LaborHistory, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2001

“NoMore Pressing Task than Organization in Southeast Asia”: TheAFL– CIO Approaches the VietnamWar, 1947– 64

EDMUNDF. WEHRLE*

The Vietnam War standsas the most controversial episodein theAFL– CIO’ s four decadesof existence.The federation’s supportfor thewar dividedits membership and drovea wedgebetween organized labor andits liberal allies. By theearly 1970s, the AFL–CIO wasa weakenedand divided force, ill-prepared for adecadeof economic decline.Few, however, recognize the complex rootsof the federation’ s Vietnam policy. American organized labor, in fact,was involved deeplyin Vietnam well beforethe American interventionin 1965. In SoutheastAsia, it pursuedits ownseparate agenda, centeredon support for asubstantial SouthVietnamese trade unionmovement under theleadership ofnationalist Tran QuocBuu. 1 Yet,as proved tobe the case for labor throughout thepost-World War IIperiod,its plans for SouthVietnam remained very muchcontingent on its relationship with the U.S.state.This oftenstrained but necessary partnership circumscribedand ultimately crippled thefederation’ s independentplans for Vietnameselabor. Trade unionistsin SouthVietnam foundthemselves in asimilar, although more fatal, bind,seeking to act independently,yet boundto the Americans anda repressiveSouth Vietnamese state. Scholars today oftenportray post-warAmerican organized labor asa partner (usually acompliant juniorpartner) in anaccord or corporate arrangement with other “functionalgroups” including thestate and business. 2 While thereis undeniabletruth

*Theauthor wishesto thank Robert Brigham, GaryHess, David Sicilia, LeeSayrs, and Jacqueline Johnson. Thearticle is dedicatedto the lateStuart Kaufman. 1TheAFL– CIO’ s interactionwith the VietnameseConfederation of Labor has receivedno prior treatmentfrom historians. Philip Foner, U.S.Labor and the Vietnamese War (NewYork, 1989)treats domesticopposition to the waramong Americanunionists. PeterLevy, The New LeftandLabor in the 1960s (Champaign, IL,1994),takes up the generalissue of labor and socialmovements in the 1960s.What scholarly workhas beendone on labor and foreignpolicy generallyattacks Americanlabor’ s international workas merelyan extensionof ofŽ cial American policy. Inthis regardsee Ronald Radosh, American Labor andU.S. Foreign Policy (NewYork, 1969),and morerecently Beth Sims, Workersof the WorldUndermined (Boston, MA, 1992),and Elizabeth McKillen, Chicago Workersand the Quest fora Democratic Diplomacy, 1914–1924 (Ithaca, NY, 1995).A limited workthat provides amorepositive appraisal is Philip Taft, Defending Freedom:American Laborand Foreign Affairs (Los Angeles,CA, 1973). 2For worksthat negativelyevaluate American labor’ s closerelationship with the statein the post-war periodsee: Christopher Tomlins, The State andthe Unions: LaborRelations, Law,and the OrganizedLabor Movement in America (NewYork, 1986);Patrick Renshaw, American Laborand Consensus Capitalism, 1935–1990 (Jackson, MS,1994),xix; Michael Davis, Prisoners ofthe American Dream:Politics andEconomics in the History ofthe U.S.Working Class (London, 1986);David Brody, “TheBreakdown ofLabor’ s Social Contract,” Dissent, 39 (Winter, 1992),32; David Brody, Workersin Industrial America;Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (NewYork, 1980),173– 214; as wellas worksby legalscholars Karl Klare, KatherineStone, and James Atleson. MelvynDubofsky, The State andLabor in ModernAmerica (Chapel Hill, 1994)offers a moresanguine view. For asenseof the generalcorporate environment in which

ISSN0023-656Xprint/ ISSN1469-9702online/ 01/030277–19 Ó 2001Taylor & Francis Ltd onbehalfof The Tamiment Institute DOI: 10.1080/00236560120068128 278 E. F. Wehrle tothese portrayals, thevery idea of“corporatism”was anathema topost-war American labor leaders,especially thosein theAFL. 3 Indeed,the leadership ofthe AFL loudly trumpetedits determination tomaintain aprincipled distanceand independence from the state.4 Suchautonomy wascentral toAmerican labor’s harsh critique ofwhat it insistedwas a world-wideCommunist conspiracy. Unions in Communistcountries werehardly unionsat all, according tothis critique, butmerely extensionsof thestate. American unions—by contrast—were “ freetrade unions,”operating independentlyand in thebest interests of workers. Yetremaining freeof state in uence proved difŽcult for American labor, especially in theera ofthe expanding state.While theAFL andlater theAFL– CIO wouldhave preferredto carry outits Vietnam program through its ownauspices or thoseof the International Confederationof Free Trade Unions(ICFTU), an international feder- ation ofanti-Communist labor movementsfounded in 1949, lack ofadequateresources hinderedthese options. As the situation in Vietnam neareda crisis point in theearly 1960s, theAFL– CIO came torealize that its program for SouthVietnamese labor couldonly berealized with substantial help from theU.S. government. In Vietnam, Buuand his edgling labor movementsuffered a similar struggle toretain an air of autonomy andlegitimacy in apost-colonial environmentthat exultedthe ideal of independence,yet in reality necessitateda painful dependenceon outside forces. Neither labor movementever fully managed tomaster thebalancing act required of modernfree trade unions. * * * * * * By thebeginning ofWorld War II, agroup ofdedicated internationalists with strong anti-Communistleanings had assembledat theAFL headquarters in Washington,DC. Includedin thegroup wereDavid Dubinsky,George Meany, Jay Lovestone,and MathewWoll. 5 Lovestone,an early leader ofthe American CommunistParty, who

organizedlabor operatedsee Michael Hogan, The MarshallPlan: America, Britain, andthe Reconstruction ofWestern Europe, 1947–1952 (NewYork, 1987),13– 17. 3GeorgeMeany, speechto Commonwealth Club, June 28,1946, 7/ 6, MeanySecretary Treasurer Papers, GeorgeMeany Memorial Archives, SilverSpring, MD(henceforthGMMA). Perhaps an outgrowthof tense labor relationsduring wartime, AFL SecretaryTreasurer George Meany was particularly vehementthat labor should keepa principled distancefrom government in the post-war period. Meanylinked his opposition to governmentcontrols to his anti-Communism in aspeechin San Francisco in the summer of1946: “ governmentinterference in business leadsto moreand morebureaucratic control and eventuallyto statesocialism, whetherunder the name ofcommunism orfascism.” On the general revivalof collective bargaining and rejectionof corporatism in the immediate post-war yearsalso seeNelson Lichtenstein,“ From Corporatism to CollectiveBargaining: Organized Labor and the Eclipseof Social Democracyin the Post-WarEra,” in SteveFraser and GaryGerstle (eds.), The Rise andFall ofthe New Deal Order,1930– 1980 (Princeton,NJ, 1985),122– 152; and Lichtenstein, Labor’s Warat Home:the CIO in WorldWar II (NewYork, 1982),16; Stephen Fraser, LaborWill Rule: Sidney Hillmanand the Rise of American Labor (NewYork, 1991),213– 214. 4Thepersistence well after the 1930sof a strandof vocal anti-statism within the AFL and to alesser extentthe CIOhas receivedlittle treatment from historians. Twohistorians who have examinedthe phenomenon to some extentare Christopher Tomlins, The State andthe Unions: LaborRelations, Law,and the OrganizedLabor Movement in America (NewYork, 1986),and TheodoreC. Liazos,“ BigLabor: George Meanyand the Makingof the AFL-CIO, 1894–1955” (unpublished PhD diss, Yale Univ., 1998),9– 12. 5Theformative experience for several members ofthe groupwas the intensebattle betweenCommunists and Socialists forthe controlof the garmentindustry unions ofNew York City in the 1920s.In this regard see Fraser, LaborWill Rule ,170,183, 233– 234; David Dubinsky, ALifewith Labor (NewYork, 1979), TheAFL-CIO Approachesthe Vietnam War 279 turnedsharply against Stalin after 1929, becamethe intellectual leader ofthis group. Early advocatesof intervention against theNazis, theAFL internationalists remained intenselyanti-Communist even during thewar andinsisted— even as the U.S. was allied with theUSSR— that Communismand Fascism werebut two sides of the same totalitarian coin. Afterthe war, the AFL internationalists devotedthemselves to challenging the advancing threat ofCommunist unions in WesternEurope. With limited resourcesand facing determinedCommunist opposition, the initial struggle proved challenging for theAFL internationalists. Butmassive interventionby theAmerican statein theform ofthe Marshall Plan—which helpedfund labor’ s anti-Communistwar— tipped the scalesagainst Communist-controlledunions in WesternEurope. 6 This pattern of American organized labor attempting toact autonomouslywith mixed results,followed by adecisiveintervention by theAmerican state,repeated itself in Vietnam. It wasin themidst of their battle for Europeanlabor unionsthat theAFL Žrst encounteredthe Indochinese issue. Beginning in 1946, French determination to reassertcolonial controlover Vietnam sparkeda bitter war betweenthe French, with their superior Žrepower,and the Viet Minh,using guerilla tactics.While initially silent onthe issue, in 1947 theFrench CommunistParty declaredits oppositionto the war in Indochina.To further supportthis position,French Communistsinaugurated a program ofsabotage andstrikes to halt shipmentsof materials tothe war. 7 AFL Europeanrepresentative Irving Brownand legendary French waterfrontlabor leader Pierre Ferri-Pisani organized anti-Communistunionists to break thestrikes and coun- ter thesabotage. 8 Giventhe French Communistcampaign against thewar, the AFL quickly came to view theIndochinese war aspart ofaninternational Communistconspiracy rather than anational struggle against colonialism. In AFLcircles— as was increasingly thecase in theU.S. government—it becamea concretearticle offaith that theSoviets controlled theViet Minh.“ Clearly, theinvasion ofIndochina,” explained anAFL pamphlet on

84–117. While not directlyinvolved in the garmenttrade upheavals, GeorgeMeany, whose wifehad been amember ofthe ILGWU,kept aclosewatch on eventsand helped repelCommunist effortsto inŽltrate his plumbers local. SeeGus Tyler, George Meany: Making ofa FreedomFighter (NewYork, 1971),3. Archie Robinson, George Meany andhis Times (NewYork, 1981),124– 125, recounts Meany’ s part in repelling Communist inŽltration ofhis plumbers localin the 1920s.AFL VicePresident George Harrison and Robert Watt, AFL international representative,should also be includedamong the AFL internationalists. 6Tony Carew, Laborunder the MarshallPlan (Detroit, MI,1987),80– 83, 101– 102; Peter Weiler, British Labourand the ColdWar (Stanford, 1988),90– 128. Disagreeing with Weilerand Carew,Denis MacShane, International Labourand the Origins ofthe ColdWar (Oxford,1992), 2, arguesthat long-termexisting divisions within Europeanlabor— and not the AFL orMarshall Plan—resulted in the defeatof Communists in WesternEuropean unions. On the AFL’s earlyembrace of the Marshall Plan seeMeany speech,“ TheMarshall Plan and AmericanLabor,” Dec. 5, 1947,AFL SecretaryTreasurer Papers, GMMA. 7Val Lorwin, The French LaborMovement (Boston, MA, 1954),117; Philip Williams, Politics in Post-War France: Partiesand the Constitution in the Fourth Republic (London, 1953),56, 174; Francois Fejto, The French Communist Partyand the Crisisof International Communism (Boston, MA,1967),34; George Ross, Workersand Communists in France (Los Angeles,CA, 1982),60– 63. Communist leaderMaurice Thorez personally pressedthe “peaceinitiative” against the warin Indochina, demanding to know: “Will the people ofFrance accept the unloading and transshipment ofthese death machines?” 8P.Ferri-Pisanito GeorgeMeany, Jan. 10,1955, 49/ 2, Jay LovestonePapers, GMMA.Irving Brown, “speech,”May 1947,10/ 8, Brown Papers, GMMA.In 1947,Irving Brown complained especiallybitterly ofthe Communist attacks on the wareffort in Indochina. 280 E. F. Wehrle

Soviet inŽltration ofAsia, “ isbeing openly plannedby theSoviet Union.”9 The Free TradeUnion News ,theAFL’ s foreign policy mouthpiece,ran aseriesof articles by Indian trade unionistS. R.MohanDas onHo Chi Minh,insisting that Howas “completely andtotally subservientto Moscow.” 10 During theŽ rstseveral years oftheIndochinese war, the AFL— normally very vocal aboutall international issues—avoided any public or private utterancesof concern, despitethe federation’ s long history ofstrong oppositionto colonialism, dating back to its call for Cubanindependence in 1896. By 1950, however,with theCold War situationin Europesomewhat settled, the AFL Žnally began expressing opencriticism ofFrench colonialism. In January 1950, after his returnfrom atrip toIndia, Irving Brownlamented that “unlesswe break with thepast in Indonesia,in Indo-China,in SouthAfrica …therewill beno hope for maintaining what isleft ofAsia.” 11 A year later, theAFL movedto back upBrown by calling for national independenceand full rights for Indochinaas a French commonwealthnation. 12 Meanwhile,the AFL prepared tocounter what it believed tobe Soviet inŽltration of SoutheastAsia. This campaign, theAFL hoped,could be waged by thenewly created anti-CommunistICFTU, into whichthe AFL wassinking substantial money.The AFL desperatelyhoped that theICFTU might operate asan activist forcethroughout the world,promoting anti-Communisttrade unions.In 1950, at anICFTU planning session,Irving Brownasserted that hecould “ think ofno more pressingtask than organization in SoutheastAsia.” 13 AnICFTU delegation,which includedboth AFL andCIO representatives,swept through SoutheastAsia later that year, briey visiting Vietnam. There,it foundevidence of a nascentlabor movementin theFrench-con- trolled regions ofsouthern Vietnam. 14 The movementwas the creation ofthe French Confederationof Christian Workers (CFTC)in thelate 1940s. The early organization attracted many ofthe Vietnamese nationalists,increasingly alienated by Viet Minhtactics and ties to the USSR. In particular, Tran QuocBuu, a well-connectednationalist, born in 1912 in thenorthern

9FreeTrade Union Committee (FTUC), Soviet ImperialismPlunders Asia ,March1951; Brown to Oldenbroek, Dec.30, 1949, 10/ 5, Brown Papers, GMMA.Evidence of Soviet designson Asian unions also concernedthe AFL. In1949, Irving Brown warnedthe ICFTUthat the Soviet tradeunions had assigneda Mr.F. G.Jakovlev to directthe inŽltration ofthe emerginglabor movements ofSoutheast Asia fromhis station in Siam. 10S.R.Mohan Das, “HoChi Minh—Vietnamese Nationalist orSoviet Agent,” Free TradeUnion News , Jan. 1951. 11Free TradeUnion News ,Sept. 1950. 12FTUC, Soviet ImperialismPlunders Asia ;“Minutesof the Meetingof the ExecutiveCouncil ofthe AFL,”Jan. 22–Feb. 5, 1952,Pamphlet Collection, GMMA; AFLNews Reporter ,Feb. 6,1952,Mar. 1951. Also see“ CIOPressReleases, Addresses by James B.Carey, ThirteenthAnnual National Farm Institute, DesMoines, Iowa, Feb. 17,1951.” The CIO, through VicePresident James Carey, echoedthe AFL’s increasingcalls for Indochinese independence. Noting the Communist threatand important rawmaterials locatedin the region,Carey also calledfor the “immediate creationof an ECA[EconomicCooperation Administration] forthe nations ofSoutheast Asia.”By early1952, the AFL’s ExecutiveCouncil weighed in with aharshly wordedstatement: “Resistanceto Communist aggressionin Indo-China should be made moreeffective by stripping it ofevery appearance of a nineteenthcentury colonial campaign.” 13“Report on EmergencyCommittee Meeting,”Mar. 16, 18, 1950, 50/ 19,Meany Papers, GMMA. 14Free TradeUnion News ,Dec.1950; John Brophy, AMiner’s Life (Madison, WI,1964),298; Irving Brown, “TheRole of Labor in InternationalRelations,” Sept., 29,1950, 10/ 5, Brown Papers, GMMA. Ina speechin 1950,Brown commentedenthusiastically on the recentICFTU mission to Asia. On the earlyhistory ofthe Vietnameselabor movement seeJohn Loss, “TheRise of the Labor Movementin South Vietnam”(unpublished MAessay, Univ. ofTexas, (1975), 3–10. TheAFL-CIO Approachesthe Vietnam War 281 portion ofVietnam, wasdrawn to the nascent movement. Already Buuwas a veteran nationalist. Hisfather had expelled him from thefamily homeat theage of14 for taking part in anti-French demonstrations.In 1940, French authorities sentencedhim to10 years’hard labor onPaulo CondoreIsland, the Devil’ s Island ofIndochina.In prison, Buucame intocontact with key members ofthe Viet Minh,a Communist-ledumbrella organization ofnationalist groups begunin 1941. Hisprison contactsincluded Pham Van Dong,a prominent Viet Minhleader andfuture Prime Ministerof the Democratic republic ofVietnam. 15 Although thedetails remain cloudy,it appears that theJapanese arranged for Buu’s releasefrom prison in 1945 andthen trained him, along with members ofthereligious sectCao Dai, tooverthrow theFrench Vichy government.Buu and the Cao Dai were among theleaders and groups that rallied tosupport the Viet Minh’s assertionof independencein thename ofthe Democratic Republic ofVietnam andto resist subsequentFrench effortsto reimpose colonial rule. 16 Yetboth Buuand the Cao Dai gradually began toquestion their alliance with the Communists,whose nationalism they consideredtainted by itsties to outside forces. Meanwhile,a French customsofŽ cer named Gilbert Jouan,working through the CFTC,had beguna campaign toorganize native workers.Jouan persuaded Buu to take alead in theproject, and personally trained theyoung nationalist in theprinciples of Christian trade unionthought. 17 With Jouan’s help, Buuput together apreliminary organization ofworkers that illegally began tounionize both rural andurban workersand later launchedseveral aggressive strikes.In 1952, whenEmperor Bao Dai revisedthe labor codesto allow for unionsof native workers,Buu named his organization theVietnamese Confederation of Christian Workers (CVTC). 18 Although afŽliated with theInternational Federation of Christian Trade Unions(IFCTU), or Christian International asit wasknown, the CVTCstrove to incorporate adiversemembership. Buuhimself wasa Buddhist. Buu’s organization wasjust the sort of Third World developmentthat theAFL hopedto harness to thwart theattraction ofCommunismand promote thebeneŽ ts of freetrade unionism.It hopedthat theICFTU wouldmove quickly toextend further

15“Bio Data, TranQuoc Buu,” n.d., 31/3, InternationalAffairs Department, Country Files, GMMA. Trinh-Quang-Quy, Phong TraoLao Dong Vietnam (Saigon, 1970),30– 41. 16EdwardLansdale, In the Midstof Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (NewYork, 1972), 152–153; Charles Finch to State, Aug. 15,1969, Box 1226, RG 59, Central Policy Files, 1967–69, Economic,Labor and Manpower, 06–10 Viet S, National Archives, CollegePark, MD(henceforthNA). Nearly25 years later, Buu was greetedenthusiastically by Cao Dai members in theirHoly Seein Tay Nihn. Buu recalledfor those assembled his earlywork with the Cao Dai. 17Joseph Zisman, “Labor in Indochina,”Oct. 1952,Box 4, RG469,Records of the U.S. Foreign AssistanceAgencies, 1948– 61, OfŽ ce of Labor Affairs,Far EastCountry Files, NA. Following Catholic teachingon labor issues,Jouan advocatedthe creationof “ chambres deme ´tier”or trade associations, through which representativesof labor and capital would regulatethe conductof business. On Catholic teachingon labor duringthis erasee Gary Gerstle, “ Catholic Corporatism, FrenchCanadian Workers, and IndustrialUnionism in Rhode Island,”213– 215, in Robert Asherand Charles Stephenson (eds.), LaborDivided: Race, Ethnicity, in U.S.Labor Struggles, 1935–1960 (Albany, NY, 1990);also seethe papal encyclicalsof Pope LeoXIII, RerumNovarum (1891), and Pope Pius XI, QuadragesimoAnno (1931); AlexanderWoodside, Community andRevolution in ModernVietnam (Boston, MA, 1976),286– 287. Buu, accordingto Woodside, lateradvocated policies based on a“triangularprinciple” in which business, labor, and governmentrepresentatives would gatherto resolveproblems. The“ triangularprinciple” may well have evolvedfrom Jouan’ s advocacy of“ chambres deme ´tier.” 18Trinh-Quang-Quy, Phong TraoLao Dong Vietnam (Saigon, 1970),30– 38; “ Bio Data, TranQuoc Buu,”n.d., 31/3, InternationalAffairs Department, Country Files, GMMA. 282 E. F. Wehrle supportto Indochina’s nascentunionists. Yet in spiteof afollow-upmission to Vietnam in 1953, theICFTU failed toafŽ liate or establish asystemof support for theCVTC. 19 The ICFTU’s reluctanceto act appeared toderive from longstanding competition with Christian International. EuropeanSocialists dominatedthe ICFTU andlooked with suspicionupon the IFCTU, which they consideredto be a more conservative organiza- tion,bound to the Roman Catholic Church.To theAmericans, such longstanding Europeanrivalries wereinfuriating, especially whenthey obstructedprogress in the battle against Communism.Watching theICFTU spinits wheelswhile tensionsheated upin Vietnam, Lovestoneangrily wroteMeany that “OnIndo-China … wehave missedout on a psychological moment.”20 The AFLhad betterluck using its U.S.government contactsto obtain aid for the CVTC.Nelson Cruickshank, Head of the AFL Social Security Department andon temporary assignmentas the Director ofthe European Labor Division ofthe Mutual Security Agency,arranged tohave labor expert Dr. JosephZisman visit Indochinato evaluate thenascent labor movement.Zisman emerged impressed by theCVTC and reportedthat the“ existenceof young andinexperienced trade unionsat this time presentboth achallenge andopportunity. Properly directedtrade unionsare among the strongestbulwarks for democracy.”21 Zisman’s recommendations,however, were the source of controversy among those involved in thenascent American aid program in Vietnam. The mission’s education ofŽcer noted “ considerablevariation in commentsmade by differentmembers ofthe Missionin regard towhat actionsthe Mission should take towarda labor andlabor ministry program.”22 There shouldbe no surprise that acountrywith very ambivalent attitudestoward organized labor shouldresist actively cultivating an organized labor movementoverseas. The AFL’s oftentense, always awkward,relationship with the statesuggests that evenAmerican organized labor sharedsome of this ambivalence. With thearrival ofthe more budget-consciousEisenhower administration, however, foreign aid for programs for theThird World driedup. 23 Moreseriously, the AFL worried that Eisenhower’s emphasis on“ massive retaliation”over directactivism would compromise theanti-Communist cause in SoutheastAsia. 24 Asthe crisis in Indochina worsenedin early 1954, theAFL feared that theinternational community andthe U.S. government intendedto abandon large portionsof Indochina to the Communists. The major powershad gathered in Geneva,Switzerland, to discuss the future of Vietnam justas the French military positionweakened with theViet Minhsiege at DienBien Phu.In late April, 1954, theAFL ExecutiveCouncil issued a statementcalling for an immediate endto French colonial rule tobe followedby amassive program ofmilitary andeconomic aid toVietnam. 25

19ICFTURegional Fund Committee, Seventh Meeting,“ Summary ofReport ofthe Missionto Vietnam (June 20–July 24,1953),” 51/ 4,MeanyPapers, GMMA. 20Lovestoneto Meany, Nov. 29,1954, 56/ 4, MeanyPapers, GMMA. 21Joseph Zisman, “Labor in Indochina,”Oct. 1952,Box 4, RG469,Records of the U.S. Foreign AssistanceAgencies, 1948– 61, OfŽ ce of Labor Affairs,Far EastCountry Files, NA. 22Malcolm Gaar,Acting Education OfŽ cer to John Tobler, “Subject: Labor and Labor MinistryTrainee Program,”April 28,1952, Box 1, RG469,Records of U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies, 1948– 61, Missionto Vietnam, Agriculturaland Natural ResourcesDivisions, ClassiŽed Files, NA. 23Carew,183. David Anderson, Trappedby Success: The Eisenhower Administration andVietnam, 1953–1961 (NewYork, 1991),70– 75, 133– 134. The Eisenhower administration was reluctantto fund aid projectsin Vietnam. Secretaryof Defense Charles Wilson ledthe battle to limit aid to South Vietnam. 24On Eisenhower’s diplomacy seeJohn LewisGaddis, Strategies ofContainment (NewYork, 1992), 131–150. 25AFLNews Reporter ,May 28,1954. Michael Ross to Jacob Potofsky, April 29,1954, 214/ 8, ACWA TheAFL-CIO Approachesthe Vietnam War 283

Determinedto in uence events, Meany dispatched an agent tothe 1954 Geneva conferencewith instructionsto press the AFL agenda. The agent,veteran trade unionistHarry Goldberg,set up what hecalled his “OSSOperations” in Geneva,which centeredaround the distribution ofAFL documents to delegates. The AFLmaterials aimed todissuade delegates from partitioning Vietnam andconvince them that nationalist forces—freed from French domination—could defeat the Viet Minh. 26 Shouldthe delegates show interest, the AFL plannedto contact sympathetic U.S. SenatorsPaul Douglas orMichael MansŽeld to introduce legislation todirect massive aid toan independentVietnam. 27 Afterseveral weeksof lobbying, however,Goldberg realized that with theFrench defeatat DienBien Phu andEisenhower’ s vacillations little couldbe accomplished at Geneva. 28 WhenGeorge Meany learned of the Ž nal resultsof theGeneva conference, he angrily assailed thedivision ofVietnam asappeasement on “ aworldscale which wouldmake Munichpale intoinsigniŽ cance.” The AFLNews Reporter addedthat “twelvemillion more persons,including threeand a half million Roman Catholics wereadded to the Redworld as half ofVietnam wasabandoned.” 29 The AFL’s lament came at atime ofgreat crisis for theCVTC. With thepartition ofVietnam, thousandsof CVTC members living above the17th parallel attemptedto escapesouth. An unnervedBuu wrote a supporterthat theCVTC was “ living through areal nightmare.”Two of theCVTC’ s mostimportant unions,totaling around50,000 members,were headquartered in thenorth. The CVTChoped to evacuate those “energetically opposedto the communist regime,” but had fewresources available for theundertaking. 30 Inevitably, somewere left behind.Any illusions that theViet Minh might showmercy tomembers ofanationalist workers’movement were shattered when ofŽcials ofthe new North Vietnamesegovernment arrestedtwo members ofthe CVTC whohad voluntarily stayedin thenorth underthe promise that they wouldbe protected by theInternational ControlCommission. Reports reaching Buuindicated that North Vietnameseauthorities had arrestedthe two and sentenced them toforced labor onthe Chineseborder. 31 The swarm ofunionists who  edsouth from theViet Minhalong with thememory ofthose left in thenorth cementedthe anti-Communist leanings already presentin theranks ofthe CVTC. The AFL didwhat it couldto help Buu’s organization, butwith limited resources andwith neither theICFTU northe U.S. government actively involved, American labor couldoffer little real comfort.Buu, therefore, sought out other alliances toanchor theCVTC in thedangerously changing times.He quickly founda wealthy and

(Amalgamated Clothing Workersof America) Papers, KheelCenter for Labor Documentation, Cornell University(henceforth Kheel). Similar concernswere expressed by the CIO. While touringIndia in the springof 1954, Michael Ross, the head ofthe CIO’s Department ofInternational Affairs, wrote to Jacob Potofsky, aCIO VicePresident, that “ifIndochina fallsthe effectdown herewill be bad.” 26Goldbergto Lovestone,May 8,1954,37/ 11,Lovestone Papers, GMMA. 27Goldbergto Lovestone,May 5,1954,37/ 11,Lovestone Papers, GMMA. 28Goldbergto Lovestone,May 17,1954, 37/ 11,Lovestone Papers, GMMA; AFLNews Reporter , May 14, 1954. 29AFLNews Reporter ,July 13,1954. Robert Zieger, The CIO,1935– 1955 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1995), 330–331. The CIO echoedMeany’ s attacks at its 1954convention, which assailedthe administration’s “impressiverecord for vacillating and contradictorypolicies” and complained of“ the loss ofat leasthalf ofIndochina tothe communists.” 30Buu to LucienTronchet, July 22,1954, 31/ 3Country Files, InternationalAffairs Department Papers, GMMA. 31“Labor Report,”Feb. 5,1955,Box 15, RG 469,Records of the U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies, 1948–61, OfŽ ce ofLabor Affairs,Labor ProgramsDivision, Far East, Country Files, NA. 284 E. F. Wehrle potentially powerful(and dangerous) ally in Ngo Dinh Nhu,the political operative whosebrother, Ngo Dinh Diem, wasa strongly anti-Communistnationalist whomBao Dai namedas Premier in June1954. Nhucarefully cultivated theCVTC and may have provided it with much-neededfunds for theresettlement of the refugees and other projects.32 In return,Buu joined Nhu in forming theCan Lao Party tosupport Diem’ s political aspirations. 33 Buu’s collaboration with Nhuin thecontroversial CanLao Party offeredthe CVTC aninvaluable shieldduring thevolatile early daysfollowing thepartition ofVietnam. As Presidentof South Vietnam, Diem’s vigorous attacks onthe Binh Xuyensect of gangsters controlling theports of Saigon openedthe harbors toCVTC organizing. 34 The CVTCrapidly grew in theŽ rst2 years following theGeneva conference. The TenantFarmers’ Union, in particular, expandeddramatically with thepersonal support of Nhu.35 By late 1955, theCVTC publicly claimed tohave 500,000 members, although it privately admitted tohaving only around350,000. 36 Alongsidesuccessful organizing campaigns, theCVTC also grew increasingly mili- tant.In 1956, it launchedstrikes that shutdown both theport ofSaigon andlater the city’s major electrical plant. In thecountryside, 13,000 members ofthe CVTC’ s plantation workers’afŽ liate struckfor betterpay andworking conditionsat fourof SouthVietnam’ s major rubber plantations. 37 Attheend of June, 1956, theCVTC even threateneda general strike toprotest remaining resistanceto unionization. 38 The organization also commencedcampaigns tobring electricity toworking classneighbor- hoods,improve education,establish medical clinics,and rebuild areas ofSaigon destroyedin theupheavals of1955. 39 All this occurredwith Diem’s explicit support.On May Day, 1956, Diem issueda statementto theworkers of his country,assuring them that their government “placedlabor above capital”and recognized the right ofworkers andunions to participate in the“ directionand progress ofthe country.” 40 Delighted with theCVTC’ s progress underthe Diem regime, theAFL enthusiasti- cally embracedthe new South Vietnamese government. TheAFL News Reporter praised

32Heath to State Department, Jan. 5, 1954and Mar.19, 1954, Box 3, RG469,Records of the U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies, 1948– 61, OfŽ ce of Labor Affairs,Labor ProgramsDivision, Far East, Country Files, NA. 33CentralIntelligence Agency, “ CurrentIntelligence Memorandum, Subject: Cast ofCharacters South Vietnam,”Aug. 28,1963, Box 128a, President’ s OfŽce Files, Vietnam General,John F.KennedyLibrary, Columbia Point, MA(henceforthJFK). 34On Binh Xuyen seeMarilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars,1945– 1990 (NewYork, 1991),48– 49; George Herring,America’s Longest War (NewYork, 1986),52– 54; Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York, 1966),103, 119– 120. 35Shaplen, 146–147. 36Dubrow to State Department, Mar.2, 1959, Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1958–1960 , 1:145–148 (hereafter FRUS,with yearand volume number). Jodie Eggersto State, Dec.12, 1955, Box 14,RG 469, Records of the U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies, 1948– 61, OfŽ ce of Labor Affairs,Labor ProgramsDivision, Far East, Country Files, NA. 37Reinhardt to State Department, May 26,1956, Box 15, Reinhardt to State Department, Mar.31, 1956,Box 14, RG 469,Records of the U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies, 1948– 61, OfŽ ce ofLabor Affairs, Labor ProgramsDivision, Far East, Country Files, NA. 38Eggersto GoldaStander, June 29,1956, Box 14, RG 469,Records of the U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies,1948– 61, OfŽ ce ofLabor Affairs,Labor ProgramsDivision, Far EastCountry Files, NA. 39Eggersto Barrows, June 29,1955, Box 28, RG 469,Records of U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies, 1948–61, Mission to Vietnam, OfŽce ofthe Director,Subject Files, NA. 40“PresidentDiem’ s May Day Messageto VietnameseWorkers,” May 1, 1956,Box 15, RG 469, Recordsof the U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies, 1948– 61, OfŽ ce of Labor Affairs,Labor Programs Division, Far East, Country Files, NA. TheAFL-CIO Approachesthe Vietnam War 285

Diem asa “progressive”and a “reformist,”willing toŽ ght landlordsand “ feudal forces.”Under Diem, theAFL proclaimed, a“far-reaching stepwas taken to stimulate thedemocratic processin strife-torn,divided, yet strategically vital Vietnam.”41 Butwhile Buu’s membership in CanLao had brought great gains, heworried about Nhu’s andDiem’ s volatility andhis ownindependence. In apost-colonial culturethat placedexaggerated value onindependence and autonomy, Buu’ s alliance with the Nhushad adeŽnite downside. Expressing apersistentpreoccupation for Buu(and Vietnamesein general)—fear ofundue outside in uences— the CVTC President told theAmerican Embassythat he“ wasreluctant to become over-obligated” to the government by “accepting outright grants from it orany ofthe political parties.”42 Nor wasBuu shy about expressing his concernsto Diem. In ameeting with thePresident in February 1956, Buuexplained that “his idea ofdemocracy was not [Diem’ s] hand-pickedassembly.” 43 Buufollowed up by refusingto give ablanket endorsement tothe Can Lao slate running for theassembly. He also ampliŽed his attacks onlocal ofŽcials whomistreated CVTCmembers andofŽ cials. Noneof this pleasedthe imperious Diem. The Žnal strawbetween Buu and Diem, according toAmerican Embassyobservers, came with thefailure ofthe CVTC to pass a resolutionpledging supportto Diem’ s government. 44 By October,1956, aconcernedAmerican Embassyreported to the State Department that Diem’s attitudetoward labor had completely changed.Government ofŽ cials openly condemnedthe CVTC and reimposed colonial-era prohibitions against large meetingswithout prior government approval. 45 Meanwhile,Nhu turned viciously on theTenant Farmers’ Union. Fearing that theunion’ s initial successmight lead toreal agrarian reform, Nhuturned over tolarge landlordscontrol of a networkof Farmers’ Associations,designed to provide affordable creditto tenants. The landlordsquickly transformedthe associations into instruments designed to manipulate andcontrol tenants.A reign ofterror descendedupon the Tenant Farmers’ Union. Several union leaderswere thrown into jail andsome languished in prison for years.The entireaffair only fueledfurther anti-Diem sentimentsin rural areas. 46 In themidst of thetroubles, Buu walked a difŽcult tightrope. Privately, helambasted thegovernment, but in public heavoided criticism, fearing that hewould be jailed and that his movementwould collapse. 47 Hehad other problems aswell. While awholesale campaign ofsubversion had yet tobegin, Buuwas aware that Communistswith revolutionary designshad inŽltrated his movement.As veterans of the Viet Minh campaign, CVTCleaders knew these tactics well andclaimed toknow the identity of

41AFLNews Reporter ,May 27,1955. 42Eggersto State Department, Dec.12, 1955, Box 14, RG 469,Records of the U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies,1948– 61, OfŽ ce of Labor Affairs,Labor ProgramsDivision, Far East, Country Files, NA. 43Eggersto Eland Barrows, Feb. 14,1956, Box 14, RG 469,Records of the U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies,1948– 61, OfŽ ce of Labor Affairs,Labor ProgramsDivision, Far East, Country Files, NA; “Recordof Conversation: PresentSituation in the CVTC,”July 11,1956, Box 15, Jay KranePapers, WalterReuther Library, Wayne State University(henceforth Reuther Library). Bui Luong,the general secretaryof the CVTC, expressedsimilar concernsto ICFTUrepresentative Jay Krane.Luong explained that he “was personally carefulnot to compromise his standingwith the workersby having too closecontact with the government.” 44Eggersto Barrows, Oct. 15,1956, Box 15, RG 469,Records of the U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies, 1948–61, OfŽ ce ofLabor Affairs,Labor ProgramsDivision, Far East, Country Files, NA. 45Ibid. 46Shaplen, 146–147. 47“ConŽdential-BR, Singapore,”Jan. 16,1958; “ ConŽdential-BR, Singapore,”Mar. 22, 1958, Box 15, Jay KranePapers, ReutherLibrary. 286 E. F. Wehrle thespies in their ranks,often choosing to allow them tooperate underthe belief that anenemy should be kept close.But in 1957, aViet Minhagent operating in theranks ofthe CVTC was arrested and jailed whenauthorities foundincriminating documents in her residence. 48 The incidentput Buu’ s movementunder a cloud. Asthesituation appeared tobe slipping outof controlin Vietnam, theAFL– CIO had fewremedies at its disposal.The ICFTU continuedto prove ineffectivein Vietnam. Having shelvedefforts to afŽliate theCVTC, the ICFTU afŽliated theWorker’ s Union ofVietnam (UOV),the smallest by far ofthe three rival labor federationsin South Vietnam. The UOVafŽliation further alienated theCVTC from theICFTU. 49 AFL– CIO Asianagent Richard Deverall bitterly complained toMeany and Lovestone that theIndians who operated much of the ICFTU machinery in Asia werenot only “hopelesslyinefŽ cient” but also resentedin therest of Asia. 50 Deverall’s vehemently expressedconcerns convinced Lovestone of the “ tragedy andstupidity ofthe ICFTU operationsin theFar East.”51 Asthe ICFTU oundered,the U.S. government enjoyeda bit more successin respondingto the needs of Vietnamese workers. Although U.S.Operations Mission (USOM)in SouthVietnam originally had budgetedno money for labor programs, USOMstaffer Jodie Eggers, formerly ofthe CIO– Woodworkers, lobbied energetically for fundsthat might help theCVTC. 52 Within ayear, Eggers had launchedseveral “labor schools”to train CVTCunionists. 53 Socomplete was Eggers’ s dedicationthat helabored onhis weekendswith CVTCmembers constructinghousing for resettled workers.54 Eggers’s programs expandedin 1957 toinclude training coursesto be given acrossthe country by ateam of20 full-time teachers,funded by a$200,000 grant from the U.S.55 Insteadof embracing thesedevelopments, ICFTU GeneralSecretary J.H.Olden- broek complained bitterly that theInternational CooperationAdministration (the coordinating bodyfor U.S.aid programs), with its plans toextend its training programs in Vietnam, Thailand, andIndonesia, was “ interfering with theprograms andplans of the ICFTU.”56

48Eggersto LelandBarrows, April 9, 1957,“ Monthly Report,”Box 18, RG 469,Records of U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies, 1948– 61, Mission to Vietnam, OfŽce of the Director,Subject Files, 1954–57. 49Deverallto Meany, Sept. 14,1960, 57/ 12,Meany Papers, GMMA.ICFTU, “InternationalSolidarity Fund Committee,”June 1964,Box 482, Jay LovestonePapers, HooverInstitute on War, Revolution, and Peace,Stanford, CA(henceforthHoover). In1964,the ICFTUdisafŽ liated the UOVafter discovering that the Vietnamesefederation essentially had liedabout its membership numbers and activitiesin order to obtain agrantfrom the InternationalLabor Organization. 50Deverallto Meany, Mar.7, 1960,57/ 15,Meany Papers, GMMA. 51Lovestoneto Meany, June 9, 1952,Box 8, MeanyPapers, GMMA. 52Jodie Eggersto GoldaStander, June 9, 1955,Box 14, Records of the U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies, 1948–61, OfŽ ce ofLabor Affairs,Labor ProgramsDivision, Far East, Country Files, NA. 53Eggersto Golda Stander, June 29,1956, Box 14, Records of the U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies, 1948–61, OfŽ ce ofLabor Affairs,Labor ProgramsDivision, Far East, Country Files, NA. 54Rudolph Marginotto GeorgeBrown, Aug. 29,1957, 31/ 3, InternationalAffairs Department, Country Files, GMMA.Eggers’ s monthly reportson labor activitiesin South Vietnamoffer a detaileddepiction ofa movement strugglingwith the vestigesof colonialism and strivingto cometo gripswith arapidly changingworld. Among the problems facingVietnamese labor in 1957,the CVTC dealtwith the case ofa woman beatento death by herFrench overseer on arubberplantation, while it simultaneously planned astrikeat alargehydro-electricity plant. 55“FY1957Operational ProgramVietnam,” 43, Box 15, Records of the U.S. ForeignAssistance Agencies,1948– 61, OfŽ ce of Labor Affairs,Labor ProgramsDivision, Far East, Country Files, NA. 56IrvingBrown memo, June 26,1959, 11/ 15,Irving Brown Papers, GMMA. TheAFL-CIO Approachesthe Vietnam War 287

Butthe nascent U.S. government program quickly ran intoother problems. In 1958, with thereassignment of Eggers toPakistan, theUSOM’ s relationship with theCVTC began todeteriorate. Again reecting his concernsover his organization’s autonomy, Buurefused demands for anaudit ofhis organization’s useof American money.The USOMresponded by endingboth thesubsidy and the labor aid program. Humiliated, theCVTC seethed with “anti-American sentiment.”57 Despiteits owndesires to avoid apartnership with theU.S. government,the AFL– CIO increasingly becameconvinced that, if it couldplay agreater mediating role, suchmisunderstandings could be avoided in thefuture. Givenits frustrationswith theICFTU andits developing hopesthat theU.S. government might more actively anddelicately interveneto help theCVTC, the AFL–CIO welcomedthe election of John F. Kennedyin 1960. In particular, Kennedy’s bold assertionof “ wecando better”appeared tooffer an exciting opportunity toreverse thenation’ s reactive posein foreign policy. Especially attractive tolabor wasKennedy’ s recognition that social,political, and economicdevelopments were integral tothe battle against Communismin theThird World.58 In Latin America, Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress,with its emphasis onboth social andmilitary efforts,offered an opportunity for suchcooperation. AFL– CIO leadersquickly convincedthemselves that they couldaccept funding and work closely with government ofŽcials while still maintaining anessential autonomy. The federation embracedthe Alliance for Progress andvolunteered to aid in thelabor sideof the administration ofthe program. 59 Together, government andlabor jointly foundedand fundedthe American Institutefor Free Labor Development(AIFLD), which estab- lishedtraining programs for unionleaders from Latin America, brought young labor leadersto the U.S. for classes,and generally promotedthe cause of free trade unionism in theregion. In late 1963, theKennedy administration expandedits partnership with organized labor, creating apermanentlabor advisory committee tothe Agency for International Development(AID), theagency createdin 1961 toreplace theInter- national CooperationAdministration andDevelopment Loan Fund. 60 In contrastto his growing involvement with AID, Meanymoved to distance himself from theineffectual ICFTU by withholding AFL–CIO duespayments and stepping uphis public criticism ofthe organization. 61 Supportedby AID moneyand inspired by Kennedy’s call toaction, the AFL– CIO aggressively movedto cement and repair relations with thenascent labor movementsof

57Bowersto Krane,Feb. 13,1958; “ ConŽdential-BR, Singapore,”Box 15, Jay KranePapers, Reuther Library. 58Gaddis, Strategies ofContainment ,201–205. Gaddis suggests that Kennedy’s Cold Warstrategy must be viewedin termsof a “universalism”that assumed that the U.S. had both the means and the moral imperative to challengethe possible expansionof Communism anywherein the world. TheAFL– CIO, in its idealisticapproach to foreignpolicy, clearlyexhibited a universalisticapproach to foreignpolicy. 59Stanley Ruttenberg,“ For aFreeWorld: Alliancefor Progress,” Free TradeUnion News ,June, 1962; Meanyto Potofsky, Jan. 2,1964,27/ 313,ACWA Papers(5619), Kheel.Kennedy also createdan ad hoc labor advisory committeeattached to the Alliancefor Progress. 60Alongsidethe AIFLD, the AFL–CIO and AID formedthe African–American Labor Collegeto train and adviseAfrican trade unionists, Meanyto KennethKelly, April 2, 1962,OfŽ ce of the President,Micro 81,GMMA. Key AFL– CIO ofŽcials also wentto workfor AID. For instance,Kenneth Kelly, Secretary Treasurerof the MassachusettsState Labor Council, becamethe Directorof Labor Affairsin AID’s OfŽce ofEducation and Social Development. 61Washington Post ,Jan. 10,1961; Meany to OmerBecu, Mar. 9, 1961,3/ 13,Lovestone Papers, Kheel. Meanyto Becu,Sept. 5, 1963,OfŽ ce of the President,Micro 81, GMMA. 288 E. F. Wehrle theThird World threatenedby Communism,such as the CVTC. Without question, theAFL– CIO’ s mosteffective overseas agent wasIrving Brown.His reputation, by the 1950s, had spreadacross the world. Communists viewed him asa dangerous agent provocateur ,aruthlesscovert operator with strongCentral Intelligence Agency(CIA) ties,dedicated to thwarting Communistin uence on international labor. Although he remained focusedon European affairs, theperceived ineffectiveness of the ICFTU forcedthe AFL– CIO torely onBrown’ s uniqueabilities world-wide. In 1961, Communistgains in Laos,Diem’ s ever growing repression,and rumors that Buuwould soon be arrested, placed the labor situationin SoutheastAsia onIrving Brown’s agenda. 62 Brownarranged for ashorttrip toSouth Vietnam. 63 Arriving in Saigon onNovember 15, 1961, Brownquickly movedto size up theVietnamese labor movement.He immediately recognizeda countryin disarray, hauntedby the“ poverty andmisery ofthemasses.” He traveled through theslums of Saigon, wherethe vast gap betweenrich andpoor drewhis attention.The Viet Cong,Brown quickly recognized, successfullyhad managed to“ identify itself with thethinking andactions of the masses andthe reality ofdaily existence,”while Diem’s government remained mired in corruption,ineffectiveness, and repression. “ Unlessthere is acleansing ofthe Augean stablesand an introduction of new, hopeful political elementsinto the regime,” insisted Brownin his ofŽcial report, “themasses, especially thepeasants— will notdefend the regime.” Brown,however, did Ž ndsomehope in SouthVietnam’ s maturing labor movement andthe leader ofthe CVTC, Tran QuocBuu. Only theCVTC, under Buu, “ constitute amoral or social sideof what mustbe a total Žght against atotal enemy.”Buu and Brownconferred closely. Buu told the AFL– CIO representative that hehad lostfaith in Diem, andcomplained ofDiem’ s persecutionof the labor movement.He described his hopesfor theCVTC and impressed Brown with his commitment toanti-Commu- nism. Ashe left Vietnam, Brownwas “ soimpressed with Buuthat Ibelieve heshould be consideredin termsof any possiblereshuf ing ofthe political controlof the govern- ment.”Perhaps more importantly, Brownhad cometo view theCVTC not only asa political andsocial force,but also as“ apossiblepara-military” force. 64 Accordingto Buu,Diem briey had enlistedthe CVTC for paramilitary purposes,as had Emperor Bao Dai beforehim, but,in both cases,Diem andBao Dai had turnedagainst theplan for fear ofcreating anarmed political opposition. 65 Following Brown’s warnings about Diem in 1961, theAFL– CIO grew increasingly concernedas Diem remained intransigent,refusing to adopt reform measures.After returning toParis, Brownmade contact with elementsin theVietnamese exile com- munity in France.These contacts urged him touse his inuence against theSouth Vietnamesestate and in supportof the “ real”nationalists operating against Diem in

62Shaplen, 146–147. 63MichaelRoss to LewJohnson, Nov. 8,1961,31/ 3, InternationalAffairs Department, Country Files, GMMA.The cover for Brown’ s mission was to be the distribution ofrelief to victims ofa recent ood alongthe MekongRiver. 64IrvingBrown, “Report on Vietnam Trip,”Nov. 17–21, 1961, 31/ 3, InternationalAffairs Department, Country Files, GMMA. 65ErnestLee to Meany, May 15,1964, 31/ 3,InternationalAffairs Department, Country Files, GMMA. TheAFL-CIO Approachesthe Vietnam War 289

SouthVietnam. 66 In 1962, asrepression mounted in Saigon, Meanyinterceded with Kennedyand Rusk asking them toprotect Buu in his increasingly precarious position. 67 In September,1963, asthe situation in Saigon wasnearing theunraveling point with thegrowing Buddhistprotest movement, Harry Goldberg met (at thesuggestion of Buu)with agroup ofVietnamese exiles representingthe Democratic Leagueof Vietnam. The group, ledby Dr. NguyenTon Hoan, told Goldberg that Buuhad recentlyjourneyed to Paris secretlyto build supportfor acoupagainst Diem. Hoan— whoalong with Buuhad formedthe nationalist Dai Viet political party in 1948—urged Goldberg andthe AFL– CIO tointensify anti-Diem lobbying in Washington.He claimed tohave earnedthe sympathies ofMichael Forrestal, anaide toMcGeorge Bundy,and proposed to replace Diem’s regime with a“broad-democratic,anti-com- munistcoalition.” 68 Along with his secretlobbying, Buubegan totake amore public postureof oppositionto Diem. In thefall of1963, hesharply criticized Diem in testimonyto a UnitedNations committee investigating Vietnam. 69 Seeking Buu’s counsel,the AFL– CIO invited him toattend its 1963 conventionscheduled for mid-November. President Kennedyalso wasto attend, and the occasion would give thetwo a chanceto meet and anoccasion for Buuto put Vietnamese labor onKennedy’ s agenda.In theend, however,a covert American-sponsoredcoup of Vietnamese Army generals overthrew Diem, endinghis repressiveregime. In theaftermath ofthe November coup,Buu chose tostay in Vietnam totry toin uence events. 70 Hemissedhis opportunity tomeet with Kennedy,whose speech to the AFL– CIO conventionwas one of his last. Kennedy’s successor,Lyndon Johnson (LBJ), had donelittle toimpress labor during his tenurein Congressbut, as Vice President,LBJ aimed tobroaden his political base. Herallied all his energiesand considerable powers of persuasion to transform success-

66Ho-Thong-Minh to Brown, April 4,1962,8/ 17,Papers of Irving Brown, GMMA.“ FreeDemocratic Party ofVietnam OverseasOrganization: BackgroundFeatures, Information and Analysis,”n.d. 8/4, IrvingBrown Papers, GMMA;Pham-Huy-Co to Lovestone,April 2, 1962,14/ 5, LovestonePapers, GMMA.Both Brown and Lovestonewere in contactwith exilednationalist leaderDr. Pham-Huy-Co, who urgedLovestone to lobby AverellHarriman, the Assistant Secretaryof State forFar Eastaffairs, againstthe oppressiveDiem regime.“ CIACurrentIntelligence Memorandum, Subject: Cast of Charactersin SVN”, Aug. 28,1963, Box 128a, President’ s OfŽce Files, JFK. ACIAproŽle described Co as an exilein Parissince 1954, with tiesto Dr. Dan’s democratizationmovement. Co apparently had contactsin South Vietnam and was responsiblefor several lea et campaigns in Saigon. TheCIA described him as “relativelycapable but not forcefuland somewhat arrogant.” 67“Minutesof Labor Advisory Committee on ForeignAssistance,” Jan. 7, 1969,11/ 11,Joseph Keenan Papers, Catholic Univ. ofAmerica Archives, Washington, DC. 68HarryGoldberg, “ Meetingwith VietnamExile Leaders,” Sept. 16,1963, 31/ 3,InternationalAffairs Department, Country Files, GMMA.Huyeh Sanh Thong, amember ofthe DemocraticLeague of Vietnamand alecturerat Yale, attendedthe meetingwith Brown. Thong laterjoined with 70otherexiles in signinga generalappeal to Kennedynot to interferewith any coups againstDiem. Theirappeal was published in The New YorkTimes .Following the coup in early1964 that brought GeneralKhanh to power, Hoan becamethe VicePremier of South Vietnam. Krulak, “Memorandum forthe Record,Subject: Meetingwith Mr.Ho Thuong Minh,”Oct. 15,1963, Box 1, RG218,Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs ofStaff, Recordsof the JFK Collection, VietnamDocuments, JCS CentralFile, 1963,NA. At the urging ofIrving Brown, GeneralKrulak met with HoThuong Minh, the formerVietnamese Defense Minister who had beenŽ redfor resisting Diem’ s “program ofviolent liquidation ofthe sects.”Minh urgedthat the U.S. seekto deposeDiem and then seeknegotiations. Krulakreported a positive impression ofMinh. 69JoseMaria Aguirre to ErnestLee, Dec. 13, 1963, 31/ 3, InternationalAffairs Department, Country Files, GMMA. 70Rusk to Saigon Embassy, Nov. 3, 1963,Saigon Embassy to State Department, Nov. 4, 1963, FRUS, 290 E. F. Wehrle fully therelationship betweenhimself andlabor. 71 Johnsoncarefully studiedlabor’ s agenda andwas well aware ofits particular interestin foreign affairs. Whenhe toured Asia in thespring of1961, Johnsonmet with unionleaders and carefully included referencesto the Asian labor scenein his ofŽcial report. In SouthVietnam, he recommendedindustrial aid, public education,and that local government “enforce existing labor lawsand work toward social reforms.”72 AsPresident, even more sothan Kennedy,Johnson seemed to embrace labor’s long-held vision ofaggressive full-employment economicsand social spendingat home coupledwith activist anti-Communismabroad. 73 This, combinedwith LBJ’s charm offensive,compromised whatever wasleft ofthe AFL– CIO’ s vauntedindependence from thestate. The federationquickly developeda relationship ofunprecedented closenesswith Johnson.This partnership setthe stage for theevents of 1964, which woulddraw the AFL– CIO andthe CVTC further together. Following thecoup against Diem, theAFL– CIO andthe CVTC hoped for a liberalization ofSouth Vietnamese labor policies.Yet many ofthe same, Diem-era ofŽcials continuedto harass thepeasantry, local farmers, andlabor organizers. 74 When asecondcoup occurred in January, 1964, Buu—fearing arrest—went into hiding. In the powervacuum that followedthe coup, Buu’ s name surfacedat theState Department asa possiblecandidate for theSouth Vietnamese premiership. 75 GeneralNguyen Khanh,however, emerged to take control,although his hold onpower remained tenuous.Seeking toeliminate possiblethreats, the general orderedBuu’ s arrest on charges offavoring neutrality. Concernedabout Buu’s safetyand the threat his arrest might have onperceptions regarding SouthVietnamese democracy, the American Embassyfacilitated ameeting betweenBuu and Khanh in early February. There the twomanaged towork out a preliminary plan for coexistence. 76 Giventhese tumultuous events, the AFL– CIO realized that, in order for theCVTC tosurvive, it neededmore in its favor than thefederation alone couldprovide. With the

January–August, 1963,Vietnam, 1961–1963 ,4:550–551, 560– 561. Tran Van Don, OurEndless War:Inside Vietnam (San Rafael, CA, 1978),110. In the immediate aftermath ofthe coup, Buu actually disappeared. Meanyand otherssuspected that he had beenarrested and pressedthe State Department to intervene. When pressed,Generals Don and Minh, the coup leaders,insisted that Buu had beenkidnapped by unknown sources.In his autobiography, however,General Don seemsto admit that the newgovernment had arrestedBuu and then releasedthe labor leaderat the requestof American Ambassador Lodge. 71Jack Conway Oral History, 16,Merger Oral Histories,GMMA; George Meany Oral History, 4–6, Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, TX(henceforthLBJ). Author’s interviewwith Walt Whitman Rostow, June 2, 1997. 72Johnson to Kennedy,“ Observations on Labor and WorkingConditions in Southeast Asia,”May 21, 1961,Box 57, RG 174,General Records of the Department ofLabor, OfŽce of Secretary, Arthur Goldberg,NA. For Johnson’s generalreport from Vietnam see “ PaperPrepared by the VicePresident,” n.d., FRUS,Vietnam, 1961–63 ,1:149–151; and Lloyd Gardner, PayAny Price:Lyndon Johnson andthe Warfor Vietnam (Chicago, IL,1994),52– 54. 73NelsonLichtenstein, Most Dangerous Manin Detroit: WalterReuther andthe Fate ofAmerican Labor (NewYork, 1995),391; Kevin Boyle, The UAWandthe Heydayof American Liberalism (Ithaca, NY, 1995). 74Lodgeto State Department, Jan. 9, 1964,Box 1340, General Records of the Department ofState, CentralPolicy Files, Labor and Manpower, NA. 75“Telegramfrom State Department to Embassy Vietnam,”Feb. 1,1964, FRUS,1964–1968, Vietnam, 1964, 1:53. 76Lodgeto State Department, Feb. 6, 1964,Box 1340, General Records of the Department ofState, CentralPolicy Files, Labor and Manpower, NA. TheAFL-CIO Approachesthe Vietnam War 291

U.S.government prepared tomake anunprecedented effort to shore up the South Vietnameseeconomy, the AFL– CIO movedto make surethat ofŽcials considered Vietnameseorganized labor in theplans. The AFL–CIO President,recognizing Buu’s vulnerabilities, aggressively began tolobby onbehalf ofthe CVTC. Meany personally invited Buuto address the May AFL–CIO ExecutiveCouncil meeting. 77 He also arranged apersonal meeting betweenBuu and President Johnson. At their May 20 meeting,Johnson assured Buu that tohim thecon ict in Vietnam wasas much apolitical asa military battle andthat herecognized the importance oftrade unions toboth battles. 78 Buu,in turn,also emphasizedthe centrality offree trade unions andurged the President to work for further democratization in SouthVietnam. The “missing link in thepresent Vietnamese chain ofevents,” Buu explained toJohnson, was a freelabor movementwhich could“ accomplish thedouble objective ofalleviating their [Vietnamese workers’] daily hardships andcreating analmost para-military type ofcivilian organization.”79 Afewshort months following their meeting,Johnson used a supposedattack onan American destroyerin theGulf of Tonkin topress through Congresslegislation that essentially gave him war powersin Vietnam. During his Washington visit, Buumade a “tremendousimpression” on both government ofŽcials andunion leaders. In his meetingswith AFL–CIO ofŽcials, he agreed toaccept help in establishing training programs for cadresassigned to areas “controlled”by theViet Cong,as well asfunding for theconstruction of new welfare centersand propaganda programs. But,as in his earlier conict with theUSOM, Buu’s neo-colonialfears for his organization’s autonomy quickly surfaced.He insisted that AFL–CIO Žnancial aid bemodest. Again, in spiteof his great need,he wishedto avoid either dependenceon the Americans ortheperception of dependence. Like the AFL–CIO in its relations with theU.S. state,the CVTC pragmatically soughtthe help it felt it needed,but still stroveto retain afacadeof independence. 80 DespiteBuu’ s preoccupationwith his organization’s autonomy,his meeting with theAmerican Presidentclearly provided him andthe CVTC with anewaura of powerand in uence in Vietnam. GeneralKhanh responded by easing restrictionson

77Meanyto Buu, Mar.9, 1964,31/ 3, Department ofInternational Affairs, Country Files, GMMA. 78“Memorandum forPresident,” May 19,1964, Box 1340, General Records of the Department ofState, CentralForeign Policy Files, Labor and Manpower, NA. MichaelForrestal memo, April 16,1964, Box 12,ConŽ dential Files, CO301,LBJ. White HouseStaff Assistant MichaelForrestal saw the meetingas an opportunity to counter“ the imageof a U.S. which all too oftenis believed to be preoccupiedin Vietnam solelywith military solutions.”In addition, Forrestalsaw Buu’s visit to the White Houseas “helpful in gettingacross to the Americanpublic that the Khanh governmentis not amilitary dictatorship.”Dean Rusk to Johnson, “Subject: Your Meetingwith TranQuoc Buu,” May 19,1964, Box 12, ConŽ dential Files, CO301,LBJ; “Memorandum forPresident,” May 19,1964, Box 1340, RG 59,General Records ofthe Department ofState, CentralForeign Policy Files, Labor and Manpower, NA. 79Buu to PresidentJohnson, May 20,1964, 39/ 7, IrvingBrown Papers, GMMA. 80IrvingBrown toMeany, June 1, 1964,1/ 27,Jay LovestonePapers, 5780,Kheel; Herring, “ ‘APeople QuiteApart’ : Americans, South Vietnamese,and the Warfor Vietnam,” Diplomatic History , 4 (Winter, 1990),2– 3. Dueto its longhistory ofcolonialism, stronganti-white, anti-Westerncurrents always existed in Vietnamesesociety. Leaders in South Vietnamperformed a near-impossible balancing actrequiring an appearanceof autonomy and yetnecessary cooperation with outsideforces. While Buu desperatelyneeded Americanhelp, he couldnot affordto be seenas too closelyassociated with the U.S. GeorgeMcT. Kahin, Intervention: How the USBecame Involvedin Vietnam (NewYork, 1986),206. General Khanh shareda similar concernthat he might appear too much underthe inuence of the Americans. 292 E. F. Wehrle labor. In theliberated atmosphere,a urry ofnew organization tookplace. The plantation andtenant farmers’ unions— which had beenvirtually decimatedby Nhu— reboundedas tens of thousands of Vietnamese farmers andworkers joined CVT- afŽliated unions. 81 Encouragedby thegains madeby theCVT, Lovestone asked Arnold Beichman, a journalist closely associatedwith theAFL– CIO, to tour Vietnam asa meansof assessingBuu and the re-emerging labor movement.Beichman foundthe CVT a vibrant organization. Buuparticularly impressedhim. YetBeichman also recognized thefederation’ s vulnerability. Buuwas the “ target”of themilitary, political parties, and rival unions.The CVThad noreal blueprint or plans for thefuture. It also continued toŽ nditself subjectto the whims of local ofŽcials. By providing basic guidanceand political support,Beichman argued,American labor couldbe the CVT’ s lifeline. 82 In early August,Irving Brownreturned to Vietnam tofurther cementthe relationship betweenthe CVT andthe AFL– CIO. Brown began by settingup a meeting between himself, Buu,and General Khanh. There, Brown pressed Khanh to involve theCVT in every aspectof governance. Khanh signaled ageneral acceptance.But Brown pushed further,asking “what about theimplementation in thevillages? In thedistricts? In the provinces?”Khanh assured Brown that hewould use his inuence to ensure that the CVT wasincorporated intodecision-making at all levels.Brown also met with AID administrator James Killian, whosesupport would be needed to help Žnancethe AFL–CIO’ s developing plans for aprogram tohelp theCVT. Killian “indicateda great willingnessto work directly with us,”and, to Brown’ s relief, seemedto offer the AFL–CIO relative autonomy in termsof how funds were to be spent. 83 In his Žnal report onhis mission,Brown again raised thepossibility ofusingthe CVT asa “para-military”organization in whichmembers might have “contactwith the village military guards andwith thelocal authorities in order tohave thearms— mostly defensive—necessary to protect the organization.” 84 With his leadership already underŽ re from all segmentsof South Vietnam in the summerof 1964, GeneralKhanh launched a crackdownon dissent. He declared a state ofemergency, severely limiting public meetings.The CVT—determined never again to showthe weaknesses it had with Diem—decided to react forcibly. This time, it would have amuchmore engaged AFL–CIO andU.S. government in its corner.To harness supportfor aseveral-weeks-oldstrike against atextile plant andto protest General Khanh’s actions,Buu announced a general strike in thefall of1964. 85 With Saigon increasingly collapsing intochaos as different groups competedfor power,Buu hoped thestrike wouldassert the CVT asa viable social,economic, and political force.A general strike—even one the Viet Congmight useto their advantage—would demon-

81Saigon Embassy to State Department, May 5,1964,Box 1340, “ GeneralRecords of the Dept. ofState, CentralFiles, 1964–66, NA” ; Jay Lovestoneto AFL–CIO ExecutiveCouncil, May 13,1964, Box 429, LovestonePapers, Hoover.Mid-way through 1964,the CVTC dropped the wordChristian fromtheir organization’s name. 82Arnold Beichman, “Report on Vietnam,”July 26,1964, 5/ 27,Jay LovestonePapers, Kheel. 83Labor NewsConference, Program 22, Series 4 (transcriptfrom Mutual Radio Program), Sept. 20, 1964. 84IrvingBrown to Lovestone,Aug. 4,1964,1/ 28,Jay LovestonePapers, Kheel. 85Lovestoneto Dr. Dan, Oct. 8, 1964,Box 707, Lovestone Papers, Hoover;John Condon to State Department, Oct. 10,1964, Box 1340, General Records of Department ofState, CentralFiles, 1964–66, NA; Lacouture, Vietnam between Two Truces (NewYork, 1966),196; New YorkTimes ,Sept. 21,1964. ThespeciŽ c purpose forthe strikewas to protesta stateof emergency declaration issued by GeneralKhanh on Aug. 19,which limited public meetings. TheAFL-CIO Approachesthe Vietnam War 293 strate theindependence and potency of the CVT toall ofVietnam. 86 Veteran French journalist JeanLacouture saw the strike ashaving adeŽnite “ political aspect,in facta clearly revolutionary one.”87 OnSeptember 21, theCVT launchedits general strike.Buu telegrammed the AFL–CIO requestingsupport that might inuence the government notto crack down onthe strikers. Meany immediately telegrammed back,proclaiming “ourall-out un- stinting supportto the free and independent workers organized in theCVT underyour great leadership.”88 The U.S.StateDepartment, however, shared little ofMeany’ s enthusiasmand worried that thestrike wasyet “another example ofnational indisci- pline.”89 With thecity’ s electrical workerson strike, Saigon satin darkness,without water, electricity, phoneservice, or bustransportation, for afull day.A total of60,000 CVT members joinedin thestrike. Buu led a group ofseveral thousandstrikers through Saigon toKhanh’ s ofŽces, where they presentedtheir demands.The general was convenientlyout of town, but his aidesnegotiated with thestrike leaders. 90 By the end ofthe day, the CVT andKhanh’ s deputiesreached a tentative agreement easing labor restrictionsand allowing for anend to the day-old general strike.Lacouture viewed the general strike asan unqualiŽ ed success: “ for theŽ rsttime aforcearose that couldbe either apossiblereplacement for thepresent regime or alink tothe enemy regime or theŽ rstpillar ofa regime tocome.” 91 Butin directing its actionsagainst thegovernment, the CVT had upsetthe delicate balance oflabor– state relations in SouthVietnam. Itsinsistence that thestrike con- cernedonly labor issuesfooled no one. While dramatically asserting itself,the CVT creatednew enemies and infuriated older ones.Khanh now had every reasonto try to neutralize this latest threat. 92 OnOctober 10, authorities includedBuu’ s nameon a list of13 military ofŽcers and seven civilians tobe arrested on charges ofconspiring against Khanhin afailed September13 coup. 93 Uponreceiving his summonson the coup charges, Buu turned immediately tohis

86Lacouture,196– 198; Tang, 91.The Viet Cong, likethe CVT, weremobilizing totakeadvantage ofthe weaknessof the Khanh government. 87Lacouture,196. 88Buu to Lovestone,Sept. 22,1964; George Meany to Buu, Sept. 23,1964, 31/ 3, International AffairsDepartment, Country Files, GMMA.In his telegramof support to Buu, Meanyalso vowedto “continueour efforts to persuadeAmerican and Vietnamesegovernments to support this democratic policy in interestof victory, Vietnamesenational freedomand socialand economicprogress.” 89Telegramfrom Embassy in Vietnam to State Department, Sept. 24,1964, FRUS,1964– 1966, Vietnam, 1964 , 1:787. 90New YorkTimes ,Sept. 21,1964. 91Lacouture,196. 92Condon to State Department, Oct. 3, 1964,Box 1340, General Records of the Department ofState, CentralForeign Policy Files, Labor and Manpower, 1964–66, RG 59,Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, Economic, General Records of the Department ofState, NA. Buu clearlycould see the forces conspiringagainst him, both fromhis enemieswithin the labor movement and fromwithin the army and government.In early October, John Condon, the AmericanEmbassy’ s Labor Attache´,gaveBuu about evenodds ofsurvival. When an Americanfriend told Buu that he hoped to seehim soon in America, Buu replied,“ Yes, as arefugee.”Chester Bain, Vietnam: The Roots ofthe Conict (NewYork, 1967),133. GeneralKhanh aggressivelypurged Diem’ s Can LaoParty in 1964from South Vietnam. Theperception ofBuu’ s continuingassociation, howeverunfair, with the Can LaoParty couldnot have helped him in Khanh’s eyes. 93New YorkTimes ,Oct, 10,1964. The accusations centered around ameetingbetween Buu and the conspiringcoup leaders,who sought Buu’s help in facilitatinga meetingwith AmericanAmbassador U. AlexisJohnson afterthe uprisinghad turnedsour. 294 E. F. Wehrle strongestsupporter, the AFL– CIO, which he hoped could muster the support to counterbalancethe South Vietnamese state. 94 Infuriated at thearrest, GeorgeMeany- drafteda causticstatement denouncing the government ofSouth Vietnam for its “inhuman anddestructive action in trumping uptreason charges against Buu,”and insisting that whatever actionsBuu took were “ with full knowledgeand agreement of theU.S. government.”Secretary ofStateRusk, fearing that Meany’s statementwas too “harsh”and might exacerbate circumstances,eventually managed toget his friend Meanyto remove someof the blunt language. The AFL–CIO president,however, insistedon making astatementthat Ruskadmitted was“ asmild aswe could expect.” 95 The dynamicsof the particularly strong labor–state relations ofthe mid-1960s now wereset in motion.Helping Buubecame a priority for theAmericans. In Saigon, the American Embassyprepared aletter “summarizing in agreed form”the events of the day.Buu, however, always cognizant ofnot appearing beholdento the Americans, refusedto use the letter in his trial. 96 Yetfew could have missedwhere the U.S. government stoodon the issue. The SouthVietnamese government couldill affordthe specterof convicting alabor leader who,only monthsbefore, had met andestablished aninformal understandingwith theAmerican president.To theabsolute relief ofall parties, amilitary courtfound Buu innocent of all charges onOctober 22. 97 Buu immediately cabledMeany to offer his thanks. 98 In December,George Baldanzi, presidentof the Textile Workers’Union, visited Vietnam onbehalf ofthe AFL– CIO. Despite the gains madeby theCVT in 1964, Baldanzi still founda desperatesituation in whichthe disciplined Viet Conghad developed“ clear-cutprograms aroundwhich peasants could be rallied.” Urban work- ers—although notaligned with theCommunists— were largely neutral in thestruggle. “The Vietnameselabor movement,”Baldanzi concluded,“ is withoutany hopetoday.” Dues-paying membership wasfalling, andBuu remained in apolitically perilous position.The AFL–CIO, Baldanzi concluded,would have tomake amuchmore fundamentalcommitment tothe CVT andSouth Vietnam. This wouldrequire a permanentAFL– CIO liaison in SouthVietnam andthe funding for CVT projects. 99 The eventsof 1964 revealed both thepotency and the continuing vulnerabilities of theCVT in SouthVietnam. Onthe eve of American intervention,as Baldanzi’ s report indicated,the CVT remained at themercy ofits government andthe general tumults oflife in thewar-torn country. The SouthVietnamese labor organization desperately neededthe help ofthe AFL– CIO andthe American government.Ties tothe Americans were,in fact,the CVT’ s only leverage against an oppressivestate— its lifeline. Yeta

94Dept. ofLabor Memorandum on the Buu arrest,1964, Box 734, Lovestone Papers, Hoover. 95Rusk to Saigon Embassy, Oct. 13,1964, Box 1340, General Records of the Department ofState, CentralForeign Files, 1964–66, Labor and Manpower, NA; “Statement by GeorgeMeany, Presidentof the AFL–CIO on Vietnam,”Oct. 13,1964, 31/ 3, InternationalAffairs Department, Country Files, GMMA. 96MaxwellTaylor to Lovestone,Oct. 19,1964, 31/ 3, InternationalAffairs, Country Files, GMMA. 97New YorkTimes ,Oct. 23,1964. 98Buu to GeorgeMeany, Oct. 26,1964,31/ 3, InternationalAffairs Department, Country Files,GMMA; Meanyto Buu, Oct. 28,1964, Micro 81, OfŽ ce of the President,GMMA. Meany responded with elation to Buu’s acquittal. Hecabled Buu that the decisionof the court“ canbe considereda triumph forjustice in your country. While wedo not viewthis verdictas the endof the problems you facewe do feelthat it should serveas an inspiration forgreater efforts to build astrong,free trade union movement which will be the bestguarantee to socialand economicprogress for the workersof Vietnam, as wellas ofeventual victoryagainst the aggressiveforces of international communism.” 99Baldanzi to Meany, Dec.23, 1964, Box 514, Jay LovestonePapers, Hoover. TheAFL-CIO Approachesthe Vietnam War 295 closerworking relationship with theAmericans wouldleave it vulnerable tocharges of being apawnof foreign interestsin acountryobsessed with post-colonial concerns about dependenceand independence. Likewise,by theend of 1964, theAFL– CIO founditself in asimilar paradox regarding Vietnam. Impressedby Buuand the CVT’ s potential asa rallying force against theViet Congand as a vehicle for domesticreform, theAFL– CIO hopedto establish astrong mentoring relationship with theemerging labor organization. Yet alone,the AFL– CIO lackedthe resources for suchan endeavor. Nor couldthe federationexpect any aid from its international labor connections,which had proven either uninterestedin or incapable ofaiding theCVT. If therewas to be any hopeof furthering its agenda in SouthVietnam, it required theAFL– CIO toexpand its cooperative relationship with theU.S. government.Such were the circumscribed choicesfaced by both labor organizations. Asearly as1965 thetragic pattern had already beenset: the survival ofSouth Vietnameselabor required both labor movementsto enter into uncomfortable partner- ships—alliances with eachother andwith their respectivegovernments that, while offering anecessarylifeline, also brought thefatal taint ofdependenceand subservience tothese free labor movements.In time both theCVT andthe AFL– CIO made the necessaryaccommodations. Even so the hour wasalready toolate in Vietnam. Many opportunitiesalready had comeand gone, and meanwhile supportfor theViet Cong had grownstronger. 100 With eventsrapidly unfolding,there could be little hopeof reversing anirreparable course.

100On the futurerelationship betweenthe AFL–CIO and the CVTseeEdmund Wehrle, “‘ReprehensibleRepercussions’ : TheAFL– CIO, FreeTrade Unionism, and the VietnamWar, 1947–1975” (unpublished PhD diss., Univ. ofMaryland at CollegePark, 1998).With the American interventionin Vietnam, the AFL–CIO becamea prime supporterof Johnson’ s policiesand continued its activesupport ofBuu and the CVT. In1968, with generousfunding from AID, the AFL–CIO established the Asian–American Free Labor Institute(AAFLI) to createa permanent presencein South Vietnam in orderto aid the CVT. Yetboth the AFL–CIO’ s support forthe warand the creationof the AAFLI proved controversial.In particular, the AFL–CIO’ s closerelationship with AID (which provided 90%of the AAFLI’s budget) openedquestions as to the autonomy ofthe labor organization. In1969, SenatorWilliam Fulbright attackedAID sponsorship ofthe AFL–CIO’ s international labor institutions, demanding to know whetherthe funding“ representedthe pricewe paid forMr. Meany’ s support in Vietnam.”Following the fall ofSaigon, the AFL–CIO helped sponsor the relocationof hundreds of members ofthe CVT, includingMr. Buu.