Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: IND32623 Country: Date: 27 November 2007

Keywords: India – – Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA) – Akali Dal (Mann)

This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein.

Questions

1. Is there any information on the Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA)? What kind of organisation was it and how did it achieve its aims and objectives? Was it involved in violent acts? Did it have an organisational structure with elected office holders for various districts? 2. Is there any recent information on ordinary Akali Dal (Mann) party members being arrested simply for being members of the party and supporting the party?

RESPONSE

1. Is there any information on the Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA)? What kind of organisation was it and how did it achieve its aims and objectives? Was it involved in violent acts? Did it have an organisational structure with elected office holders for various districts?

No reports giving a detailed description of the Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA) were found in a search of the available sources. The KLA is briefly mentioned in a number of reports and media articles; however, the information contained is often variable. In general, the KLA appears to have been a secessionist militant group operating in Punjab during the 1980s and 1990s. Some sources describe the KLA as either “loosely affiliated with”, or a wing of, the (KCF). Various articles in the 1980s and 1990s report on violent activities of the KLA, and a number of alleged commanders of the group are mentioned in these articles. In 2006, sources contacted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) stated that the “KLA was comprised of only a few members”. No other information on the specific organisational structure of the KLA was found. Generally, the available information indicates that the organisational structure of the more than 20 militant groups operating in Punjab was largely decentralised. According to some sources, including DFAT advice from 1992, most Khalistan militant groups operated under the authority of umbrella organisations such as the various “Panthic Committees”, which were decision making bodies. For a time the KCF drew together a number of small militant groups and operated as the military wing of the Panthic Committees’ ; however, the KCF later splintered again into a number of smaller groups. General information on militant groups, the KCF and the Panthic Committees is included in this response. (For mentions of the affiliation between the KLA and the KCF, see: Amnesty International 1995, Human Rights are Women’s Rights, March, ACT 77/01/95 http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/women/womeneng.txt – Accessed 26 November 2007 – Attachment 1 and ‘Suspected Sikh Terrorist Leader Arrested’ 1986, The Record, 3 September – Attachment 2; for DFAT advice from 2006 on the KLA, see: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006, DFAT Report 520 – RRT Country Information Request IND30287, 9 August – Attachment 12; for information on militant groups and Panthic Committees, see: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, DFAT Report No. ND84486 – India: Punjab : Militant Groups, 6 July – Attachment 3; for information on the organisational structure of the KCF, see: Anil G.C., ‘Persistence and Death of Intense Armed Secessionist Movements: An Analysis of the War for Khalistan and the First round of the War for Eelam’ (undated), Columbia University website http://www.columbia.edu/cu/polisci/pdf- files/apsa_gc.pdf – Accessed 30 October 2006 – Attachment 4; for background on the Khalistan movement, see: Weiss, M. 2002, ‘The Khalistan Movement in Punjab’, Yale Center for International & Area Studies website, 25 June http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/globalization/punjab.pdf – Accessed 7 November 2003 – Attachment 5).

The information found on the KLA was quite disparate. The group was variously described as follows:

A 1995 Amnesty International report describes the KLA as loosely affiliated to the Khalistan Commando Force. A September 1986 article states that “[t]he Khalistan Liberation Army is a wing of the Khalistan Commando Force, the most powerful terrorist group”, while a December 1986 article in The Times mentions “[t]he Khalistan Liberation Force, a new breakaway faction of the Khalistan Liberation Army” (Amnesty International 1995, Human Rights are Women’s Rights, March, ACT 77/01/95 http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/women/womeneng.txt – Accessed 26 November 2007 – Attachment 1; ‘Suspected Sikh Terrorist Leader Arrested’ 1986, The Record, 3 September – Attachment 2; ‘Gandhi promises action on Punjab’ 1986, The Times, 2 December – Attachment 6).

A 1992 Agence France-Presse article states that “The KLA is one of the half dozen better armed Sikh separatist organisations battling for a Sikh homeland called Khalistan”, while a 1987 Reuters News article describes the KLA as “one of the smallest of 22 extremist groups fighting for an independent Sikh homeland in Punjab” (‘Indian troopers kill top Sikh militant in Punjab’ 1992, Agence France-Presse, 26 February – Attachment 7; ‘ Kill Two Leaders Of Sikh Extremist Group’ 1987, Reuters News, 14 November – Attachment 8).

A 1989 article in The New York Times reports that Atinder Pal Singh, a senior official of the Khalistan Liberation Army, had been charged in the assassination of Indira Ghandi (Hazarika, S. 1989, ‘4 Sikhs Charged In Gandhi’s Death’, New York Times, 8 April – Attachment 9).

Research Difficulties There are a number of Khalistan militant groups and splinter groups. An undated list on the Portal website includes the following: (KZF); Khalistan Commando Force (KCF); Khalistan Liberation Front (KLF); Khalistan Armed Force (KAF); Khalistan Liberation Organisation (KLO); Khalistan National Army (KNA); Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA). It may be that occasionally the names are used interchangeably in reports, accidentally or otherwise. For example, DFAT advice in 1992 expresses no knowledge of the existence of the KLA but then mentions the activities of the “Khalistan Liberation Army” when discussing the KCF (‘Terrorist Groups – Punjab’ (undated), South Asia Terrorism Portal website http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/terrorist_outfits/index.html – Accessed 26 November 2007 – Attachment 10; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, DFAT Report No. ND84486 – India: Punjab Sikhs: Militant Groups, 6 July – Attachment 3).

It should also be noted that obtaining information on the non-violent activities of these separatist groups may be affected by bias and sensationalism in media and government reports. In a 1987 journal article in Pacific Affairs, Andrew Major discusses the distorted media reporting on the Punjab crisis and the misuse of “such labels as ‘moderates,’ ‘extremists’ (sometimes ‘radicals’), ‘fundamentalists’ (sometimes ‘fanatics’), ‘terrorists,’ and ‘secessionists,’ all of which are generally prefixed by the word, ‘Sikh.’” Meredith Weiss also notes that Indira Gandhi used her access to national and international media “to consistently describe the opposition as religious fanatics who advocated secession and separatism motivated by ‘communalism’ and ‘regionalism.’” She referred more often to extremists’ than to moderates’ actions and statements to substantiate this characterization, until “In the end it became self-fulfilling prophecy” (Major, A. 1987, ‘From Moderates to Secessionists: A Who’s Who of the Punjab Crisis’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 60, no. 1, Spring, pp. 42-58 – Attachment 11; Weiss, M. 2002, ‘The Khalistan Movement in Punjab’, Yale Center for International & Area Studies website, 25 June http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/globalization/punjab.pdf – Accessed 7 November 2003 – Attachment 5).

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) advice In 1992 DFAT advised that no organisation called the Khalistan Liberation Army was known, and questioned whether claimants meant the Khalistan Liberation Force. However, in the next section, DFAT states the following in its description of the Khalistan Commando Force:

Main group led by Wassan Singh Zaffarwal. This, along with the AISSF faction led by Mehta Chawla, is part of the Panthic Committee (Zaffarwal). The Khalistan Liberation Army operates out of along the border region with Punjab and promotes and uses violence to achieve its objectives, which are unclear beyond the establishment of Khalistan.

There is another faction calling itself the same name and led by Paramjit Singh Panjwar. This comes under the main Panthic Committee of Sohan Singh (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, DFAT Report No. ND84486 – India: Punjab Sikhs: Militant Groups, 6 July – Attachment 3).

Later DFAT advice in 2006 confirmed that the KLA did actually exist; however, the sources referred to by DFAT claim that it only existed until 1992:

Following up public source material available through the South Asia Terrorism Portal ( www.satp.org), post contacted Ajai S Sahni (Executive Director), Institute for Conflict Management (a key terrorism analysis group). Sahni advised that the Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA) was one of a number of small Sikh militant groups which proliferated for a short duration and then disappeared. Sahni described the KLA as a terrorist organisation which was wiped out by 1993 by police anti-militant operations. By 1993, most KLA members had either died, disappeared or left India to live in Pakistan. Other sources such as Endgame in Punjab by KPS Gill (who headed the Punjab police during its phase of aggressive anti-militancy operations) confirm that the KLA, a minor outfit, was wiped up by 1993. Post also contacted Inspector Sardar Jagjit Singh Pukhtana, Criminal Investigative agency, who advised that the KLA existed as an independent terrorist group from 1978 until 1992. Pukhtana supporting the views of Sahni and Gill stated that the KLA was comprised of only a few members and that it was not recognised by local administration (Panchayat), public, police or government. Inspector General, Rajender P Singh, Inspector General Intelligence, was also consulted and stated that a person’s involvement in a group could be confirmed if details were provided on provision of a letter of request. Confidentiality considerations preclude post from doing this.

3. Sahni stated that organisations such as the KLA typically comprised only 4 – 5 main members and none issued documents relating to identity or membership, nor did they retain any records. These organisations which were illegal were never recognised by local administrations (Panchayat), police or the government (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006, DFAT Report 520 – RRT Country Information Request IND30287, 9 August – Attachment 12).

Reports & media articles mentioning KLA The following reports and media articles were found, dated from 1986-2005, which mention KLA. A number of different suspected leaders are referred to, including a “senior official” of the group who was implicated in the assassination of Indira Gandhi. These reports follow in chronological order:

2005:

Even last year, 25 militants owing allegiance to Khalistan Liberation Force, Khalistan Liberation Army, Khalistan Commando Force (Panjwar) were arrested with weapons and explosives (Awasthi, S. 2005, ‘Fear psychosis or real threat?’, The Times of India, 2 July http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1158128.cms – Accessed 26 November 2007 – Attachment 13).

A 2000 article describes revenge attacks involving Joga Singh, a “Lt General” of the Khalistan Liberation Army (‘How Punjab people resisted terrorism’ 2000, The Sunday Tribune, 23 April http://www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20000423/spectrum/books.htm#6 – Accessed 26 November 2007 – Attachment 14).

1995:

In India, armed Sikh groups fighting for independence in the state of Punjab have abducted, raped and ill-treated women. Some women have been forced to marry members of these groups. Majir Kaur was kidnapped in Tarn Taran in June 1992 by members of the Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA). She was raped and forced to marry a member of the Khalistan Commando Force, which is loosely affiliated to the KLA (Amnesty International 1995, Human Rights are Women’s Rights, March, ACT 77/01/95 http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/women/womeneng.txt – Accessed 26 November 2007 – Attachment 1).

1992: Indian security forces shot dead a top Sikh militant credited with 200 political murders in a gunbattle Wednesday as nine others died in violence overnight in the troubled northern state.

The Press Trust of India (PTI) identified the slain Sikh as Rajbeer Singh, a deputy chief of the hardline Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA) and said he died after a fierce firefight in a Gurdaspur district sugarcane field.

Police had placed a one million rupee (38,400 dollar) bounty on Rajbeer Singh’s head, saying the KLA deputy chief had murdered an estimated 200 people in many of Punjab’s 13 districts.

Security forces seized a rocket launcher, six missiles, one assasult rifle and 300 spent shells from the cane field where several militants had ambushed a security patrol, PTI said in a report from Gurdaspur, a frontier district.

…The KLA is one of the half dozen better armed Sikh separatist organisations battling for a Sikh homeland called Khalistan or land of the pure in Punjab.

Four other Sikh militants belonging to groups other than the KLA were killed in separate overnight gunbattles with security forces, PTI said, adding that five civilians also died in separatist violence (‘Indian troopers kill top Sikh militant in Punjab’ 1992, Agence France- Presse, 26 February – Attachment 7).

1989:

Investigators today charged four Sikhs, including a dismissed senior policeman, in the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

The charges were brought three months after two Sikhs were hanged for the killing of Mrs. Gandhi. The move also followed publication last month of a judicial investigation into the 1984 assassination that sharply rebuked 22 senior intelligence, police and security officials for security lapses and failure to heed warnings of threats against Mrs. Gandhi.

…The most prominent of the accused is Mr. Mann, a former senior official who was dismissed when he called on Sikhs in the armed forces and the police to revolt against the Government. Mr. Mann is the head of a powerful faction of a militant Sikh political group, the Akali Dal party, and has been imprisoned on terrorism charges for more than four years.

Atinder Pal Singh was identified as a senior official of the Khalistan Liberation Army, an extremist organization operating in the Punjab (Hazarika, S. 1989, ‘4 Sikhs Charged In Gandhi’s Death’, New York Times, 8 April – Attachment 9).

1988:

Several Sikh groups have helped turn the rich farms of Punjab into India’s “killing fields.” They include the Khalistan Commando Force, the Babbar , the All-India Sikh Students Federation, the Khalistan Liberation Army, the Dal Khalsa and the Dashmesh Regiment. At least two of these groups, the and the Dashmesh Regiment, are believed to be active overseas, particularly in and West (Leventhal, P. & Chellaney, B. 1988, ‘Nuclear Terrorism: Threat, Perception and Response in South Asia’, Paper prepared under the auspices of the Nuclear Control Institute’s Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Project for presentation to the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, , Nuclear Control Institute website, October 10 http://www.nci.org/p/pl-bc.htm – Accessed 26 November 2007 – Attachment 15).

1987: Punjab police on Friday shot dead two captive leaders of a Sikh extremist group when their comrades tried to free them in an ambush, police said.

Two ambushers were also killed.

J P Birdi, police chief in Punjab’s northern Gurdaspur district, named the dead as Tarsem Singh Kohar, self-styled general of the rebel Khalistan Liberation Army, and his second-in- command, Sukhdev Singh.

Birdi said police escorting the two men, captured in August, 1986, were attacked as they left a farm where they had gone to conduct investigations.

Sukhdev and an attacker were killed immediately and Tarsem and another ambusher were shot 40 minutes later after a chase.

The Khalistan Liberation Army is one of the smallest of 22 extremist groups fighting for an independent Sikh homeland in Punjab.

Nearly 1,100 people have been killed this year in Punjab violence related to the campaign for an independent Khalistan (‘Punjab Police Kill Two Leaders Of Sikh Extremist Group’ 1987, Reuters News, 14 November – Attachment 8).

1986:

On Sunday, Sikh militants shot dead 24 Hindu bus passengers and injured eight others near Khudda, about 217 miles north-west of Delhi. The deaths of 10 more people in the Punjab yesterday prompted calls in Parliament for the sacking of the Punjab Chief Minister, Mr Surjit Singh Barnala.

Suspected Sikh militants killed eight people in Punjab yesterday. Another two people scuccumbed to injuries suffered in similar attacks in different shootouts earlier, the Press Trust of India said.

Unidentified gunmen were reported to have shot dead three people, members of a family, in the village Kotla Saddar in district, some 18 miles from the Sikh holy city of Amritsar, last night.

Meanwhile, Delhi police fired into the air and charged with wooden batons yesterday to disperse an angry mob of some 3,000 who were demonstrating against the deaths of the bus passengers. The demonstration, on the fringe of the capital, was the most violent of several anti-Sikh protests that followed the Sunday killings. At least five people were injured in the melee, and about 25 demonstrates were arrested.

In central Delhi, police arrested about 300 supporters of the oppositioin Janata Party who staged a protest march in defiance of a government order against public assembly.

The Khalistan Liberation Force, a new breakaway faction of the Khalistan Liberation Army, claimed responsibility for the bus attack (‘Gandhi promises action on Punjab’ 1986, The Times, 2 December – Attachment 6).

1986:

Punjab police arrested a Sikh suspected of being a top terrorist leader wanted in connection with several killings and terrorist attacks in the troubled state, the United News of India reported yesterday. Harbhajan Singh, the suspected second in command of the underground Khalistan Liberation Army, was arrested in Batala district Monday night, the news agency quoted police as saying.

Khalistan is the name Sikh separatists give to the state they demand be carved out of Punjab. The Khalistan Liberation Army is a wing of the Khalistan Commando Force, the most powerful terrorist group.

The suspected head of the Khalistan Liberation Army, Tarscem Singh Kuhar, was captured Aug. 12 in Punjab in an offensive recently launched by police. Dozens of suspected terrorists have been killed in the offensive and more than 100 have been arrested (‘Suspected Sikh Terrorist Leader Arrested’ 1986, The Record, 3 September – Attachment 2).

Panthic Committee information The UK Home Office 1998 country information report on India provides the following information on the Panthic Committees in Punjab:

Militant violence in Punjab

5.3.86 Virtually all of the militant groups in Punjab pursued their campaign for a separate state of Khalistan through acts of violence directed not only at members of the police and security forces but also specifically at Hindu and Sikh civilians. [12]

5.3.87 Most of the militant groups in Punjab traced their origins to Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a charismatic Sikh preacher who rose to prominence in the mid-1970s. After the storming of the the number of militant groups operating in Punjab grew. Some authorities claimed there were no more than 1,700 armed militants, while many journalists believed there may have been five times that number. [12]

5.3.88 The militants were organised into at least seven major groups and all theoretically operated under the authority of one of the Panthic Committees which functioned as decision making bodies and issued instructions. [12]

5.3.89 The Panthic Committee headed by Dr Sohan Singh was historically the most powerful and was supported by a number of militant factions:

Khalistan Commando Force (Paramjit Singh Panjwar faction) Babbar Khalsa Khalistan Liberation Force (Budhisingwala) Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (Sangha) Sikh Student Federation (Bittu)

5.3.90 The Panthic Committee headed by Manochahal was supported by:

Bhindranwale Tiger Force (Manochahal) All India Sikh Student Federation (Manjit) Khalistan Commando Force (Rajasthani group)

5.3.91 The Zaffarwal Panthic Committee was supported by:

All India Sikh Student Federation (Mehta Chawla) Khalistan Commando Force (Zaffarwal)

5.3.92 In addition to this there were perhaps dozens of other groups, some representing splinter factions, as well as loosely organised armed gangs (UK Home Office 1998, India Country Assessment, November – Attachment 16; see also: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, DFAT Report No. ND84486 – India: Punjab Sikhs: Militant Groups, 6 July – Attachment 3).

Khalistan Commando Force A Columbia University paper on armed secessionist movements provides information on the organisational structure of the Khalistan militant groups. The paper notes that the KCF, previously a loose combination of various small militant groups, was formalised in January 1986 as the military wing of the Panthic Committee. Between 1987 and 1988 the KCF and the Khalistan movement had expanded its regional scope into half of Punjab’s districts. In mid 1988, however, the KCF splintered into many small militant groups again. The relevant sections follow:

In January 1986, radical Sikhs organized a “Sarbat Khalsa,” which over two hundred thousand Sikhs attended. Under secessionist militants’ initiative, the “Sarbat Khalsa” passed the resolution for an independent state of Khalistan, elected a “Panthic Committee” (executive committee consisting of five members), and formalized the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) – hitherto an extremely loose combination of the various small militant groups that had sprouted in Punjab in the 1984-1985 sub-period – as the military wing of the “Panthic Committee”. The “Panthic Committee” made a formal unilateral declaration of independence on April 29, 1986.

… Although the movement’s numerical strength as well as local support grew in the first half of 1986, it lacked a tight disciplinary structure; at that time, the KCF, the main umbrella organization of various small militant groups, had an eclectic combination of cadres with genuine commitment to the secessionist cause, criminal elements and personal vendetta- seekers. Cognizant of the evils of fractionalization, , the KCF’s commander, made efforts to introduce a centralized structure in the KCF in 1986. He was only partly successful in his centralization drive, as warlords like Gurbachan Singh Mancohahal, who had enjoyed considerable autonomy in their actions in the pre-1986 sub-period, broke away from the KCF following this drive and the KCF did not have any severe punishment mechanism to punish defectors.

As the secessionist militants’ activities increased in 1987, the Indian central government dismissed the Akali Dal’s provincial government in May 1987 and re-imposed president’s rule in the province.109 Besides the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), another draconian law – National Security Act (NSA) – was enacted in 1987. Thereafter, the state’s application of military power against the movement increased considerably. This increase in military power against the movement and the attendant collateral damage, along with Labh Singh’s partial success in centralizing the KCF’s command-and-control structure and the attendant increase in operational efficiency, increased local support for the Khalistani militants between 1987 and 1988 and expanded the movement’s regional scope: while the movement was primarily confined to two border districts before 1986, it had gripped six of Punjab’s twelve districts by 1988.

… After Labh Singh’s assassination, the KCF splintered into many small militant groups again. Wassan Singh Zaffarwal tried to reorganize the rump of the KCF around some of the small militant groups but there was a strong disciplinary problem, as the heads of the small groups (each controlling around 20-30 militants) were unwilling to submit to policy guidelines and wished to retain their own independence. Many leaders of the small militant groups that operated within the rump KCF’s framework violated its policy guidelines and left the organization before they were expelled from the KCF.

… As the Sikh populace became increasingly radicalized, the mass base of all militant groups had broadened in 1989-1991 – by the end of 1991, the movement had a total of 10,000 militants. In the process, people of various shades, including lumpen, criminal elements, had joined the movement during that sub-period (Anil G.C., ‘Persistence and Death of Intense Armed Secessionist Movements: An Analysis of the War for Khalistan and the First round of the War for Eelam’ (undated), Columbia University website http://www.columbia.edu/cu/polisci/pdf-files/apsa_gc.pdf – Accessed 30 October 2006 – Attachment 4).

Further background information is provided in a 2002 paper titled ‘The Khalistan Movement in Punjab’:

A guerilla force, the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), developed among Sikhs motivated by Bhindranwale and his messages or else antagonized by Operations Bluestar and Woodrose. Sikh village youths in particular were driven to terrorist acts by the army and police force’s misuse of power. Most were motivated by a sense of injustice and inequality, although the religious context and presumed moral imperative to restore social and economic justice, was seen to validate armed resistance. The strength of the guerilla groups (which got arms via Pakistan and Afghanistan) surged in 1987-88, although these efforts were uncoordinated at first.

… The guerilla movement (comprised of around twenty militant organizations in Punjab) was fractured by rifts over policies and tactics, plus struggling with finding sufficient resources and recruits, by 1988 and increasingly so by the early 1990s. The question of whether to raise social reform issues during the period of armed struggle or to hold off on these was especially divisive. Moreover, given the nature of the movement and high casualty rate, there was a constant need to recruit new guerillas but no time for ideological or disciplinary training. The necessarily decentralized organizational structure of the guerilla organizations and weakness of prevailing institutional structures aggravated the situation.

… Most dangerously, Indira Gandhi used her access to national and international media “to consistently describe the opposition as religious fanatics who advocated secession and separatism motivated by ‘communalism’ and ‘regionalism.’” She referred more often to extremists’ than to moderates’ actions and statements to substantiate this characterization, until “In the end it became selffulfilling prophecy (Weiss, M. 2002, ‘The Khalistan Movement in Punjab’, Yale Center for International & Area Studies website, 25 June http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/globalization/punjab.pdf – Accessed 7 November 2003 – Attachment 5).

See the following for more information on the Khalistan movement and Punjabi militant groups:

• Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, IND102546.E – India: Treatment of Sikhs in Punjab within a contemporary historical context (2005 – 2007), 11 July – Attachment 17;

• Research Response IND30814 of November 2006 provides information on Sikh and pro-Khalistan militant groups and military training in Pakistan (RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response IND30814, 1 November – Attachment 18);

• RRT Research Response IND16298 of November 2003 provides information regarding the Khalistan movement, its decline and links to Jalandhar (RRT Country Research 2003, Research Response IND16298, 25 November – Attachment 19);

• Research Response IND16269 provides information on the Khalistan Movement (Question 1), the treatment of Punjabi Sikhs (Question 2), Akali Dal supporters (Questions 4-5) (RRT Country Research 2003, Research Response IND16269, 14 November – Attachment 20).

Other information It should be noted that Gram Panchayats and Jilla Panchayats (or Parishads) refer to local governance system at the village and district levels. Jilla is also spelt as “Zilla”. A previous research response provides information on local government structure in India (RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response IND31942, 12 July – Attachment 21).

Also of interest is a 1995 report which states:

Participation remained high for rural local elections through the early 1990s and, gradually, the Akali Dal replaced the terrorist groups as the major vehicle for rural Sikh political expression. The Akali Dal replaced the Congress party as the dominant political party in Punjab as it swept the parliamentary elections in April 1996. Through a combination of severe police methods and effective politics, terrorism in Punjab began to be contained, although not eliminated (‘Sikh nationalist ’ 1997, Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, vol. 2 – Attachment 22).

2. Is there any recent information on ordinary Akali Dal (Mann) party members being arrested simply for being members of the party and supporting the party?

Note: The Mann faction of Akali Dal is referred to variously as: Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar) (SAD(A)); Akali Dal (Mann); SAD(M).

Please see Research Response IND32228 which provides recent information on the treatment of Simranjit Singh Mann and Akali Dal (Mann) supporters (RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response IND32228, 11 September – Attachment 25).

The available information indicates that a number of Akali Dal (Mann) party leaders have been arrested over the past year on charges of sedition for engaging in pro-Khalistan activities. According to the available information there has been long-term enmity between supporters and leaders of Akali Dal (Mann) and supporters and leaders of Akali Dal (Badal). Akali Dal (Badal) are now in power in Punjab. It has been claimed that the current government is suppressing legitimate opposition political activity in the state; however, a number of protests and rallies by Akali Dal (Mann) supporters and others have continued. It should be noted that Akali Dal (Mann) is perceived as a “hardline” Akali Dal faction, and there appears to be some general distrust of the party and its leaders because of their pro- Khalistan stance. A 2005 article states that “[t]he rattlings by Khalistani ideologues like Jagjit Singh Chohan and Simranjit Singh Mann have reinforced the fear psychosis”. There is some information to suggest that recent events have also recreated a general fear of a return to militant unrest in Punjab (Awasthi, S. 2005, ‘Fear psychosis or real threat?’, The Times of India, 2 July http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1158128.cms – Accessed 26 November 2007 – Attachment 13; for information on arrests, see: ‘Bail granted to Mann, Zafarwal’ 2007, The Times of India, 11 August – Attachment 23; Chaudry, A. 2007, ‘Separatist leaders held, tension prevails in Talwandi Khurd’, Indian Express, 4 September http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=254404# – Accessed 6 September 2007 – Attachment 24). As requested, US Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) information from 2003 on the treatment of members of the Akali Dal (Mann) party has been included in this response as Attachment 28 (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003, IND03004.ZSF – India: Information on Treatment of Members of the Akali Dal (Mann) Party in Punjab, 16 May http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgne xtoid=4a97361cfb98d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=d2d1e89390b5d 010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD – Accessed 27 November 2007 – Attachment 28).

Recent events According to a June 2007 article, there were concerns that “radical Sikhs” such as the Akali Dal (Mann) vice-president were exploiting a volatile situation which could lead back to violence. The article quotes an Intelligence officer as saying that “an intense vigil” was being maintained on the activities of surrendered former militants:

While the state has been taking all precautionary measures to keep a close watch on the law and order situation, a section of radical Sikhs has refused to play it cool.

The Punjab police on Saturday registered a case of sedition against a former militant, Daljit Singh Bittu, for raising pro-Khalistan slogans at a meeting organised against the Dera chief last week. Bittu, who is also vice-president of the Akali Dal led by Simranjit Singh Mann, has been a former militant and has been trying to instigate the Sikh masses with provocative addresses.

There are strong apprehensions among police officials that the volatile situation might not be exploited by former militants lying low for quite some time now.

Unconfirmed reports say that some of the militants hiding in Pakistan have been trying to gauge the situation in Punjab to create trouble and revive fundamental feelings among the Sikhs, or may as well try to execute a few incidents of violence.

There are more than 100 former militants who had surrendered to get back to normal life but have the potential to bounce back to violent activities in the state, said an Intelligence department officer.

An intense vigil was being maintained on their activities, he added (Bharadwaj, A. 2007, ‘Would Operation Bluestar come back to haunt Punjab again?’, DNA, 4 June – Attachment 26).

In October 2007 a terrorist act in Punjab prompted claims that this event had opened “a new chapter in terrorism in India and mark[s] the revival of Sikh militancy in Punjab”:

[T]he blasts at open a new chapter in terrorism in India and mark the revival of Sikh militancy in Punjab.

…The IB [Intelligence Bureau] says that the blasts at Ludhiana were planned well in advance. The IB also says that the Sikh militants had been training hard with the ISI in Pakistan for quite some time and this could be the beginning of terror in Punjab.

It is said that the Sikh militants who have been lying low for some time now have rejuvenated themselves. With the aid of the ISI, they will try and cause more disturbances in the country. The ISI too needed a partner in the Indian borders and hence they were training these militants hard for the past few years, the IB also says (Nanjappa, V. 2007, ‘Smaller towns are the new terror targets: IB’, Rediff.com, 15 October http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/oct/15punjab4.htm – Accessed 26 November 2007 – Attachment 27).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources: Government Information & Reports Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada http://www.irb.gc.ca/ UK Home Office http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ US Department of State http://www.state.gov/ United Nations (UN) UNHCR http://www.unhchr.ch/ Non-Government Organisations Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org/ Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org/ Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/ Minority Rights Group International http://www.minorityrights.org/ International News & Politics BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/ Rediff News http://www.rediff.com/news/punjab.htm Region Specific Links South Asia Terrorism Portal website http://www.satp.org/ Topic Specific Links British Organisation of Sikh Students website http://www.boss-uk.org All About Sikhs website http://www.allaboutsikhs.com/ Ensaaf website http://www.ensaaf.org/ Search Engines Google http://www.google.com.au/

Databases: FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIAC Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Research & Information Services database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. Amnesty International 1995, Human Rights are Women’s Rights, March, ACT 77/01/95 http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/women/womeneng.txt – Accessed 26 November 2007.

2. ‘Suspected Sikh Terrorist Leader Arrested’ 1986, The Record, 3 September. (FACTIVA)

3. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, DFAT Report No. ND84486 – India: Punjab Sikhs: Militant Groups, 6 July. (CISNET India CX2551)

4. Anil G.C., ‘Persistence and Death of Intense Armed Secessionist Movements: An Analysis of the War for Khalistan and the First round of the War for Eelam’ (undated), Columbia University website http://www.columbia.edu/cu/polisci/pdf- files/apsa_gc.pdf – Accessed 30 October 2006.

5. Weiss, M. 2002, ‘The Khalistan Movement in Punjab’, Yale Center for International & Area Studies website, 25 June http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/globalization/punjab.pdf – Accessed 7 November 2003.

6. ‘Gandhi promises action on Punjab’ 1986, The Times, 2 December. (FACTIVA)

7. ‘Indian troopers kill top Sikh militant in Punjab’ 1992, Agence France-Presse, 26 February. (FACTIVA)

8. ‘Punjab Police Kill Two Leaders Of Sikh Extremist Group’ 1987, Reuters News, 14 November. (FACTIVA)

9. Hazarika, S. 1989, ‘4 Sikhs Charged In Gandhi’s Death’, New York Times, 8 April. (FACTIVA)

10. ‘Terrorist Groups – Punjab’ (undated), South Asia Terrorism Portal website http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/terrorist_outfits/index.htm l – Accessed 26 November 2007.

11. Major, A. 1987, ‘From Moderates to Secessionists: A Who’s Who of the Punjab Crisis’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 60, no. 1, Spring, pp. 42-58.

12. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006, DFAT Report 520 – RRT Country Information Request IND30287, 9 August.

13. Awasthi, S. 2005, ‘Fear psychosis or real threat?’, The Times of India, 2 July http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1158128.cms – Accessed 26 November 2007.

14. ‘How Punjab people resisted terrorism’ 2000, The Sunday Tribune, 23 April http://www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20000423/spectrum/books.htm#6 – Accessed 26 November 2007.

15. Leventhal, P. & Chellaney, B. 1988, ‘Nuclear Terrorism: Threat, Perception and Response in South Asia’, Paper prepared under the auspices of the Nuclear Control Institute’s Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Project for presentation to the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, Nuclear Control Institute website, October 10 http://www.nci.org/p/pl-bc.htm – Accessed 26 November 2007.

16. UK Home Office 1998, India Country Assessment, November.

17. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, IND102546.E – India: Treatment of Sikhs in Punjab within a contemporary historical context (2005 – 2007), 11 July. 18. RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response IND30814, 1 November.

19. RRT Country Research 2003, Research Response IND16298, 25 November.

20. RRT Country Research 2003, Research Response IND16269, 14 November.

21. RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response IND31942, 12 July.

22. ‘Sikh nationalist terrorism in India’ 1997, Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, vol 2. (CISNET India CX23856)

23. ‘Bail granted to Mann, Zafarwal’ 2007, The Times of India, 11 August. (FACTIVA)

24. Chaudry, A. 2007, ‘Separatist leaders held, tension prevails in Talwandi Khurd’, Indian Express, 4 September http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=254404# – Accessed 6 September 2007.

25. RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response IND32228, 11 September.

26. Bharadwaj, A. 2007, ‘Would Operation Bluestar come back to haunt Punjab again?’, DNA, 4 June. (FACTIVA)

27. Nanjappa, V. 2007, ‘Smaller towns are the new terror targets: IB’, Rediff.com, 15 October http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/oct/15punjab4.htm – Accessed 26 November 2007.

28. US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003, IND03004.ZSF – India: Information on Treatment of Members of the Akali Dal (Mann) Party in Punjab, 16 May http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1 a/?vgnextoid=4a97361cfb98d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel= d2d1e89390b5d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD – Accessed 27 November 2007.