50- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 50 SECRETHNOFORNFOP eS b3-1

Se»b7E-1, 2, 3,6

Se Ke

i ne

Gd Pyb3-1 ' b7A-1 2,3.

Oo : bl-1 b3-1RAL b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 _ i ———

FORSECRETHNOFORN

“51 17-cv-597(FBI) - 51 a bi i b3-1 ee b7E-1,2,3,6b7A-1

~---- The remainder of this pageis intentionally left blank. --~-

8 17-cv-597(FBI) - 52 TOP

SECRET/NOFORN

foraccuracy in accordance (U) (8) The FBI has reviewedthisverified application

sending a copy ofthe draft to the with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include was previously provided to appropriatefield office(s). A copy of those procedures the Court.

------The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank.

-53- ~ 47-c¢v-597(FBI) - 53 FOP-SECRETHNOEORN

(U) VERIFICATION

($) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information

regarding Carter W.Pageis true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United bl-1 States Code, § 1746 on /o Sb b3-1 b7A-1

b6-1 b7A-1 Supervisory Special Agent b7C-1 Federal Bureauof Investigation

A» LeeAnn Flynn Hall, CIWahrk, Certify FISC, that this documentis a true and correct copy of the original, SECRET/NOFORN 17-cv-597(FBI) - 54

FOP FOPR-SECRET/NOFORN

(U) CERTIFICATION

as one of the officials ($) I, the undersigned, having been designated

by the Foreign Intelligence authorized to makethe certifications required

certify with regard to the Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby targeting a =equested in this verified application EE b7A-1 | | 6 Russia, a foreign power,as follows: 47p-1, 2, 3, Carter W.Page, an agent of the Government of

requested herein is | (A) (U) The information sought through the authorities

foreign intelligence information.

requested herein is to (B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities

the related criminal obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding

primarypurpose of theauthorities OT mattersdescribedin this application, the

for the prosecution of crimes other requested herein is not to obtain information or related to such foreign than thosereferred to in the Act, 50 USC. § 1801(a)-(e), FOP intelligence crimes.

the authorities bl-1 The foreign intelligence information sought by (C) (U) b3-1 obtained by normal investigative techniques. b7A-1 requested herein cannot be reasonably b7E-1, 2, 3,6

being sought through the (D) (&) The type of foreign intelligence information

in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), i-e., authorities requested herein is that described

SECRETF/HNOFORN

55- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 55 SECRET/NOFORN

information that relates andis necessary to the ability of the UnitedStates to protect

against clandestineintelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this

foreign poweror by agentsof this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B),

ie., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and

is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conductof the foreign affairs

of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign FOP intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). . (E) vn a (&) The basis for mycertification that bl-1 the information soughtis the type b3-1 of foreign . b7A-1 intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 be obtained by normal investigative techniquesis as follows. (ee

b1-1 b3-1 a b7A-1 2es b7E-1, 2 Es S 5 es es

SECRET/NOFORN -56- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 56

FOP |, SSee | e a b7A-1 5es

bl-1

a LOb7A-1 b7E-1, 2 | |

“57- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 57 es es

es a oab1-1 es betas es |

es as a a © ° ies bn b6-2 aSb7A-1 a es es | es

-58- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 58 =

|.) ae b7A-1 ee . | b7C-2 =— b7E-1, 2

;ee = 1. a Res. ) ) b7A-1 eee oS

| , bi-l | 5 63-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

-59- 17-cv-597 (FBI) - 59 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

| b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1,2,3 -

6) b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

_ b7E-1, 2, 3 |

— -60- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 60 bl-1 b3-1 _ b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3 |

bl-1 @G) b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

il bl-1 b3-1 6) ‘b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3 -61- - 47-¢v-597(FBI) | - 61 bl-1 - b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3 (3) il bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2,3

(U) (3) Based uponthe foregoing information, it is the Government’sbelief that

the authorities requested herein targeting Pagearecritical investigative means for obtainingthe foreign intelligenceiriformation identified herein,

----- The remainder of this pageis intentionally left blank, -----

-62- 6 “ 17-cv-597(FBI) - 62 FOP

SECRETHNOFORN

Carter W.Page in & Accordingly, Lexecutethis certification regarding Surveillance Act of accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence

1978, as amended.

John F. Kerry Secretary of State Federal Bureau of Investigation

Blinken Andrew G. McCabe AntonyJ. of State _ Deputy Director Deputy Secretary _ Federal Bureau of Investigation

. John O. Brennan. Ash Carter of Defense Directorof the Central Secretary Intelligence Agency

E. Rice James R. Clapper,Jr. - Susan to the Presidentfor - Director of National Intelligence Assistant National Security Affairs

Stephanie O'Sullivan Principal Deputy Directorof National Intelligence . bl-1 . b3-1 [o tl b7A-1 Dat Shit Jak FISC, Flynn Hall, Clerk, SECRETHNOFORN |, LeeAnn is TOP certifythat this document and correct copy 6. a true 7 . at the original. 17-cv-597(FBI) - 63

SECRETHNOFORN

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (8) I findthatthis application regarding Carter W. Pagesatisfies the criteria and requirements for such applicationsset forth in the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approveits filing with this Court.

6) FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 6

lil

“64 17-cv-597(FBI) - 64 FOP-SEERET/NOFORN

(&) Accordingly, I approvethefiling of this application regarding Carter W. Pagewith the Court, oa b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1

thé

Loretta E. Lynch Attorney General of the United States

Sally Quilliarbyat ~_C) | Deputy Attorney General of United States

Assistant Attorney General for National Security bI- 1 3-1 b7A-1

\, LeeAnn~ehFlynn Hail,alike,Clerk, is certify that this document copy a true and correct FOP-SECRETHNOFORN at the original. -65- --47-cv-597(FBI) - 65

SECREFYNOFORN

(VU) (8) WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application

regarding Carter W.Page satisfies the criteria and requirementsof the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that this Court authorize the activities describedherein, and enter the proposed

orders and warrants which accompanythis application. FOP

Respectfully submitted,

b6-3 b7A-1 b7C-3 U.S. DepartmentofJustice

I, sconesos30 uobr iso, certify that this documentis a true and correct copy of the original. . SECRETHNOFORN

~66- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 66

FOP Filed | United States Foreign All Informationis considered unclassified Court SECREF Intelligence Survelliance except where otherwise shown UNITED STATES oct a 2016 LeeAnn Flynn Hail, Clerk of Court By: J23J98T32_— : Classify SURVEILLANCE COURT bl-1 Reason: (C) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ad Derived From: FBI NSICG,dated 10ff}2016 | D.C. b7A-1 Declassify On: a WASHINGTON, Docket Number: IN RE CARTER W.PAGE,A U.S. bl-1 b3-1 PERSON b7A-1 ;

PRIMARY ORDER ANDWARRANT

States of America 1. An application having been made by the United

Act of 1978, as amended, 50 pursuantto the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Act), for an order and warrant U.S.C. §§ es4 or the (hereinafter “order”) for ae 27£1 set forth therein, the Court finds consideration having been givento the matters bl-1 b3-1 as follows: . b7A-1 . b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 . og officer and approved by the 2. The application has been made by a Federal

Attorney General;

application, thereis 3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified

probable cause to believe that:

SECREF bl-l Derived from: . Application to the USFISC in Docket Numbercaptioned above b3-1 Declassify on: P| b7A-1 17-cv-597(FBI) - 67 SECREF

(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia)is a foreign

powerand Carter W. Pageis an agent of Russia, as defined by b7A-1 ~ -b7E-1,2

i 4. The minimization procedures proposedin the application have been bd ; adopted by the Attorney General and meetthe b3-1 definition of minimization b7A-1 procedures undefis | b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

9. The application containsall statements and certifications required byf

ee: thecertification is notclearly erroneouson the basis ofthe statements mace rere, 3:b1-1 b7A-1 any other information furnished under a b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

WHEREFORE,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,pursuantto the authority

conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the UnitedStatesis

GRANTED,andit is

FURTHER ORDERED,asfollows:

“2- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 68 SECRET

| 1. The United States is authorized to conductf BDthe target as follows; [IS bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 fil

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 vay u 1 Qo 17-cv-597(FBI) - 69

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 ' b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

nly

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 ij

“4 17-cv-597(FBI) - 70 bl-1 b3-1

esb7A-1 b7C-2 Fe b7E-1, 2, 3,6

ee —— ee

7 bl-1 o_o b3-1 b7A-1 a b7E-1, 2, 3,6 a Re ees Ol

bl-1 b3-1 a a -b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

i Se Pe SS

cS | 17-cv-597(FBI) - 71 SECRET A b1-1 b3-1 es b7A-1 es b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 a

es b1-1 es b3-1 b7A-1 es b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 ee es eee es bl-1 es b3-1 b7A-1 es b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 es S| Le | | ,es 0 es

17-cv-597(FBI) - 72 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 © b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

HTILIIIT Mt

bl-1 b3-1 --

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 1

“7- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 73 SECRET Ps |bl1-1 b7A-1

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

as i. ce bi

as b7A-1 b7E-1, 2,3, 6

a as

“8 17-cv-597(FBI).- 74 b1-1 a b3-1 b7A-1 a b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 eS a eS a a

bl-1 P| — rast = b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

a a ee ee bill b3-1 we b7A-1 Re b7E-1, 2; 3, 6 a ee Ge

47-cv-597(FBI) - 75 SECRET _

bl-1 es b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

- 6. The authorities approved arefor the period indicated below unless

otherwise ordered by this Court. b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 Asto all information b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 acquired through the authorities approved herein, the FIshalErase

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-F- b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Hl -10- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 76 bl-1 . b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2,3,6 re es

bl-1 b3-1 Be b7A-1 ee b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 a

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 _ b7E-1,2, 3, 6

a a

-11- - 77— 47-cv-597(FBI) bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 ~ b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-12- Vil 17-cv-597(FBI)- 78

bl-1- b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 " bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2,3, 6

-13- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 79 bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

b1-1 b3-1

iit b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6 TN “14 17-cv-597(FBI)- 80 bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

| |

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

- bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6 il

-15- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 81 SECREF a bla b3-1 - b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-16- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 82 SECREF

This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires at WEEastern Time

on the __ day of January, 2017. | bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

Signed 10-2016 7 Eastern Time Date . Time tay Jl— ROSEMARY M. COLLYER - foe United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

~ {, LeeAnnlalaFlynn Hall, ibe SC, cartify that this documentis a true and correct copy at the original.

-17- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 83 FOP

All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise shown. _ SECRETHNOFORN/FISA Classify By: J23J98T32 Reason: (C) UNITED STATES Derived From: FBI NSICG,dated 01-2017 Declassify On: MD pOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE,— bled Cee Ofak WASHINGTON, D.C. 43.1 Mis - b7A-1

(9) IN RE CARTERW.PAGE, A U.S. Docket Number: / bil PERSON. b3-1 b7A-1

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

(S) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to conduct [iE described herein, pursuant

Act of 1978, as amended,Title 50, United bi-l to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance b3-1 b7A-1 States Code (U.S.C.), §S EEEPISA or the Act). b7E-1, 2,36

|e 1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This applicationis

made by a: Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)of the Federal Bureau bl-1 b3-1 \ , of Investigation (FBI) whoseofficial duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision on '

. sg ; . . b7C-1 of the FBI’s investigation of the above-captionedtarget based upon information b7E-1, 2.3.6 officially furnished to [ED

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP Cwcitedy Derived from: Pe b3-1 Declassify on: [x b7A

OI Tracking No. 144610 17-cv-597(FBI)-84

FOP-SECRETHNGOFORN/FISA

2. ( Identity of the Target Thetarget of this application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agentof a foreign power, describedin detail below. The

status of the target was determinedin or about December 2016 from information

provided by the U.S, DepartmentofState. PO bl1-1 esb3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

3. (%) Statementof Facts The United States relies upon the followingfacts

and circumstances in supportof this application. __ bl-l b3-1 a. (&) The target of this application is an agentof a foreign power. a 136

(&) The following describes the foreign power andsets forth in detail a

description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf ofthis foreign

power.

(U) (&) This verified application reports on developmentsin the FBI's investigation of the above captionedtarget since the mostrecent application described herein. Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous applications has been summarized or removed not because it was factually inaccurate butin order to create a more concise document.

(U) (&) The Governmentof the Russian Federationis a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).

SECRETF/NOFORN/FISA

-2- 17-cv-597(FBI)-85

FOP FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

(Russia) is an internationally (U) (& The Government of the Russian Federation

of this application,is listed recognized foreign government and,as of the execution

Departmentof State, and in in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States

published by the United Nations, and its Permanent Missions to the United Nations,

thereof. establishmentsin the United States are components

Russian Federation (U) (§) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

47-cv-597(FBI)-86 SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

es bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 es b7E-1, 2 es bl-1 es b3-1 b7A-1 es b7E-1, 2 es FOP es es es es a

(O) (X) (Carter W. Pageg peer b3-1 es : kknowinglyly engageinen . 7"b7A-1 clandestineintelligenceactivities (other than intelligence gatheringactivities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involveor are about to involvea violation of the criminalstatutes of the United States, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engagein suchactivities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign poweras defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E). EEE

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

17-cv-597(FBI)-87 FOR

SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

I, (U) Overview.

application seeks renewed authority to conduct (ARR This bl-1 The FBI believes Page has been the on ee~ Carter Page. ; b7A-1 as Governmentia b7C-2 subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian - b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 Page is

for U.S. President (Candidate #1).’ a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate

believes that the Russian Government Asdiscussed in greater detail below,the FBI

the outcomeofthe 2016 U.S. engaged in efforts to undermine andinfluence

election. Presidential bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2

FOP

#1 was. elected President. | _ 1(8) On or about November8, 2016, Candidate in order to maintain the historical ble Although Candidate #1 is now the President-elect, otherwise stated, the original accuracy of the background information, unless b3-1 #1’s campaign team will references to Candidate #1 and membersof Candidate b7A-1 filed in this matter (see docket number remain the sameasin theinitial application

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-5- 47-cv-597(FBI)-88 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA es bl-1

es b7E- 1,2

I. {XANF) The FBI Believes that the Russian Government Engages in Influence Operations Against the United States. (U) A. @HNEX RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

(SANKXDuring an interview with an identified newsorganization, the FOP Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, “Russia has tried to influence U.S. elections since the 1960s during the Cold War” and “there’s a tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others.” The DNI commentedthat this influence included providing moneyto particular candidates or providing disinformation, The DNI added that“it shouldn’t come as a big shockto people,...

I think it’s more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can bring to bea in the same efor PEes —_ 7 b3-1 “b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

17-cv-597(FBl)-89

FOP SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP a bl-1 b7A-1 es brE-1,2

(SNE) In or about July 2016, WikiLeaksreleased a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee (DNC)ns

bl-1 3-1 a There has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government b7A-1 b7E- 1,2,3 was behindthe hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvementin the hack.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was

a not responsible for the hack, butsaid that the release of the DNC documents was

net positive: “The important thing is the content that was givento the public.” Despite Russia's den es b3-1 b7A-1 a b7E-1, 2, 3

2 (BMMEX According to informationonits website, WikiLeaks is a multi- the national media organization and associatedlibrary. WikiLeaks specializes in official analysis and publication oflarge datasets of censored or otherwise restricted bi-1 FOP materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source e-mails it says b3-1 information,in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of b7A-1 are from the accounts of DNC officials. PO b7E-1, 2

SECRET/NOEORN/FISA

17-cv-597(FBI)-90

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA es b3-1bl-1 b7A-1 addition, according to an October7, 2016 Joint Statementfrom the Departmentof b7E-1, 2, 3

Homeland Security and the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence on Election

Security (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian

Governmentdirected the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and

institutions, including from U.S.political organizations. The Election Security Joint

Statementstates that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, amongothers,sites like

WikiLeaksare consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed

efforts. Accordingto the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and

disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity thatis

not new to Moscow- the Russians haveused similar tactics and techniques across

Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election

_ Security Joint Statementstated that, based on the scope andsensitivity of these

efforts, only Russia’s senior-most officials could have authorized these activities.

Morerecently, on December 29, 2016, the White Houseissued a statementthat the

US. President had ordered a numberofactions in responseto the Russian

Government's aggressive harassmentof U.S. officials and:cyber operations aimedat

the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the current U.S.

Presidential Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-8- 17-cv-597(FBI)-91 FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

that these took actions intended to interfere with the U.S.election process and

the Russian activities could only have been directed by the highest levels of

Security Joint Government[in context,thisis likely a reference to the Election

Statement].

influence (SANIRK Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to US. and foreign elections, Russia’s coordination _ bl-1 i: the information discussed herein regarding oo b3-1

eeb7E-1, 2

I «2 2227: to undermine and election. P| improperly andillegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential

(1) FOR

b7A-1 Ss — of FISA: Po Asstated in the legislative history

SECRETYNOFORMN/FISA

-9- 17-cv-597(FBI)-92 FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

Notonly do foreign powers engage in spying in the UnitedStates to obtain information, they also engagein activities which are intended to harm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion,or the activities of individuals. Such activities mayinclude political action (recruiting, bribery orinfluencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the plantingoffalse or misleadingarticles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace andsafety of our citizens. HLR. Rep. No. 95-1283,pt. 1, at 41 (1978). (U) B. (YNEX The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

X3/ANK) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos? andCarter Page (the

target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate#1 as part of his/her

foreign policy tear. ae bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2 FY the FBI believes that the Russian Government'sefforts to influence the

2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with Candidate #1’s campaignisio b1-1 es b3-1 b7A-1 as b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

Ss b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-10- 17-cv-597(FBI)-93 TOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2 _

established relationships with Cuss As discussed below, Pagehas FOR intelligence officers, | Russian Governmentofficials, including Russian bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-11- 47-cv-597(FBI)-94 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1 es b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

(U) Ill. (& Carter Page.

(U)A. (%) Page’s Connections to Russia and the RIS.

RSKASRY Page, a U.S. citizen, FOP is the founder and managing partner of Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment managementand advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging marketsay Lsb7A-1

Pe, bl-1=| es b7A-1 b7E-1,2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

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—FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA bl-1|, es b7A-1

CC) 5

in Russia GEfrom approximately 2004 - 2007, Pagelived b7A-1 During this time, Page began 7E-1, 2

business dealings with Gazprom

bl-1 by Page during i b3-1 XSAN) According to information provided b6-2 Page b7A-1 interview with the FBI b7C-2 FOP b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2

b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA -13- 47-cv-597(FBI)-96

es es es bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 es b7E-1, 2 es | es es es

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

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FOP FOP

—

SECREFHNOFORNIFISA

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 6

I along with Evgeny Buryakov (U) %SYAXF) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy,

sealed complaint in the U.S.District Court and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a 951 for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and for the Southern District of New York agent of a foreign government). (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered of the workedin the United States as an agent According to the complaint, Buryakov

under non-official cover, posing as an SVR. Specifically,Buryakov operated two Russian bank. Buryakov worked with employeein the Manhattan office of a to gather intelligence on behalf of other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, FOR intelligence gatheringefforts of Podobnyy Russia.” The complaintstates that the City things, attemptingto recruit NewYork and Sporyshevincluded, among other

in or about January 2015. At the time of (U) 7 (GAR) Buryakov was arrested no longer lived in the United States and Buryakov’s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act were not arrested. In or about March 2016, without providing prior notice to the in the United States as an agentof Russia Buryakov was sentenced to 30 monthsin Attorney General. In or about May2016, prison.

SECREFHNOFORNFISA -15- 17-cv-597(FBI)-98 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

residentsas intelligence sources for Russia, eee

ees we Ls | as ae Se FOP es pn LS |: Ls mE aes ay es es

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-16- 17-cv-597(FBI)-99

FOP SECRETYNOFORN/FISA FOP (U) B. @YNF) Page’s Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

(SNK) According to open source information,in July 2016, Page traveled to

Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.* In b1-1 b3-1 addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two b7A-1 b7D-1 Russian officials duringthis trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI b7E-1, 2

confidential human source (Source #1),? PF reported that Page had a

b3-1

b7A-1 ) b7E-1, 2,4 a

X@SHNE) Source #1 bl-1 has been an FBI source since b3-1 b7A-1 October 2016, the FBI suspendedits in or about b7E-1, 2,5 of relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1’s unauthorized disclosure with informationto the press. Notwithstanding the suspension of its relationship from Source #1, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting the Source #1 has been corroborated and usedin criminal proceedings. Moreover, with FBInotes that the incidentthat led to the FBI suspendingits relationship herein. Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting thatis described

(U) @f8NK) Source #1, who now ownsa foreign business/financial intelligence a firm, was approachedbyan identified U.S. person, whoindicated to Source #1 that U'S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1’s ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 FOR have a long-standing businessrelationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behindthe research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person waslikely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-17- 17-cv-597(FBI)-100

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

(U) XESYANB) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described herein, Source #1 provided the informationto the identified U.S. person who had FOP hired Source #1 and to the FBI. b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

(RXASE) Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia, based on Source#1's previousreporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 providedreliable information to the FBI, the FBI bl-1 believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible. b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

17-cv-597(FBI)-101

FOP-SECRET/HNOFORN/FISA

_ secret meeting with Igor Sechin, whois the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy bl-1 company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.” ceported a '

that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy eT 5

cooperation and the prospects for an associated movetolift Ukraine-related Western sanctions against Russia.[i a | a bl-1 JOCKSANE) MEE according to Source 1IIS 55) EL asl b7E-1, 2 —bI-I b3-1

. b7D-1 (U) 1 (SMM) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Departmentofthe Treasury b7E-1, 2 (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the ManagementBoardfor Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcementalso stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOTsanctions announcementidentified Sechin as someone whohas “shown utter loyalty to Viadimir Putin - a key componentto his current standing.” : bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

47-cv-597(FBI)-102 FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

RE Divyckin [whois assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin],§j

I bl-1 3230: seccetiy with Page b3-1 b7A-1 and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or b7D-1 b7E-1, 2 “kompromat”® that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it

being released to Candidate #1’s campaign.

(TS) aeses

(U)8 @) Kompromatis a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, whichis typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

17-cv-597(FBI)-103 ==—

FOR-SECRETHNOFORNFISA

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bl1-1 b3-1 ACSHKIEX se b7A-1 Re bE.b7E-1, 2

bl-1 a b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

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esbl1-1 Aesb7A-1 b7E-1, 2 FOP

a. July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that

Candidate #1’s campaign worked behindthe scenes to make sure Political Party #1’s platform would notcall for giving weaponsto Ukraineto fight Russian and rebel

forces, contradicting the view of almostall Political Party #1’s foreign policy leaders in Washington. Thearticle stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought “to make

FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-22- 17-cv-597(FBI)-105 SECRET/NGOFORN/FISA FOP sure that[Political Party #1] would not pledgeto give Ukraine the weaponsit has been asking for from the United States.” Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding

like a supporter of Ukraine’sterritorial integrity in September[2015], noted that

Candidate #1 had recently adopted a “milder” tone regarding Russia’s annexation of

Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate

#1 might recognize Crimeaas Russianterritory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions

against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1’s shift was

not clear, Candidate #1’s more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party

#1's official platform, follow Candidate #1’s recent association with several people

sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, includingforeign policy advisor Carter Page ee b3-1 ee =f b7E-1, 2 | (Roa

bl-1 ae |: b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-23- 17-cv-597(FBl)-106 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2 Iv.) SXANEX Page’s Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Governmentto Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(U) (SXAEX On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization publishedan article (September 23rd NewsArticle), which was written by the news organization’s Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S.intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspectedefforts by the Russian

Governmentto influencethe U.S. Presidential election. According to the September

23rd NewsArticle, U.S.officials received intelligence reports that when Page wasin

Moscowin July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New

Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd

NewsArticle stated that a “well-placed Western intelligence source” told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

Russian deputy minister whois now the executive chairmanof Rosneft. At their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of thelifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd NewsArticle, the Western intelligence source also reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as deputy chief for internalpolicy andis believed by U.S.officials to have

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FOR

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

agencies about the U.S. election.” responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian

News Article, certain members of (U) SXRSEF According to the September 23rd

on the alleged meetings between Congress were “taken aback” after being briefed as a possible back channel to the Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings

policy. The September 23rd NewsArticle Russians that could undercut U.S.foreign

hired bya business associate to 19 (8) As discussed above, Source #1 was Russia. Source #1 provided theresults conduct research into Candidate#1’sties to and the FBI assesses that the business of his research to the business associate, to the law firm thathired the business associate likely provided this information the FBI that he/she only provided this associate in thefirst place. Source #1 told the FBI. information to the business associate and bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

#1 directly The FBI does notbelieve that Source news organization that published the provided this information to the identified September 23rd News Article. FOP 2016, however,after the Director of the (U) (XSKNK) In or aboutlate October stated that the FBI had learned of senta letter to the U.S. Congress, which FBI that the FBI was might be pertinent to an investigation new informationthat with | #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated conducting of Candidate #2, Source | influence the 2016 U.S.Presidential this action and believed it would likely Source #1 independently, and election. In response to Source #1’s concerns, FBI to speak only with the FBI onthis againstthe prior admonishmentfrom the herein to an identified news matter, released the reporting discussed #1’s reporting is Although the FBI continuesto assess Source organization. #1 suspendedits relationship with Source reliable, as noted above, the FBI has because of this disclosure.

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-25- 17-cv-597(FBI)-108

SECREFT/NOFORN/FISA

also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI

Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamedin the letter, but the article indicated that the advisoris Page]

and “high ranking sanctionedindividuals” [in context, likely a referenceto Sechin] in Moscow over the summer as evidenceof “significant and disturbingties”

between Candidate #1’s campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI. FOP

(U) (SMF) Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as in otherarticles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1’s

campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attemptto distance Candidate

#1’s campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that

Page’s precise role in Candidate #1’s campaignis unclear. Accordingto thearticle, a spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign called Page an “informal foreign

advisor” who “does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign.” In addition,

another spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign said that Page “has no role” and

added “[w]e are not awareof any ofhis activities, past or present.” However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why

Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was

FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-26- 17-cv-597(FBI)-109 SECRETYNOFORN/FISA TOP

based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1’s then campaign manager.

During the interview, the campaign managerstated, “[Pageis] not part of the

campaign I’m running.” The campaign manager addedthat Page has not been part

of Candidate #1’s national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became

campaign manager. In responseto a question from the interviewer regarding

reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to

conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign

manager responded,“If [Page is] doing that, he’s certainly not doing it with the

permission or knowledgeof the campaign... .” PO

es) b7E-1, 2

“(U) (SXANF) On or about September25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.

In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News

Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing

more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any

sanctionedofficial in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss

SECRETHNOFORNFISA FOP

-27- : 17-cv-597(FBI)-110 FOPR-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

any “final” questions the FBI may have.”

PSE Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news

organization published anarticle that was based on an interview with Page

(September 26th NewsArticle). In the September 26th NewsArticle, Page stated

- that all of the accusations were complete “garbage” and that he did not meet with

Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his

work with Candidate #1’s campaign because the accusations were a “distraction.”

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b1-1 b3-1 b6-2

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SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-28- 17-cv-597(FBI)-111

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA -29-

a> 17-cv-597(FBI)-112

b7D-1 b7A-1 b3-1 bl-1 b7E-1, b3-1 bl-1 b7E-1, b7D-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, b7A-1 b3-1 b1-1 b7D-1 2, 2, 2 5,6 6 SECRETFHNGEORN/FISA TOP

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SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-30- 17-cv-597(FBl)-113 FOR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

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bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

FOP

SECRETHNOFORNFISA

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bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 FOP b7E- 1, 2, 3,6

7 | SRAes

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

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-32- 17-cv-597(FBI)-115

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SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

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SECRET//NOFORN/FISA FOR

-34- 17-cv-597(FBl)-117 FOP

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TOR

SECRETHNOFORNIFISA

-35- 47-cv-597(FBI)-118 SECRETFY/NOEORN/FISA

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FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-36- 17-cv-597(FBI)-119 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

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SECRET//NOFORN/FISA FOP

-37- 17-cv-597(FBI)-120

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17-cv-597(FBI)-122 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-40- 17-cv-597(FBl)-123 FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 (S b7A-1b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

' (Ff |

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' -41- 17-cv-597(FBI)-124

A SECRETHNOFORN/FISA -42-

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VII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (S{XNR) As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 and conspiring with the Russian Governmentiii

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-43- 17-cv-597(FBI)-126 foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that Page imsb7A-1 EE«.owingly engagein clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engagein suchactivities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign poweras defined by 50 U.S.C.§ 1801(b)(2)(E). CO) (SNK) ee Me | ee}: FBI submits that there is probable causeto believe that b7E-1,2 such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of the United ss

)es Eeb7A-1

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-44- 17-cv-597(FBI)-127 ee

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

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-45- 17-cv-597(FBI)-128 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA } i

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FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

-46- 17-cv-597(FBI)-129 TOP

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-48- 17-cv-597(FBI)-131

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4. (&) Proposed Minimization Procedures Asto all information acquired throughthe authorities requested herein, the FBI will follow P|

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bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 ee | eS |.b3-1 ] ; b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRETH/NOFORNFISA FOR

-50- 17-cv-597(FBI)-133 TOP-SECRETHNOFORNFISA

)

bl-1=}! es b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 (x) a a

| bl-1 | (&) Fe b3-1 bEb7E-1, 2, 3, 6 Be

Sought Through the authorities (U) 5, (@) Natureof the Information bl-1 information with me \ requested herein, the UnitedStatesis seeking foreign intelligence b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 detailed furtherin the respectto the activities of the target described above and

facts set forth herein, the FBI is certification set forth below. As indicated by the FOR is necessary to the ability of seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and

activities by an the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence

agents of this foreign intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by

foreign territory that power,andinformation with respectto a foreign poweror

and the conduct of the relates and is necessaryto the national defense, security,

SECRETHNOFORNFISA

-51- 17-cv-597(FBI)-134 FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

foreign affairs of the United States. These sameauthorities mayalso incidentally acquire otherforeign intelligence information, as defined by the Act. — bl-1 es b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 a b3-1 b7A-1 es b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 a

es bl-1 b3-1 es b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

a a

SECRETHNOEORN/FISA

-52- 17-cv-597(FBI)-135

FOP SECRETH/NOFORN/FISA FOP eee—“(‘;‘sSCtéi b3-1 ne 1.75.1 Sn b7E-1, 2, 3,6

a (8) Certification Thecertification of the Assistant to the President for b1-1 b3-1 National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the > 3.6

President as a certifying official in Executive Order Number

as amended,is set forth below.

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2,7

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-53- 17-cv-597(FBI)-136 SECRETINGEORN/FISA FOP

(U) The Purposeof the Authorities Requested

(3) TheFBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the authorities requested in this application may produce information and material which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a violation of United States law, and this investigation mayresult in an eventual criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussedin thecertification, at least a significant purposeof this request nr__ ii bl-1 ; . .. ; 1: .,. 63-1 a: to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 of this target.

ne §=—°7E-1, 2.3.6

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-54- 17-cv-597(FBI)-137 TOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA — bh a b3-1

PoEb7E-1, 2, 3, 6 Ce

a 5 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

ae of the Authorities Requested (Seealso, 9, (S) Duration bl-1 b3-1 automatically terminate when foreign The authorities requested should not b7A-1 same 675-1, 2, 3,6 obtained. Additional information of the intelligence information has first been requested. basis throughoutthe entire period type will be obtained on a continuous

must identify and monitor are incremental The activities which the United States FOR relating to such activities are often disguised and continuous, and communications and intelligence information being sought to appear innocuous. The type of foreign at a are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, the fact that the activities of this target

obtained andcollection can be ended. giventime,all such information has been

the authorities specified herein for a period Accordingly, the United States requests

of ninety (90) days.

SECREFHNOFORNIFISA -55- 17-cv-597(FBI)-138 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA ies bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

. es bl-1 b3-] FOP es b7A-1 D7E1,2

S bl-1 b7A-1b3-1 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

-56- 17-cv-597(FBI)-139 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 B a

bl1-1

Ss b7A-1|.

b7E-2, 6

2 eS a b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-57- 17-cv-597(FBl)-140 FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1

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aeee ee ee

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRETFYNOFORN/FISA FOR

-58- 17-cv-597(FBI)-141 SECRETYNOFORN/FISA FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 (5)

SS bl-1 eC SSC‘(‘éiéRYSb3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 ee, b3-1 ee b7E-1, 2, 3,6

FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-59- 17-cv-597(FBl)-142 TOP-SECREF/NOFORN/FISA

(U)(&) Specific Authorities Requested Based uponthe foregoing information, the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conducttheactivities described immediately below for the period requested herein. © ; b1-1 See} b7A-1 F . b7E-1, 2, 3,6

(my

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

FOP-SECRETH/NOFORN/FISA

-60- 17-cv-597(FBl)-143 a (3) B g FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA SECRETHNOFORMNMFISA -61- 17-cv-597(FBI)-144 b7C-2 b3-1 bl-1 b7E-1, b7A-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b6-2 b3-1 b1-1 b7E-1, b7C-2 b7E-1, b7C-2 b7A-1 b3-1 bl-1 b6-2 2, 3,6 2, 2, 3,6 3,6 FOP SECREFYNOFORNFISA FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 6 Oo b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-145 SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOR

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

SECREFHYNOFORN/FISA FOP -63- 17-cv-597(FBl)-146 ee ee b7A-1b3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b3-1 b7A-1 es

a bl a b7A-1b3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP

-64- 17-cv-597(FBI)-147 SECRET//NOFORN/FISA TOP | bl-1 b3-1 ns +74.) . b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 ee | | Se Pe ee ee Pe bi-l Ssb3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

Ss | , ! b3-1 as v7 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 Ss

SECRET/HNOFORN/FISA FOP

-65- 17-cv-597(FBI)-148 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP : bi-1 a b7A-1b3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 (U) (& The FBI has reviewedthis verified application for accuracy in accordance

with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copyof thedraft to the

appropriatefield office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to

the Court.

----- The remainderof this page is intentionallyleft blank. -----

SECREF/NOFORN/FISA FOP

-66- 17-cv-597(FBI)-149 —TOP

SECRET/NOFORNIFISA

(U) VERIFICATION information (8)I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing

Executed pursuantto Title 28, United bl-1 regarding Carter W.Pageis true and correct. b3-1 b7A-1 | 2or} . States Code, § 1746 on SJenuonens

b6-1 b7A-1 b7C-1

Supervisory special Agent Federal Bureauof Investigation

17-cv-597(FBI)-150 FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

(U) CERTIFICATION

(8) 1, the undersigned, having been designated as oneof the officials

authorized to makethecertifications required by the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do herebycertifywith regard to the

quested in this verified application targeting

W. Page, an agent of the Governmentof Russia, a foreign power,as follows: Carter bl-1 b3-1 (A) (U) The information sought throughthe authorities requested herein is_ b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 e foreign intelligence information.

(B) (U) Atleast a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to EB obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstandingthe related criminal matters describedin this application, the primary purpose of the authorities

requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other

than thosereferred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign

intelligence crimes.

(C) (U) Theforeign intelligence information sought by the authorities bil b3-1 E herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normalinvestigative techniques. 74-1 requested b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 (U) (D) (S) The typeof foreign intelligence information being sought through the

e requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), ie., authorities

FOP-SECRET/NOFORNIFISA

-68- 17-cv-597(FBI)-151

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

information thatrelates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect

against clandestineintelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this

foreign powerorby agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B),

i.e., information with respect to a foreign poweror foreign territory that relates and

is necessary to the national defense orsecurity, and the conduct of the foreign affairs

of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign

intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).

(E) (&) The basis for mycertification that the information soughtis the type b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot b7E-1, 2, 3,6

be obtained by normal investigative techniquesis as follows. | esb3-1 b7E-1, 2 |

—

FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

-69- 17-cv-597(FBI)-152 SECRETFYNOFORMFISA FOP Ss a ab3-1 b7E-1, 2

5ee |;bl-1 b7A-1 | b7E-1, 2

Ch —“CSCSCSCsSC(‘CSCSCUOS b3-1 ee =} b7E-1, 2, 8

FOPRSECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-70- | 17-cv-597(FBI)-153 SECREFYNOFORN/FISA FOP

b1-1

ee b7A-1boa . a Sy b7E-1, 2, 8

AY ) S) ee |) b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-71- 17-cv-597(FBI)-154 TOR

SECRETHNOFORMFISA

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 () b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

FOP

il bl-1 b3-1 ) b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

SECRETHNOFORNFISA -72- 17-cv-597(FBI)-155 SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

es b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

es es b3-1 Bdb7A-1 FOP

(

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

FOP-SECRETFYNOFORN/FISA

-73- 17-cv-597(FBI)-156 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2,3

bl-1 8 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

ee ||| b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-74- 17-cv-597(FBI)-157 SECRETF/NOFORN/FISA FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

(U) (8) Based uponthe foregoing information,it is the Government's belief that the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

----- The remainderof this page is intentionally left blank. -----

FOP-SECRETF/NOFORN/FISA

-75- 17-cv-597(FBI)-158 " FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

&) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in

accordance with the requirements ofthe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of

1978, as amended.

es B. Comey L John F. Kerry irector Secretary of State Federal Bureauof Investigation

Andrew G. McCabe AntonyJ. Blinken Deputy Director Deputy Secretary of State Federal Bureau ofInvestigation

John O. Brennan Ash Carter Directorof the Central Secretary of Defense Intelligence Agency

JamesR. Clapper,Jr. Susan E. Rice Director of National Intelligence Assistant to the Presidentfor National Security Affairs

Stephanie O'Sullivan Principal Deputy Director of NationalIntelligence . b1-1

b3-1 uf \F b7A-1 Date '

XN I, ; LeeAnn FORNIF |Flynn Hall,aha)Cler , FISC certify that this document is sa a true and correct copy of the original. 76- 17-cv-597(FBI)-159 FOR

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (&) I find thatthis application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements for such applicationsset forth in the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approveits filing with this Court. sf b3-1 —f Ss b7E-1, 2,6

FOP

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-77- 17-cv-597(FBI)-160 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP

@&) Accordingly, I approvethefiling of this application regarding Carter

W.Page with the Court,| | | bil

b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1

Loretta E. Lynch Attorney General of the United States

De OH Me Sally Quilliar’Yates Deputy Attorney General of th ited States

Assistant Attorney General for National Security on

\ "7 b7A-1 Date

TOP ~hy 2 [ale |, LeeAnnFlynn Hall, Cletk, FISC, certify that thisdocumentis | a true and correctCopy SECRET/NOFORNFFISA of the original. -78-

17-cv-597(FBI)-161 FOP

SECRETF/NOFORN/FISA

that this application (U)(%) WHEREFORE,the United States submits and requirements of the Foreign regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and therefore requests that Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and enter the proposed this Court authorize the activities described herein,

orders and warrants which accompanythis application.

Respectfully submitted,

b6-3 b7A-1 b7C-3

Attorney U.S. Departmentof Justice

TOR

2 . xes, 7 ‘ Aa} Flynn Hail, Clerk, FISC, 1, LeeAnn is certify that this document a true and correct COpy SECRET/NOFORN/FISA of the original. -79-

17-cv-597(FBI)-162 Classify By: J23J98T32 Reason: (C) Derived From: FBI NSICG,dated oI2017 Filed Declassify On: United SECRET States Fareign t intelligence Surveillance Cou All information is considered ( unclassified except where UNITED STATES JAN a 20t7 63.1b1-1 otherwise shown. LeeAnn Flynn Hail, Clerk of Court BTA FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

WASHINGTON,D. C.

IN RE CARTERW. PAGE, AUS. Docket Number: fo PERSON bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50 U.S.C. SN or the Act), for an order and warrant (hereinafter “order”) for a«.: consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds as follows: bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the D7E-1, 2,3, 6 Attorney General;

3. Onthe basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, thereis probablecause to believe that:

SECREF Derived from: Application to the USFISC in Docket Number captioned above bi-1 Declassify on: Fe i i 17-cv-597(FBl)-163 SECRET

(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 powerand Carter W. Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by

4, The minimization procedures proposedin the application have been

bl-1 adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization b3-1 procedures undefia b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

5. The application contains all statements and certifications required by

PT the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis 1-1 ofthe statements made indni b7A-1b3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

. WHEREFORE,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,pursuantto the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United Statesis

GRANTED,anditis

FURTHER ORDERED,as follows:

17-cv-597(FBl)-164 SECRET

1. The United States is authorized to conduc

MEINE0 he target a follows; bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 |

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6 it

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

I |

17-cv-597(FBI)-165 bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-166 bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-167 nN4 t 17-cv-597(FBl)-168 b3-1 bl-1 b7E-1, b7A-1 b3-1 bl-1 b7A-1 b6-2 b7E-1, b7C-2 bl-1 b3-1 b7E-1, b7A-1 2, 2, ,3, 2, 3,6 3,6 6 Ne bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 ee i

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBl)-169 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6 ee ee Se bl-1 gs. b3-1 b7A-1 ee b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 Se | ee ns a , ___s

bl-1 a b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

47-cv-597(FBI)-170 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-171 .

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

. -10-

47-cv-597(FBI)-172 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 | b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 ii b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 wT

-11-

17-cv-597(FBI)-173 b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 TT

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

-12- wi

47-cv-597(FBI)-174 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 ee SEER es

ee bl-1 b3-1 ees b7A-1 es b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

es es bl-1 b3-1 es b7A-1 es b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 es es ey

-13- 17-cv-597(FBI)-175 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 -14- "|"

17-cv-597(FBI)-176 b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

Hi b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 | b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

| J -15-

17-cv-597(FBI)-177 :

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

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b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6 7

17-cv-597(FBI)-178 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-17-

17-cv-597(FBI)-179 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

—--- The remainder of this pageis intentionally left blank. --—-

-18-

47-cv-597(FBI)-180

! SECREF

This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expiresEastern Time

on the day of April, 2017. bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

Signed 01-2017a Eastern Time Date Time WUMerSo_ MICHAEL W. M AN Judge, United States oreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

b6-3 b7A-1 b7C-3

-19- 17-cv-597(FBI)-181

All information is considered bl-1 unclassified except where SECRET/NOFORN/FISAFOP b3-1 otherwise shown. b7A-1 Classify By: J23J98T32 UNITED STATES Reason: (C) os wary iceprom: FBINSICG,dated EQREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT |” / fi’ P| Declassify On: | F WASHINGTON,D.C.

6) IN RE CARTERW.PAGE, A U.S. Docket Number:

~ b3-1

b7A-1

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

@) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to oni, 25 described herein, pursuant

to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United oy States Code (US.C.), SQMINIBFISA or the Act). _—-bIE-1,2,3,6 a 1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This applicationis

made b , a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau a

of Investigation (FBI) whoseofficial duties at FB] Headquarters include supervision ey b7C-1 of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

officially furnished tof

FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA Chesed ee Derived from: Po b3-1 Declassify. on: (xy b7A-1

OI Tracking No. 146281 17-cv-597(FBI)-182

FOR-SECRETHNOEORMFISA

2. &) Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agentof a foreign power, described in detail below. The status of the target was determined in or about December 2016 from information provided bythe U.S. Department of State. iS b3-1 ne 37; b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

3. (&) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts and circumstances in support of this application. bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 a. §§) Thetarget of this application is an agentof a foreign power. b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 r

(&) The following describes the foreign powerandsets forth in detail a description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign power.

(U) &) This verified application reports on developmentsin the FBI's investigation of the above captioned target since the most recent application described herein. Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous applications has been summarized or removed not becauseit was factually inaccurate but in order to create a more concise document.

(U) (X The Governmentof the Russian Federation is a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-2- 17-cv-597(FBl)-183

TOP

SECRETHNOFORNIFISA

(Russia)is an internationally (U) (Sy. The Government of the Russian Federation

of this application,is listed recognized foreign government and,as of the execution

Departmentof State, and in in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States

by the United Nations, andits Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published

thereof. establishments in the United States are components

Of The Russian Federation (U) (§) ClandestineIntelligence Activities Sa

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

17-cv-597(FBI)-184 es b3-1bl-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

(0) (©) Carter W, Page neers NN(0i31y engage in 43-1 clandestine b7A-1 intelligenceactivities (other thanintelligence gatheringactivities) for b7E-1,2 or on behalf of such foreign power, whichactivities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly conspires with other personsto engage in suchactivities and, therefore, is an agentof a foreign poweras defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

17-cv-597(FBI)-185

“FOP TOP

SECRET/NOFORN/ISA

1 (U) Overview.

authority to conduc{i (SINK) This application seeks renewed bl1-1 on Page. The FBIbelieves that Page has been ee of Carter b7A-1 b7C-2 by the Russian Government [i the subject of targeted recruitment b7E-1, 2,3,6.

to a Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate Page is a former foreign policy advisor the FBI believes that the Russian #1).! As discussedin greater detail below, of the 2016 undermine and influence the outcome Governmentengaged in efforts to

aan USS. Presidential election, b1-1|, = b7A-1 a WE}?

#1 was elected President. about November 8, 2016, Candidate 1) On or historical bl-1 President, in order to maintain the Although Candidate #1 is now the me‘ ' unless otherwisestated, the original accuracy of the background information, of Candidate #1’s campaign team will references to Candidate #1 and members filed in this matter (see docket numbers remain the same as in = applications

TOP-SECRETHNOFORNIISA

-5- 17-cv-597(FBI)-186 b1-1 es b3-1 beb7A-1

Il, (U)XS7RSR) The FBI Believes that the Russian GovernmentEngagesin Influence Operations Against the United States.

(U) A, XSZAXF) RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential] Elections.

(SNM) During a September2016 interview with an identified news organization, the then Director of NationalIntelligence (DNI) stated, “Russia has tried to influence U.S.electionssince the 1960s during the Cold War” and “there's a tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others.” The then DNI commentedthatthis influence included Providing moneyto particular candidates or providingdisinformation. The then DNI addedthat “it shouldn’t - comeas a big shock to people, ... I thinkit’s more dramatic maybe because they have the cybertools that they can bring to bearin the same effort.” Fs bl-1 es b3-1 ees b7A-1 . b7E-1, 2

17-cv-597(FBI)-187 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

Ss b3-1| , b7A-1 | ee

KXASBY In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee (DNC).

| There has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government b7E-1, 2, 3 f

wasbehind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvementin the hack.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was

’ not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents wasa

net positive: “The importantthing is the content that was givento the public.” Despite Russia's deni! Ss |bl-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2,3

2 (KI) According to information on its website, WikiLeaksis a multi- national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restrictedofficial materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousandsof e-mails it says are from the accounts of DNCofficials. at . b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA -FOP-

17-cv-597(FBI)-188 FOP-SECREF/NOFORN/FISA ee ‘bl-1 b3-1 a b7A-1 b7E-1, 2,3 addition, according to an October 7, 2016 Joint Statementfrom the Department of

Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election

Security (Election Security Joint Statement) the USIC is confident that the Russian

Governmentdirected the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and

institutions, including from U.S.political organizations. The Election Security Joint

Statementstates that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, among others, sites like

WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures wereintended to interfere with the U.S.election process; activity that is

not new to Moscow - the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statementstated that, based on the scope andsensitivity of these

efforts, only Russia’s senior-mostofficials could have authorized these activities.

Morerecently, on December29, 2016, the White House issued a statementthat the

U.S. President had ordered a numberof actions in response to the Russian

Government's aggressive harassmentof U.S.officials and cyber operations aimedat

the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the U.S. Presidential

SECRETHYNOFORN/FISA FOP

17-cv-597(FBl)-189 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

Administration publicized its assessmentin October[2016] that Russia took actions

intendedto interfere with the U.S.election process andthat these activities could

only have beendirected by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context,

this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].

(S{QXR) Based on the Russian Government’s historical efforts to influence US. and foreign elections, {iii bl-1 ma and the information discussed herein regarding Russia’s coordination b3-1 b7A-1 with Carter Page b7E-1, 2

to attempt to undermine and

improperly andillegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. fF

©) A

FOP b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

Po Asstated in thelegislative history of FISA:

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-9- 17-cv-597(FBI)-190 SECRETF/NOFORN/FISA

Notonly do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engagein activities which are intendedto harm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, orthe activities of individuals. Such activities may includepolitical action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda FOP (including the plantingof false or misleadingarticles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who opposethe foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

(U) B. X$NX) The Russian Government’s Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(SXNEX In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos? and Carter Page (the

target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy b1-1 teor. ees b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2 OY the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the

2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with Candidate #1’s campaign. as i bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 | b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-10- 17-cv-597(FBI)-191

“FOP SECREFYNGFORNFISA FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b3-1 b7A-1 Chote As discussed below, Page has established relationships with | b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

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SECRETYNOEORN/FISA FOP

Russian Governmentofficials, including Russian intelligence officers, P| b7A-1 Ssb7D-1 a —“‘t‘SCtSSS ee 7].b3-1 b7E-1, 2,3

III. (U)(S) Carter Page. : (U) A. (8) Page’s Connections to Russia and the RIS. (

(SANK) Page, a U.S.citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global i

Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment managementand advisory firm that

focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets.

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP

-12- 17-cv-597(FBI)-193 FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA 7 b7E-1, 2

es >) sfb3-1 b7E-1, 2

CO) SN)

PRcom approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia PO b7A-1 SEuring this time, Page began 575-1, business dealings with Gazprom

bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-13- 17-cv-597(FBI)-194 SECREFTHNOFORN/FISA FOP

(ARK) According to information provided by Page during Po

interview with the FBI b7A-1 rJ o ga b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 - b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2,3

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-14- 17-cv-597(FBI)-195 FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

b6-2 (XRF) Accordingto information provided by Page during afoterview b7A-1 with Che b7C-2b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2,6

(U) (KR) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy,along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaintin the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New Yorkfor violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951

(conspiringto act, andacting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government).

According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the

SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev,to gatherintelligence on behalf of

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-15- 17-cv-597(FBI)-196 FOP-SECRETYNOFORNFISA

Russia.? The complaintstates that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy and Sporyshev included, amongother things, attempting to-recruit New York City residents as intelligence sources for Russia. |

bl1-1 b3-1 tw o o b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(U) 8 (6XRIE) Buryakov wasarrestedin or about January 2015. At the time of Buryakov’s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev nolongerlived in the United States and were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiringto act in the United States as an agentof Russia without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov wassentenced to 30 monthsin prison. According to information provided by the Federal Bureauof Prisons, Buryakov wasreleased on March 31, 2017.

FOPR-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-16- 17-cv-597(FBl)-197 TOP

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA ee |: b3-1 b6-2 a b7A-1—* b7E-1, 2

(U) Officials on 2016 B. S6XRB{ Page’s Coordination with Russian Government U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities. 2016, Page traveled to KXBNEY According to open source information, in July

New Economic School.? In Russia and delivered the commencementaddressat the

metwith at least two a addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page | b7A-1 information provided by an FBI p7p-1 Russian officials duringthis trip. First, according to b7E-1, 2 reported that Page had a confidential human source (Source #1),

b3-1 b7A-1

O) > 5)ee 71, 2,4

10 (POLAND} Source #1 source since b1-1 had been an FBI ‘by the FBI. As (TS) b3-1 Source #1 has been compensate the FBI suspendedits b7A-1 discussed below in footnote 20, in or about October2016, disclosure of b7E-1, 2,5 relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1’s unauthorized Source #1 as an FBI source. informationto the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed as previous reporting from Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable proceedings. Moreover, the Source #1 has been corroborated and usedin criminal

TOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-17- 17-cv-597(FBl)-198

SECRETHNGFORN/FISA

FBInotes that the incidentthatled the FBI to terminateits relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 providedthe reporting that is described herein.

(U) GESXANEX Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financialintelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, whoindicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm hadhiredthe identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding FOP Candidate #1’s ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behindthe research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. The FBI speculates thatthe identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign. — (U) KDEX/MF) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI. b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

(2SYANH) Notwithstanding Source#1's reason for conducting the research bil into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previousreporting history b3-] with the FBI, whereby Source #1 providedreliable information to the FBI, the FBI b7A-1 believes Source #1's reportin g herein to be credible. b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECRETH/NOFORN/FISA

-18- 17-cv-597(FBI)-199

FOR

| SECREFHNOFORNFISA bl-1 b3-1 [a Russian energy b7A-1 . ; Sechin, whois the President of Rosneft secret meeting with Igor b7D-1 | b7E-1,2. President Putin.” GE-eported company] and a close associate to Russian

b3-1 : ee b7A-1 | b7D-1 | b7E-1, 2.

( bl-1 | b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2 .

b7A-1 b7D-1 i bE 7 bi-1 1 (FONK) b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

the U.S. Departmentof the Treasury (U) 2y¥$¢f50R) In or about April 2014, taken against Russian Government announced sanctions that would be (USDOT) Ukraine. Sechin was as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize officials and entities as the Government, and further identified identified as an official of the Russian _ a position he Management Board for Rosneft, President and Chairman of the also stated Sechin was formerly the continues to hold. The USDOT announcement from 2008 until 2012, and from Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Deputy President Putin. was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian 2004 until 2008, Sechin “shown identified Sechin as someone who has The USDOTsanctions announcement componentto his current standing.” utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin — a key

FOR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-19- 17-cv-597(FBI)-200 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA ! that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy b1-1 b3-1 cooperation and the prospects for an associated move tolift Ukraine-related Western va senctions against Russiaiirra b7E-1, 2

(TSAR) I eccording to Source #1IIISammmmmme es ba ee FOR b7A-1b3-1 RR Divyekin [whois assessed to be Igor b7D-1 Nikolayevich Divyekin], J b7E-1,2

es I met secretly with Page andthattheir agendafor the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or “kompromat”™ that the Kremlin Possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it

13 KSANR) ( b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

(U) # @&) Kompromatis a Russian term for compromising Politician material about a or political figure, whichis typically used to create negative publicity or

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-20- 17-cv-597(FBI)-201

FOP-SECRETHNOFORNIFISA

eign being released to Candidate #1’s mp

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1,2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1,2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1,2

FOP-SECRETHNOFORNIFISA

-21- 17-cv-597(FBI)-202 bi-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

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b6-4 b7A-1 b7C-4 b7E-1, 2 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 -b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

-22- 17-cv-597(FBI)-203 SECRET//NGEORN/FISA

FOP bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 aPsEd

a,il a a. July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that

Candidate #1’s campaign worked behind the scenes to makesure Political Party #1’s platform would notcall for giving weaponsto Ukraineto fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almostall Political Party #1’s foreign policy leaders

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-23- 17-cv-597(FBI)-204

FOP FOR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1’s campaign sought “to make sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weaponsit has been asking for from the United States.” Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporterof Ukraine’sterritorial integrity in September[2015], noted that

Candidate #1 had recently adopted a “milder” tone regarding Russia’s annexation of

| Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate

#1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions

against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1’s shift was

notclear, Candidate #1’s more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party

#1’s official platform, follow Candidate #1’s recent association with several people

sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter

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(8555 Fr

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SECRETHNGFORN/FISA

-24- 17-cv-597(FBI)-205 FOP

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

bab3-1 a b7A-1 b7D-1 a b7E-1, 2

with the Russian Governmentto IV. (U)GYAN Page's Denial of Cooperation Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

2016, an identified news organization (U) SXANEF Onor about September 23,

Article), which waswritten by the news published anarticle (September 23rd News alleging that U.S. intelligence organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent,

to suspectedefforts by the Russian officials are investigating Page with respect

election. According to the September Governmentto influence the U.S. Presidential in intelligence reports that when Page was 23rd NewsArticle, U.S.officials received commencement addressat the New Moscowin July 2016 to deliver the above-noted 23rd senior Russian officials. The September Economic School, he met with two

Western intelligence source” told the news NewsArticle stated that a“well-placed a longtime Putin associate and former organization that Page met with Igor Sechin,

executive chairman of Rosneft. At their Russian deputy minister who is now the

thelifting of sanctions with Page. alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issueof the Westernintelligence source also According to the September 23rd NewsArticle, reports that Page met with another reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received as Russian security official who now serves top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former

FORSECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-25- 17-cv-597(FBI)-206 SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

deputy chief for internal policy andis believed by U.S. officials to have

responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies aboutthe US. election.”° (U) (SKN) Accordingto the September 23rd News Article, certain members of Congress were “taken aback”after being briefed on the alleged meetings between Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd NewsArticle

* (8) As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. Source #1 providedthe results FOP of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm thathired the business associatein thefirst place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only information provided this to the business associate and the FBI.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 The FBI doesnotbelieve that Source #1 directly provided this information to the identified newsorganization that published the September 23rd NewsArticle.

(U) (¥8ANK) In or about late October 2016, however, after the Director of FBIsenta letter to the the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI new information had learned of that might be pertinentto an investigation conducting that the FBI was of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated with this action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to Source #1’s concerns, Source #1 independently, against and the prior admonishment from the FBI to speak only with the FBI on this matter, released the reporting discussed herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continues to assess Source #1’s reliable, reporting is as noted above, the FBI has now closed Source #1 as an active source.

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-26- 17-cv-597(FBI)-207

FOP-SECREF/NOFORN/FISA

also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI

Director, andciting the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the

advisor was unnamedin theletter, but thearticle indicated that the advisoris Page]

and “high ranking sanctioned individuals” [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the summerasevidence of “significant and disturbingties”

between Candidate #1’s campaign and the Kremlin that neededto be investigated

by the FBI.

(U) (S{XMX) Based on statementsin the September 23rd NewsArticle, as well as in otherarticles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1’s

campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate

#1’s campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd NewsArticle noted that

Page’s precise role in Candidate #1’s campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign called Page an “informalforeign

advisor” who “does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign.” In addition,

another spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign said that Page “has no role” and

added “[w]e are not aware of any ofhis activities, past or present.” However, the

article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why

Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about

September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-27- 17-cv-597(FBI)-208 FOP

SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

campaign manager. based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1’s then

is] not part of the Duringthe interview,the campaign managerstated, “[Page

that Page has not been part campaign I’m running.” The campaign manager added

since he/she became of Candidate #1’s national security or foreign policy briefings

the interviewer regarding campaign manager. In response to a question from

to essentially attempt to reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials the campaign conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government,

not doingit with the manager responded,“If [Pageis] doing that, he’s certainly

7 permission or knowledge of the campaign... .’

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

a letter to the FBI Director. (U) (XK) On or about September25, 2016, Page sent

in the September 23rd News In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations

of the accusations was nothing Article and denied them. Page stated that the source

did not meet with any more than completely false media reports and that he

would be willing to discuss sanctionedofficial in Russia. Page also stated that he

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA | -28- 17-cv-597(FBI)-209 FOP-SECRETHNOFORNFISA

have.” any “final” questions the FBI may identified news about September 26, 2016, an (SMXR) Additionally, on or with Page that was based on an interview organization published an article Page stated In the September 26th NewsArticle, (September 26th News Article). did not meet with complete “garbage” and that he that all of the accusations were of absence from his stated that he was taking a leave Sechin or Divyekin. Page also a “distraction.” because the accusations were work with Candidate #1’s campaign

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FOR

bl-1 b3-1

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

SECREFHNOFORNFISA

-29- 17-cv-597(FBI)-210

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 5, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-211 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 es

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

eC“ testi‘ a b7E-1, 2, 3

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP

-31- 17-cv-597(FBI)-212 SECREFYNOFORN/FISA FOP

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SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-32- 47-cv-597(FBI)-213 FOP

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 i 5 > bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1

es |.b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-33- 47-cv-597(FBI)-214 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-34- 17-cv-597(FBI)-215

FOP FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA -35-

P > 17-cv-597(FBI)-216 Hl b7E-1, b7A-1 b3-1 bi-1 b7E-1, b7A-1 b3-1 bl-1 b7E-1, b7A-1 b3-1 bl-1 2, 2,3 2, 3,6 3,6 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA TOP

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FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

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FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-37- 17-cv-597(FBI)-218 FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 (SR b7D-1b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1

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FORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA

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FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-39- 17-cv-597(FBI)-220 FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

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-40- 17-cv-597(FBI)-221 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

Peyh IVEY a bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-41- 17-cv-597(FBI)-222 FOP-SECRET/NOEORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 ESb6-2 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6.

bl1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOP-SECRET/NOFEORN/FISA

-42- 17-cv-597(FBl)-223 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP ns >). —-b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 | b7E-1, 2, 3,6 | 5c rs 2bl-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2

FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

-43- 17-cv-597(FBI)-224 FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

ES °°bl-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2° Tn ee ee a

(U) G. (8//NF) Page’sLetter to the U.S. DepartmentofJustice.

(SANEKIn or around February 2017, Page senta letter to the U.S.

Department of justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, urging the review of what Page claimed was“severe election fraud in the form of disinformation, suppression of dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses led by members of

[Candidate #2’s] campaign andtheir political allies last year.” In his letter, Page claimsthat hehas notdirectly supported a political campaign since September

2016, but continues to be subjected to personal attacks by former members of

Candidate #2’s campaign basedonfictitious information. Page wrote that his academic lecture and related meetings with scholars and business people in

Moscow had no connection to the U.S. election. Page attributes the assertions in the September 23rd NewsArticle that Page met with two senior Russian officials

FOP-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

-44- 17-cv-597(FBI)-225 FOR

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

the (i.e., Sechin and Diveykin) while he was in Moscow in July 2016to give

is “false commencement address at the New Economic School, which Page claims

the information evidence,” to Candidate #2’s campaign. Page further claims that and relied on by Candidate #2’s campaign, certain members of the U.S. Congress,

#2’s paid the mediaare lies that were completely fabricated by Candidate

consultants and private investigators. bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-45- 17-cv-597(FBI)-226 SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 ! b7A-1 | b7C-2 : b7E-1, 2 FOP

(SHINE) bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(SANK) bl1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-46- 17-cv-597(FBI)-227

FOP FOP

SECREFINOFORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2

b7E-1, 2 ii bl1-1 b3-1 (SANE) b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-47- 17-cv-597(FBI)-228 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 FOP b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(SHNK) bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-48- 17-cv-597(FBI)-229

FOP FOR

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 a b6-2 , |b7C-2 pe aia

ANY

bl-1+ ee b6-2 . eeb7C-2

FOR

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-49- 17-cv-597(FBI)-230 S ay | rs b3-1bl-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 4,6

() bl-1 OO esb3-1 es b7A-1 b7C-2aoe a : es es

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2, 4

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-50- 17-cv-597(FBI)-231

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 5 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 bl-1 b6-2 b3-1 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-51- 17-cv-597(FBl)-232 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOR

b1-1

|b6-2 b7A-1 | b7C-2 | b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bi-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6.

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-52- 17-cv-597(FBI)-233 S b1-1 (SANK b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

17-cv-597(FBI)-234 FOR-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-54- 17-cv-597(FBI)-235 b7C- | b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 a (i) EY Ss *b3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

VIII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (SINK) As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating

and conspiring with the Russian Governmentii

b7A-1 EE Base! on the b7E-1, 2 foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that Page [Is NS<1owingly engage in

clandestineintelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-55- 17-cv-597(FBl)-236 FORSECRETFHNOFORN/FISA Ss = nn as ()

Po the FBI submits that there is probable causeto believe that b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of the United Statesiii

0)ee rs

es a | b3-1 Os b6-27; b7C-2 67-1, 2,3,6— ee ee

SECRETF/NOFORN/FISA FOP

-56- 17-cv-597(FBI)-237 b7E-1,2,3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 (8) b7E-1, 2, 3,6 é

a b1-1 b3-1 ss b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 SSSS b7E-1, 2, 3,6 es a

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

re a

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

_ -57- 17-cv-597(FBI)-238

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-58- 17-cv-597(FBI)-239 SECRETY/NOFORN/FISA FOP

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

SS ee | b3-1 b6-2

b7E-1, 2,3,6 |

ee SSS a ee || = b3-1 ee b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-59- 17-cv-597(FBI)-240 SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 B bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 ! b7E-1, 2,3,6 | a

FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

-60- 17-cv-597(FBI)-241

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

= 4. (& Proposed Minimization Procedures Astoall information acquired

through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will follow eC |b3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6, es : es Ce ee Si si‘ i( es FP b1-1 Cs +3.) OO Oeb7A-1

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP

-61- 17-cv-597(FBl)-242 FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 ee re b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 |

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

as| b3-1 |7A. b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA FOR

-62- 17-cv-597(FBI)-243

ee |. ESb3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6 a

a | b3-1 es b7E-1,| 2, 3,6

5. (& Nature of the Information Sought Throughthe authorities bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with }77) > 3 6 respectto the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the certification set forth below. Asindicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestineintelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign poweror by agentsof this foreign power, and information with respect to a foreign powerorforeign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conductof the

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-63- 17-cv-597(FBl)-244 SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities mayalso incidentally acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

bl-1 & b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(8) b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-64- 17-cv-597(FBI)-245 | FOR-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA >| es b3-1

©b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

A a

_b1-1 | The certification of the Assistant to the President for 6. (SX Certification b3-1 | nt 33.6 | Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the National Security “hy Sy > 6

' President as a certifying official in Executive Order Numberfi Es 22ered, is set forth below.

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2,7

FOPRSECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-65- 17-cv-597(FBI)-246 FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

(U) The Purposeof the Authorities Requested

(3) The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in

the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the authorities requested in this application may produceinformation and material which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a violation of United States law, andthis investigation may result in an eventual criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at least a significant purposeofthis bl-1 request (os b3-1 b7A-1 7 is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI’s investigation 7E-1,2,3,6 — of this target. 2 Ns b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Ce ee eS

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-66- 17-cv-597(FBI)-247 FOP-SECREFHYNOFORN/FISA or Rn b3-1 b7A-1b7E-1, 2,3, 6 eee | a. 5 |b3-1 ||b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 _ nes (See 0 b3-1 9. (&) Duration of the Authorities Requested b7A-1 3,6 terminate when foreign b7E-1, 2, The authorities requested should not automatically

Additional information of the same intelligence information hasfirst been obtained. the entire period requested. type will be obtained on a continuousbasis throughout and monitor are incremental The activities which the United States must identify

to such activities are often disguised and continuous, and communicationsrelating information being sought and to appear innocuous. Thetype of foreign intelligence

precludethe conclusionthat, ata the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing

obtained andcollection can be ended. given time, all such information has been specified herein for a period Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities

of ninety (90) days.

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-67- 17-cv-597(FBI)-248

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

Bs b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

FOR

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 yy

FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

-68- 17-cv-597(FBI)-249 + eS b3-1 esb7E-1, 2

5 a . b7A-1 |:b7E-2, 6

bab3-1 a b7A-1 Ss

2 5es b3-1

eSb7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-69- 417-cv-597(FBI)-250 SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 | b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

FOP

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-70- 17-cv-597(FBI)-251 FOR-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA SS esbl-1 b7A-1

CS) ee as 6 CSC“ tesb1-1 b7A-1 ns >?) 2.3.6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 : A | a

FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

-71- 17-cv-597(FBI)-252 FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

(%) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information, the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conducttheactivities described immediately below for the period requested herein.

3 iii bl-1 BB ie +3) . b7A-1 P| b7E-1, 2, 3,6

}) i

bl-1 b3-1

Ssb7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 6S b6.2b3-1 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-72- 17-cv-597(FBI)-253 SECRETHINOFORN/FISA FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1

~ b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

> i

nN | 17-cv-597(FBI)-254 > M

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 a

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 : b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

| ee

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-255 FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

5S blll ee b3-1 b7A-1

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-75- 17-cv-597(FBl)-256 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-76- 17-cv-597(FBI)-257 FOP-SECREFTHNOFORN/FISA

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 es (3.1 b7A-1

eeee—s—SC—CCSCSCSs‘(‘aS Ow nn b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBI)-258 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA bt. FOP a bIA-1b3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 (U) (&) The FBI has reviewedthis verified application for accuracy in accordance with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copyof the draft to the appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures waspreviously provided to the Court.

FOR-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-78- 17-cv-597(FBI)-259 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOR

(U) VERIFICATION

(8) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuantto Title 28, United bl-l

States Code, § 1746 0n_April [M20 bat

b6-1 b7A-1 Supervisory Special Agent b7C-1 . Federal Bureau of Investigation —

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-79..

17-cv-597(FBI)-260 FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

(U) CERTIFICATION

(&) I, the undersigned, having been designated as oneof the officials

authorized to makethecertifications required by the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Actof 1978, as amended, do herebycertify with regard to the b1-1 cecuested in this verified application targeting b3-1 b7A-1 Carter W.Page, an agent of the Governmentof Russia, a foreign power,as follows: 7E-1,2,3,6 |

(A) (U) The information sought throughthe authorities requested herein is

foreign intelligence information.

(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to

obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstandingthe related criminal

matters described in this application, the primary purposeof the authorities

requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other

than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign

intelligence crimes.

(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities bl-1 b3-1 requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques. an 136

(D) (&) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the

_authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), ie.,

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-80- 17-cv-597(FBI)-261 FOR

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA | informationthat relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestineintelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this

| foreign poweror by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B),

| i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and

is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs .

of the United States. These same authorities mayalso incidentally acquire foreign

bled intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). b3-1 the information sought is the type b7A-1 (E) %) Thebasis for my certification that b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 of foreignintelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot

be obtained by normalinvestigative techniquesis as follows. 5) a . bl1-1 |

Psb7A-1 | ee Eb? SS)

FOP Ss)

SECRETFYNOFORN/FISA

-81- 17-cv-597(FBI)-262 FOP-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

SS 5 bi-1 a b7A-1b3-1 5 5 b7E-1, 2

a bl1-1b3-1 ee Eeb7A-1

a b3-1b1-1 sfb7A-1

SECREFHNGEORN/FISA

-82- 17-cv-597(FBI)-263

FOP

a | bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 8 |

(U) (&) b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-83- 17-cv-597(FBl)-264 SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

a b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

-84- 17-cv-597(FBI)-265 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOR

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

bl1-1 b3-1 eeeee—s—CSCCSC‘(‘CNSCSSRRSS b7E-1, 2, 3

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA TOP

-85- 17-cv-597(FBl)-266 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

B bl-1

se b7A-186 b7E-1, 2, 3

Se bI-1 b3-1 ee 7A b7E-1, 2,3 —

es ° b3-1 ee b7E-1, 2,3

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-86- 17-cv-597(FBI)-267 FOP-SECRETHNOFORNFISA

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

(U) (&) Based uponthe foregoing information,it is the Government's belief that the authorities requested herein targeting Pagearecritical investigative means for obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

SEGCRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-87- 17-cv-597(FBI)-268 FOR-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

%&) Accordingly, I executethis certification regarding Carter W. Pagein

accordance with the requirementsof the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Actof

1978, as amended,

{Jaynes B. Comey / Rex Tillerson irector Secretary of State Federal Bureau of Investigation

Andrew G, McCabe Deputy Director Deputy Secretary of State Federal Bureau of Investigation

Michael R. Pompeo _ JamesN. Mattis . Director of the Central Secretary of Defense Intelligence Agency

Daniel R. Coats H.R. McMaster Director of NationalIntelligence Assistant to the Presidentfor National Security Affairs

Principal Deputy Directorof National Intelligence bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

FOP-SECRETHNGFORN/FISA -88- 17-cv-597(FBI)-269

FOR-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (8) I find that this application regarding Carter W.Pagesatisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approveitsfiling with this Court. Se : bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 6

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-89- 17-cv-597(FBI)-270 FOP-SECRETHNOFPORN/FISA

(8) Accordingly, I approvethefiling of this application regarding Carter W. Page with the Cou, bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 - b7E-1 LiceLora DanaJ. Boente?” Acting Attorney Generalof the United States a?

” (U) Pursuantto Executive Order 13787 (March 31, 2017), DanaJ. Boente is serving as the Acting Attorney General with respect to this matter by virtue of the Attorney General’s recusal.

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-90-

17-cv-597(FBI)-271 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOR

(U) (9) WHEREFORE,the United States submits that this application

regarding Carter W. Pagesatisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that

- this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed

orders and warrants which accompanythis application.

Respectfully submitted,

b6-3 b7A-1 b7C-3

U.S. DepartmentofJustice

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP 17-cv-597(FBI)-272 All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise shown. Fitge SECRET intelligencehaa feed Staton Rane: | Classify By: sone Foreign J23J98T32 Urveillance Court | Reason: (C) APR Derived From: FBI NSICG,dated UNITED STATES 2017 of | . ; Leeann Flynn Hail,» cyClerk of Court | Declassify On: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 1-1 b3-1 WASHINGTON,D. C. b7A-1

IN RE CARTER W.PAGE, A U.S. Docket Number: PERSON bl1-1 a | b3-1 b7A-1

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

I, An application having been made by the United States of America

pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50

U.S.C. SSSA or the Act), for an order and warrant (hereinafter “order’) for [i ond full

consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds

as follows: : bl-1 7 b3-1 b7A-1 2. The application has been madebya Federalofficer and approved by the b7E-1, 2, 3,6

Attorney General;

3. Onthebasis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is

probable causeto believe that:

SECRET

Derived from: Application to the USFISC bl-1b3-1 in Docket Number captioned above 7 Declassify on: Pe Pact

17-cv-597(FBI)-273 SECREF

(A) The Governmentof the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign

powerand Carter W.Pageis an agent of Russia, as defined by ea ,

| _ 4, The minimization procedures proposedin the applicationhave been ~~ _—_iOb*I-1 . b3-1 adopted by the Attorney General and meetthe definition of minimization er 336) procedures ndic i 5. The application contains all statements andcertifications required oy

De the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis 1-1 ~ b3-1 ofthe statements made in: 874b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 any other information furished nc

WHEREFORE,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,pursuantto the authority

conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United Statesis

GRANTED,andit is

FURTHER ORDERED,as follows:

17-cv-597(FBl)-274 SECRET

Zi 1. The United States is authorized to conducfii Ee target as follows; res

bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 | b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 1 b3-1 b7A-1

| b7E-1,2,3,6 |

bl-1 | b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBI)-275

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2

| b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

: ‘ ‘ _ 17-cv-597(FBl)-276 bl1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 -b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-277 nNt T 17-cv-597(FBI)-278 b3-1 b7E-1, b7A-1 bl-1 b7E-1, b7C-2 b7A-1 b6-2 b3-1 bl-1 b7E-1, b7C-2 b7A-1 b6-2 b3-1 bl-1 2, 2, 2, 3,6 3,6 3,6 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-279 SECREF | eS b3-1 esb7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl1-l b3-1 b7A-1 : b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

bi-l i b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-280 bl-1 b3-1 a b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-281 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

art -10- 17-cv-597(FBI)-282 SECRET EE OE bit as b7A-1b3-1 b7E-1,2,3,6 |

es bI-l | | b3-1 : b7A-1 i ns

6. The authorities e approved are for the period indicated below unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

= Asto all information acquired throughthe authorities approvedherein, .as -1 the FBI shall follow b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-11- 17-cv-597(FBI)-283 bl-1 | b3-1 ! b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-12- 17-cv-597(FBI)-284 ; bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

Jf. |

-13- 17-cv-597(FBI)-285

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 | b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1,2, 3,6

| -14- 17-cv-597(FBI)-286 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

eS: eS. °b3-1| | : b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

: -15- 17-cv-597(FBl)-287 SECREF

bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 |

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 es +71,2,3,6

bl-1 | b3-1 | b7A-1 | es b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 .

OO| :

| -16- 17-cv-597(FBI)-288 b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 Ml b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-17- 17-cv-597(FBI)-289 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

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-18- 17-cv-597(FBl)-290 SECREF

This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires at I Eastern Time on the day of June, 2017. bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 ied stned pa Eastern Time

Date ime

Bnew! (ghee ANNE C. CONWAY Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

b6-3 b7A-1 b7C-3

-19- 17-cv-597(FBI)-291

FOP-SECRETHNOFORNIFISA oe

UNITED STATES All information is considered unclassified shown. except where otherwise COURT :=~. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE bl-1 Classify By: J23J98T32 Reason: (C) WASHINGTON,D.C. b3-1 Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated | b7A-1 06.2017 Dectassify On: Docket Number: (&) IN RE CARTERW. PAGE, A USS. bl-1 7 b3-1 PERSON. b7A-1

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

to this Court for authority to (8) The United States of America herebyapplies 2s lescribed herein, pursuant i-1

This application is pL 1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application - , 3-1 Agent (SSA)of the Federal Bureau 6-1 made by PF a Supervisory Special b7A-1 include supervision )7C-1 (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters of Investigation b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 target based upon information of the FBI’s investigation of the above-captioned

officially furnished to

TOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA ee ee 1 Derived from: FP Declassify on:. f

OI Tracking No. 147743 47-cv-597(FBI)-292 SECREF/NOFORN/FISA

2. (8) Identity of the Target Thetarget ofthis application is Carter W. Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, described in detail below. The bi1-1 status b3-1 of the target was determinedin or about June 2017 from information provided 67A-1 by the US, Department of Sia, III b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOP 3. (8) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts j-} b3-] and circumstancesin support of this application. b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6 a. (&%) Thetarget of this applicationis an agentof a foreign power. (3) The following describes the foreign powerandsets forth in detail a description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign power.

(U) (% This verified application reports on developments in the FBI's

investigation of the above captioned target since the mostrecent application

described herein. Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous applications has been summarized or removed not becauseit was factually inaccurate butin orderto create a more concise document.

(U) &) The Governmentof the Russian Federationis a foreign poweras defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).

SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

-2- 17-cv-597(FBI)-293

FOP FOP-SECRET/INGFORN/FISA

(U) (&% The Governmentof the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally recognized foreign governmentand,as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Departmentof State, and in

Permanent Missionsto the United Nations published by the United Nations, andits establishments in the United States are componentsthereof.

&) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation Se es }3-bl-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

17-cv-597(FBI)-294

SECREFHYNOFORN/FISA FOP bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 %

bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

(U)Cc B) Carter W, Pac [I owingly engagein 53-1 — b7A-1 clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for b7E-1, 2

or on behalf of such foreign power, whichactivities involve or are aboutto

involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly

conspires with other persons to engage in suchactivities and, therefore, is an

agent of a foreign poweras defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

FOP-SECRETFYNOFORN/FISA

17-cv-597(FBI)-295 TFOPR-SECRETINOFORN/FISA

I. (U) Overview.

This application seeks renewed authority to conductig (S//KIE) bl-1 Carter Page. The FBIbelieves that Page has been b3-1 ee . b6-2 eines the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government

for U.S. (G//INK) Pageis a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate

detail below, the FBI believes that President (Candidate #1).’ As discussed in greater

and influence the outcome the Russian Government engaged in efforts to undermine bi1-1 b3-1 ee of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. b7A-1 Oe W7E-L2

FOP

#1 was elected President. biel 1 (8) On or about November8, 2016, Candidate to maintain the historical b3-1 Although Candidate #1 is now the President, in order stated, the original b7A-1 accuracy of the background information, unless otherwise # 1’s campaign team will references to Candidate #1 and membersof Candidate this matter (see docket numbers remain the same asin previous applications filed in

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

47-cv-597(FBI)-296 FOP-SECREFH/NOFORN/FISA

es bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

II. (U) (3//IXR) The FBI Believes that the Russian Government Engages in Influence Operations Against the United States. (U) A. @//MR) RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

(3//NE) During a September 2016 interview with an identified news

organization, the then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, “Russia has

tried to influence U.S.electionssince the 1960s during the Cold War”and “there’s a tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others.” The then DNI commentedthat this influence included providing moneyto particular

candidatesor providing disinformation. The then DNI addedthat“it shouldn’t

comeas a big shock to people, ... I think it’s more dramatic maybe because they have the cybertools that they can bringto bear in the sameeffort.” PF Pe,bl-1 STesb7A-1

17-cv-597(FBI)-297 SECRETANGFORN/FISA FOR

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

(S7/INK) In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee (ONC)? aaa b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3 GEThere has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government

was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvementin the hack.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was

not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a

net positive: “The important thing is the content that was given to the public.”

bl-1 Despite Russia's dena! b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

2 @//MK) According to information on its website, WikiLeaksis a multi- national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwiserestricted official materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousandsof e-mails it says are from the accounts of DNC officials. bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA TOP

-7- 17-cv-597(FBI)-298 FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA Ss — : b3-1 es 1 b7E-1,bE 2,3 addition, according to an October 7, 2016 Joint Statementfrom the Departmentof

Homeland Security and the Office of the Director ofNationalIntelligence on Election

Security (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian

Governmentdirected the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. The Election Security Joint

Statementstates that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, amongothers,sites like

WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity thatis not new to Moscow - the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across

Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election

Security Joint Statement stated that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia’s senior-most officials could have authorized theseactivities.

Morerecently, on December29, 2016, the White Houseissued a statementthat the

U.S.President had ordered a numberofactionsin response to the Russian

Government's aggressive harassmentof U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the U.S. Presidential

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

17-cv-597(FBI)-299 FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia took actions intended to interfere with the U.S. election process and that these activities could only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context, this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].

(%/KE) Based on the Russian Government’s historical efforts to influence US. and foreign elections,

PB and the information discussed herein regarding Russia’s coordination bi-l b3-1 with. Carter Pa[Iams 1b7A-1

I «3 28:20t0 undermine and improperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. po

CO) S/XK) ee ee b7E-1,bE 2

PO Asstated in thelegislative history of FISA:

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-9- 17-cv-597(FBI)-300 FOP-SECRETHYNOFORN/FISA

Notonly do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engagein activities which are intended to harm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion,or the activities of individuals. Such activities may includepolitical action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Suchactivity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace andsafety of our citizens. ELR. Rep. No. 95-1283,pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

(U) B. (3//KE) The Russian Government’s Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(8//NB) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos? andCarter Page (the

target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy te. rr br. b3-1 a byD.1b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 PF the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the

2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhapsother

individuals associated with Candidate #1’s campaign ii bl-1 b3-1 a b7D-1b7A-1 eee b7E-1, 2

; bl-1 - b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-10- 17-cv-597(FBl)-301 SECREFYNGEORN/FISA FOR

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

sori As discussed below, Page hasestablished relationships with b3-1 . b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

FOPR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-11- 17-cv-597(FBI)-302

' SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP

Russian Governmentofficials, including Russianintelligence officersi b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2,3

Ii. (U)&) Carter Page.

(U) A, (@) Page’s Connections to Russia and the RIS.

(H/INR) Page, a USS. citizen, is the founder and managingpartner of Global

Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets. Po b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-12- 17-cv-597(FBI)-303 U) (3XC) re

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 com approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia Po EE(uring this time, Page began business dealings with Gazpromi

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-13- 17-cv-597(FBl)-304 SECREFYNOFORN/FISA FOP

(S{/MIR) According to information provided by Page during Qi b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 interview with the FEiiiiiiiinneD2c i eee—“(C;isSCSCSCSCsiésC®S,bl-1 i b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

b1-1

b3-1 6 (&//KIE) b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 | b7E-1,2,3

SECREFI/NOFORN/FISA FOP

-14- 17-cv-597(FBI)-305

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA b6-2 b7A-1

(//KIK) According to information provided by Page during AZ interview ae 5

z. > ct @ ee

ow v

FOP b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 6 |

(U) (8//IMR) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951

(conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agentof a foreign government).

Accordingto the complaint, Buryakov workedin the United States as an agentof the

SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakovworked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev,to gatherintelligence on behalf of

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOR

-15- 17-cv-597(FBl)-306 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP

Russia.’ The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy

and Sporyshev included, amongotherthings, attempting to recruit New York City

residents as intelligence sources for Russia.

bl-1 : b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(U) * (8//MK) Buryakov wasarrested in or about January 2015. Atthe time of Buryakov’s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshevnolongerlived in the United States and . were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of Russia without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 monthsin prison. According to information provided by the Federal Bureauof Prisons, Buryakov wasreleased on March 31, 2017.

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOR

-16- 17-cv-597(FBI)-307 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

bl1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(U) B. (&//IIK) Page’s Coordination with Russian GovernmentOfficials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

(8//XIK) According to open source information,in July 2016, Page traveled to

Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.’ In addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page metwith at least two

Russian officials duringthis trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI at

b7A-1 confidential human source (Source #1),

(U)> (S//

Source #1 has been compensated . bl-1 discussed below in footnote 22, in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its —_b3-1 relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1’s unauthorized disclosure of - b7A-1 information to the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source. b7E-1, 2,5 Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-17- 17-cv-597(FBl)-308 SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

FBI notes that the incident that led the FBI to terminateits relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.

(U) (KS¥/MK) Source #1, who now ownsa foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approachedbyan identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1’s ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing businessrelationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person waslikely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(U) (X3//INR) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described herein, Source #1 provided the informationto the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 andto the FBI. b3-1 | b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

@£8//NK) Notwithstanding Source #1’s reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia, based on Source #1’s previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI bl-1 believes Source #1’s reporting herein to be credible. b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-l b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

FOPR-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

-18- 17-cv-597(FBI)-309 FOP-SECREFINOFORN/FISA

bl-1 secret meeting with Igor Sechin, whois the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy b3-1 | . b7A-1 company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.” EDreported b7D-1 = b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b7A-1 Sle(U)ES//DER)U ae b7E-1, 2

1 (S/R) bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

12 (//ME) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Departmentof the Treasury (USDOT)announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the ManagementBoard for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcementalso stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOTsanctions announcementidentified Sechin as someone who has “shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin —- a key componentto his current standing.”

FOPR-SECREFHNOFORNFISA 17-cv-597(FBI)-310 : FOP-SECRETINGFORN/FISA that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy bi-1 cooperation and the prospects for an associated movetolift Ukraine-related Western b3-1 b7A-1 sanctions against Russia, Ias b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-20- 17-cv-597(FBI)-311 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA TOP

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(O/(80) occordingcording to Source #1aa 7 I b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

Divyekin [whois assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin],§j

(S/H) | bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA TOP

-21- 17-cv-597(FBI)-312 SECRETFYNOFORN/FISA FOP

Ict secretly with Page bl-1 b3-1 and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekinraising a dossier or b7A-1 b7D-1 “kompromat”’ that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility ofit b7E-1, 2 being released to Candidate #1’s campaign.'* i

(U) * (&) Kompromatis a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, whichis typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.

bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

7 (XS//MR) bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

18 (KX/NIE) bl-1 : b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

FOPR-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

-22- 17-cv-597(FBI)-313

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-4 b7A-1 b7C-4 b7E-1, 2

b6-4 b7A-1 b7C-4 b7E-1, 2

FOR-SECRETANOFORNFISA

-23- 17-cv-597(FBI)-314 SECRETINOFORN/FISA FOP es 8 b3-1 7A : b7D-1 E12 Re S/R) a a rs (| b3-1 = =—( 8 b7D-1 es hl a es a DO SS a

bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFINOFORN/FISA

-24- 17-cv-597(FBl)-315 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP b1-1

Ssb7A-1 b7D-1 0 2b7A-1

| a July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that F

Candidate #1’s campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1’s platform would notcall for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel

forces, contradicting the view of almostall Political Party #1’s foreign policy leaders

in Washington. Thearticle stated that Candidate #1’s campaign sought “to make

sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weaponsit has

been asking for from the United States.” Further, an August 2016article published

by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding

like a supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that

Candidate #1 had recently adopted a “milder” tone regarding Russia’s annexation of

Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate

#1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions

against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1’s shift was

not clear, Candidate #1’s moreconciliatory words, which contradict Political Party

#1’s official platform, follow Candidate #1’s recent association with several people

FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

-25- 17-cv-597(FBI)-316 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOR sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter bl-1 b3-1 Page.age b7A-1 7B12 es eSb3-1 rsb7D-1

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 ae b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2,5

SECREFANOFORN/FISA FOP

-26- 17-cv-597(FBI)-317 SECRETYNOFORN/FISA FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-27- 17-cv-597(FBI)-318 FOP-SECREFT/NGOFEORN/FISA a S|bl-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Iv. (U) g/m) Page’s Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Governmentto Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(U) (S/R) On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization published an article (September 23rd NewsArticle), which was written by the news _ organization’s Chief Investigative Correspondent,alleging that U.S. intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian

Governmentto influence the U.S.Presidential election. According to the September

23rd NewsArticle, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in

Moscowin July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencementaddressat the New

Economic School, he met with two senior Russianofficials. The September 23rd

NewsArticle stated that a “well-placed Western intelligence source” told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-28- 17-cv-597(FBI)-319 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their

alleged meeting, Sechin raisedtheissueof thelifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd NewsArticle, the Western intelligence source also

reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another

top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now servesas

deputy chief for internal policy andis believed by U.S. officials to have

responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies aboutthe U.S.election.

* (S) As discussed above, Source #1 washired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only providedthis information to the business associate and the FBI.

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 The FBI does notbelieve that Source #1 directly providedthis information to the identified news organization that published the September 23rd NewsArticle.

(U) (X8//NK) In or about late October 2016, however, after the FBI Director sent a letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of new information that might be pertinentto an investigation that the FBI was conducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she wasfrustrated with this action and believedit would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to Source #1’s concerns, Source #1 independently, and against the prior admonishmentfrom the FBI to speak only with the FBI onthis matter, released the reporting discussed

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-29- 17-cv-597(FBI)-320 FOP-SECREFTINOFORN/FISA

(U) (&//IX® According to the September 23rd NewsArticle, certain members of

Congress were “taken aback”after being briefed on the alleged meetings between

Page and Russianofficials and viewedthe meetings as a possible back channelto the

Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd NewsArticle also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI

Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamedin theletter, butthe article indicated that the advisoris Page] and “high ranking sanctioned individuals”[in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow overthe summeras evidenceof “significant and disturbing ties” between Candidate #1’s campaign and the Kremlin that neededto be investigated by the FBI.

(U) (8//INK) Based on statements in the September 23rd NewsArticle, as well as in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1’s campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attemptto distance Candidate

#1’s campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd NewsArticle noted that

Page’s precise role in Candidate #1’s campaign is unclear. Accordingto thearticle, a

spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign called Page an “informal foreign

herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continuesto assess Source #1’s reporting is reliable, as noted above, the FBI closed Source #1 as an active source.

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-30- 17-cv-597(FBI)-321 FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA advisor” who “does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign.” In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign said that Page “has no role” and added “[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present.” However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond whenasked why

Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about

September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was

based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1’s then campaign manager.

Duringthe interview, the campaign managerstated, “[Pageis] not part of the

campaign I’m running.” The campaign manager added that Page has not been part

of Candidate #1’s national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became

campaign manager. In responseto a question from theinterviewer regarding |

reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to

conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign

manager responded,“If [Page is] doing that, he’s certainly not doing it with the

permission or knowledge of the campaign... .” Po

(U) (&//RE) On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-3]- 17-cv-597(FBI)-322 SECRETF/NGFORN/FISA FOP

In this letter, Page madereference to the accusations in the September 23rd News

Article and denied them. Pagestated that the source of the accusations was nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any sanctionedofficial in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss any “final” questions the FBI may have.

(U)(S7/KK) Additionally, on or about September26, 2016, an identified news organization published anarticle that was based on an interview with Page

(September 26th NewsArticle). In the September 26th NewsArticle, Page stated that all of the accusations were complete “garbage” and that he did not meet with

Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he wastaking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #1’s campaign because the accusations were a “distraction.”

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2, 2 6

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(S/N)

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SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-35- 17-cv-597(FBI)-326 FOP-SECREFYNOFEORN/FISA

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SECREFYNOFORN/FISA FOP

-38- 17-cv-597(FBI)-329 SECRETYNGFORN/FISA FOP 5rs

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-40- 17-cv-597(FBI)-331 FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

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-41- _17-cv-597(FBI)-332 FOPRSECRETINOFORN/FISA (S/O) re

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-43- 17-cv-597(FBI)-334 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

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-44- 17-cv-597(FBI)-335 (5/5b3-1

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-45- 17-cv-597(FBI)-336 SECRETHNGOFEORN/FISA FOP

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FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-46- 17-cv-597(FBI)-337 FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA bl-1

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-48- 17-cv-597(FBl)-339 FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

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(U) G. (&/AXF) Page’s Letter to the U.S. Departmentof Justice.

(6//K®) In or around February2017, Pagesent a letter to the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, urging the review of what Page claimed was“severeelection fraud in the form of disinformation, suppression of dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses led by members of [Candidate #2’s] campaign andtheir political allies last year.” In his letter, Page claims that he has

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-49- 17-cv-597(FBI)-340 FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA not directly supported a political campaign since September2016, but continues to be subjected to personal attacks by former members of Candidate #2’s campaign basedonfictitious information. Page wrote that his academic lecture and related meetings with scholars and business people in Moscow had no connection to the

U.S. election. Page attributes the assertions in the September 23rd NewsArticle that

Page met with two senior Russian officials (i.e., Sechin and Diveykin) while he was in Moscowin July 2016 to give the commencement address at the New Economic

School, which Pageclaimsis “false evidence,” to Candidate #2’s campaign. Page further claims that the information relied on by Candidate #2’s campaign, certain membersof the U.S. Congress, and the mediaarelies that were completely fabricated by Candidate #2’s paid consultants and private investigators.

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-50- 17-cv-597(FBl)-341 SECRETHNGFORN/FISA FOR

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-53- . 17-cv-597(FBI)-344 TOP-SECRETFINOEFORN/FISA

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-54- 17-cv-597(FBI)-345 FOP

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-55- 17-cv-597(FBI)-346 SECREFYNGEORN/FISA

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-57- 17-cv-597(FBI)-348 SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

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SECREFHYNOGFORN/FISA FOP

-58- 17-cv-597(FBI)-349

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VIII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (S¥/KXIR) As discussed above, the FBIbelieves that Page has been collaborating and conspiring with the Russian Governnenii b7A-1

b7E-1, 2 Based on the foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that Page Is

FOP-SECRETANOFORN/FISA

-64- 17-cv-597(FBI)-355 FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA CS icsosincly engagein BA b7E-1, 2 clandestineintelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or

on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other personsto

engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agentof a foreign poweras defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E). (CU) (S/S)

TAL P< FBI submitsthat there is probable causeto believe that b7E-1,,2

such activities involve or are aboutto involveviolations of the criminal statutes of the United Statesiii

) See (7... b7E-1, 2

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-67- | 17-cv-597(FBI)-358 SECREFYNOFORN/FISA FOP

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-68- 17-cv-597(FBI)-359 FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

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4, (§) Proposed Minimization Procedures Astoall information acquired

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-70- 17-cv-597(FBI)-361 SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOR

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5. (3) Nature of the Information Sought Throughtheauthorities a ; ; . ne ; . ; 4 b7A-1 requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with b7E-1.23,6 respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the

certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBIis |

seeking foreign intelligence informationthat relates andis necessary to the ability of

the United States to protect against clandestine intelligenceactivities by an

intelligence service or networkof this foreign poweror by agentsof this foreign

power, and information with respect to a foreign poweror foreign territory that

relates and is necessaryto the national defense, security, and the conductof the

foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally

acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act. re Ps b3-1 ee b7A-1b7E-1, 2,3,6

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-73- 17-cv-597(FBI)-364 SECRET//NOFORN/FISA FOP

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6. (8) Certification Thecertification of the Assistant to the Presidentfor bl-1 b3-1 NationalSecurity Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 Presidentas a certifying official in Executive Order Number

s amended,is set forth below. rs es +11 . b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 7

(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested

(%) The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in

the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However,the

authorities requested in this application may produce information and material

which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-75- 17-cv-597(FBl)-366

SECRETFYNOEORNFISA FOP

violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual

criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussedin thecertification, at b1-1 least a significant purposeof this request 1_ on : (ii | ; a . ; hoi ote ge. DIE-1, 2, 3, 6 a is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation of this target. 5

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-76- 17-cv-597(FBI)-367 . SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

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9 & Duration of the Authorities Requested (See 7:__ ; bl-1 The authorities requested should not automatically terminate whenforeign b3-1 b7A-1 intelligence informationhasfirst been FOP obtained. Additional information of the same 7E-1, 2, 3, 6 type will be obtained on a continuousbasis throughoutthe entire period requested.

Theactivities which the United States mustidentify and monitor are incremental and continuous, i and communications relating to such activities are often disguised to appearinnocuous. Thetypeofforeign intelligence information being sought and the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusionthat, at a given time, all such information has been obtained andcollection can be ended.

Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period of ninety (90) days.

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bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

-80- 17-cv-597(FBI)-371 TOR

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

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FOR bl-1 ib7A-1 es b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 — _— a a

SECREFHNOFORNIFISA -81- 17-cv-597(FBI)-372 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

(U) (&) Specific Authorities Requested Based uponthe foregoing information, the UnitedStates requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct-the activities described immediately below for the period requested herein. (S) aa

P| ) bl-1 b3-1 Ps b7A-1 , b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 Ss

bl-1 | b3-1 | b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6 | FOP

Hic) bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 ; (2) - b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

-82- 17-cv-597(FBI)-373

FOP SECREFHNOFORNFISA FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 ) b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 - b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOR-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

-83- 17-cv-597(FBl)-374 Ls |b1-1 ee vab6-2 es b7E-1,2,3,6b7C-2 as

a 2 Lsb3-1 ES bre?b7A-1 Ss b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 Ss

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-375 FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

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bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

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17-cv-597(FBl)-376 SECREFYNOEORN/FISA FOP SS bl1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-86- 17-cv-597(FBI)-377 SECRETINOFORN/FISA TOP

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es Ss Se i b3-1

|b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 a Sa

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SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOR

-87- 17-cv-597(FBl)-378 FOP-SECRETFYNOFORN/FISA

Ss b3-1 b7A-1HE 2.3.6

i: Ms 8bl-1 23,6b7A-1

(U) (8) The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copyof the draft to the appropriatefield office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to the Court.

wao~ The remainderof this page is intentionally left blank. -----

SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-88- 17-cv-597(FBI)-379 FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

(U) VERIFICATION

(&) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information regarding Carter W. Pageis true and correct. Executed pursuantto Title 28, United bL-l

b3-1 States Code, § 1746 on | 2011 b7A-1

b6-1 b7A-1 . b7C-1 upervisory special Agen Federal Bureau of Investigation

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-89-

17-cv-597(FBI)-380 SECRETINOFORN/FISA FOP

(U) CERTIFICATION

(3) I, the undersigned, having been designatedas one ofthe officials

authorized to make thecertifications required by the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do herebycertify with regard to h_iii

EE¢cested in this verified application targeting / b1-1 Carter W. Page, an agent of the Governmentof Russia, a foreign power, as follows: b3-1 b7A-1 . . vs _, b7E-1, 2, 3,6 (A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is

foreign intelligence information.

(B) (U) Atleast a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to

obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal

matters described in this application, the primary purposeof the authorities

requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other

than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign

intelligence crimes.

| (C) (U) Theforeign intelligence information sought by the authorities a bl-1 iz requested herein cannotbe reasonably obtained by normalinvestigative techniques. on 1 | b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 | ——— (D)D @) The type typof foreign& intelligence& information being§ soughtSoug through8 the

es authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C),i.e., |}

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA FOP

-90- 17-cv-597(FBI)-381 FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

of the United States to protect informationthatrelates and is necessary to the ability

service or network of this against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence

50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), foreign poweror by agentsofthis foreign power, and

territory that relates and i.e., information with respect to a foreign poweror foreign

the conduct of the foreign affairs is necessary to the national defenseor security, and

incidentally acquire foreign of the United States. These same authorities mayalso

of 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (e). intelligence information asdefined by other subsections bl-1 soughtis the type 3-1 (E) (8) The basis for my certification that the information b7A-1 and that such information cannot b7E-1, 2, 3,6 of foreign intelligence information specified herein

as follows. be obtained by normalinvestigative techniquesis 5) a : ee b3-1 ba Os b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFHNOFORNFISA

-91- 17-cv-597(FBI)-382 FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA 2es bI-1 a b7A-1b3-1 2: b7E-1, 2

a bl-1 2 ° es |b3-1 b7E-1, 2

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FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-92. 17-cv-597(FBI)-383 FORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA

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b7A-1

b7E-1, 2,8 il

b6-2 (U) (® b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

FOPR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-93- 17-cv-597(FBI)-384 FOPR-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA |

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

-94- 17-cv-597(FBI)-385

FOP TFOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

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b7A-1

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FOR-SECRETHNOFORNIFISA -95- 47-cv-597(FBI)-386 SECRET/NGOEORN/FISA 9 es

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aS a

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- |

( — 7b3-1 b7E-1, 2, 3 es

(U) (8) Based upon the foregoing information,it is the Government's belief that |

the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for

obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

FOP-SECRETHYNOFORN/FISA

'-97- . 17-cv-597(FBl)-388 -FORSECREH/NOFORN/FISA

(&) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W.Pagein

of accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

1978, as amended.

Rex Tillerson 7

Director Secretary of State Federal Bureau of Investigation

Andrew John J. Sullivan Deputy Director Deputy Secretaryof Stale Federal Bureau of Investigation

Michael Pompeo James N. Mattis Director of the Central Secretary of Defense Intelligence Agency

Daniel R. Coats H.R. McMaster Director of National Intelligence Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs FOR

Principal Deputy Director of NationalIntelligence bl-1 b3-1 ea b7A-1 Date

SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

-98-

17-cv-597(FBI)-389

SECREFINOFORN/FISA

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (&) I find thatthis application regarding Carter W. Pagesatisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approveits filing | with this Court. FOP

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 6

FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-99- 17-cv-597(FBI)-390 SECRET/NOFORN/FISA -FOP

(8) Accordingly, I approve the filing of this application regarding Carter

b3-1 anes $=7 b7A-1 SL). oo b7E-1

General of the United States

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA FOP

-100- 47-cv-597(FBI)-391 TORSECREHNOTORITITSA

Ys WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application regarding Carter W.Pagesatisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Actof 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed orders and warrants which accompany this application.

Respectfully submitted,

b6-3 b7A-1 b7C-3 U.S. Departmentof Justice

TOPSBERERHNCEDRNFISA

-101- 17-cv-597(FBI)-392 Filed

SECRET IntotigesosSeriesun

JUN Za 2017 is considered UNITED STATES All Information LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk unclassified except where reverk of Court otherwise shown FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT bl-1 Classify By: J23J98T32 D.C. b3-1 Reason: (C) WASHINGTON, Derived From: FBI NSICG_dated b7A-1 on 062017 Decker Number: v. PAGE, A U.S. Docket IN RECA Ra PERSON b7A-1

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

of America 1. An application having been made bythe United States

1978, as amended, 50 pursuantto the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of

for an order and warrant U.S.C. §§ eess or the Act), (hereinafter “order”) ora27 therein, the Courtfinds consideration having been given to the matters set forth bl-1 b3-1 as follows: b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 and approved by the 2. The application has been madeby a Federalofficer

Attorney General,

there is 3. Onthebasis of the facts submitted in the verified application,

r? probablecauseto believe that:

SECREF b1-1 Derived from: Application to the USFISC in Docket Number captioned above b3-1 b7A-1 Declassify on: f 17-cv-597(FBI)-393 SECRET

(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign

power and Carter W.Pageis an agentof Russia, as defined by b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

4, The minimization procedures proposedin the application have been _b1-1 b3-1 adopted by the Attorney General and meetthe b7A-1 definition of minimization b7E-1, 2.3.6 procedures unde

5. The application containsall statements and: certifications required by ble

ssCSt andthe certification b3-1 is not clearly erroneousonthebasis b7A-1 of the statements made und b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 d

any other information furnished und

WHEREFORE,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,pursuantto the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is

GRANTED,anditis

FURTHER ORDERED,asfollows: FS

17-cv-597(FBI)-394 SECREF

[a 1. The United States is authorized to condci he target as (011s; SE bl-1

SEb7A-1

fe bl-1

eSb7A-1 ' b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 a .

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ksb7E-1, 2, 3, 6 :

17-cv-597(FBI)-395 bl-1 I b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Ale bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 TL 17-cv-597(FBI)-396 bl-1 b3-1 b6-2

1} b7A-1 b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 I]

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 |

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 I 17-cv-597(FBI)-397 bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-398 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bi-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-399 es b1-1 es b3-1 b7A-1 es b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 ee es b1-1 ES b3-1 b7A-1 es b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 es es ee bl-1 a b3-1 b7A-1 es b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 SE es pe

bl-1 b3-1 esb7A-1 2, 3,6

SECRET -8- 17-cv-597(FBI)-400 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 WI

bl-1 MI b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1

b7A-1

i b7E-1, 2, 3,6 I

17-cv-597(FBI)-401 b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

I -10-

17-cv-597(FBI)-402 SECRET

bl-1 | Ps b7A-1

De bab3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 |

Ce wun SSb7A-1

. SECREE -11- 17-cv-597(FBl)-403 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 |

bl-1 6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unless b3-1 — b7A-1 otherwiseordered by this Court. b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Asto all information acquired throughthe authorities approved herein,

the FBI shall follow bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

-12-

17-cv-597(FBI)-404 Ypa 17-cv-597(FBl)-405 bl1-1 b1-1 b7A-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b3-1 b7E-1, b7E-1, bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, bi1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3,6 6 6 6 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 |

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-14- 17-cv-597(FBI)-406 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-15- 47-cv-597(FBI)-407

es ey esbl-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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17-cv-597(FBI)-408 :

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bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

| wn

-17- : 17-cv-597(FBI)-409 b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bi-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 |

-18-

17-cv-597(FBI)-410 bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

----- The remainderof this pageis intentionally left blank. -----

-19- 17-cv-597(FBI)-411 SECREF

This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires at Eastern Time

on the : day of September, 2017. | bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

06 a 291 , Signed Eastern Time

Date Time

Intelligence Surveillance Court

b6-3 . b7A-1

Fstyeand correct copy of the SECRET b7C-3 s origin -20- 17-cv-597(FBI)-412