Peloponnesian War a Civil War

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Peloponnesian War A Civil War ●Delian League ● Controlled by Athens…a Naval power! ●Peloponnesian League ● Controlled by Sparta…a military machine! Trouble Brewing… ● Athens power is increasing through the Delian League…Sparta feels threatened. ● Athens controls trade routes of grain and other foods ● 431 B.C. Sparta gives an ultimatum: Free all the cities under your control or else face war. War Begins… ● Sparta attacked Athens in 431 BC ● Athens didn’t want to fight Sparta on land, so they went behind the city walls ● Sparta burned the farmland/countryside ● Pericles wanted to wait out the Spartan military but a plague hit ■ 1 out of 4 people died…including Pericles City Walls of Athens Deadlock ● Food was scarce because Sparta burned the land ● Labor was short because slaves escaped to Sparta ● Athens won sea battles & Sparta won land battles ● Then, Sparta gained an ally…. Spartan’s Help… ● The Persians agreed to help Sparta with $$$ to build a bigger Naval fleet. ○ The Persians were still an enemy of Greece, but they hoped the city-states would destroy each other. The End is Near ● Sparta gained control of Athens’ port. ○ Athens left their boats in the harbor to get supplies & Sparta took them. BAD MOVE ☺ ● News Spread back to Athens and they barricaded themselves inside Athens. ● Spartans cut off supplies by land and water…Athens was forced to give up in 404 B.C Results of the War ● 27 years of war ○ Cities and crops destroyed ○ Economic and military power lost ● Democracy is in decline ● A united Greece was over ● New Power…Philip II of Macedon looked to take over the Greek city-states Peloponnesian War Summary.

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THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL ROLE OF THE ALLIES OF SPARTA IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR BY PANAYIOTIS KATSIVARDELOS Thesis Presented for the Degree of the Master of Letters GLASGOW 1992 © Panayiotis Katsivardelos 1992 ProQuest Number: 13815419 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 13815419 Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 GLASGOW UNIVERSITY LIBRARY PARENTIBUS CARISSIMIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Knox for his understanding, cooperation, constructive criticism and especially for drawing my attention to numerous points throughout this work. Special thanks to Prof. MacDowell whose influences have helped in various direct and indirect ways. I owe particular debts of gratitude to my family, for their moral support and constant encouragement during all these years. Finally I would like to extend my thanks to my colleagues and friends in Glasgow, for their contribution which aided me in improving parts throughout my work and especially to C. Arvanitis & A. Fragos. I would also like to extend my sincere appreciation to J.
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