Питання психології DOI: 10. 33099/2617-6858 – 20 – 58 – 5 – 123-130 Loboda Y. О. candidate of philosophic sciences, associate professor, leading scientific fellow of National Defence University of Ukraine named after Ivan Cherniakhovskyі https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9121-6696

ON THE CHALLENGES FOR STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE: COGNITIVE AND INFORMATION OVERLOAD

In the article on the basis of the contemporary Western literature were analyzed two main challenges for the analytical departments of strategic intelligence: cognitive biases and information overload. In the paragraph “Defining the core issue” it was stated that the problems of cognitive biases and informational overload are the permanent challenges, which have to be analyzed continuously. In the paragraph “Analysis of the latest publications” were pointed out the classic and contemporary works on psychology of intelligence and information overload. The main aim of the article is searching the ways of mitigating of negative consequences of the cognitive biases and information overload in strategic intelligence. In the paragraph “Exposition of the main material” were considered the typology of cognitive biases and essence of the information overload. In “Conclusions” were outlined possible ways of response to challenges of cognitive biases and information overload. Key words: intelligence; cognitive ; information overload. Defining the core issue. The problems of Nevertheless, the notion of in cognitive biases in intelligence analysis and intelligence analysis remains important for the overcomplicating intelligence institutions in studies in theory and history of intelligence. conditions of information overload are the classic Traditionally the cognitive biases are linked issues for intelligence studies. They need to be with human psychology. The weak sides of this reconsidered permanently according to historical approach are the following: changes. - Psychological biases are relevant only on Analysis of the latest publications. The the tactical and operational levels, where personal following scholars focused their attention on the opinion (or group thinking) really matter. On the cognitive biases in intelligence analysis: S. strategic level of intelligence analysis, where the Marrin [9, 10], L.Johnson [15], R.J.Heuer [5], role of a personality reduced, the task of search Moore [12]. The information overflow was for the psychological roots of cognitive biases analyzed (but not limited) by: C.E. Brueggemann appears to be more complicated. [1], A. Oettinger [13], T.S. Thomas [16], K.J. - Psychology deals with operations of Wheaton [17]. analysis of motivation and description of The aim of the article: to analyze essence cognitive biases, their logical structures and of the contemporary challenges to intelligence relation to norms which could help to avoid them analysis in the cases of cognitive biases and remain obscured. organizational consequences of information Nonetheless, the main advantage of the overload with ways of their mitigation. psychological approach, mainly represented by Exposition of the main material. The R.Heuer, is the following: the typology of the question of influence of cognitive biases on the cognitive biases is profoundly described, the intelligence blunders is not free from biases itself: variety of its phenomena are classified: 'Biases in it is very easy to accuse members of intelligence Evaluation of Evidence (The Vividness Criterion, community in cognitive biases when they fail Absence of Evidence, Oversensitivity to (even if some other cause(s) actually worked Consistency, Coping with Evidence of Uncertain out); the theoretical basis of the analysis of the Accuracy, Persistence of Impressions Based on cognitive biases is not unified: it contains diverse Discredited Evidence); Biases in Perception of approaches taken from psychology and critical Cause and Effect (Bias in Favor of Causal thinking theory, backed by formal logic. Explanations, Bias Favoring Perception of Вісник Національного університету оборони України 5 (58) /2020 123 Питання психології Centralized Direction, Similarity of Cause and 105]. Thus, the task of mitigation of the cognitive Effect, Internal vs. External Causes of Behavior, biases belongs not to theoretical debates only; it Overestimating Our Own Importance, Illusory relates to the organizational structures of Correlation); Biases in Estimating Probabilities intelligence community and the professionalism (Availability Rule, Anchoring, Expression of of its management. Uncertainty, Assessing Probability of a Scenario, Structured analytical techniques offered as Base-Rate Fallacy); Hindsight Biases in one of the remedies of the cognitive biases faced Evaluation of Intelligence Reporting (Analysts their critics from the intelligence community: normally overestimate the accuracy of their past Stephen Marrin [10] argues that structured judgments. Intelligence consumers normally methods (at least in the time of his service in CIA underestimate how much they learned from in 1996-2000) are used very rarely; intelligence intelligence reports. Overseers of intelligence officers preferred intuition in their work. He production who conduct post-mortem analyses of states that structured techniques are perfect for an intelligence failure normally judge that events making the process of analysis transparent and were more readily foreseeable than was in fact accountable (and therefore it would make the case)' [5, pp. 111 – 173]. Another systematics analysis much more correct), but it takes more based primarily on the psychological approach is time to conform all the formalities related to this the following: ‘Evoked-Set Reasoning, method. Overloaded officers usually work within Prematurely Formed Views, Presumption that the tight temporal frameworks, which makes Support for One Hypothesis Disconfirms Others, using of structured techniques less preferable to Inappropriate Analogies, Superficial Lessons them. Mitigating this problem may contain the From History, Presumption of Unitary Action by following: to reduce exploitation of more Organizations, Organizational Parochialism, problematic methods (like intuition) it would be Excessive Secrecy (Compartmentation), possible to offer more convenient formal Ethnocentrism, Lack of Empathy, Mirror- (structured) methods or/and special software to Imaging, Ignorance, Rational-Actor Hypothesis, make their workflow more transparent and Denial of Rationality, Proportionality Bias, accountable, and as a result – more accessible for Willful Disregard of New Evidence, Image and counter-bias inspections. Self-Image, Defensive Avoidance, More fundamental approach is proposed by Overconfidence in Subjective Estimates, Wishful scholars who are based on the theory of critical Thinking (Pollyanna Complex), Best-Case thinking [12]. Being an applied form of Analysis, Conservatism in Probability traditional formal logic, critical thinking is Estimation, Worst-Case Analysis (Cassandra focused not on the representations of cognitive Complex)’ [8, pp. 36-38; 4, pp. 106-107]. Dearth biases, but on their structures and relation to the makes a very important notice: he writes about norms of correct thinking. Pitfalls related to the institutional causes of boosting the cognitive main elements of abstract thinking (notion biases: “Biases can be enforced, or at least re- (classification, comparison, definition, division), enforced - formally or informally - by propositions (contradiction, controversy, organizations through organizational negation), inference (induction, deduction, parochialism and "group-think" and can have as abduction, traduction) [12, p. 36], hypothesis and their basis ethnocentrism. This phenomenon can theories building, their falsification and operate at the level of given intelligence verification, main laws of logic (identity, organizations, intelligence disciplines, or sectors excluded middle, non-controversy, sufficient of government. Some of these problems are reason)) can be attributed not only to exact rooted in the methodologies we select to analyze persons from IC, as it was in the case of the the world; but they all will certainly influence the psychological approach, but to the pattern of the way we use any given methodology. Consider, workflow of entire analytical groups and for instance, the problems associated with institutions. Logical tradition provides rigorous inappropriate analogies and superficial lessons rules of the correct thinking which could help to from history. The latter invariably produces bad avoid cognitive biases more effectively, than history and hence flawed understanding” [4, p. psychological approach proposes to do.

124 Вісник Національного університету оборони України 5 (58) /2020 Питання психології The method of mitigation of the cognitive logic and its applied form – critical thinking – can biases depends on the approach to them. Shallow, increase chances of avoiding the negative too generalized and wide prescriptions, given by outcomes of cognitive biases. representatives of the psychological approach [5, Furthermore, any intelligence service could pp. 173 – 184] are not comparable with the be easily blamed for incompleteness, fuzziness, approach of representatives of critical thinking obsoleteness of the information it provides, as scholars [12, pp. 95-96] – the last look way more well in errors in its analysis. The motto “the fundamental and constructive, because refers not command’s hunger for information is perpetual, to exact personalities, but to universal cognitive you always have to deliver more information” structures, which can be detectable on the was (or had to be) the fundamental principle of personal, group and institutional levels. professional intelligence services – not only to Developing critical thinking skills by avoid the accusations like that, but it has reflected intelligence analysts may allow to avoid not only the essence of intelligence work. This endless personal errors, but institutional as well. This strife for perfection of fullness of information has would conform the initial W.Platt’s claim of the been challenged by the recent technical relevant education of the intelligence officers [14, development in informational domain, which p. 151, 284]. caused overwhelming informational overflow for It is possible to choose between different intelligence services, adding a new point of strategies entailed by the choice between “Art” criticism against them. The data overload can and “Science” (or any type of their combination), make all the elements of processing of but intelligence officer is not required to information less adequate; the organizational overcome the limits of scientific methods which structures of intelligence agencies, channels of he uses. It is required knowledge about these communication between participants of limits, which will not guarantee any success, but intelligence communities facing the urge of can increase its chances. Problem of induction reforming. “Not to see a wood behind the trees” and The criticism against military intelligence Platonic-Hegelian maxim “If facts do not fit a was systematically articulated in “On war” by theory, than it is worse for facts!” are archetypic, Carl von Clausewitz: “Many intelligence reports they are accessible by common sense, intuition or in war are contradictory; even more are false, and education. Mere verification will not help in all most are uncertain” [2, p. 117]. David Khan the cases; data (no matter how complete) does not points out that it became usual to avoid the provide its automatic understanding. In this case, analysis of Clausewitz’ view on intelligence [3, p. intelligence becomes art, because understanding 125]. The rare academic criticism of Clausewitz’s cannot be quantified and very specific training; approach to intelligence, expressed by Ferris and thus, in this case the educational system bears full Handel (“Clausewitz's views on operational responsibility of developing of professional skills intelligence were not simple, nor were they of intelligence officers. absolutely accurate, as shown by the experience There is no panacea against cognitive (and of at least one contemporary. Devoting much all the other) biases in intelligence analysis. Some personal attention to the task, the Duke of scholars say that intelligence blunders are Wellington demonstrated that it was possible to inevitable. But understanding of the inner limits collect useful tactical and operational intelligence of the scientific methods, the rules of correct on the enemy. A small but notable minority of thinking given by formal logic, rich tradition of British and American generals of that era adopted semiotics, theory of Fregean “sense-meaning” a similar view. From an examination of the same distinction can create advantage for intelligence base of data as Clausewitz, the Baron de Jomini analyst at least over the enemy, which could not drew different conclusions about operational have these skills. Critical thinking should be used intelligence, and, over 2,000 years earlier, the against myths, wrong mindsets, stereotypes, over- influential Chinese strategist Sun Tzu praised - in and underrationalization of enemies and other fact, exaggerated - the military value of cognitive biases by intelligence analysts educated intelligence” [6, p. 3]) is followed by a statement, in the most fundamental way – by training in that makes Clausewitz’s criticism more relevant

Вісник Національного університету оборони України 5 (58) /2020 125 Питання психології to the issue of overcautiousness of a decision The traditional problem of redundant maker caused by the intelligence: “To cautiousness of commanders caused by Clausewitz, audacity is less dangerous in intelligence is multiplied in our days by the commanders than caution and less frequently technical revolution, which enormously increased found. 'Given the same amount of intelligence [in the number of sources of information, made a commander], timidity will do a thousand times OSINT more crucial than ever before. In more damage in war than audacity'; 'a general contemporary world, everyone drowns in the cannot be too bold in his plans, provided that he streams of information: “The information is in full command of his senses, and only sets revolution has brought information overload. himself aims that he himself is convinced he can Everyone with a PC and an Internet connection achieve'; 'We always have the choice between the runs the risk of being bombarded with ideas and most audacious and the most careful solution. images. While this can broaden an individual’s Some people think that the art of war always perspective by providing access to different advises the latter. That assumption is false. If the points of view and sources of information, it can theory does advise anything, it is the nature of also reinforce delusions by showing that others war to advise the most decisive, that is, the most believe the same thing. Bizarre ideas and outright audacious'; 'boldness grows less common in the lies can be propagated much more easily than in higher ranks'; 'no case is more common than that the past.” [11, p. 7-8]. New communication and of the officer whose energy declines as he rises in computing technologies have offered rank and fills positions that are beyond his optimization of data processing for intelligence abilities.' In Clausewitz's equation, uncertainty services which significantly improved their and its psychological consequences reduce the capability: “Advances in scientific knowledge, frequency of boldness among commanders and translated into new technology, have made increase the value of this scarce commodity on previously unmanageable intelligence tasks the field of battle. If all commanders were feasible and greatly increased the speed at which aggressive risk-takers, this characteristic would intelligence professionals perform traditional define the military art but it would no longer offer activities. Improved sensors, transmission a comparative advantage to any general. When capabilities, and analytical tools deliver most commanders are cautious, then audacity is unprecedented volumes of information and at a premium” [6, p. 7]. Contemporary strategists processing capabilities to the intelligence also follow Clausewitz in assessing the role of a community and its customers, military and commander, which faces the challenge of political decision makers. Processes that used to information overload, requiring rather take days or weeks now take only seconds. professional preparation and psychological talents Activities carried out at dispersed locations than optimization of information processing: “A throughout the world can be managed centrally, complex-stable battlespace, for example, can ensuring coherence in the information delivered result in information overload. A complex- and a rapid flow of intelligence between the field unstable environment generates an and administrative office” [13]. Moreover, the “overwhelming amount of information, but emergence of the concept of “informational [decision makers] will not know which overload in intelligence community” happened information to attend to due to constantly before the “communication/computer” revolution changing circumstances.” To get a clearer picture and related to the organizational complexity: of whether uncertainty breeds indecision or poor “Fundamental are the problems of overload and judgment among blue, red or other decision complexity. The very sophistication of modern makers, this net assessment should be integrated information-gathering systems produces the with the psychological profiling of specific problem of overload. Intelligence systems may decision makers if possible. Some commanders demand ever more data in the empirical illusion and terrorist group leaders are capable of good that more data will solve the mysteries and judgment under uncertainty, but many are not.” secrets when, in fact, they are likely to suffer the [16, p. 101 – 102]. fate of the thirsty individual who tries to drink from a firehose. As the 9/11 Report noted: ‘‘One

126 Вісник Національного університету оборони України 5 (58) /2020 Питання психології can see how hard it is for the intelligence internal informational overload with reports and community to assemble enough of the puzzle other forms of accountability (“A network with a pieces gathered by different agencies to make small number of critical nodes (mechanistic), for some sense of them. . . . Accomplishing all this is example, is more susceptible to disruption and especially difficult in a transnational case. We information overload, while one that is highly sympathize with the working-level officers, decentralized is able to resist, adapt, re-route drowning in information and trying to decide flows, and repair itself. On the other hand, what is important.’’ Overload manifests itself also communication and coordination are more in the concept of ‘‘noise,’’ wherein the glut of difficult in spider webs. Generally, the extraneous material inhibits the analyst from organization will at least be a critical capability if focusing on the information that is central to the not a COG itself. To get a sense of whether the analytical problem or even prevents the analyst organization is a strength or weakness, what its from spotting it” [15, p. 154]. Thus, vulnerabilities are, and how it might be affected contemporary “informational overload” is a result directly or indirectly, we need to assess its design, of complexity of organizational structures and the independence of its units, the location of overwhelming streams of information, and leadership, and “how hierarchical dynamics may therefore the ways of solving this problem does be mixed with the network dynamics.” (Thomas not relate to the improving procession of 2004, p. 159)), but this extensive response seems incoming data only – it is a systematic problem, the most ineffective, although it remains the one which has to be analyzed within the frameworks of the main ways of responding the informational of organizational reform as well. overload. It also contains the risks of complexing The intelligence services are not excluded hierarchical interaction: bigger volumes of from the overloading with information, which has information could be required to be reduced and essential negative impact on the productivity of simplified, which can make the analysis more the analysts: “There is too much intelligence. A shallow [17, p. 10]. veritable flood comes in each day as message Charles E. Brueggeman proposes the traffic, and then there is the vast amount of following ways of mitigating the information finished intelligence products available through overload: government intranets. An analyst could easily - “Strong leadership must emerge from spend all day doing nothing but reading both business partners and IT specialists in order intelligence and ton actually producing anything. to solve the challenges of circular reporting and But being an analyst, by definition, requires an complexity of data sources. Both must re- effort to make sense of the pieces of the terrorist engineer their approach to resolving technology puzzle and provide value-added analysis” [7, p. problems. As “end users” identify deficiencies 23]. Stephen Marrin writes about one of the ways that require a technology solution, IT specialists of response to this challenge: “This overload of must partner with them by leveraging their information could explain why CIA’s analysts are expertise. The IT professional must draw out of organized in narrow accounts; because of the the end user the scope of the deficiency, volume of information, issues must be segmented compliment that with their understanding of the in order for a single analyst to master the relevant domain, and facilitate the development and data. But it also has implications for the future. In implementation of “context-based” technology order to ensure that analysts read all relevant tools.” [1, p. 72 – 73]. This approach requires information, the CIA may have to divide its flexibility of intelligence service, while some of workforce into smaller segments as more and which still remain conservative. The other more information becomes available” [9, p. 15]. problem is secrecy – civil IT contractors should Solving new problem with quantitative changes be controlled, which requires extra resources and by increasing specialization in fragmented groups enlarges intelligence service structures. Own IT and potentially hiring more new specialists does infrastructure developed within the intelligence not seem a final (or even satisfactory) solution. service may suffer from isolation from the newest Multiplying analytic groups complicates commercial market products and can get outdated communication between groups and may increase rapidly;

Вісник Національного університету оборони України 5 (58) /2020 127 Питання психології - “Awareness and focus: Establish within the intake” [1, p. 78] – this can work in the case each fusion center a work team focused on when the outlined measures clearly showed their circular reporting. This team should develop efficiency. Anyway, data processing will always procedures and guidelines aimed at reducing require the personal involvement of a human with circular reporting” [1, p. 74] – increasing internal his/her experience, intuition, talents; reporting would boost informational overload and - “Training: An adaptable, automated, does not guarantee the optimization of the data knowledge-driven, best practice and standard processing. Contemporary world changes rapidly, operating procedures technology must be the volume of information increases permanently, developed and accessible to the analysts. It is and the bureaucratic means of solution simply through these automated standard operating does not match the urgent requirements; procedures that technology will help drive the - “Best practices: Investigate successful work of the analysts. Doing so will minimize the models that are already addressing the broad complexity of which data sources should or issue of information overload and the specifics of should not be utilized. Coupling this feature with circular reporting and complexity related to data automated federated access to data sources will sources” [1, p. 75] – the successful models in the further reduce the negative effects caused by the globalized informational domain do not live long. complexity of data sources” [1, p. 84-85] – higher They have to be changed simultaneously with the intelligence officers recognize the current realities which they refer to. The well-developed problem of adequate training of intelligence bureaucratic machines of the intelligence employees in the following way: 1. The problem communities are traditionally conservative and of gap between generations – young officers deal often do not show nor intention, neither ability to with the informational technologies way more change; effectively than their elder colleagues due to - “Structure and operations: Explore and bigger interest to social networks, actual validate the relevancy of an intake, analyze, and software, “natural OSINT skills” and merely disseminate model with other fusion centers. By bigger experience in that; 2. The problem of engaging other centers and perhaps partnering versatility of educational background of the with them, further advance the concept of a young employees – they are expected to have as similar operational models that enable the sharing versatile education as possible, because it is of information” [1, p. 77] – the analysis of believed to improve their critical and creative relevance of incoming information is essential, capabilities. These can work only jointly with but distinguishing this as a special procedure fundamental training in professional intelligence could take too much time, which is unacceptable preparation, because the lack of this can destroy during times of information overload. The all the advantages of the up-to-date skills of relevance of information could be established young employees. during further systematic analysis and Conclusions. To summarize, it would be comparison with other data; relevant to assert that: - “Survey of technologies: A more formal - Intelligence services are often criticized survey of duplicate detection as it relates to primarily for incompleteness and obsoleteness of circular reporting in the intelligence and fusion the information and analysis provided. From the center business should be undertaken. Finding a other side, military decisionmakers often appear technology that would include artificial unready for the volume of information provided intelligence and learning algorithms that by intelligence; in this case, a better form of semantically analyzes the concepts of the interaction between intelligence and command document and possibly categorizes some into a needed. Also more profound professional domain taxonomy or ontology would be of great education in intelligence theory for staff officers value. The ideal situation would be to mix and and political leaders would help. match these technologies, outfit the resulting tool - The problem of information overloading with a user interface specifically designed for the of intelligence services is not entirely new – any intake function of a fusion center, and embed it in relatively complex bureaucratic structure suffers the work environment of the person performing from this, and intelligence community is not an

128 Вісник Національного університету оборони України 5 (58) /2020 Питання психології exception; more resilient organizational structures - The technical tools of mitigating the are needed, which seems extremely hard to be information overload can not substitute the done within conservative bureaucratic experience and intuition of humans. Therefore, organizations; along with technical development aimed to cope - Organizational means of mitigating this with information overload the biggest attention problem simultaneously increases it – more has to paid to development of human resources, analyst units and newly extra hired employees because it is way harder to achieve. The extensive encourage internal paper/data exchange and help solution of increasing the quantity of employees to plug up internal communication between to respond the information overload is not a members of intelligence community; ultimate remedy, but it would help better if the - Using modern electronic systems of data selection process of the incoming staff would be processing and communication for collecting, improved and bigger attention would be paid to analyzing and disseminating intelligence is an their education, including science and enormous advantage. In the same time, the same programming training. tools create a uncontrolled stream of information - Fulminantly changing world, which which increases drastically and needs to be delivers drastically increasing volumes of filtered, analyzed and assessed. This stream can information to be analyzed, requires adequate be easily increased by a belligerent subject to generation change. Contemporary intelligence guarantee the analysts’ collapse – the capabilities services require young minds with their specific of analyzing centers are limited, unlike the world wide web digital experience. This requires volume of incoming information, which can be optimization and reconsidering of the potentially unlimited. In this case, some serious transmitting of the professional skills and wisdom counter-overload measures should be taken: the between generations. Mere informational specific techniques should be elaborated, which exchange will not work, some personal have to include the methods and tools of avoiding involvement is needed. There is a threat that total collapse under the informational overload. informational overload brings: not everything in Another problem related to this point is that the intelligence profession can be transferred belligerent actors use the common informational from one generation of analysts to another, but domain and technologies – this means that the digital tools can create an illusion that intellectual competition in this realm depends on previous experience is useless and everything can the scientific success and as a result – on the be solved only with computers. technical superiority. - The problem of informational overload - Information overload forced intelligence seems to be extremely hard to solve. The known analysts to revisit the role of OSINT, which measures taken mainly belong to extensive enormously enlarged due to development of methods: hiring extra analysts and improving digital technologies. This should not change the software and hardware of digital processing understanding of HUMINT, which should remain centers. Following the data opened to civilians it fundamental. The informational skill can never is hard to find any more successful method other substitute the talents required in HUMINT, but than extensive ones. Decision makers are always the informational overload can cause the shift of hungry for information, but it is still a huge priorities of the members of intelligence challenge for services not to drown in the ocean communities in favor of SIGINT and OSINT. of information. The more effective solution is still to be found.

References 1. Brueggemann C.E. Mitigating Information Overload: The Impact of “Context-Based Approach” to the Design of Tools for Intelligence Analysts – Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2008. 2. Clausewitz C. von. On War. – Princeton University Press, 1984. 3. David Kahn. Clausewitz and intelligence, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 1986, 9:2-3, 117-126. 4. Dearth D.H. Politics and Intelligence // Strategic Intelligence: Theory and Application. / Ed. by D.H.Dearth, R.T.Goodden. - Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership; Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, 1995.

Вісник Національного університету оборони України 5 (58) /2020 129 Питання психології 5. Heuer R.J., Jr. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999. 6. Ferris J., Handel M.I. Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command in Military Operations // Intelligence and National Security, 1995, 10:1, 1-58. 7. Kauppi M. Counterterrorism Analysis 101. // Defense Intelligence Journal, 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002). 8. Krizan L. Intelligence Essentials for Everyone. - Washington, DC, Joint Military Intelligence College, 1999. 9. Marrin S. Intelligence Analysis: Structured Methods or Intuition? / American intelligence Journal, 2007. 10. Marrin S. Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging Gap between Scholarship and Practice. – Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2012. 11. Metz S. Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post-Modern Warfare. – Strategic Studies Institute, 2000. 12. Moore D.T. Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis. – Washington: National Defense Intelligence College, 2009. 13. Oettinger A. Information Overload: Managing Intelligence Technologies // http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=1061 14. Platt W. (1957) Strategic Intelligence Production. Basic Principles. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1957. 15. Strategic Intelligence. Vol. 1. / Ed. by L. Johnson. – Praeger Security International, 2007. 16. Thomas T.S. Beneath the Surface: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace for Counterterrorism. – Joint Military Intelligence College, 2004. 17. Wheaton K.J. The Warning Solution: Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload. - Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, April 2001.

Резюме Лобода Ю. О. кандидат філософських наук, доцент, провідний науковий співробітник лабораторії (гуманітарних проблем) кафедри суспільних наук Національного університету оборони України імені Івана Черняховського ВИКЛИКИ СТРАТЕГІЧНОЇ РОЗВІДКИ: КОГНІТИВНІ АБЕРАЦІЇ ТА ІНФОРМАЦІЙНЕ ПЕРЕНАВАНТАЖЕННЯ У статті «Виклики стратегічної розвідки: когнітивні аберації та інформаційне перенавантаження» на основі огляду сучасної західної літератури проаналіовано два основних виклики, з якими стикаються аналітичні відділи стратегічної розвідки: когнітивні аберації та інформаційне перенавантаження. Головна мета статті – пошук способів усунення негативних наслідків когнітивних аберацій та інформаційного перенавантаження в стратегічній розвідці. Зазначено, що проблеми когнітивних аберацій та інформаційного перенавантаження є постійними викликами, які треба досліджувати перманентно. Вказано на класичні та сучасні роботи з психології розвідки та дослідження з проблем інформаційного перенавантаження. У розділі Розглянуто типологію когнітивних аберацій та сутність інформаційного перенавантаження в сучасних умовах. Окремо зазначено, що складність дослідження когнітивних аберацій в аналітичній роботі стратегічної розвідки полягає в тому, що ці дослідження самі не є вільними від таких аберацій і часто залежать від академічної кон’юнктури або особистого досвіду дослідника – зокрема, традиційно проблематика когнітивних аберацій належить такій царині мілітарних досліджень, як «Психологія розвідки», при цьому може ігноруватись логічні аспекти когнітивних помилок, які мають універсальний, а не особистісний характер. Розглянуто сутність феномену інформаційного перенавантаження, який стає дедалі поширенішим в умовах бурхливого розвитку електронних засобів комунікації, проаналізовано способи вирішення проблеми інформаційного перенавантаження, запропоновані Ч.Е.Брюггеманом. У висновках приведені можливі способи відповіді на виклики когнітивних аберацій та інформаційного перенавантаження. Ключові слова: розвідка; когнітивна аберація; інформаційне перенавантаження.

Recelved/Поступила: 21.12. 20.

130 Вісник Національного університету оборони України 5 (58) /2020