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Plotinus on <I>Eudaimonia</I>: a Commentary on <I>Ennead</I

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Plotinus on <I>Eudaimonia</I>: a Commentary on <I>Ennead</I 82 Book Reviews / Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 76-92 Kiernan McGroarty, Plotinus on Eudaimonia: A Commentary on Ennead 1.4, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, xxiii + 236 pp., $95.00. What does eudaimonia involve, according to Plotinus? Posing this question is particularly difficult in light of the fact that “eudaimonia” is a term specifically associated with Aristotle, and yet eudaimonia for Plotinus differs in important ways from Aristotelian eudaimonia, focusing as it does on soul living the per- fect, true life in the intelligible realm. Posing the question involves further difficulties because Plotinus, according to the report we receive from Porphyry in the Vita Plotini, in fact lived an exemplary life here in the sensible realm, taking in orphans, earning the trust of Roman politicians, and treating friends and students with particular dignity. In short, the virtuous life that Plotinus led appears to be at variance with the vision of the life of eudaimonia on behalf of which Plotinus argues. Plotinus’ ethical writings are located primarily in Ennead I, and interest in and focus on them has increased significantly in recent years, with translations and commentaries by Pavlos Kalligas and Allesandro Linguiti on treatises in Ennead I, a book by Alexandrine Schniewind (with extensive discussion of Ennead I.4), and other articles. Kiernan McGroarty’s translation and com- mentary is the first English translation with commentary on Ennead I.4 (46th out of 54 treatises in Porphyry’s chronological sequencing of the Enneads), and by his own acknowledgement, the author has been able to build upon work done in recent years in order to strengthen his discussion. Th e book includes an introduction which situates well (and briefly) Ennead I.4 within the context of Plotinus’ life and in relation to his philosophical predecessors. Th e text and translation of Ennead I.4 follow, and in the remain- der of the body of the work, McGroarty engages in a detailed commentary on I.4. Th e volume closes with two brief appendices, one focusing on St. Ambrose’s use of Ennead I.4 in his sermon “Jacob and the Happy Life,” and the other providing a brief essay on Plotinus’ views on suicide (with McGroarty arguing, against John Rist in Plotinus: Th e Road to Reality, that Plotinus did allow for the possibility of suicide in certain circumstances). Th e translation of the text is very good. By McGroarty’s own account, he has “sacrificed style for accuracy” (xx), but that accuracy nevertheless brings forth a very readable translation. McGroarty also does not attempt to translate some crucial Greek terms, including eudaimonia and spoudaios (what A.H. Armstrong translated in the Loeb series as “well-being” and “a good man,” respectively). Th is allows the meaning of those words to be understood on the basis of what Plotinus says, not on the basis of preconceptions we may have about them. Fur- ther, McGroarty’s translation makes Plotinus’ language, where appropriate, © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/187254708X282321 Downloaded from Brill.com09/28/2021 06:46:33PM via free access Book Reviews / Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 76-92 83 gender neutral (as opposed to Armstrong’s translation, which is dominated by talk of “man” and “he”). Compare McGroarty’s I.4.11 with Armstrong’s. Th e commentary too is nicely done. McGroarty helpfully begins every chapter of commentary with an overview of the theme of the chapter and some of the major issues to focus on during the chapter. He is particularly attentive in these opening remarks to the logic of Marsilio Ficino’s division of the text into various chapters. In the early chapters of the treatise, where Plo- tinus addresses the views of opposing schools, McGroarty expends much energy reflecting on precisely which school (Aristotelian, Stoic, Epicurean, for example) Plotinus is opposing in a given line of text or through a particular choice of words. Such extremely detailed work will be helpful for scholars who wish to be clear about Plotinus’ philosophical predecessors and his relation to them. As Plotinus turns to setting out his own philosophical position regard- ing eudaimonia in ch. 3 ff., McGroarty rightly focuses on the metaphysical foundations for Plotinus’ views about eudaimonia. Central to this discussion is Plotinus’ belief that while the Stoics are essentially correct (against Aristotle) that the spoudaios who has eudaimonia cannot be affected by adverse circum- stances (ill health, pain, misfortune), the Stoics do not have a sufficient meta- physics to explain the spoudaios’ imperviousness to such misfortunes. Plotinus, by contrast, does, because of the sensible-intelligible distinction central to his Platonic philosophy. Th e spoudaios achieves eudaimonia at the level of Nous, where mind thinks Platonic Forms and thinks them as a unity, not as a series of discrete entities. Because eudaimonia involves this non-discursive thinking of the spoudaios, and because both ontologically and epistemologically, non- discursive thinking, which takes place at the level of Nous, is separate from discursive thinking, which takes place in everyday consciousness, Plotinus is able to provide a theoretical justification for the Plotinian spoudaios’ insuscep- tibility to pain, misfortune, and the like. Th is is a move which the Stoic appears unable to justify theoretically due to the Stoic belief that existence is corporeal. Th e force of this argument becomes very clear in the context of Plotinus’ famous treatment of the “bull of Phalaris.” If we assume that someone is roasted in this bull, Plotinus’ metaphysics allows him to distinguish an outer, sensible person who suffers in the bull and an inner person, residing always among the intelligibles and not composed of matter, who would not suffer during the roasting. By contrast, according to Plotinus, it makes no sense for the Stoics to claim that such an experience is pleasant for the Stoic sage, since there is no comparable metaphysical distinction between an “outer” person and an “inner” person in Stoic thought. Th e above Plotinian position and its accompanying arguments make up much of the philosophical work being done in Ennead I.4. While I am not one Downloaded from Brill.com09/28/2021 06:46:33PM via free access 84 Book Reviews / Th e International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 76-92 necessarily to agree with all that Porphyry says in the Vita Plotini about Ploti- nus, Porphyry’s general comment about the late treatises—namely, that they show Plotinus’ powers waning—seems apt in the case of this particular trea- tise. It does not show the theoretical or argumentative complexity of even the treatise which precedes it in chronological order—III.7 (45), On Eternity. Th ese comments on Plotinus’ fundamental argument in the treatise and the quality of this piece of argumentation bring us back to McGroarty’s transla- tion and commentary. McGroarty himself acknowledges frequently through the text that there are signs of Plotinus’ waning abilities. Th is, then, makes this reader wonder whether this is the best treatise of Plotinus’ upon which to focus so much energy. Th e obvious retort to this concern, however, is that Plotinus’ ethical thought and argumentation deserve closer scrutiny than they traditionally have received. Th is seems fair, and I applaud such efforts. But it would have been good in this volume to see an even more complete account of the life of the Plotinian spoudaios as engaged both in the abstract non-dis- cursive thinking which Plotinus so often advocates and in the everyday atti- tudes and behaviors of excellence which Plotinus lived. One of the great challenges we face in understanding Plotinus’ approach to eudaimonia and the spoudaios is how we are to integrate these qualities. McGroarty rightly focuses on the relation between civic virtues and purificatory virtues as discussed by Plotinus in I.2 [19], but he seems unable to work through the tension, some- thing for which one might hope in a manuscript such as this. It might be possible to develop an understanding of the relation between the two by focus- ing on what is often referred to as Plotinus’ double-energeia principle, accord- ing to which the activity of the soul at its highest level, Nous, necessarily flows out to produce an activity from the soul, i.e., a human being deeply and inti- mately engaged with the world. In any case, although McGroarty discusses the issue of the self engaged at these two different levels, it’s clear that work remains to be done and that the discussion should continue among all of the scholars who are currently wrestling with this important aspect of Plotinus’ thought. David B. Rehm Mount St. Mary’s University Emmitsburg, Maryland, USA [email protected] Downloaded from Brill.com09/28/2021 06:46:33PM via free access.
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