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Bacon, Aphorisms Francis Bacon, “Aphorisms” (from Novum Organum) 1 of 8 APHORISMS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE AND THE EMPIRE OF MAN Francis Bacon This text comes from Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, 3 vols., edited and translated by Basil Montague (Phila- delphia: Parry & MacMillan, 1854) Vol. 3, pp. 345-371 (vol. 2: 1852). The Novum Organum, or, Five Suggestions for the Interpretation of Nature is part two of Bacon’s Instauratio Magna (Great Renewal), published in 1620. The Novum Or- ganum begins with “Summary of the Second Part, digested in Aphorisms,” and the text reprinted here is the first set of these aphorisms (followed by a set of aphorisms entitled “Aphorisms on the Interpretation of Nature, or the Reign of Man”). 1. MAN, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and 11. As the present sciences are useless for the discovery of understands as much as his observations on the order of effects, so the present system of logic is useless for the nature, either with regard to things or the mind, permit discovery of the sciences. him, and neither knows nor is capable of more. 12. The present system of logic rather assists in confirming 2. The unassisted hand, and the understanding left to itself, and rendering inveterate the errors founded on vulgar no- possess but little power. Effects are produced by the tions, than in searching after truth; and is therefore more means of instruments and helps, which the understanding hurtful than useful. requires no less than the hand. And as instruments either 13. The syllogism is not applied to the principles of the sci- promote or regulate the motion of the hand, so those that ences, and is of no avail in intermediate axioms, as being are applied to the mind prompt or protect the understand- very unequal to the subtlety of nature. It forces assent, ing. therefore, and not things. 3. Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the 14. The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect. For nature is words, words are the signs of notions. If, therefore, the only subdued by submission, and that which in contem- notions (which form the basis of the whole) be confused plative philosophy corresponds with the cause, in practi- and carelessly abstracted from things, there is no solidity cal science becomes the rule. in the superstructure. Our only hope, then, is in genuine 4. Man, whilst operating, can only apply or withdraw natural induction. bodies; nature, internally, performs the rest. 15. We have no sound notions either in logic or physics; sub- 5. Those who become practically versed in nature, are the stance, quality, action, passion, and existence are not clear mechanic, the mathematician, the physician, the alche- notions; much less, weight, levity, density, tenuity, mois- mist, and the magician; but all (as matters now stand) ture, dryness, generation, corruption, attraction, repulsion, with faint efforts and meager success. element, matter, form, and the like. They are all fantasti- cal and ill defined. 6. It would be madness, and inconsistency, to suppose that things which have never yet been performed, can be per- 16. The notions of less abstract natures, as man, dog, dove; formed without employing some hitherto untried means. and the immediate perceptions of sense, as heat, cold, white, black, do not deceive us materially, yet even these 7. The creations of the mind and hand appear very numer- are sometimes confused by the mutability of matter and ous, if we judge by books and manufactures: but all that the intermixture of things. All the rest, which men have variety consists of an excessive refinement, and of deduc- hitherto employed, are errors; and improperly abstracted tions from a few well known matters; not of a number of and deduced from things. axioms. 17. There is the same degree of licentiousness and error in 8. Even the effects already discovered are due to chance and forming axioms, as in abstracting notions: and that in the experiment, rather than to the sciences. For our present first principles, which depend on common induction. Still sciences are nothing more than peculiar arrangements of more is this the case in axioms and inferior propositions matters already discovered, and not methods for discov- derived from syllogisms. ery, or plans for new operations. 18. The present discoveries in science are such as lie immedi- 9. The sole cause and root of almost every defect in the sci- ately beneath the surface of common notions. It is neces- ences is this; that whilst we falsely admire and extol the sary, however, to penetrate [Page 346] the more secret powers of the human mind, we do not search for its real and remote parts of nature, in order to abstract both no- helps. tions and axioms from things, by a more certain and 10. The subtlety of nature is far beyond that of sense or of the guarded method. understanding: so that the specious meditations, specula- 19. There are and can exist but two ways of investigating and tions, and theories of mankind, are but a kind of insanity, discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly from the only there is no one to stand by and observe it. senses and particulars to the most general axioms; and from them as principles and their supposed indisputable Francis Bacon, “Aphorisms” (from Novum Organum) 2 of 8 truth derives and discovers the intermediate axioms. This dispersed, cannot suddenly strike the understanding; so is the way now in use. The other constructs its axioms that, in common estimation, they must appear difficult from the senses and particulars, by ascending continually and discordant, and almost like the mysteries of faith. and gradually, till it finally arrives at the most general 29. In sciences founded on opinions and dogmas, it is right to axioms, which is the true but unattempted way. make use of anticipations and logic, if you wish to force 20. The understanding when left to itself proceeds by the assent rather than things. same way as that which it would have adopted under the 30. If all the capacities of all ages should unite and combine guidance of logic, namely, the first. For the mind is fond and transmit their labors, no great progress will be made of starting off to generalities, that it may avoid labour, and in learning by anticipations; because the radical errors, after dwelling a little on a subject is fatigued by experi- and those which occur in the first process of the mind, are ment. But these evils are augmented by logic, for the sake not cured by the excellence of subsequent means and of the ostentation of dispute. remedies. 21. The understanding when left to itself in a man of a 31. It is in vain to expect any great progress in the sciences steady, patient, and reflecting disposition (especially by the superinducing or engrafting new matters upon old. when unimpeded by received doctrines), makes some at- An instauration must be made from the very foundations, tempt in the right way, but with little effect; since the un- if we do not wish to revolve forever in a circle, making derstanding, undirected and unassisted, is unequal to and only some slight and contemptible progress. unfit for the task of vanquishing the obscurity of things. 32. The ancient authors, and all others, are left in undisputed 22. Each of these two ways begins from the senses and par- possession of their honors. For we enter into no compari- ticulars, and ends in the greatest generalities. But they are son of capacity or talent, but of method; and assume the immeasurably different; for the one merely touches curso- part of a guide, rather than of a critic. rily the limits of experiment, and particulars, whilst the other runs duly and regularly through them; the one from 33. To speak plainly, no correct judgment can be formed, the very outset lays down some abstract and useless gen- either of our method, or its discoveries, by those anticipa- eralities, the other gradually rises to those principles tions which are now in common use; for it is not to be re- which are really the most common in nature. quired of us to submit ourselves to the judgment of the very method we ourselves arraign. 23. There is no small difference between the idols of the hu- man mind, and the ideas of the divine mind; that is to say, 34. Nor is it an easy matter to deliver and explain our senti- between certain idle dogmas, and the real stamp and im- ments: for those things which are in themselves new can pression of created objects, as they are found in nature. yet be only understood from some analogy to what is old. 24. Axioms determined upon in argument can never assist in 35. Alexander Borgia said of the expedition of the French the discovery of new effects: for the subtlety of nature is into Italy, that they came with chalk in their hands to vastly superior to that of argument. But axioms properly mark up their lodgings, and not with weapons to force and regularly abstracted from particulars, easily point out their passage. Even so do we wish our philosophy to and define new particulars, and therefore impart activity make its way quietly into those minds that are fit for it, to the sciences. and of good capacity. For we have no need of contention where we differ in first principles, and our very notions, 25. The axioms now in use are derived from a scanty handful, and even in our forms of demonstration.
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