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OP-ED

MASSIMO PIGLIUCCI

inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. The Naturalistic What Hume is saying, I think, is that one needs to be very careful in moving from considerations of matters of (science) to considerations of a moral Fallacy or ethical (). Put this way, the move is a logical fallacy in the uch of the trouble that modern sense that there is no logical justifica- science encounters with people tion for going from factual premises to Mof a religious bent can be traced moral conclusions: the premises literal- to what is sometimes referred to in ly do not necessarily support the conclu- philosophy as the “naturalistic fallacy.” sion. But, contrary to what many people This is the idea that one cannot derive seem to think, this does not mean that an ought from an is; i.e., that matters of the move is necessarily wrong. The (the realm of science) do not direct- fact that the conclusion doesn’t always ly translate into matters of moral judg- logically follow from the premises does ment (the realm of religion for some; not exclude the possibility that this is the realm of philosophy for others). correct in some specific cases. This, I Exam ples abound: creationists don’t think, is what Hume meant: he said that like what they perceive to be the morally he was annoyed at his philosophical degrading implications of evolutionary colleagues for moving from is to ought theory, while moral conservatives bent without an explanation. Presumably, technical competence, are normal and on banning all kinds of abortion insist in the move would be acceptable if a suit- fallible human beings), it is also reason- ignoring science’s findings about when able explanation were provided. able to think that the way the world is one can reasonably say that a develop- All of this is very theoretical, and the should inform our view of the roots and ing fetus is sentient. reader could reasonably wonder what consequences of morality itself. Let us it matters in practice. Let’s take a sim- then begin by examining more closely ple example to clarify things a bit. Is it the first articulation of the naturalis- morally wrong to eat meat? Many people Moving from consider- tic fallacy, provided by have defended this conclusion based on in 1740. (Note: the term naturalistic ations of fact to consider- the understanding that other sentient fallacy was used in philosophy by G.E. creatures are being hurt and that this is Moore in 1903 in a slightly different con- ations of a moral or ethical not right on logical grounds because we text, but modern commentators often are sentient creatures as well. There are nature is a logical fallacy. refer to Hume’s version whenever this logical problems with this position. For topic is discussed.) But this does not mean example, what level of behavioral sophis- In his Treatise of Human Nature tication counts as “sentient”? Is it OK to that the move is necessarily (III[I]1), Hume writes: eat a shrimp, given its very simple ner- wrong. In every system of morality, which I vous system and consequent inability to have hitherto met with, I have always feel or perceive much about the world? remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of What about a clam or a scallop? Are eggs This is a serious issue, because, of reasoning . . . when of a sudden I am sentient? If one refuses to eat even eggs, course, science does occasionally carry surpris’d to find, that instead of the why discriminate against plants? And a heavy burden of social consequence usual copulations of propositions, is, why is sentience such a morally crucial (just think of the atomic bomb or the and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or criterion? eugenic programs of the early twenti- an ought not. This change is impercep- A completely different defense of eth century in Europe and the United tible, but is, however, of the last con- omnivory (i.e., eating a balanced diet of States). Yet the two opposing camps sequence. For as this ought or ought meat, vegetables, and fruits) is that it is seem equally misguided: if on the one not, expresses some new relation natural for human beings to do so. We hand we certainly don’t want to leave or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and were constructed by as moral decision-making in the hands of at the same time that a reason should omnivorous animals, and there is there- scientists (who, after all, outside of their be given, for what seems altogether fore nothing wrong (neither biologically

free http://www.secularhumanism.org 14 OP-ED

nor morally) in behaving as such. Some it is exactly that some natural behav- from one to the other—as Hume wisely people may not find such an argument iors are not morally acceptable. Here’s admonished—one should also be cau- against vegetarianism, shall we say, par- another example likely to make religious tious in not ignoring the first one while ticularly palatable, but it is reasonable to conservatives go ballistic: sex is natural, thinking about the second, if one wants so abstinence-only programs of sexual to proceed rationally about such mat- “education” are unnatural and need to ters, that is. “. . . the way the world is be independently justified—which one cannot do if the interested parties don’t Further Reading should inform our view of share the premise that God doesn’t want David Hume (1739–1740), A Treatise on us to play around with our sexual organs Human Nature (New York: Claren don Press, 1978). the roots and consequences until the “proper” time. of morality itself.” I do not pretend to have successfully Massimo Pigliucci is a professor of defended either omnivory or premarital evolutionary biology at the State sex (though I have happily engaged in University of New York at Stony both), but I hope to have stimulated Brook. His latest book is Denying ask them why a naturalistic defense, in the reader to think more deeply about : , , and this case, is not allowed. By the reverse the complex relationship between the the Nature of Science (Sinauer, 2002). side of Hume’s reasoning, sometimes world of facts and that of moral judg- Many of his ramblings can be found one should be asked to articulate why ments. While one cannot merrily jump at www.rationallyspeaking.org.

CARL COON

of them. At least they did in some nation- states—the ones that are success stories today. In others, internal divisions con- Humanism and the tinually tear the states apart and prevent effective governance. The current era is one in which a host of trends and developments are UN: A Shared Future? forcing countries to cooperate on a glob- al basis to cope with problems that are ot too long ago, I had a brief humanists here.” threatening all humanity. The threat of exchange with a high-ranking And why not? There is a certain sym- nuclear war and other conflicts in an era NUnited Nations official in New metry between humanism and the whole when weapons of mass destruction are York. I noted the similarity between idea of global governance, just as there is humanist worldviews and those held symmetry between patri- otism and national gov- ernment. Nation-states “People didn’t give up the evolved out of smaller groups when the advan- old loyalties entirely; they tages of aggregation be- just superimposed a new came so compelling that people became willing to sub- set on top of them. At least ordinate the interests of their own they did in some nation- tribe, region, or ethnic group to those of a larger and states—the ones that are more inclusive community. success stories today.” Patrio tism evolved as the social glue that held the nation’s individual parts together. People didn’t within the UN, as expressed by UN give up the old loyalties Secretary-General Kofi Annan and oth- entirely; they just super- ers. “Of course,” he replied. “We are all imposed a new set on top

15 http://www.secularhumanism.org Dec. 2004/Jan. 2005