The Railways A~I) the War Effort, 1914-19151

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Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 4, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

THE RAILWAYS A~I) THE WAR EFFORT, 1914-19151

Political and administrative background troller of (Federal) railways: 'Be patient as possible with the Generals. Some of them Subsequent to the creation of the Union of will trouble you more than they will the ene- South Africa in 1910, steps were taken to my.''' Thus reasoned the civil railway adminis- combine the armed forces of the four ex- tration. colonies in the new Union Defence Forces. It remains unclear as to whether the Defen- Appropriate legislation was provided in the ce authorities had any particularly determined Defence Act of 1912. Considerable time was views about military-railway relationships. In needed before all the provisos of the Act any event, arrangements made in August could be implemented, and the outbreak of 1914 and later inclined to accord with the war in August 1914 found the infant Defence mainstream of the General Manager's ideas. Forces incomplete and unprepared for a task Formal arrangements for top-level liaison of the magnitude confronting them. One spe- were established on 8 August. On that date cific area where arrangements were inade- an officer of the railway administration was quate was that of railway transport. appointed Railway Transportation Officer, with Clause 89 of the Act of 1912 stipulated the military rank of Major, at Defence Head- that in wartime the military authorities might quarters. He was in direct telephonic com- requisition rolling stock and locomotives. In munication with all sections of the Depart- addition, the Governor General could autho- ment of Defence, as well as with the Gene- rize any officer to assume control over the ral Manager of Railways. In addition, two of- whole or any portion of any railway system ficers of the Railway Administration were within the Union". Since this arrangement posted to the headquarter staff of the Gene- was not compulsory, there was a choice ral Officer Commanding in the Field, and other between two alternatives. The military es- railway officials were to be appointed Railway tablishments could assume complete control Staff Officers, with military rank, at points of the railways, or control could be left in where substantial troop movements were the hands of the constituted civil administra- continually in progress. tion. Between these clear alternatives various In detail, the system functioned as follows. compromise arrangements could also have The General Manager retained control of the been made. railways and acted in an advisory capacity to The General Manager of Railways had fixed the Minister of Defence. Railway operation lIiews on the subject, being convinced that was carried-out by railway personnel under control should rest entirely with the civil au- the control of the Defence Department. At thorities. He believed that those who ran Defence Headquarters, the Railway Transpor- the railways in peacetime could put their tation Officer fell under the authority of the 3 skills and knowledge to good use in wartime • Quartermaster General. Requests from the All traffic, whether civil or military, would Defence authorities for rail facilities were be dealt with as speedily as possible, unham- transmitted to him via the Quartermaster Ge- pered by interference from military comman- neral. In turn he passed them on to the ders lacking experience of railway manage- 'War Section' at Railway Headquarters in ment. Practical reasoning apart, the General Johannesburg. This War Section was set up Manager could turn to precedent. He quoted to direct movements of military trains, co- from Lt Col Sir E. P. C. Girouard's history of the railways during the Anglo-Boer War 1. The author would like gratefully to express his thanks of 1899-1902: 'Civil railway officials have to the Librarian of the South African Railways Reference been heard to say that attacks by the enemy Library in Johannesburg for the loan of much of the do- cumentary material upon which this article is based. on the line are not nearly so disturbing to 2. Statutes of the Union of South Africa, 1912, p 252. traffic as the arrival of a friendly general with 3. Report of the General Manager of Railways and Harbours for the Year ended 31st December 1914 (UG 25 - 1915), his force." During the American Civil War, pp 75-76. one particular incident had led to the remark 4. UG 25 - 1915, P 76. 5. South African Railways and Harbours Magazine, Nov 1918, by the Assistant Secretary of War to the con- p 658. Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 4, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

ordinate requests for transport, and main- The Rebellion tain direct central control. Between them, the Operations during the Rebellion were charac- Railway Transportation officer and the War terized by extremely mobile, fast-moving war- Section were responsible for the conveyance fare. The rebel commandos came into being by rail of troops, animals, commissariat, mu- over a period of time and frequently operated nitions, ordnance and other materials of war. independently of one another. Once the few The Railway Staff Officers took their orders large organized rebel bodies had been broken from the War Section." A circular signed by up, the fighting degenerated into a series of the Quartermaster General on 16 November skirmishes and scraps between bodies of 1914 explained that the Railway Transpor- organized loyal troops and fragmented rebel tation Officer groups. makes provision under the direction of the Quartermaster-General for the move- The country where disaffection was most ment by rail of troops, animals, stores, rife was sparsely populated, with wide open supplies, etc as required, also for har- spaces that made it easy for rebels to melt bour and dock requirements in addition away and later regroup away from Govern- to acting generally as intermediary offi- ment troops. Under these difficult circum- cer between Defence Headquarters and stances the Defence authorities had recourse Railway and Harbours Administration in to the railways as a suitable means of moving all matters ... troops from point to point fast enough either to surround the rebels or to block their pas- The R.T.O. is responsible for the satisfac- sage in a particular direction. Troop trains tory marshalling of rolling stock to meet troops' requirements and for ensuring were placed at the disposal of the Defence Department, and five armoured trains were that entrainment and detrainment of built. troops, animals, and vehicles are carried out with care and due expedition. During the Rebellion, centralized direction of He should see that all military stores rail movements proved virtually impossible. arriving are properly secured and delive- Rebel movements were often not predictable red to consignees promptly . and military commanders had to react to un- The same circular laid down that expected situations without losing time.

Railway Staff Officers are appointed to If a commander urgently wanted rail trans- Forces where such an appointment is port, he frequently overrode the railwaymen considered necessary and this officer will to get his way. Many acts of interference arrange for all local movements by rail occured, and rail operations during the Re- and also where necessary, act as Mili- bellion were notable for ill-feeling between tary Embarkation Officer in addition to defence and railway authorities, unco-opera- performing any Naval transport duties tion in some instances and a good deal of which may be imposed upon him.7 frustration to both parties. These arrangements were made with an eye on intended military operations to take over As shown above, senior defence and railway German South West Africa. The system was officials were agreed that smooth running of planned to secure co-ordination between mili- the railways depended on the specialist know- tary and railway officers at organizational ledge of the railway staff, and following from level, thereby ensuring efficient rail services in this it was desirable that these specialist staff the field. A plan of campaign was finalized not be interfered with. In fact, local military by 21 August, and a force under Brig Gen commanders failed to appreciate this and, H. T. Lukin landed at Port Nolloth on 1 Sep- tember, Col P. S. Beves landed at LUderitz- bucht, without opposition, on 18 September, 6. UG 25 - 1915, P 75; South African Railways and Harbours Archive, File OX 158; SAR & H Archive, 'History of War and Col G. Maritz took up position at Uping- Services rendered by the Union Railway and Harbours ton with 1 000 South African Mounted Rifles. Administration' (Draft); Archive of the Secretary for Defence, (DC Series), Box 113, File 2395/Z. Before it could get under way, the projected 7. Archive of the Secretary for Defence, (DC 9199 series), campaign had to be suspended because of Box 78, File A.274/9199. 8. The Union of South Africa and the Great War, 1914-1918 the outbreak of rebellion in the Union.' (Official History, 1924), p 13.

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pressed both by operational contingencies and trains - were needed than would have been their natural concern for the comfort and wel- the case for infantry only. fare of their own units, would arrange train Horses and bulky equipment (which on a few transport for their men with scant regard for occasions included motor cars) could be the disruption thereby caused to other, pos- loaded and unloaded with relative ease only sibly scheduled, services. Two examples will where fixed station facilities existed. Cam- illustrate this. paign exigencies often required that com- A train arrived at Krugersdorp from Pretoria mandos detrain and entrain at points where with a cargo of mules, trollies, and vater- facilities did not exist; this meant consider- carts. General Myburgh, who was present, or- able time was expended with corresponding dered that the train be placed in a siding. delay to rail movement on a single track. Soon afterwards the order was counterman- Then too, troops and horses could be de- ded, and each of a number of commandos trained at one point to participate in a parti- then at the station had to be issued with all cular operation, might travel many miles in its individual requirements. This entailed un- so doing, and retrain somewhere far removed loading some wagons, and transferring the from the first point. None of this could be contents of some wagons to others. Once all predicted or planned in advance. The resulting this was done, the transport officer discove- difficulties may be imagined when it is reali- red that mistakes had been made; the train zed that on the Klerksdorp-Kimberley line, was unloaded and thereafter loaded up once a single-track stretch, twenty-two troop trains more. The railway official concerned reported were continuously operating over a period that of several days, and in this context some sta- great rnconvenience was caused through tistics for rail use in the Rebellion are of the officers commanding the various interest. The period covered is from August squadrons being unable to give us the to December, 1914. slightest idea as to the number of wag- gons, watercarts, motor cars, etc etc. Number of troops conveyed: 135000 which they desired to load, and no one seemed to care. There was no organiza- Troop mileage : 22 200000 tion of the men who took no notice of Number of animals con- their officers and we had the utmost veyed : 169 000 difficulty to find out who was actually responsible for the whole business ... Animal mileage : 27 065 000 At Potchefstroom a delay of seven hours was Number of transport vehicles experienced in the departure of two trains conveyed : 4 855 carrying the Potchefstroom Ruiters and their Transport vehicle mileage : 1 090000 commissariat. The major cause of delay was apparently lack of co-ordination, since troops Supplies, ammunition, etc. and equipment arrived at different times. conveyed (tons) : 36 684 These two examples are representative of Supplies, ammunition, etc. what went on in the operational areas.9 (ton miles) : 7479 000

Greater stress on good organization might Number of special trains: 61310 have alleviated or even at least partially eliminated instances such as the above, but The five armoured trains proved very useful. there were some problems, imposed by the They were used for patrolling the line in type of warfare, which could not be over- disaffected areas, for repairing the line where come. Because the Government troops were it had been damaged by rebels, and insofar entirely mounted commandos, troop trains as limited directional mobility allowed, for had to provide accommodation for men and combat duties such as blocking rebel at- horses, not to mention all the accompanying tempts to cross the line. supplies and equipment. Main line coaching stock was provided for the men, and cattle 9. SAR & H Archive. File OX 58. trucks for the horses. This meant that far 10. UG 25 - 1915, P 77; SAR & H Archive, 'History of War Services rendered by the Union Railway and Harbour Ad- more rolling stock - and therefore more ministration' (Draft).

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Armoured Train No 5, 'Schrikmaker'

Numbered from one to five and individually One engine. named, the armoured trains were: One guntruck. One breakdown van. NO.1: 'Trafalgar' One bogie truck. (Commissioned 22 Oct 1914) Two bogie cattle trucks. NO.2: 'Scot' One short van. (Commissioned 6 Nov 1914) One water tank truck.'1 NO.3 'Erin' The crew of the same train was assembled ( Commissioned 9 Nov 1914) approximately as follows:'" NO.4 'Karoo' Captain (From civil railway adminis- ( Commissioned 6 Nov 1914) tration; only temporarily in uniform) 4 Lieutenants (Three from civil railway NO.5 'Schrikmaker' administration; one from Dept of (Commissioned 18 Nov 1914) Defence) In addition to the armoured trains proper, 30 Riflemen (From Dept of Defence) two steel bogie trucks were fitted with loop- 9 Machine-gunners (From Dept of De- holes at Bloemfontein and used as an im- fence) provized armoured train for patrol purposes, 20 Gunners for ) manned by local Defence Force members. heavy gun ) From civil 19 bogie trucks were fitted with sandbags 12 Trai:l operating ) railway admi- and distributed at various points in the Trans- men ) nistration and vaal and Orange Free State. They were either 4 Electricians to ) temporarily attached to armoured trains or used as im- operate searchlight ) attached to provized armoured trains as circumstances 25 Skilled men for ) SA Engineer demanded. other duties ) Corps'" The five true armoured trains comprised standard rolling stock, suitably reinforced 11. UG 25 - 1915. P 79: SAR & H Archive. File DX 158. 12. Archive of the Secretary for Defence. (DC 9199 series). with steel plating to withstand bullets, and Box 55. File A.188/9199. Precise establishment figures are provided with loopholes. The composition of not available. 13. The SAEC was composed of railway staff. It was responsible the 'Trafalgar' was: for railroad repair and construction work in GSWA.

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Armoured Train No 2, 'Erin'

Reading through the files of the Archive of the issued by the Director of Military Rail- Secretary for Defence, one perceives that ways ... the Rebellion did not occasion any serious General or other officers commanding the interruption in planning for the campaign in Southern, Central, or Northern Forces, German South West Africa. Experience gained should refrain from giving any instruc- during the Rebellion was put to good use in tions in conflict with the Director's ge- the subsequent campaign and in this con- neral or specific instructions, but should nection one may engage in an interesting represent to the Minister any points in speculation regarding a change in the system which they are of opinion that the mili- of railway management. With effect from 15 tary situation requires any modification December 1914 Mr. W. W. Hoy, General of the Director's general or specific in- Manager of the SA Railways and Harbours, structions.lo was appointed to temporary commissioned rank as Colonel in the Active Citizen Force. It is not possible to prove a direct connec- His post was designated 'Director of Military tion between Col Hoy's appointment and Railways' and he was attached to the Per- the experiences of the Rebellion, but quali- manent Force Staff of Defence Headquar- fied speculation in that direction is in order. ters.11 His authority and the limits of his For it is indisputable that Col Hoy believed powers were laid down as follows: very strongly in the doctrine of non-interference in railway affairs, and he let no oppor- . under and subject to the authority tunity slip past of stating his case. He would of the Minister of Defence, [he] will have welcomed any arrangement to reduce issue instructions to officers of the South military interference.'" On their side, the De- African Engineer Corps, as to the con- fence authorities did not wish to offend struction and maintenance and working highly-placed (and sensitive) persons like of railway lines and harbour works in Hoy; then too, it was clear that the Railway those areas. Staff Officers needed additional backing.

While officers of the South African En- This is not to suggest that Col Hoy was gineer Corps and South African Railways 14. Geceral Orders (No 10 of 1914), dd 15 Dec 1914, Para9raph and Harbours Administration ... are as 133. a matter of course subject to the orders 15 Ibid. and instructions of the General or other 10 For statements of Hoy's approach see UG 25 - 1915, pp 75 ct seq: SAR & H ArC:lIve, 'Relationship with Defence Dept officer commanding ... they must carry and organisation to be arranged in time of War'; Archive of the Secretary for Defence, (DC series). Box 113. File out any general of specific instructions 2395/Z.

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given an open hand. The terms of his ap- ::;iderations of strategy required that several pointment show the Minister of Defence as new railroads be built where none existed the supreme authority. However, the Minis- previously. ter's directions were not to be conveyed to Shipping had to be chartered or otherwise Col Hoy by military commanders in the field; supplied to convey troops and war material the last paragraph of the order reaffirms that from Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town liason between defence and railway authori- to Walvis Bay, Port Nolloth and Swakop- ties would be conducted at top level - that mund. A great quantity of miscellaneous is, between DHQ and the War Section in equipment was provided from Railway stocks, Johannesburg. and some equipment was manufactured for the Defence Department, leading the General The Campaign in German South West Africa Manager to remark that the railway work- The Railways' involvement in GSWA extended shops 'have, to a certain extent, served as far beyond the provision of transport. Con- the Woolwich Arsenal of the Defence Force.";

Mounting guns at the Salt River works

South African forces approaching from the rial for a line of such length was not avail- south would depend on the railways for sup- able and the entire Union was combed for plies. But in 1914 a direct rail link with Ger- items. Afterwards the railway authorities man territory did not exist. The northernmost professed themselves greatly satisfied with South African railhead was at Prieska, and progress; in one semi-official publication the the southernmost German one, at Kalkfon- line was called 'one of the noteworthy feats tein. The intervening distance was 315 miles. in the annals of railway construction."" Con- On 15 August 1914 the Defence Department struction continued day and night. requested the Railways to construct a line to 17. UG 25 - 1915, P 81. Upington as speedily as possible. Work be- 18. SAR & H Archive, 'History of War Services rendered by gan on 24 August and Upington (South) the Union Railway and Harbours Administration' (Draft). 19. South African Railways and Harbours Magazine, Aug 1915, was reached on 20 November.li' New mate- p 704.

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The mobile plant which enabled work on the Prieska-Upington line to proceed at night

The Prieska-Upington line was not yet com- was instituted to convey supplies over the ri- plete when the Government decided to con- ver for military forces operating to the north. tinue it to Nakob, on the German border, Several small vessels were provided for the and thence to Kalkfontein. From there the ferry service, and a large ferry pontoon with German-built lines could be used as many cradles. slipways and docks was designed of them were built to the standard 3 foot and built at the railway workshops in Cape 6 inch gauge of the Union lines. Work com- Town. With this locomotives and other heavy menced on a temporary bridge across the equipment were floated across the river so Orange River at Upington but was interrup- that construction of the Upington-Kalkfontein ted by floods. To deal with this a ferry service line could proceed. The line reached Nakob

Construction of the Pi"ieska-Upington line [.~":'~.... 7 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 4, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

on 17 May 1915 and linked with the Ger- Converted to 3 ft 6 in Gauge man system at Kalkfontein on 25 June."" Swakopmund-Usakos 94 The Prieska-Upington-Kalkfontein line was by Usakos-K ranzberg 7 far the most involved and extensive construc- fon operation undertaken, but there were 101 also three other new construction tasks. In addition to these great stretches of line had to be rebuilt in the wake of the German retreat. Reconstructed Miles Bridges damaged The Germans seriously damaged the lines and or destroyed either took rolling stock with them or de- Luderitz-Windhoek 542 67 stroyed it. Railway ancillary services were Seeheim-Kalkfontein 122 20 left unusable. Construction and reconstruc- Rossing-I

German wrecking party, Tsanichas River bridge

Railway Staff Officers were appointed in of the disembarkation of approximately 3 000 terms of the scheme explained previously. men, 4. 000 animals, and 6 000 tons of sup- When Brig Gen Lukin's force landed at Port plies, munitions and equipment. At the end Nolloth on 1 September 1914 it was accom- of October 1914 Perrott returned to the Union panied by Mr R. R. Perrott, a Divisional Su- due to the suspension of the campaign. On perintendent, in the capacity of Director of 29 November he was selected for the similar Railways. He was responsible for running post of Assistant Director of Military Railways the Cape Copper Company's railway and har- at Luderitzbucht. Col Hoy, in terms of the bour in Namaqualand in terms of Clause 89 powers vested in him, empowered Perrott of the Defence Act. This involved supervision to take local control of the working of rail-

8 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 4, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za Scientia Militaria, South African Journal

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ways at and near LUderitzbucht. He was res- have been to escort advanced troops and ponsible for the passing of requisitions for all patrol the line.";; material and stores for railway and harbour In addition to the armoured trains, several purposes, and the water supply, armoured gun trains were sent to GSWA. These were trains, and their crews also fell under his essentially a means of transporting heavy jurisdiction."" The Quartermaster General in- guns - 12 pounders, 2.5" howitzers, and structed the DAQMG at LUderitzbucht on 4 4.7" naval guns loaned by the Imperial naval December that Perrott would hold the authorities at Simonstown. It was neither rank of Major and practicable nor in some instances possible to will be an Administrative Officer on fire the guns from the train. There appear your Staff and will refer to you on mat- to have been seven such trains. 'B' Battery ters of principle. In routine matters he (No.4-gun train) was composed as follows: will conduct the business of his De- partment ... The Director of Railways One extended tender frame for 4.7" gun and Harbours will, however, make direct Two armoured trucks arrangements for and obtain any rail- One armoured van way material or harbour plant that may One armoured water tank truck be necessary ... This procedure will One armoured stores truck prevent any unnecessary circumlocution, Ons armoured caboose as Major Perrott is the only officer able One armoured flat bogie."" to gauge requirements.""

The function of the armoured trains in GSWA 22. GAR & H Archive, 'History of War Services rendered by the Union Railway and Harbours Administration' (Draft); SAR is not very clear. It seems that four were & H Archive, File DX 153. sent here ('Trafalgar', 'Karoo', 'Scot', and 23. Arc:lIve of the Secretary for Defence (DC 9199 series), Box 73, File A.274/9IS9. 'Schrikmaker') and that the 'Erin' was retained 24. SAR & H Archive, Files DX 10, DX 158. in the Union in case of an emergency."' Their 25. Archive of the Secretary for Defence (DC 9199 series), Box 55, File A.188/9199 application in GSWA would in all likelihood 23. Ibid; SAR & H Archive, File DX 10.

Six-inch gun mounted in running position

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To transport troops and supplies the Rail- were unable to meet the demands of an ar- ways and Harbours Department chartered my. Responsibility for the water supply was 15 steamers. These, along with the ex- relegated to the SA Engineer Corps, and by German Rufidji, taken as a prize, represented enlarging the plants at LGderitzbucht and Wal- a tonnage of 57,479. Eleven tugs were provi- vis Bay, and erecting equipment at Swakop- ded for harbour work; five of these were the mund, an extra 168,000 gallons per day were property of the SAR & H. Several launches supplied. and lighters were obtained to help with disembarkation. Ambulance vehicles were provided. Two bo- Active prosecution of a campaign in a dry arid gie vans were converted into fully equipped area of operations depended on an assured ambulance coaches, each accommodating 16 supply of water. Under the German regime patients, and ran between Cape Town and a condensing plant was installed at LGderitz- Wynberg. A third similar coach operated on bucht, but it was deliberately damaged when the Upington line. Two travelling post office the Germans retreated. There was also a vans were converted into ambulance vans in plant at Walvis Bay, but both plants together the Railways' Pretoria workshops.

Ambulance van

Searchlights, bought from local mining com- covering the period August-December 1914, panies, were fitted to the armoured trains it will be seen that the task was one of real and two motor buses."' magnitude. Statistics for rail transport for the entire cam-

paign are not available, but from the following, 27. UG 25 - 1915, SAR & H Archive, File DX 158.

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Number of troops conveyed: 69 000 conveyed (tons) 36500 Troop mileage 22 000 000 Supplies, ammunition, etc. Number of animals conveyed: 45600 (ton miles) 11 832 000 Animal mileage 25928 000 Number of special trains 247"S Number of transport vehicles How may one assess the effectiveness and conveyed 5380 value of the Railways' contribution to the war Transport vehicle mileage 1 974 000 effort over the period of the Rebellion and Supplies, ammunition, etc. the campaign in German South West? In all

A frequeni sight: demolished bridge, GSWA

Karibib 23 May 1915 the Railway documentation studied by the ... Hoy with all his engineers has caus- present writer, not one single item was found ed chaos . . . I hElve already made all where;n any railway official analysed or cri- sorts of plans, but it is now becoming tically examined the work of the railway ad- c1eai to me that our forward movement ministrat:on. The tone is of pride and occa- is being delayed by the clumsy feeble- s:onal self-satisfaction in a good job well ness 0•. a bunch of engineers, and be- done. From the Defence documentation it is cause of these Collins"" and Beaton::" clear that the Defence authorities did their should never be in such a respons:ble utmost to co-operate with the Railways. Due posit:on, and I fear that Hoy listens to to pressure of other factors, and the need to them to much. However, it is damned reElct to unexpected situations, it was how- discouraging and has a bad effect on the ever not always possible to meet railway burghers and gives the enemy every schedules or to warn railway authorities in chElnce to make the already difficult po- advance. In official Defence correspondence sitions before us still more difficult::' ... . there is no substantial indication of displea- sure with the Railways, and so the following, 2J UG 25 - 1915. P 76. 29. Officer Commandmg the SA Engineer Corps. with the rank written by General Botha to General Smuts 0; Lt Col. during the GSWA cElmpaign, is of particular 30. Second-in-command to Collins. with the rank of Major. 31. W. K. Har.cock and J. van dcr Poel (eds): Selections from interest: the Smuts Papers, Vol III. pp 635, 636. (CUP. 1966).

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Motor rail-lorry equipped for ambulance purposes

Apparently the Commander-in-Chief would mands have been met, I deem it my have welcomed greater authority over the tem- duty to refer to some of the many avoid- porarily uniformed railway staff, but his po- able difficulties ... in the hope that a wers were circumscribed by the terms of knowledge thereof will yet result in a reference granted to Col Hoy in December better understanding and in an endea- 1914. Botha was probably referring to a delay vour, on the part of the Defence De- caused by local problems; in other words, partment, to avoid the mistakes of the

a situation which could not be resolved past ... 33 through the established arrangement of The Secretary for Defence personally des- War Section, Railway Transport Officer, and cribed the memorandum as a 'diatribe'; he Railway Staff Officers. But if Botha felt that regarded parts of it as 'nonsense'; and no- the railway administration had too much of a ted, 'I cannot for a moment understand what free hand, he would have encountered op- on earth Sir William Hoy means by his fre- position from those men. After the GSWA quent references to "interference." The Sec- campaign Hoy drafted, but did not submit, a retary sent his comments on the memorandum series of proposals for co-operation with the to the Minister of Defence, and his reaction Defence Department in time of war.3~ In them is shown in the endorsement: 'Seen by Mi- he argued strongly for an independent rail- nister. No action: file.'3.j The Defence authori- way organization. And in 1917 Hoy sent a ties were not prepared to concede any fur- memorandum to the defence authorities with ther degree of control. these remarks: The value of the Railways' contribution was [The Department of Defence's] methods immense. It was true indeed that the have been most exasperating at times during the past three years and have re-

sulted in much avoidable inconvenience 32. SAR & H Archive, 'Relationship with Defence Dept and and expence . organisation to be arranged in time of War.' 33. Arc~ive of the Secretary for Defence, (DC series), Box 113, File 2335/Z. Now that the more urgent military de- 34. Ibid.

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SAR & H rendered unique services without elaborate liaison structure was unable to han- which the suppression of the Rebellion and dle all contingencies. In retrospect it is pos- the advance into GSWA would have been sible to see in the melting-pot of 1914-1915 enormously complicated. But it is also true the first stages in the evolution of the Rail- to say that the efficiency of each party was ways and Harbours Brigade as an Active called in question by the other and that the Citizen Force unit after the war.