CHAPTER 1

THE HOLDING WAR

N the south-western Pacific in April 1943 the tide was turning agains t I the Japanese. Their thrust towards Wau in New Guinea had just been defeated, and in the Solomons in February they had abandoned Guadal- canal. They still held, however, a vast arc stretching from the Aleutians , through the western Pacific, New Guinea and the Indies to Burma, and had held it for about a year . After many setbacks in the west the Allies were meeting with som e success against the Germans and Italians. The British victory at El Alamein in November 1942 had been followed by Allied landings i n North Africa. In April 1943 the British Eighth Army advancing wes t across North Africa linked with the British First Army, supplemente d by an American . Tunis fell to the British and Bizerta to the Americans on 7th May. About 250,000 prisoners were taken and the German Army of Africa was destroyed . With the loss of North Afric a the spirit and power of Italy were broken . In November 1942 the Russians had startled the Germans by suddenly going over to the offensive. All along the line the Germans were pushed back. On 31st January 1943 the commander of thei r Sixth Army surrendered at Stalingrad ; nearly 90,000 prisoners were taken . In the same month the Russians broke the investment of Leningrad . Like the British victory in Libya and the Allied victory in Tunisia, the Russia n victories could not be measured wholly or even mainly in terms of groun d gained. The British, American and Russian armies had won a mora l ascendancy over the Germans and had inflicted vast human and material damage. President Roosevelt, Mr Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff ' had met at Casablanca in January to decide Allied policy for 1943 . The American Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom direct control of the war agains t Japan had been entrusted, considered it opportune to prepare for a large - scale offensive in the Pacific . Before the Casablanca Conference ther e was no comprehensive plan for the defeat of Japan .2 Faced by the Ger- mans across the Channel, the British Chiefs of Staff still emphasised th e importance of beating Germany first, and containing Japan in the Pacifi c until the defeat of Germany should make larger Allied forces available. 1 The Combined Chiefs of Staff was the term given to the Chiefs of the American and British Services sitting in conference together . The American Chiefs alone were known as the Join t Chiefs of Staff . The Combined Chiefs who met at the Casablanca Conference comprised th e Americans (General George C . Marshall of the Army, Admiral Ernest J . King of the Navy, General H . H . Arnold of the Army Air Force) ; and the British Chiefs of Staff (General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord ; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff) . Roosevelt's Chief of Staff, Admiral William D . Leahy, was unable to go to Casablanca because of illness . Mr Harry L. Hopkins accompanied the President . Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the British Staff Mission to Washington, and Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten were also present . s The Joint Chiefs' directive of 2nd July 1942 had given three localised tasks : 1 . Occupation of Santa Cruz and Tulagi by South Pacific forces assisted by South-West Pacific Area forces. 2 . Occupation of north-eastern New Guinea and the northern Solomons by SWPA forces . 3 . Re- conquest of New Britain by SWPA forces .

2 THE HOLDING WAR Ian 1943 At the first meeting of the Combined Chiefs at Casablanca on 14th January, before the arrival of the two main figures next day, the America n naval chief, Admiral King, criticised the small dimensions of the Allie d effort against Japan . In December 1942 he had made an estimate of th e percentage of the total war effort (men, ships, planes, munitions) o f all the Allies, including China, then used in the Pacific. His conclusion was that only 15 per cent of the total Allied resources then engaged was being used there . The remaining 85 per cent was being used in Europe , Africa, the Battle of the Atlantic and in the build-up of forces in Britain .3 It is not easy to see how King arrived at these figures in view of the fact that, in December, the greater part of the United States Navy was i n the Pacific; nine infantry divisions and two Marine divisions were als o there, whereas there were only eight American infantry divisions in th e United Kingdom and North Africa. There were, however, more America n air groups in the western than the eastern theatre—34 against 25 .4 King's statistics were indicative not so much of the actual situation as of hi s determination to spare no efforts to have larger forces allotted to the Pacific. At Casablanca not only Admiral King but General Marshall, althoug h agreeing that Germany must be defeated first, urged that the hard-wo n initial successes in the Pacific must be followed up promptly and that Japan must not be allowed to build up her strength and launch fres h offensives . Marshall informed the British Chiefs that the Americans wished t o strike the Japanese defences in the rear and on the flanks (for example, i n Burma) . The American Chiefs thought that the Japanese were establishin g a strong defensive line from the Solomons to Timor . King stated that the fighting in the Solomons and eastern New Guinea was designed t o secure the approaches to " and the key to the situation is Rabaul " . After the capture of Rabaul, which, in the Casablanca planning, wa s almost taken for granted, King urged that the Philippines be attacked across the Central Pacific, using stepping stones in the Marshalls, Caroline s and Marianas. The British Chiefs were not keen yet to take any large-scale initiative against Japan . They were apprehensive lest a large effort even in Burma should reduce the strength of the main attack on Germany, although the y agreed on the desirability of reopening the Burma Road . Nor were they enthusiastic about attacking Truk or the Philippines before the fall of Germany.

s The account of high-level planning in this chapter is largely based on the official histories o f the United States Navy, Army and Air Force, and the memoirs or biographies of Churchill, Brooke, King, Leahy, Arnold and others . 6 See M . Matloff and E . M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942 (1953) , a volume in the official series United States Army in World War II. The American Army divisions in the Pacific were : Central Pacific : 24th, 27th, 40th . South Pacific : Americal, 25th, 37th, 43rd . South-West Pacific : 32nd, 41st . There were 346,000 American troops overseas in Pacific commands, including Hawaii, an d 347,000 in Great Britain and North Africa, or on the way thither .

Jan 1943 CASABLANCA CONFERENCE 3 President Roosevelt, however, regretted that so little attention appeared to have been paid by the Combined Chiefs to China . He said that "island hopping strategy" promised to be too lengthy and "that some other metho d of striking at Japan must be found" . As American submarines were reputed to have sunk 1,000,000 tons of Japanese shipping (one-sixth o f the Japanese merchant marine) in the first year of the war, Roosevelt suggested that submarine warfare be intensified and supplemented by ai r attacks on Japanese shipping from Chinese airfields . Mr Churchill made it evident that he was mainly interested in operations in the Mediterranean . A lively discussion ensued between the Combined Chiefs on 17th an d 18th January when the Americans reaffirmed their desire to keep th e initiative in the Pacific, and Marshall stated emphatically that the American people would not tolerate "another Bataan" . In a warning which must have shaken the British Chiefs of Staff, Marshall stressed that enoug h forces must be kept in the Pacific because "a situation might arise in th e Pacific at any time that would necessitate the United States regretfull y withdrawing from the commitments in the European Theatre" . 5 King sup- ported Marshall and informed the British that many of the demands in the Pacific came from Australia—a British country .° By 18th January the Combined Chiefs had finished their recommenda- tions for Pacific objectives in 1943 . After the Americans had offered to provide some ships and landing craft for Burma, the Combined Chiefs agreed that the recapture of Burma should begin in 1943, but that the y would discuss it again later in the year. The Americans considered that the Japanese forces must remain under continual, powerful and extensive pressure. Because the Japanese were operating on short interior lines, the Allies could keep the initiative along their 12,000-mile line and preven t the Japanese consolidating only by attacking areas important enough t o draw "counter-action" which would be defeated and would result in whittling away the enemy's strength, particularly at sea and in the air. The Americans therefore considered that these operations were necessary : 1. Seizure of the Solomons, of eastern New Guinea as far as Lae an d Salamaua, and of the New Britain-New Ireland area ; 2. Seizure of Kiska and Attu in the Aleutians ; 3. After Rabaul, seizure and occupation of the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Caro - lines through Truk and extension of the occupation of New Guinea to th e Dutch border; 4. Operations in Burma designed to keep China in the war and increase th e employment of China-based aircraft against shipping.

6 Quoted in J. Miller, Jr, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul (1959), p . 7, a volume in th e official series United States Army in World War II . 6 In his diary of the Casablanca Conference, Brigadier Ian Jacob (Assistant Military Secretar y to the United Kingdom War Cabinet) wrote on 13th January : "Apparently the operations in the Pacific are planned exclusively by the Navy Department, who in their turn leave the res t of the world to the War Department . TheTe is little or no collusion, so that the allocation of resources as between the Pacific and the rest of the world is inevitably a hit and miss affair, or perhaps one could better describe it as a game of grab . The Navy have their ships and th e Army have theirs. The Navy control the landing-craft, so that the Army finds it difficult t o squeeze out what they want for their own projects. On the other hand, the Navy is apt to find itself in difficulty on the administrative or logistical side of their Pacific operations, as they often do not bring the Army into the picture early enough. This happened at Guadalcanal, where the U .S . Marines were thrown ashore and then it was found that there was no follow-up, no maintenance organisation, and no transport. The Army was then called in to help—very nearly too late . " Quoted in A. Bryant, The Turn of the Tide 1939-1943 (1957), p . 540 .

4 THE HOLDING WAR Jan 1943 The British Chiefs feared that the number of operations envisaged by the Americans in the Pacific might jeopardise success against Germany, and therefore suggested that the operations in the Pacific for 1943 shoul d be limited to operations against Burma and Rabaul . Finally the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that in the Pacific th e Allies were to retain the initiative and prepare for a full-scale offensiv e when Germany had been defeated . At the outset the Allies would tak e Rabaul, make secure the Aleutians, and then advance from east to wes t across the Pacific through the Gilberts and Marshalls towards Truk an d the Marianas. With strategic plans for the war against Japan settled, the American s now gave the British a statement of how they intended to carry them out . The Combined Chiefs noted a memorandum from General Marshall , Admiral King and General Arnold that the Allies in 1943 would "work towards positions from which land-based air can attack Japan" . The Joint Chiefs' memorandum continued that "assault [by ground troops] on Japan is remote and may well not be found necessary" . For the final top-level meeting on 23rd January the Combined Chief s produced an eleven-page paper covering their proposals for the conduc t of the war in 1943. It is interesting to note that as a result of eleven days of deliberations they gave top priority to "security of sea communications" . This meant that they considered the Atlantic Ocean the most important battlefield of the war and that the shortag e of escort vessels was the first need to be met . Second on the priorities list—and closely involved with the first item—was "assistance to Russia in relation to othe r commitments" . Third on the list was "Operations in the Mediterranean"—the pla n for the capture of Sicily, giving as the target day "the favourable July moon" . . . . Fourth on the list was "Operations in and from the United Kingdom"—provisions for the continued build-up of American forces . . . . Fifth on the list was "Pacific and Far East Theatre"—operations in the Aleutians, from Midway towards Truk and Guam, advances in the East Indies and the reconquest of Burma . The three final items on the list were provisions for a study of the Axis oil positions—for nava l and air command in West Africa—and a provision that "all matters connected wit h Turkey should be handled by the British" .7 Thus, in theory, the Pacific war theatre came only fifth on the list . To attain even this degree of priority the American Joint Chiefs had bee n forced to abandon their opposition to a Mediterranean offensive in 1943 and had accepted postponement of the invasion of France until 1944 . When he saw the paper of the Combined Chiefs at the conference o n 23rd January Harry L . Hopkins scribbled a pencilled note to Field Mar- shal Dill : "Jack, I think this is a very good paper and damn good plan ."8 The paper and plans certainly were good as far as the war against German y was concerned ; but about the Pacific war, particularly in the South and South-West Pacific Areas, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and through them the Combined Chiefs were less realistic and less well informed . It was one thing to capture Sicily in July ; another to capture Rabaul in May .

7 R. E . Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L . Hopkins, Vol II (1949), p. 688 . 8 Sherwood, p . 688 .

1942-43 OPERATIONS IN BURMA 5 Prospects in Burma were even less promising . In the whole vast Burma - India-Ceylon theatre Field Marshal Wavell, at the beginning of 1943 , commanded 14 divisions and 24 independent brigades, of which 5 s

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were deployed in eastern India and Assam ; but most of Wavell's forma- tions were under-equipped and under-trained . The Japanese Burma Area Army, formed in March 1943, contained 4 well-trained divisions . Wavel l had opened a limited offensive against Akyab in December 1942, but b y March it was evident that it was doomed, and "by the start of the mon- soon, our forces in Arakan were back approximately in the positions fro m which the advance had begun five months earlier" .9 Wavell had originally planned to assist the reconquest of Burma b y allowing Brigadier O . C. Wingate's specially trained jungle force, know n as the "77th Indian Infantry Brigade", to penetrate into central Burm a and thus assist the Allied campaigns in north and south Burma . Because

o A. P . Wavell, Despatch on Operations in the India Command, from 1st January 1943 to 20th June 1943, para. 14.

6 THE HOLDING WAR Feb-June 1943 of restricted resources, however, he had then decided to help a possibl e advance from the north by Chinese forces commanded by the American , Lieut-General Joseph W . Stilwell, by sending Wingate into upper Burma to cut the enemy's line of communication to Myitkyina, Bhamo and Lashio. When Wavell heard from Stilwell that the Chinese had no inten- tion of advancing, he decided to let Wingate's force go ahead for th e sake of gaining experience. On 7th February Wingate's men left Imphal in seven columns to cu t the main north and south railway between Mandalay and Myitkyina , harass the enemy in the Shwebo area, cross the Irrawaddy, and cut th e railway line between Maymyo and Lashio . By 18th February the main body had crossed the Chindwin although two columns were ambushed an d dispersed. The railway line was successfully blown and Wingate then crossed the Irrawaddy in March, but, because of many difficulties—th e climate, the health of the men and animals, the lack of water, and th e danger of arranging dropping of supplies from the air when large numbers of Japanese were about—operations against the Mandalay-Lashio railwa y were abandoned, and Wingate retraced his steps . When the Japanese opposed a crossing of the Irrawaddy at Inywa, Wingate broke up hi s force into dispersal groups most of which returned to India by June . Describing this operation Wavell wrote:

The enterprise had no strategic value, and about one-third of the force whic h entered Burma was lost. But the experience gained of operations of this type, i n supply dropping from the air, and in jungle warfare and Japanese methods, wa s invaluable. The enemy was obviously surprised and at a loss, and found no effective means to counter the harassment of our columns .l The Japanese occupation of Burma during 1942 had isolated China except for a tenuous air supply route over 500 miles of the Himalayan "hump" between Assam and Yunnan . By early 1943 China's position was serious, with the 39 divisions of the Japanese Kwantung and China Expedi- tionary Armies controlling strategic areas . Theoretically China had abou t 300 divisions but most of these were well below brigade strength and of dubious quality.

It was not long before the salient but unpalatable fact that the wa r against Japan would take second place began to be placed before th e Australians. Broadcasting on 18th April the Prime Minister, Mr Curtin , spoke of the Casablanca decisions and made Australia's position clear . To the people of Australia I say that the holding war imposed on Australia by the decisions of the Casablanca Conference . . . means that our resources will be used up in many cases, worn out in many instances, and strained to a serious exten t in others . . . . To our Allies I say that the Australian Government accepts globa l strategy insofar as it conditions Australia's employment as an offensive base unti l Hitler is beaten, but it does not accept a flow of war material, notably aircraft , which does not measure up to the requirements of a holding war .

1 Wavell, despatch, para . 28 .

Jan 1943 DISCUSSIONS AT NOUMEA 7 Five days before the beginning of the Casablanca Conference th e American Joint Chiefs of Staff had requested General Douglas Mac - Arthur, Commander-in-Chief of the South-West Pacific Area, to submit plans for the capture of Rabaul. MacArthur had replied that his force s would be unable to take part in any further operations without a lon g period of rest and preparation; the 7th Australian and 32nd American Divisions were being withdrawn for "reconstruction" after the Papua n campaigns, the 1st Marine Division was recuperating after Guadalcanal , and the 9th Australian Division was just returning from the Middle East .2 The "beat Hitler first" strategy was the cause of intense chagrin to MacArthur who did not accept it with the same resignation as Curti n and who repeatedly complained of the paucity of forces at his disposal . At Casablanca it was clear that General Marshall would not take undu e risks in the Pacific, that General Arnold was convinced that dayligh t bombing of Europe was the quickest way to break down Axis resistance , but that Admiral King on the other hand was primarily interested in th e Pacific war. King's support, naturally, meant support for the predominantl y naval Central Pacific Command of Admiral Chester W . Nimitz, whose orders up to date had been to hold the island positions necessary to secur e lines of communication between America and the South-West Pacific Area , prevent the Japanese from further expansion in the Central Pacific, defen d North America, protect essential sea and air routes, and support Mac - Arthur's forces. On the day when the Casablanca Conference ended Admiral Nimit z met Admiral William F . Halsey, commander of the South Pacific Area , at Noumea, to discuss their next objective after Guadalcanal . The two admirals believed that they would receive no substantial naval reinforce- ments during the period of the fight for Tunis and the projected invasio n of Sicily, or while submarines remained a grave threat in the Atlantic . They had already rejected any plan to assault Rabaul as being too costly. It was indeed strange that the Combined Chiefs at Casablanca shoul d have based most of their Pacific plans on the early capture of Rabaul, at a time when the three Pacific commanders (MacArthur, Nimitz and Halsey) realised and stated the impracticability of capturing this grea t Japanese base with their existing forces . Nimitz and Halsey considered that their next move should be a northward advance in the Solomons to Munda on New Georgia where the Japanese had built a good airfield ; and Nimitz insisted that this central Solomons operation should be con - ducted by the navy . Here he collided with MacArthur who was equall y firm that Halsey's command should be under his wing . MacArthur's stand was backed by the Joint Chiefs' directive of July 1942, under which the three tasks were primarily the responsibility of the South-West Pacifi c Area, but the admirals felt that, as MacArthur had his hands full in New Guinea, the navy should run the central Solomons operations.

'The components of the third veteran Australian division—the 6th—were at this time scattere d in New Guinea, eastern Australia, and the Northern Territory .

8 THE HOLDING WAR Feb-Mar 1943 The growing concept that the main advance against Japan should b e made across the vast reaches of the Central Pacific was strongly resisted by MacArthur, who considered that the quickest way to Japan was by a series of hops along the coast of New Guinea and on to the Philippines . It was too early for such thoughts as what follows shows . On 28th February MacArthur and his staff completed an outline plan fo r the achievement of the second and third tasks set in the Joint Chiefs' directive of July 1942. It was very tentative and no fixed dates were se t for the five operations which it outlined . The first of these would be th e capture of Lae by an airborne force landing in the Markham Valley cooperating with an amphibious force moving along the coast in smal l craft; Salamaua would be bypassed but important bases in the Huon Penin- sula-Vitiaz Strait area such as Finschhafen would be captured, and a combined airborne and amphibious attack would finally be launche d against Madang. The second operation, after the capture of the Huon Peninsula-Vitiaz Strait area, would be the capture of New Georgia in the Solomons by the South Pacific Command . The South-West Pacific and South Pacific Commands would then launch amphibious assault s on New Britain and Bougainville . The fourth and fifth operations would be the capture of Kavieng and Rabaul respectively . MacArthur believed that in order to carry out his part of this ambitiou s plan he would need to be reinforced by five infantry divisions, and abou t 3,200 combat and transport aircraft . He considered that, with this extra strength, his command and the South Pacific Command, which, he sug- gested, needed no reinforcement, would be able to drive the Japanese back to Truk and Wewak during 1943 . Even Rabaul might be captured . After MacArthur had asked permission to send staff officers to Washing - ton to explain his plans, the Joint Chiefs called a conference of represen- tatives of the three Pacific commanders beginning in Washington on 12t h March. MacArthur sent Lieut-General George C . Kenney, the com- mander of the Fifth Air Force; Major-General Richard K. Sutherland, his Chief of Staff; and Brigadier-General Stephen J . Chamberlin, his senior Operations Officer . Halsey was represented by Captain Miles R . Browning, his Chief of Staff, and others ; and Nimitz by his deputy, Rear-Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and others . After much discussion, during which the navy insisted that the Pacific was and would continue to be "a nava l problem as a whole" and should be unified under a naval command, Marshall suggested a solution which he admitted "skirted" the questio n of combining the commands. Under this proposal Halsey would retain control of operations in the Solomons but would be subject to general directives from MacArthur, while naval units attached as task forces would remain under Nimitz's control . King said that as the Joint Chiefs had undertaken to prevent difficult situations developing between Mac- Arthur and Nimitz, he would agree with Marshall, provided that control of the fleet remained "in a fluid state" . When the Joint Chiefs announced the maximum reinforcements fo r the Pacific in 1943 it was obvious that the plan would have to be con-

Mar-Apr 1943 COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS 9 siderably modified. Two infantry divisions would be sent to MacArthur in the second and third quarters of the year ; by December the aggregat e number of American-manned aircraft in the South and South-West Pacifi c Areas would have been increased from 1,476 to 2,663 . Additional naval units requested would be supplied, if available, by the Pacific Fleet . On MacArthur's behalf Sutherland suggested, therefore, that the scop e of the plan be much reduced and that the tasks for 1943 be limited t o the capture of the Solomons, the north-east coast of New Guinea as far as Madang, and western New Britain. He also suggested that airfields should be constructed on Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, 115 and 16 5 miles respectively north and north-east of Milne Bay, to provide bases for medium bombers and fighters to attack New Britain and support Halsey's operations in the Solomons . These practical recommendation s were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the plan with which th e destinies of the Australian forces were to be so intimately linked wa s set out in a cabled directive from Marshall dated 28th March . Under the heading "Command" the directive stated : (a) The operations outlined in this Directive will be conducted under the direc- tion of the Supreme Commander, South-West Pacific Area. (b) Operations in the Solomon Islands will be under the direct command of th e Commander, South Pacific Area, operating under general directives of the Supreme Commander, South-West Pacific Area. (c) Units of the Pacific Ocean Area, other than those assigned by the Joint Chief s of Staff to task forces engaged in these operations, will remain under th e control of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area. The tasks were then outlined : (a) Establish airfields on Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands . (b) Seize Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen-Madang area and occupy western New Bri- tain. (c) Seize and occupy the Solomon Islands to include the southern portion o f Bougainville . The intentions were, in the words of the directive, "to inflict losses o n Japanese forces, to deny these areas to Japan, to contain Japanese force s in the Pacific theatre by maintaining the initiative, and to prepare fo r the ultimate seizure of the Bismarck Archipelago" . MacArthur was finally instructed to submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff his plan, including th e composition of the forces to be used and the sequence and timing of th e operations. Thus, MacArthur was in strategic command of the South-West an d South Pacific Areas, but Halsey retained tactical control in his area. Sub- ject only to directives from the Joint Chiefs, Nimitz allocated ships an d aircraft from his fleet as he saw fit. Early in April Halsey flew from his headquarters in Noumea to Brisbane to see MacArthur. Later, he described the meeting thus : I had never met the General . . . . Five minutes after I reported, I felt as if we were lifelong friends. I have seldom seen a man who makes a quicker, stronger , more favorable impression . He was then sixty-three years old, but he could have

10 THE HOLDING WAR Mar-Apr passed as fifty . His hair was jet black ; his eyes were clear ; his carriage was erect. If he had been wearing civilian clothes, I still would have known at once that h e was a soldier. The respect that I conceived for him that afternoon grew steadily during the war. . . . I can recall no flaw in our relationship . We had arguments , but they always ended pleasantly. Not once did he, my superior officer, ever forc e his decisions upon me. On the few occasions when I disagreed with him, I tol d him so, and we discussed the issue until one of us changed his mind .3 These then were the general Allied plans in April 1943 when both sides paused for a breathing space after the bloody battles for Papu a and Guadalcanal. Until March 1942 the information available to the Allies about the Japanese Army had been disturbingly scanty . It was supplemented considerably as a result of the capture of documents an d prisoners in the Papuan campaign, and the Australian Intelligence staff became a main source of new information about the opposing army, bu t still far too little was known . 4 A fortunate incident early in March 1943, however, transformed th e situation . At that time the 47th Australian Battalion was garrisonin g Goodenough Island. On 7th March and for the next few days groups of Japanese—survivors of the convoy dispersed or sunk in the Bismarc k Sea battle of 2nd to 5th March—landed on the island . Between the 8th and the 14th Australian patrols killed 72 Japanese, captured 42 and found 9 dead on a raft . One patrol, under Captain Pascoe, 5 stalked a group of eight Japanese, who had landed in two flat-bottomed boats, killed them all, and found that the boats contained large quantities of docu- ments in sealed tins. This important-looking discovery was hurried back to the headquarters in Brisbane where the documents were found to include a complete Army List showing the names of all Japanese officers and their units . Examination and collation provided a complete and detailed picture of the Japanese Army and revealed the existence of many units hithert o unknown.° Soon afterwards Intelligence officers from all Allied head - quarters attended a conference at Washington at which the new informa- tion was re-examined and a system of interchange arranged which resulte d

S W . F. Halsey and J . Bryan, Admiral Halsey 's Story (1947), pp . 154-5 . ' The extent to which the Australian Intelligence staff at this stage was influencing Intelligence staffs farther afield is perhaps illustrated by the following occurrence . On 23rd September 1942 the staff at Allied Land Headquarters (L.H .Q .) had prepared a paper on Japan's war policy . It reached the conclusions that Japan' s air strength would not permit her to undertake the offensive against Russia, India or the SWPA simultaneously, or even against two of these . Her immediate aim would be to secure the East Asia sphere. This would involve creating a strategic barrier north of Australia, completing the occupation of New Guinea and "thereafte r possibly Darwin and the north-east coast of Australia" . Generally she would build up her strengt h so that, should Germany be defeated, she could defend her sphere against the Allies and rel y on their exhaustion and war weariness to secure a negotiated peace. On 8th November the Combined Intelligence Committee at Washington prepared a paper for the Combined Chiefs o f Staff which reached General Blarney ' s headquarters a few days later. It reproduced the Australian paper almost word for word (without acknowledgment), one difference being that the Washingto n paper said (in the telegraphic version which reached Australia), "in particular unlikely at present attempt occupy Australia, British Joint Intelligence Committee consider occupation Darwi n is possibility" . 6 Capt J . C . Pascoe, VX112201 ; 47 Bn. Grocer; of Wonthaggi, Vic ; b . Violet Town, Vic , 27 Jan 1909 . e Captain A . W. McWatters who was in charge of mopping-up along the coast later described the result of Pascoe's action thus : "When it was over the badges showed some of the Japanese dea d were in the brass-hat class and had some official looking boxes. . They were immediately shoved back to battalion and quickly sent away . . . We gradually learned the show had picke d up the stud book and all the box and dice, etc."

tan-Apr OPPOSING FORCES 1 1 in all partners thenceforward having an extensive and accurate knowledge of the Japanese Army's composition and deployment.' The time had gone when the Japanese had hoped to cut the America n supply route to Australia by capturing New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa . When the Japanese realised that this was beyond them, they had con- centrated on preparations to hold a line running from Timor across th e Arafura Sea to Wewak, Lae and Salamaua, thence along the south coast of New Britain to Rabaul and south to New Georgia in the Solomons . Since the early days of the war Field Marshal Count Terauchi's Southern Army Headquarters at Saigon had controlled the XIV Army in the Philippines, the XVI Army in the Netherlands East Indies and the Japanese forces in Burma and Malaya .8 A new army—the XIX—was established in January 1943, under the Southern Army, to take over from the XVI in Timor, the Arafura Sea, Dutch New Guinea, Ceram, Ambon , Halmahera and Morotai . The troops in New Guinea and the Solomons comprised the Eighth Area Army, commanded by Lieut-General Hitosh i Imamura, who was under the direct control of Imperial General Head- quarters. Under Imamura were Lieut-General Haruyoshi Hyakutake 's XVII Army in the Solomons and Lieut-General Hatazo Adachi's XVIII Army (20th, 41st and 51st Divisions) in New Guinea. In the area about 400 combat aircraft were available. Japanese naval forces based on Truk were estimated to consist of 6 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 15 cruisers, approximately 40 destroyers and 27 submarines . Arrayed against Imamura's Eighth Area Army in April 1943 were the forces of the South and South-West Pacific Areas . Under his command Halsey had the 2nd Marine Division and two American infantry division s (25th and Americal) which had taken part in later fighting on Guadalcanal , three fresh American divisions (the 3rd Marine, the 37th from Fiji and the 43rd from New Zealand and New Caledonia), and the 3rd New Zealan d Division. He also had a powerful fleet, consisting of 6 battleships, 2 aircraf t carriers, 3 escort carriers, 13 cruisers, approximately 50 destroyers, an d numerous smaller ships and submarines ; 350 carrier-based aircraft and 500 land-based aircraft of the Thirteenth American Air Force and th e Royal New Zealand Air Force completed Halsey's force, described by th e American naval historian as "a well-oiled fighting machine, strong in al l three elements".9

7 The Australian representative was Lieut-Colonel R. R. Lewis who had specialised in this fiel d with great success. In May 1943 LHQ Intelligence estimated that there were 347,000 troops in Japan ; 1,161,000 in China, Manchukuo and neighbouring areas ; 82,000 in Burma ; 117,000-119,000 in the Indies; 100,000-106,000 in New Guinea and the Solomons . When other garrison forces were added th e total strength of the Japanese Army was estimated at 2,169,000-2,176,000 . The Japanese Army in the field was organised into army groups, area armies, and armies . There were four groups of armies (Japan Defence, Kwantung, China Expeditionary and Southern ) which were each the equivalent of an Allied command of a theatre of operations . An area army (e.g . Eighth Area Army, Rabaul) was the equivalent of a British or American army, while a Japanese army was the equivalent of a British or American corps . A Japanese division, con- taining three regiments, each of three battalions, was approximately equal in numbers to a n Australian division. S. E. Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier 22 July 1942-1 May 1944 (English edition 1950) , p. 95, a volume in the series History of United States Naval Operations in World War II.

12 THE HOLDING WAR Mar 194 3 In the S.W.P.A., MacArthur had two American infantry divisions (32n d and 41st), but the 32nd and one regiment of the 41st were tired and depleted as a result of the Buna campaign . The 1st Marine Division wa s recuperating in Australia . His main infantry force comprised the Aus- tralian Army of twelve divisions (ten infantry and two armoured) . About half of the 1,400 aircraft of the Fifth Air Force under the command o f General Kenney were R .A.A.F. planes of a variety of British, American and Australian types . It was in his naval forces that MacArthur suffered most by comparison with Nimitz and Halsey . In March MacArthur's naval force had been renamed the Seventh Fleet .' Thus by a stroke of Admiral King's pen (wrote the American naval historian) th e impoverished Southwest Pacific Force achieved fleet status . On its birthday, however, the new Seventh Fleet was still measured in tens rather than thousands . On paper it made a brave showing with seven task forces composed of strangely assorte d surface, air and underwater craft scattered between northern Papua and south - western Australia, under three different flags (Australian, American and Nether - lands), but most of its strength was still listed as "upon reporting", which mean t assigned ships en route or still in American waters . Planes, corvettes, minelayers and destroyers . . . were busy searching for Japanese submarines in Australia n waters . Vice-Admiral Crutchley's cruisers (H .M .A.S. Australia and Hobart, U.S.S. Phoenix) waited for their services to be required. There were a few tenders, onl y two tankers and but one transport; freight to New Guinea was hauled by the "Army's Navy" of small chartered Australian vessels, or the Dutch ships that had survived the Buna campaign . Most skeletal of all was the Amphibious Force, commanded by Rear-Admiral Barbey .2 The paucity of the naval forces of the South-West Pacific was du e not only to lack of ships and beaching craft, but to the rivalries betwee n the American Services . Believing that the Pacific war was primarily a naval problem, the American Navy was reluctant to place substantial numbers of naval ships at the disposal of an American military com- mander; a fact which not only complicated MacArthur 's planning bu t caused him to look around for an alternative naval force . As the decisions of the Casablanca Conference descended from the high places in Washington to the Allied commanders in the Pacific, i t became obvious that any military offensive in the South-West Pacific in 1943 would have to be carried out mainly by the , jus t as during the bitter campaigns of 1942 . As Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Army and Commander o f the Allied Land Forces in the South-West Pacific, General Sir Thoma s Blamey had the dual task of controlling operations and administration . His main administrative problem early in 1943 was how to obtain enough men to sustain the Australian part of his army . As a result of the expansion of the army in the critical months of 194 2 and the subsequent heavy losses, chiefly because of tropical diseases, a struggle for manpower had begun between each of the three Services, an d

1 Each American fleet could be further subdivided into task forces which could be shuffled fo r each different operation. In these task forces the first digit was the number of the fleet . Task forces were divided into task groups with numbers following a decimal point, and the group s into task units, with numbers following a second decimal point. a Morison, p. 130. l K . -1 . .,1 J- Salamaua isthmus and the coastline looking south to Nassau Bay . General Sir Thomas Blarne y and Lieut-General Sir lve n Mackay at New Guine a Force headquarters .

r I mtrali~u ; I1'ur SlrmuriuU

(Australian liar .%femoria l Major-General F . H. Berryman, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (left), with Brigadie r M . .1 . Moten, commander of the 17th Brigade .

Mar-Apr REORGANISATION OF ARMY 13 the munitions and aircraft factories . In March 1943 the War Cabinet noted that the army's actual strength was 79,000 below the establishment and that it required a monthly intake of 12,500 men. "If this manpower is not forthcoming," said a War Cabinet Minute, "it will be necessar y either to reduce the striking force or to reduce the number of other for- mations to maintain it. This is a critical question of supreme importance ." On 30th January the War Cabinet had ordered a review of war produc- tion programs and of plans for the expansion of the Services . Now, in March, it directed that such a review be expedited, and "that the persona l attention of the Commander-in-Chief, A .M.F., be again drawn to this matter in regard to the delay that has arisen". Already, after the Papuan operations, Blarney had carried out a fairly far-reaching reorganisation of the army "partly", as he wrote afterwards, "as a result of experiences in New Guinea and the general need for saving manpower and partly as a result of my desire to simplify the administration of the Army" . It provided that the First and Second Armie s should take over certain responsibility from the three eastern lines o f communication areas with consequent saving of manpower ; the coast- defence units were reduced by 3,630, and further reduction was planned. Five infantry divisions—5th, 6th, 7th, 9th and 11th—were being organise d as "jungle divisions " with reduced transport, artillery, etc. The 2nd Motor Division was being disbanded and the men thus released were to be used to bring to full strength an armoured force to consist of the 1st an d 3rd Armoured Divisions, 4th Armoured Brigade, and 3rd Army Tan k Brigade. On 30th April the War Cabinet had before it Blarney's views on th e problems. It had to bear in mind the advice of the War Commitment s Committee that 10,000 persons a month were the maximum availabl e for the three Services, and for munitions and aircraft production . Blarney said that any reorganisation was limited by the need (a) to prepare a force of three infantry divisions for offensive operations in accordanc e with General MacArthur's plans, and (b) to maintain adequate force s to defend the mainland of Australia and Australian territory in New Guinea, and to provide a reserve for relieving units in New Guinea. He assessed the total at nine infantry divisions, two armoured divisions, on e armoured brigade, one army tank brigade with proportionate non - divisional and base units . Three infantry divisions (apart from thos e required for offensive operations) would be required for New Guinea . Blarney added : This requirement insofar as the defence of Australia is concerned is based on th e altered strategic situations since the submission of the C-in-C's last appreciation i n Sep 42, when Japanese Naval and Army units were concentrated in great strengt h in the South-West Pacific, and the position was one of extreme gravity . Since then, however, the recent successful campaigns in the Solomons and New Guine a areas, and the effectiveness of air attack on Japanese invasion convoys have improve d our position considerably by forcing the enemy front farther to the north an d seizing the initiative. This has not removed the danger of invasion since the enemy' s reaction has been to increase his land and air forces to a very great degree . It is

14 THE HOLDING WAR Apr 1943 obvious that he does not intend to accept his defeats without a great effort to wrest the initiative from us. In these circumstances it is a justifiable and indeed an unavoidable risk to weaken our defensive forces in areas most remote from the enemy in favour o f concentrating such forces in areas in which they are most likely to be required . With this in view the forces in Australia are now in course of being dispose d as follows : Queensland—Torres Strait Force (approximately one battalion group), one armoured division, and brigades in movements to and from New Guine a (in addition the offensive force of three divisions and ancillary units is en route to or in training in the Atherton area) . Darwin—One infantry division and ancillary units . Western Australia—One infantry division, one armoured division and ancillar y units. New South Wales—One infantry division (mainly under-age personnel) an d ancillary units, one armoured brigade and one army tank brigade . Other States—Miscellaneous units but no field formations. The allocation of three infantry divisions for the defence of New Guinea i s based on the need for holding areas of strategic importance, and the provision o f a small force for reinforcing such areas or other points that may be threatened . The areas in question are Milne Bay-Goodenough Island, which requires a minimum of one division, Buna which requires another division, Wau which requires at a minimum two brigades, and Moresby for which there remains one brigade as a general reserve and for Moresby's defence . . . . In addition to the A .M .F. forma- tions, arrangements have been made to retain 158 U .S. Regiment for garrison dutie s in New Guinea, whilst the remainder of the U.S. forces in Australia are being trained as a Task Force for special operations . In view of increased Japanese interest in the Arafura Sea area, the garrison at Merauke is being increased from one battalion group to a brigade group less a bat- talion . Any serious Japanese threat in the direction of Merauke would have to b e met from the force being prepared in Australia for future offensive operations. Blarney stated that he was disbanding some ancillary units, reducin g base units and replacing army men by men of the Volunteer Defenc e Corps in the coast defences. The reduction so achieved would not excee d 20,000, and further field formations would have to be disbanded if the intake into the army—now 4,000 a month, and gradually decreasing — was not increased. The monthly wastage rate as soon as major operation s began again was estimated at 11,800, leaving a deficiency of 7,800 a month. If further releases from industry could not be made, Blarney advise d that "the force being prepared for offensive operations should be reduce d by one infantry division (with ancillary units) for the reason that th e Australian New Guinea and mainland defensive component has bee n reduced to the barest minimum". The War Cabinet decided that the Minister for Defence should discuss the matter with MacArthur ; and that a force of three divisions must be maintained for major offensives . In this appreciation the size of the forces required for purely defensiv e roles in Australia and New Guinea seems, in retrospect, to have bee n estimated on a lavish scale, particularly in view of the naval and air losses Japan had suffered : there were to be three divisions in New Guinea,

Apr1943 REDUCTION INEVITABLE 15 three (one armoured) in northern and western Australia, and three (in- cluding one armoured) in eastern Australia, in addition to the three A.I.F. divisions retraining in north Queensland. Thus Australia, with a population of 7,000,000, was maintaining twelv e divisions and now had in the army nearly 500,000 men, about 7 per cent of the population. The number of divisions was greater in proportion to population than was being maintained, for example, by Britain or th e United States . At the same time Australia was engaged on a relatively big munitions program. Some reduction of the army was inevitable.

PACIFIC OCEA N

admiral, I, Ireland

aegainville Ganda

JAVA ' LTG

3rwin CORAL r K j F SEA INDIA N N.T.Force /

OCEA N

—I FIRST ARMY { .. 4 DIV. 3 ! 4 'bane A Toowoomba..i•Canungra SOUTH r° AUSTRALIA SECOND ARMY 1 Bde 4 th Bde 3 Army TIE de Singleton', SPaoariatta .I~,., NEW SOUTH delaide' WALES o f ; \''L .r. Cfa r VICTORIA L ._ 'Melbourne'.' Militia Bill Area WIIn n s P6a:d. . Australian dispositions and area of Militia Bil l

On 24th April the A .M.F. actually numbered 466,901 (not including 22,823 women3) of whom 285,931 were in the A .I.F., including 125,91 2 who had enlisted in that force from the militia . On the same date there were 128,197 members of the R .A.A.F., including 16,746 serving over- seas; and 30,658 members of the R .A.N. including 17,199 afloat .4 In New Guinea there were 54,809 Australian troops of whom 40,534 were in operational units . The largest part of the Australian Arm y (141,650) was in Queensland ; 35,033 troops were stationed in the North-

*These were 2,997 AANS, 15,678 AWAS and 4,148 AAMWS. *Mr Curtin on 22nd June 1943 announced that at the end of March 1943 the gross enlistment figures were 820,500, and of these 530,000 had volunteered .

16 THE HOLDING WAR Feb-Apr ern Territory; and 60,970 in Western Australia . The American Army in the Australian area numbered 111,494 including 40,023 round Bris- bane and 30,058 in New Guinea; but only 18,124 of the American troop s in New Guinea were in operational units . MacArthur also had 48,96 1 members of the American Army Air Force, making a grand total of 160,455 American troops . Militia units as a whole could now become part of the A .I.F. if 75 per cent of the unit's actual strength or 65 per cent of the authorised "war establishment", whichever was the greater, had volunteered to join the A.I.F. The role of the militia in future operations had been finally decide d by the passing on 19th February 1943 of the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943 commonly known as the Militia Bill. The bill defined the "South-West Pacific zone" to which the militia could henceforth b e sent as an area bounded on the west by the 110th meridian of eas t longitude, on the north by the equator, and on the east by the 159t h meridian of east longitude . 5 At the end of April 1943 the Australian formations were organise d as follows:

First Army : (Lieut-General Lavarack)—Toowoomba, Queensland : 4th Division (6th, 11th, 12th, 14th Brigades ) 3rd Armoured Division (2nd Armoured and 1st Motor Brigades ) Torres Strait Force II Corps : (Lieut-General Morshead s )—Barrine, Queensland : (16th, 30th Brigades ) (18th, 21st, 25th Brigades ) (20th, 24th, 26th Brigades ) Second Army : (Lieut-General Mackay)—Parramatta, New South Wales : (1st, 9th, 28th Brigades ) 3rd Army Tank Brigade III Corps : (Lieut-General Bennett)—Mount Lawley, Western Australia : (2nd, 5th, 8th Brigades ) 1st Armoured Division (1st Armoured Brigade, 3rd Motor Brigade ) Northern Territory Force : (Major-General A . S. Allen)—Darwin : 12th Division (13th, 19th, 23rd Brigades ) New Guinea Force : (Lieut-General Mackay, acting 7 )—Port Moresby : (17th Brigade ) (4th, 29th Brigades ) 11th Division (7th, 15th Brigades ) L.H.Q. Reserve : 3rd Brigade—Adelaide 4th Armoured Brigade—Singleton, New South Wale s

6 One Australian territory—Norfolk Island—lay in the South Pacific Area, and, appropriately, was garrisoned by New Zealand troops from October 1942 until February 1944 . See O . A. Gillespie, The Pacific (1952), a volume in the series Official History of New Zealand in th e Second World War 1939-45 . 6 Lt-Gen Sir Leslie Morshead, KCB, KBE, CMG, DSO, ED, NX8 . (1st AIF : 2 Bn and C O 33 Bn 1916-19 .) Comd 18 Bde 1939-41 ; GOC 9 Div 1941-43, II Corps and NGF during 1943-44, 1944-45 . Branch manager, shipping line; of Sydney ; b . Ballarat, Vic, 18 Sep 1889. Died 26 Sep 1959 . 7 Lieut-General E. F. Herring, commander of NGF, was on leave .

Apr 1943 AMERICAN FORMATIONS 1 7 Major-General S . G. Savige's 3rd Division headquarters was, in April , establishing itself at Bulolo, Major-General E . J. Milford ' s 5th was at Milne Bay, and Major-General C . A. Clowes ' 11th at Port Moresby . Just across the Dutch border on the southern coast of New Guinea the 62nd Battalion (Lieut-Colonel Haupt $ ), assisted by a Netherlands East Indies company, was garrisoning Merauke . The battalion had arrived between December 1942 and February 1943 and was given the task of defending the airfield and docks area . Between New Guinea and Aus- tralia was Torres Strait Force (Colonel Langford 9 ) responsible for the defence of the islands in the strait. American forces under the control of New Guinea Force at this time included the 158th Regiment attached to the 11th Division in Por t Moresby and the 41st Division (162nd, 163rd and 186th Regiments) in the Oro Bay area . Back in Rockhampton Lieut-General Robert L . Eichel- berger's I American Corps controlled only one division—the 32nd (126th , 127th, 128th Regiments) at Brisbane. Of the nine A.I.F. and eighteen militia infantry brigades comprising the army in April, only one A.I.F. brigade (the 17th) and four militia brigades (4th, 29th, 7th, 15th) were in New Guinea . With such a large and vulnerable coastline and with such a comparatively small force i n New Guinea, the army was finding increasing use for the Independent Companies,' the first seven of which had carried out infantry tasks alon g Australia' s vast defence arc from Timor to New Caledonia . By A pril 1943 15 A .I.F. and 8 militia battalions had gained battle experience in New Guinea . The militia battalions belonged to the (9th, 25th, 61st Battalions) which had taken part in the suc- cessful defence of Milne Bay; the 30th Brigade (3rd, 39th and 55th/53r d Battalions) which had fought over the Kokoda Trail, and, in compan y with the 14th Brigade (now 36th and 49th Battalions) had joined th e 4 A.I.F. brigades attacking Gona and Sanananda . In July 3 of these 8 battalions—the 3rd, 39th and 49th—would be disbanded and their officer s and men distributed among the units of the 6th Division as reinforcements , leaving only 5 battle-tried militia infantry battalions . As mentioned, two armoured divisions (Major-General H. C. H. Robert- son' s 1st and Major-General W. Bridgeford' s 3rd), the 4th Armoured Brigade and the 3rd Army Tank Brigade were being maintained in Aus- tralia. There had been 185 tanks in Australia in April 1942 ; there were now, in April 1943, 1,672, and 775 more had been ordered in Aus- tralia. 2

2 Lt-Col A. G. K . Haupt, ED, SX1475 . 2/1 MG Bn 1940-42 ; CO 62 Bn 1943-44, 2/1 MG B n 1944-45 . Industrial chemist ; of Renown Park, SA; b . Adelaide, 31 Jan 1910 . 9 Col H. R. Langford, OBE, MC, QX53209. (1914-18 : 1 LH Regt and Lt RFA .) Comd Tps Thursday I 1942, Torres Strait Force 1942-43, 1 Beach Gp 1943-44 . Grazier; of Brisbane ; b. Waverley, NSW, 18 May 1895. ' An Independent Company in 1943 included 18 officers and 277 other ranks . organised into thre e platoons each of three sections, and with a headquarters including signallers and engineers. 2 1n July 1943, however, the War Cabinet decided that manufacture of tanks in Australia would cease.

18 THE HOLDING WAR Apr1943 For most of the volunteers who had enlisted in the 1st Armoured Division in 1941 believing that they would be serving in the Middle Eas t early in 1942 the past year had been one of frustration . By the spring of 1942 Robertson had trained the division to as near perfection as a formation is likely to achieve without being in action ; and sprinkled through it were a considerable number of officers who had served in North Africa and Syria, chiefly in the mechanised cavalry . In retrospect it seems unfortunate, for a variety of reasons, that a more sanguine view of the possibility of invasion of Australia was not taken in the summe r of 1942-43 and that this fine division was not transferred to Africa, perhaps in the transports which brought the 9th Division home, to play a part in the coming campaigns there and in Europe.

Around the arc embracing the Japanese conquests there was, in April , little actual fighting between opposing ground forces . Indians and Britis h were withdrawing in Burma after the failure of the Chindit operation an d the operations in Arakan; the Chinese were now in the eighth year o f their dogged resistance to the Japanese . In New Guinea Brigadier M. J. Moten's Kanga Force was patrolling against the Japanese among the jungle-clad precipitous ridges of the Mubo area.3 The men of Kanga Force knew nothing of the great plans for th e future; only that they had saved Wau, that they were now held up nea r Mubo and that they presumed their objective was Salamaua . It seeme d to these Australians, fighting in such primitive conditions, that the Japanes e sun was still at its zenith ; and that it would be an immense and arduou s task to fight from Wau to Salamaua, let alone from Wau to Tokyo . Soldiers and civilians alike had watched the bitter campaigns of attritio n in Guadalcanal and Papua with anxiety and foreboding . What alternative was there to this slogging, exhausting fighting where gains were to b e measured almost by the yard stick of trench warfare? It was a gri m and gloomy future and none could foresee the end of the war if similar battles had to be fought for all islands along the route to Tokyo . The operations in New Guinea were now under the control of Lieut- General Mackay, who, since January, had been acting commander o f New Guinea Force . Mackay, a sage, exacting and resolute commander , had led the 6th Division in the campaigns in North Africa and Greec e early in 1941, and from September 1941 to April 1942 had commande d the Home Forces in Australia . Since then his substantive appointment ha d been that of commander of the Second Army . On 24th March Major- General Savige, another former officer of the 6th Division, now com- manding the 3rd Division, arrived at Port Moresby to take command i n the only active battle zone in the South-West Pacific . At this time few commanders of his rank had had more varied active service : a junior infantry officer on Gallipoli and in France in 1914-18, commander of a n independent force in Kurdistan in 1918, and of an infantry brigade

+Kanga Force consisted of : 17th Brigade (2/5th, 2/6th, 2/7th Battalions), three Independent Companies (2/3rd, 2/5th, 2/7th), one battery from the 2/1st Field Regiment and one sectio n from 1st Mountain Battery.

Mar-Apr GENERAL SAVIGE IN COMMAND 19 the 17th—in operations in North Africa, Greece and Syria in 1940-41 . In order to see his new area, and to renew his acquaintance with hi s old brigade which, it so happened, was to be his main fighting force, Savige visited the battle areas between 30th March and 13th April . He returned to Wau six days later, and on 23rd April moved with hi s divisional headquarters to Bulolo . On the same day he took comman d of all troops in the area and Kanga Force ceased to exist.