t

Isaac Herzog Th e comprehensive Annual Report by the Jewish Minister of People Policy Planning Institute constitutes a Social Affairs platform for an extremely important debate on the Executive Repor and Services and issue of the state of the Jewish People all over the for Diaspora Affairs world, in view of the trends, ups and downs, processes Annual Assessment No. 4 State of Israel and events that have left their mark over this past year both on the State of Israel and on world Jewry. I am confi dent that the recommendations and The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute conclusions of this very thorough report will constitute key points in shaping a solution to the critical issues facing the Jewish People, as we may see in the Report. AnnualAnnual AAssessmentssessment David Harris For those who want to learn more about the external Executive Director, and communal challenges facing the Jewish people, American Jewish the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute’s Annual Committee Assessment 2007 ought to be required reading. Once again, JPPPI has produced a comprehensive and incisive study of the issues that most aff ect our worldwide community. Th is report reminds us that all Jews are responsible for one another. If we’re going 2200720062007007 to live out that adage, as we should, taking JPPPI’s analysis to heart is the right place to begin.

Richard Th e history of this century has validated that Jewish Prasquier People indeed exists, whatever its location, either Th e Jewish Président du in Israel or in the Diaspora. Too many Jewish People Policy CRIF (Conseil community leaders do not have the appropriate tools Planning Représentatif des to confront the complex challenges it faces from both Institute Institutions Juives within and the outside. Th e JPPPI vigilantly and de France) admirably accomplishes the vital task of providing Givat Ram Campus POB 39156 Societal Aspects those tools, and they are a matter of survival. Jerusalem 91391 Israel …The notion of the Jewish People comprised of Jewish communities Phone: Baroness Th e work of the JPPPI is unique in its insight and (972)-2-5633356 around the world with a core state in Israel shows signs of weakening… breadth. Its publications, as well as the Jerusalem Ruth Deech Fax: Member of the Israel and the American Jewish community are challenged to develop conference of July 2007, provide readers and (972)-2-5635040 House of Lords, UK, participants with the tools and support they need to a strong leadership, pro-active rather than defensive… and Independent face Jewish problems worldwide. With the resources www.jpppi.org.il Adjudicator for of the JPPP I feel better equipped to handle issues of Email: Higher Education antisemitism and the European diaspora. [email protected] Partners and Members Board of Directors and of the General Meeting: Professional Guiding Council:

Zeev Bielski Chairman as Chairman of JAFI Executive Dennis Ross Lester Crown and Charles Goodman Members of the board on behalf of the Crown-Goodman family Ya’acov Amidror Arlene Kaufman and Sandy Baklor Uzi Arad Jack Kay Irwin Cotler Lee Kohrman Uzi Dayan as President of the David and Inez Myers Foundation Sami Friedrich Efi Stenzler and Avraham Duvdevani Ruth Gavison as Chairman and co-Chairman of Jewish National Fund Steve Hoffman Hagai Meirom Morlie Levin as Treasurer of JAFI Judit Liwerant Leonid Nevzlin Isaac Molho On behalf of the Nadav Foundation Steve Nasatir Yaakov Neeman John M. Shapiro John Ruskay as President of the UJA Federation of New York Susan Last Stone Jay Sarver Aharon Yadlin as Chairman of the JAFI Budget and Finance Committee Founding President Richard L Pearlstone Yehezkel Dror as Chairman of the JAFI Board of Governors Director General Our thanks to the UJA Federation of New York, the Avinoam Bar-Yosef Jewish Federation of Greater Los Angeles, and to the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago for their Projects Coordinator support of this project Ita Alcalay Jewish People Policy Planning Institute Annual Assessment 2007

EXECUTIVE REPORT No. 4

Societal Aspects

PROJECT HEAD Prof. Chaim I. Waxman

CONTRIBUTORS Aharon Arazi, Avinoam Bar-Yosef, Sergio DellaPergola, Yehezkel Dror, Naftali Elimeleh, Simon Erlanger, Sylvia Barack Fishman, Avi Gil, Hedva Goldschmidt, Yogev Karasenty, Udi Lion, Judith Liwerant, Dov Maimon, Yehudah Mirsky, Israel Pupko, Shulamit Reinharz, Yuval Rivlin, Emmanuel Sivan, Steven Spiegel, Einat Wilf, Ruth Yaron, Zvi Zameret

Editor Rami Tal

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 1 ______

Copyright © 2007, The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute (Established by the Jewish Agency for Israel) Ltd, Jerusalem

Layout: Marzel A.S. — Jerusalem Cover Design: Nitza Bruck, Jerusalem Cover Production: S. Kim Glassman, Jerusalem Printed in Israel by Gefen Publishing House LTD. Jerusalem WWW. ISRAELBOOKS.COM

2 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS CONTENTS

Foreword ...... 5

1. Preface ...... 7

Part I — Policy Directions for World Jewry Today

2. Strategic Agenda and Policy Directions ...... 11

3. Selected Indicators of World Jewry — 2007 ...... 15

PART II — Significant Recent and Current Challenges

4. The American Jewish Community’s Reaction to the 2006 Israel-Hizbollah War . . . .21

5. Israel — Developments in 2006–2007 ...... 31

6. The Jews of Europe 2000–2007 ...... 39

PART III — Societal Aspects of the Jewish People

7. Jewish Religious Patterns ...... 49

8. Jewish Family Patterns ...... 56

9. Socioeconomic Characteristics and Mobility ...... 63

10. Jewish Migration and the Challenge of Multi-locality ...... 72

11. Jewish Cinema ...... 75

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 3 4 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Foreword

The flagship project of the JPPPI is its annual assessment on the state of the Jewish people. This year’s assessment differs from its predecessors in several respects. First, it focuses heavily on the effect of the war in Lebanon not only on Israel, but also on the Tlargest Jewish community outside of Israel, the Jewish community in the United States. Second, rather than providing an overview of the changing status of different Jewish communities internationally, this year’s assessment analyzes a number of societal aspects and developments in leading Diaspora communities and in Israel. And third, by outlining socio-economic, migra- tion, family and religious patterns, it offers insight into cultural directions and trends among the Jewish people. Not surprisingly, one sees a mixed picture of positive and negative developments in this year’s assessment. On the positive side of the ledger, many of Israel’s Sunni Arab neighbors share Israel’s fears and threat perceptions of Iran. If nothing else, shared threat perceptions create the potential for common or at least parallel actions vis-à-vis Iran. Additionally, while the war with Hizbollah in Lebanon was dispiriting for Israelis, the Winograd commission’s unvarnished critique of the government’s performance has led to important lessons learned and the introduction of some structural changes in the government and military’s decision-making process. Further, in the American Jewish community, the war in Lebanon demonstrated that the fissures — political and religious — tend to be submerged in response to outside threats to Israel. And, though there are many worrisome trends in Europe, there is also an encouraging develop- ment: there is a new found interest in all things Jewish — e.g., Jewish and Israeli literature tops best-seller lists and Jewish studies are becoming established in increasing numbers of European universities. On the negative side of the ledger, antisemitism is worsening and Jewish communities are shrinking in Europe. In Israel, the social-economic gaps are widening domestically. Externally, Iran poses an ominous danger over time to Israel, and more immediately, Israel confronts far more acute threats from radical Islamists with Hizbollah increasingly potent in Lebanon and Hamas now having taken over control in Gaza. In light of all this, the assessment offers its own agenda for urgent action by Jewish and Israeli leaders. Among other things, more effective strategies are needed to deal with the threats posed by the Iranian nuclear program and the radical Islamists. To ameliorate some of the social-

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 5 economic gaps in Israel, policies will be needed to upgrade education and meet the standards of most developed countries; policies will also be needed to facilitate study by Haredi women and men in programs designed to help yeshiva graduates enter the job market. Given shrinking Jewish populations in the Diaspora, the successful U.S. Birthright program should be introduced to Europe and ways must be found to reduce or subsidize the high costs of Jewish services and facilities so Jewish life can become more accessible to a wider public. And, despite all the sen- sitivities, new modalities of conversion that take account of traditional criteria are needed even while policies to integrate children of out-married couples into mainstream Jewish society are also developed. The issue for Jewish and Israeli leaders is not just to be aware of the agenda for action but to develop the means to follow through on the priorities outlined in this year’s assessment. Let’s hope they do so.

Ambassador Dennis Ross Chairman of the Board and Professional Council The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute

6 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Preface

This year’s Annual Assessment Executive salient features indicated in the table are then Summary is somewhat different from its prede- discussed in some detail. cessors, for a variety of reasons. Among them is There follows, in Part II, three major essays a perception that the notion of the Jewish people which assess, among others, the reactions to Tcomprised of Jewish communities around the and impact of the major event of this past year, world with a core state in Israel is one which the Second War in Lebanon. The first examines shows signs of weakening and, perhaps there- the reactions of American Jewry to the war; fore, is increasingly expressed by the more the second examines the impact of the war and deeply affiliated members of organized Jewish its aftermath on Israeli society; and the third communities as well as by some Israeli leaders. surveys antisemitism in central Europe from Accordingly, this year’s Annual Assessment 2000 until the present. takes the Jewish people as a reality and examines The first two essays explicitly, and the third a number of its societal aspects. In lieu of an implicitly, conclude with a focus on the challenge examination of the major events in Jewish com- of leadership. Perhaps more clearly than ever munities on a country-by-country basis, this before, the American Jewish community seeks year’s assessment looks at some societal aspects leadership, and what is needed is a leadership of the largest Diaspora Jewish community, with which will have the foresight to lead pro-ac- some attention also on other Diaspora com- tively, rather than continuing to act defensively. munities. In the future, we hope to expand the Israel, too, is challenged to face its weaknesses scope and give much more attention to other and failures and to muster its resources both Diaspora communities. domestically and in the Diaspora to develop Part I begins a series of tentative suggestions, strong Jewish leadership. That is the overrid- based on the information and analyses provided ing policy recommendation of this assessment, in the material that follows, for a strategic and it is the one with which the final essay con- agenda and policy direction. In order to see the cludes, namely, the urgent need to focus on the suggestions in perspective, they are followed by crafting of policies for the fostering of Jewish an updated table indicating a number of major People leadership. characteristics of the Jewish people. Some of the Part III consists of a series of essays which

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 7 examine Jewish socio-economic patterns; migra- this year’s Executive Report, it was decided to tion patterns; family patterns; religious patterns; hold that analysis, which is in progress, for next and one aspect of Jewish culture, namely, cinema. year’s Annual Assessment. That will permit the It is JPPPI’s goal to provide a comprehensive complete attention the subject warrants. examination of Jewish cultural patterns. That is, There are, for sure, other societal aspects however, extremely difficult and complex, espe- which warrant examination but for which there cially because of the paucity of theories and data is a dearth of data or other reliable information. on the subject. We begin this year’s analysis with The fact is that there we know much too little the very revealing subject of Jewish cinema. and, if we are to plan effectively, we need much No analysis of the societal aspects of the more empirically-grounded information. To Jewish people is complete without an exami- further this, JPPPI hopes to prepare a detailed nation of the changing roles of Jewish women research agenda on important but neglected within the Jewish community, and it was aspects of the Jewish people which will hope- expected that this section would begin with fully be taken up by salient research bodies. a major essay on the subject. However, when the multidimensionality and other complexi- Chaim I. Waxman ties of the subject became apparent, rendering Senior Fellow a significant analysis unfeasible to complete for Jewish People Policy Planning Institute

8 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Part I

Policy Directions for World Jewry Today

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 9 10 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Strategic Agenda and Policy Directions

The material presented in this Annual Assessment as to reach the standards of the most devel- leads to ten strategic agenda domains with policy oped countries need development. directions that require urgent consideration by D. Policies are needed to encourage and facili- Jewish organizations and leaders. They do not tate study by Haredi women and men, T including comprehensive professional replace the strategic agenda and recommenda- tions presented in earlier Annual Assessments programs designed to help yeshiva graduates and other JPPPI documents, but are added to aspiring to enter the job market, particularly them. These include: IT fields.

2. SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES 1. ISRAEL A. While education is widespread among A. Clearly, security issues of Israel emerge as Jews, the quality of education constitutes the most important challenge aggravated a growing concern. Innovative policies to in 2007. Therefore, policies are urgently restructure Jewish education, making it more Cneeded to help Israel with crafting its politi- Wattractive and easily available, are needed. cal-security grand-strategies, help it mobilize These policies should aim for a quantum critically needed resources, confront the jump in utilizing the potentials of IT. dangers of global radical Islamic terrorism B. Following the consequences of globaliza- and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear tion, many Jews have been able to thrive capacities. but many others have suffered significantly B. Unequal distribution of wealth has become negative consequences. In most western more acute and pockets of poverty have countries, relative to high income employ- emerged. Development of effective redistri- ees, the gap between Jews and non-Jews is bution mechanisms is needed, together with narrowing. Jewish communities need new more strenuous efforts to increase participa- policies to cope with this trend. tion in the labor market. C. A particular population segment which C. Policies directed at upgrading education so appears to be poverty stricken comprises

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 11 a significant part of Shoah survivors. This 4) Informal Jewish education needs to be situation should urgently be examined and strengthened. There is an acute shortage of rectified. teachers and educators in many European D. A relationship is emerging between higher countries. Emissaries and envoys from Israel socioeconomic status and greater access to and the U.S. already work in the FSU and Jewish services and facilities — hence to Germany. They should also be sent to the Jewish identification. This calls for enhanced rest of Europe. In order to strengthen Jewish attention to the costs of Jewish life and the identity, the successful U.S. Birthright urgent need to make it more accessible to a program should be introduced in Europe as wider public. well.

3. EUROPE B. Leadership:

The overall Jewish population numbers in 1) Policies are needed which facilitate coor- Europe are at a historic low. Due to emigration, dination of the diverse Jewish leadership assimilation and an ageing population, many both within national Jewish communities communities are set to shrink further or to and in Europe as a whole. The ideological, Tvanish altogether. Nevertheless, while it seems political and religious struggles of the past hard to reverse this trend it might be possible to are a luxury European Jewry can no longer slow it considerably. To achieve this, the follow- afford. ing issues require innovative policies: 2) Shrinking numbers mean declining political influence and electoral power. In countries like Britain and France, the Jewish commu- A. Communities: nity’s influence will be surpassed by Islamic 1) Identification of viable communities and immigrant communities within the next few concentration of efforts on them with the years. Nevertheless, despite rising antisemi- help of “infrastructure” plans. tism there is also a widespread interest in 2) Search for new sources of funds. Judaism. The growing clash with militant 3) Jewish formal education must expand. Islam leads many Europeans to look for Evidence from all over the world shows Europe’s Christian roots, which in the spirit that children attending Jewish day schools of Jewish-Christian reconciliation since the are more likely to develop a Jewish identity. “Second Vatican” are commonly defined European Jewish schools are usually pri- now as “Judeo-Christian”. This new devel- vately run, consequently they are expensive opment creates the need for novel policies. and many cannot afford them. Therefore, It might well mean that Europe actually a significant share of the funds mentioned looks for a Jewish moral voice in the chal- above should be used to make Jewish educa- lenges ahead. It would be wise to provide tion available to all Jewish children. such a voice by establishing a unified Jewish

12 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS presence at the European institutions in emphasis on cultural creativity (as detailed Strasbourg and Brussels, so that the Jewish in a separate JPPPI strategy paper). People are heard. This of course would d. Encouraging highly gifted youngsters to also serve to help combat antisemitism and prepare themselves for cultural creation. counter security threats. e. Developing specific plans for various types of cultural creativity, such as film making. 4. AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY AND THE SECOND LEBANON WAR 7. JEWISH FAMILY PATTERNS A. Policies should be prepared, providing Jewish community leaders, intellectuals and opinion A. Despite all sensitivities, new modali- leaders with opportunities to deepen their ties of conversion making it easier while understanding of Israeli security issues. P meeting traditional criteria should be B. Prepare long-term plans to strengthen Jewish developed. influence, taking into account expected polit- D ical, demographic and cultural changes. B. Focused policies, based on an understand- ing of the complexities involved, are needed to enable children of out-married couples 5. MIGRATION to gain acceptance into the mainstream of Consider ways to involve mobile Jews in com- Jewish society. munity activities and to adjust community C. Available research findings on the potential belonging as a whole to increasing geographic of the provision of social services and finan- mobility. C cial and value-oriented incentives to lead middle class families to have a 3rd or a 4th 6. JEWISH CULTURE child should be translated into operational policies. Policies to facilitate and intensify Jewish cultural creativity should be crafted. Ideas to be consid- ered include, for instance: 8. STRATEGIC THINKING Pa. Studying Jewish creativity and its drivers. Findings on the Second Lebanon War clearly b. Building up gravity centers of Jewish cultural creative activities, so as to achieve a critical exposed weaknesses in strategic thinking. mass of mutually supporting facilities, However, this is the case in respect of many creative persons, festivals and so on. Fdomains critical for the future of the Jewish c. Building up Jerusalem as the Civilizational People. Upgrading Jewish People strategic Capital of the Jewish People, with special thinking is therefore a must.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 13 9. DEEPER STUDY OF SOCIETAL 10. JEWISH PEOPLE LEADERSHIP DIMENSIONS AND PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPMENT JEWISH PEOPLE The subject of Jewish People leadership is not Preparation of the Annual Assessment ran into directly studied in the Annual Assessment, in serious problems due to the lack of adequate part because of the objective difficulties involved data on critical societal dimensions, without in “studying” it. Still, there can be no dispute which policy needs cannot be fully mapped Tabout the urgent need to upgrade the overall Pand adequate policies cannot be developed. quality of Jewish People leadership, in Israel and Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop a the Diaspora, to assure the qualities needed for research agenda and implement it. coping with the challenges of the 21st century. Policies to develop Jewish People leadership should therefore be crafted.

14 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Selected Indicators on World Jewry — 2007

Jewish Recent Ever Visited Index of Human GDP per capita Jewish Population Day-school Out- Israel Tourists to Development (Purchase Aliyah (Core Definition) Attendance marriage (% of Jew. Israel Parity US $) Country Value World Rank Rate (%) Rate (%) Pop.) Projected Most Most Most 1970a 2007b 2004d 2004d 2006 2006e 2006e 2020c recenta recenta recenta World 12,633,000 13,155,000 13,558,000 .965–.331 1–177 38,454–779 19,264f 1,822,257f Israel 2,582,000 5,393,000 6,228,000 .927 23 24,382 97 5 – – – North America 5,686,000 5,649,000 5,581,000 .960–.948 6–8 39,676–31,263 2,385 545,018 United States 5,400,000 5,275,000 5,200,000g .948 8 39,676 25h 54 35 2,157 493,653 Canada 286,000 374,000 381,000 .960 6 31,263 55 35 66 228 51,365 Latin America 514,000 393,000 364,000 .879–.482 31–154 15,720–1,892 1,355 69,243 Argentina 282,000 184,000 162,000i .863 34 13,298 50–55 45 >50 293 11,803 Brazil 90,000 96,000 90,000i .792 63 8,195 71 45 >50 232 15,476 Mexico 35,000 40,000 42,000 .821 53 9,803 85 10 >70 72 13,311 Other countries 107,000 73,000 70,000i .879–.482 31–154 15,720–1,892 75 15–95 >50 758 28,653 Europe non-FSU 1,331,000 1,155,000 1,030,000 .966–.757 4–92 38,827–7,753 3,686 874,907 France 530,000 490,000 482,000 .942 16 29,300 40 40–45 >70 2,408 251,166 United Kingdom 390,000 295,000 238,000 .940 18 30,821 60 40–45 78 594 161,048 Germany 30,000 120,000 108,000 .932 21 28,303 <20 >60 >50 110 89,536 Hungary 70,000 49,000 34,000 .869 35 16,814 <15 60 .. 63 7,588 Other EUj 171,000 149,000 134,000 .956–.856 4–42 3,827–14,623 10–25 33–75 >50 326 293,609 Other non-EUk 140,000 52,000 34,000 .965–.757 1–92 38,454–7,753 5–20 50–80 .. 185 71,960 FSUl 2,151,000 357,000 173,000 .858–.652 40–122 14,565–1,202 7,469 131,343 Russia 808,000 225,000 130,000i .797 65 9,902 <15 80 .. 3,593 73,416 Ukraine 777,000 77,000 25,000i .774 77 6,394 <15 80 .. 1,777 30,574 Rest FSU Europel 312,000 37,000 15,000i .858–.694 40–114 14,565–1,729 <15 65–75 .. 813 16,876 FSU Asia 254,000 18,000 3,000 .774–.652 79–122 7,440–1,202 <15 50–75 .. 1,286 10,477 Asia (rest)m 104,000 20,000 21,000 .949–.492 7–150 29,251–679 490 115,435 Africa 195,000 77,000 60,000 .842–.331 47–177 11,652–779 3,801 60,543 South Africa 118,000 72,000 57,000 .663 121 11,192 85 20 79 114 16,589 Oceania 70,000 111,000 101,000 .957–.523 3–139 30,331–2,543 72 20,887 Australia 65,000 104,000 95,000 .957 3 30,331 65 22 70 66 18,165 a Source: Division of Jewish Demography and d A measure of a country’s public health, educa- accurate estimate would probably be 25–26%. Statistics, The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary tional attainment, and real income. Source: United i Revised population projections for 2020. Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Nations Development Programme (2005). j Without Baltic states. b Source: DellaPergola, American Jewish Year Book e Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2006). k Including Turkey. (2006). Provisional data. f Including country not reported. l With Baltic states. c Source: adapted from DellaPergola, Rebhun, Tolts g After downward reduction following NJPS 2001. m Without Israel, FSU and Turkey. (2000), medium variant. h Based on partial response from NJPS 2001. A more

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 15 GLOBAL PATTERNS in income per capita measured by real purchase power (but only 62nd in income distribution At the beginning of 2007 the world Jewish equality), 29th in educational enrollment, and population reached 13,155,000 — an estimated 34th in public corruption (a worsening of 6 places 60,000 more than the previous year — reflect- versus the previous ranking). This does not take Aing growth of 80,000 in Israel and decline of into account events and trends in 2006. 20,000 elsewhere. The overall growth rate of In Israel a comparatively young age com- 0.5% resulted from a 1.5% increase in Israel and position and a persisting preference for nuclear a -0.2% decrease in the Diaspora. These trends families with children stand behind an annual continued the well established patterns of past natural population increase of about 70,000. The years. Minor population increases in Canada and highest number of Jewish births ever recorded in Australia were compensated by more significant the country (104,000 in 2006) strengthened the losses in Eastern Europe, Western Europe as a claim that Israel has become the largest Jewish whole, Latin America, and Africa. In Western community worldwide with 5,393,000 Jews plus Europe, Germany continued to increase, but another 308,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish France and the United Kingdom declined. The households. estimates reported here refer to the concept In the United States a high profile debate on of core Jewish population, mostly inclusive of the size of the Jewish community benefited from self-reported Jews who do not hold another some new sources of data but mostly from the monotheistic religion, and people without secondary analysis of older ones. Our estimate religion with Jewish parents. In some countries of 5,275,000 represents the middle range such as the FSU, Jewish population estimates between two large national surveys conducted reflect declared ethnic affiliations. in 2001. The National Jewish Population Survey These population changes primarily reflect (NJPS) and the American Jewish Identity Survey the different internal demographic balances (AJIS) provided national estimates of 5,200,000 of Jewish communities in different countries, and 5,350,000 Jews, respectively. These figures but also the exposure of individual Jews to the point to effective Jewish population reduction political and socioeconomic constraints and versus the early 1990s and are highly coherent opportunities within national societies and with available indicators of late marriage, low in the framework of an open global system. fertility, frequent intermarriage, ageing, and the Levels and changes in the Index of Human weakening of international migration. The role Development (HDI) provide an apt background of changing Jewish identification is of course to these demographic trends. Based on the latest very important in determining population esti- available data (2004) Israel kept its 23rd place out mates. In the U.S., a weakening in ethnic and of 177 in the global ranking of countries by HDI, community oriented expressions of Jewish iden- but it recorded the fastest improvement versus tification can be noted along with resilience of each of the countries with major Jewish popula- religious oriented components of Jewish identi- tions. Israel was 9th best in terms of health, 23rd fication. A transition in perceptions of Judaism,

16 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS from one’s own religion, to secular, cultural, or America (-15%), 2,400 from North America undetermined modes of identification growingly (+4%), and 3,700 from Europe (+1%). Among emerges among people aged in their 20s to 50s. the latter countries, an increase of over 50% On the other hand, the younger Jewish popula- (to about 600) occurred in immigration from tion segment includes a rapidly growing share of the United Kingdom — the country where the Orthodox and Jewishly educated children. highest increase in antisemitic incidents was Rather than tackling these substantive reali- recorded. As against this, aliyah from France ties in the perspective of the last decades, the diminished by 5%. Migration to discussion on different U.S. Jewish population Israel includes a growing share estimates has focused on the quality of sources of non-Jews. Immigration is sig- of data, none of which can be conclusively rated nificantly off-set by out-migration, In Western better than others. Large national surveys with leading to an international migra- Europe, relatively low response rates are pitted against tion balance close to zero. the Jewish compilations of disparate surveys — local or Tourism to Israel, 1,822,000 population national — with better response rates but spread in 2006, diminished too by 4%. in Germany over many years, collected with different and Increases from North America continued not always random methods by different inves- (+7%), from the FSU (+12%), and to grow, but tigators, based on different definitions of who is from Africa (+32%), were off-set by declined in a Jew, not comparable in their topical contents, decreases from Latin America (-27%) France and and each inadequate to portray the whole of and Europe (-9%), incorporating the UK. American Jewry in isolation from other cognate a diminution of 19% from France . sources. The Jewish population estimates, and an increase of 3% from the higher by one or even two millions suggested UK. These variations, too, provide by some investigators, mostly reflect a broader indirect hints at the contextual pressures felt by definition than the core Jewish population used Jews in different countries, although they also in our estimates. tend to be sensitive to economic circumstances International migration between Israel and in the countries of origin and to the security situ- the rest of world Jewry played a minor role in ation in Israel. global Jewish population redistribution. A total The available estimates, although far from of 19,000 new immigrants went to Israel — a exhaustive, indicate clearly negative country decrease of 9% versus 2005. Of these, over correlations between the extent and reach of 7,000 arrived from the FSU (-20%), over 4,000 full-time Jewish education and the frequency of from Africa and Asia (+6%), 1,400 from Latin intermarriage.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 17 18 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Part II

Significant Recent and Current Challenges

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 19 20 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS The American Jewish Community’s Reaction to the 2006 Israel-Hizbollah War

The Israel-Hizbollah War in the summer of 2006 the Hamas electoral victory in January 2006. The was as shocking to the American Jewish com- right continued to warn of dire consequences. munity as to everyone else with interest in the Meanwhile, the centerpiece of their oppo- Middle East. The American Jewish community sition to Israeli policy had moved to the Ttypically focuses on Israel during acute crises, convergence plan, but in the early weeks of and the summer crises vis-à-vis both Hamas and the Olmert government there was insufficient Hizbollah did not occur at a time of previous activity to generate once again considerable community concentration on Israel, an atten- debate. The center among American tion that had abated since the early period of the Jews, inclined in any case to support Second Intifada, the last time when Israelis were whatever Israeli government is in The publi- dying in large numbers. power, provided broad support for cation by Mid-2006 found American Jews adjusting to the plan without passion. Most of two political the loss of Ariel Sharon, the victory of Hamas, the left, though inclined to favor scientists of the emergence of Kadima, the new premier- negotiations, was not prepared to an attack on ship of Ehud Olmert, and discussions of his oppose an Israeli government that the “Israel so-called convergence plan based on unilateral wanted to reduce the occupation. Lobby” withdrawals from most of the West Bank. After If there had been any issue attracted years of deep divisions in the community that that attracted broad attention and broad atten- during the 1980s and 1990s tended to mimic the emotion in the American Jewish tion and community before the war on a Likud-Labor split in Israel, organized American emotion in Jewry was just recovering from the acrimony subject related to Israel, it was the the American over Gaza disengagement. Most American Jews publication by two leading political Jewish com- supported the Sharon government’s actions, but scientists, Stephen M. Walt and John munity. the right — secular and religious, was still bitter Mearsheimer, of an attack on the . over a withdrawal whose prospects had gener- “Israel Lobby.” Beyond the disturb- ated harsh debate and whose implementation ing subject itself, the community was focused continued to rankle, as right wing supporters of almost unanimously on the vitriolic nature of Israel believed disengagement had only aided their broadside, the frequent inaccuracies, the

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 21 unclear definition of “the Lobby” — at least at of dollars for ambulances and trauma counsel- first, and the media attention their initial article ing, just as they always have.” attracted. Even those on the left who To the overwhelming majority of American had had qualms about recent AIPAC Jews, Israel was once again in the headlines and Among the actions, found it difficult to defend in peril. Not surprisingly, a strong consensus majority of a paper (and the frequent articles then rapidly emerged in favor of Israel’s actions American and presentations that followed) so in the war. American Jewish leaders not only Jews, a biased and lacking in objectivity. sought to ensure that the United States would strong Before hostilities began, there back Israel; they also wanted to demonstrate consen- was disagreement concerning how support for Israel at a moment of the country’s sus rapidly strongly to support current Israeli isolation internationally and danger at home. It emerged policy, and over specifics, especially also helped that this conflict was perceived as a in favor related to the Palestinians. Certainly, just war both among American Jews (and indeed of Israel’s the ideological activists at either most Americans) and in Israel, where such tra- end of the political spectrum were ditional famous critics of Israeli policy toward actions in deeply divided with each other. But the Palestinians as Amos Oz, David Grossman the Second the Walt-Mearsheimer contretemps and and A.B. Yehoshua argued in its support. Lebanon War. had clearly demonstrated that the None of the moral ambiguity of the occupation . American Jewish community was of the Palestinians pertained in this conflict — at capable of acting in a concerted and unified least before the controversy over the bombing of manner when provoked. Lebanon emerged more clearly. In any case, beyond the unified attacks on This profound concern for Israel can be traced Walt-Mearsheimer, a side activity for the official not only to religious, ideological, and political community and those most intensely engaged connections; it also exists because of personal in matters Israel and the political arena, the war relations where Americans “are worried about erupted at a quiet time in a context of basic friends and relatives under bombardment or support for the latest Israeli policies, and with driven from their homes.” American Jews, living a backdrop of some confusion as to the exact away from the violence of the region, thus felt a nature of those policies. This stability, even sense of obligation to step in and do what they somnolence, was transformed almost instantly could in order to help Israelis when they most when the swift events that led to war suddenly needed support. Crises are effective in rallying erupted. As Israel began moving into the war, the American Jews because, unlike the failures and American Jewish community began mobilizing successes of diplomacy that occur behind closed the resources at its disposal. As the New York doors and over long periods of time, dramatic Times described it, “With Israel at war again, developments like katyusha rockets falling on American Jewish groups immediately swung northern Israel capture individuals’ immediate into action, sending lobbyists to Washington, attention. These kinds of problems and threats solidarity delegations to Jerusalem and millions offer opportunity for the provision of goods,

22 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS services, and funds to help Israeli victims. And logical terms (with the overwhelming majority if that were not enough, media coverage con- of Orthodox leaning right, and most Reform stantly brought the war to America in a context — especially their leaders — leaning left). The in which many Jews believed that news coverage differing official attitudes toward the respec- was overly sympathetic to Lebanese suffering, tive movements in Israel added to the tension with insufficient attention to Israelis being killed between the movements at home. In this case, from an area from which Israelis had voluntarily however, all three movements decided to either withdrawn in 2000. endorse the effort or to actually fund-raise for it. The American Jewish community’s intense As the UJC stated, “The federation system and support for Israel in this period can be seen the synagogue movements, together, represent in the funds that were raised following the the largest Jewish constituent framework on initial eruption of violence. By mid-August, the continent. They are breaking new ground in the American Jewish Committee had received their determination to broaden the overall base more than $1.5 million in donations and the of support for Israel by creating a united front American Friends of the Israel Defense Forces through the Israel Emergency Campaign.” The had collected more than $4.5 million. The con- Conservatives approached the UJC certed effort of United Jewish Communities’ to work together; the Orthodox, Israel Emergency Campaign ultimately received after initial hesitation, accepted a The Israel $310.8 million in donations. A similar push to joint campaign with UJC and like Emergency support Israel was also seen following the start of the Conservatives received support Campaign the Second Intifada. For instance, United Jewish for their work in Israel; the reform, of the United Communities received nearly $360 million in according to Rabbi Eric Yoffie, Jewish donations to support Israel during this intifada, president of the Union for Reform Communities but over a longer period of time. Judaism, enthusiastically endorsed was joined by When Israel faces a crisis, the American the UJC campaign, but were not all the three Jewish community is prompted to act and asked to fold their own campaign major denom- contribute more funds to Israel. But most into the UJC’s. remarkable in this regard, the Israel Emergency Not only were American Jews inations Campaign of the United Jewish Communities staging large rallies in major American — Reform, was joined by all three of the major denomi- cities, communicating their support Conservative, nations: Reform, Conservative, and even more for Israel to Congress and the Bush and most surprisingly given past patterns, Orthodox. In administration, attending syna- surprisingly recent years, the community had not acted in gogues in larger numbers than usual given past unison on almost any issue, especially given the (especially for the summer), and patterns, increasing divide between the denominations — criticizing negative media, but they Orthodox. particularly between the Orthodox on the one were also providing a united front . hand and Conservative and Reform on the other. and large donations as a further They were even divided on Israel both in ideo- reminder of how important they believed Israeli

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 23 security to be for them and for the United States. nization to criticize Israel’s actions for harming The commitment was so strong that when the Palestinian and Lebanese civilians. usually sacrosanct AIPAC began a fund-raising Similarly, on the right, a strong “we told you campaign for its own organization during the so” attitude dominated, with a feeling that their war, even it came under criticism for asking for opposition to the unilateral withdrawals from money for itself at a time when everyone else Lebanon in 2000 and from Gaza in 2005 had was seeking funds for rebuilding the psyche and been vindicated. Nevertheless, most right wing physical structure of northern Israel. supporters of Israel quickly swung behind the Though some disagreements within the com- country in its emerging predicament and partici- munity could be seen later in the conflict, and pated in fund raising, public rallies, and efforts certainly afterward, the 2006 Israel-Hizbollah to persuade the Bush administration to continue War demonstrated how the pro-Israel left and to provide Israel strong support, and in particular pro-Israel right were able to set the time to complete the job against Hizbollah. aside differences in the interests of As the war continued somewhat inconclu- As the war maximizing backing of Israel. This sively, however, divisions between left and right continued point was recognized by the Los re-emerged, though at first in a more muted form inconclusively, Angeles Times when it stated that than before the war. Some on the right believed divisions the recent crisis demonstrated “the that Israel waited too long to initiate a ground between right broadest and most unified commu- war, and then did so too timidly. Prominent neo- and left re- nity support of Israel they’ve seen in conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer emerged. years.” As John Fishel, president of criticized Prime Minister Olmert’s “unsteady and . the Jewish Federation of Greater Los uncertain leadership,” in an August 4 column. Angeles, stated in July 2006, “Israel “Foolishly relying on air power alone, he denied is clearly under great duress, and its situation has his generals the ground offensive they wanted, mobilized support throughout the community only to reverse himself later.” Ariel Cohen across geographical and ideological lines.” of the Heritage Foundation, a well-known Thus, though traditionally advocating a nego- conservative think tank in Washington, com- tiated and peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli plained “that the Olmert-Peretz-Halutz team conflict, groups representing opinions from the is lacking a clear strategy and tactical plan on American Jewish left stood firmly behind Israel. how to defeat Hizbollah.” Following a solidar- As the prominent American Jewish commen- ity mission to Israel, leaders of the (Orthodox) tator, James D. Besser, noted, “Many moderate Rabbinical Council of America pleaded with doves believe the Israeli offensive, and especially the Israeli military to review its policy of taking the widespread attacks in Lebanon, are morally pains to spare the lives of innocent civilians in justified.” The solidarity within the Jewish com- light of Hizbollah’s tactic of hiding its fighters munity was perhaps exemplified when the and weaponry among Lebanese civilians. Some head of the Union for Reform Judaism refused donors complained that the Israel Emergency to endorse a student petition urging his orga- Fund campaign of the UJC was aiding Israeli

24 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Arab victims of Hizbollah katyushas as well as out Hizbollah rocketeers by force have made Israeli Jews. Israeli civilians much less safe.” He proceeded But naysayers soon developed on the left as to argue that Israel miscalculated in its decision well, encouraged particularly by the increased “to escalate” the conflict in the north, and that Lebanese casualties as the war dragged on much the way to prevent such attacks is to solve longer than originally anticipated and as Israel the Palestinian problem. “Were Israel’s conflict finally did initiate a ground war in southern with the Palestinians resolved, other challenges Lebanon. Some on the left began to argue that like Hizbollah would melt away. The idea of the Israeli reaction was disproportionate to firing rockets into Israeli towns would appear the initial kidnappings. Though they were in absurd.” the minority, dissenting voices emerged. For When money was being raised for Israel example, the group Brit Tzedek v’Shalom, the through United Jewish Communities, it was the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace based in exception to hear within the Jewish community Chicago, moved in the later stages of the war calls to also raise funds for Lebanon. In the wake from calling for active U.S. diplomacy to pressing of the war, portions of the Jewish community, for an immediate cease-fire, which differed at both on the left and the right, began to adjust to the time from both the American and Israeli the new political environment. On the one hand, government positions. Though they recognized the left was confronted with the harsh reality that Israel was the victim in the current crisis, a that unilateral withdrawals and a more forth- representative from Americans for Peace Now coming position by the new Israeli government also stated that “we have deep questions about did not prevent war. But that did not address the the efficacy of what Israel is doing” for fear that problems they wanted to solve of pressing for its military thrusts might empower Hamas and diplomatic solutions short of the use of force, Hizbollah. and the pro-Israel left found itself “scrambling The noted Jewish analyst, Leonard Fein, for a new approach now that some of its key in a Forward article entitled “Was There Really assumptions lie buried in the rubble of southern No Other Way?” talked about his “queasiness” Lebanon and Gaza….” The answer became as he supported Israel. He worried about “too clearer after the war as groups and analysts on many ‘mistakes,’ too many dead children” in the left continued to maintain that Israel must Lebanon, and a likely “callous indifference” in continue to pursue peace with its neighbors and the selection of targets. “In the end, has Israel find ways to get out of the West Bank. In the not through its own miscalculations committed months that followed, these groups saw their the same dangerous error that the United States opportunity during the aftermath of the war, has committed, is committing, in Iraq — antici- and especially with the publication of the Iraq pating a quick victory and instead fracturing the Study Group Report led by former Secretary of myth of its invincibility?” Matthew Yglesias of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee the American Prospect, writing in the Chicago Hamilton to endorse open channels of commu- Sun Times, put it more bluntly. “Efforts to root nication with Syria and Iran, and more intense

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 25 talks with Abu Mazen. A very few would add anything more than endless conflict, a solution Hamas to this line-up. not appealing to American Jews or Israelis. As As the left tried to encourage the United James Besser noted, “the conflict revealed the States to end the violence during the last days soaring costs of war as Israel’s enemies become of the war, the pro-Israel right for its part more sophisticated and better armed; it’s harder pointed out that unilateral withdrawals from to be hawkish when the price is so high.” southern Lebanon in May 2000 and from And one Jewish activist, disillusioned with his Gaza in September 2005 meant that Israel had previous support for the peace process, none- made major concessions without receiving any theless complained about the right: “they have security guarantees or assurances in return, and nothing positive to offer. To most Jews here, had suffered accordingly. Such an argument their ideas just look like endless occupation, was recognized by the executive director of endless war.” At the same time, the left had to the American Jewish Committee, David Harris, avoid appearing naïve and unrealistic in the rec- when he stated that “the idea you could leave ommendations for accelerating diplomacy that these territories and be safe behind a security it increasingly promoted. That left the majority barrier” was no longer accepted. Describing the of the American Jewish community floating in previous year’s efforts against disengagement by the middle with little guidance and direction, the Zionist Organization of America, an article because in recent years the center had to some in the Chicago Jewish Star reported, “Their extent followed either left or right or a combina- warnings proved accurate, but their ‘I told you tion, depending on events in the Middle East and so’ crowing has been limited in the current the positions of the American and Israeli govern- crisis…” since their message seemed obvious ments. Before we address the center’s role, the and the immediate problem of assuring contin- rift within the American Jewish community can ued U.S. support loomed larger. The also be verified in polling data. Zionist Organization of America In the 2006 Annual Survey of American “The conflict initially planned after the war to Jewish Opinion, participants were asked, “Do revealed take steps to discourage Israel from you approve or disapprove of the way the Israeli the soaring engaging Syria, because it realized government has handled the conflict between costs of war that it was no longer necessary to Israel and Hizbollah in Lebanon?” While as Israel’s oppose Prime Minister Olmert’s plan 35% stated that they “Disapprove” of Israel’s enemies to withdraw from parts of the West actions, a majority of 55% stated that they did become more Bank as support no longer existed “Approve” of the steps that had been taken sophisticated for that initiative. (10% stated that they were “Not Sure”). While The problem that both the left and better this is certainly a high percentage of those who and the right confronted after the supported Israel’s actions, it does not reflect the armed”. . war was that their positions had overwhelming majority that most likely existed been directly challenged. The right when the conflict first began. It also appears that faced the problem that it was not offering the opinion of the American Jewish population

26 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS was no different than the general population that as we have seen both the left and the right in the United States. A Gallup poll conducted emerged from the war weakened — neither the between July 21–23, 2006 shows that 50% of answer of endless confrontation or of negotiat- Americans either stated that they “Approve ing with untrustworthy opponents seemed at strongly” or “Approve not strongly” of Israel’s the end of the war to offer much solace. actions, whereas 38% either stated that they The result was a new subtle element in “Disapprove strongly” or “Disapprove not American Jewish thinking, an apocalyptic tone strongly.” These numbers are very close to the epitomized by a Boston woman who told the 55% approval and 35% disapproval seen in the Boston Globe, “I’m sick about it, truthfully. public opinion poll conducted on the American They’re handling it the best they can. We have Jewish community. to come out victorious. If we don’t, that’s the Because the survey of American Jewish end of Israel.” In the summer of 2006, American opinion was conducted between September 25 Jews felt compelled to mobilize because the war and October 16, one can assume that the “crisis renewed an old fear that Israel’s very existence mode” mentality that defined the American was in danger. Except for the opening hours Jewish community when the soldiers were first of the Persian Gulf War when missiles reigned kidnapped slowly faded, ultimately reverting down on Israel, such panic had not been seen back to the status quo divisions between the for more than thirty years since the 1973 Yom left and right that existed beforehand and that Kippur War. This concentrated trepidation was reflected the general American population’s not shared by Israelis. opinion toward the conflict. Referring to donations made by Nevertheless, the war did generate subtle the American Jewish community, In the changes in American Jewish thinking not Rabbi Marvin Hier of the Simon summer reflected entirely in the polls. On the one hand, Wiesenthal Center stated, “If they of 2006, most American Jews gravitate to the center, a [Jews] begin to increase their gifts American kind of silent majority following established dramatically, it is often an indica- Jews felt organizations and looking for guidance. As tion that their concerns have greatly compelled Besser again describes, American Jews “support expanded.” With attacks occurring to mobilize Israel and its right to defend itself, they distrust on two fronts, the American Jewish because the the Palestinian Authority, they recognize Hamas community conflated the issues of war renewed and Hizbollah as terrorist groups that are inter- Gaza and Lebanon and identified a an old fear wider war against Israel, reinforcing ested only in Israel’s destruction, but they also that Israel’s believe Israel must find a way to negotiate an end the perception that Israel was under very exis- to the decades-old conflict with the Palestinians.” siege. Whereas perceived existential tence was in This widely accepted assessment leaves room threats have historically emanated danger. for influence on the left and the right, and par- from Israel’s Arab neighbors, the . ticular opportunities for centrist groups such as danger that Israel now faced not the Israel Policy Forum. It suggests, however, only came from Hizbollah, but also emanated

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 27 from Iran, patron of both Hizbollah and Hamas, Policy Conference in March 2007. And in the a country that is developing nuclear weapons, aftermath of the war, the Jewish right remains and whose president had shortly before the war newly focused on the danger of Iran, publicly threatened Israel with destruction and emerged advocating stronger sanctions and privately in as the world’s most powerful Shoah denier. some limited circles a consideration of the use of Despite the condemnations of force under extreme circumstances. Hizbollah by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, On the other hand, polls repeatedly demon- and Egypt, an “us versus them” men- strate that American Jews are strongly opposed President tality was still prevalent throughout to the war in Iraq and any use of force in Iran. Bush’s the American Jewish community. Whether the problem is Iraq, Iran, Syria, or support With widespread international Palestine, American Jews by solid majorities are for Israel is criticism of Israel and its military in favor of negotiation. Similar to the general questioned in response, even from Human Rights rejection of his policies, the community does many circles Watch, the United States appeared not support President Bush’s Mideast policy, and . to be the only ally on whom Israel they are far more sympathetic with the newly could rely in what many American elected Democratic Congress. Even President Jews saw as an otherwise hostile and unsympa- Bush’s support for Israel is questioned in many thetic world. Indeed, in the AJC annual survey, circles as rhetorically robust but practically inept 56% of American Jews responded that Israel and and counter-productive. the Arabs would never be able to settle their In sum, these attitudes mean that the recent differences and live in peace, while only 38% war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 increased believed they would be able to do so. Given this the concern and awareness American Jews felt worldview, it is not surprising that in the imme- about the dangers Israel faces while simulta- diate aftermath of the war there was much talk neously intensifying skepticism about Israel’s in American Jewish circles about a second Shoah reliance on military force. Most American Jews perpetrated by Iran with deep worries expressed are looking to the Israeli government to pursue about Israel’s ability to survive in what seemed viable policies they can support. They are at to be a deeply hostile and progressively extrem- once more nervous about Israel’s future and ist region. more enthusiastic about negotiations than most However, the consequence of this new focus Israelis. These contradictory views mean that, on the perils confronting Israel works in two like most of those involved in the Arab-Israeli ways. On the one hand, President Bush’s strong conflict, they are looking for viable, practical support for Israel during the war meant renewed solutions to the seemingly intractable problems backing from strong advocates of Israel, espe- that resurfaced in the summer of 2006. The cially on the right and among Republicans, as war reinforced the expectation that American reflected in the warm welcome accorded to Jews will staunchly back Israel in crisis, but it Bush administration representatives, especially also revealed that, perhaps more than in earlier Vice President Cheney, at the annual AIPAC crises, they are desperately looking for a way

28 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS out of fear and hopelessness. Understanding majority of American Jews are seeking answers: future American Jewish attitudes should be seen they will solidly back Israel in crisis, and any in this light. differences among disparate groups This conclusion means that the American will be muted or even eliminated. Jewish community is staunch, perhaps stauncher But between crises they will pick The American than many analysts might have thought before and choose among perspectives. Jewish com- the war, as reflected almost incidentally in the And, after the war, neither the left munity is intense negative outcry that greeted former nor the right has been able to mount more effec- President Jimmy Carter’s book published in a concerted perspective with wide- tive in November 2006, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid. spread support. As soon as there backing Israel But it also means that most American Jews is an initiative from Israel or the in extreme United States, there will almost cer- will follow an initiative pursued by either the crisis than it is American or the Israeli governments regarding tainly be widespread support among in generating the Palestinians, the Syrians, Lebanon, the Saudi American Jews whatever dissent innovative Peace Plan, or even the Iranians — particularly if may be raised, especially on the ideas or in secret or public diplomacy precipitates an end to right. The majority of American Jews pressing for the pretensions of an Iranian nuclear force. would prefer an initiative to stasis, Yet, if either government took major initia- but the apprehensions generated by government tives such as talking to Hamas or the Syrians the summer 2006 war also mean action in the there would be concerted opposition on the that there will not be any major calls absence of right as has already been seen over the last for specific diplomatic movements crisis. decade and a half in American Jewish reaction from American Jews either. And . to such disparate Israeli initiatives as Oslo and the impact of the summer events disengagement. Prime Ministers Rabin and mean that American Jews might be more likely Sharon were irritated that they had not received to support a military action against terrorists or stronger support among American Jews, and Syria or Iran by either the United States or Israel they were correct in arguing that some areas of than would have been the case before the war, the establishment were muted in their backing despite skepticism about their utility as reflected of their positions. Clearly, the impact of the in opposition to the Iraq war. right was to create areas of tepid reaction in In sum, the impact of the war on American the community. However, in the end both ini- Jews was contradictory. It generated increased tiatives were supported by the overwhelming fear and intensified trust in diplomacy, produc- majority of American Jews, and undoubtedly ing opportunities for leaders in Washington a future Israeli initiative would similarly be and Jerusalem, especially on the diplomatic backed in analogous fashion — particularly in front, that did not exist beforehand. But it also the likely event the U.S. government backed it as meant that American Jews wanted more, not well. less. Interestingly, when Secretary of State Rice In the wake of the war, it is clear that the began her intensified diplomatic campaign in

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 29 early 2006, she received more criticism in the complex problems, and that leadership when it community for not doing enough than for doing comes is likely to emanate from outside rather too much. The organized community was fun- than inside the community. That is the critical damentally supportive. That experience reflects lesson of the Hizbollah war: even more than in more than any other where we are heading. previous times, the American Jewish commu- Similarly, the organized community has sup- nity today is more effective in backing Israel in a ported sanctions on Iran strongly, but except on moment of extreme crisis than it is in generating the far right and left it has been largely quiet innovative ideas or in pressing for government on the use of military force or of direct negotia- action in the absence of a crisis. The community tions. More than ever after 2006, the American is in the end more reactive than pro-active, and Jewish community is looking for leadership to should be understood in this vein.

30 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Israel — Developments in 2006–2007

OVERVIEW — though it is an open question how deep and long-lasting these effects are in light of the Developments in Israel during the assessed rapidity of situation-changing developments. period have been dominated by relations with Following the unprovoked kidnapping of two external actors and their domestic repercus- Israeli soldiers by a violent Hizbollah incursion, sions on one hand and social “normalcy” and Israel reacted with strong military action which Deconomic thriving on the other. However, the developed into what was retroactively formally most important feature was the high rate of entitled the Second Lebanon War. During the change including reality-altering surprise devel- first phases of the war, Israel and its leadership opments — which put Israel to hard tests that enjoyed substantial public and international continue with escalating vigor. support and leeway. However, as time passed, A time span of one year is too short to the perceived failure of the Israel Defense Forces evaluate the events, some of which are quite to deliver an unequivocal and speedy victory on dramatic. Therefore, this year’s Assessment one hand, and continuous massive missile fire on highlights only some selected Israeli events and Israel’s North on the other hand, led to erosion processes, whilst deeper analysis and evaluation of support. The war ended with United Nations will be undertaken in the 2008 Assessment. Security Council Resolution 1701, which met main Israeli demands for the withdrawal of THE WAR IN LEBANON AND ITS Hizbollah from the Northern border and the AFTERMATH setting up of a multi-national force to reinforce the Lebanese Army which moved to the South, The Second War in Lebanon and its still unravel- with provisions to prevent rearmament of ing aftermath constitute the key developments Hizbollah. However, while parts of the resolu- in Israel in the past year. The war, which lasted tion are being implemented, others, including 33 days, was one of Israel’s longest. Despite its very important ones such as disarmament of Tlow toll in human life compared to Israel’s other Hizbollah and preventing shipments of military wars, it had deep impact on Israeli society, its equipment via Syria, are not. Concerning longer- perception of itself and its perception by others term impacts of the War on Israeli deterrence,

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 31 future developments in Lebanon, the Palestinian to investigate the conduct of the war both on issue and the geopolitics of the region as a whole, the political and the military echelons and to evaluations differ and impacts on draw conclusions as it sees fit, on the basis of the future are unclear. access to all relevant material and the right to In Israel there is strong disagree- question officials at its discretion. Asymmetric ment on the conduct of the war and The War in Lebanon was directed by a team high-inten- its results. While nearly all agree of leaders of civilian background, Olmert as sity wars that the war was not managed well, PM, Amir Peretz, the former head of the Labor cannot end in there is a division of opinions: some Union, as Defense Minister. The background of “victory” or think that it should have been con- the then Chief of Staff, Dan Halutz, consisted “defeat” in cluded earlier or perhaps not have mainly of serving in the air force rather than in the classical been started; another view is that the ground forces. Parts of the public criticized meanings of it should have been pursued much them harshly, but most of the public awaited more intensely with large scale entry the report of the Committee of Inquiry. In April these terms. . into Northern Lebanon of massive 2007 its eagerly awaited Interim Report was pub- Israeli troop formations. There is lished, in both classified and public versions. also disagreement whether the While the Commission was initially suspect results, including effects on deterrence, are more for being nominated by the government which of a “victory” or of a “defeat.” However, in con- was to be investigated and lacking the status of sidering these opinions and the war as a whole, a Judicial Commission of Inquiry of the past, one should keep in mind that asymmetric high- the personal standing of its members, as well as intensity wars of this type are inherently hard to its damning Interim Report established its cre- tackle and cannot end in “victory” or “defeat” in dentials in the public, and quelled the popular the classical meanings of these terms. protests. The Interim Report dealt in detail with A strong protest movement against the way the first constitutive days of the war. It chas- in which the war was managed resulted in the tised the leadership for faulty decision-making, setting up of an official committee of inquiry by pointing to “very serious failings in the decisions the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, and the way they were made” and especially approved by the Cabinet on 17 September 2006. the lack of consideration of “the whole range The Winograd Committee, known by its chair, of options” reflecting a “weakness in strate- Eliyahu Winograd, is composed of five members: gic thinking.” Contrary to expectations, the the chair, who is a retired judge, two senior Commission wrote in unequivocal terms that retired generals, and two senior professors and “The primary responsibility for these serious policy intellectuals.* It has a very broad mandate failings rests with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff.” However, while making a number * One of whom is the Founding President of JPPPI and the second of whom is a member of the Board of important recommendations for improving of Directors of JPPPI. performance of the government and assuring

32 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS high-quality professional staff work on polit- of a sign of robustness or of social weakness. ical-military issues, directed in part to redress Probably it is a mixture of both. over-influence of the military, it refrained from In some views, disappointment with Israeli making any personal recommendations, reserv- performance during the war impairs its image in ing the right to do so in its final report. the USA as a strong partner and increases appre- The resignation of Dan Halutz, as well as hensions among Jews about the security of Israel. Peretz’ declaration that he would resign after the However, such impacts must be seen within Labor Party primaries and his subsequent ousting longer-term processes, such as the successful from the Defense Ministry by new Labor Party launching of an Israeli surveillance satellite. Still, Chairman Ehud Barak, are at least partly a result clearly the Second Lebanon War makes it all the of the Winograd Committee’s work and report. more necessary for future military actions to The future of the Prime Minister is widely result in unambiguous Israeli achievements. At regarded as depending on the Final Report of the the same time, the war makes clear, as should Committee expected in the autumn of 2007. have been known in advance, that in asymmet- One of the war’s most problematic aspects ric conflicts, whether of low or high intensity, which is widely accepted as a failure, also as classical concepts of “victory” do not apply. a result of the State Comptroller’s Report, was Following the end of the war, intense the handling of the home front. Not only were drawing of lessons in the IDF and the Winograd Israel’s civilians in the North and Center-North Interim Report, intense learning and improve- shelled for 33 successive days, but also the ment efforts, strongly supported by the Prime handling of the shelled towns is widely seen Minister, are under way. Much of as very inadequate. Images on TV of old and the military is undergoing retraining, disabled people sitting in run-down shelters military stocks have been upgraded waiting for volunteers to bring them food were and all of Israel’s defense doctrine Long-term not uncommon. Some municipalities exhibited a is under revision (a process which results of complete breakdown of order with their person- started before the war in a task the Second nel fleeing the towns, but others performed very force headed by former Minister Lebanon War well. Civic actors, such as volunteers, NGO’s, Dan Meridor). The defense budget- depend a lot Jewish organizations, wealthy individuals or ing process is also being revised, on Israel’s corporations provided important services. following recommendations of ability to However, life for most Israelis continued a committee headed by David learn from as usual, though there was much identification Brodet, former director-general of errors. with the North and many had relatives and the Treasury. . friends from the North who came to live with All in all, it is widely agreed that them. There was a good deal of volunteering long-term results of the Second to help the North, but much of the “sweet life” Lebanon War depend a lot on Israel’s ability to of Tel Aviv continued as usual, at least on the learn from errors and that its strength as a demo- surface. Opinions differ whether this is more cratic learning society openly investigating its

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 33 failures augurs well for the future. However, the East as a whole. Israel is aware of this situation enemies of Israel are also learning and re-arming, and tries to prepare for it by both seeking agree- including Hizbollah as arms flow from Syria and ment and gearing for conflict. Iran has not been effectively stopped, despite UN Resolution 1701. All the more so, Israel is SYRIA making a supreme effort to prepare for whatever may come. Relations with Syria are also in part unstable. Syria re-supplied Hizbollah and strengthens its cooperation with Iran. At the same time, THE PALESTINIANS it expresses readiness and even willingness to One of the probable effects of the Israeli failure Rnegotiate with Israel “without prior conditions” to stop missile attacks on its North during the on reaching a peace. Second Lebanon War, is a shift in activities Intelligence assessments in Israel, as pub- by extremist Palestinian groups from suicide lished in the mass media, differ in their opinions Oattacks in Israel to shooting of light missiles on and recommendations, some supporting negoti- the South of Israel and especially the town of ations with Syria and others regarding the offers Sderot, in part because of the electoral success as a trap designed to improve the international of Hamas and their desire to concentrate on standing of Syria without any real willingness to solidifying their power and in part thanks to reach an accommodation with Israel. the Security Fence. However, Israeli counter- This is a critical issue for Israeli statecraft measures including selective preventive action which became acute during the period of this continued and the Israeli government contin- assessment, which is all the more complex ued to express its adherence to the Road Map. because of the lack of USA support for Israeli Then another quantum jump characterizing the negotiations with Syria. Middle East and Israel’s predicaments occurred, namely the brutal takeover of Gaza by Hamas THE GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AS A as part of violent power struggles among the WHOLE Palestinians. It is too early to gauge the results of this The Second Lebanon War, which after all was development. In some respects it might provide a very limited one, and developments with the a “partner” on the West Bank for agreements Palestinians resonated with broader external with Israel, but on the other it may develop into geopolitical developments, most prominently establishment of an Islamic fanatic quasi-state Tthe growing influence of Iran and radical Islam in Gaza which becomes an active base for anti- in the Middle East. The war with Hizbollah was Israeli activities in cooperation with Iran and its viewed through this prism as a general rehearsal allies. The second half of 2007 and 2008 may for a conflict with Iran. Hamas’ takeover of Gaza well be critical for the future of Israeli-Palestinian was viewed in a similar vein. Iran’s increasingly relations and indeed for the future of the Middle bellicose statements against Israel and its lead-

34 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS ership’s Shoah denial, especially as a means to nuclear activities, and the danger of Islamic undermining what is viewed as one of Israel’s extremists. most important claims to legitimacy, consoli- USA deeper entanglement in Iraq, together dated the growing sense among Israelis that with changes in domestic U.S. Israel is being encircled on all sides by Iran and politics, raise questions about its local subsidiaries. This led to a question- future policies in the Middle East. The most ing of whether the process of Arab acceptance Relations with the USA continue serious geo- of Israel’s existence, which began in the early to be critical for the future of Israel. strategic issue 1970s, was now jeopardized by the Hamas They continue to be very strong, but facing Israel phenomenon and the strengthening of the Iran- worries persist. continues to Hizbollah-Hamas axis, which negates Israel’s However, the most serious be Iran’s per- very existence. geostrategic issue facing Israel con- sistent efforts The victory and military takeover of Gaza tinues to be Iran and its persistent to move by Hamas also tended to confirm the view that and apparently partly successful towards the Palestinian side is divided and from Israel’s efforts to move towards a nuclear a nuclear point of view does not constitute a reliable party. weapons capability, including weapons Against Hamas, which is opposed to recognition delivery vehicles. This issue will capability, of and peace with Israel, there is Fatah with its most likely continue to dominate including leader Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the elected Israeli security issues because of the delivery Palestinian President, who recognizes Israel, is serious dangers it poses, which are vehicles. committed to the peace process and rejects the viewed by many as existential. . use of terrorism. But President Abbas is unable to control Hamas, and his own movement is ISRAELI MINORITIES weak and divided. However, concurrently with what seems like a significant step backwards Relationships between Israel’s Jewish majority by the Palestinians in the process aimed at and its Arab Muslim minority exhibited a fork- achieving peace with Israel, certain other moves like path with separatist and integrationist indicate that some of the prerequisites for a trends both becoming stronger. The publication historical compromise are ripening and espe- Rof the Future Vision of the Arab Palestinians in cially that the “three no’s’”of the Arab League Israel by the National Committee of the Heads in Khartoum (1967) — no peace, no recognition of the Arab Local Authorities voiced clearly that and no negotiation with Israel — have turned the pre-requisite for integration and recognition into “yes” in the Beirut (2002) and Riad (2007) depends on Israel’s stripping itself of its Jewish resolutions. A normal peaceful relationship with identity. Whereas the document received some Israel is now defined as a strategic goal by sig- thoughtful responses by Jewish intellectuals in nificant parts of the Arab world. The moderate the press, on the whole it was perceived by the Arab countries are disturbed and frightened Israeli public as just another confirmation that by Iranian hegemonic regional ambitions and Israel’s Arab minority does not accept the basic

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 35 right of Israel to exist as the homeland of the runners against Olmert in the next elections. Jewish people. Olmert, Netanyahu, Barak and their generation However, many Arab citizens of political leaders are operating in an environ- repeatedly argued that the ment of low expectations, guarded perceptions, document represents extremist diminishing ideological fervor and harsh and in Olmert, and minority views within their part intractable external and security problems. Netanyahu community and that the majority Citizens seem to perceive the next generation of of Israel’s Arab citizens are more and Barak political leaders as less impressive, less vision- interested in gaining greater access are operating ary, more personally flawed, less committed, to employment opportunities and in an environ- and more prone to pursuit of personal gain. A social services. These citizens were ment of low poll conducted for Ben-Gurion University in provided several positive gestures, May 2007 showed that 82% of Israel’s citizens expectations, when Raleb Majadla was nominated do not think that any of Israel’s leaders share guarded per- to become Israel’s first ever Arab ceptions and Minister, when the Labor Union David Ben-Gurion’s qualities of leadership, diminishing launched a national strike on behalf vision, humility and integrity. David Grossman, ideological of employees of municipalities the writer who has lost his son in the war, called fervor. — Arab in a major part — whose the leadership “hollow” in his speech on Rabin’s . salaries were not paid for months, Memorial Day, a phrase widely picked up in the and when legal efforts to ensure mass media and by the public. their increased representation in Traditional divisions between left and right, government civil service posts were conducted between pro-peace and pro-Land of Israel are in earnest. increasingly irrelevant with the broad majority of the Israeli public forming “a new middle” in A GENERATIONAL SHIFT IN which there is little ideological support for con- LEADERSHIP tinued occupation, but also deep distrust of the Palestinians, and the wider Arab and Muslim The past year marked also the final changing of world. Voters perceive the difference in views, as the guard in Israel’s top political leadership. After well as personalities, between the front-runners a “start” in the second half of the 1990’s under Netanyahu and then briefly under Barak, the as minute. The confluence of the war’s negative Tyears 2000 — 2007 were marked by a return to outcomes and later developments with the gen- the perceived comfort of old and trusted leaders, erational change in leadership may become a especially Ariel Sharon. Sharon’s descent into watershed in Israeli politics, hopefully bringing coma in 2006 and Peres’ move into the non-ex- about a re-vitalization. There are indicators of ecutive presidency left the next generation of movement in such a direction, but this may leadership in power and opened the way for the require time — while at the same time Israel re-emergence of Netanyahu and Barak as front- faces critical choices.

36 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS THE CHALLENGE OF CORRUPTION Olmert’s ability to put together a coalition of those who have much to lose by early elections, The leadership crisis is magnified by the frequent including some of the main parties and many of surfacing of suspected and also proven cases of the present Knesset members. corruption, unethical behavior and even crimes among Israel’s senior politicians. Israeli society T ISRAEL’S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE demonstrated that it is willing — reluctantly — to tolerate some forms of corruption. However, the As if separated from the region’s geopolitics and revelation of suspected instances of corruption the summer’s war, Israel’s economy continued committed by leaders lacking public credibility to grow in a healthy pace. The war registered causes public hue and cry. The investigations barely a blip on Israel’s economic indicators, of suspicions concerning a number of senior Awhich investment bank analysts have termed ministers and the President, together with the nearly perfect. For the first time in its history, findings of the Zeiler committee’s investigations Israel’s exports were higher than its imports, into police behavior, generated a widespread the stock market broke new records and more sense of a dangerous wave of corruption, tied in and more Israelis made a name for themselves with a broader context of “money and politics.” as international investors. The sale Together with the perceived results of the of the Wertheimer’s family’s Iscar to Second Lebanon War and other developments, Warren Buffet before the war and the pronounced result reflected in all opinion his subsequent visit to Israel after Two Israels: polls is decreasing trust in government. This is the war, where he expressed his a successful widespread also in other Western democracies, admiration for Iscar’s management entrepreneur- but more dangerous in Israel in view of its aspi- and achievements and for the Israeli ial private rations on one hand and existential problems on hi-tech and its knowledge-intense sector is the other. industry in general, seemed to take thriving side place in a world disconnected from by side with GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY the region’s turmoil. This has led one of Israel’s leading financial writers a declining Despite all these developments, Olmert’s gov- to write of “two Israels”, in which and in parts ernment has weathered all storms to the surprise a successful entrepreneurial private apparently of many. The paradox is that while Olmert’s sector is functioning and thriving corrupt politi- government has been exhibiting remarkable side by side with a political and cal and public D public sector that is declining and sector stability amid continuous challenges and very low approval ratings, the continuous expecta- even corrupt. The New York Times . tion of its imminent collapse has created a sense columnist Tom Friedman pointed of persistent government instability — which to this phenomenon in his June 10th has proven false. One potential source of the column “Israel Discovers Oil” saying that “if you government’s ability to survive may rest with want to know why Israel’s stock market and car

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 37 sales are at record highs — while Israel’s gov- BETWEEN RISE AND DECLINE ernment is paralyzed by scandals and war with The past year’s developments sharpen ques- Hamas and doesn’t even have a finance minister tions on the trajectory of Israel into the future: — it’s because of the ecosystem of young inno- what trends move more towards dangers and vators and venture capitalists.” Witnessing this which ones provide more of opportunities? dichotomy many commentators have wondered TAnd, is Israel adequately equipped to contain about its sustainability. the dangers and utilize the opportunities? At the same time, significant parts of the Although quite a few indicators may be read population did not benefit from the economic as pointing in a negative direction, our assess- prosperity, income disparities remain very pro- ment is that the last year demonstrated both nounced and the number of poor remained serious domains of weakness and significant high despite some improvement. Therefore, domains of strength. There is ground for worry Israel continues to face major socio-economic but also for hope — and most important of all problems. for the future will be Israel’s capacity to learn from failures and to rebuild its leadership, tasks with which the Jewish People can be of much help.

38 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS The Jews of Europe 2000–2007

Europe today is in the midst of a period of seems to be emerging whereby the model of a transition. Old economic, political and social multicultural society is replaced by an immigra- certainties and paradigms are changing or dis- tion policy with strong demands on integration, integrating and have not yet been replaced by language skills and the acceptance of Western Enew ones. The continent is changing rapidly values. And last but not least, the rise of evan- and often beyond recognition. In this defining gelicalism and a Catholic church working for moment nobody can be sure where Europe is more or less opening for a “re-Christianization” actually heading. Demographic decline, over- of Europe exert more and more influence as can burdened social welfare states, growing state be seen in recent developments in Italy. The old sectors, economic stagnation, mass immigration and established European Jewish communities from Muslim lands, secularization, a European find themselves caught in these developments integration which seems disoriented and para- on a continent where not much is defined these lyzed, weak defense and foreign policies and days and a lot of things seem to be shifting and anti-Americanism are characterizing many conflicting. This opens up new dilemmas and parts of Europe and have led some to write off challenges. To give one example: Out of past Europe altogether. However the dismissal of experience and ideological conviction, European the old continent seems a bit premature con- Jews tended until recently overwhelmingly to sidering that most economies are gaining steam be politically liberal and to the left, advocating again in 2006/07, with reform agendas under a multicultural society. Out of concern for their way or being discussed in Germany, France and security and their long-term survival, which Italy, and considering that a modified European many see endangered by Muslim immigra- integration is being pursued with new vigor. In tion and the so-called new antisemitism, many the aftermath of the murder of Theo van Gogh today support the right-wing, advocating strong in Holland, the London bombings and the con- immigration control combined with strong troversy on the Mohamed-cartoons there are demands on integration and assimilation. While in most Western European countries intense maybe diminishing an Islamist threat, these debates raging on the compatibility of immigra- new integration policies with their centralizing tion and Western democratic values. A consensus nationalist overtones could well make it harder

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 39 to preserve Jewish identity as well. They could on a special meaning in the public Jewish dis- well prove problematic and counterproductive course of the 1990s largely due to the symbolic from a Jewish point of view. Jews are caught in significance Germany still holds in the collec- a political dilemma. tive Jewish memory as being both the country where Jewish modernity largely originated and centered and where the destruction of European DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE Jewry was conceived and executed. Great hopes The community being confronted by this is of a German-Jewish renaissance were put into shrinking and therefore becoming weaker losing the revival which immigration was seen to bring the limited political clout it had in the first place. to the Jewish communities in Germany, and In 2001 about 1.6 million Jews lived in Europe. which was supposed to be at the very center TNumbers have been steadily declining for of a general European-Jewish revival. Because decades due to low birth rates, assimilation and of this, many Jewish organizations rushed to intermarriage and to emigration. In the countries Germany establishing a symbolic or even real of the Former Soviet Union numbers have gone presence, opening offices in Frankfurt and Berlin down dramatically since 1990 with only some or building institutions such as rabbinical semi- 413,000 Jews still living there. In most European naries. Jewish communities the balance of death and With the number of community members birth is negative. However communities are rising from 26,000 in 1989 to 102,472 in 2003, shrinking at different speeds. In many countries the situation indeed seemed dynamic. Jews smaller communities are vanishing and Jews seemed to be thriving in Germany. That in are concentrating in larger communities, so the 2000 there were 87 official congregations with big cites might still see growing communities. dozens of synagogues and community centers In 2001 the European Union (EU) still had an built, with Germany becoming the worldwide estimated combined Jewish population of some focus of Jewish architecture, seemed to prove 1 million with France being the biggest com- that there was indeed a Jewish renaissance munity and Paris being the largest Jewish city under way. Jewish officials and intellectuals outside of America or Israel. Britain’s Jewish started to speak of a community which had population has been dropping steadily since the passed the provisional state of always “sitting 1970s and was estimated at 275,000 in 2001. on packed suitcases” but finally was here to stay as an integral part of Germany. All this seemed to coincide with a renewed interest THE GERMAN EXCEPTION — A by the general public in anything Jewish and RENAISSANCE UNDER WAY? in a renewed preoccupation with the coun- Germany was the only country whose Jewish try’s Nazi past. Museums and memorials were community experienced massive growth during constructed, the most famous of which are the 1990s due to large scale immigration from the Holocaust memorial and the Berlin Jewish Gthe former Soviet Union. This immigration took museum, which together with the partly recon- 40 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS structed synagogue at Oranienburgerstrasse therefore decided not to settle immigrants in have become Berlin landmarks. Jewish study existing communities but to spread them across centers were established and expanded at many the whole country, bringing them “back” to universities. For the first time Jewish history was towns and even villages were Jewish life had taught and studied as part of the general Jewish been absent since 1938. history. The existing Jewish community on the Nevertheless what many missed to see other hand saw the influx of was that the so-called revival under way was immigrants as the sole chance to largely state-sponsored and artificial. It was to strengthen itself and secure its serve appearances more than substance. Jewish demographic survival. As refugees Jewish immi- immigration bolstering Jewish demographics under the “Quota Refugee Law,” the grants to had come about as a result of political decision- “Kontingentflüchtlingsgesetz” Jews Germany, making which sought to reassure the West in were to enjoy free entrance and resi- having been the aftermath of reunification of the good inten- dency . All persons from the Former recognized tions of the new Germany with its newfound Soviet Union (FSU) whose nation- as refugees, full sovereignty and its massive economic and ality there had been registered as had access to political clout in Europe. That is one of the main “Jewish” or who were descended reasons why the newly unified German Federal from at least one Jewish parent were state-spon- Republic continued after 1990 the policy of the eligible for immigration. Non-Jewish sored benefits newly defunct Eastern German GDR which in spouses, children under 18 and including its last days had opened its borders to alleg- unmarried adult children living in the free lodging, edly persecuted Jews from the former Soviet same household were also included. language Union. Whereas the reason East Germany had Since Jewish immigrants were to be courses and opened its gates seems to have been a late try recognized as refugees under the welfare. at “Wiedergutmachung,” the newly unified “Geneva Refugee Convention” of . Germany by furthering Jewish immigration 1954 they had access to state-spon- would demonstrate to a rather suspicious world sored benefits such as free lodging, that it had definitely changed since 1945. By rec- language-courses and welfare. There was to reating a large Jewish presence in the country be no limit as to the extent of Jewish immigra- Germany would show that it had definitely tion into Germany except for the absorption come to terms with its past and arrived in the capacity of the German “Länder.” Compared to democratic West for good. If the Jews “returned” other refugees, they were better treated, with and trusted the emerging new Germany, then the notable exception of ethnic Germans who it could be trusted by Europeans, Americans at the time arrived from the FSU and Romania and the rest of the world as well. Restoration by the hundreds of thousands. Until the end of of Jewish life therefore clearly served a foreign 2004, some 190,000 people from the Former policy purpose. To create something resembling Soviet Union reached Germany as Jewish pre-1933 “normalcy” was the aim and it was “Kontingentflüchtlinge.”

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 41 NO RENAISSANCE world — an immigration which went straight away into welfare was hard to justify at a time This at first seemed to revive the Jewish com- when Germany faced high unemployment and munity in Germany which turned into the the social welfare system was strained. Pressure fastest-growing Jewish community of the world by the Israeli government was an additional factor Tbesides Israel. Nevertheless it soon became clear in taking the decision to limit Jewish immigra- that integrating the newcomers proved to be a tion in 2005. From then on Jews like every body challenge well beyond the human and financial else fell under a new “Zuwanderungsgesetz” or resources of many communities. By 2006 many “Immigration Law.” This law was to regulate communities were on the verge of splitting and to limit all migration into Germany. The along the lines of “newcomers” and “oldtimers.” new law puts the immigrants’ integration and The Jewish credentials and the Jewish interest of many newcomers also remained doubtful. Only their economic prospects well before any other less than 80,000 of the 190,000 who had come consideration. It now required that Jews with became members of organized Jewish commu- the intent to immigrate to Germany first had to nities. The policy of distributing immigrants prove that an existing community would accept across the whole country instead of integrating them as members. This meant that Halachic them into existing communities also proved to criteria were introduced into the legal process, be problematic. People were sent to places with since most of the communities organized in no Jewish infrastructure. There was a shortage of the “Zentralrat” are Orthodox-affiliated. Prior Rabbis, teachers and communal workers despite knowledge of the German language was also the activities of Habad-Lubavitch and the Lauder required. Potential Jewish immigrants now foundation establishing schools, seminaries, a had to prove that they would not be depen- Yeshiva and providing basic religious services. dent on welfare and that they were willing to Often after an initial period of belonging to com- enter the German labor market. Already in the munity and receiving funds people just seemed course of 2005 immigration of Jews from the to vanish in a void. Add to that, that in early former Soviet Union dropped dramatically. It 2005 according to a German ministry of interior has dropped ever since. The period of rapid estimate, between 60 to 85 percent of Jewish expansion of the Jewish community in Germany immigrants were still dependent on welfare. was over. The communities affiliated with the Most FSU-immigrants were not integrated into the economy, despite their generally high “Zentralrat” now count 105,000 members. Since academic qualifications. The ministry thought this is still a Jewish community where a large this to be due to the lack of knowledge of the part of the members live on welfare, where reli- German language and the advanced age of many gious and non-religious Jewish institutions are Jewish immigrants. For German officials — not struggling and where the young only make for needing Jewish immigration anymore to make a small percentage, a renaissance does not seem reunification go down well in the rest of the under way.

42 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS SOCIAL STATUS NEW ANTISEMITISM

The German example shows the importance There are however plenty of studies on anti- of socio-economic data in judging the future semitism in most major European countries. of a community. With the notable exception The reason is of course the emergence of the Tof Germany recent data concerning the socio- Tso-called new antisemitism since 2000, which is economic status of Jews is hard to come by. It a general European phenomenon. The European is still generally assumed that European Jewry is Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia largely middle class or upper middle class. The (EUMC) — a European Community body — case of the German Jewish community proves has commissioned several reports on the issue this assumption wrong. Not much is known in of antisemitism in Western Europe since 2002. this respect about other Jewish communities It specifically deals with the diminishing line in Europe. However it is probably safe to say between antisemitism and excessive criticism that Jews are as hit by the effects of high unem- of Israel leading to a discourse of delegitimiza- ployment and economic decline during recent tion of both Israel and the Jewish people. In its years as everyone else. Even in Switzerland with working definition of antisemitism the EUMC its 3 percent unemployment rate and high per comes to the conclusion that denying the Jewish capita income is still one of the most affluent people the right to self determination, applying countries on the continent, more and more Jews double standards when it comes to Israel and the have been forced to turn to the social welfare Jews and holding Jews collectively responsible offices of Jewish communities. In France quite a for actions of the state of Israel are all displays of great number of Jews actually live in the lower antisemitism. The combination of classic forms middle class suburbs — the Banlieue — which of antisemitism with anti-Israelism of the left are most hit by the economic and social crisis and the prejudice coming from the background France experienced in the last decade. Often of largely Muslim immigrant communities make Jews live there next to immigrants from the up the fabric of the new antisemitism. The so- Maghreb. Since these suburbs are also hotbeds called new antisemitism is especially striking of violent protest and islamist agitation, Jews in France. As the French researcher Jean-Yves often find themselves exposed to violence there. Camus writes, since the beginning of the Second In England high real estate prices are changing Intifada the increase in antisemitic activity is an the face of the London community. There as everyday reality in France, as shown by both almost everywhere else the high cost of housing the statistics of the Ministries of the Interior and of Jewish education seem to put great strain and Justice and those of the representative on Jewish household budgets and thus on Jewish body of the Jewish Community, CRIF (Conseil continuity. However since studies on poverty, Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France). social status and social mobility are virtually The number of violent antisemitic acts grew non-existent this cannot be proven in quantita- dramatically between 2002 and 2004. However, tive terms. since then — mainly due to increased police

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 43 work and a strong law and order policy by In Germany antisemitism is also on the rise then minister of interior and present president despite the enormous effort invested in remem- Nicolas Sarkozy — incidents have diminished bering the past or “Vergangenheitsbewältigung.” somewhat. Nevertheless there seems to be a As in other countries open manifestations of feeling of uneasiness amongst French Jews. antisemitism, anti-Americanism and anti-Israel- According to Camus it derives from the fact, ism have become fashionable in all social circles. that for the first time since 1945, while the threat A recent empirical study commissioned by the of the extreme right remains a new social-democratic Friedrich-Ebert-Institute and form of antisemitism has emerged, presented in 2006 actually proves this point. While Jews which comes from a radicalized Opinions of the extreme and neo-Nazi right are still segment of the Muslim population. are no longer to be found in fringe groups only prominent in This segment of the population is but have arrived at the very center of society. the political on the rise. While the Jewish com- All in all 26.7 percent of all Germans east and and intel- munity now stands at about 575,000 west agree to xenophobic statements, while 8.6 lectual life out of a total population of 58,520 percent were shown to have a rigid extreme- of France, as million, the number of Muslims is right or neo-Nazi views. The number of openly result of the estimated at somewhere between antisemitic people was 20.1 percent much higher demographic 3.7 and 6 million. While Jews are than in the “New Bundeslaender” (the old com- still quite prominent in the political munist GDR), where it stands at 9.2 percent change they and intellectual life of the Republic, only. Physical attacks are also on the rise in will lose influ- as result of the demographic change Germany. ence. they will lose influence. The result of . In Switzerland a 1998 report by the Federal all of this is that aliyah from France Commission against Racism demonstrated that is on the rise as is emigration to Canada, though antisemitism was on the advance. As elsewhere most French Jews stay put. The more affluent in Europe, the Swiss media’s presentation of buy apartments in Israel. Antisemitism is also Israel and the Middle East has been a major on the rise in Britain. Already in 2003 there were factor. A recent poll found that over 86 percent 375 antisemitic incidents recorded, representing of Swiss Jews deplore media bias and distor- a 7 percent increase from 2002. Incidents have tions and think they have contributed to a major risen ever since. In 2006 a 20-year record was decrease in personal and communal security. reached with 60 percent more reported incidents Verbal and sometimes physical attacks have than in1986. Of those incidents, 37percent were become common but still are rarely recorded considered violent. These have included cases or reported. Only recently has the Swiss of physical harassment, desecration of syna- Federation of Jewish Communities set up an gogues and cemeteries, threats and propaganda. institution to collect data and provide reliable A disproportionate amount of manifestations of statistics, and its first report stated that antise- antisemitism in Britain originate from Islamist mitic incidents are on the rise. Anti-Israelism is sources. now common on all levels of Swiss society, and

44 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS so is antisemitism though it is expressed less was his sickness and not his antisemitism. He openly. A March 2000 poll by the GFS-Research received a light sentence. Immediately after the Institute in Berne found that 16 percent of the synagogue fire in Geneva which destroyed part Swiss population harbored intense antisemitic of the building on the second day of Shavuoth feelings. Although this result was similar to the 2007 the Geneva police suspected arson. Only a European average, it was double the percent- few hours after having issued a statement to the age earlier polls had found. A 2006 study by the press, Geneva officials retracted and spoke about University of Geneva’s Department of Sociology an electrical shortcut as the most likely cause of found that 20 percent of the Swiss are “affected the fire. The investigation was still under way by antisemitism.” Since the methodology of the by the end of May 2007. Geneva study has come under attack, the GFS Research Institute prepared a new study which POSITIVE TRENDS was published in April 2007. According to this study only 10 percent of the Swiss population While Jewish communities experience hold systematic antisemitic views. This would demographic decline and exposure to rising be the lowest percentage in Europe. The study antisemitism there is at the same time a rising is however using a classic definition of antisemi- interest in everything Jewish on the continent. tism excluding excessive criticism of Israel as WKlezmer music is en vogue for more than a defined by the EUMC. On closer inspection it decade now. Jewish and Israeli literature leads also turns out that an additional 28 percent are bestseller lists. Jewish topics fill the pages of said to be holding “selective anti-Jewish views.” nearly every European periodical. Jewish Studies That the picture may be even bleaker is sug- have become an established discipline in more gested by the latest GFS study, which finds 50 and more universities. Institutes and Jewish percent of the Swiss agreeing to the statement Museums are opened everywhere. Germany that Israel is conducting a war of extermination can again serve as an example. In Munich, against the Palestinians. Be that as it may, the on November 9, 2006, the 68th anniversary of synagogue fires of Lugano in 2005 and Geneva “Kristallnacht,” a new synagogue, soon to be in 2007 seem to show that there indeed is a completed with a new community center and problem with antisemitism in Switzerland and a Jewish museum, was dedicated in the very perhaps with its public handling as well. In heart of the city center. With its height of 20 Lugano, arson was established as the reason of meters, it constitutes a landmark which will the fire which caused heavy damage. The perpe- be an integral part of the Munich skyline and trator was then found and arrested and brought cannot be missed. However, whether a largely to trial. Despite a rather long history of antise- cultural and historic interest by the Europeans mitic utterances and deeds on his part the court is enough to enhance Jewish security and to established that the arsonist was mentally ill and guarantee Europe’s remaining Jews a long-term therefore his reason for burning the synagogue future remains to be seen.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 45 46 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Part III

Societal Aspects of the Jewish People

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 47 48 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Jewish Religious Patterns

Second Lebanon War suggests that a real rap- The marked decline in overt Jewish interreligious prochement may be in the making. tension in recent years is viewed by many as a In Israel, however, the situation is more very positive development in American Judaism. complex. On one level, there are signs of more It is held to bespeak a new era of tolerance and T “civil” meetings between Orthodox and Reform even pluralism, which are viewed as signs of factions. On the most official levels, however, communal health. Some, however, such as Jack the conflict between the Orthodox establish- Wertheimer, provost of the Jewish Theological ment and the non-Orthodox, especially Reform, Seminary, are not so sanguine. Wertheimer has intensified. For example, on Yom Hashoah correctly avers that beneath all of the manifest (Shoah Memorial Day), former Chief Rabbi cooperation, there are very basic divisions Mordechai Eliyahu opined that the Shoah was between the leaders of the different religious punishment for the sins of Reform Judaism. Just movements and they speak very different lan- one week later, the invitation to the father of an guages which have very different meanings even Israeli soldier killed in the line of duty to par- when employing the same term. ticipate in the official Yom Hazikaron (Memorial It remains to be determined whether a com- Day) prayer service was retracted because he munity requires that everyone agree or even was a Reform rabbi and refused to accede to a employ the same categories of religious dis- request to be called upon without his title. course, or instead, that despite their differences All indications are that the official rabbin- they feel a sense of kinship and at least behave ate is intensifying its stringencies in the most civilly toward each other. Perhaps what is impor- crucial areas, especially marriage, divorce, and tant is that the various factions view themselves conversion. There is a small number of more as a common community despite their ideologi- civil-minded, nationalist rabbis who are chal- cal differences, and that they cooperate civilly lenging the rabbinate’s monopoly, but they are with each other to a maximum feasible. The a very small minority. Even among the more cooperation of the various streams of American progressive rabbis of Religious Zionist back- Judaism during the efforts to help Israel when ground there is hesitancy to openly challenge it was attacked by Hizbollah rockets during the the rabbinate. In no small measure, the rab-

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 49 binate’s increasing stringency is related to the visible and powerful political articulation. Within significant growth in the political power of the the Sephardi community one can discern several Haredim, especially the Shas party, as evidenced trends signaling a pulling away from Shas, in by the slate of recent Haredi appointees to the varying directions, such as the call by Rabbi rabbinic courts. Those appointments generated Mordechai Eliyahu, former Sephardic Chief harsh criticism within the Religious Rabbi, arguing for the perpetuation of the range Zionist movement, both within of Sephardi halakhic traditions, contra Rabbi The opposi- Israel and in the Diaspora. Ovadia Yosef’s long-held stance in favor of a tion of the The growing strength of the unitary halakha for Sephardim and Ashkenazim Religious Haredim, especially Shas, was alike; at the same time, Sephardi religious intel- Zionist com- also largely responsible for the lectuals are increasingly articulating a moderate recent passage of the Nahari Law, and socially active Jewish identity from within munity to the according to which recognized but Sephardi traditions. disengage- unofficial educational institutions, Within the Religious Zionist community, ment has such as those of Haredim and the the Gaza disengagement of 2005 continues to not yet led Arab population, will receive finan- leave its marks. The nearly unanimous oppo- to a cor- cial underwriting along with state sition of the Religious Zionist community to responding schools. The law passed over- the disengagement has not led, as many feared disengage- whelmingly, even though it will it would, to a corresponding and thoroughgo- ment from clearly undermine the national edu- ing disengagement from secular Zionism and secular cation system. the State of Israel. Indeed, the disproportion- Zionism and The steady rise and institu- ate number of religious military casualties the State of tionalization over the last almost during the 2006 Lebanon War offered a sad but Israel. twenty-five years of the Shas party powerful reminder of the continued commit- . continues to reshape Israel’s reli- ment to the State and the Zionist project by the gious landscape in interesting ways. majority of Religious Zionists. (Interestingly, a Shas’ undertaking upon itself the maintenance similarly disproportionate number of casual- of a large social welfare apparatus not limited ties came from the Kibbutz movement, which, (as is its Ashkenzai Haredi counterpart) to despite its strong political disagreements with those in the ambit of yeshivot gives it a broader the Religious Zionist camp, still shares with the traction in Israeli society at large. Indeed, Shas latter an ideologically-grounded commitment to argues, contrary to both Religious Zionism and Zionism.) Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodoxy, that it can partici- A recent development which may have great pate in Israeli society as an explicitly religious, significance for religious-secular relations is the indeed Haredi, party that nonetheless rejects proposal by a member of the National Religious many of Zionism’s fundamental premises. Shas Party, Zevulun Orlev, suggested several years is by no means the exclusive vehicle of Sephardi ago by the Covenant of Prof. Ruth Gavizon and religious identity, but it is that identity’s most Rabbi Yaacov Meidan, of two laws, one which

50 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS establishes Sunday as an additional day of rest, within Religious Zionism powerfully to the in place of Friday, and a second which formally surface and perhaps to the breaking point. Even enacts the Sabbath as the official Israeli day of so, on Independence Day 2007 the Religious rest on which all industry and commerce, as well Zionist community as a whole held the prayer as government institutions, will be prohibited services and celebrations that it always had, indi- from functioning, but which does not explic- cating an enduring fundamental commitment to itly prohibit cultural events from taking place the state and its institutions. It is, nevertheless, on the Sabbath. Public transportation, other of concern that increasing numbers of intellec- than to cultural events and leisure, will also be tuals are no longer comfortable identifying as prohibited. This law is a compromise but one Religious Nationalists. which, on the one hand, establishes the sanctity Alongside this political ferment, the Religious of the Sabbath but, on the other, recognizes the Zionist community, left, right and center, contin- needs and desires of many non-observant Jews. ues to exhibit mounting cultural creativity in the The laws have received the endorsement of a realms of film, drama, plastic arts and literature number of highly regarded rabbinical figures, and this effervescence adds its own distinctive but it remains to be seen if they can survive the presence to Israeli cultural life. attacks from the ardent among both the religious The last fifteen years or so have and secular populations. seen the steady growth of a cluster For many On the other hand, within Religious Zionism of phenomena well-characterized of the one sees the further consolidation and growing by leading journalist Yair Sheleg as “Hardalim,” educational influence of the “Emuni” (“faithful”) “the fourth stream.” This includes the State is or “Hardal” trend (“Hardal” is the acronym avowedly secular batei midrash, merely a for “Haredi-Dati-Leumi” or “Ultra-Orthodox prayer services and prayer com- vehicle for Nationalist”). This grouping combines a powerful munities and life-cycle events, the the long- ideological commitment to settling the Land incorporation of Jewish texts and range goals of Israel with Ultra-Orthodoxy’s rejection of themes into the works of avowedly of settlement, secular culture and of feminism, and its reliance secular artists, writers and musi- which in turn on Da’at Torah (i.e. Rabbinic ideological rulings cians, secular rabbis, and festivals of is a religious not necessarily grounded in halakhic analysis) Jewish culture. duty with as the basis for political decision-making. While Central to this broad cultural Messianic historically Zionism saw settlement as serving project is Hebrew — both as lin- implications. the long-range goals of the State, for many of guistic medium as well as a vehicle . the Hardalim, the State is merely a vehicle for of cultural identity that connects the long-range goals of settlement, which in deeply with but does not necessarily identify turn is a religious duty with Messianic implica- with Judaism qua religion. In this respect the tions. While the Lebanon War has tabled issues “fourth stream” draws on, and is perhaps a of territorial compromise for now, any renewed renaissance of, an earlier Zionist vision (and diplomatic process will bring these tensions in particular that associated with the Second

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 51 Aliyah of 1904–1914, whose best known and of roughly one-quarter of the Committee’s most representative member was David Ben- members. On this particular issue, three Gurion) which saw in the creation of a modern opinions were thereby endorsed as legitimate Hebrew culture an effort that was both revolu- options within Conservatism: A reaffirmation tionary and an assertion of deep continuity with of traditional prohibitions on homosexuality, the totality of Jewish history and the classical accompanied by a concern for the welfare of gays sources. and lesbians; a ruling that gay and lesbian Jews While this phenomenon has points of contact may be ordained as clergy and their commit- with Israel’s very strong New Age culture, it ted relationships may be recognized, although differs in its explicit drawing on Jewish texts, not as sanctified marriage; and a ruling which, and its eschewal of the highly personal, some while upholding the traditional prohibitions, might say narcissistic, dimensions of New Age. argued that homosexuality is not a unitary con- At the same time, as Yair Sheleg crucially points dition and urged the development of educational out, this “fourth stream” has yet to give rise to programs within the community to achieve a distinctive body of Jewish praxis, let alone a understanding, compassion and dignity for gays social and political program. and lesbians. There was also some support on A number of groups, such as the committee for a more comprehensive repeal The issue of “MiMizrach Shemesh” and “Ma’aglei of the prior ban against homosexual relation- homosexual- Tzedek” are staking out strong posi- ships. ity may serve tions on social justice issues from Surveys taken soon after the decision indi- as a marker an avowedly traditional Jewish cated that much of the movement’s laity was between the perspective. Powerfully moving as left uncertain as to the decision’s operative Conservative these efforts are, they have yet to meaning. Some of that uncertainty was dispelled and the more wrap their hands around the com- in March 2007 when the Jewish Theological avowedly plexities of, let alone influence the Seminary, the denomination’s flagship institu- liberal workings of, elite power groups tion, announced that henceforth it would be or formulate broader sustainable elements accepting openly gay students to its rabbinical economic programs. and cantorial schools. In a statement accompa- within Turning to the U.S., in December nying the announcement, the Chancellor-elect, Orthodoxy. 2006, the Committee on Law and . Professor Arnold Eisen (though himself not Standards, which is the halakhic a rabbi, a distinguished scholar of modern advisory council of the Rabbinical Assembly, Jewish thought and society) explained that the Conservative Judaism’s rabbinic organiza- adoption of the two more liberalizing opinions tion, issued a range of opinions on the issue of “provided halakhic authorization of the move,” homosexuality in the Jewish community. By the that this decision was “in keeping with the long- terms of the Committee’s operations, a range standing commitment of the Jewish tradition of opinions on any one issue may be consid- to pluralism,” and that “we respect those who ered valid on that issue if it receives the support disagree with us and understand that in the

52 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS context of all that unites us, diversity makes us Jewish Israeli children registered in grade 1 is in stronger.” one of the Haredi school systems. The outcomes of this development for There are some 50,000–100,000 Old Yishuv Conservative Judaism, on its own terms and descendants and their fellows who do not vote its relationships to other denominations, or participate in Israeli socio-economic and polit- Orthodoxy in particular, remain to be seen. It will ical life. By contrast, the Sephardic Shas party is likely facilitate greater cooperation between the a member of the ruling political coalition and movement’s mainstream institutions and those holds three ministry positions. The Ashkenazi groups and institutions, such as the University Haredim still refuse official ministry of Judaism in Los Angeles, which have for positions but are able to lobby for some time been advocating this policy. At the the Haredi sector’s social and edu- In 2007, one same time, the resignation from the Committee cational interests and get financial of every three by Rabbi Joel Roth, perhaps the movement’s support without directly partaking in Jewish Israeli leading halakhist and author of the most tradi- governmental decision making. This children in tionalist ruling, perhaps indicates that the issue sector, composed of both Hassidic grade 1 is in of homosexuality may in the coming years serve and Lithuanian components, which one of the as a vivid marker between the Conservative is increasingly involved in Israeli Haredi school socio-economic life and is under- movement and the more avowedly liberal systems. elements within Orthodoxy. While it is too early going interesting change, is facing . to tell, the debate and discussion overall may major challenges. well contribute to the Conservative movement’s Their ideology was developed mainly by the clarifying its relationship to and understanding charismatic Rabbi Abraham Karelitz (“Hazon of halakhah on the whole. Ish” — 1878–1953) and his correspondingly charismatic follower Rabbi Elazar Menachem Shach (1898?-2001) during the 1950s and SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE AMONG 1960s in order to face the new political situa- ISRAEL’S HAREDI POPULATION tion of a Jewish minority “exiled” in a Jewish state. Karelitz proposed collaboration with Israeli ultra-Orthodox, “Haredi,” Jewry has the Zionist institutions to get financial funding grown dramatically over the past 50 years. and backing, in order to set up a cultural and Precise figures on the number of Haredim are not social enclave. He persuaded David Ben Gurion Iavailable, in part because of varying definitions to free Haredi youth studying in yeshivot from of who is a Haredi. Haredim now comprise 15 military service, and he developed a comprehen- percent of Knesset members. The Haredi popu- sive school system, ranging from kindergarten lation of Israel is growing steadily, primarily as to kollel (full time study institutions for married a result of high birth rate (4.7 compared to 2.7 lifelong students), aimed at developing a Torah- for general Israeli Jewish population and 1.1 for only intellectual elite to replace the rabbinical Diaspora women). In 2007, one of every three elite exterminated in the Shoah. He also devel-

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 53 oped a comprehensive schooling system for girls metic, language, history, psychology, foreign that prepared them to be dedicated partners for language (English) and other professional skills their learning husbands, to give birth to as many that are foreign in Talmud-only oriented educa- children as possible and to carry much of the tion of males. Recent years have witnessed a burden of educating them, and to be employed growing number of women leaving the limited full time as teachers. Haredi job market and obtaining high salary Today, however, there is a shortage of posi- positions in the wider society. One result is a tions for female teachers in religious schools cultural gap between spouses which challenges and the religious market is satu- the prevalent family balance of power, leading rated. Newly married Haredi to an increase in divorces among newly-mar- women, therefore, are seeking ried Haredim. In addition, increasing numbers Increasing employment outside the traditional of Haredi women are pressuring for academic numbers areas. As funding from the parents’ degrees and professional skills appropriate to of Haredi families, German war reparations, work in the consulting, high tech, public rela- women are and welfare state stipends decrease tions, marketing and management positions. pressuring steadily, young Haredim are Some Lithuanian and Hasidic Haredi rabbinic for academic becoming the poorest population in leaders who perceive the dangers to the system degrees and the Jewish world. if this trend grows, have banned professional professional Much as their rabbis may wish and academic programs in the Haredi Beit Yaakov skills appro- that they remained socially and cul- women’s high schools. Religious Zionist and priate to turally isolated, they increasingly Sephardi Haredi programs, however, continue to come into contact with the larger offer diverse professional trainings for women. work in mar- society and are influenced there Breaking barriers previously imposed on keting and from. A significant fringe population, the provision of higher education to religious management often of Anglo-Saxon origin enjoys women, Machon Lustig in Ramat Gan is one of positions. shopping in malls; ultra-Orthodox the newly established colleges that embarked . radio, which includes advertising on a novel program: to introduce them to work and global news, is heard by many; in high-tech fields. It offers bachelor’s degrees religious Hasidic music integrates pop and even in managerial accounting and computer science reggae rhythms and styles; increasing numbers to women who have studied in the Beit Yaacov are attracted to fashionable clothing; Haredi school system. The college opened its doors in internet forums get many visitors weekly — 1999 with nearly 30 young women and today some market researchers claim that one of every enrolls 450, the vast majority of whom are three Haredi households is discreetly connected married to men who study in kollels. The insti- to the internet. tute consults with Rabbi Aharon Leib Steinmann, Also, in order to prepare females to face their a well-known Haredi leader in Bnei Brak, who double dedication, they have received an eclectic supports its work. “Whoever graduates with us, education that includes advanced skills in arith- earns three times more than a teacher; at least

54 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS three times,” claims one of the rabbis who heads jobs in order to survive. Today, some 80 percent the college. of Hassidic and most Sephardic Haredi men Another institute, the Haredi College of work. Most of those not working are followers Jerusalem, allows ultra-Orthodox women to of the Lithuanian leaders that are fully dedicated earn academic degrees in fields such as social to Torah study. Out of the entire Haredi popula- work, speech therapy and medical laboratory tion, about 40,000 yeshiva students are officially science through arrangements with Israeli uni- registered as solely studying and many of them versities and colleges. The college opened in work part time in illegal, low-paid jobs. Despite 2001 with 23 women. Today it has 453 women their efforts, they do not succeed in getting a and 80 men. The men and women enter the decent wage for their large families. The critical building from separate entrances and study on problem, therefore, is not their refusal to work different floors to prevent interaction. Adina Bar but their lack of professional training which Shalom, the eldest child of the Rabbi Ovadia leads them to low-level and unskilled jobs. The Yosef, co-founded the institute after consulting challenge is to develop training programs and with her father and receiving his approval. Both appropriate part-time or full-time job opportu- colleges are described as environments in which nities for those who have intellectual abilities Haredi women can feel comfortable. There are but no professional skills. Some private and also teachers and rabbis available for students to public initiatives have been undertaken and are talk to about resolving any issues that may arise beginning to show successes, especially in the between their studies and their ideology. high-tech and finance sectors. One of the successful initiatives supported by Three main interconnected challenges to the the Haredi rabbinical leadership is the single-sex Israeli Haredi enclave’s traditional strategy can computer hardware and software companies, therefore be distinguished: (1) unemployment, located in Haredi neighborhoods, that allow poverty, and uncontrolled demographical mul- mothers to earn better salaries, provide flexible tiplication; (2) the cultural opening to the larger working hours and promote the development Israeli society; (3) the political involvement of professional careers without threatening the Haredi leaders may lead to collective responsi- existing societal family system. bility. Which path will predominate remains to The major stimulus for the development of be seen. At the present, it appears that patterns the burgeoning Haredi labor market has been among Israel’s Haredim may increasingly welfare cuts, implemented during the administra- resemble those of Haredim elsewhere, and this tion of Binyamin Natanyahu, which forced most may have an important impact on religious-sec- non-wealthy, full-time students to find part-time ular as well as Israel-Diaspora relations.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 55 Jewish Family Patterns

people entity rests on a functionalist perspec- There are in Jewish tradition two institutions tive. which are referred to as mikdash me’at, a sanctu- There is not one single model of the Jewish ary in miniature. One, in the public sphere, is family. Jews are indeed “a nation spread out the synagogue; the other, in the private sphere, T and separated among the nations,” and in each is the family. Both of these institutions are pre- society that they dwell, they acculturate to sented as basic agents of Jewish socialization one degree or another and internalize cultural and as central in consolidating the collective, the patterns from the larger society. That is a major Jewish people. In examining the Jewish family source of the differences in customs between within the context of societal aspects of the Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Mizrahim, etc., and Jewish people, the focus is not on the well-being between the various groups among all these. In of individuals as individuals but, rather, as part terms of the subject at hand, the Polish Jewish of the Jewish people. The focus is also not on the family was different from the German Jewish well-being of the family per se. Indeed, there are family, the German was different from the today many debates over the definition of the Turkish, the Turkish from the Moroccan, etc. family. The focus here is on its role as an agent Especially when dealing with the subject of of Jewish socialization which fosters Jewish the Jewish family, there is a tendency toward identity and identification. This is, therefore, a nostalgia, to romanticize “good old days” that, definite functionalist perspective of the family. in many ways, were actually not so good at all, Of course, there are other perspectives, such as or did not exist at all. For example, under cir- the conflict perspective, which do not accept the cumstances of high infant and child mortality, very basic assumption concerning the centrality relatively few families could simultaneously of the family in Jewish socialization, but that raise many children, in spite of a high birth need not be of concern as the entire premise of rate. It is, therefore, even more important to be the Annual Assessment is that there is a Jewish empirically-based in discussions of this central collectivity and its well-being depends on the institution. well-being of its constituent parts. Indeed, the In addition, in much of the analyses and dis- entire notion of policy planning for a Jewish cussion which follows, Jews in each country

56 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS are treated as a single unit and are typically they marry later, Jews also begin having children compared to non-Jews in that country. It must, later and, indeed, the U.S. data bear this out. however, be emphasized that there is significant Thus, among married women ages 46–55, 40 variation among Jews themselves along tradi- percent of the Jews are married and living with tionalist-modernist lines, just as there is such their children, as compared to only variation among non-Jews. What is being por- 18 percent of the non-Jews. trayed here are the overall group patterns, and In part, as a consequence of The tendency with respect to one variable, explicit reference marrying and having children later, in Israel to will be made to the internal variation because Jews also have fewer children than marry at a of its potential significance for future develop- non-Jews, a point to which we relatively ments. return later. younger age Jewish men and women in the U.S. marry At most ages, greater percentages apparently somewhat later than non-Jews. However, of Jewish than non-Jewish males stems from this does not reflect a declining significance of are living in family households. At traditional- marriage and family for Jews; they also are more younger ages — from about 18 to likely than non-Jews to eventually marry and less 35 — a little over half of Jewish men ism which likely to divorce and remain divorced. In fact, at are living in families. At all older both encour- almost every age, a lower percentage of Jews ages, about three-quarters are. The ages earlier are either previously married or widowed than mature middle years 36–55 are more marriage non-Jews. They are also much more likely than family-centered for Jewish women, and pro- non-Jews to be living with family rather than and the oldest age groups are less scribes living alone or with non-family members, and much so. Nearly 80% of Jewish men ages together less likely than non-Jews to cohabit without 65 and older are living in families, without marriage after their first marriage. predominantly with their wives, marriage. In France, the second largest Diaspora com- compared to about 66% of non- . munity, the major characteristics of Jewish Jewish males and less than 50% of marriage are similar to those of the U.S. In Israel, Jewish women of these ages. As a whole, Jewish by contrast, there has long been a tendency to men and women are a little more likely to live in marry at a younger age, apparently stemming families at most ages than non- Jews. from Israel’s greater traditionalism which both Demographers estimate that more than half encourages earlier marriage and proscribes living of marriages in the U.S. will end in divorce. The together without marriage. The age of first 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) marriage in Israel has risen somewhat in recent asked respondents who were not married to years, as have the percentages of single men their first spouse how that marriage ended. The and women in the 20–29 age group. However, data show that about the same proportion of among those ages 40–44, approximately 95 Jewish and non-Jewish men report that they are percent have been married at least once. now divorced or that an earlier marriage ended It is not unreasonable to assume that, just as in divorce. However, more Jewish than non-

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 57 Jewish women report a divorce at some time are very young, which means not only lower in their lives. Given the frequency of divorce, family income but also loss of occupational its implications for families, and the higher rate activity which can have lifelong consequences of intermarriage in second and later marriages, on both income and advancement opportunities. these are patterns that should be of The result is Jewish families with fewer children concern and carefully watched. than the minimum necessary to maintain group th Since the 19 In Israel, follow-up of Jewish size, i.e. zero population growth. Viewed soci- century, In marriage cohorts indicates a divorce etally, Jews in the United States, Canada, much Europe as rate of about 10 percent after 6 of Europe and much of the West are becoming well in the years of marriage, 15 percent after a smaller percentage of the overall populations U.S., Jewish 10 years, and 20 percent after 25 in the countries in which they live, as well as families have years. These divorce rates are quite declining numerically. This is especially the case been smaller conservative in international per- where there are high intermarriage rates, in and Jews spective, but the trend has been which cases couples have even fewer children have had rapidly increasing since the 1990s. and most of the children of such unions do not The frequently quoted method of identify as Jewish. lower birth dividing the number of divorces Jews in Israel, by contrast, have relatively rates than by the number of marriages per- high and steady birth rates. The Total Fertility non-Jews. formed in the same year provides Rate — a measure of current trends inclusive of . much higher divorce figures but it is all women married or not — varied around 2.6 patently wrong. children during the 1990s and was 2.7 in 2005. At least since the 19th century, in Europe as Recent surveys in Israel point to a unique per- well as in the United States, Jewish families sistence of relatively high norms about desired have been smaller and Jews have had a lower and ideal family size among married Jewish birth rate than non-Jews. As was indicated, Jews adults. In 1988 Israeli married women indicated on the whole marry later than do non-Jews; they an ideal family size of 3.4 children for a family also want and expect fewer children, have the of the same socioeconomic status as their own. most favorable attitudes toward contraception, In 2005 the same ideal had increased to 4.0. and are its best practitioners. Coupled with their If the more religious groups are put aside, the expertise in birth control, Jews have high educa- average remained 3.8, and it still was around 3 tional and occupational aspirations and status, children among the most secular sections of the both of which contribute to desires for fewer Jewish population. Over time, diffuse and stable children. The educational costs for children gaps can be observed between ideal family size include not only the actual financial outlays for perceptions (3–4 children) and actual implemen- their schooling which, alone, are very high; a tation (2–3 children). major part of the larger cost may also include the Among Jewish communities out of Israel, cost of one of the parents, invariably the mother, fertility has been comparatively low since taking an occupational leave while the children the beginning of the 20th century — often sig-

58 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS nificantly lower than among the respective America’s Jews are less likely than those of surrounding populations since the end of World any other American religious group to say that War II. Given the current lowering of fertility children are central in one’s life. They are also in most developed countries, low Jewish fertil- much less likely to believe that childless people ity is now less distinctive than it was. Around are missing out on life. This contrasts starkly 2000, Jewish women in their 30s in the U.S. with Israel, in which Jews are much more child- had about 1.2 children, their peers in France had oriented. 1.6–1.7, versus 2.4 in Israel. Jewish women in Western Jews, on average, hold quite liberal their 40s toward the end of reproduction had on attitudes toward divorce. In the U.S. and much the average 1.9 children in the U.S., 2.2 in France of the West, they are more likely than any and 3.4 in Israel. other group, including those with no religion, The Jewish public in Israel widely prefers to approve of divorce for unhappily married policy interventions supportive of larger families. parents of preschool children and more likely This goes hand in hand with a high share of to disagree that marriage is for a lifetime. But, households who declare they might consider while they are accepting of divorce in theory having another child if the appropriate socioeco- both for themselves and for others, they are no nomic and infrastructure opportunities were in more likely than average to have ever divorced. place. These findings cannot be explained by dif- Moreover, religious commonal- ferences in the socioeconomic and educational ity is highly correlated with marital composition of Jewish populations but rather stability. Thus, in the U.S., couples A high share reflect a different approach to the role of the in which both are Jewish are about of house- nuclear family and reproduction in Israel versus as likely to divorce as couples in holds in the western world. An obvious consequence is which both are mainline Protestant, Israel declare a much faster Jewish population growth in Israel both fundamentalist Protestant, they might than in other communities. Likewise, the fact both Catholic, or both some other consider that the birth rate among France’s Jews is higher religion, and less likely to divorce having than that of Jews in the U.S. may also reflect than those in which both have another the more pro-active family policies in France, no religion or those in religiously- child if the although pro-natal policies do not always result mixed marriages appropriate in higher birth rates. For example, after WW Jews in the U.S. have generally socioeco- II, a number of European countries introduced been opinion leaders on many social nomic and pro-natalist social policies with the explicit aim issues. They believe more strongly infrastructure of increasing the population but which did not in equality between the sexes than opportunities have that effect. It appears that those policies any other religious group; they hold were in place. may be effective only when the social values more liberal political and social . support having larger families. Among America’s opinions than any other group Jews, such are clearly not the values. Although except those who say they have no religion; they have positive attitudes toward marriage, and, historically, they have held more socially

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 59 progressive — or at least liberal — views on questions, including the religion of spouses prior the family than other Americans. Thus, they to their marriage. It was found that approxi- are more likely than non-Jews to approve of a mately 7 percent of the Jews who were married couple living together whether or not they plan at the time had non-Jewish spouses. Much more to marry. And yet, Jews also have quite positive surprising was the rapid rise in the rate of inter- attitudes toward marriage, with high percent- marriage, from about 2 percent among those ages stating that, over one’s lifetime, it is better who were married during the first quarter of to be married than to be single. the century, to about 5 percent between 1930– According to the comparisons provided 1950, to 10 percent during the first half of the by the International Social Survey 1960s, and to more than 20 percent among those Programme, Israel pertains to a married during the second half of the 1960s. The Until recently, group of more traditional societies 1990 NJPS indicated a continuation in the rising intermar- regarding attitudes to family norms intermarriage rate, to the point of its becoming riage was such as: “Married people are usually the majority. The survey found that 51 percent much more happier than unmarried people”; of Jews who married between 1975–1984, common “Better a bad marriage than not to and close to 57 percent among those married among marry”; “People who wish to have between 1985–1990, were married to non-Jews. American children should marry.” Indeed, These percentages reflect the religious affiliation Jewish births out of marriage are quite at birth and are not discounted for conversion males than infrequent in the Jewish milieu. In to Judaism. Further moderate increases in inter- females, but Israel, in 2004, they accounted for marriage in the U.S. occurred during the 1990s, 3.3 percent out of the total birth according to the NJPS. the gender rate (but 8.6 percent among women In addition to the rapidly rising rate of inter- gap has above age 40), as against over 30 marriage, important changes also took place essentially percent among the total population with respect to its character and, some argue, its narrowed. in France and about 50 percent in meaning and consequences. One major change . Scandinavian countries. is gender patterns. Until recently, intermarriage The issue of intermarriage, its causes and was much more common among Jewish males consequences, is one of the most complex with than females. During the decade of the 1960s, for respect to the area of the family. Until the end of example, nearly 25% of the spouses of married the 1960s, intermarriage in the West was largely Jewish men were not Jewish, as compared to viewed as a deviant case, the exception, and rare. 17 percent of the spouses of married Jewish Although unknown at the time, we now know women. However, the gender gap has essentially that intermarriage was much more prevalent narrowed and, indeed, by 1990, was even slightly behind “the Iron Curtain,” in the USSR. The first higher among Jewish women than men. Much systematic, national survey of Jews in the U.S., of this gender equality reflects broader patterns the 1970–71 National Jewish Population Study of decreasing educational, occupational and (NJPS), included a broad range of demographic economic gender gaps among American Jews. As

60 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS a result, women, as much as men, increasingly tion to intermarriage, but they have no uniform interact with non-Jews in increasing numbers of policy. One strong communal stance is that of social spheres, which presents increasing oppor- the relatively small and highly insular Syrian tunities for close, even intimate, relationships. In Jewish communities in the U.S. and in Mexico, the more recent marriages recorded in the 2001 which refuse to accept intermarriage and have a NJPS, however, more Jewish men than women firm policy prohibiting any conversion, no matter had non-Jewish spouses. how sincere the particular individual involved Until recently, it was accepted as axiomatic might be, so that no member of that commu- that Jews who intermarried rejected the Jewish nity even think that his or her intermarriage community and their intermarriage was their might ever be accepted. Aside from these rare final step in leaving that community. Today, con- exceptions, the only organized communal action ditions have changed and many of those who that exists is among the growing intermarry do so for reasons unrelated, at least number of groups on the liberal and consciously, to their feelings about being Jewish Reform side that advocate complete The majority or the Jewish community. They marry for love or communal acceptance of intermar- of American other reasons and, at the time of their marriage, riage. Jewish they do not consider their Jewishness to be an Leaving aside its meaning for parents feel issue. Indeed, they may even have very strong those directly involved in intermar- that the hap- and positive feelings about their Jewishness. riage, the spouses themselves, it is piness of their As intermarriage became more common, an issue for the larger community children is attitudes toward it have correspondingly because of its implications for the more impor- changed, from parental opposition, to grudging children of such marriages. Most tant than acceptance, to indifference. Today, it seems data indicate that the majority of whether or unbelievable that, as recently as a century ago, children of intermarriages are not not their chil- the traditional Jewish rites of mourning were raised as Jewish. For example, the dren’s spouse often practiced by the families of those who 1990 NJPS data indicated that only is Jewish. intermarried. Recent studies indicate that the 25 percent were. The 2001 NJPS . majority of American Jewish parents feel that indicated a 33 percent rate of unam- the happiness of their children is more impor- biguous affiliation to Judaism among the children tant than whether or not their children’s spouse of intermarriages. Moreover, even for many that is Jewish. were being raised as Jews, there existed a pattern Collectively, as well, there is almost no of pluralism in rituals which scholars viewed as communal policy which even suggests a pref- affecting the Jewish socialization of children and erence for endogamy, i.e. Jews marrying Jews. was a barrier to a clear and unambiguous sense Indeed, in parts of the American Jewish commu- of Jewish identity. nity, calls for policy affirming the inherent value During 2006, a study of children of intermar- of Jews marrying Jews have been labeled racism. riages in Boston indicated that the majority are The Orthodox are more explicit in their opposi- being raised as Jews. This is a unique case and

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 61 is apparently the result of massive communal gious meaning and were entirely national. For efforts promoting raising of such children as many Jews who married non-Jews, there was Jews. Encouraging as these findings are, it is still often no question of their retaining their Jewish much too early to know precisely what is meant identity and identification; it was inscribed in when parents say they are raising their children their identity card. In some cases, intermarriage as Jews. Moreover, we do not yet know how the was what saved Jewish communities during children themselves will choose to identify. The the Shoah. Many of those married to non-Jews findings from Boston do indicate the importance suffered greatly because of their Jewishness of serious communal efforts and may provide which they refused to foreswear, and their situ- an example of action that might be extended to ation is in no way comparable to that of the Jew other Jewish communities. in the West who intermarries. Be that as it may, there is an abundance of Among the close to a million olim from the evidence which demonstrates the positive corre- FSU who arrived in Israel during the 1990s, there lation between endogamy, marriage within the is a significant percentage who are married to group, and every empirically analyzed pattern non-Jews. Their children are facing a unique of Jewish identification. Endogamously married situation in that they are being socialized in a Jews are much more likely to identify with the society and culture which is overwhelmingly community, to affiliate with one of the tradi- Jewish and they will, invariably, one way or tional religious streams, to frequent a synagogue, another, assimilate into Jewish society. Perhaps to contribute to Jewish charities and philanthro- ironically, it is the very ease with which they can pies, to live in Jewish neighborhoods, to have assimilate into the broader Israeli society and Jewish friends, to be connected with informal culture that presents the greatest challenge to Jewish associations, and to have visited Israel those who insist that Jewish status be religiously In the countries that are now the FSU, inter- based. The nearly 310,000 Jewish connected marriage and its meaning is even more complex. non-Jewish immigrants — mostly from the FSU In many of those countries, Jewish identity — raise a primary policy concern on the way to and identification were largely devoid of reli- full integration within Israeli society.

62 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Socioeconomic Characteristics and Mobility

The major socioeconomic characteristics among emerging educational profile can be described as world Jewry reflect more general trends in human nearly universal academization of the younger capital and labor force structure and mobility in adult generation in the Diaspora, and in-depth modern developed societies but also substantial professional training to the level of Masters and TJewish distinctiveness. When reviewing some Ph.D. for quite a substantial minority. Around of the major ongoing socioeconomic processes, 1990, above 70% of Jewish adults in the U.S. the minority-majority antithesis is a powerful had some post-secondary education, and over explanatory factor of the different options avail- 50% held university degrees, against 38% and able to Jews, hence of significant Diaspora-Israel 20%, respectively among the total white popula- differentials. tion. Similar data applied to Jews in the Russian Republic — a singular similarity given the huge EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT differences in economic structure and organiza- tion between the two societies. In Mexico in Well rooted in the traditional emphasis of Jewish 1991, over two thirds of the adult Jewish popu- society on learning, and also reflecting higher lation had attained college or had higher degrees. than average socioeconomic status already Percentages in other more developed countries attained by a significant share of the Jewish were similar or only slightly lower. Wpopulation, primary and secondary school atten- dance can be considered a universally attained In 2001 in the U.S., the share of adult Jews goal. Drop-outs at the high-school level call for with post-secondary education had grown to constant vigilance and enhanced investment as almost 90%, and those holding a college degree they constitute a safe predictor of various forms were around 67%, about half of which had of social deviance. completed graduate studies. In the U.K. in 2001, Rates of higher education among Jews are over 50% of Jews aged 25–34, versus 21% at age uniquely high. The proportions of both Jewish 65–74, had completed a university degree. More males and females holding college degrees problematic is the fact that Jews in U.S. universi- remain far above the average of the total pop- ties tend to become less attracted by science and ulation in the most advanced countries. The technology, and to become a smaller percent-

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 63 age of outstanding students. The latter is in part national perspective and relative to its adult explained by the fast rise of Asian students. population size, and the emphasis among these In Israel, too, access to post-secondary and on science and technology is still high in com- academic education is rapidly expanding, with parison with other developed countries. about 65% of the younger adult generation of Jews aged 25–34 having followed post-secondary EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS studies, and 34% holding a college or university degree. In terms of the overall exposure to higher Over the 20th century, patterns of social and education, Israel’s Jews favorably compare with occupational mobility among Jews have been education attained among the total popula- truly extraordinary. If we compare the starting tion in many Western European societies. The points in the places where most Jews resided percentage of the Israeli-born of European- Othen, in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, American origin who are university/college and the profiles attained in the countries where educated is significantly higher than Jews have settled after a massive process of that of the foreign born. However, planetary redistribution, the extent and speed there still exist visible gaps among of change are probably unique in international In terms the Israeli-born of Asian-African perspective. The most striking example concerns of school origin vis-à-vis the former group in the U.S., where mass immigration brought science and terms of the total number of years a Jewish population largely from Eastern mathematics of school attended, of the per- European countries, that was the product of a centage of high school who attain clear downwardly self-selection process vis-à- achievements matriculation — the pre-requisite to vis the characteristics of the whole existing pool Israel is com- be admitted at universities — and of Eastern European Jews. The overwhelming paratively of the actual enrollment in higher majority of immigrants were indeed able to very weak, education. These gaps have greatly indicate an occupation abroad — unlike large yet Israel con- diminished over the last several numbers of non-Jewish immigrants to the new tinues to be decades but they have not disap- continent — but most of them belonged to the a very strong peared completely. lower social strata relying on manual and related producer of A much less promising picture work. Within a span of three generations, the Ph.D. gradu- emerges once the cognitive achieve- overwhelming concentration of Jews in the U.S. ates relative ments of Israeli school pupils are gradually moved from manufacturing produc- to its popula- compared with those observed in tion to trade and sales, then to management, and tion size. other countries. OECD and other finally to the liberal and academic professions. . studies indicate that in terms of The socioeconomic profile of the Jewish pop- school science and mathematics ulation tended to converge toward the higher achievements Israel is compara- rungs of the national occupational ladder, and in tively very weak. Yet, Israel continues to be a fact became disproportionately represented in very strong producer of Ph.D. graduates, in inter- those more prestigious and better earning social

64 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS strata. Similar trends appeared among Jews in colonies and protectorates in North Africa and in other developed countries, though the more metropolitan France during the early years of the rapid evolution of the North American economy post-colonial period. made that case more striking. In less developed economies, the massive In the U.S. around 1990, 56% of employed turning of Jews toward the academic and liberal Jewish men and 49% of Jewish women belonged professions has been significant but slower. An to the upper occupational brow, inclusive of interesting example of a country where until the professionals and managers. Of these, 39% of recent past the concentration of Jews in trade men and 36% of women were in the academic, and industry has remained significant is Turkey. technical and liberal professions, more than In 1988, 61% of heads of households in Istanbul twice the proportion among total whites, and were in trade, versus 15% of managers and 11% 17% and 13%, respectively, were in manage- of professionals; nor were there visible signs of rial positions. In 2001, the share in the upper mobility across the age spectrum. In Mexico City occupational strata had further increased to 65% in 1991, 53% of the economically active Jewish of men and 63% of women, of which 53% of population were managers and proprietors, men and 51% of woman in the professions, versus 27% who were professionals. Looking and 12% of each gender in managerial posts. at a division by economic branches, 35% were This points to a narrowing or even disappear- in industry and 29% in commerce. In Caracas, ance of the gender gaps that had prevailed in the Venezuela, in 1998, 21% were in sales, versus past. 28% of managers and 17% of professionals. In other Western countries, trends were In Mexico, the majority of the Jews belong similar. In England and Wales in 2001, 42% of to the upper and middle classes which consti- employed Jews had professional, associate pro- tute less than 10% of the general population. fessional and technical occupations, and 25% Only 5% of the Jews belong to the lower class, were managers and senior officials. In France in compared to 63% of the general population. 2002, Jewish occupational distributions were But some attrition in Jewish economic status quite different reflecting a higher concentration has emerged. While in 2000, 74% of the Jews in lower management and clerical jobs. Only belonged to the upper and upper middle class, about 13–14% of Jewish men and women were in 2006 their number went down to 71%; the in the liberal professions, versus 40% of men middle class went up from 14% to 15%; lower and 22% of women in managerial positions middle class went from 8% to 9% and the lower ranking from top to middle range. The pro- class from 4.9% to 5.1%. portion of Jews in clerical positions, including In Israel, the all-inclusive character of the teachers, was 31% of men and 52% of women state’s economy with a predominantly Jewish — far higher than in other Western countries. labor force allows — in fact demands — for These data reflect a persistence of high percent- employment of comparatively high propor- ages of Jews who are government employees, tions of Jews in agriculture, industry, and public continuing a pattern that prevailed in the French services. Consequently a comparatively lower

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 65 proportion of Jews in Israel are employed for men, and from 24% to 11% for women. In in professional and other technical activities spite of the striking structural differences in the requiring university training than may be the occupations of Jews in the economy with Jewish case for occupationally selective majority or relatively small Jewish minorities, Jewish minorities in the Diaspora. the main thrust of the observed trends is very Among the Nonetheless, the development similar. Increasing professionalization reflects Jewish labor of Jewish occupational stratifica- the continuing expansion of higher education; tion has been quick and highly manual labor is being substituted by a greater force in most significant. Among the employed emphasis on services. It should be stressed that Diaspora Jewish population, the proportion in both cases — Jews in Israel and Jews in the communities, of professionals passed from 10% Diaspora — the diminishing impact of manual self-employ- in 1961 to 28% in 2005 among work reflects transformations in the economy, ment continues men and from 23% to 34% among but also prominently a substitution by other to be largely women. This occurred while the population groups: in the world at large, by above the share of women in the labor force anyone — locals or foreigners — willing to take average of the dramatically increased. In 2005 the up those jobs; in Israel, by Palestinians and or by total popula- proportion in the labor force among foreign workers. tion. Jewish women aged 15 and over A further important change, observed across . was above 55%, versus slightly the board of Diaspora Jewry, consists in the more than 60% among men. At steady passage of Jews from self-employed to age 25–34, the proportion for both genders was salaried positions. Among the Jewish labor force above 80%, with a slight surplus among women. in most Diaspora communities, self-employment Jewish women participation on the labor force continues to be distinctive and largely above the is quite high in international comparison, which average of the total population. Yet, allowing cannot be said of the Jewish male labor force for the higher income levels of the Jewish labor — due among other things to the relatively force relative to the national average in the high percentage of males who pursue reli- respective countries, a growing share of Jews gious studies as their main activity throughout now work as employees for large-scale national adulthood. or multinational organizations. Their presence The share of Jews employed in Israel as has also increased in the public sector where it managers is fairly low in international per- was traditionally scant. In France, the share of spective, increasing from 7% in 1961 to 9% Jews employed in sales diminished from 21% in 2005 for men, and from less than 2% to (including a minor share of artisans) in the 3.5% for women over the same years. At the 1970s to 9% in 2002. In the U.S. the aggregate opposite end of the ladder, Israel has had signifi- of clerical and sales positions passed from 24% cantly high shares of Jewish crafts, operatives, in 1990 to 23% in 2001 among men, and from unskilled and agriculture workers — yet declin- 41% to 28% among women. ing between 1961 and 2005 from 56% to 36% Self employment has long been one charac-

66 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS teristic trait of the Jewish labor force. In Mexico trasts with the past, when Jewish geography in 1991, as many as 63% were self-employed, was largely determined by historical patterns including owners and workers on their own. of settlement eminently tied to the political- The Jewish labor force in Israel has followed economic constraints of the pre-emancipation a different course. Whereas the initial backbone period. Often, though not always, migration of the economy heavily relied on investment may be associated with a movement of Jews and ownership by the state or by public bodies from locales with a stronger Jewish infrastruc- such as the Histadrut (incorporating the Trade ture, to places with a weaker one. This may Unions), the ongoing process of privatization significantly dilute individual expressions of is accompanied by a growing impact of free Jewish identification and weaken affiliation with initiatives. Yet the proportion of self-employed Jewish organizations. in Israel — estimated at less than 15% — is An emblematic indicator of the sensitivity significantly lower than in most large Jewish of Jewish population distribution to communities worldwide. The proportion of general market forces is the over- those employed in wholesale, retail trade and whelming concentration in major 52% of world repairs, in business activities, and in health, urban areas resulting from intensive Jewry live welfare and social work services, including international and internal migrations. in only five the liberal professions, has increased in Israel, The extraordinary urbanization of large metro- while it has diminished in manufacturing, con- the Jews is indicated by the fact that politan areas: struction, and agriculture. As a consequence of in 2006 eighteen metropolitan areas these various processes, over the last dacades worldwide had an estimated popu- Tel Aviv, differences in occupational distribution of Jews lation of 100,000 Jews or more and New York, in Israel and in the main Diaspora communi- altogether comprised about 75% Jerusalem, ties have significantly diminished. Jews in Israel of the total world Jewish popula- Los Angeles stand occupationally where Jews in the larger tion. Over one half of world Jewry and Haifa. communities in the Diaspora stood one or two (6,798,000, or 52%) lived in only . generations earlier. five large metropolitan areas: Tel Aviv, New York, Jerusalem, Los Angeles, and Haifa. The second tier comprising about 25% of GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY AND world Jewry included, in that order, Southeast METROPOLITANIZATION Florida, Be’er Sheva, Philadelphia, Paris, Chicago, One significant outcome of these patterns of Boston, San Francisco, London, Toronto, social mobility is a very high amount of geo- Washington DC, Buenos Aires, Baltimore, graphical mobility within and between urban and Detroit. Moscow, Montreal, Cleveland areas. Availability of career opportunities is and Atlanta, each with less then 100,000 Jews Othe main determinant of such mobility, which each, were the following largest Jewish urban in turn reflects general trends of national and concentrations. regional development in each country. This con- Most of these places are large, heteroge-

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 67 neous, well connected internationally and of density still constitutes one of the salient bases world economic and cultural significance. In for frequent personal interaction and community these places, large numbers of Jews enjoy very organization. favorable and perhaps unprecedented standards of living and can bring to fruition high levels of JEWS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM education and professional specialization. But — leaving aside the Israeli locations where the To further understand the logic of current situation is different — these are also the places changes in socioeconomic stratification in the where Jews often face the challenge of more light of changes intervening over the last genera- intensive competition with, and easy access tion in the context of past large-scale migration, to alternative, non-Jewish cultures and social Tthe Jewish presence — expressed in absolute networks. numbers and as a percentage of the total pop- In spite of these processes, Jewish popu- ulation — can be related to major social and lation distribution within major economic indicators of the respective places urban areas continues to be highly of residence. Do Jews simply move and redis- distinctive. Residential distributions tribute at random, or do their mobility patterns Around 2000, significantly reflect socioeconomic reflect the inherent attraction or repulsion of the about 89% stratification. As noted, Jewish main socioeconomic and other market forces of the Jews occupational mobility has resulted that operate in society at large? globally lived in a massive redistribution through- Answers about the underlying logics of the in the highest out occupational groups, social Jewish presence are provided by studies of the ranked fifth classes, and income strata. Jewish geographical distribution of Jews examined at of countries, residential mobility, consequently, the level of detail, respectively, of 160 countries whereas less has been characterized by massive globally, of about 70 different economic regions than 1% lived relocation throughout the appro- within the European Union, of the 50 federal priate sections of the urban fabric. at the bottom states in the United States, and of the main In most large urban areas out of oblasts, or provinces, in the Federal Republic of fifth of coun- Israel, a very substantial minority, Russia. In each instance, the geographical units tries. and sometimes the majority of the . were first sorted by level of economic develop- whole Jewish population can be ment, and then sub-divided into five groups, found on a small minority of a city’s each with the same number of geographical territory. At the same time, in most large con- units. Around 2000, about 89% of the Jews urbations a trend prevails of growing territorial globally lived in the highest ranked fifth of diffusion and population dispersion. Jews some- countries including most western nations and times anticipated and sometimes followed these the state of Israel, whereas less than 1% lived general patterns, thus periodically becoming less in the bottom fifth of countries; over 59% of or more concentrated with respect to the total Jews in the European Union lived in the top fifth urban population. Overall, Jewish territorial of economic regions, against 1% in the bottom

68 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS fifth; and 68% of Jews in the United States SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES AND lived in the top fifth of states, against 1% in the CHALLENGES bottom fifth. Similar correlations emerged in the Four socioeconomic issues seem to be of special Russian Republic. interest for the socioeconomic study of Jews in Clearly, over time, the more economically recent years, and its policy implica- and culturally attractive locales, at the country, tions. regional, and provincial level, were able to hold F The first concerns the possible Average their Jewish population or to draw Jews from effects of economic globalization incomes weaker locales through international or internal and of the periodical waves in attained by migration. The inherent logic which connects national economies on the standard Jews are the presence of Jews with the existence of of living of Jewish communities. certain basic socioeconomic and cultural con- Especially affected have been many quite univer- ditions locally clearly indicates a response to medium and small Jewish entrepre- sally higher changing opportunities on the part of a Jewish neurs who did well in the past but than the population generally highly educated, and quite whose bases of economic activity averages in specialized in its professional activities. But are now powerfully challenged by the respective the data can also be interpreted as an indica- competition from the emerging non-Jewish tor of material and functional dependency of economies in less developed coun- populations, the Jewish presence on the general situation tries. To the extent that imports but in most of society at large, whose major changes gen- substitute for local production, western erally are far beyond the control of the Jewish the latter has to find more sophis- countries the ticated products and outlets, or to community. income gap is reconvert to other types of activity. The present situation is radically different narrowing. The Jewish economy was affected . from the one that prevailed during most of Jewish in vehemently negative modes in history. In the past the Jews were tolerated or those countries which passed from discriminated against, and often held in their a regime of substantial autarchy to nearly unlim- agenda a hope for changes in society that would ited openness to the global market. Examples benefit their political and social status. Under can be provided especially in Latin America, but the more stable and attractive present conditions also in other areas. Jewish interests increasingly coincide with those The consequent turning of many Jews to of the prevailing societal order. Hence, at the end tertiary activities probably has had mixed of a long transformation which allowed for polit- effects on their income distribution. On the ical emancipation and economic achievement, one hand, average incomes for highly educated the Jews find themselves in a more conservative professionals tend to be far better than those state of mind in their relation towards society at of other employees. On the other hand, the big large. fortunes that could be accumulated through

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 69 manufacturing or other types of heavier capital both in the recent past and for the foreseeable investment are probably less frequently found future is the far greater degree of socioeco- today than was the case in the past. In relative nomic homogeneity among Diaspora Jews than terms, average incomes attained by Jews are among the general population of the respective quite universally higher than the averages in the countries, or even among Jews in Israel. This respective non-Jewish populations. However, implies that socio-demographic changes tend there is evidence that — once one to be more synchronic and massive among focuses only on those permanently the Jewish Diaspora than among other social and gainfully employed — in most groups whenever relevant political, economic, Israel’s Western countries the income gap and cultural changes — if not upheavals — policy to between Jews and non-Jews is nar- occur. continue the rowing. A third issue concerns the unequal distribu- Falashmora A second issue relates to the tion of resources across the Jewish population. immigra- late and possibly terminal stages of Emerging poverty has come to the forefront of tion from upward social mobility. In the past, community care in many of the more devel- Ethiopia may Jewish earners were often immi- oped countries and in Israel. One rather diffused have rescued grants with a background of poverty, problem is the emergence of widening social thousands striving to find their way in a tight gaps connected with the general improvement from harsh- market in which, remarkably, many of standards of living in the context of increas- ness and of the competitors were other Jews. ingly unregulated global markets. The speed and duress, but It now seems obvious that having amount of increase at the upper income level already reached the top, for many has brought has been greater by far than at lower levels. Jewish households the main objec- Consequently the distance between the richest into Israel tive is no longer to improve their and the poorest has increased, as documented by a growing social status but rather to maintain rising values of the Gini Index of income distri- group prone the reasonably comfortable stan- bution. Since in many countries poverty is being to be poverty dards already achieved. This requires measured in relative terms as a given percent- stricken. strategies for the Jewish community age of average or median national income, often . facing society quite different from rapidly rising standards of living are accompa- those needed in the past, when the nied by rising percentages of households below Jew often was a persecuted underdog. Nor is the the poverty line. This is a technical issue which outcome obvious considering that upward social obfuscates the debate on poverty and signifi- mobility also exists among other minorities and cantly detracts from the need to understand and overall among the non-Jewish majority. tackle the poverty conditions that actually exist. The outcome indicates a certain degree of While the actual living conditions of the lower economic uncertainty for an otherwise mostly income deciles are today better than in the past, middle-class and fairly comfortable Jewish pop- the subjective feeling of deprivation facing the ulation. What remains a well established fact increasing distance from households comprised

70 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS in the higher income deciles acts as a powerful tionship between Jewish identification and factor in the whole assessment of one’s own socioeconomic characteristics and change, socioeconomic situation. about which very little research is available. In While relative poverty is usually at center the past, upward social mobility and the con- stage in social welfare policy planning, the sequent higher degree of integration within emergence of absolute poverty should not society at large tended to coincide with a weak- be neglected. This is particularly acute in the ening of interest in Jewish culture and the sense context of intensive international migration of Jewish communal belonging. The more — in particular from the Former Soviet Union recent research indicates a far more complex and Ethiopia. Israeli policies to continue the relationship between socioeconomic status and Falashmora immigration may have rescued Jewishness. The fact that the costs of belong- thousands of individuals from harshness and ing to an organized Jewish community are quite duress, but has brought into Israel a growing high generates a direct relationship between group prone to be poverty stricken. Poverty also available income and the ability to purchase tends to be concentrated among Haredim, and Jewish community services — unless the latter in Israel with Arab citizens, in connection with are heavily subsidized by the Jewish commu- low labor force participation of males (among nity or from outside sources. A lower degree of Arabs, of females) and large households. The Jewish connectedness has consequently shifted latter tend to reflect social norms and ideals, over time from being a prerogative of upper and such that poverty among certain sections of the elite strata, to characterizing the lower socioeco- public — namely the more religiously obser- nomic strata. Under these circumstances, Jewish vant — can be termed a culturally determined participation, Jewish knowledge, Jewish connec- choice. Poverty, calling for urgent Jewish com- tions, and the sense of identificational belonging munity interventions, has also emerged during tend to become a dependent variable of the short periods of intensive economic crisis such more general socioeconomic profile within a as in Argentina in 2002. A further population Jewish population. segment which appears to be poverty stricken A study of the 2001 NJPS by Barry Chiswick comprises a high share of the Shoah survivors. and Jidong Huang (The Earnings of American Jewish In the FSU over 120,000 people receive basic Men: Human Capital and Denomination) further- socioeconomic help through of the Joint-Hessed more shows that in the U.S. earnings respond organization. In Israel the number of Shoah sur- positively to schooling, labor market experience, vivors who are poor or near poor and also have being married, being born in the country, and for problems in physical or mental health and/or the foreign born, seniority in the country. Labor have housing problems has been estimated at market earnings appear to be associated with over 124,000, including 57,000 immigrants from Jewish education, those having attended full the FSU and 30,000 from Southern and Eastern time Jewish day school reporting significantly Mediterranean countries. higher earnings. Those raised without religious A fourth issue of interest concerns the rela- involvement or who as adults are not religiously

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 71 involved have lower earnings. Beyond some These innovative findings seem to corroborate point of religious practice, however, time and the argument of an emerging circularity between effort devoted to religious activities may have a socioeconomic opportunities and Jewish identi- negative effect on secular labor market earnings. fication maintenance.

72 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Jewish Migration and the Challenge of Multi-locality

Migration is one of the phenomena which have from earlier patterns. Jewish communities that most significantly influenced the Jewish people emigrated in their near entirety included those in the last century. Beyond influencing the geo- in North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, graphical distribution of the Jews across the and Ethiopia. The absolute majority of pre-ex- Mglobe, migration has a considerable impact on isting Jews left the FSU. Jewish culture as well as forms of identification In more recent decades and especially since and community participation. the 1990s, globalization processes, improve- Estimates of the intercontinental Jewish ments in the means of transportation and migrations between 1840–1914 indicate that communication and the dissemination of about 2.75 million Jews migrated, mostly from multicultural absorption policies by receiv- Eastern Europe to the U.S. Between 1915–1948, ing countries have contributed to increasing about 1.6 million migrated, of which 650,000 numbers of migrants being multi-local, that is, to the U.S, 485,000 to Palestine, and 465,000 to living in or maintaining ongoing vibrant links other countries (mainly Argentina, Canada and with more than one country. Globalization has other countries in Latin America). In contrast to expanded the means through which migrants, the migration of other populations, which often especially but not exclusively Chinese, Indians were “circular” or “temporary,” Jewish migra- and Latin Americans, remain economically, tions were typically permanent and the bridges socially, culturally and politically involved with with the places of origin were severed, in the their sending countries. It has also resulted in the sense that not only was there relatively little migration of highly skilled individuals character- return migration, there was also no aspiration ized by hyper-mobility involving remigration or even possibility to return. Since 1948, nearly and return. five million Jews and members of their families Increasing numbers of Jews today either migrated, about 60 percent of whom to Israel. choose more than one place as their place of The other main destination countries of Jewish residence or commute between places (living migrations were the U.S., France, Canada, and working in different places). This new trend Australia and Germany, and Jewish immigration appears to become more common in Israel and patterns have undergone substantial changes among the Jews from the Diaspora. There are

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 73 no specific data on the numbers of multi-local weekend to Israel. Others travel less frequently, Jewish immigrants across national borders; there spending only one week per month in their is also a high level of national commuting among country of origin, while others completely Jewish communities within the U.S. refrain from traveling and manage entire multi- Today, rather than moving “from” a place local enterprises at a distance. They are typically “to” a place, migration is increasingly character- highly-skilled individuals in liberal professions, ized by moves back and forth between places. high-tech, academics, Jewish communal profes- Multi-local migration may be voluntary or sionals, or retirees whose families reside in Israel. coerced, as the result of lack of possibilities in There is among the multi-local olim, as among the receiving country; constant danger of being Western olim in general, an overrepresentation of deported (lack of legal status); high level of rejec- those who define themselves in religious terms tion by the receiving society, etc. For Jews, it has as Orthodox — although they do not represent become overwhelmingly voluntary. Moreover, the majority of all migrants.. if in the past the Jews migrated in order “to FSU immigrants in Germany have greatly be,” currently they increasingly move in order altered the Jewish community there altogether. “to see.” In Israel, for example, larger propor- They maintain multi-local relations with their tions of the immigrants arriving in families both in their countries of origin as Israel continue to maintain multi- well as with those in Israel and other destina- local links with their countries and tions. Many of them actually chose Germany 20 percent of communities of origin. It has been over relocating in Israel or the U.S. due to its the families estimated that at least 20 percent of geographical proximity to their places of origin. of North the families of the North American They conduct their lives in the Russian language American and nearly half of French immi- and there are many Russian influences on the and nearly grants arriving in Israel during the daily life of the community. Most of them are half of French past decade may be characterized elderly and in need of socioeconomic support. immigrants as multi-local. More than 15 years Contemporary multi-local migrations among arriving in ago, researchers already pointed Jews are also discernible from South Africa to Israel during to the phenomenon of multi-lo- Australia, Caracas to Miami, Mexico City to San the past cal Russian immigrants to Israel, Diego, and Argentina to Spain. The majority of Canada, the U.S., and Germany. international migrants appear to maintain several decade may There are numerous indicators that identities that link them simultaneously to more be charac- the number of Russian immigrants than one nation. terized as spending some time in Israel and in There has been a general decline in immigra- multi-local. Russia is on the rise. tion to Israel since 2003, and the annual figures . There are varying patterns of for 2004–2006 are the lowest since the 1980s. multi-localism among immigrants in Israeli aliyah officials and policy makers do not Israel. Some travel on a weekly basis, working yet seem to have grasped either the new migra- in their country of origin and returning for the tion patterns or the opportunities of multi-local

74 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS aliyah, and they are doing almost nothing to between home and host countries affects the encourage it. Rather, most aliyah-recruitment normal performance of the family unit. Although efforts in Israel are invested in marginal popu- communications technology facilitates the capa- lations, such as the Bnei Menashe from India, bilities of the family to maintain continuous the Bnei Avraham from Peru, the remaining contact, normal tasks require innovative solu- Falashmora from Ethiopia, and other marginal tions. Researchers disagree about the effect of groups such as Yemenite hassidei Gur in New this type of migration on spouses and children, York, whose numbers are relatively small but most agree that it has some impact. Much compared to the core of potential olim in the more research and analysis of multi-locality at Western Jewish communities, or even in the the family level is called for. FSU. Multi-local immigration produces and encour- Multi-local immigrants, who tend to be ages multi-local enterprises, which take the form well-educated and highly skilled, are strongly of businesses caring for the transportability of influenced by Israel’s policies regarding taxation capital (remittances and travel); industry caring and the portability of social benefits from home for the consumption of home-made products to host society. Since the economic reforms of (ethnic consumption); or the formation of busi- 2002, earnings from work abroad are heavily nesses at the home country which implement taxed and therefore strongly dissuade and the capital accumulated at the destination. These impede transfer of capital. Also, current Israeli businesses develop wider and faster if the immi- taxation and portability rights policies do not gration is accompanied by spatial (geographical) encourage the mobility rights of multi-local concentration of immigrants. immigrants and may dissuade others from Turning from transnational to intranational engaging in this kind of movement. migration, American Jews are characterized by Multi-local immigration influences, perhaps an increased dispersion throughout the U.S. and first and foremost, the immigrants’ families. by high levels of mobility. These characteristics Not all family members experience multi-local- present new challenges to the national Jewish ity in the same way. Home and host countries community. In the U.S., migration impacts on may mean different things for them and their the migrants’ degree of affiliation with and par- mobility paths, and each one of them might ticipation in the Jewish community. Evidence differ from the other strongly indicates that, for a variety of reasons, The ongoing traveling of family members levels of participation decline with migration.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 75 Jewish Cinema

INTRODUCTION: DEFINING JEWISH rion which makes a film ‘Jewish’ is the extent CINEMA to which it addresses Jewish subject matter. For instance, is Cabaret a Jewish film, as it has a sec- Like the question of “Who is a Jew”, any discus- ondary Jewish character searching for his way, sion of Jewish cinema may lead to a dead end and is of course rooted in the context of Nazi and join the rest of the largely futile discussions ascendance to power? Laround questions such as what is Jewish art or Beyond that, there are more complex con- Jewish music. tent-related questions: Is a Jewish film only Is Saving Private Ryan a ‘Jewish film’, because one that addresses particular Jewish dilemmas, Steven Spielberg is Jewish? What about ET, such as any film about antisemitism? (And in which may contain Jewish themes involving this context, is every Holocaust film actually ‘a ET’s alienness? And are all of Woody Allen’s Jewish film’?) What about films about assimi- films ‘Jewish’, or only those which emphasize lated Jews, such as Annie Hall? specifically Jewish issues, such as Annie Hall or One could also ask whether films dealing Crimes and Misdemeanors? with basic moral dilemmas stemming from the The biggest flaw in such a definition, Judeo-Christian culture are ‘Jewish films’, as however, is that it excludes from the discus- in a large part of the work of Polish filmmaker sion many important films about Judaism and Kieslowski — both his outstanding Decalogue Jews made by non-Jews; for example, films TV series and some of the films derived from it, about the Shoah, such as Au Revoir les enfants most prominently Thou Shalt not Kill. The same is (by Louis Malle) or La Vita e Bella/Life is Beautiful true for major chunks of the works of filmmak- by Roberto Benigni. And what about Fanny and ers who have a deep Christian affinity, such as Alexander, in which the Jews (Isaac and his son Ingmar Bergman and Martin Scorsese. And what Ishmael) play a major role? about films directly inspired by the Bible, such Conversely, one could opt for a definition as East of Eden, Cinema Paradiso, and the entire based on the film’s content, regardless of its list of Cecil B. DeMille’s biblical films? And if maker, as in the examples cited above, of films so, what about The Last Temptation of Christ? And made by non-Jews. In this definition, the crite- can the role of Jews in Mel Gibson’s Apocalypto

76 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS be ignored? (Indeed it would be bitterly ironic if Thus, even intriguing films made in the Jewish we conclude that this movie may be categorized context, such as Hill 24 Doesn’t Answer, are in fact as a ‘Jewish work’…). a kind of pre-history, insufficient for signifying a And what about the ‘pogrom’ scenes per- comprehensive cultural meaning. petrated by Indians against the Whites in The question of Judaism in Israeli cinema classic Westerns, which according to the film goes hand in hand with the question of Judaism Hollywoodism: Jews, Movies and the American in the renascent Israeli-Zionist culture. It could Dream (1998), got their inspiration directly certainly be argued that any film made by Jews in from pogroms against Jews which many of Israel is a ‘Jewish film’. But beyond the maker’s Hollywood’s founding fathers suffered in the identity criterion, one should bear in mind that Ukraine prairies? it was a distinctive Zionist claim that anything ‘Jewish Cinema’ seems to escape definition, made by the Jewish People in their land is auto- just as Judaism itself escapes any attempt ever matically part of a living, contemporary and made in the history of Jewish thought to find a relevant Jewish culture. clear and universally accepted definition. Thus, And indeed, in the early films, of which the for the purpose of this review, we propose a def- most prominent is They Were Ten (1960), the cin- inition which presumes to create, not a critical ematic hero represented the Zionist myth of the category of ‘Who’s a Jew and who is not,’ pioneer-farmer. The film expressed the longings but an active social and cultural category: we for biblical existence and its derivative themes review films which made waves and/or raised (drought, quarrels over water, sentiments of a debate around questions concerning various the ‘desert generation’ and other variations on Jews, within and outside Jewish communities biblical themes). In these films the diasporic around the world. This definition is based on origin and cultural background from which the the essence of the art of cinema: it is there to protagonists came was erased (or, in film jargon, stir spectators to deal with their life questions, ‘retouched’). Like Elik in the novel The Elik and therefore seems to hold more potential for Chronicles by Moshe Shamir, the cinematic hero a meaningful elaboration of the ‘Jewish film’ had also ‘arrived from the sea’ and dissociated question; the role it plays in the Jewish discourse himself from his diasporic past. of identity, which never ends. Peaking in the first half of the 20th century, Hebrew literature dramatically described the struggle against ‘diasporic’ Jewishness. In Israeli THE QUESTION OF JUDAISM IN ISRAELI cinema, which developed over forty years later, CINEMA that struggle was already decided. Zionism has Historians of Israeli cinema are in strong dis- won, Jewishness has gone underground, and is agreement regarding the point of its beginning. in fact absent from the screen. We can safely say that until the 1960s, there Historically, the renewed Hebrew literature may have been a few scattered films, but a local had a long-standing, rich and fascinating textual Hfilm industry, in the usual sense, did not exist. tradition. Therefore, even as Israeli writers

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 77 were struggling against it, they were forced to the character of Kuni Lemmel, 1966). Here the acknowledge its greatness, and it had always secular Sabra and the Jew who ‘converted to been their great literary nemesis. In contrast, Zionism’ could nostalgically connect with the Israeli cinema had no significant visual heritage classic Jewish world, mainly because it was per- on which Israeli filmmakers could build. It was ceived as unthreatening. As is well known, Kuni therefore the European cinematic tradition, Lemmel is an amusing and even pleasant nin- along with its Christian imagery, compoop, but he has no contemporary power or which provided the tools and visual value. language required for mystical In those years (late 1960s and the first half of The only and transcendental expression the 1970s) the massive immigration from Islamic Jewish (as would happen more than two countries also received its repressed expression, heritage decades later, in Assi Dayan’s through a whole new genre which emerged at important film, Life According to traceable in that time — the ‘Burekas comedy’. Here too, Agfa). Israeli cinema the Jewish ‘bomb’ was defused through its folk- The governmental and cultural is the popular loristic commercialization. It is important to establishment’s attitude to cinema tradition of emphasize that ‘Burekas’ films were not made in Israel has always been prob- “Yiddishspeil”. by filmmakers who had experienced repression, lematic. Among other things, . but rather by old-time Ashkenazis, who seem to this attitude stemmed from the have used Yiddishspiel formulas to describe the Jewish belief that the transcen- popular world of Mizrahi immigration waves. It dent is always to be found in the word and not the image (the ancient commandment “thou is interesting to note here that the only impor- shalt not make unto thee any grave image or tant film to deal with the question of the crisis any likeness of anything” has not been reduced in Jewish identity and the social alienation of to the ritual sphere only). This resulted not that immigration (and which actually launched only in governmental under-budgeting of the the ‘Burekas’ genre) — Salah Shabbati (1964) cinema industry, as compared to other cultural — was the work of Ephraim Kishon, himself spheres (until today, theater budgets are several a new immigrant from Hungary, whereas most times larger), but also in a depreciatory societal filmmakers in that era came from the Ashkenazi attitude towards the medium of film as a whole, cultural center. The only exceptions to this rule which was perceived as a vulgar and inferior — and that is no coincidence — are Moshe form, and as such, not even expected to reflect Mizrahi and Nissim Dayan, whose Mizrahi fundamental questions of Jewish identity. This roots have enabled them to maintain a dialog may be the reason why the only Jewish heritage of a secret, albeit critical, love with Jewish tradi- traceable in Israeli cinema is the popular tra- tion. A good example is Mizrahi’s treatment of dition of the ‘Yiddishspeil’, which indeed led levirate marriage in his I Love You Rosa (1972). to a successful series of films and even to one Dayan’s prominent works in this respect include of the greatest cinematic hits of all times (in his monumental TV series Michel Ezra Safra and

78 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS Sons (1982), along with his important feature occupied a relatively marginal place in early film, Light out of Nowhere (1972). Israeli cinema (except in documentary films). But this repressed ‘Jewishness’ finally broke Very belatedly, the Shoah now increasingly through and began to fight back. The social occupies a meaningful space in Israeli cinema, form it took was the struggles between religious as part of a larger process taking place in Israeli and secular Jews in Israel. In the sociological society and culture. Orna Ben-Dor’s division of Israel, the Orthodox accepted the films — the trailblazing 1988 docu- role of bearers and representatives of diasporic mentary Because of That War, and The Shoah, tradition and Judaism. When they attempted New Land, the feature film which which fuels to repossess their position and status, a culture followed in 1995 — are a case in the majority war broke out. Thus, films created in the 1990s, point. of Jewish such as The Appointed, Forbidden Love and Snow The change for the positive, albeit films around in August reflected their secular makers’ ambiva- gradual, in the way Israeli cinema the world, lence towards their Jewish identity. On one coped with Jewish culture and hand, these films were fraught with violence identity, surprisingly began through has occupied (labeled as normative Haredi behavior) and television, with the establishment a relatively alienation. On the other hand, along with the of Channel 2 in 1992. In general, marginal terror they reflect, there is also desperate love. the breakthrough of Israeli cinema place in In all of the films, the secular man (or woman, in terms of quality stemmed from early Israeli in The Appointed) is in unrequited love with a this supposedly more commercial cinema. Haredi woman/man. It is always a hopeless love, medium. The commercial channel . because in these films it is not only the Haredi endorsed the production of Bat Yam establishment which fights the secular suitor, but New York, a TV series by Yossi Madmoni and also the Haredi beloved who ultimately rejects David Ofek (and The Barbeque People/Mangalists, them. Beyond the sexual fantasies of a secular the feature film that followed), which exposed man about the forbidden and covered Haredi for the first time a rich Jewish world occupied by woman, this is a heart-rending expression of the majority of Israelis who are neither secular the secular filmmaker’s secret yearnings for the nor religious: the traditional Jews, who are, of Jewish world that has been lost. In this context course, also mostly Mizrahi. It was followed it is understandable why it is the Haredi Jew by other series, such as Catching the Sky, Meorav who is labeled as the inheritor of ‘Jewishness’ Yerushalmi, Within a Touching Distance and others, in secular cinema. In contrast, the religious-na- which for the first time portrayed a complex, tional or modern religious Jew, is totally absent non-stereotypical religious and traditional from most of these films. culture. The scope of this paper is too narrow to In full-length feature films the change is discuss the place of the Shoah in Israeli cinema. still slower, since it largely relies on the emer- Suffice it to say that that the Shoah, which fuels gence of new filmmakers. But here too, Shemi the majority of Jewish films around the world, Zarhin’s Leylasede, Ori Inbar and Doron

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 79 Tsabari’s Driks’ Brother (written by ex-Orthodox NORTH AMERICAN JEWRY Amnon Dankner), Nirit Yaron’s divorce episode in Tel-Aviv Stories (1992), have all heralded the From its inception, there has always been a gradual resurgence of complex Jewish themes in strong presence of Jewish producers, directors, Israeli cinema. scriptwriters and actors in the American film Eventually the circle of filmmakers has Findustry. In fact, Hollywood was established extended to include various cultural groups. as a Jewish business and the Jews dominated Beyond the major breakthrough of Mizrahi it until the late 1940s. The fact that the cinema writers (Buzaglo, Madmoni, Ofek, Tsabari, Ben industry was still in its infancy during the years of the great Jewish immigration to the U.S. Shitrit, Zarhin), and to a certain extent of former was of critical importance to Jews. While other Soviet Union immigrants (Dover Kushashvili, occupations were practically closed to them, Arik Kaplun and recently other young film- many Jewish immigrants recognized the com- makers), a surprising change has taken place in mercial potential in movies and jumped on the Orthodox society. emergent industry’s wagon with much enthusi- Up until recent years, religious society has asm. Being themselves immigrants, Hollywood treated cinema as a forbidden secular medium. Jews have experienced the immigrant yearn- Following the establishment of the Ma’ale Film ings for low-cost artistic gratification and desire School, religious filmmakers, and later even to escape from the bleak economic reality for Haredi students, have begun to make films. two hours of fantastic cinematic fiction. The Most prominent among these are Yossi Cedar movies provided a refuge from the sufferings of with The Arrangement/Time of Favor and Campfire the present, where an American society free of and Shuli Rand with Ushpizin/Divine Guests. social conflict and safe from a pessimistic future Naturally, they directly address Jewish issues. was created at an affordable cost. Along with Another new and equally fascinating phenom- the economic profit, Hollywood Jews realized enon is the flourishing of a Haredi ‘cinema’ the prestige involved in artistic pursuit and the industry producing dozens of films annually, challenge of developing a new artistic language, specially made for home viewing on DVD. Such and they took on that challenge with a passion. films are used by Haredi society as a substitute Despite the Jewish identity of many for commercial television and most of them are Hollywood producers, writers, actors and direc- still of very low-quality. tors in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, it is almost Despite all the positive developments impossible to trace in American movies from described above, Israeli cinema is still waiting those years any Jewish elements or themes for non-Orthodox filmmakers to directly and which go beyond the stereotypical and super- boldly confront their own culture and past and ficial level. Jewish characters with accentuated lend them a new and refreshing cinematic inter- and caricatured attributes made their occasional pretation. appearance in the movies, but the plots they

80 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS served never developed into a substantial Jewish The next decade was to reveal the talent theme. of directors who peaked in the 1980s, such Only since the 1960s on can one trace an as Steven Spielberg (Schindler’s List, 1993) and increasing preoccupation by Jewish filmmak- Barry Levinson (Avalon, 1990). Characterizing ers with the examination of Jewish identity in this transitional generation is their tendency to general, and of Jewish American identity in par- first establish themselves as filmmakers, often ticular. The works of filmmakers such as Sidney renouncing their Jewish identity, and turning Lumet’s The Pawnbroker (1964), Bye Bye Braverman to address that identity once they have gained (1968); Larry Peerce’s Goodbye, Columbus (1969); stability, and as part of the process of their Ernest Lehman’s Portnoy’s Complaint (1972); Mike maturation and establishment as accomplished Nichols’ Biloxi Blues (1988) and Angels in America filmmakers. (2003); Paul Mazursky’s Next Stop, Greenwich The increasing interest of Jewish-American Village (1976); Enemies: A Love Story (1989); Mel filmmakers in their Jewish identity should be Brooks’ The Producers (1968); Woody Allen’s regarded as part of the social processes taking Annie Hall (1977), Zelig (1983); Jeremy Kagan’s place in the U.S. and as a result of processes The Chosen (1981); Barbra Streisand’s Yentl (1983); undergone by second and third generation and Joan Micklin Silver’s Hester Street (1975) and Jewish-American immigrants. On the one hand, Crossing Delancey (1988) — have all portrayed these are the years in which American identity distinctly Jewish protagonists and attempted became an issue for other U.S. minorities as to examine the weight and significance of the well. On the other, these were also the years Jewish component in these characters’ identity. when many Jewish filmmakers felt that, unlike In these films, for instance Next Stop, Greenwich their parents, they were already exempt from Village, Jewish identity was largely presented as proving their loyalty to the U.S., and thus able to a burden. For Larry, the protagonist, Jewishness confront and question the nature of their Jewish is mainly represented in the image of his parents’ identity with more confidence and depth. The family in general, and that of his aggressive making of movies addressing Jewish subjects mother in particular. Exposed to the lively scene should be regarded as part of the general Jewish of bohemian New York, Larry’s family seems to awakening, whose major manifestations are be nothing but a ball and chain. He must choose found in American literature, journalism and between life in the realms of the conservative popular culture. family past (which could turn him into a pale The 1990s and the 2000s mark the birth shadow of masculinity, as it did to his father), of a new generation of filmmakers, who have or following his lost lover, an authentic repre- tackled their Jewish identity from their earliest sentative of the Beat generation who inhabited films, and who move freely between various and Greenwich Village in the 1950s. It is not surpris- varied cinematic genres, making way for Jewish ing that the protagonist chooses to leave his characters, Jewish themes and conflicts derived family behind and try to find his place in the from the duality of Jewish-American identity. cosmopolitan Village society of the future. The shadow of the catastrophe of European

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 81 Jewry is still present in the works of these direc- embrace this tradition with a smile (The Hebrew tors, but it occupies a secondary place. Hammer). Among the most prominent of this gen- One would expect that in the third genera- eration are directors and writers such as Ethan tion of Jewish immigration to the U.S., young and Joel Coen (Miller’s Crossing, 1990; The Big filmmakers would no longer be preoccupied Lebowski, 1998); David Mamet with the meaning of their American identity. (Homicide, 1991; State and Main, However, an examination of some of the above- The making 2000); Darren Aronofsky (Pi, 1998); mentioned films inevitably leads to the opposite of movies Ben Younger (Prime, 2005); and Liev conclusion: many Jewish-American filmmak- address- Schreiber (Everything is Illuminated, ers still regard the Jewish component of their ing Jewish 2005); scriptwriters such as Stuart identity as crucial, whether they like it or not. Blumberg (Keeping the Faith, 2000) Unlike the 1960s and 1970s films, Judaism in subjects and Mark Zakarin (Keeping Up with these newer films is presented in a completely should be the Steins, 2006); documentarists different light. For Jake, the protagonist in Keeping regarded Mark Jonathan Harris (The Long Way the Faith, Judaism is anything but an archaic, as part of Home, 1996; Into the Arms of Strangers: obsolete cultural relic. Like Larry, the hero of the general Stories of the Kindertransport, 2000); Next Stop, Greenwich Village, he is in love with Jewish Menachem Daum (A Life Apart: a young non-Jewish woman, but for him this is awakening, Hasidism in America, 1997; Hiding and a difficult dilemma because he finds in Judaism manifested Seeking: Faith and Tolerance after the a whole world of morality and discipline. His in American Holocaust, 2004) and Sandi Simcha choice to serve as a rabbi attests to the relevance literature, Dubowski (Trembling Before G-D, he finds in Judaism, and which he will not easily journalism 2001). give up, despite the prized temptations of the and popular These films deal with a variety of non-Jewish world. Neither is the family unit in culture. subjects: examining the connection this film presented as a relic from the past. The . between the Eastern European past manipulative and repulsive mother of Next Stop, and American identity (Schreiber), Greenwich Village is replaced in Keeping the Faith Jewish mysticism (Pi) and exploring the meaning with a loving and understanding mother, and of religious rituals in contemporary Jewish the family unit is depicted as highly valuable American life (Keeping up with the Steins). They and integral to the protagonist’s identity. also contain various positions regarding the Like other films of its generation, Keeping degree of commitment felt by these filmmak- the Faith does not advocate a total return to the ers towards their Jewish past. Some manifest Jewish community nor a withdrawal from the a postmodernist position, which regards non-Jewish world. Such films acknowledge Jewishness as one existential option among the contribution and value of the Jewish world many (The Big Lebowski, Keeping the Faith), others and they seek to find a place for it alongside express explicit criticism of traditional Judaism’s the modern values which they have already stances (The Believer), and still others joyfully affirmed. And yet, their Jewish identity is an

82 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS element which gives Jewish filmmakers a sense that is conscious of the non-Jewish majority and of partial alienation and makes their complete seeks to locate its own authentic voice in the integration in non-Jewish society a complex contemporary cultural cacophony. A few Jewish task. In many of these films the Jew remains a films were made in Germany (Zucker, 2004, by stranger, even if only partially so, to American Dani Levy) and in Spain (Only Human, 2004, by cultural life; but contrary to the preceding gener- Dominic Harari and Teresa Pelegri). Other foci ation, this one is resigned to this stranger-status of filmmaking with a substantial Jewish element and often embraces it, reconciled and content. exist in three other countries — France, Britain Recognizing the importance of family and roots, and Argentina. these filmmakers wish to posit the family in the France: Jewish characters were present in center of their world. For them it is not merely films already in the 1920s and 1930s. Especially a relic from the past, but a component of the memorable is the character of Rosenthal, the present, which secures their future survival. It Jewish prisoner of war in Jean Renoir’s La seems that in the third generation, young film- Grande Illusion (1938). By the end of the Second makers are trying to find out whence they came World War Jewish characters appeared in French from, so that they know where they should go. films dedicated to the horrors of the war, such as Enclosure (1961, Armand Gatti) and The Old Man and the Child (Claude Berri, 1967). During the JEWISH CINEMA OUTSIDE ISRAEL AND 1980s non-Jewish directors continued to address THE U.S. the treatment of the Jews by the Vichy govern- Four fifths of world Jewry is concentrated in Israel ment (Au Revoir, les enfants, 1987, Louis Malle) and the U.S. But Jewish and non-Jewish filmmak- and the French government’s coping with the ers born in other Jewish centers often address the memory of the Shoah after the liberation (Les nature of contemporary Jewish identity. Unlike Années sandwiches, 1988, Pierre Boutron). FIsraeli cinema and also Hollywood, which Among films produced in the 1960s, the were owned by Jews from their inception, comedy Pas Question le Samedi (Alex Joffé, 1965) the global Jewish cinema attempts to express is worth mentioning, for his centering on a Jewish positions within cultural frameworks comedic gallery of Jewish characters, of mostly that are identified with the non-Jewish majority. Ashkenazi origin. Moreover, in many European countries the Jew From the 1970s on, Jewish directors also as a character first appeared in the films of non- began to dedicate whole films to the examina- Jewish filmmakers. The view which identifies tion of the nature and position of Jewish identity the Jews as the ‘Other’ of European society has in France. That is how the comedy Les Aventures thus preceded the attempts by Jewish filmmak- de Rabbi Jacob, directed by Gérard Oury, became ers to furnish an independent self-definition of a resounding hit in 1973, to be followed by other their identity, and contemporary Jewish cinema comedies, such as Levy et Goliath (Oury,1987), may be regarded as an attempt to establish an La Vérité si je mens! (Thomas Gilou, 1997; independent Jewish cinematic position, one followed by a successful sequel in 2001); XXL

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 83 (Ariel Zeitoun, 1997) and God is Great and I’m Burman. His three successful films, Esperando al Not (Pascal Bailly, 2001). In these films, Jewish mesías/Waiting for the Messiah (2000), El Abrazo characters are examined in the context of their Partido/Lost Embrace (2004) and Derecho de interaction with their non-Jewish environment, Familia/Family Law (2006) all outline the autobi- with the didactic objective of pointing out their ography of a Jewish young man who is deeply similarity, and the solidarity that should exist connected to his Jewishness and who constantly between Jews and their non-Jewish neigh- springs back and forth between the non-Jewish bors. The exception is the two Le Grand Pardon society of Buenos-Aires and Israeli urban society. films made by Alexandre Arcady in 1982 and Valentín (2002) by Alejandro Agresti is also con- 1992, which depict the life of a Jewish family cerned with similar identity qualms, depicted of North-African origin whose members are through the journey of a young boy’s learning France’s leading crime organization. In this film of his mother’s Jewish identity. (clearly influenced by Francis Ford Coppola’s The cinematic preoccupation with Jewish The Godfather), France is not portrayed as a wel- identity in France, Britain and Argentina suggests coming melting-pot, but rather as a place which that the talk about the demise of Jewish culture forces its inhabitants to identify with their in these countries was premature. There is a ethnic origins and cultivate their tribal-Jewish dynamic Jewish culture in these communities, links. and such films are evidence. There is, however, UK: Up to the 1990s, significant Jewish films the question of the relationship between these are hard to find. Carol Reed’s 1955 film, A Kid films and the life of the Jewish communities for two Farthings, is a rare example of a film from in these countries. Filmmakers there are aware these years which dedicates a significant role of the community’s position as a minority, but to a Jewish character. But in recent years the that does not deter them; on the contrary, it stirs United Kingdom is enjoying a wave of Jewish them to examine the contemporary meaning of filmmaking, with emphasis on the experiences this ethnic Jewish identity. The future of these of Jewish youth. Some of the films are dedicated initial trends is not clear, but at this time, Jewish to memories and conflicts of ancient past The filmmaking around the globe is still very much Governess (1998, directed by Sandra Goldbacher) alive and kicking. and Solomon and Gaenor (1999, Paul Morrison) and recent past, such as Esther Kahn (2000, by THE PLACE OF JEWISH CINEMA IN Arnaud Desplechin) and Sixty Six (2006, Paul CONTEMPORARY FILM CULTURE Weiland). But at the heart of this filmmaking wave is a deep contemplation of the present, In recent years Jewish cinema around the world as in Suzie Gold (2000, Ric Cantor); Shem/Name is enjoying an unprecedented flourishing. Film (2004, Caroline Roboh) and Song of Songs (2006, festivals across the globe offer programs rich in Josh Appignanesi). Jewish cinematic content. Among these, the San Argentina: The recent thriving of Jewish- IFrancisco Festival, founded by Debra Kaufman Argentinian film is mainly thanks to Daniel in 1980, is a major event. The festival attracts

84 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS over 30,000 visitors a week, and their screen- In the major Jewish festivals, there is a clear ing guide is distributed in over 100,000 copies. trend of seeking new and controversial subject Many major Jewish festivals are held annually matter, rather than dealing with classic Jewish in England, Germany, Austria, Sweden and issues. In the last five years certain topics and Holland. In Israel a Jewish film Festival has been films stood out in Jewish festivals: held annually in Hanukah for the last seven Jewish homosexuality: The films Trembling years, showing dozens of Jewish films from before G-D by Sandi Simcha Dubowski, about around the Jewish world. In New York, Los Jewish homosexuals, and Keep Not Silent by Angeles and Miami there is an annual Jewish Ilil Alexander, about religious lesbians, are the Film Festival, founded twenty-five years ago by outstanding works in this vein. They starred former Kaveret band member Meir Pfenigstein. not only in Jewish festivals but were also suc- Around the world, many Israeli Consulates hold cessful in the international film sphere, having special events where Israeli films are screened. been screened in cinemas around the world and This is unprecedented, and it seems that no winning numerous awards. Trembling before G-D other artistic medium enjoys such demand and was even purchased for screening by leading interest as Jewish and Israeli film. international networks such as ABC, Arte, The great importance of the festivals, beyond Sundance Channel, DR TV, ABC Australia, HBO the exposure they offer Jewish and Israeli films Latin America and others. and in addition to the enhancement and elucida- The link between the tough macho Israeli tion of Jewish identity through the medium of male and homosexuality was celebrated in film, lies in the encounter that is facilitated by two major hits in the Jewish these festivals, between Jewish works and Israeli world: Walking on Water and Yossi audiences, and between Israeli works and Jewish and Jagger, an award-winning and The San audiences. Jewish identity and Israeli identity widely screened TV drama center- Francisco (which, as said, are not overlapping) both benefit ing on a love story between an army Jewish from a productive meeting in these numerous officer and one of his soldiers. Cinematic film events. Fascinating dialog and a welcome Gender and Women Issues: Festival, diffusion are inevitably created between the These featured in the films Tehora founded in various films, their makers and their audiences. and Mekudeshet, which gained wide 1980, is a The current Jewish cinematic fermentation recognition in Israel and abroad, major event, should be seen as stemming both from the dis- and last year a film about a Jewish attracting comedian addressing sex issues covery of Jewish identity as relevant to a new over 30,000 generation of young filmmakers, the discovery made the headlines. The interest in visitors in a of the medium of film as a promising, effec- the more traditional peeping into week. the Haredi world was still evident in tive and refined channel for Jewish creativity, . and the desire of a growing Jewish audience to films such as Bat Melech, Pru Urevu, explore their roots and the face of contemporary Israel vehapashkevilim, Hared liserato (about the Judaism, preferably in the movies. films of Yehuda Groweis) and others.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 85 One of the ‘hottest’ subjects raised in Jewish than classic ‘Jewish’ issues, are important for festivals is the Arab as the Israeli ‘Other’. retaining and attracting young crowds to fill This year the Manhattan JCC is cinema seats. planning a festival titled The Voice Most prominent in this respect are the film In the major of the Other, dedicated to the Arab festivals of Boston, New York and San Francisco, Jewish film in film, especially documentary which have a leftist leaning and naturally gravi- works, as replacing the religious, tate towards such subject matter, whereas the festivals, Haredi and other Jewish ‘Others.’ festivals of Southern California, New Jersey and there is a In this respect, the Jewish world smaller Canadian cities are seeking to present clear trend of is following a global trend of an the more ‘Yiddishkeit’-type, less controversial seeking new international and political interest issues. In these smaller centers, audiences are and contro- in films made by Arab filmmak- coming mainly to enjoy themselves, so that versial subject ers or featuring Palestinians. In the organizers are less keen on offering the ‘heavier’ matter, rather last Docaviv festival, the film Three political issues, preferring light comedies and than dealing Times Divorced by Ebtisam Mara’ana complaining about a shortage of new Israeli with classic won the first prize. The films, Bedel comedies. Jewish issues. and Shadia (featuring an Arab-Israeli . female Karate artist) won awards in CONCLUSION the prestigious IDFA 2005 festival. ‘Security-oriented’ films about political prison- This summary aspires to outline two pro- ers ‘with blood on their hands’ and 9-Stars Hotel, cesses: (a) a significant change occurring in the about teen Palestinian laborers, starred in the last decade in the amount of films produced in major festivals this year, including the presti- the Jewish world. Instead of a handful of films gious Sundance festival. Tdepicting Jewish conflicts, stories and characters, The Jewish San Francisco festival and a from early 2004 on dozens of Jewish films were number of other Jewish festivals are dedicat- made, in Israel and all over the world, that deal ing space for films addressing these issues and with distinctly Jewish problems and topics. (b) regard them as an integral part of Jewish films The change is not only in the quantity of films arriving from Israel. made but also in their subject matter. The few The Arab as the Other is gradually entering Jewish films produced during the 1960s and Israeli television as well, as in series such as 1970s had a distinct historical or nostalgic charac- The Weekly Portion (a female physician, a Jewish ter. In Israel, the cinema of these years repressed studies major) and others. its Jewish roots and later even launched a frontal In the conference of Jewish festivals held in and often violent attack against their repre- May 2006 in Toronto, the question was raised sentatives. In contrast, current Jewish cinema how to attract young unaffiliated audiences to is vigorously addressing questions such as the Jewish festivals. There is no doubt that innova- place of religious ritual in the life of a modern tive and controversial issues, and trendy rather Jew, the relationship between traditional reli-

86 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS gious and secular Jews, Jewish holidays as a being exposed to private and universal Jewish cinematic space, the nature of the relationship dilemmas from around the world. Such exposure which may exist between Jews and non-Jews, is inevitably followed by a self-exploration of or the likelihood of survival of the Jewish ethnic identity by the spectators. minority within the non-Jewish majority. Such In the beginning of the third millennium, films reflect the emotional struggles of a new cinema is a cultural bridge linking filmmakers generation of artists who use film to explore the and their audiences, Judaism and Israeliness, nature of their current identity. The variety of spectators and their selves. Film enables contem- identities is increasingly diversified in all direc- porary Jews to walk a cinematic bridge and find tions — from religious filmmakers in Israel to a mirror for reflecting their own multiple identi- assimilated filmmakers in the Diaspora who are ties. It is a readily available, accessible, complex rediscovering their Jewish identity. and constantly changing bridge, which is not At the same time, such films contribute to always very stable, but it does illuminate and the shaping of a future Jewish identity. New and expose the yearning Jewish soul — a bridge of larger audiences are coming to the cinema and light.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE I 87 JPPPI Main Publications The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute - Annual Assessment 2004–2005 The Jewish People Between Thriving And Decline JPPPI Staff and contributors 2005 To succeed, large resources, judicious coping with critical decisions and careful crafting of long-term grand-policies are needed. The full volume contains analyses of the major communities around the world and in-depth assessments of significant topics. Between Thriving and Decline — The Jewish People 2004, Executive Report, Annual Assessment No.1 JPPPI Staff and contributors 2004 Facing a Rapidly Changing World — The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, Executive Report, Annual Assessment No.2 2005 JPPPI Staff and contributors 2005 Major Shifts — Threats and Opportunities — The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, Executive Report, Annual Assessment No.3, 2006, JPPPI Staff and contributors 2006 A Strategic Plan for the Strengthening of Jerusalem, JPPPI Staff 2007 Institut de Planification d’une Politique pour le Peuple Juif, Rapport Annuel du JPPPI 2005/2006, Le Peuple Juif en 2005/2006, Entre Renaissance et Déclin, Special edition in French, JPPPI Staff and contributors 2006 China and the Jewish People: Old Civilizations in a New Era Dr. Shalom Salomon Wald 2004 This is the first strategic document in the series of Improving the Standing of the Jewish People in Emerging Superpowers Without a Biblical Tradition. Position Paper: Global Jewish People Forum JPPPI Staff 2005 The position paper examines President Moshe Katsav’s initiative to establish a “Second House” and makes a number of recommendations. Soft Power — A National Asset Dr. Sharon Pardo 2005 Today’s global changes in the international arena require more consideration of soft assets possessed by the Jewish People. Prepared for the 2005 Herzliya Conference. Strategic Paper: Confronting Antisemitism — A Strategic Perspective Prof. Yehezkel Dror 2004 The increasing ability of fewer to easily kill more and more makes new antisemitism into a lethal danger that requires comprehensive, multi-dimensional and long-term counter-strategies. Alert Paper No. 2: Jewish Demography — Facts, Outlook, Challenges Prof. Sergio DellaPergola 2003 There may be fewer Jews in the world than commonly thought, and if the current demographic trends continue unchanged, there might be even fewer in the future. Alert Paper No. 1: New Anti-Jewishness Prof. Irwin Cotler 2003 The new anti-Jewishness consists of discrimination against, or denial of, the right of the Jewish people to live, as an equal member of the family of nations. A Road Map for the Jewish People for 2025 JPPPI Staff 2006 Published in the context of the Alternative Futures for the Jewish People 2025 project. Prepared for the 2006 Herzliya Conference.

88 I SOCIETAL ASPECTS THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE (ESTABLISHED BY THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL) LTD

The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute was established in 2002, as an independent non-profit organization. The Institute examines the challenges, threats and opportunities facing the Jewish People, and engages in strategic policy planning to assure long-term thriving. Interface with actual policy making is enhanced by helping the major Jewish organizations and the government of Israel in agenda setting and presenting analyzed and innovative policy options.

Among the projects in process in 2007: • Annual Assessments of the Situation and Dynamics of the Jewish People • Alternative Futures of the Jewish People: 2030 • Jewish Demographic Policies • Improving the Standing of the Jewish People in Emerging Superpowers without a Biblical Tradition • Jewish People Crises Management • Developing Jewish People Leadership • A Jewish People Strategy Towards Islam • Global Jewish Identity and Identification • Improving the Image of the Jewish People • Geo-political Environment: Opportunities and Challenges

The Institute promotes Jewish leadership policy discourse by publishing policy papers, preparing background material for decision-makers and holding workshops for decision- makers and policy professionals. In addition, the Institute provides advice and helps with staff development in an effort to help build-up strategic thinking and policy planning capacities of the Jewish People. t

Isaac Herzog Th e comprehensive Annual Report by the Jewish Minister of People Policy Planning Institute constitutes a Social Affairs platform for an extremely important debate on the Executive Repor and Services and issue of the state of the Jewish People all over the for Diaspora Affairs world, in view of the trends, ups and downs, processes Annual Assessment No. 4 State of Israel and events that have left their mark over this past year both on the State of Israel and on world Jewry. I am confi dent that the recommendations and The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute conclusions of this very thorough report will constitute key points in shaping a solution to the critical issues facing the Jewish People, as we may see in the Report. AnnualAnnual AAssessmentssessment David Harris For those who want to learn more about the external Executive Director, and communal challenges facing the Jewish people, American Jewish the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute’s Annual Committee Assessment 2007 ought to be required reading. Once again, JPPPI has produced a comprehensive and incisive study of the issues that most aff ect our worldwide community. Th is report reminds us that all Jews are responsible for one another. If we’re going 2200720062007007 to live out that adage, as we should, taking JPPPI’s analysis to heart is the right place to begin.

Richard Th e history of this century has validated that Jewish Prasquier People indeed exists, whatever its location, either Th e Jewish Président du in Israel or in the Diaspora. Too many Jewish People Policy CRIF (Conseil community leaders do not have the appropriate tools Planning Représentatif des to confront the complex challenges it faces from both Institute Institutions Juives within and the outside. Th e JPPPI vigilantly and de France) admirably accomplishes the vital task of providing Givat Ram Campus POB 39156 Societal Aspects those tools, and they are a matter of survival. Jerusalem 91391 Israel …The notion of the Jewish People comprised of Jewish communities Phone: Baroness Th e work of the JPPPI is unique in its insight and (972)-2-5633356 around the world with a core state in Israel shows signs of weakening… breadth. Its publications, as well as the Jerusalem Ruth Deech Fax: Member of the Israel and the American Jewish community are challenged to develop conference of July 2007, provide readers and (972)-2-5635040 House of Lords, UK, participants with the tools and support they need to a strong leadership, pro-active rather than defensive… and Independent face Jewish problems worldwide. With the resources www.jpppi.org.il Adjudicator for of the JPPP I feel better equipped to handle issues of Email: Higher Education antisemitism and the European diaspora. [email protected]